Paradigms in Science and Archeology

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Paradigms in Science and Archaeology
Author(s): G. A. Clark
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Source: Journal of Archaeological Research, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 203-234
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Journalof ArchaeologicalResearch,Vol. 1, No. 3f 1993
Paradigmsin Scienceand Archaeology

G. A. Clark1
The paradigmconceptas developedin western philosophyof science contexts

is reviewed,and themetaphysical paradigmsthatgovernresearchprotocolsin
mainstreamOld and New Worldprehistoricarchaeologyare describedand
compared.It is concludedthatpost-1970 New Worldarchaeologicalresearch
receivesitsintellectual
mandatefromanthropology, is foundedon postpositivist
ontology,a modified-objectivist
biases, and is governedby a critical-realist
epistemology, and an experimental-manipulativemethodology. Post-1970 Old
Worldarchaeologicalresearchis viewedas a kind of history, remainsmostly
in the strictempiricisttradition,and is governedby a realistontology,an
inductivistepistemology,and byan observationalmethodology.The claims of
variouskindsofpostprocessualarchaeologyare abo evaluatedin termsof the
paradigmconcept
epistemology;researchtraditions;criti-
KEY WORDS: prehistoricarchaeology;postpositivism;
cal realism.
INTRODUCTION
Each country has itsowntraditions of researchin respectto thevari-

thatcompriseitsintellectual
ous disciplines life.These traditions
are based,
on theconceptof themetaphysical
in thefinalanalysis, paradigm - a col-
lectionofbiasesand preconceptions aboutthenatureof our knowledge of
theworldor, in thepresentcontext, some aspectof theworld,suchas a
discipline.In the UnitedStates,prehistoric
scientific archaeologyis the
roughequivalent of what is known as prehistory Europe (but is consid-
in
ered a branchof anthropology), is typicallytaughtin departments of an-
and
thropology, proceeds from fundamental concepts and assumptions that
Tempe, Arizona 85287.

Arizona State University,
department of Anthropology,
203
© 1993 Plenum PublishingCorporation

1059-0161/93/0900-0203$07.00/0
204 Clark
are distinctfromthose that underliethe teachingof prehistoryin Europe.

In Europe, prehistoricarchaeologyis usually considered to be a kind of
historyprojected back into the preliteratepast. It is taughtin historyde-
partments,or in autonomous departmentsof archaeology,treats process
in the remotepast as an extensionof process in history,and is conceptually
and organizationallyseparated fromsocial and culturalanthropology(Clark
and Lindly,1991).
This essay reviewsthe paradigmconcept as it has been used in west-
ern science, then compares the paradigmsthat governprehistoricarchae-
ology in the anglophone New World with those that govern archaeology
in the Old World (especiallythose of continentalEurope). I also summarize
and provide a reaction to the claims of various kinds of postprocessual
archaeology,notablythose identifiedwith its Britishwing. I endeavor to
present a sketch of the fundamentalconcepts that are importantin the
two research traditions,because I believe that these shadowyentities,sel-
dom made explicit,have a marked effecton our construalsof patternin
the archaeological record, and what pattern might mean in behavioral
terms.I take it as axiomaticthat the broad parametersof the intellectual
traditionsto which we pertain are identifiable,at least in general terms
(Clark, 1989, 1991). Others,who consider the disciplineto be composed
of a collectivityof individualscholars,do not agree that it is possible to
do this (e.g., Knüsel, 1992).
THE NATUREOF THE PARADIGM
In the anglophone world, both processualistsand postprocessualists

followThomas Kuhn (1962, 1974, 1977, 1991) withrespectto the definition
of the paradigm.For him,the term"paradigm" meant a prototypicalmode
of problem solvingthatimplicitly definedforscientistshow theymust"see
the world."Accordingto Kuhn,scientistsconstructcomplextheoreticaland
methodologicalsystemsbased always on a particularparadigm,but these
systemsare seldom, if ever, made explicitin any formalsense. They are,
in the final analysis,totallysubjective.That does not mean, however,that
theycannot be subjected to criticalscrutiny.In anthropology,a metaphysi-
cal paradigm has been likened to a "worldview" - an affirmation,
or an as-
sertion about the nature of the world of experience (or a part of it, like
the biases and preconceptionsthatunderliea scientificdiscipline)(Binford
and Sabloff,1982; Watsonet al, 1984). Once indoctrinatedin the paradigm
(and this occurs throughthe formalprocess of education), scientiststypi-
cally dedicate themselvesto the resolutionof problems whose solutions
tend to reinforceand amplifythe credibilityof the paradigm,ratherthan
Paradigms in Science and Archaeology 205
to question its validity.From Kuhn's perspective,this is how science in

general functions,withoutmuch concernforthe preconceptionsand biases
that are the foundationsof its knowledgeclaims. This is what he means
by "normal science,"characterizedby "moppingup operations,"the habit-
of routinequestionsand problems,
ual activitiesof science,the investigation
defined and legitimatizedby consensus (Kuhn, 1991, p. 37).
But, as everyoneknows,in the course of normal science anomalies
alwaysoccur- phenomena thatthe paradigmcannot explain,or that it can
explain only inadequately,or that, in their implications,contradictit di-
rectly.Generally these anomalies are ignored,but if enough of them ac-
cumulate,theycan provokea paradigmshift,causing scientiststo abandon
the rulingparadigm altogetherand to substitutea new one for it. Kuhn
argues that the process of paradigmshifttends to occur relativelyrapidly,
causing the kind of "scientificrevolution"that appears in the title of his
book. Except duringthe normal science phase, this notion of rapid and
conclusivechange negates the possibilitythat science can be a gradual,cu-
mulativeprocess, and implies that change is episodic and essentiallyun-
predictable. That is not to say, however, that knowledge itself is
noncumulative.Rather,as more comprehensiveparadigmsare devised and
come into general acceptance, their explanatory"reach" is progressively
enlarged, more knowledgeis subsumed under them, and more can ulti-
matelybe explained more adequately (Clark, 1987).
Kuhn also thinksthatthe worldof science is profoundlyconservative,
and because of this,mostscientistsare not disposed to accept a new para-
digm or, more accurately,simplydo not understandit,being indoctrinated
in the biases and preconceptionsof its predecessor.From a certainphilo-
sophical point of view, distinctmetaphysicalparadigms are incommensu-
rate. They do not share any common patterns by which they can be
compared. Those who subscribe to differentmetaphysicalparadigmscan
maintainan interminablediscourse withoutever resolvinganything,since
theyemploy distinctfundamentalconcepts and give differentmeaningsto
superficiallyshared concepts.A good example in the literatureof anthro-
pology is the currentresurgenceof interestin the century-oldquestion of
modern human origins(Clark, 1992).
The nature of paradigmshiftshas been much discussed in the phi-
losophy of science, in archaeology,and in many other disciplines.Kuhn's
assertionthat paradigmshiftswere essentiallyabsolute, irrational,and un-
predictablewas debated in American archaeology duringthe 1970s, and
there were some, like Raymond Thompson (1972), who argued that ar-
chaeology could best be viewed as a kind of historyand that there were
manyaspects of continuity withrespectto paradigmaticchange, especially
with regard to its methodology.This was put in the contextof another,
206 Clark
broader discussion,which had to do withwhetheror not distinctaspects

of the paradigmcould change,if in factthe metaphysicalparadigmdid not
change (cf. Meltzer, 1979). Kuhn thinksthat the "conversion"of scientists
to the emergentparadigm is a process that is at once both political and
subjectiveand thatscientistsoftenadopt a new paradigmbecause it is pro-
posed or supportedby well-knownscholars,or because the field in general
has tacitlyaccepted it already. Both processes occurred with respect to
processual archaeology,but the so-called "revolution" in fact took place
duringmore than a decade (ca. 1965-1975).
Once adopted by the majorityof the practitionersof the discipline,
the new paradigm tends to give the impressionthat it is better able than
its predecessorto resolvecertainproblems(i.e., those anomalies withwhich
its predecessor could not successfullycontend). There is also the notion
that the new paradigm is a betterapproximationof "reality"than the dis-
carded one. The latter issue also has been much discussed in philosophy
of science contexts,and there are many philosopherswho opine that the
"real world" is in itselfunknowableand that,froma certain philosophical
point of view,no single realityexistsapart fromour perceptionsof it. This
perspectiveformspart of the collection of biases emphasized by certain
elements of the radical critique,but it also underliessome approaches to
what I thinkof as standard processual archaeology. With respect to the
paradigm,it has as a consequence the fact that propositionalstatements
are only"true" and "false" in the contextof a givenmetaphysicalparadigm,
but withinthat paradigm,the concepts of truthand falsityare perfectly
valid and, in fact, necessaryfor the functioningof normal science. This
point was verybadly misunderstoodby partisansof strictempiricismand,
also, by some postprocessualistswho subscribeto relativistbiases (see be-
low). To Kuhn, the role of the paradigmwas to provide the secure infer-
ential base required for science to organize the chaos of experience.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARADIGMS
Early on, the notionof the paradigmwas subjected to criticalscrutiny,

mainlyin philosophyof science contexts.Figure 1 shows how the concept
of paradigmwas viewed afterthe middle 1970s. In its broadest conceptu-
alization,the paradigmconsistsof "the totalityof beliefs,values and tech-
niques that link togetherand unifya scientificcommunity"(Kuhn, 1991).
However, and unfortunately, Kuhn was careless in his use of the concept;
one of his criticsenumeratedno fewerthan 21 different uses of "paradigm"
in the pages of The Structureof ScientificRevolutions.According to Mar-
garet Masterman (1970), whose scheme I am followinghere, the paradigm
concept was used in at least three distinctways. The most inclusive,and

the one most relevantto this essay,is that of the metaphysic - an affirma-
tion or an assertionabout the contentof a scientificdiscipline.There is
also an intermediateusage or level, called by Masterman the sociological
paradigm. By this she meant paradigmscomprisedof "divergent,self-ref-
erencingschools," to borrowthe words of David Clarke (1973), that often
were found withina single metaphysicalparadigm.A good archaeological
example is the contrastbetweenthe partisansof deductive-nomological (D-
N) approaches and those of general systemstheory(GST) thatexistedun-
der the metaphysicof processual archaeologyin the United States during
the 1970s (Flannery,1973). Both consideredthemselvesto be adherentsof
"the new archaeology,"but theydisagreedwith respect to how to achieve
its objectives.Notice that thereis no overlap in the sociological paradigms
shown in the diagram, a point to which I returnbelow. There is also a
thirdlevel, subdivided into various sublevéis,that Masterman designated
the level of the constructparadigm.By this she meant that paradigmwas
also used in its methodologicalsense to denote a collection of methods
and techniquesshared by distinctsociological paradigms.Because of this,
there is overlap between the various constructparadigmsshown in Fig. 1.
When Kuhn published The Structure of ScientificRevolutionsin 1962,
he was convincedthat the metaphysicalparadigmwas a closed logical sys-
tem that absolutelydeterminedall the characteristicsof its subordinateor
constituentparadigms.He was much criticizedforthisrigidand unrealistic
position,and after1974, he abandoned it (see, e.g., papers in Kuhn, 1977).
It became obvious that,in manyfields,and especiallyin hybriddisciplines
such as archaeology,there is an enormous overlap with respect to meth-
odology (see, e.g., Dibble and Débenath, 1991). Whethertherewas overlap
with respect to sociological paradigmswas less clear, and in Fig. 2, I give
my perceptionof the structureof archaeological paradigms typicalof the
1980s.
Some aspects of Fig. 2 deserve commentaryor emphasis. For one
thing,the diagramis both hierarchicaland reticulatein structure,and pro-
ceeds fromthe more to the less inclusive,fromthe more to the less ob-
servable, and back again. If the entrypoint is at the bottom,at the level
of "data," phenomena that are directlyobservable in the real world are
involved."Facts," however,are abstractions,perhaps best conceptualized
as measurementstaken on data. Techniques such as measurement,once
applied to data, come to embodydistinctassumptionsabout the structure
of the phenomena of interest(Carr, 1985a, b). They relate data and facts
to generalizations,which are derived inductivelyfromdata. Activitiesin-
volvingdata and factsare common to all archaeological researchand cor-
respondto Masterman's(1970) constructor methodologicalparadigmlevel
208 Clark
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(cf. Fig. 1). Test implicationsare conditionsthat are expected to apply to

patternsin data and are arrivedat via deductionfroma hypothesis,which
can be definedas any unconfirmed but testableproposition(Hempel, 1966,
p. 19). Hypotheses state in
that, given circumstances,particularevents are
covered by (are particularizationsof and thus explained by) suspected
and/orconfirmedlaws or law-likegeneralizations(Watson et ai, 1984, p.
7)-
Then, at the level of "models" and "theories," thingstypicallyget
fuzzyconceptually.The main reason is that archaeologylacks the body of
confirmed,warranted,nontriviallaws or law-like generalizations that is
characteristicof more fullyaxiomatized disciplines.Put another way, we
do not have "theories" in the sense that physicshas theories. There are
good reasons for this,of course- the main one being the often-remarked-
upon differencesin the research protocols of experimentaland observa-
tional sciences (Clark, 1982). While most workers appear to share a
perceptionof what a metaphysicalparadigmis (although theydo not nec-
essarilyagree on the nature of the metaphysic),theoriesand models tend
to be used interchangeablyby almost everybody.Although theories have
relativelyprecise definitionsin more fullyaxiomatizeddisciplines,theyare
most generallyviewed as the keys to understandingthe empirical world.
Hempel (1966, p. 244) writesthat theories
are normallydeveloped onlywhen previousresearchhas yieldeda body of
information,
including
empirical aboutthephenomenain question.
generalizations,
A theoryis thenintendedto providedeeperunderstanding those
by presenting
phenomenaas manifestations
of certainunderlying
processes.
Personally,I preferBinford's (1981, p. 25) less rigorous,common-sense

definition:
Theoriesare theanswersto the"why"questionsof dynamics.
Theyare concerned
withunderstanding and howsystems
variability proceedfromone stateto another.
Models, on the other hand, are vague formulationsthat functionat

a numberof levels to characterizeor describepatterns,not necessarily"to
provide deeper understanding"of it. Few archaeologistsappear to make
the distinction(and I, like many others,have often sought refuge in the
comfortableambiguityof "models"). Theories and models appear to occupy
an intermediateposition between that of the metaphysicand that of the
hypothesis;in Masterman's terms,theypertain to the realm of the socio-
logical paradigm. Whatever they are, they express relationshipsamong
nonobservables(abstractions)of various kindsand, throughhypotheses,re-
late diverse phenomena of interestto underlyingcausal processes. It is
worth remarkingthat facts and data have a tenacious and debilitating
autonomyin archaeology,and observationsare considered to be a better
210 Clark
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source of knowledge about the past than theories. This seems "wrong-
headed" to me; maybe we should thinkabout turningit around. While a
constantinterplaybetweenthe empiricaland the theoreticalis the hallmark
of all good science, it strikesme that archaeologyhas tended to relymuch
too heavilyupon the strictempiricistnotion that structurein data is rela-
tivelyself-evident(Carr, 1985a, b).
Finally,I thinkthat the overlap between theoriesand models is di-
rectlyrelated to the extentto which these concepts are shared, which in
turnis a functionof the degree of communicationacross sociological para-
digmboundaries,whichis a functionof language. The boundaries between
"schools" are more or less permeable and, despite allegations to the con-
trary,have much to do with the idiom of scientificcommunication.Ar-
chaeology, along with other observational sciences, lacks the universal
operational metalanguage of mathematics,the internationalmedium of
communicationin highlyaxiomatized, experimental,"big science" disci-
plines. As an Old World archaeologisttrainedin the notoriouslymonolin-
gual Americanresearchtradition,it is evidentto me thatone of the biggest
problems facing the discipline today is simplya failure to communicate.
As a consequence, the metaphysicalparadigmsthatgovernthe various Old
and New World researchtraditionsare seldom, if ever, made explicit[see
papers in Clark (1991) for an attemptto do this].It is forthis reason that
I have argued stronglyfor the publicationof translations(Clark, 1990).
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PARADIGMS
Despite theiradmittedlysubjectivenature,any metaphysicalparadigm

can be evaluated, or at least characterized,in termsof three criteriathat
are perhaps best expressedas questions.Accordingto Egon Guba (1990a),
whose scheme I am followinghere, the firstis its (1) ontology:According
to the tenets of the paradigm,what is the nature of the "knowable," or
what is the natureof "reality"?The second criterionis its (2) epistemology:
What is the nature of the relationshipbetween the "knower" and the
"known" (or knowable)? The thirdis its (3) methodology:How should the
investigatorproceed in the process of investigation(Guba, 1990a, b)? One
could argue that the answers to these questions outline the basic belief
systemsaccordingto whichinquiryproceeds. It should be emphasized that
these belief systemsare in no sense foundational (i.e., they cannot be
proven or disproven).They are rationalassertionsabout how we mightgo
about investigatingthe world of experience.
In the last three centuries,essentiallyfive metaphysicalparadigms
have emerged in westernscience, although the first,strictempiricism,is
212 Clark
not usually regarded as part of science (although it is very importantin

the historyof archaeological research).These are, in a roughchronological
order, (1) strictempiricism,(2) classic positivism,(3) postpositivism,(4)
criticaltheory,and (5) constructivism (Casti, 1989; Guba, 1990b) (Fig. 3).
StrictEmpiricism
Strictempiricismproceeds froma realist ontologyin the sense that

it is held that an objective realityexists"out there," apart fromour per-
ceptions of it. Epistemologically,strictempiricismis characterizedby an
inductivistresearchprotocol. Structureor patternin data is consideredto
be intrinsicto them,and the significanceof patternis arrivedat inductively.
The significanceof patternis consideredto be more or less evidentto the
adequately prepared investigator, and the professionalcompetence of the
investigator is taken into account in the evaluationof his or her conclusions
(see, e.g., Thompson, 1972). Methodologically, strict empiricistshave
adopted an observational research protocol, devoid of any deductivecom-
in
ponent, lacking any formal notion of a hypothesisor of the evaluation
of a hypothesis(cf. Swartz, 1967; Fritz and Plog, 1970).
While strictempiricismdisappeared fromthe exact sciences over 200
years ago, it still exhibitsa remarkabletenacityin archaeological investi-
gation. Probably somethinglike 90% of all archaeological research ever
conducted, in both the Old and the New Worlds, has been done under a
strictempiricistparadigm. I suggestthatstrictempiricismis alive and well
in all the intellectualtraditionsof archaeology,and remains dominantin
most of the Old World researchtraditions.In a mannerof speaking,strict
empiricismhas no real epistemology, because the natureof the relationship
iSiîîbe STRICT CLASSIC POST- CRTTICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

evaluatedIn terms EMPIRICISM POSITIVISM POSITIVISM THEORY
of their
realist realist realist
critical criticalrealist relativist
"ONTOLOGY:
EPISTEMOLOGY: inductivtst dualist-objectivistmodifiedobjectivist subjectivist subjectivist
modified dialogic- comparative-

observational experimental- transformative interactive
METHODOLOGY: experimental
manipulative
Fig.3. The metaphysicalparadigms ofwesternsciencefromthe16thto the21stcentury (alter

Guba,1990).Classicpositivism providedthefoundation fortheemergence ofwesternscience
in theAge of Enlightenment andwas dominant up untilaroundthemiddleof the19thcen-
tury,when it beganto be replacedby in theexactand predictive
postpositivism sciences,a
processthatwas essentially completeby the late 1920s.Criticaltheoryand constructivism
becameimportant in certainbranchesof socialscienceafterabout 1930butare largelyir-
relevantin experimental science.
between the investigatorand the investigatedis never subjected to critical

scrutiny.
Classic Positivism
Classic positivismdominatedwesternscience fromits beginningsin

the Age of Enlightenmentuntil the 1920s. It is also rooted in a realist
ontology(i.e., it is held that a realityexistsout there,independentof our
perceptionsof it, and that it is governedby time-and context-free natural
laws and mechanisms). It is the business of science to discoverthese laws,
some (many) of which entail predictionand implyor require linear cau-
sality.Probably the best-knownexample is the metaphysicalparadigm of
Newtonian physics (Kitchener, 1988; Capra, 1988; Casti, 1989).
Epistemologically,classic positivismis both dualist and objectivist,which
means that the investigatormustadopt a noninteractiveposture removed,
supposedly,fromthe object of investigation(Guba, 1990b,pp. 19, 20). The
dualityis between the observerand the observed; the actions of the ob-
serverare not supposed to influencethe resultsof observationin any way.
Values, preconceptions,and other bias factorsare, in theory,precluded
frominfluencingthe outcome of experiment.It was held that objectivity
freeof values, theories,etc.,was possible. From a modernperspective,this
is ingenuous. Methodologically,positivismis experimental,which means
that research questions or hypothesesare establishedbeforehandin pro-
positional form,then subjected to some kindof empiricaltest (i.e., falsifi-
cation,froma Popperian perspective)undercarefullycontrolledlaboratory
conditions(Popper, 1972). The positivistparadigm characterizedwestern
science duringthe firstthree-quartersof the 19th century,when the "big
science" disciplines(astronomy,physics,chemistry, etc.) began to assume
recognizableform(Casti, 1989).
Postpositivism
Postpositivism,practiced today by most of the exact sciences, is a

modifiedor evolved formof classic positivism.Ontologically,postpositivists
move to a position of criticalrealism,which means that,although a real
worldgovernedby naturallaws is held to exist,it is impossibleto perceive
it directly,owingto imperfections in our sensoryand intellectualcapacities.
Although"truth"in an absolute sense is held to be unattainable,the ob-
jective of postpositivistinvestigationis to arrive at better and better ap-
proximations of it. Realism (sometimes called "hypothetical realism")
remains the central ontological bias. Epistemologically,postpositivismis
214 Clark
usually considered as "modified objectivist";objectivityremains what is

called a regulatoryideal and is used to select among competing,alternative
explanations.It is acknowledgedthat it is impossibleto arriveat total ob-
jectivity.There is also explicitrecognitionof the existenceof a criticalin-
tellectualtradition,made manifestin a criticalintellectualcommunity(i.e.,
one or various "schools") withinwhichthe paradigm is more or less con-
sistentand accepted by consensus,but outside of which it mightbe non-
sensical. Methodologically,postpositivists have adopted what Guba (1990b,
pp. 22, 23) calls an "experimental-manipulative" research protocol,which
aims to consider simultaneouslymultiple alternative hypotheses,which
seeks to avoid or minimizethe effectsof bias in "natural" (i.e., nonobtru-
sive) settings,and whichdepends ratherheavilyupon groundedtheory(i.e.,
a body of theoryalready well tested and confirmed).
In classic positivism,therewas a tendencyto concentrateany test on
a single hypothesis,whichautomaticallyeliminatedthe simultaneousevalu-
ation of other alternativehypotheses.In postpositivism, the hypothesishas
become a more sophisticatedconcept, and the process of evaluation has
been expanded into the simultaneousevaluation of a series of alternative,
competing hypotheses. In big science contexts,this process has become
stronglyquantified.It is recognized that bias is inevitable,but in purely
experimentalcontexts,everyeffortis made to predictand control the ef-
fectsof bias withthe greatestprecisionpossible. Since the Heisenberg Un-
certaintyPrinciple was articulatedand widelyaccepted in the theoretical
physicsof the 1930s, there has been a general recognitionthat bias is in-
escapable, even in tightlycontrolledlaboratorycontexts,and experimental
outcomes are always expressed in termsof probabilities(Feynman, 1985;
Kitchener,1988). Processual archaeology in both the United States and
the United Kingdom typicallyproceeds froma postpositivistmetaphysical
paradigm and the preconceptionsand biases that underlie it (Watson et
al, 1984).
Critical Theory
The fourthparadigm,criticaltheory,reallysignifies"ideologicallyori-
ented investigation"(Guba 1990b, p. 23). Here are included the various
formsof Marxism,some kinds of materialism,feministinquiry,etc., where
it is explicitlyrecognized that participationin the process of investigation
will bias the results. From a criticaltheoryperspective,nature can never
be perceived as it "really is" or "reallyworks,"except througha lens or
filterof values. However, most criticaltheoristssubscribeto the same on-
-
tological position as the postpositivists that of critical realism. In other
words,theyrecognizethat a realityexistsout therebut argue that we can

comprehendit only throughthe imperfectintellectualfiltersof our pre-
conceptionsand biases. But thereis a paradox here, or at least a troubling
inconsistency, and that is that a realistontologywould seem to implyor
demand an objectivistepistemologyin order to discoverthe nature of re-
ality.Criticaltheorists,however,almostexclusivelyadopt a subjectivistepis-
temology,which basically specifiesthat values mediate investigationand
that investigationcannot be attemptedat all withoutthe values of the in-
vestigatorplayingan importantrole. In otherwords,a subjectivistepiste-
mologyis recruitedin the serviceof a realistontology,withthe resultthat
much criticaltheoryis not verycredibleoutside of a particular,and often
veryrestricted,metaphysic.
Methodologically,criticaltheoryis said to be "dialogic-transfomative,"
whichmeans that,withinthe confinesof the paradigm,criticaltheoristsseek
to eliminatefalse consciousnessand transform the world,selectingelements
of the relevantdomain that can be comprehended,and decidingwhichof
them can be altered. Because of its methodology,then, there is a strong
proselytizingor propagandisticaspect to muchcriticaltheory,to whichmany
postpositivistsobject. In archaeology,the best and most obvious examples
of criticaltheoryare the worksof Michael Shanks and ChristopherTilley
(1987, 1988); it is also evident,althoughless marked,in some of the pub-
licationsof Ian Hodder (e.g., 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, cf. 1991).
Constructivism
Constructivismis the last of these paradigms.In contrastwith the

rest,whichare essentiallydisposed to be eclecticin the sense thattheycan
accommodate aspects and elements of other metaphysics,constructivists
considerthat positivismand postpositivism are so defectivethat theymust
be replaced altogether.Ontologically,constructivists are relativists.They
emphasize the theory-ladennatureof facts,the underdetermination of the-
ory and the of
difficulty arriving at a genuine test of a theory, and the
value-laden nature of facts(Guba, 1990b,pp. 25-27). They argue that the
resultsof any investigationare alwaysdeterminedby the interactionof the
investigatorand the "investigated"and that multiplerealities exist in the
formof multiplemental constructions.The latterare grounded in the so-
ciological paradigm and in the realm of experience,local and specific,the
formand contentof which are essentiallydependent upon the life experi-
ences of the person internalizingthem.
Epistemologically,constructivists - the investigator
are subjectivists
and the investigatedare "fused" into a singleentity,and the resultsof the
216 Clark
process of investigationare literallythe creationof the process of interac-

tion between the two. From a constructivist point of view, subjectivityis
not only forcedupon us by the human condition(as postpositivists would
also argue), it is the only means to reveal constructionsheld in the minds
of individualhumans. Put anotherway, if realitiesexist only in the minds
of people, subjectiveepistemologieswould appear to be the only way we
can access them. At thisjuncture,the question arises whetherthese mul-
tiple realitiesare idiosyncraticor whetherthere are degrees of overlap or
sharingamong them.The answeris thatthereis typicallya restrictednum-
ber of overlappingor shared realities- a kindof polytheticset- withfewer
realities than the number of individualsand with only a partial overlap
between any pair of individuals.One can supposedlyarriveat thiscircum-
scribed set of realities by means of thickdescription,followed by careful
and controlledcomparison.
Methodologically,constructivists (1) seek to collect or compile indi-
vidual constructions,(2) describe these in as complete and precise a man-
ner as possible, and (3) compare and contrastthem dialectically,withthe
objective of generatingone (or a few) constructionsabout which there is
substantialconsensus. Constructivistsdo not seek to predict or control a
real world thatexistsapart fromperception,nor to transformit (as critical
theoristswould do), but ratherto construct(or, arguably,reconstruct)the
world at the only point in which it exists- in the human mind (Guba,
1990b, c).
The boundarybetween criticaltheoryand constructivism in archae-
ology is a bluny one, due to the rapidlyevolvingand incoherent nature of
the radical critiqueas a whole and to the near-impossibility of neatlycate-
gorizingits dominantpersonalities.Practicallythe only example of an ar-
chaeology that could, with some degree of justification, be labeled
"constructivist" is the workof Mark Leone, who has been engaged foryears
doing historicalarchaeologyin the cityof Annapolis,Maryland[(e.g., 1981,
1984; Leone et al, 1987) but see below, for Leone is not a relativist].He
has been concernedto reconstructthe various archaeologies of the diverse
socioeconomic classes, ethnic,racial, and linguisticgroups that comprised
the city during various periods in its long history.His investigations,as
much historicalas archaeological,have an importantpublic aspect in that
he has been charged by the municipalitywith the constructionof a series
of small museums,each one of which illustratesaspects of the cityfrom
the perspectiveof the various social groups that comprised it. According
to Leone, then,Annapolis does not have a singlearchaeological recordbut
various ones- the archaeologyof the slaves, the archaeologyof the mari-
time traders,the archaeology of the southernaristocracy,of mercantile
capitalism,etc. While these effortsare arguablysuccessfulgiven the his-
torical"reach"ofdocumentation (butcf.Young,1988),it shouldbe borne

in mindthat,in defaultofwritten records,therewouldbe no wayto evalu-
ate independently thecredibility of Leone's reconstructions. Paradigmbias
is alwaysmoreproblematic whenit is implicit, as it is in the case of all
prehistoricarchaeologicalresearch.
Because manyproblemsand questionsregardedas "significant" are
held in commonbydistinctregionalor nationalresearchtraditions (e.g.,
modernhumanorigins,emergenceof social complexity, etc.), it is illu-
to
minating try to catch a glimpse of the metaphysics that appear to un-
derlietheir"worldviews." This is whatis attemptedin the nextsection.
I argue therethatprehistoric archaeologyin the Old and New Worlds
proceeds from fundamentally different viewof thepast,foundedon fun-
damentally differentmetaphysical paradigms. Underlying manyContinen-
tal approachesis the preconception thatprehistory is historyprojected
back intothepreliterate past and thatprocessin theremotepast can be
treatedas analogousto, and an extensionof,processin history (see, e.g.,
Otte and Keeley,1990). This contrastssharplywiththe anthropological
biases that underlieAmericanresearchtraditions(see, e.g., Dunnell,
1986; Meltzer,1979; Meltzeret ai, 1986). Metaphysicalparadigmsare
typicallynotsubjectedto muchcriticalscrutiny within researchtraditions
and, as noted,have no objectiverealitybeyondthatconceded themby
theiradherents.So, fromone pointof view,one metaphysical paradigm
is "as good as another."However,because the assumptionsunderlying
themetaphysical paradigmcan determine thecharacterof itssubordinate
paradigms(which in turn determine research protocolsin any problem
context), conflicts arise with respect to the nature of explanationand
whatkindsof explanationsare regarded,a priori,as plausible.From an
Americanperspective, thereare majorproblemswiththe contention that
prehistory is an extension of history, and these have far-reaching impli-
cationsfor European construalsof the natureof patternand what it
mightmean.
OLD AND NEW WORLD ARCHAEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS
The first,and practically attemptat comparing

the only,systematic
themetaphysical paradigms of prehistoric
archaeologyin bothhemispheres
is the essayby LewisBinfordand Jeremy publishedmorethana
Sabloff,
decadeago (1982;see also papersin Clark,1991).Theybeginbyreminding
us ofsomeofthecontributions especiallytherejection
ofclassicpositivism,
notionthat"the factscan speak forthemselves."
of the strictempiricist
For morethana century, it has been evidentthatan objectiveobserver
218 Clark
does not existwho is capable of observingnature directlyand, thus,"dis-

covering"facts or structurelatent in nature. Facts or structurein data is
the creationof paradigmaticbias, essentially"invented"by the investigator
in order to assist in problem solving.Binfordand Sabloff adopt Kuhn's
definitionsof "paradigm" and "theoiy" (i.e., the paradigmis an assertion
of what the world is like; a theoryis an argumentinvokedto explain why
the world is as it appears to be). The significantdifference,of course, is
thatthe factsno longerspeak forthemselves.Meaningcomes fromhumans,
and not fromnature.
In an effortto illustratethe effectsof paradigmaticbias on systematic*
and archaeological interpretation, Binfordand Sabloffdescribe the char-
acteristicsof two paradigmsthat,in theiropinion, have governed archae-
ological researchtraditionsin the United States and in ContinentalEurope,
respectively,fromca. 1940 to ca. 1970 (Table I). Accordingto them,the
two distinct metaphysical paradigms of the Old and New Worlds are
founded upon two distinctconceptions of "culture,"which influencenot
only methodologybut also the meaning that we give to patternin an ar-
chaeological record. It should be kept in mind thattheyare referring here
to prehistoric archaeology (i.e., portions of the time-space continuum
where no writtenrecordsexist and where the directhistoricalapproach is
not an option).
The New World Paradigm
In the New World (or, more accurately,the anglophoneNew World),

the conception of culture adopted by archaeologistsoriginatedin culture
area studies and was developed principallyby culturalanthropologistssuch
as AlfredKroeber (Berkeley)and Clark Wissler(Columbia), beginningdur-
ing the 1920s. This conceptof culturewas characterizedbythe presumption
of much continuityacross extensivegeographicalareas and was manifest
in the formand distributionof its materialresidues. Moreover,continuity
was perceived to be verystable in space and time,so long as the natural
environmentdid not change verymuch. Because of these biases, marked
discontinuitiesin patternwere regarded as exceptional.
This collection of preconceptionsand biases regardingthe nature of
culturein anthropologyhad a major effecton NorthAmericanarchaeology,
of course, and, by about the 1940s, resultedin "the normativeconception
of culture"- the dominantparadigm in the disciplineup until the end of
the 1960s (Willey and Sabloff,1980). The basic archaeological analytical
units(potterytypes,projectilepoint types,etc.- typesin the genericsense)
were seen as analogous to the units employed by culturalanthropologists
Table I. Metaphysical
Paradigmsin Prehistoric
Archaeology(1940-1970):Major Biases and
Preconceptionsof theAnglophoneNewWorld(Canada,UnitedStates)and Continental Old
World(especiallyFrance,Belgium,Spain,Italy)Conceptions
of Culture(based on Binford
and Sabloff.1982Ì
New WorldParadigm Old WorldParadigm
of culture
The definition
Developedout of culturearea studies Developedout of Europeanhistory and
nationalism
Receiveditsmandatefromsocialand Receiveditsmandatefromnaturalscience
culturalanthropology (esp. geology, paleontology)
Essentiallygradualist, Characterized
emphasizedcontinuity bypunctuated equilibrium;
overspace and time emphasized in thattraits
discontinuity
werebelievedto be congruent withsocial,
ethnicgroups
Led to normative Also normative;
(i.e.,variety-minimizing) culturesequal differentiated
viewsof culture packagesof traitsoverspace and time
Recognizessomevectoredchangewithin Essentially staticwithinanalyticalunits
analyticalunits
Coherent;culturesequatedwithtrait Incoherent; whencultures changed,they
complexesthatcohereoverspace and time changeden blocand abruptly (because
of population replacement)
Existedat a levelabovethatof social, Existedat thelevelof social,ethnic,and
ethnic,and linguisticgroups linguisticgroups
Manydefinitions of culture;some Definition of cultureessentiallyideational
phenomenological, othersideational (i.e., norms,valuesin people'sheads)
like Kroeber and Wissler. The purpose of an archaeological type was to

providethe investigator withan organizationalsystemthatwould allow him
to group specimens in such a way that they would exhibitdemonstrable
historicalcontinuity and thatcould be interpretedand understoodin terms
of human behavior.To the scholars of that era, a typeshould exhibittem-
poral and spatial cohesion with respect to its attributes,and if it was a
"good" type (i.e., useful, reliable, diagnostic), its attributesshould have
been totallycoherent(i.e., the best typeswere in factmonothetic,or nearly
so). Under this paradigm,cultureitselfwas viewed as a cohesion of char-
acteristicsor traitsand was consideredto existabove the level of the social,
ethnic,racial, and linguisticunits that created it (i.e., it existed at a more
inclusivelevel than specificethnic,racial,linguisticgroups). In myopinion,
thisis the most importantdistinctionbetweenthe Old and the New World
paradigmsof the 1940-1970 era.
220 Clark
The Old World Paradigm
In the Old World,culturewas consideredto be a kindof material

expressionof distinctethnic,social,linguistic, etc.,groupsthatexistedat
thelevelof suchgroups,and notabovethem.Because of thisbias,a given
archaeological assemblagewas equatedwitha givenethnicor socialentity,
although this equationwas seldommade explicit.Fromthisperspective,
cultures were seen (and, in myopinion,continueto be seen) as packages
of traitsdifferentiated amongthemselves, butnotdifferentiated internally.
In thissense,theywereas "normative" (variety-minimizing) as theirAmeri-
can counterparts, if not moreso. This equationof cultureswithpackages
of indexfossiltool typeswas the pointof departureforthe Frenchpara-
digm,exemplified byFrançoisBordes,butalso adoptedbybracketing gen-
erationsof Frenchprehistorians, at least up untilthe early-mid1980s.
Accordingto itstenets,it wouldbe possibleto detecteitherculturalcon-
tinuity or the lack of it in an archaeologicalrecord,dependentupon the
time-spacedistribution of thefossilesdirecteurs, interpreted moreor less
directly as the remains of the of
passing long-gone ethnic or social entities
analogous to the tribes,nations,and cultures of history.
Binfordand Sabloff(1982) emphasizedthatthe twoconceptions of
cultureweremetaphysical paradigms our
recapitulating expectations in re-
gard to whatcultureis "like."Both were based on empiricalgeneraliza-
tions,buttheyproceededfromdifferent setsofpresuppositions and biases.
to
Both consistedof consciousattempts describethe phenomenological
worldof culture,but giventhatthe two realitieswere different, the de-
scriptions and explanations ofthepatterns perceivedin each case werealso
different. The New Worldparadigmprovidesus witha portraitof geo-
graphicaland temporalcontinuity, butit is a limitedkindof continuity in
comparison withthe time-spaceframework of the Old World.Moreover,
the New Worldparadigmviewsthe archaeological record,almostinevita-
bly, as a series of birthsand growths, followed a
by seriesof collapsesor
declines,and thecycleis repeatedoverand overagain.Thispreconception
about the nature of change can be seen veryclearlywithrespectto
Mesoamericanarchaeology, withits Formative, Pre-Classic, Classic,Post-
Classic, and Proto-Historic epochs and stages.
The Old Worldparadigmprovidesus withan ideationalportrait of
culturein whicharchaeologicalassemblages(as definedby theirfossiles
directeurs) are equatedwithdistinct ethnicor socialentitiesof some kind.
It is a viewof culturecharacterized bya lackofcontinuity acrosstime - by
a seriesoftime-successive replacements- and also by a lackof geographical
continuity, each culturebeingdefinedspatiallyby its own assemblageof
"diagnostic"artifacts. There are also differences of scale. Cultureis seen
as immutableover the long term,and when there are changes (and they
are rare), theytend to be abrupt and complete,explained by the physical
replacementof one groupby another.In general,culturesin the Old World
paradigmchange less, mix less, and are modifiedonly gradually,if at all,
over the course of time.It is a model characterizedby a kindof punctuated
equilibrium,with long periods of stasis correspondingto the classic ana-
lyticalunits(e.g., Solutrean,Magdalenian), "punctuated"by transitionepi-
sodes of a relativelyshort duration (1-2 kyr),which coincide with unit
boundaries.Binfordand Sabloffargue thatthe Old World paradigmis in-
capable of acknowledgingthe possibilitythat distinctaspects of a culture
could change (withoutchange in otheraspects) and could appear as distinct
artifactassemblages in given times and places. This possibilityis negated
by the definitionof cultureitself,whichrequiresthat change mustbe total
and conclusive,owing to the concept of population replacement.
Binfordand Sabloff(1982) add thatthe Old World paradigmis char-
acterizedby certainothertendencies,some of whichare arguable fromthe
perspectiveof the early 1990s. They claim, for example, that there is a
tendencyto overemphasizeeitherindex fossiltool typesor typologicalsys-
tematicsto the near-exclusionof other lines of evidence, as if these were
in some way significantin theirown right.This tendencycontributesto a
European versionof the normativeview of culturethat,like its American
counterpart,tends to minimizethe amount of variation perceived in an
archaeologicalassemblage.They also claim thatthereis too muchemphasis
on the artifactsthemselves,and a tendencyto studyartifactsas a domain
of investigationisolated fromother domains of investigation.There is in-
sufficientemphasison the geographicaland environmentalsettingsof sites
in the landscape and a tendencyto extractthe site fromits social and natu-
ral contextand consider it as the principalanalyticalunit. In otherwords,
theyare criticizingthe Old World paradigmfor its lack of a systemicper-
spective of broad scope, which would be capable of evaluating multiple
variables and patternssimultaneously.They suggest that the traditional
European preoccupation with typological systematicstends to distract
European prehistoriansfromother,more productivelines of evidence (e.g.,
technologicalsystematics,the studyof raw materialprocurement,use and
discardpatterns,intrasitespatial analysis,settlementpatternstudies,studies
of adaptation,etc.).
The 1970-1990 Era
Readers will,of course, have theirown opinions about the accuracy

of thischaracterization.In myview,the portraitof the Old World paradigm
222 Clark
is fundamentallyaccurate but a littleout of date. Other than continued

application of traditional,typologicallybased time-space systematics,not
much happened on the Continentduringthe 1970s. The 1980s have seen
increased emphasis on technology,raw material distributions, production
sequences- thechaîne opératoireof Frenchprehistorians(e.g., Boëda, 1988;
Geneste, 1988; Meignen, 1988)- in part,at least, because of "penetration"
of the European intellectualmarket by American approaches and ideas
throughpartial (and delayed) overlap at the sociological paradigm level.
Very littlehas come "the other way," and what has crossed the Atlantic
tends to come fromthe United Kingdom (see below). I believe that there
are two reasons for this. One is the near-total monolingualismof the
American archaeological research traditionthat,as a consequence, is sel-
dom exposed to Continentalliteraturein any significantor sustainedway.
The other is the near-totalabsence in Continentaluniversitycurriculaof
what could be called an explicitconcernwitharchaeological theorybuild-
ing. One does not have to be a rocketscientistto see whythis is so. If, in
fact,archaeologyis perceived to be historyprojected back into the prelit-
erate past, explanation in archaeologyis taken to be analogous to expla-
concernedwiththe unique outcome
nation in histoiyand is particularistic,
of an equally unique sequence of events.Put anotherway, European pre-
historianstend to be the strictestof empiricists,little influencedby the
constant soul-searchingthat has been an integralpart of the American
quest for explanationsince the mid-1960s.While European prehistoricar-
chaeology has changed a lot over the past decade, much of that change
has been methodologicaland has had no impactwhatsoeveron the meta-
physic.And it is at the level of the metaphysicthat explanationlies. I be-
lieve the Binfordand Sabloffcharacterizationremainsaccurate withregard
to (1) the continuingabsence of a systemicperspective,(2) the overem-
phasis on typologicalsystematicsand its implications,and (3) the tendency
to equate prehistorian-defined analyticalunitswiththe ethnicor social en-
titiesknownto us fromhistory(see, e.g., Otte and Keeley, 1990; cf. Clark
and Lindly,1991). It has not escaped the attentionof its criticsthat the
Old World paradigm mightbe largelya productof the chaotic recent his-
toryof Europe itself,marked,as it continuesto be, by warfare,population
displacements,and ethnic and social unrest.
In the New World, the Binfordand Sabloffview of the 1940-1970
era was littlenoted nor muchremarkedupon,essentiallybecause fewAmeri-
cans took issue with theirpictureof the traditionalculture-historicalpara-
from Willey and Sabloff,1980) and because there was
digm (drawn largely
an ongoing dialectic about the evolving nature of the Americanist meta-
Robert
physic,anyway,withinthe boundaries of that research tradition.
Dunnell (1984, 1986) questioned certainaspects of it, especiallytheircon-
strualof the epistemologyand methodologyof traditionalNew World ar-

chaeology,withwhich he has long disagreed. He made an argumentthat
culture-historical inquirywas not the mindlesspattern-searching enterprise
that it was sometimesclaimed to be (e.g., Swartz,1967) and that it was,
in fact,a highlyproductive"normal science" phase in the historyof the
discipline.He went on to make the more problematicassertionthat it was
foundedin deductivereasoning,thatit constituteda collectionof methods
not explicitlyrationalizedin theoreticalterms,and thatitsconceptualstruc-
ture,includingits expectationsabout patternand the meaningof pattern,
was widelybut implicitlyheld on a consensual basis that arose fromthe
factthatits practitioners were all productsof a singleintellectualtradition.
Of these observations,perhaps the most controversialis its allegedlyde-
ductivecharacter.
Watson (1986), in a kindof rebuttal,reacted to thisview. She labeled
Dunnell a strictempiricistbecause he thinkshe can avoid the inferential
links involved in reconstructing the past by resortingto what she called
"artifactphysics" - "the hard
phenomena of the archaeological record"
(Dunnell, 1978, p. 195). This is naïve, she claims,adding (correctly,in my
view) that all our statements about the past are inferentialreconstructions
of it, variouslycredible (depending upon our preconceptionsand biases),
but just as paradigm-boundand theory-dependent as were the interpreta-
tions of the 1940-1970era.
I do not intendto commentat lengthupon major trendsin post-1970
Americanistarchaeology (for currentreviews,see Watson, 1986, 1991;
Dunnell, 1984, 1986, 1991; the annual Advances volumes edited by Mike
Schiffer, etc.). It seems evidentto me thatmainstreamAmericanistarchae-
is
ology firmlygrounded in a postpositivist metaphysicthat views the past
as "real" in some fundamentalsense, and accessible to scrutiny.There are,
of course, many and diverse aspects to what I thinkof as "mainstream
Americanistarchaeology."While theyshare a numberof distinctbut over-
lapping sociological paradigms, they all proceed from the same meta-
- thatof
physic anthropologicalarchaeology(Meltzer, 1979). I wantinstead
to concentrateupon the preconceptionsand biases of what I thinkof as
"the radical critique"- the archaeologicalminoritythatdefinesitselfin op-
positionto the mainstream.
RAGGING THE RADICAL CRITIQUE: ARCHAEOLOGY AS ALMOST

ANYTHING BUT SCIENCE
As is well-known,the postpositivist
legacyof westernscience thatun-
derlies processual archaeologyin the United States has been attacked in
224 Clark
recentyears by certainelementsof the radical critique.Arguingfromboth

relativistand realist perspectives,critical theoristshave claimed (1) that
processual archaeologyhas been a failure,in that it has not improvedun-
derstandingor generated new knowledgeof the past that is more secure
inferentially than that produced by traditional,pre-1970 archaeology; (2)
that processual archaeologyis mostlyunconsciousof its own biases, espe-
ciallywithregardto the limitationsof functionalism and its derivativesthat
underlie its groundingtheories; (3) that logical positivismhas been misin-
terpretedas antiempiricistand is not, in any case, an appropriatephilo-
sophical base for a "human science" (whateverthat is); (4) that positivism
is a product of the industrialized,capitalist West, and other (and by im-
plication,better) paradigms are available (especially the various formsof
Marxism);(5) thatscience cannot be extractedfromits broader social con-
text and will always be influencedby prevailingsocial, political,and eco-
nomic biases; (6) that processualists believe that the past is directly
accessible and is somethingthatexistsindependentlyfromour perceptions
of it (i.e., it is "objectified");(7) thatthe processualistsaccept the existence
of a permanentframe of reference(that of natural science) in order to
determinethe natureof an objectifiedreality;(8) thattheyemploya model
of economic rationalityderived fromwesterncapitalism;(9) that theysub-
scribe to adaptationist biases grounded in biosocial evolution; (10) that
processual archaeologyis not, in fact,"processual" (i.e., it does a poor job
of confronting process questions both in the past and in the present); and
(11) that, with its emphasis on cultural materialism,the ideational realm
is ignored or deemphasized (and consequentlydiscarded as unattainable)
(Shanks and Tilley, 1987, 1988; Bell, 1987; Binford,1987; Hodder, 1985,
1986, 1987, 1991; Earle and Preucel, 1987; Preucel, 1991).
The Biases of the Radical Critique
It is not easy to untanglethe variousskeinsof thoughtin the literature

of the radical critique,althoughPattersonhas recentlyattemptedto do so
(1989, 1990). What emergesfromthisis a kindof poorlydefined,polythetic
set comprisingthree partlycomplementary,partlycontrasting,positions
grounded intellectuallyin French poststructuralism, various aspects of so-
cial Marxist thought,and, to a certain,very limitedextent,symbolican-
thropology.Pattersonidentifiesa rapidlyevolvingvariant,headed by Ian
materialist,and
Hodder (e.g., 1985, 1986), that is realistyet antipositivist,
structuralMarxist and that, in its most recent incarnation(1991), argues
that social historyaffectsour construalof patternin the past, present,and
future;that differentsocial segmentshave distinctconceptionsof the past
(and, because of this,theyrepresentthe past in differentways); that our

perceptionof the past reflectscontemporaryrelationshipsand structures
of power and authority(and, more broadly,the present-daysocial context);
thatthe archaeologicalrecordhas an objectifiedrealitybut is, nevertheless,
also a "textto be decoded"; and that middle-rangetheory(sensu Binford,
1981; Schiffer,1987) is inadequate to model processes of any conceivable
interestto anyone.
A second line of thought is identifiedwith the work of Michael
Shanks and ChristopherTilley (1987, 1988) and receives its intellectual
mandate fromFrench structuralism, poststructuralism, and Marxism. Of-
fered as part of a criticalexaminationof the biases of various processual
theorists,theirown point of view recognizes a realist perspectiveon the
past (but, again, one that is accessible only throughreading the cultural
material record as a text analogue). They also assert that archaeology is
an interpretive effortand is influencedby the sociopoliticaland socioeco-
nomic ideologies of the present,arguing that alternativeand equivalent
"understandings"of the past exist that reflectcontemporaryrelationships
of power and authority. They take the processualiststo taskfortheirefforts
to develop methods that seek to extractscience from its social context,
since theybelieve that this is impossible to do. They advocate a kind of
activistarchaeologyin which archaeologistsunite with other intellectuals
in the struggleagainst the establishedsocial order and all formsof knowl-
edge and power used to "repress."Archaeologicalknowledgeis to be mar-
shalled to empowerthe economicallyand sociallydisadvantagedvictimsof
westernimperialism.An extensionof thisimperialismis the hegemony(one
could almost read tyranny)of the processuali version of the scientific
method.MetaphoricalMaoists, theywish to "let a thousandflowersbloom"
while, at the same time, eradicatinga few noxious capitalistweeds from
the intellectualgarden.
The thirdposition is representedby Mark Leone (e.g., 1981, 1984,
1991; Leone et al, 1987), who argues that,while archaeological practice
and ideologyare part of the present,theyare neverthelessbiased in terms
of particularhistoricalspecifics(e.g., analyticalframeworks, frameworks for
the justificationof knowledgeclaims). Like Hodder, Leone claims that the
processualists have not been sufficiently critical of their own analytical
frameworksand knowledge claims and that one cannot ignore ideology,
since it restrictshuman action in the past and affectssocial consciousness
(and manyother things!)in the present.Ideology itselfhas a history,and
it is necessaryto examine it because, by doing so, archaeologistswill be in
a position to choose alternativeinterpretations that are betterfounded in
a range of alternativereconstructionsof the past (Leone et ai, 1987).
226 Clark
A Reaction
Confrontedwiththisattackbased on what manyof us would consider

to be versionsof processual archaeologythat are dated, misinterpreted, or
mutuallycontradictory, it is not surprisingthat a coherent response has so
far not been forthcoming. The attack itselfis incoherent.As Patterson's
overviewshows veryclearly,thereis considerabledisorderin the postproc-
essualist camp, withas much intellectualenergyexpended on internaldis-
putes as is directedat the opposition(see also P. Watson,1991; R. Watson,
1991a, b). In fact,at times it is difficultto determinewho the opposition
is. However, there has been a reaction,and although it is still a partial
one, it contains some recurrentelements.
Perhaps the most damagingobservationto emerge fromreactionsto
various criticaltheorybooks (and I have not read all of them!) is that the
postprocessualistexplicationof the methodology,inferentialstructure,and
positivistfoundationsof processual archaeologyare oftendistorted,impre-
cise, and/orwhollyor partlyincorrect.There is a general tendencyto cari-
cature processual archaeologyas grounded in classic positivism,when in
factit receivesits intellectualmandate frompostpositivism. They also tend
to confoundthe role of deductionin verificationwiththe inductivecontext
of discoveryas if,in some way,the inductive,deductive,and abductiveas-
pects of problem solving could be neatly and absolutelyseparated from
one another.
Shanks and Tilley (1987, 1988) also claim to rejectquantifiedresearch
protocolsowing to the erroneous belief that the processualistsuse quanti-
fication to produce "value-free data." Since they deny the existence of
value-freedata (as, of course, do processualists),Shanks and Tilley also
are ill disposed toward precision,prediction,and control. However, they
underminethe credibilityof theirown position with theirstrongdepend-
ence on statisticsin the famous beer can studythat,as P. Watson (1990,
p. 220) points out, comprises about 30% of Reconstructing Archaeology
(1987). Based on other quantifiedpatternsearches, they arrive at other
post hoc accommodativearguments - argumentscooked up afterthe fact
in order to explain patternsin data (Binford,1981).
Shanks and Tilley also reject in its totalitythe concept of social evo-
lution.Time-transgressive data patternsare attributedexclusivelyto the op-
eration of historicalfactors,and history,for them as for many others,is
particularisticand nongeneralizing.The only explanation of change they
propose to offeris "a full account of change" (Oakeshott, 1933, p. 43),
whichby definitionmustbe particularistic. However, theyactuallydo gen-
eralize. Their "completeexplanationsof change" are not,in fact,comprised
of historicalsequences of events but, instead,consistalmost exclusivelyof
empiricalgeneralizations,thus contradictingtheirown explicitlystated bi-

ases about what is causingpatternin materialculture.And so it goes. Even
ignoringthe so-called "crisisof historicity" [the problematicnature of his-
torical facts (Young, 1988)], the problems forprehistoricarchaeologyare
formidableand obvious ones.
Although there are clear differencesbetween Hodder, on the one
hand, and Shanks and Tilley,on the other,the Britishwingof the radical
critiqueseems to be whollylackingin a coherentinvestigation strategythat
would permitany kind of independentevaluation of the credibilityof its
"understandings"and "interpretations."In short,you either "buy it" (by
accepting their biases) or you don't. There is nothing"in between" that
would permitone to connect an assertionabout the "nature of the world"
to a body of evidence about the natureof the (or a) past. They nevermake
clear how one explainssocial transformations in the particularcase (except
as the unique resultof an equally unique series of historicalevents) or in
general,or whysocial transformations are thoughtto have occurredin the
firstplace. They explicitlyreject any notion of a generalizingmode of ex-
planation and, with it, any pretensionto objectivityin the evaluation of
the credibility of theirknowledgeclaims.The whole is couched in a strident,
1960s-style rhetoric that advocates a "radical, value-committedarchaeol-
ogy" (Shanks and Tilley,1988,p. 206) in whicharchaeologistsare to employ
theirexpertisein the fightagainst"the prevailingregimeforthe production
of truth"(1988, p. 204)- presumablythe western,capitalist,positivisttra-
dition. Nonwestern,noncapitalist,antipositivistalternativearchaeologies
are advocated (Marxist,poststructuralist, symbolic,etc.), but no compelling
reason is articulatedfor choosing any one of them or for choosing them
over theirpositivistcompetitors(P. Watson, 1990; R. Watson, 1991a, b).
In reviews generallysympatheticto the radical critique, Patterson
(1989, 1990) criticizesprocessual archaeologyfor its "largelyimplicit,em-
piricist,behaviorist,functionalist, and logical positivistgroundingtheories"
(1989, p. 556), its obsession with technique, and its claims to objectivity.
In contrast,postprocessualistsare supposedly more criticallyself-aware,
employ broader conceptionsof both historyand culture,and view history
as a context-dependent human constructionand archaeologyas a "series
of texts,"also sociallyconstructed,that cannot be "read" (in fact,do not
exist) apart fromthe circumstancesin which interpretations occur (1989,
p. 561). He calls for a dialectic between processual and postprocessualar-
chaeology in order to identify elements incompatible with the different
theoretical perspectivesof each (1990, p. 197). The eclecticism charac-
teristicof both sides is deplored (because it stands in the way of synthesis),
and an appeal is sounded for criticalassessmentof theirstrengths,weak-
nesses, and implicationsforthe studyof process. Whateverthe differences
228 Clark
among them,the threekindsof postprocessualarchaeologyhe outlinessup-

posedly (1) confrontthe empiricist,positivistbiases of processual archae-
ology concerningstructure,history,and change, (2) reject the notion that
the past is directlyknowable (i.e., has an objective realityapart fromour
perceptionsof it), (3) view historyas a human construction,ratherthan
somethinghanded down by nature, and (4) acknowledge the importance
of contemporarysociopolitical influences in the constructionof history
(Patterson,1989, p. 562).
Some "Final" Thoughts (as of February 15, 1993)
Is it possible to reconcile these allegationswiththe tenetsof proces-

sualism?I would suggest(1) thatsome postprocessualists(e.g., Leone) have
in fact confrontedthe subjective element in historywithoutabandoning
independentverificationof knowledgeclaims; (2) that most processualists
would agree withthe postprocessualistassertionthatthe past is not directly
knowable; (3) that processualistsalso see history(and archaeology)as hu-
man constructions(but neverthelessadopt a realist stance); and (4) that
theywould readilyacknowledgethe subjectiveelementin history.In short,
it seems to me thatPatterson'spointsof alleged contrastare, in fact,wholly
or mostlycompatible with the position of processual archaeologytoday.
The processual archaeologythat is the targetof the radical critiqueis little
more than a caricatureof the processual archaeologyof the 1990s.
I would also contend,despite assertionsto the contrary, thatthe Brit-
in
ish wing of criticaltheoryis, large part, a relativist
archaeologybecause
"truth"itselfchanges accordingto the sociopoliticalpersuasionof the ar-
chaeologist(Shanks and Tilley, 1987, 1988; but cf. Hodder, 1991). Not so,
of course, for the processualists,or for the American postprocessualist
Mark Leone (1981, 1984, 1991; Leone et ai, 1987), who, while he acknow-
ledges the importanceof the subjectiveelement in the constructionof his-
tory,also endorses a realist archaeology and the analyticalstrategythat
goes along withit. Perhaps the most "processual" of processualarchaeolo-
gists,Lewis Binford,has recentlyobserved that our knowledgeof the past
is constructedin thepresentout of (1) the staticmaterialresiduesof once-
dynamicprocesses now foundin geological contexts(i.e., the archaeological
record), (2) the observationswe choose to make on the archaeologicalre-
cord (in turn,determinedby our biases and the preconceptionsof the re-
search traditions to which we pertain), and (3) general contemporary
knowledge about the world in the waning years of the 20th centurythat
guides our choices of observationsand our interpretations of them (1989,
I
p. 13). suggest that many postprocessualists would findthis outline for a
research agenda to be more or less compatiblewith theirown. If there is

a partingof the ways,it is because some of the more extremeelementsof
the radical critiquehave abandoned any disinterestedattemptat objective
verificationof theirknowledgeclaims.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Much of the researchthat eventuallyresultedin this essay was actu-

ally done in Spain duringtwo visitsin May-September 1991 (Universidad
de Cantabria, Santander) and October 1992 (Universidad Internacional
Menéndez Pelayo, Valencia). I wish to thankthe Ministeriode Educación
y Ciencia (Grant SAB 91-0247),colleagues at the Universitiesof Cantabria,
Valencia, and Oviedo, and the Generalität(Valencia) forunderwriting my
work. A special agradecimiento,y un abrazo, goes to my long-timefriend
and colleague, Prof.Manuel R. González Morales, Departmentof Archae-
ology and History,Universityof Cantabria.
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Migration as an Explanatory Concept in Paleolithic Archaeology

Article in Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory · January 1994

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Paradigmsin Scienceand Archaeology

The paradigmconceptas developedin western philosophyof science contexts

Each country has itsowntraditions of researchin respectto thevari-

Tempe, Arizona 85287.

© 1993 Plenum PublishingCorporation

are distinctfromthose that underliethe teachingof prehistoryin Europe.

THE NATUREOF THE PARADIGM

In the anglophone world, both processualistsand postprocessualists

to question its validity.From Kuhn's perspective,this is how science in

broader discussion,which had to do withwhetheror not distinctaspects

DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARADIGMS

Early on, the notionof the paradigmwas subjected to criticalscrutiny,

concept was used in at least three distinctways. The most inclusive,and

(cf. Fig. 1). Test implicationsare conditionsthat are expected to apply to

Personally,I preferBinford's (1981, p. 25) less rigorous,common-sense

Models, on the other hand, are vague formulationsthat functionat

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PARADIGMS

Despite theiradmittedlysubjectivenature,any metaphysicalparadigm

not usually regarded as part of science (although it is very importantin

Strictempiricismproceeds froma realist ontologyin the sense that

iSi^i^ibe STRICT CLASSIC POST- CRTTICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

EPISTEMOLOGY: inductivtst dualist-objectivistmodifiedobjectivist subjectivist subjectivist

modified dialogic- comparative-

Fig.3. The metaphysicalparadigms ofwesternsciencefromthe16thto the21stcentury (alter

between the investigatorand the investigatedis never subjected to critical

Classic positivismdominatedwesternscience fromits beginningsin

Postpositivism,practiced today by most of the exact sciences, is a

usually considered as "modified objectivist";objectivityremains what is

words,theyrecognizethat a realityexistsout therebut argue that we can

Constructivismis the last of these paradigms.In contrastwith the

process of investigationare literallythe creationof the process of interac-

torical"reach"ofdocumentation (butcf.Young,1988),it shouldbe borne

OLD AND NEW WORLD ARCHAEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS

The first,and practically attemptat comparing

does not existwho is capable of observingnature directlyand, thus,"dis-

The New World Paradigm

In the New World (or, more accurately,the anglophoneNew World),

like Kroeber and Wissler. The purpose of an archaeological type was to

The Old World Paradigm

In the Old World,culturewas consideredto be a kindof material

The 1970-1990 Era

Readers will,of course, have theirown opinions about the accuracy

is fundamentallyaccurate but a littleout of date. Other than continued

strualof the epistemologyand methodologyof traditionalNew World ar-

RAGGING THE RADICAL CRITIQUE: ARCHAEOLOGY AS ALMOST

recentyears by certainelementsof the radical critique.Arguingfromboth

The Biases of the Radical Critique

It is not easy to untanglethe variousskeinsof thoughtin the literature

(and, because of this,theyrepresentthe past in differentways); that our

Confrontedwiththisattackbased on what manyof us would consider

empiricalgeneralizations,thus contradictingtheirown explicitlystated bi-

among them,the threekindsof postprocessualarchaeologyhe outlinessup-

Some "Final" Thoughts (as of February 15, 1993)

Is it possible to reconcile these allegationswiththe tenetsof proces-

research agenda to be more or less compatiblewith theirown. If there is

Much of the researchthat eventuallyresultedin this essay was actu-

Clark,G. A. (1990). Algunosreflexiones sobrela epistemología: Una respuestaa Utrilla.

Kuhn,T. (1962). The Structure of ScientificRevolutions,Universityof Chicago Press, Chicago.

Watson,R. (1991a).Whatthenewarchaeology Current

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT LITERATURE