ARTICLE 19, Civil Code. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
Mendez
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 20, Civil Code. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
ARTICLE 21, Civil Code. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Dmanum absque injuria – loss without injury
CASE: Amonoy v. Gutierrez
Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from
the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum
absque injuria — for which the law gives no remedy, saying he is not liable for
damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case.
Petitioner did not heed the TRO suspending the demolition of structures. Amonoy
initially had the right to demolish but when he received the TRO that right had
already ceased. Hence, his continued exercise of said right after the TRO was
already unjustified. As quoted by the Supreme Court: “The exercise of a right
ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to
the prejudice of others.”
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then, the
demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. The petition is
denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.
Breach of Promise to Marry
CASE: Tanjanco v CA
Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this
case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate sexual relations with the
defendant, and such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
here there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces for a year.
CASE: Constantino v.
Had the petitioner been deceived of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately ended her relation with respondent when he knew that respondent
was a married man after their first sexual contact.
Their repeated intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise
to marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to the respondent.
SC: “Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire.”
CASE: Pe v. Pe
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the father and tried to win Lolita’s
affection thru and ingenious trickery the wrong he caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. He has
committed injury to the family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21.
CASE: Baksh v CA
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Baksh that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of
the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure
her into sexual congress. Baksh’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on
marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs,
and public policy.
SC: If the promise to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because
of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal
seduction), except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of
the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
CASE: Wassmer v Velez
The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry - A
wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for
the groom to walk out 2 days before. But the defendant’s act is still punishable
under Article 21. His unreasonable withdrawal is contrary to good customs, since
defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.
ARTICLE 1, Family Code. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (52a)
CASE: Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges Inc.
The Labor Code of the Philippines, provides:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated,
or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.
The stipulation against marriage is valid if:
- Marriage is related to the nature of work.
- Marriage is intervening the work performance of an employee.
ARTICLE 2, Family Code. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
CASE: Silverio v. Republic
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant.
To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
CASE: Republic v Cagandahan
Respondent has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps
to interfere with what he was born with.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity
of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
ARTICLE 3, Family Code. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
CASE: Navarro v Domagtoy
A summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority
of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized
by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court’s jurisdiction.”
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
CASE: Salgado v Anson
SC: "[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."
Exceptions from marriage license requirement:
Art. 27 – Marriage in articulo mortis
Art. 28 – Marriage in a remote place
Art. 29 – Solemnizing officer shall state in affidavit the marriages
performed in 27 and 29
Art. 30 – Original affidavit and copy of marriage contract shall be sent
within 30 days after the marriage
Art. 31 – Marriage may be solemnized during stopovers
Art. 32 – Military commander may solemnize within the zone of
operation
Art. 33 – Marriages among Muslims and other ethic communities
Art. 34 – Marital Cohabitation
CASE: Cariño v Cariño
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the
marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license
therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
CASE: Republic v. CA

CASE: Niñal v Bayadog

The five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should
be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that
is, unbroken.
CASE: Borja-manzano v Sanchez
Mere separation and free & voluntary cohabitation with another person do not
dissolve the marriage tie. Cohabitation for at least five years exempts them from
the marriage license but it does not free them of their legal impediment to contract
a subsequent marriage.

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age. (53a, 55a)
CASE: Morigo v People
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.