G.R. No.
L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179,
184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599,
644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935,
961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-
1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130,
136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199,
202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357,
358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599,
600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918,
1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50,
51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-
433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
 enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for
the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd
ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in
the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports
the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of
this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without
keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the
rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead
to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is
not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in
the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in
this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-
but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC
7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the
Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might
have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
 existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these
PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding
on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE,
HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B.
BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-
Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September
30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated November
26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case
No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-
governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is
engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood
projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some
cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter
islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public
and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners
Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna,
Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to
the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it
to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply
with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of
Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the
same remained unheeded.
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB)
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which
prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the
same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP),
which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were
posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL
directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons
cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served
against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, injunction and damages15 against respondents before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights
to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping,
tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was
prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL
assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160,16 otherwise
known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved
by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action
against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island,
which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain.
Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing
requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved
by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as
provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject
ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has
not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP;
(b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor
was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence,
not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over
timberlands belong to the national government, through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents
were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the
public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built
thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to have no title over the
disputed property.23
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.
The Proceedings Before the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved
upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission
in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s
testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous
places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations
were conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27 The
CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power
and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation
to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and
administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a
municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA
pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no
proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for
injunction improper.31
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a
Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.34
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary
to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the
resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments
or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or
resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within
thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed
approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending
with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however,
bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said
ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be
deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed
by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning
of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the
action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or
in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction
that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to
all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x
x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions
are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the
moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject
ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the
LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public
hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance.
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence
to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast,
Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and posting
requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence
thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting
evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.
Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v.
Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite
the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that
public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of
controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with
the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance
was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has
not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to
the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject
ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to
establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed
in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged
that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been
submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative
Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court
upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the
part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that
there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance
had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it
is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by
the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them
to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to
petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party
asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden
of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we
are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied,
citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the
validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to
be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the
structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not
appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon
them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-
MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO
DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil
case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and
void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the
owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their
brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the
defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the
improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly
and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6
percent per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-
respondents from the cross-complaint relative to the value of the improvements
claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar
of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the deceased
Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of the
plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in
equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by
law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner
the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to
Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with
certificate of title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931
in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and
identified in the cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No.
285; that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of
the fruits which he received from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary
documents to transfer the land and its possession to the respondents; that he
petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or
encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan
cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the
respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and
by way of special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he
was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between
him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified
by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum
of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and
that, should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of
the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following
public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between
Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L.,
hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L.,
hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and
with each other as follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of
a parcel of land in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of
Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate of title No.
325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No.
285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral
Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M.
No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E.
104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6";
N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning,
"Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5,
stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by
property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan
River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property
claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under
authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations
of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927
and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of
the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo
trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) boñga trees.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed
value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No.
3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to the
party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the party of
the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only
the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of which
improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of
the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the
second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th day of
November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution
of this instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with
interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become
null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and
effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for
the amount due thereunder, with costs and also attorney's fees in the event
of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and
assessments which are or may become due on the above described land
and improvements during the term of this agreement.
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this
agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of
First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of
Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the
issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of
time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to
redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the
property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including
all unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the
mortgagee.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII
hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under
Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the
day and year first herein before written.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula
by reason of her sex, to me known and known to me to be the person who
signed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed
the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this
page of the acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the
parties to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence and in the
presence of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists
of only one parcel.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial
seal, this 16th day of May, 1932.
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass
that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax
on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into
another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the
land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and
would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner
entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not
collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at
P5,000, according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in
his name and on March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from
P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the
conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set
out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its
improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the
entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the
parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date
of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court
of Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the
land and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of
the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law
between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that
if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the
words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in
accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for
doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The
words used by the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to
enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12
per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover,
agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties
entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated
interest thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay,
within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest
thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the
parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of
the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was
covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land
would file a motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of
title No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in
clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period of four years and a half, she would execute an
absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the
same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be
disapproved by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the contract of sale would
automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than
those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law,
morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and
when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid
contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on
article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives
his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no
difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what
extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under the
view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its
essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend
to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom,
except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest
intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a
condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also
occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following
words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several
promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to
be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so
far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a
lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because
an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same
consideration, and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation
of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary
implication declares the entire contract void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512;
New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v.
Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19
Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v.
Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac.
R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in
Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of
mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no
question that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The
second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116
of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance
or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term
of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should
Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four
and a half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would execute in favor
of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest
stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after
the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of
the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone
the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land
tax. These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the
mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of
error is well-founded and that error was committed in holding that the contract
entered into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its
improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error
the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of
violating the Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The
assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said document
is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that certain
pacts thereof are illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874,
as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the
verbal agreement entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have
been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error
the same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted
in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits
thereof, resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the
improvements introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties
entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements
thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he
would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his
receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of
antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract
of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No.
2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in
taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with
Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not
sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not
expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every
person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by
which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides
further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith".
Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of
ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the
possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was
the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not have before us
a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point. In
resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the
petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of
any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will
be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found
established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the
petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from
the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether
good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on
article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded
upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the
capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and
even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies
against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such
circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law,
the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not
infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one
thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible
and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation
of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better
still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to
the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and
appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the
interpretation of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish
Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the
basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as
clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes
of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section
116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner,
his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax
declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land,
because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the change of
possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have
stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land
and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the
Civil Code and having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the
provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the
respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the
petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or
the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to
pay them the sum of P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the
petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court
denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the trial
court that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents have
not established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the petitioner and
the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements
on condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would
attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the
stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the
payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the
elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil
Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits
be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing
remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed,
amounted to P120 per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from
the land hardly reached said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of
said improvements was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the
fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a
certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these data here to show that
the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits of the
mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly covers the
interest earned by the secured indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we
hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in
Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon
verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is
a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that
the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by
paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and
have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market
value to be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the
respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged
improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the
improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000,
without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged
improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner may ask
for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds
thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the
costs in all instances. So ordered.
Diaz, J., concu
G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE respondents.
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners.
The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in reality a very
simple question from the viewpoint of the Solicitor General. We agree with the latter.
There is actually only one issue to be resolved in this action. That issue is whether or
not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner's appeal
on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of action.
Appeal from what? That indeed is the question.
But first the facts.
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly resident
in the Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A. 1 As he left certain shares of stock in the
Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976,
with the Philippine Revenue Representative in San Francisco, U.S.A. 2
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 on
February 9, 1978.3 This assessment was protested on March 7, 1978, by the law firm
of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was denied by the
Commissioner on July 7, 1978.5 No further action was taken by the estate in pursuit
of that protest.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to probate in
the Circuit Court of Oregon 6Ward Graham, the designated executor, then appointed
Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of
the will in the Philippines.7
Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with
the petitioner as ancillary administrator. 9 As such, he filed a second estate tax return
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980.10
On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment on the
estate in the amount of P72,948.87.11 This was protested on behalf of the estate by
the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980.12
While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a
motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35 as assessed on
February 9, 1978.13 He said that this liability had not yet been paid although the
assessment had long become final and executory.
The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed on August
13, 1980, against the second assessment of P72,948.87.14 On this understanding, he
filed on September 15, 1981, a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
challenging the said assessment. 15
The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner stressed, no
answer was filed during a delay of 195 days) and in the end instead cancelled the
protested assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31,
1982.16 This cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic.17
The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984.18 The petitioner
then came to this Court oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the shares of stocks
left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property;
(2) whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owner's death or
six months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal filed with the respondent court
should be considered moot and academic.
We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.
In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue wrote as follows:
Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary
Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton & Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila
Sir:
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR
GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon, U.S.A. on March 14,
1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand were issued by this
Bureau. One is for the amount of P96,509.35 based on the first
return filed, and the other in the amount of P72,948.87, based on
the second return filed.
It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was issued on
February 9, 1978 on the basis of the estate tax return filed on
September 16, 1976. The said assessment was, however,
protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but was denied on July 7,
1978. Since no appeal was made within the regulatory period, the
same has become final.
In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid
assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15) days upon receipt
hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this Bureau, BIR
National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. The assessment for
P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred to above is hereby
cancelled.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for P72,948.87
that the petitioner had been deprived of a cause of action as it was precisely from this
assessment that he was appealing.
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition questioning the
assessment of July 3, 1980, was "premature" since the protest to the assessment
had not yet been resolved.20 As a matter of fact it had: the said assessment had been
cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The respondent court was on surer
ground, however, when it followed with the finding that the said cancellation had
rendered the petition moot and academic. There was really no more assessment to
review.
The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3, 1980,
had the effect of canceling the first assessment of February 9, 1978, and that the
subsequent cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect of
automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not binding on him
because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of
our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.
The petitioner is clutching at straws.
It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of
P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is considered
provisional only based on the estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this
Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due from the estate. Any
amount that may be found due after said investigation will be assessed and collected
later." 21 It is illogical to suggest that aprovisional assessment can supersede an
earlier assessment which had clearly become final and executory.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he
argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed
the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is
the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of
their ignorance?
If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are
not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be
any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow
discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first assessment
is already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late hour. The
assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The
protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by the
decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and
executory.
In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its denial.
In his motion with the probate court, the respondent Commissioner stressed that "in a
letter dated January 29, 1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor Graham thru the aforesaid
foreign law firm informed claimant that they have paid said tax liability thru the
Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and Puno, Philippine law firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext.,
Makati, Metro Manila that initiated the instant ancillary proceedings" although he
added that such payment had not yet been received.22 This letter was an
acknowledgment by the estate of the validity and finality of the first assessment.
Significantly, it has not been denied by the petitioner.
In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise the
question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before
the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should have done earlier,
following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days after it received notice of said
denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner could then have raised the first two
issues he now raises without basis in the present petition.
The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should be
considered conjugal property or belonging to him alone is immaterial in these
proceedings. So too is the time at which the assessment of these shares of stock
should have been made by the BIR. These questions were not resolved by the Court
of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to act on the petitioner's appeal from an
assessment that had already been cancelled. The assessment being no longer
controversial or reviewable, there was no justification for the respondent court to rule
on the petition except to dismiss it.
If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the
computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer be
rectified because the original assessment has long become final and executory. If
that assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, that error — for error it was — was committed not by the respondents but
by the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner represents. So how can he now
complain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered,
Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as
follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged
matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision
of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less
than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the
transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the
subject the serious consideration which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased
was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a
legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in
1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged
that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine
Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia
Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after
hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference
to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the
Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters
Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage
between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage;
accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The
order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a
partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children,
Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As
to the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court.
As to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error,
these can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese
marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong
Boo was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-
first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February
16, 1985, to a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to
having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in
evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows:
One hundred Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers
years of life and the venerable Chiong Ing, father of the
health for both. bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage,
and let this document serve as proof of the
acceptance of said marriage which is to be
celebrated during the merry season of the
flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for
your and the spouses much happiness, a long
life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as
that which you brought forth. I consider the
marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia
as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat
each other with great love and mutual courtesy
and that both they and their parents be very
happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-
first year of the reign of the Emperor Quang Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his
marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong
Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime
thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910,
Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears
from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine
Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his
native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to
have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of
the claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor
noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother
of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by
overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses
stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China,
he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this
appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the
relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son
Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the
mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before
the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it
is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion
([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and
the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the
conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants of
an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage.
The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding
that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by
the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty
years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the
death of the husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior
Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce
a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the same
category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case,
there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-
three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of
an acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the
affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North
Borneo. But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question,
because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong
Boo is fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime
prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan,
Philippine Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the
ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan
Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one
of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the
marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and
another, the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied
with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house
of the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the
Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was
consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born
five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with
Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as
his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents.
Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of
registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late
as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom
is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend,
especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that
proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the
Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the
Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced
in the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections
of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a
judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or
minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of
the word "priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any
denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian
religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the
lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and
considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service
is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc.,
obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest.
"Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A
"denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin
[1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H.
9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form
for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is
indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of
a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from
the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance,
there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to
consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the
priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true
that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband
and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt
[1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage
Law which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law
which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage
heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall
be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or
omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he
had authority and that they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the
legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between
Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of
the Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages,
and it is not to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to
validate void marriages celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary
to the laws which then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing
could be clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all
embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" —
Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase?
"Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of
such authority" — Could stronger language than this be invoked to announce
legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission" —
Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the
marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the
parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married" — What was the purpose of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the
marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to
perform the same, and if either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is
there any word or hint of any word which would restrict the curative provisions of
section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By what system of mental
gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from such precise language the curious
idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the
revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would
ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order
No. 68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the
Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory
law, and executive proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that
"The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on
every branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form
of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon
any citizen of the Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be
interfered with or molested in following his calling, and that the separation between
state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute." The notable state paper of
President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that the
Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main
constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in
the same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the
Captain General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government
guaranteed "with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free
exercise of their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will
also respect their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January
14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section 3,
provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding
civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is
deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except
laws of the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account
local laws and customs. . . ." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [ j]; Act No. 1283, sec.
6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine
Commission; Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.)
Various responsible officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government
not to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to
make quotation of the same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were
inspired by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages
of the Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is,
that a marriage between two Indians entered into according to the customs and laws
of the people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be
recognized as a valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will
be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they
use no solemnization. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony
entered into before a proper official by members of that Church competent to contract
marriage constitutes a valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633;
Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for
denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual
marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can
render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended
to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209;
Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution
which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction
which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences,
entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong
Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at
least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local
custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these
marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make
them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or
to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.
In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court
in the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United
States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these
decisions to be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two
Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question
was a tribal marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had
been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In
neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit
of the so-called unwritten law, was any consideration given to the provisions of
section IX of General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would
unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.
We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the
Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law
as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is
unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved
and that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and
we find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the
widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the
law.
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a
partition of the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings
in accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so
ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,
vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon)
with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v.
Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin
Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated
December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal
amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his complaint the
following:
xxx
2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is
duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was
dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the Land
Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that
he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was
duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the
payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand defendant refused
and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;
5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s
valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of counsel
for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorney’s fees the amount of
₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that there is
no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist
in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account
and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already
closed at the time he issued a check;
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one
which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much
as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the
payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.3
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment,
which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan
vehicle of Simon.4
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of
another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant
action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
xxx
xxx
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the
said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X
(10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint
against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a
consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for
payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26,
1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who
is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made
integral part hereof as Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:
1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of
Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;
2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest;
however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the
right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the
information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at
all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any
claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private
complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution
evidence was not represented at all by a private prosecutor such that no
evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to
prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective
implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for
damages;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which
provides as follows:
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during
the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action;
4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation
at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to
file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an obligation
which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his
liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming
the allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the
issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to
that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be
negotiated by delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such
negotiation was valid and effective against the drawer;
5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the
circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely
impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended
 only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said
check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the
criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal
offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant
action may still be prosecuted;
7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for
damages against the bond is totally without any legal support and perforce
should be dismissed outright.6
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to
dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion
to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should
be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not
only identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery of the
value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In both civil
and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded
on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil
case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case
and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution
evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is
filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or
reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a
separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the
waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and
express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to
prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation
as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22
against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the filing of the
instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right to institute a
separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for
sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:
1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";
2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14,
2000;
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the
defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
implementation of the writ of attachment;
 4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch
to the defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from him on
August 16, 2000; and
5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:
Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his
previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon;
and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs.
Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal
of Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of
litis pendentia.
In his comment, Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
11
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case
because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC,
viz:
xxx
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social
injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused
to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity
which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became
effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced
that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a
reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account
of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing."
It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The
complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code
and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later bounced. It
was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal case for violation
of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became
effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and
may be made to apply to the case at bench, since procedural rules may be given
retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge
damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised
its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the
ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez14 stretched the meaning
and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of
money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.15
In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied
because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action,
being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a
private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate civil
action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the
unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can
give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of
the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for
the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas
v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution
of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v.
Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so may leave the
offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.18
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action
has a vested right in the rules of procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the
changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of
evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post
factounder the Constitution.21
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all
criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing
and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.22
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the
check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular
No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks
to enforce against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding
filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the
complaint or information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the
pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the
proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus:
xxx
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks
was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation
of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation
to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.1avvphi1
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically
states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of
the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with
B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon
being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action
in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before
the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite
the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for
criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of
the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action,
which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed
is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming
for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to
recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will
not apply to the case at bar.24
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez25 to give due
course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No.
275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa,
is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22.
Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the
recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve
his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based
on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed.
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability
arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in
the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained
under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence
of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties
or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of
the existence of the third becomes nil.28
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably
shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in
the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00,
that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case
No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had
issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon CERTIFICATION
which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any
judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim. Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. Division.
915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000;
and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC. RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse
and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. EN BANC
We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City. G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent. PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
SO ORDERED. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS, respondents.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: BELLOSILLO, J.:

ARTURO D. BRION** Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
Associate Justice essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
Acting Chairperson immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to
jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have
ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
Associate Justice Associate Justice speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
"escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
Associate Justice
conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity,
ATTESTATION contrition and remorse.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968,
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
ARTURO D. BRION Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Associate Justice Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
Acting Chairperson
 You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic),
bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . .
. Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation
in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from
9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Br. 61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases
filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210,
sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of
each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and
Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,
plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent
failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction
but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or
obfuscation. Thus —
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory
words complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried
"about some missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the
Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of
P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words must have been
uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal
therefrom the decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution
of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest.
But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the
MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992
dismissed his petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September
4, 1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of
the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition
that he had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above
order; in fact, he had failed to give the court an.opportunity to
correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error on the matter. He
is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the questioned
order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of
his petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v.
Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any
capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in
denying the petitioner's application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of
time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant
probation after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of
appeal, upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each case, but
expressly rules out probation where an appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his
petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of
probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason
for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was
such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he
appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the
penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation
even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with
regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those
not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the
court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of
the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a
special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of
the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not
therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of
Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification.
As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of
petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from
applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the
probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice
Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute.
We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that
any statutory language that appears to favor the accused in
acriminal case should be given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . .
have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of
the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and·as
illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may
legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear
and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The
"true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges
and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in
mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be
given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-
maker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical
source independent of and transcending the words of the
legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict
interpretation" rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and
"liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined
and principled search for the meaning which the law-making
authority projected when it promulgated the language which we
must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4,
as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The
Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no
need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites
us to engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner
rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words
of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a
statute as he finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as
this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion
and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability
and continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with
respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts, cutting the words here
and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to
have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing
 and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable
to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
given statute or contract until it has been
submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as
our people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if
the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and
express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a
negativeclause, "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v.
Salvador, 13 we said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of
statutory construction. negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the
law does not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already
probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to
within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused
found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up.
And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be
determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple
prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit
set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to
probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is
immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the
probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the
word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed
but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even
if petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1)
day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as
he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime committed on each date of
each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four (4) informations,
he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as each prison term
imposed on petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation
is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a
risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong
doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might
further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have
been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The
Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of
multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence,
the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and
the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and
thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single
decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed
thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of
thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of mutilation and
sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to
twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin.
Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of
probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision
he could not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although
he did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be,
that the penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have
qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16)
times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months,
which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the
Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128
months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months,
hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the
total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times
since there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for
probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties
imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on
each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should
suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed,
the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed
by the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or
incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties
imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16)
times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability
of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the
penalties imposed therein. Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.
Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above
entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the
Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight
penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was
acquitted or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4)
Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any
of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account
for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is
that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole
modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have
immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being
convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in
appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties
imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is
that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing
his penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified
under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record
is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised
only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his
acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of
his positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and
credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite the absence of
corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the
cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in
relying on his positive identification considering that private complainants could not
have missed identifying him who was their President and General Manager with
whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further argued that
although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other
persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of them was
presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could not have
convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not
complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties
imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable
range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence
therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting his
appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism
on the part of an accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for
probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to
the Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was
solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals
would increase his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC
Decision had already become final and executory because of the negligence,
according to him, of his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within
the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec
3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of
the four (4) Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave
oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however
may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly
convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is
clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision" 22of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the instant
petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific
issue —
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time.
The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation . . .
.
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for
probation from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is
allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of
time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up
for execution of judgment before he filed his application for
probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must
be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case,
such period for appeal had passed, meaning to say that the
Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal
therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal
from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in
addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner.
The petitioner did not file his application for probation before the
finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at
probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for
probation may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become
final, the conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for
service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond
comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the
MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal,
he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the
penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the
period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the
instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000
JUANITA NARZOLES, PERLITA GUTIERREZ, MYLENE GERONAGA, LETICIA M.
FORNAL, ARNEL DIMALIBOT, MARITES SAGUID, IRENE MARCENE, ABRAM
GERONAGA, ROLANDO LU, MARIBETH HERNANDEZ, CORAZON AGARAP,
PATRICIA ROSARIO, BERNADETTE LU, ANGELES MANGUL and JOSEFINA
MARTE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EASTERN MINDORO INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCES (EMITS), AND MR. MARCIAL S.
SEMILLA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Section 4, rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provides that the 60-day period
for filing a petition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial. In the event of the denial of the motion, the petitioner
only has the remaining period within which to file the petition. Does the amendment
apply to cases where the motion for reconsideration was filed before the amendment
although the petition was filed after the amendment took effect? This is the question
originally raised by the instant petition.
From the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing their complaint for illegal
dismissal, petitioner-employees appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered
respondents to reinstate petitioners "but without backwages." Petitioners received the
NLRC decision on 23 July 1998, and filed a motion for reconsideration on 3 August
1998. (The last day for filing said motion was on 2 August 1998, a Sunday.)
On September 1, 1998, the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 took effect per Circular
No. 39-98. The amendment added another paragraph to said Section, and reads:
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after
notice of said judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
Previous to the amendment, Section 4, Rule 65 provided in the lone paragraph that
"(t)he petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court."
On 19 October 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in this Court
on 17 December 1998. The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC.1
Acting on the petition, the court of appeals denied the same for late filing. Apparently,
the CA applied Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, in computing
the period for the filing of the petition for certiorari. It held:
The reglementary period to file petition for certiorari is sixty (60) days from notice of
the accrual of the cause for certiorari (Sec. 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Petitioner's last day to file their petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The
petition was filed before the Honorable Supreme Court on December 17, 1998.
Consequently, this court hereby RESOLVES TO DISMISS the petition for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period.2
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners filed the
present petition for review.
There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98,
which took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore
applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense.3 No vested rights attach to
procedural laws.4 Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98,
correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for petitioners
to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60-day reglementary period. As
petitioners only had the remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it
received a copy of the resolution denying reconsideration, to file the petition
for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998
was nine (9) days too late.
Petitioners, however, claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-
98 since it would work injustice to them.5 We do not deem it necessary to rule on this
contention in view of further amendments to Section 4, Rule 65.
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion
resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been
because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought
about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on
the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a
fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a
petition for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to
further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. When and were petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.1âwphi1 [Underscoring supplied.]
The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in
the Manila Bulletin on august 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7,
2000, two newspapers of general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only
be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are
applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal
requirements.6 They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb
certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they
have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason
of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that
which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give
validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing
laws have been complied with.7 Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence,
are retroactive.8
Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on
September 1, 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation," its retroactive application cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the
petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the
same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative
Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of
this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-
employees.
As regards the contention of respondents that the case ought to be dismissed,
considering that only three of the fifteen petitioners verified the petition
for certiorari originally filed in this Court, the same is best resolved by the Court of
Appeals, where the records of the case remain.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to GIVE DUE COURSE to, and
GRANT, the petition. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concu
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167057 : April 11, 2012]
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PNOC-ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND ESTER R. GUERZON, CHAIRMAN, BIDS
AND AWARDS COMMITTEE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court,
from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or
any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the Government’s direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing
the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or
awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing,
prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d)
terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or
authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.cralaw
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and
issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.
Antecedents
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (“NEA”) published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply
and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty
thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification
Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and
PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA’s projected allocation for
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as
private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility
together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that
only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit
their financial bids.
Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and eligibility, only four (4)
bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding
for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids
where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection
of private respondent’s [Nerwin’s] manufacturing plants and facilities, including its
identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s
requirements.
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80
[for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000,
NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors
the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80
on account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries
(lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the
amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed
substantial and extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is
equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the
Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the
poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of
poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and
specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No.
32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 “given the time
limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of
October 2001 fast approaching”. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules
of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private
respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a
ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to
have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the
pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private
respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought
the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the
eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said
officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government
Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the
award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA
allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract,
prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted
by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the
Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-
qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project
(“O-ILAW project”).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW
Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee,
alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the
items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the
complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure
projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition
against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and
file the complaint.[3]
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents’ reply, the RTC
granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4]
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this
Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and
Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-
EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from
continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the
amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the defendants
may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final
determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in
the amount of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict
compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to
set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents’ motions for reconsideration, to
set aside order of default, and to admit answer.[6]
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action
for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite
the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO
in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring
respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing
them.[7]
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and
December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case
No. 03106921, private respondent’s complaint for issuance of temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February
9, 2005.[9]
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act
8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on
government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on
the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary
injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
 III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also
one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and
why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent
Judge’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for
TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the
assailed order enjoining petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same
is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus,
already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July
20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions
and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall
issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person
or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a
private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which
earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law
was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in
an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had
the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the
ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in
cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National
Housing Authority vs. Allarde “As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the
Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha
Construction: The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means ‘construction, improvement
and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication
facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems,
shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital
buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government
capital investment.”
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the
case, that would justify respondent Judge’s blatant disregard of a “simple,
comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects.” Respondent Judge did
not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the
single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in
the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondent’s complaint
for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered
by petitioners.[10]
The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion,
firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents
notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding
out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO
and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location
of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such
contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a
private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall
not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such
that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable
injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the
court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified
and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability
that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation
of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left
for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act
No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the
lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect
the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No.
03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the
assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine
him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening
retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-
2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA
explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed
to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a
government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was.
He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Court’s various circulars enjoining
courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects
in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon.
Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed
that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs
against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v.
Judge Laviña faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a
government infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or
openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of
the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining
strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to
his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge
to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to
ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they
are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the
circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the
disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the
performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and
unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them
susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for
being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges
are expected to know and apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law,
which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He
having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him,
the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction
to dismissal or suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of
Nerwin’s other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the
RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive
remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the
norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of
TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants
and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case
No. 03106921 be avoided.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to
refrain from a particular act or acts.[13]It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted
to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the
case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.[14]
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to
be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the
violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima
facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the
issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise
to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by
statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded,
however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough that:
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a
present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And
while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not
be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but
need only be a “sampling” intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification
for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This
should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the
preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial
court.

Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs
only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its
complaintxxx.[18]
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering
that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not
involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate
courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the
issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the
manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by
the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is
manifest abuse.[21]
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of
improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to
dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in
disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function of a
TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23] or to decide
controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent
threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the
rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a
means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of
circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on
the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should
issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the
applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[31]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, *Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim
Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were]
performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of
the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of
channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at
the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing
the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of
the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily
jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the
[p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of
the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was
merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but
without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO
PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and,
therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an
entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A
witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This
is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions,
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-
examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested
by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in
official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima
facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief
Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that
the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified
before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire
Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the
trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving
the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it
constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his
personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions
were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were
annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first
purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then
be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in
the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that
it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but
the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his
Report and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse
party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but
not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section
does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the
official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and
makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence as prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon
v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily
needed; the occasions in which the officials would be summoned
from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless.
The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not
done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were
there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as
witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The
work of administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence.
For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private
documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and
fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not
presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44
of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would
have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible
since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements
given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as
"official information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they
were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes
part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were
of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of
the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the
morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted
an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident13 and
saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it
was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the
chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain
was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the
cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It
is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res
ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or
inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of
the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference
or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be
such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the
injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant,
and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s
want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference
which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to
the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by
which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised
by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity,
in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in
which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to
show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of
defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court
add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to
apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged
with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the
accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a
building to the basement while he was working with appellant’s construction
project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive
control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control
of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees.
On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites
are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement
while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;]
thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is
 present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia
and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive
control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus
a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x
x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did
not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell
respondent’s husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated
earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff
establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant
to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that
of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to
explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro
executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to
Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety
and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care
but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of
petitioner’s employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits
are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-
examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit
is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due
care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her
husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death
benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming
from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic
Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the
government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to
the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said
injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said
Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions.
The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which
involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and
regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex
Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the
Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the
affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his
heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue
of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition
for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus
Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either
to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with
their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to
dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the
deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio
Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor
and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except
Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x
x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to
the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they
set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence
and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing
an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the
fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations
by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount
for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or
a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be
decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated
in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-
Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the
Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by
workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under
other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule
that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or
the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice
of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of
compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional
benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim
for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil
complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the
respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum
that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception
in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged
negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the
police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed her sworn
statement before the police investigator concerning her personal
circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident.
She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who recommended
the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the
prosecutor’s office. This is a standard operating procedure for police
investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain
why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent
Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did
not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred
from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were
notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting
evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon
the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she
received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation
report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an
afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of
the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of
evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to
any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the
records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the
foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she
learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received
the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall
under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of
her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary
school for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages
could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not
know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the
ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to
allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were
attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the
trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the
facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the
complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of
the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that,
although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was
"civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits
from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent
also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim
and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent
remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent
with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of
election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is
designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise
that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine
is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a
single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery
under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil
Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the
other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge
of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by
the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is
 asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver
of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows
that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an
intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for
the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff,
to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,
erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue.
On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in
pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing
for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her
husband’s death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.
In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is
the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly
learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation
of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules
and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or
mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at
bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in
the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for
benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990,
10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to
her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system
(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do
not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC,
although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment
representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total
monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive
from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the
trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the
ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall
be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling
in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
SO ORDERED. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
SERENO, CJ:
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
vs. raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these
matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals
x-----------------------x judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony
D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are
G.R. No. 154954 concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the
validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents. reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering
the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
x-----------------------x against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified
the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all
of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
G.R. No. 155101
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse
vs.
of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and
Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated.
x-----------------------x Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the
date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition
in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio
Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident
or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present
case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during
the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and
that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan
City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while
the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs
by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were
given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their
first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the
day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these 16. Antonio General (General)
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
pronounced dead on arrival.
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans: 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) In Criminal Case No. C-38340
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be
resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused
De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola
(Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the
sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of
moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed
the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the
accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo
Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy
trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable.
She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of
12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the
proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it
concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault
(culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent
to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code.
It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to
the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and
culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that
the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner
that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice
aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their
acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like
their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former
also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his
death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from
the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a
result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases
against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue
that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted
their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their
completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their
respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these
applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case
against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520
had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived
their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded
to that for intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of
their probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and
terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal
assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration
concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered
and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February
2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et
al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to
an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the
acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and
so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny
the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act
complained of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be
appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize
that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with
that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x
x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what
the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus
– is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the
result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the
result. On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous,
and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or
omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with
malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient
in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se,
the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi–
cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the
act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against
the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason
of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that
there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the
person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of
each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged
liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty
for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the
nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony
already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one
hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the
distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365
(Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs
as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties
outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the
death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious
intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi
in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is
what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA
finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result
of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge
therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our
Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no
longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the
former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65
petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that
a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until
after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment
once the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled
from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of
a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the
judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the
state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to
increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when
applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and
executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove
the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed
in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a
second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and
resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule
120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already
explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that
this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the
court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is
articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner
done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the
judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very
heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this
Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a
criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that
what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and
not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct
and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether
the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition
is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose
resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition,
any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of
lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must
be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular
appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal
would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial
annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the
judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity
of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That
power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance
with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not
the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of
the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 –
of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor
Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with
or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in
a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners
therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on
an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with
the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals
the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate
court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the
moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal
– the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield
the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its
decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain
with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be
ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed
except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting
the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan
appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or
when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the
judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case
was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order
must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of
the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of
origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the
execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its
jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of
the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before
the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only
upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months
after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September
2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October
2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent
to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG
assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25
November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a
comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we
eventually required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of
the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on
the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority
to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-
upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal.
In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them
undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to
help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is
an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of
Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed
by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not
therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the
RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court
was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after
the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case,
the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión
mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed
to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the
accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity
and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis
that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court
enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of
the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-
probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the
1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch
130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later
downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days
of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first
time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the
time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use
of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice.
As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson
et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in
Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual
termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To
support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment
of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we
find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely
to "suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence
with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by
a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand
modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who
appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En
Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He
will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser
offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment
— even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to
pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the
carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas
not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation."
The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those
who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes
on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would
have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of
two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to
apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through
no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad
the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have
availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even
have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him
is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
(Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by
arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to
prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable
to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon
is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which
granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al.
have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the
minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to
discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of
the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence
reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next
lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must
be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the
accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et
al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding
accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is
determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before
the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is
made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence.
It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties
specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set
by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on
the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two
penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is
concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the
shortening of the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion
tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson
et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of
prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties:
ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty
sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their
sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once
the judgment of conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they
shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall
forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation
office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in
the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
expressly remitted in a pardon.85 Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible
to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.
probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the
point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87 fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as
follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n
is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. correccional, as maximum."
We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension SO ORDERED.
from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from Chief Justice
continuing with her teaching profession.
WE CONCUR:
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual ANTONIO T. CARPIO
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto Senior Associate Justice
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed Chairperson
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even Associate Justice Associate Justice
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed BIENVENIDO L. REYES
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions Associate Justice
prescribed in the probation order.
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED. assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise Chief Justice
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA
JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of substance. The dispositive portion2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998
in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle
Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife.
She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with
the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the
care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was
bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati
City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was
in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of
respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay
office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3 that respondent was no
longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills
showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and
other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in
the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts
Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was
re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this
Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It
provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
 b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902
insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in
custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did,
because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an
interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition
for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily
evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving
out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has
territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it
cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this
Court – or any court for that matter – to determine. The enactment of a law
on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is
a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts
but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of
the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme
Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody
of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129
since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To
the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their
children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the
Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to
"protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the
Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding
children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule
therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to
quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and
transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to
avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the
child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate
 court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor
General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a
work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had
exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioner’s submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction
of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same
manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is
concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable
only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the
territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined
with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court
of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by
law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the
regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was
merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied
the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not
an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more
than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not
accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may
render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction.7 In the case at bar,
a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate
the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or
where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country
is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a
ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country"
does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such
a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer
in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable
anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in
CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,, J., Chairman, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, on leave.
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital),
Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity
of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September,
1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of
Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8
German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty
shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to
possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty,
after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license
or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he
had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed
by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962,
reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and

trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes
and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of
Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking
in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery
and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed
a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take
effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the
position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of
peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me
once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any
abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient
ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and
immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated
December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm,
particularly described below, for use in connection with the
performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance
of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original
thereof with us.

V
e
r
y

t

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information
regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and
other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in
the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of
the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs.
Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the
accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively,
with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint,
nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally
liable for illegal possession of a nfirearm and ammunition on the ground that the
rulings of the Supreme Court in cthe cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed
and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, i supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointmentsa of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent. l
Let us advert to Our decisions inGPeople v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.o In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's
v accused because it was shown that at the time he
judgment of conviction against the
was found to possess a certain efirearm and ammunition without license or permit, he
r
had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and ordern and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold
o
and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that
the Governor has no authority tor issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless,
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We
held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of
the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of
the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly
abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec.
878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative
Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines
[of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
 servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec.
879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret
agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this
appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is
of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of
criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to
the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence
of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may
not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 134284, December 1, 2000.
AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner.
vs.
ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DE LEON, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of a decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598 entitled "Ayala
Corporation vs. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation, ‘ dismissing Ayala
Corporation’s petition for lack of merit.
The facts of the case are not in dispute:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (herein-after referred to as Ayala) was the registration
owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an
area of 840 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka
Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the
buyers contained Special conditions of sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the
Special Conditions of Sale were.
a. The vendee shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to
the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval.
b. The construction of the building shall start on or before March 30,
1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither
no the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully
paid.
c. There shall be no resale of the property.
The Deed Restrictions, on the other hand, contained the stipulation that the gross
floor area of the building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot
area and the total height shall not exceed forty two (42) meters. The restrictions were
to expire in the year 2025.
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special
Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy anf Sy Ka Kieng, in April
1989, were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Rosa-Diana) with Ayala’s approval. As a
consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of title of the subject property, Rosa
Diana, on July 27, 1989 executed an Undertaking, together with the buildings plans
for a condominium project, known as "The Peak", Ayala released title to the lot,
thereby enabling Rosa-Diana t register the deed of sale in its favor and obtain
Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its name. The title carried as encumbrances the
special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions. Rosa-Diana’s building plans as
approved by Ayala were ‘subject to strict compliance of cautionary notices appearing
on the building plans and to the restrictions encumbering the Lot regarding the use
and occupancy of the same.’
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of
building plans for "The Peak" which Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval
envisioned a 24-meter high, seven (7) storey condominium project with a gross floor
area of 3,968.56 square meters, the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to
the building official of Makati, contemplated a 91.65 meter high, 38 storey
condominium building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters.1 Needless
to say, while the first set of building plans complied with the deed restrictions, the
latter set seceded the same.
During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project, Ayala filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 139 for specific performance,
with application for a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against
Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply with the contractual
obligations under the deed of restrictions annotated on its title as well as with the
building plans it submitted to the latter. In the alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission
of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty.
The lower court denied Ayala’s prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana
to complete the construction of the building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on Rosa-Diana’s title. The Register of Deeds of
Makati, however, refused registration of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that
the case pending before the trial court, being an action for specific performance
and/or rescission, is an action in personal which does not involve the title, use or
possession of the property.2 The Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the
ruling of the Register of Deeds saying that an action for specific performance or
recession may be classified as a proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof for which a notice of lis pendens may be
held proper.3 The decision of the LRA, however, was overturned by the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157. In G.R. No. 112774, We affirmed the ruling of
the CA on February 16, 1994 saying.
We agree with respondent court that the notice of lis pendens is not
proper in this instance. The case before the trial court is a personal
action since the cause of action thereof arises primarily from the
alleged violation of the Deed of Restriction.
In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of evidence before the trial court.
Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring that Ayala failed to establish its
right to the relief sought in-as much as (a) Ayala admittedly does not enforce the
deed restrictions uniformly and strictly (b) Ayala has lost its right/power to enforce the
restrictions due to its own acts and omissions; and (c) the deed restrictions are no
longer valid and effective against lot buyers in Ayala’s controlled subdivision.
The trial court sustained Rosa-Diana’s Demurrer to Evidence saying that Ayala was
guilty of abandonment and/or estoppel due to its failure to enforce the terms of deed
of restrictions and special conditions of sale against Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng. The
trial court noted that notwithstanding the violation of the special conditions of sale,
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng were able to transfer the title to Rosa-Diana with the
approval of Ayala. The trial court added that Ayala’s failure to enforce the restrictions
with respect to Trafalgar, Shellhouse, Eurovilla, LPL Plaza, Parc Regent, LPL
Mansion and Leronville, which are located within Salcedo Village, shows that Ayala
discriminated against those which it wants to have the obligation enforced. The trial
court then concluded that for Ayala to discriminatory choose which obligor would be
made to follow certain conditions and which should not, did not seem fair and legal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court saying that the "appeal is
seated by the doctrine of the law of the case in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157" where it
was stated that
xxx Ayala is bared from enforcing the Deed of Restriction in question pursuant to the
doctrine of waiver and estoppel. Under the terms of the deed of sale, the vendee Sy
Ka Kieng assumed faithful compliance with the special conditions of sale and with the
Salcedo Village Deed of Restrictions. One of the conditions was that a building would
be constructed within one year. However, Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building
as required under the Deed Sale. Ayala did nothing to enforce the terms of the
contract. In fact, it even agreed to the sale of the lot by Sy Ka Kieng in favor of
petitioner Realty in 1989 or thirteen (13) years later. We, therefore, see no justifiable
reason for Ayala to attempt to enforce the terms of the conditions of sale against the
petitioner.
xxx
The Court of Appeals also cited C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, "Ayala
Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation’ which relied on C.A. G.R. S.P.
No. 29157 in ruling that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in
dispute. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner, the Court of
Appeals clarified that "the citation of the decision in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton
Development Corporation, Ca G.R. C.V. No. 46488, February 27, 1996, was made
not because said decision is res judicata to the case at bar but rather because it is
precedential under the doctrine of stare decisis."
Upon denial of said motion for reconsideration, Ayala filed the present appeal.
Ayala contends that the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No.
29157 that it is estopped from enforcing the deed restrictions is merely obiter
dicta inasmuch as the only issue raised in the aforesaid case was the propriety of
a lis pendens annotation on Rosa-Diana’s certificate of title.
Ayala avers that Rosa-Diana presented no evidence whatsoever on Ayala’s
supposed waiver or estoppel in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157. Ayala likewise pointed out
that at the time C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was on appeal, the issues of the validity
and continued viability of the deed of restrictions and their enforceability by Ayala
were joined and then being tried before the trial court.
Petitioner’s assignment of errors in the present appeal may essentially be
summarized as follows:
I. The Court of Appeals acted in manner not in accord with law and
the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the
doctrine of the law of the case, or stare decisis, operated to dismiss
Ayala’s appeal.
II. The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law and departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed
to expressly pass upon the specific errors assigned in Ayala’s
appeal.
A discussion on the distinctions between law of the case, stare decisis and obiter
dicta is in order.
The doctrine of the law of the case has certain affinities with, but is clearly
distinguishable from, the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, principally on the
ground that the rule of the law of the case operates only in the particular case and
only as a rule of policy and not as one of law.4 At variance with the doctrine of stare
decisis, the ruling adhered to in the particular case under the doctrine of the law of
the case need not be followed as a precedent in subsequent litigation between other
parties, neither by the appellate court which made the decision followed on a
subsequent appeal in the same case, nor by any other court. The ruling covered by
the doctrine of the law of the case is adhered to in the single case where it arises, but
is not carried into other cases as a precedent.5 On the other hand, under the doctrine
of stare decisis, once a point of law has been established by the court, that point of
law will, generally, be followed by the same court and by all courts of lower rank in
subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.6 Stare decisis proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike.7
The Court of Appeals, in ruling against petitioner Ayala Corporation stated that the
appeal is ‘sealed’ by the doctrine of the law of the case, referring to G.R. No. 112774
entitled "Ayala Corporation, petitioner vs. Courts of Appeals, et al., respondents". The
Court of Appeals likewise made reference to C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled,
"Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, Inc." in ruling against
petitioner saying that it is jurisprudentially under the doctrine of stare decisis.
It must be pointed out that the only issue that was raised before the Court of Appeals
in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was whether or not the annotation of lis pendens is
proper. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, in fact stated "the principal issue to be
resolved is: whether or not an action for specific performance, or in the alternative,
rescission of deed of sale to enforce the deed of restrictions governing the use of
property, is a real or personal action, or one that affects title thereto and its use or
occupation thereof.8
In the aforesaid decision, the Court of Appeals even justified the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens on the ground that Ayala had ample protection should it
succeed in proving its allegations regarding the violation of the deed of
restrictions, without unduly curtailing the right of the petitioner to fully enjoy its
property in the meantime that there is as yet no decision by the trial court.9
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was aware that the issue as
to whether petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions has yet to be
resolved by the trial court. Though it did make a pronouncement that the petitioner is
estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions, it also mentioned at the same time
that this particular issue has yet to be resolved by the trial court. Notably, upon
appeal to this Court, We have affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals only as
regards the particular issue of the propriety of the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.
We see no reason then, how the law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be
applicable in the case at bench. If at all, the pronouncement made by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can
only be considered as obiter dicta. As earlier mentioned the only issue before the
Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of the lis
pendens. The additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is
estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized that this said
issue is being tried before the trial court was not necessary to dispose of the issue as
to the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum is an opinion of a judge
which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point, not the proffered deliberate
opinion of the judge himself.10 It is not necessarily limited to issues essential to the
decision but may also include expressions of opinion which are not necessary to
support the decision reached by the court. Mere dicta are not binding under the
doctrine of stare decisis11.
While the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the present petition is not barred
by C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled "Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Inc." under the doctrine of res judicata, neither, however, can the latter case be cited
as presidential under the doctrine of stare decisis. It must be pointed out that at the
time the assailed decision was rendered, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 was on appeal
with this Court. Significantly, in the decision. We have rendered in Ayala Corporation
vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation12 which became final and executory on July
5, 1999 we have clearly stated that "An examination of the decision in the said Rosa-
Diana case reveals that the sole issue raised before the appellate court was the
propriety of the lis pendens annotation. However, the appellate court went beyond the
sole issue and made factual findings bereft of any basis in the record to
inappropriately rule that AYALA is in estoppel and has waived its right to enforce the
subject restrictions. Such ruling was immaterial to the annotation of the lis pendens.
The finding of estoppel was thus improper and made in excess of jurisdiction."
Coming now to the merits of the case, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to expressly
pass upon the specific errors assigned in its appeal. Petitioner reiterates its
contention that law and evidence do not support the trial court’s findings that Ayala
has waived its right to enforce the deed of restrictions.
We find merit in the petition.
It is basic that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.13 We
are constrained, however, to review the trial court'’ findings of fact, which the Court of
Appeals chose not to pass upon, in as much as there is ample evidence on record to
show that certain facts were overlooked which would affect the disposition of the
case.
In its assailed decision of February 4, 1994, the trial court, ruled in favor of
respondent Rosa-Diana Realty on the ground that Ayala had not acted fairly when it
did not institute an action against the original vendees despite the latter’s violation of
the Special Conditions of Sale but chose instead to file an action against herein
respondent Rosa-Diana. The trial court added that although the 38-storey building of
Rosa-Diana is beyond the total height restriction, it was not violative of the National
Building Code. According to the trial court the construction of the 38 storey building
known as "The Peak" has not been shown to have been prohibited by law and neither
is it against public policy.
It bears emphasis that as complainant, Ayala had the prerogative to initiate an action
against violators of the deed restrictions. That Rosa-Diana had acted in bad faith is
manifested by the fact that it submitted two sets of building plans, one which was in
conformity with the deed restrictions submitted to Ayala and MACEA, and the other,
which exceeded the height requirement in the deed restrictions to the Makati building
official for the purpose of procuring a building permit from the latter. Moreover, the
violation of the deed restrictions committed by respondent can hardly be
denominated as a minor violation. It should be pointed out that the original building
plan which was submitted to and approved by petitioner Ayala Corporation,
envisioned a twenty four (24) meter high, seven (7) storey condominium whereas the
respondent’s building plan which was submitted to and approved by the building
official of Makati is that of a thirty eight (38) storey, 91.65 meters high, building. At
present, the Peak building of respondent which actually stands at 133.65 meters with
a total gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters, seriously violates the dimensions
indicated in the building plans submitted by Rosa-Diana to petitioner Ayala for
approval in as much as the Peak building exceeds the approved height limit by about
109 meters and the allowable gross floor area under the applicable deed restrictions
by about 19,105 square meters. Clearly, there was a gross violation of the deed
restrictions and evident bad faith by the respondent.
It may not be amiss to mention that the deed restrictions were revised in a general
membership meeting of the association of lot owners in Makati Central Business
District the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA).
Whereby direct height restrictions were abolished in lieu of floor area limits.
Respondent, however, did not vote for the approval of this revision during the
General Membership meeting, which was held on July 11, 1990 at the Manila Polo
Clud Pavilion, Makati, and Metro Manila. Hence, respondent continues to be bound
by the original deed restrictions applicable to Lot 7, Block 1 and annotated on its title
to said lot. In any event, assuming arguendo that respondent voted for the approval
of direct height restrictions in lieu of floor area limits, the total floor area of its Peak
building would still be violative of the floor area limits to the extent of about 9,865
square meters of allowable floor area under the MACEA revised restrictions.
Respondent Rosa-Diana avers that there is nothing illegal or unlawful in the building
plans which it used in the construction of the Peak condominium ‘inasmuch as it
bears the imprimatur of the building official of Makati, who is tasked to determine
whether building and construction plans are in accordance with the law, notably, the
National Building Code."
Respondent Rosa-Diana, however, misses the point inasmuch as it has freely
consented to be bound by the deed restrictions when it entered into a contract of sale
with spouses Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng. While respondent claims that it was under
the impression that Ayala was no longer enforcing the deed restrictions, the
Undertaking14it executed belies this same claim. In said Undertaking, respondent
agreed to ‘construct and complete the construction of the house on said lot as
required under the special condition of sale." Respondent likewise bound itself to
abide and comply with x x x the condition of the rescission of the scale by Ayala
Land, Inc. on the grounds therein stated x x x.
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and
absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good custom, public
order or public policy, they must be complied with in good faith. Hence, Article 1159
of the New Civil Code provides.
"Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."
Respondent Rosa-Diana insists that the trial court had already ruled that the
undertaking executed by its Chairman and President cannot validly bind Rosa-Diana
and hence, it should not be held bound by the deed restrictions.
We agree with petitioner Ayala’s observation that respondent Rosa-Diana’s special
and affirmative defenses before the trial court never mentioned any allegation that its
president and chairman were not authorized to execute the Undertaking. It was
inappropriate therefore for the trial court to rule that in the absence of any authority or
confirmation from the Board of Directors of respondent Rosa-Diana, its Chairman and
the President cannot validly enter into an undertaking relative to the construction of
the building on the lot within one year from July 27, 1989 and in accordance with the
deed restrictions, Curiously, while the trial court stated that it cannot be presumed
that the Chairman and the President can validly bind respondent Rosa-Diana to enter
into the aforesaid Undertaking in the absence of any authority or confirmation from
the Board of Directors, the trial court held that the ordinary presumption of regularity
of business transactions is applicable as regards the Deed of Sale which was
executed by Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng and respondent Rosa-Diana. In the light of
the fact that respondent Rosa-Diana never alleged in its Answer that its president and
chairman were not authorized to execute the Undertaking, the aforesaid ruling of the
trial court is without factual and legal basis and suppressing to say the least.
The fact alone that respondent Rosa-Diana conveniently prepared two sets of
building plans –with one set which fully conformed to the Deed Restrictions and
another in gross violation of the same – should have cautioned the trial court to
conclude that respondent Rose-Diana was under the erroneous impression that the
Deed Restrictions were no longer enforceable and that it never intended to be bound
by the Undertaking signed by its President and Chairman. We reiterate that
contractual obligations have the force of law between parties and unless the same is
contrary to public policy morals and good customs, they must be complied by the
parties in good faith.
Petitioners, in its Petition, prays that judgement be rendered:
a. ordering Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation to
comply with its contractual obligations in the construction of the
Peak by removing, or closing down and prohibiting Rosa-Diana
from using, selling, leasing or otherwise disposing, of the portions
of areas thereof constructed beyond or in excess of the approved
height, as shown by the building plans submitted to, and approved
by, Ayala, including any other portion of the building constructed
not in accordance with the said building plans, during the effectivity
of the Deed Restrictions;
b. Alternatively, in the event specific performance has become
impossible;
 1. ordering the cancellation and recession of the April 20, 1976 Deed
of Sale by Ayala in favor of the original vendees thereof as well as
the subsequent Deed of Sale executed by such original vendees in
favor of Rosa-Diana, and ordering Rosa-Diana to return Ayala Lot
7, Block 1 of Salcedo Village;
2. ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165720
(in the name of Rosa-Diana) and directing the office of the Register
of Deeds of Makati to issue a new title over the lot in the name of
Ayala; and
3. Ordering Rosa-Diana to pay Ayala attorney’s fees in the amount of
P500, 000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P5,
000,000.00 and the costs of suit.
It must be noted that during the trial respondent Rosa-Diana was able to complete
the construction of The Peak as a building with a height of thirty-eight (38) floors or
133.65 meters. Having been completed for a number of years already, it would be
reasonable to assume that it is now fully tenanted. Consequently, the remedy of
specific performance by respondent is no longer feasible. However, neither can we
grant petitioner’s prayer for the cancellation and rescission of the April 20, 1976 Deed
of Sale by petitioner Ayala in favor of respondent Rosa-Diana inasmuch as the resale
of the property by the original vendees, spouses Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng to comply
with their obligation to construct a building within one year from April 20, 1976, has
effectively waived its right to rescind the sale of the subject lot to the original
vendees.
Faced with the same question as to the proper remedy available to petitioner in the
case of "Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Inc., ‘ a case which is on all
fours with the case at bench, we ruled therein that the party guilty of violating the
deed restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its
obligation, that is, for the payment of damages. In the aforesaid case it was observed
that the Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDR) imposed development
charges on constructions which exceed the estimated Gross Limits permitted under
the original Deed Restrictions but which are within the limits of the
CRDR’s.1âwphi1.nêt
MACEA. This trust fund shall be used to improve facilities and utilities in Makati
Central District.
3.1 The amount of the development charge that shall be due from the OWNER shall
be computed as follows:
DEVELOPMENT
CAHRGE = A x (B-C-D)
Where:
A – is equal to the a Area Assessment which shall be set at Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) until December 31, 1990. Each January 1st thereafter, such amount shall
increase by ten percent (10%) over the immediately preceding year; provided that
beginning 1995 and at the end of every successive five-year period thereafter, the
increase in the Area Assessment shall be reviewed and adjusted by the VENDOR to
correspond to the accumulated increase in the construction cost index during the
immediately preceding five years as based on the weighted average of wholesale
price and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
B – Is equal to the Gross Floor Area of the completed or expanded building in square
meters.
C – is equal to the estimated Gross Floor Area permitted under the original deed
restrictions, derived by multiplying the lot area by the effective original FAR shown
below for each location.
We then ruled in the aforesaid case that the development; charges are a fair measure
of compensatory damages which therein respondent Ray Burton Development Inc. is
liable to Ayala Corporation. The dispositive portion of the decision in the said case,
which is squarely applicable to the case at bar, reads as, follows:

The pertinent portion of the Deed of Restrictions reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 1996, in CA G.R. C.V. No. 46488, and its Resolution dated
October 7, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof
3. DEVELOPMENT CAHRGE For building construction within the Gross Floor Area
judgement is hereby rendered finding that:
limits defined under Paragraphs C-2.1 to C-2.4 above, but which will result in a Gross
Floor Area exceeding certain standards defined in Paragraphs C-3.1-C below, the
OWNER shall pay MACEA, prior to the construction of any new building a
DEVELOPMENT CHARGE as a contribution to a trust fund to be administered by
 1. The Deed Restrictions are valid and petitioner AYALA is not
estopped from enforcing them against lot owners who have not yet
adopted the Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions.
2. Having admitted that the Consolidated and Revised Deed
Restrictions are the applicable Deed Restrictions to Ray Burton
Development Corporation, RBDC should be, and is bound by the
same.
3. Considering that Ray Burton Development Corporation’s Trafalgar
plaza exceeds the floor area limits of the Deed Restrictions, RBDC
is hereby ordered to pay development charges as computed under
the provisions of the consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions
currently in force.
4. Ray Burton Development corporation is further ordered to pay
AYALA exemplary damages in the amount of P2, 500,000.00
attorney’s fees in the amount of P250,000.00
SO ORDERED:
There is no reason why the same rule should not be followed in the case at bar, the
remedies of specific performance and/or rescission prayed for by petitioner no longer
being feasible. In accordance with the peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, the
development charges would certainly be a fair measure of compensatory damages to
petitioner Ayala.
Exemplary damages in the sum of P2, 500,000.00 as prayed for by petitioner are also
in order inasmuch as respondent Rosa-Diana was in evident bad faith when it
submitted a set of building plans in conformity with the deed restrictions to petitioner
Ayala for the sole purpose of obtaining title to the property, but only to prepare and
later on submit another set of buildings plans which are in gross violation of the Deed
Restrictions. Petitioner Ayala is likewise entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in the
sum of P250, 000.00.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 4,
1997 and its Resolution dated June 19, 1998, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgement is rendered.
a. orderings respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation to pay development charges as computed under the
provisions of the consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions
currently in force; and
b. ordering respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation to pay petitioner Ayala Corporation exemplary
damages in the sum of P2,500,00.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of
P250,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12
years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign
object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an
information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one
Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said
Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said
Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage
and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for
trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4)
Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera,
(8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo
Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel
Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19)
Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino
Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the
testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita
Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight,
accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along
Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from
among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told
them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a
bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the
same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took
out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of
the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a table
were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks
inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed
it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out later to
be the foreign object which was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario
Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers
against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there
as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay
down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the
young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so
that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave
Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in
bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and
accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his
attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the
vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would
not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because
he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an
"American, paid Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He
then left them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and
Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But
they could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left,
and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following
day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez
claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that
the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion
wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing
in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory
remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already
went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed
his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage
scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at
Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by
people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and
foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition
and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious
condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one
who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her
residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as
"guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room.
Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario
Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony
of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified
that it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario.
The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against
Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that
through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May
14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year,
because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother,
Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a
girl by the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His
brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law
and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony
even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits
Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year
that he had regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he must have
already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In
his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and
softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very
well. It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a
characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he
claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital,
nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away
from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong
to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe
Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced
upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her
and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her.
After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only
because she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they
decided to help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her
confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to
get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when
she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was
an important factor because their program assisted only indigent patients
from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose
bowel movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis,
but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive
infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she
was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there
was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal
discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body.
One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr.
Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several
attempts proved futile because said object was deeply embedded in the
vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged,
tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and
incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after
the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because
the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The
surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that
Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life.
Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the
anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19
at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5
inch incision on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were
congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and
patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to
have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were
traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which
has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object
which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual
vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia.
Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the
assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to
the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz.
Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive
when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the
ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario
got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to
2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz
which was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory
arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the
intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a
transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked
the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under proper receipt.
Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially
Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis.
Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked
her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar
Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to
trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her
that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin
Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the
burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her
residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case
against the person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course
she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the
same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi
with his messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was
willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The
old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to
pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi
telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted
to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no
longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty.
Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office
of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with her
nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay
tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law
office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and
thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother
that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only
P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that there
was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and
she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's
office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city
fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty.
Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to
it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even
apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A",
was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police
Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other
hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's
vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also
conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado
Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia,
since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about
43 street children and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot
was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the
foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with
Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who
brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S.
Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was brought to
Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description
supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies
thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of
the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to
the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie
Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description by
Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also described him as
having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita,
Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be European or
Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell,
P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and
Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to
the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on
September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where
foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was
negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were
standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male
caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of
the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to
Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so
the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a
conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them
that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario
Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner
had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard.
Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said
caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and
Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm
that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the
Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this
operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western
Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a
suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the
pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag
which contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought him to
the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were
 allowed a permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small
shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the
form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the
suspect's name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the
questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters
and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already
shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained
at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against
him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused
was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria
Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after
her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father
Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was
filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when
the trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his
(Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death of his
daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was
already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no
crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was described as an
American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it
is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the
commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been
born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears
that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on
December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James
Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and
possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he
had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein.
Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for
Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the
purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot
was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the
Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that
the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and
penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to the private
prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly
committed by the court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON
OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO
COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12)
YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN
HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction
only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it
behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of
the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant
indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a
young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a
sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—
whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the
alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining
whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years
of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state
do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually
abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of
force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's
grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975.
These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the
Rules of Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about
pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member of
the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the
admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of
birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth
date because her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's
mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just
given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on
December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was
more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record
and the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted
at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by
Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk,
Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified
that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this
as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in
this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older
than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must
have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father
supported by other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate
and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal
certificate presented by the defense without any probative or evidentiary value.
(Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the
application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the
1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable
to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the
declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred
or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the
declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age
were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as
they both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is
certainly not before the controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on
Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's
relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what
happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to
the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court
accepted the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4
months old. The mother stated that she knew the age because the child was born
about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from
one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the
day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable
assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral
was never established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be
remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in
court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He
was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was
baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was
there any basis shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical
records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he
brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year
before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of
Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based
on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less
than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the
exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court
rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by
interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the
evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court
to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman
Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with
him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal
book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the
name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on
December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of
Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as
her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held
that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its
pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that
while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified—but not the veracity of the status
or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship
(Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v.
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal
certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but
it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must
indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception
to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its
transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the
church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence,
the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was
baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism.
Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a
baptismal certificate different from the one presented in court. However, no other
baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that brought by
the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized
on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have
been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was
born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that
Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one
(1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario
was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had
allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her
mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below
twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more
reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she
was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of
proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in
this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of
the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape
were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the
appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00
the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p.
50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies
and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a
poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may
have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not
come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was
committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a
consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the
appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside
Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence.
Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not
enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in
Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from
Rosario as the same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the
alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he
answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin
na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at
napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler,
na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay
inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng
Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang
dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga
kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may
takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
 T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang
ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa
larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa
kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad
noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang
ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit
"A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the
appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object
was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color
with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92,
January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the
veracity of the statements made especially when he answered on additional cross-
examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object
being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all
certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession
of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that
the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such
statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as
part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of time
between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a
mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence
to show that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given
instinctively because the event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section
42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's
vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the
appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her
vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even
categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object
allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by
Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when
she told you that she was already able to remove that object from her
vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already
removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night,
she again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to
call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words
against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children
were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario
was said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was
undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the
pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis,
a witness for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and
a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member
of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He was
awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate of
United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo
Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and
became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial
Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a
Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM
Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has
attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks
entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and
medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the
pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2"
which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated.
Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the
probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human
being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the
tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The
tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions
that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is
concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid
its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest
symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but
may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering
the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this
shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of
power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The]
composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water
and any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are
irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of
the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes
develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would
be a supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the
woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction
like fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN.,
pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame
wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr.
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction
such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this
object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed,
in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of
this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period
of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the
insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in
the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator
was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on,
on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before
this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any
adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN.,
Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this
lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the
patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you
mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said
time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an
accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot
be based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which favor
him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body
lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per
certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric,
Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic
(see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator
depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or
mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the
open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1
shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and
based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much
earlier. Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part
of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a very thin layer of
membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the
case. We see no reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should
not be controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario
Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give
an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28,
1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that
day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if
any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The
patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel
chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door
to the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was
fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at
that time and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly
distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with
maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28,
1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your
findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I
placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and
was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum
examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal
canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal
canal and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try
to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so
also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in
the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you
able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA
ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and
placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from
the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened
next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that
date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after
that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at
that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal
conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since
Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she
was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that
time because there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she
was still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic
Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits
indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working
days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk
to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort
room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who
worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of
her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She
actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor
and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in
the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-
13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually
testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in
pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September
14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still
answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains.
Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her
condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning,
and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the
foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to
the infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and the
abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the
case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since
we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if
the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The
defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the
Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat
with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the
presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of
witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is
no direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left
inside the victim's vagina which caused her death seven (7) months after its insertion.
What the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While
circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though,
that the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of
Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to
the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
[1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to
the liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her
death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they
sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys
should preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most heartless and
inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their
young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made
to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of
Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the
nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and
prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his
example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our
criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of
society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or
conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
 1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt
about her being less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took
place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet
born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not
satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation
of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the
evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina
of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the
vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about
it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was
able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that
second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her
stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only
hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign
object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection
only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would
have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened
in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence,
however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that
December. As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure
Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left
on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits
"DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in October, but then
it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside
the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it
creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital
confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang
naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the
hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by
a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's
unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she could have allowed
herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or
vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the
alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish
appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty. (SeePeople v. Mula
Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could
have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused
her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the
Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions
and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the
accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should
be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those
whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against
the accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be
allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As
stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused.
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty
of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the
court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the
fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to
act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p.
379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally
certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the
children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel.
Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look
at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to
satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the
appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to
the hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the
two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a
pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis
defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the
compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex.
Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually
committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a
passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a
crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual
and social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey
v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill
seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts
injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right
of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV,
Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the
country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The
well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby
be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause
 for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate
profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected
in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or
blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the
prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts
of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did
insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or
possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this
case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order
or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has
abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the
responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the
appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant
should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the
case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of
P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect
street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own
parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on
statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent
influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten
segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but
pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign
publications catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street
children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant
because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's
concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them.
Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The
appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the
appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether
we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or
do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate.
The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice.
We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our
Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of
the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same
vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P
440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent,
their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another
co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963
and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied.
The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of
only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia
herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister
Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school
together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and
application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the
petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required
by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the
trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was
required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court,
furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to
redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as
the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same
learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and
not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as
follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining
owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would
not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard
cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly
applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in
view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much
less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have
the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it
is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a
thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date
of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The
complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and
fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to
more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the
running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written,
would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice
although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents'
pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in
1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the
other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales
made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the
first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of
the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired.
This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none
of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words,
when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
 While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire,
to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before
one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict
letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to
reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and
this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the
general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So
we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are
—
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of
Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a
delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of
transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair
of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which
said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side
of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon
and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child
and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut
upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the
effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the
accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and
 reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at
Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery
thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then
went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be
delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of
it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the
delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the
inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to
stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came
into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case
is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied
in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damages should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the
above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are
of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence
does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what
different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the
rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally
the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme
court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14
March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13
April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June,
1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage
were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he
had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he
had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which
they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time
and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the
horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day
of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the
day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses
in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or
American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt.,
590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y.,
212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if
every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods
out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be
impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse,
at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of
ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can not be said that
the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is
negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition
of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some
person all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be
determined by the jury from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the
part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a
quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a
public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon."
The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that
the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk
loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and that the horse
had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial
court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were
proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods,
upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from
fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for
four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid
of cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or
knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due
care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question,
is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in
doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there
will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91
U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292;
Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43
La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved
destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for
so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by
society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes
happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does
not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only
creates aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of
the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard
Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case
before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth
water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built, as to tear
up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of
negligence on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing,
unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was
rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat
under control of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that
such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained,
 sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be
so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact
of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under
which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the
defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima
facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of
merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the
injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the
time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of
accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades
and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to
believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the
custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his
official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9,
2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's
letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No.
049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase
in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a
consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent
suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of
₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was
not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the
two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It
invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until
a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit
or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been
paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two
(2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on
the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly
to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus,
its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days,
of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the
NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year
2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after
respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal
in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled
that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap
year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular
year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April
15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted
as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be
neither interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be
strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly
applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the
day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been
filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within
the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its
basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final
adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation
v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is
a regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which
case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month
contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
(emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning
of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day
of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008;
one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked
and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law
cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final
Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
1987.1avvphi1
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly
and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law 12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
logically or reasonably reconciled.33
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of 15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a 16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative 17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason,
we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, 20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori. 21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this
case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its 23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed
as follows: 24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the
last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998 return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998 Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998 Arturo V. Parcero.
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
No costs.
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
SO ORDERED.
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-
appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and
go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to
get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of
her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not,
however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for
her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already
married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that
the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following
morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the
standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the
parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration
did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a
maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of
Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still
solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters
when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor
knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by
her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to
annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-
4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and
she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground
of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta
sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta
F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of
Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to
the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties
were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to
the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in
the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not
duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and
the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because
of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
—
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement,
and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized
by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage
was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that
in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after
the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of
Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage
to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was
under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in
conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of
that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable,
and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance
of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez
and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on
21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo
ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize
its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the
declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article
17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot
be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction
where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage
are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez
must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal
to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore,
her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with
a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid
divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of
the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710
became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that
the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905,
could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards
passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without
legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate
of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used
in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case
at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in
this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In
not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a
person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question
arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them
was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too
liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño
and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward
him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's
own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec.
on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to
the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove
that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was
canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was
not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their
daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither
does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury
even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-
132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best
for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his
child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable
for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as
where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse,
but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his
child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result
in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment,
or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the
parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does
not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her
spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice
given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment
and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to
recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez
from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was
celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that
there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf.
Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into
voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All
told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of
moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were
not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably
to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does
not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño
and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages
and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to
set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case
No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said
case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982;
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381
Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case,
Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
 them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
—
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects of foreign governments,3 entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent
was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1,
1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the
company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28,
2000, this time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the
Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.7 Respondent was named as the
project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1.8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for
its International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31,
2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry.9
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer,
requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term that had
already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.10
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of
respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the
replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI
Project.13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank14 that
matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance,15 denied the motion to dismiss.16 The trial
court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration,17 prompting them
to file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205].18 On August 23,
2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds—for lack of
statement of material dates and for insufficient verification and certification against
forum shopping.19 An Entry of Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on
September 20, 2000.20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000,
still within the reglementary period, a second Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
already stating therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification
and certification. This second petition, which substantially raised the same issues as
those in the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.21
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed
April 18, 2001 Decision22finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial
of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was
the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial
court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis.23
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the
assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 imputing the following errors to the
appellate court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO
JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE
LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS.26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject
matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may
be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the
most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters
raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first one) and the
instant petition for review thereof.
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the
petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without
prejudice.27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects
in the formal requirement of verification28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates.29 The dismissal being
without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a second petition attaching
thereto the appropriate verification and certification—as they, in fact did—and stating
therein the material dates, within the prescribed period30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the
said Rules.31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the
merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as
though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words, the
termination of a case not on the merits does not bar another action involving the
same parties, on the same subject matter and theory.32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res
judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification
of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on
procedural grounds,33 petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in
their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the
second certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition before the CA. In
any case, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that
will not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal
defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings,
considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no longer
present.34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is
only authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, the certiorari petition filed
with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the Authorization35 dated September 4,
2000, which is attached to the second certiorari petition and which is also attached to
the instant petition for review, is limited in scope—its wordings indicate that
Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in
the petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the
instant petition for review.36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally
applied the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory
explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been
made.37 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this
point and appended to their Reply38 an updated Authorization39 for Hasegawa to act
on behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient
compliance with the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the
verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which we agree,
Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The
aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the subsequent August 17,
2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and chief executive
officer, not by the company's board of directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled
that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not
even its officers, can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the
board.40 Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his
behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be denied pursuant
to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter that demands strict observance of the Rules.42 While technical rules of
procedure are designed not to frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are
intended to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent
the clogging of court dockets.43
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to
question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule
that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject
of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The appropriate recourse is
to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to
proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by
appeal in due course.44 While there are recognized exceptions to this
rule,45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages
filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and
perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese
language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to
the parties46 following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private
International Law.47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they
elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial
court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They
merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of
respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus.49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition
before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense
of forum non conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court, petitioners
dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and
introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most
significant relationship rule.51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of
the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo.52 We
only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their
incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases
are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where
can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where
can the resulting judgment be enforced?53
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.54 Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law
asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum
law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum
contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the
other.55 The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter
a judgment.56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction.1âwphi1 Jurisdiction,
however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a
controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the
defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case
and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation.57 In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually
referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law.58 It is further determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim,60 the movant must show that
the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it
the power to adjudicate the claims.61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial
court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for,
indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa
City.62 What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are
the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63 or the law of
the place where a contract is made.64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed."65 It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract66 and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly.67 Under the "state of the most significant
relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should
determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract
was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties.68 This rule takes into account
several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue to be resolved.69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to
a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law.70 They
determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a
conflicts problem.71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction,
choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact
that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules.72 Also, when the law of
a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to
the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction
or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case
and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and
take into account or apply the law of some other State or States.74 The court’s power
to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While
it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign
sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.75
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,76 be used to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss
because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground.77 Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.78 In this case, the RTC decided to
assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the
civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that
jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated
July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of
way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio,
Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico
Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia
Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro
Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of
sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last
September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the
point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of
houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio,
then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa.
On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic
Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately
one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to
P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned
row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26
meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated
the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw
that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants
Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-
Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-
E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the
area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said
fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a
bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the
first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having
(at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants
were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their
footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive
part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum
of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of
the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as
earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of
the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of
damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand
(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as
Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues,
namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is
proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to
petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to
rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no
longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is
that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance
any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to
uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if
such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain
the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or
modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative
reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of
damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals
when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for
the injury caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should
be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person,
and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as
may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to
his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission
which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque
injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to
the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in
Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as
owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls,
ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law
or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment
of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere
in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully
perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or
damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful
use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according
to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a
general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon
his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. 18 When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same
as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the
incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, 20 although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right
has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose
and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting
from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
[G.R. No. 120859.January 23, 2002]
METROBANK vs. WONG
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 23
2002.
G.R. No. 120859(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, petitioner vs. Francisco Y.
Wong, respondent.)
G.R. No. 120816(Francisco Y. Wong, petitioner vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, and Register of Deeds for Zamboanga del Sur, respondents.)
On June 26, 2001, we denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (petitioner) against Francisco Wong
(respondent), on two grounds: first, while personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary under Act No. 3135, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded
from exacting such additional requirement; and second, the case of Olizon v. Court
of Appeals[1]cralaw, relied upon by petitioner, has not actually dispensed with the
posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135.The pertinent portion of our
Decision reads:
"The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in
three public places, and (2) the publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation.Personal notice to the mortgagor
is not necessary.Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage
contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements.In
this case, petitioner and respondentin entering into a contract of
real estate mortgage, agreed inter alia:
'all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters,
summonses, subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be
sent to the MORTGAGOR at 40-42 Aldeguer St. Iloilo City, or at the address that may
hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE.'
"Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to
apprise respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the
subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard
his rights.When petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure
sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to
render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.
'The second query must be answered in
the affirmative.An incisive scrutiny
of Olizon shows that this Court has not actually
dispensed with the posting requirement under
Section 3 of Act no. 3135, xxx.:
"Obviously, as correctly pointed out by respondent, what
prompted the Court to dispense with the posting requirement is the
"unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of the
confluent circumstances" Involved in Olizon.It bears stressing that
in the said case, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale sought to be
annulled was conducted more than 15 years ago, thus, even
on the equitable ground of laches, the Olizons' action for
annulment of foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale
was bound to fail."
Petitioner now seeks reconsideration of our Decision.Invoking the case of Cortez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[2]cralawpetitioner contends that this Court construed a
similar stipulation between the parties therein, regarding the sending of all
correspondence to the mortgagor, as a mere expression of general intent.As such, it
may not prevail against the parties'specific intent to make Act No. 3135 (which does
not require personal notice of foreclosure) the controlling law between them.
The Cortez case finds no application to the case at bar.Indeed, it cannot provide
solace to petitioner's cause.
First, our Decision is sustained by the much later cases of Grand Farms, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[3]cralaw and Concepcion v. Court of Appeals.[4]cralaw In these
cases where similarly worded stipulations between the parties are involved, we ruled
that while personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary under Act No. 3135,
nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting
additional requirements, such as notice of foreclosure to the mortgagor.Said
stipulations, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, shall be considered as the law between the contracting parties and shall be
faithfully complied with.In Grand Farms, this Court held:
"While private respondent was constituted as their
attorney-in-fact by petitioners, the inclusion of the aforequoted
paragraph (k) in the mortgage contract nevertheless rendered
personal notice to the latter indispensable.As we stated in
Community Savings & Loan Association, Inc., et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., where he had the occasion to contrue an identical
provision:
'On the other important point that
militates against the petitioner's first ground for
 this petition is the fact that no notice of the
foreclosure proceedings was ever sent by CSLA
to the deceased mortgagor Antonio Esguerra or
his heirs in spite of an express stipulation in the
mortgage agreement to that effect.Said Real
Estate Mortgage provides, in Sec. 10 thereof
that:
'(10) All correspondence relative to
this mortgage, including demand letters,
summons, subpoenas, or notifications of any
judicial or extrajudicialactions shall be sent to
the Mortgagor at the address given above or
at the address that may hereafter be given in
writing by the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee, and
the mere act of sending any correspondence by
mail or by personal delivery to the said
address shall be valid and effective notice the
Mortgagor for all legal purposes, xxx.
'The Court of Appeals, in appreciating
the forgoing provision ruled that it "is an
additional stipulation between the parties.As
such, it is the law between them and as it not
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy, the same should be complied with
faithfully (Article 1306, New Civil Code of the
Philippines).Thus, while publication of the
foreclosure proceedings in the newspaper of
general circulation was complied with, personal
notice is still required, as in the case at bar, when
the same was mutually agreed upon by the
parties as additional condition of the mortgage
contract.Failure to comply with this additional
stipulation would render illusory Article 1306 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines.'
xxx xxx
"We do not agree with respondent court that
paragraph (k) of the mortgage contract in question was
intended merely to indicate the address to which the
communications stated therein should be sent.This
interpretation is rejected by the very text of said paragraph as
above construed.We do not see any conceivable reason why
the interpretation placed on an identically worded provision in
the mortgage contract involved in Community Savings & Loan
Association, Inc. should be adopted with respect to the same
provision involved in the case at bar.
"Xxx.Those mentioned in paragraph (k) are specific
and additional requirements intended for the mortgagors so
that, thus apprised, they may take the necessary legal steps
for the protection of their interests such as the payment of the
loan to prevent foreclosure or to subsequently arrange for
redemption of the property foreclosed.
"What private respondent would want is to have paragraph
(k) considered as non-existent and consequently
disregarded.Furthermore, it bears mention that private respondent
having caused the formulation and preparation of the printed
mortgage contract in question, any obscurity that it imputes thereto
or which supposedly appears therein should not favor it as a
contracting party."
And second, there exists a crucial distinction between the situation of the parties
in Cortez and in the case at bar.Unlike in Cortez where the mortgagor was the
borrower of the loan that was secured by the mortgage, respondent, in the present
case, mortgaged his property merely to accommodate Mindanao Grains, Inc. (MGI),
the actual borrower.In short, respondent was merely an "accommodation
mortgagor."Not being a party to the contract of loan between MGI and petitioner,
respondent has the right to demand from the latter a personal notice of foreclosure
under the Real Estate Mortgage.
Also, respondent's assertion that as a condition precedent to his execution of the real
estate mortgage, the said document must clearly state (which it does) that his
address is 40-42 Aldeguer St., Iloilo City, the place where "all correspondence
relative to the mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas, or
notifications of any judicial or extra-judicial actions shall be sent, "clearly shows
that the intention of the parties is that the mortgagee should notify the mortgagor or
the other parties concerned of the foreclosure proceeding.To be sure, the importance
of such personal notice to respondent herein cannot be overemphasized.In variance
with Cortez where the mortgagors were very much aware of their default, in this case,
no such default or knowledge thereof could be imputed to respondent.
Evidently, what petitioner would like us to do is to disregard its obligation, under the
Real Estate Mortgage, to furnish respondent with personal notice of foreclosure.This
cannot be done in view of the basic rule in our civil Code that "obligations arising from Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be involved are purely of law.
complied with in good faith."[5]cralaw
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
The rest of petitioner's arguments deserve scant consideration, the same being mere sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita
rehash of those raised in the petition which have been fully passed upon in our was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of
Decision. the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED with finality. parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe
Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in
SO ORDERED. their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita
EN BANC on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962 town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They
exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents
vs.
sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant. continued nonetheless.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of
P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of
defendant's. In English it reads:
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a
defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month
action. and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with Reply
one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that
defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to Love
prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up
complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby
causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair
was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the
name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial
court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove
that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial
court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it
was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be
unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each
other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment
and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a
married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in
love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the
frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he
was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only
in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the
rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her.
The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review
and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented
is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with
the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that:
she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City,
and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in
October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in
20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments;
she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during
a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs,
and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and
approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim,
that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and
resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since
September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year
medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the
present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the
manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced
the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman
of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c)
petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry
private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions —
made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting
sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would
not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time
and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed
marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as
his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day
he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and
brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal
for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that
they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned
to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's
apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he
even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of
this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant
gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued
to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff
left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted
a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod
sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City,
although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant
had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already
looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already
invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that
the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis
and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining
the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant
who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a
girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior
to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not
used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact,
we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must
have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought
because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would
not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in
public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on
March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal
 of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant
where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of
good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that
when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in
pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and
taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this
case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991;
he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies
to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he
has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is
not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if
he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes
that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good
moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife
as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As
to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had
professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her,
such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case.
The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of
the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity
to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts
had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the
case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before
the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these
exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay
v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above
quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of
the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise
to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of
De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in
the United States and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
 Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved,
would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be
held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of
the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach
of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus,
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the
woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because
We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening
disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example
set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort
upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be
some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or
other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman,
the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity
of the female, and the defendant merely affords
her the needed opportunity for the commission of
the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am.
Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for
one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman
of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where
there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse
was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept.
30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if
the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If
it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil.
471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if
there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is
accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
 But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness
(sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of
fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen
years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent,
the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari
delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from
the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her
own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become
a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN,
p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in
need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in
dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that
may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear
that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent
on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very
beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with
a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that
the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the
Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition
of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there
should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only
where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does
not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one
is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be
said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and
the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to
their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters
and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing
appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December,
1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented
and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December
1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter
conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc.,
where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling
the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the
complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and
directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of
this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age.
 Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.
Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and
residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with
summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started
visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the
defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as
are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became
very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in
consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff
consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have
carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a
short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country,
the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed
the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage,
but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant
stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has
not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am
chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his leaving on the Convair today.
promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. would only create a scandal.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions Paquing
may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On
that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
here involved.
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
PAKING
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

EN BANC Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, fees; and the costs.
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail
BENGZON, J.P., J.: to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted
for resolution."
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following
worse, complete public humiliation. day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants
petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
Dear Bet — expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6,
1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time.
however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case
amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting
a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits
attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as
scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of
facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P.
Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside
was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court
pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now
as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for
he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40
Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated
in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to
marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law
may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau,
party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-
8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who
was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant
would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's
judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., Respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a
decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint,
filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry
the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the
order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against
defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00,
respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under
our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:chanrobles virtual
law library
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad
then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who
was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In
1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of
Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in
1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Esca�o," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in
a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on
or about October 4, 1954.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code
of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of
said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of
such promise is sought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult,
or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the
celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without
just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses
which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised
marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers
must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate
the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court
ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best,
however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code
Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the
Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in
other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that
might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing
the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and
that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil
Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or
impliedly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future
spouses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or
by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent
of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil
action for damages in case of breach of the
promise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years
is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or
guardian.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be
affected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral
suffering.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of
the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable
for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is
rejected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on
account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are
set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we
quote:chanrobles virtual law library
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil.,
866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights
of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 - pp. 1342 - 1344
Maryland 1945 - pp. 1759 - 1762
Nevada 1943 - p. 75
Maine 1941 - pp. 140 - 141
New Hampshire 1941 - p. 223
California 1939 - p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 - p. 326
Indiana 1936 - p. 1009
Michigan 1935 - p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
 The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression
trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear
that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in
consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be
a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May
19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the
light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions
for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower
courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires
in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be
recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil
Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and
the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338
of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we
find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant - who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be - when she became intimate
with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first
instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."chanrobles virtual law library
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a
monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the
income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and
shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000,
as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added
to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 - consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization
and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child - and increased the moral
damages to P7,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch
105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent
Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which
rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for
mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the
aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913,
were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
and originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through
counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch
105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November
20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set on
January 8, 1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding
judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance
of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for
the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability
or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8
January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March
25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a
private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the
act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As
such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants
and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which
a private party or prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from
the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case
at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised
Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a
person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he
lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and
controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance
and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately
intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the
ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily
see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty
of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if
the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be
criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of
the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for
the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas
v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution
of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States
v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the
offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to
relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that
the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She
suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases
consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the
interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the
private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the
check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big.
22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the
civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the
offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is
justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution
(Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for
the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits
must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability
is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to
permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina B.
Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913.
The temporary restraining order issued by this court a quo for further proceedings.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate
number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board
his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side
of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move
to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought
for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar
Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the
Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as
Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as
well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the
existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight,
although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the
civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took
the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to
work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their
residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his
hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to
her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go
there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan,
the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in
said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the
Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who
appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent
wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted
in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for
petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel
for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case
No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground
that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the
TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles
took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed
of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the
Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza.
He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep
of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook
them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus
which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding.
After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right
on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook
the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in
front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the
right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine
Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was
their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in
the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision
took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan
and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the
amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the
materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages
and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees,
including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay
costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible
error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW
THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s
DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal
with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his
wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan,
Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway
Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a
Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries
attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies
of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject
as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in
the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth
by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case
No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case.
The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s
employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case,
the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that
petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the
facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to
be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both
petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing
the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that
the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be
admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have
its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the
witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the
same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be
admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process
when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for
petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For
failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case
despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In
admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation
to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his
right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said
section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may
be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version.
They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the
Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil
case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on
board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed
along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together
with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the
above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then
being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac,
who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently
lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor
vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside
where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the
above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by
pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries
which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the
medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral
part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-
described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was
solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio
Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed
without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision
of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of
negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was
negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the
proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while
closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and
not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111],
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the
Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on
quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act
or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime
or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this
case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and
to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in
the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly
swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus
causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court
will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case
and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that
would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the
trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who
was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving
credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15)
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him
about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the
collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep
of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a
product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain
why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from
the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given
to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus
was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos,
Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the
manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken
with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the
jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between
the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that
his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of
the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar
Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the
latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its
"ugly head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was
trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and
the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel
to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should
have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the
jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road.
Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as
testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable
only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under
Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that
petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise
of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready
investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required
due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To
fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition
of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of
the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke
the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not
only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The
mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were
being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting
and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as
follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its
vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its
personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules
promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in
the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is
no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how
its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents
similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be
made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this
case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is
not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of
petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases
above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough
supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should
have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of
supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all
the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and
regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for
the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary
damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00
awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be
lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced
to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered
to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE
FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which
reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the
crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the
complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO
GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID
BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA,
ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and
FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE
COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega,
Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato,
and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping
one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
 Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of
said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said
stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio
Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of
actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their
public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor,
and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to
pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages
in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo,
Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto
Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal
participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was
a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five
months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also
challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary
damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in
the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the
crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act
was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing
(sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on
record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF
LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO
COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS
RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE
APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
 COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS
CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL
INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN
HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS'
PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF
NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE
CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND
THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR,
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00
IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal
case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him.
They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of
the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be
raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig,
97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable
Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v.
Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil.
457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the
forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments,
and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because
these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other
offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the
violence must be employed against the person, not against
property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense
other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for
threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to
render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the
reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The
information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the
elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the
information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does
not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled
to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he
can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are
liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by
reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza,
51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case,
the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of
the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and
this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing
that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to
institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution
when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words,
the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo
in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable
act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of
these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in
cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of
the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it
in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation
or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil.
558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and
malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability
(See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from
or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would
not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which
led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for
and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and
for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which
Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action
barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a
declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused
 who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is
predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the
commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of
malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he
did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he
could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a
proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes
which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not
permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello,
120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established
in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of
the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of
the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging
of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced
by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No.
32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not
vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen,
forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods
inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the
goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it
cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from
the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara.
Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods
taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall
have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had
not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-
accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police
force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers,
demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or
around, and after having first inventoried the goods and
merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal
building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras
to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away,
the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them
were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and
equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of
the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The
defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a
nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in
fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the
government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore,
farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could
be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of
the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the
Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the
Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of
Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the
 Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and
brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of
the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier
cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this
provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by
a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following
the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action
but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it
render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but
hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are
distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the
reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or
other independent civil action, and of presenting the same
evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the
prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of
the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the
unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate
civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other
independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it
clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the
same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action,
and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same
criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the
accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action,
would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable
doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that
the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is
much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against
the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such
doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the
two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the
vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to
damages not because the act or omission is punishable but
because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to
grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of
only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can
stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability.
It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the
act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a
provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the
victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he
seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent
of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for
the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action
mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in
the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
 accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act
Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-
(Rollo, p. 36.)
46).
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
Rules of Court which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
time a separate civil action to be filed. observed:

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err
in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New
Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed
with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is
the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:têñ.£îhqwâ£
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting,
namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is
manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and
"criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code
Commission, thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to
allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by
him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not
conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative
to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the
cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is
proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the
complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one
most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He
should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which
peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:têñ.£îhqwâ£
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an
exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no
reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article
makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to
determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or
suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result
of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil
action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and
'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary
sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised
Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have
been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws
of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries'
could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in
their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the
term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used with the
latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to
the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature
when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent
has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by
 the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as
the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them
merely concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No.
141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a
civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro
Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may
give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless
imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine
because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the
result.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a
civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro
Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may
give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless
imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine
because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the
result.
FIRST DIVISION
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of
Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they
inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the
private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other
respondent, whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.*
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate
estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years
later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for
P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras
and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos
City. 1 On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale
with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu
proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:
. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant,
Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his
witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the
proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the
Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a
criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of
Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their
signatures to the Deed." 3
The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She
then came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view
of the peculiar circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case,
the criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this
suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but
only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the
accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment
in his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was
not the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by
his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for
the order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated
in the regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been
premature and that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double
jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his
Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the
ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did
indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of
dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this
Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear
provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording
of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly
says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of
the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if
the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C.
Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's
misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused. 5
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as
to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused". 6
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere
in the decision of Ras v. Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but
also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case
at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to
Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never
sold the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of
sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on
the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the
issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a
suspension of the criminal action was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil
cases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of
a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial
question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro
Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and
forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel
(plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal
case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in
the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal
case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross
injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in
the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a
forgery and spurious.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint
in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation
to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged
deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is,
therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first
determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his
property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity
of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged
double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that
the defense in the civil case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had
to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for
suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not
been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona
could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal
action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may
proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in
accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for
the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also
bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial
Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence"
and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his
questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D.
Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further
proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-63796-97 May 2, 1984
LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S. A., petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XLIX, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila and GOBINDRAM
HEMANDAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65659 May 2l, 1984
GOBINDRAM HEMANDAS SUJANANI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, in his capacity as Minister of Trade and Industry,
and HON. CESAR SAN DIEGO, in his capacity as Director of
Patents, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners in 63796-97.
Ramon C. Fernandez for private respondent in 63796-97 and petitioner in 65659.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
It is among this Court's concerns that the Philippines should not acquire an
unbecoming reputation among the manufacturing and trading centers of the world as
a haven for intellectual pirates imitating and illegally profiting from trademarks and
tradenames which have established themselves in international or foreign trade.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a well known European manufacturer of clothings and
sporting apparels sold in the international market and bearing the trademarks
"LACOSTE" "CHEMISE LACOSTE", "CROCODILE DEVICE" and a composite mark
consisting of the word "LACOSTE" and a representation of a crocodile/alligator. The
petitioner asks us to set aside as null and void, the order of judge Oscar C.
Fernandez, of Branch XLIX, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
granting the motion to quash the search warrants previously issued by him and
ordering the return of the seized items.
The facts are not seriously disputed. The petitioner is a foreign corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines, It is
undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the abovementioned
trademarks used on clothings and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in
many parts of the world and which have been marketed in the Philippines since 1964,
The main basis of the private respondent's case is its claim of alleged prior
registration.
In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued
Reg. No. SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the trademark
"CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE" by the Philippine Patent Office for
use on T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company. Two years
later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark under the Principal
Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an order dated March 3, 1977 which
states that:
xxx xxx xxx
... Considering that the mark was already registered in the
Supplemental Register in favor of herein applicant, the Office has
no other recourse but to allow the application, however, Reg. No.
SR-2225 is now being contested in a Petition for Cancellation
docketed as IPC No. 1046, still registrant is presumed to be the
owner of the mark until after the registration is declared cancelled.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to respondent Gobindram Hemandas all
rights, title, and interest in the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE".
On November 21, 1980, the petitioner filed its application for registration of the
trademark "Crocodile Device" (Application Serial No. 43242) and "Lacoste"
(Application Serial No. 43241).The former was approved for publication while the
latter was opposed by Games and Garments in Inter Partes Case No. 1658. In 1982,
the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. No. SR-2225 docketed as
Inter Partes Case No. 1689. Both cases have now been considered by this Court
in Hemandas v. Hon. Roberto Ongpin (G.R. No. 65659).
On March 21, 1983, the petitioner filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by
Hemandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The
NBI conducted an investigation and subsequently filed with the respondent court two
applications for the issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of
the premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and
Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas.
The respondent court issued Search Warrant Nos. 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, "it appearing to the satisfaction of the judge
after examining under oath applicant and his witnesses that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that Gobindram Hemandas ... has in his control and
possession in his premises the ... properties subject of the offense," (Rollo, pp. 67
and 69) The NBI agents executed the two search warrants and as a result of the
search found and seized various goods and articles described in the warrants.
Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that the trademark
used by him was different from petitioner's trademark and that pending the resolution
of IPC No. 1658 before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil action on the same
subject matter and between the same parties would be premature.
The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion arguing that the motion to quash was
fatally defective as it cited no valid ground for the quashal of the search warrants and
that the grounds alleged in the motion were absolutely without merit. The State
Prosecutor likewise filed his opposition on the grounds that the goods seized were
instrument of a crime and necessary for the resolution of the case on preliminary
investigation and that the release of the said goods would be fatal to the case of the
People should prosecution follow in court.
The respondent court was, however, convinced that there was no probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated March 22, 1983,
the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or officers in
custody of the seized items were ordered to return the same to Hemandas. (Rollo, p.
25)
The petitioner anchors the present petition on the following issues:
Did respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction,
(i) in reversing the finding of probable cause which he himself had
made in issuing the search warrants, upon allegations which are
matters of defense and as such can be raised and resolved only
upon trial on the merits; and
(ii) in finding that the issuance of the search warrants is premature
in the face of the fact that (a) Lacoste's registration of the subject
trademarks is still pending with the Patent Office with opposition
from Hemandas; and (b) the subject trademarks had been earlier
registered by Hemandas in his name in the Supplemental Register
of the Philippine Patent Office?
Respondent, on the other hand, centers his arguments on the following issues:
I pleaded.
THE PETITIONER HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ORDER DATED APRIL 22, 1983.
Hemandas argues in his comment on the petition for certiorari that the petitioner
being a foreign corporation failed to allege essential facts bearing upon its capacity to
sue before Philippine courts. He states that not only is the petitioner not doing
business in the Philippines but it also is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
He also cites the case of Leviton Industries v. Salvador (114 SCRA 420) to support
his contention The Leviton case, however, involved a complaint for unfair competition
under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166 which provides:
Sec. 21 — A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a
mark or tradename has been registered or assigned under this Act
may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair
competition, or false designation of origin and false description,
whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the
Philippines under Act numbered Fourteen Hundred and Fifty-Nine,
as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time
it brings the complaint; Provided, That the country of which the said
foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen, or in which it is
domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to
corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines.
We held that it was not enough for Leviton, a foreign corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York, United States of America, to merely
allege that it is a foreign corporation. It averred in Paragraph 2 of its complaint that its
action was being filed under the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166,
as amended. Compliance with the requirements imposed by the abovecited provision
was necessary because Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166 having explicitly laid
down certain conditions in a specific proviso, the same must be expressly averred
before a successful prosecution may ensue. It is therefore, necessary for the foreign
corporation to comply with these requirements or aver why it should be exempted
from them, if such was the case. The foreign corporation may have the right to sue
before Philippine courts, but our rules on pleadings require that the qualifying
circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively
In contradistinction, the present case involves a complaint for violation of Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code. The Leviton case is not applicable.
Asserting a distinctly different position from the Leviton argument, Hemandas argued
in his brief that the petitioner was doing business in the Philippines but was not
licensed to do so. To support this argument, he states that the applicable ruling is the
case of Mentholatum Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman: (72 Phil. 524) where Mentholatum Co.
Inc., a foreign corporation and Philippine-American Drug Co., the former's exclusive
distributing agent in the Philippines filed a complaint for infringement of trademark
and unfair competition against the Mangalimans.
The argument has no merit. The Mentholatum case is distinct from and inapplicable
to the case at bar. Philippine American Drug Co., Inc., was admittedly selling
products of its principal Mentholatum Co., Inc., in the latter's name or for the latter's
account. Thus, this Court held that "whatever transactions the Philippine-American
Drug Co., Inc. had executed in view of the law, the Mentholatum Co., Inc., did it itself.
And, the Mentholatum Co., Inc., being a foreign doing business in the Philippines
without the license required by Section 68 of the Corporation Law, it may not
prosecute this action for violation of trademark and unfair competition."
In the present case, however, the petitioner is a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines. The marketing of its products in the Philippines is done
through an exclusive distributor, Rustan Commercial Corporation The latter is an
independent entity which buys and then markets not only products of the petitioner
but also many other products bearing equally well-known and established trademarks
and tradenames. in other words, Rustan is not a mere agent or conduit of the
petitioner.
The rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments pursuant to its
rule-making power under Presidential Decree No. 1789, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Investment Code, support a finding that the petitioner is not doing business
in the Philippines. Rule I, Sec. 1 (g) of said rules and regulations defines "doing
business" as one" which includes, inter alia:
(1) ... A foreign firm which does business through middlemen acting
on their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or
commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the
Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission
 merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the
Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the
Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its
account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal Thus,
where a foreign firm is represented by a person or local company
which does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm
the latter is doing business in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the above provisions to the facts of this case, we find and conclude that the
petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines. Rustan is actually a middleman
acting and transacting business in its own name and or its own account and not in the
name or for the account of the petitioner.
But even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation that the petitioner
failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity to sue, the petitioner
may still maintain the present suit against respondent Hemandas. As early as 1927,
this Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing business
in the Philippines needs no license to sue before Philippine courts for infringement of
trademark and unfair competition. Thus, in Western Equipment and Supply Co. v.
Reyes (51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a foreign corporation which has never done
any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do
business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use
therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to
maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof
from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign
corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of
such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed
domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign
corporation.
We further held:
xxx xxx xxx
... That company is not here seeking to enforce any legal or control
rights arising from, or growing out of, any business which it has
transacted in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the action:
Is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill,
whenever that reputation, corporate name or goodwill have,
through the natural development of its trade, established
themselves.' And it contends that its rights to the use of its
corporate and trade name:
Is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect
against all the world, in any of the courts of the world-even in
jurisdictions where it does not transact business-just the same as it
may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against trespass,
or conversion. Citing sec. 10, Nims on Unfair Competition and
TradeMarks and cases cited; secs. 21-22, Hopkins on TradeMarks,
Trade Names and Unfair Competition and cases cited.' That point
is sustained by the authorities, and is well stated in Hanover Star
Mining Co. v. Allen and Wheeler Co. (208 Fed., 513). in which the
syllabus says:
Since it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protected, a
trade-mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities
or states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's
goods have become known and Identified by the use of the mark.
Our recognizing the capacity of the petitioner to sue is not by any means novel or
precedent setting. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases illustrating instances when
foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines may nonetheless sue in our
courts. In East Board Navigation Ltd, v. Ysmael and Co., Inc. (102 Phil. 1), we
recognized a right of foreign corporation to sue on isolated transactions. In General
Garments Corp. v. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50), we sustained the right of
Puritan Sportswear Corp., a foreign corporation not licensed to do and not doing
business in the Philippines, to file a petition for cancellation of a trademark before the
Patent Office.
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this
petition for certiorari was a letter complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas
with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If
prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being
conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the
People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved
party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter
which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated.
Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the
main case. We cannot snow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape
prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a
crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts
for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are
moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and
France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a
party and which we entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.
The Paris Convention provides in part that:
ARTICLE 1
(1) The countries to which the present Convention applies
constitute themselves into a Union for the protection of industrial
property.
(2) The protection of industrial property is concerned with patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks service marks, trade
names, and indications of source or appellations of origin, and the
repression of unfair competition.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 2
(2) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall as regards
the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries
of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or
may hereafter grant, to nationals, without prejudice to the rights
specially provided by the present Convention. Consequently, they
shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal
remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided they
observe the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 6
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, either administratively if
their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party,
to refuse or to cancel the registration and to prohibit the use of a
trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation,
liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known in
that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the
benefits of the present Convention and used for Identical or similar
goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of
the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or
an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 8
A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union
without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms
part of a trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 10bis
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to persons
entitled to the benefits of the Union effective protection against
unfair competition.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 10ter
(1) The countries of the Union undertake to assure to nationals of
the other countries of the Union appropriate legal remedies to
repress effectively all the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10 and l0bis.
(2) They undertake, further, to provide measures to permit
syndicates and associations which represent the industrialists,
producers or traders concerned and the existence of which is not
contrary to the laws of their countries, to take action in the Courts
or before the administrative authorities, with a view to the
 repression of the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10 and 10bis, in so
far as the law of the country in which protection is claimed allows
such action by the syndicates and associations of that country.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 17
Every country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure
the application of this Convention.
It is understood that at the time an instrument of ratification or
accession is deposited on behalf of a country; such country will be
in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions
of this Convention. (61 O.G. 8010)
xxx xxx xxx
In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co. (234 F. 2d 633) the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals had occasion to comment on the extraterritorial application of the Paris
Convention It said that:
[11] The International Convention is essentially a compact between
the various member countries to accord in their own countries to
citizens of the other contracting parties trademark and other rights
comparable to those accorded their own citizens by their domestic
law. The underlying principle is that foreign nationals should be
given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that
country makes available to its own citizens. In addition, the
Convention sought to create uniformity in certain respects by
obligating each member nation 'to assure to nationals of countries
of the Union an effective protection against unfair competition.'
[12] The Convention is not premised upon the Idea that the trade-
mark and related laws of each member nation shall be given extra-
territorial application, but on exactly the converse principle that
each nation's law shall have only territorial application. Thus a
foreign national of a member nation using his trademark in
commerce in the United States is accorded extensive protection
here against infringement and other types of unfair competition by
virtue of United States membership in the Convention. But that
protection has its source in, and is subject to the limitations of,
American law, not the law of the foreign national's own country. ...
By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same treatment in the
Philippines as we make available to our own citizens. We are obligated to assure to
nationals of "countries of the Union" an effective protection against unfair competition
in the same way that they are obligated to similarly protect Filipino citizens and firms.
Pursuant to this obligation, the Ministry of Trade on November 20, 1980 issued a
memorandum addressed to the Director of the Patents Office directing the latter:
xxx xxx xxx
... to reject all pending applications for Philippine registration of
signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other
than its original owners or users.
The conflicting claims over internationally known trademarks
involve such name brands as Lacoste, Jordache, Gloria Vanderbilt,
Sasson, Fila, Pierre Cardin, Gucci, Christian Dior, Oscar de la
Renta, Calvin Klein, Givenchy, Ralph Lauren, Geoffrey Beene,
Lanvin and Ted Lapidus.
It is further directed that, in cases where warranted, Philippine
registrants of such trademarks should be asked to surrender their
certificates of registration, if any, to avoid suits for damages and
other legal action by the trademarks' foreign or local owners or
original users.
The memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to a policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. It is not, as wrongly alleged by the private
respondent, a personal policy of Minister Luis Villafuerte which expires once he
leaves the Ministry of Trade. For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation
to be enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties founded on the generally accepted principle
of international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been adopted as part of the law
of our land. (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). The memorandum reminds the Director of
Patents of his legal duty to obey both law and treaty. It must also be obeyed.
Hemandas further contends that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order of April 22, 1983.
A review of the grounds invoked by Hemandas in his motion to quash the search
warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They
are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the
case. For instance, on the basis of the facts before the Judge, we fail to understand
how he could treat a bare allegation that the respondent's trademark is different from
the petitioner's trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash. We will
treat the issue of prejudicial question later. Granting that respondent Hemandas was
only trying to show the absence of probable cause, we, nonetheless, hold the
arguments to be untenable.
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search warrant, the
Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the determination of probable cause by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce (Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has
traditionally meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them
and act in pursuance thereof (People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667).
This concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by our ruling in Stonehill
v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause "presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws."
The question of whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided
in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20
SCRA 507). We agree that there is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of the existence of probable cause since, as we have recognized
in Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), the existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason. More so it is plain that our country's ability to abide by international
commitments is at stake.
The records show that the NBI agents at the hearing of the application for the
warrants before respondent court presented three witnesses under oath, sworn
statements, and various exhibits in the form of clothing apparels manufactured by
Hemandas but carrying the trademark Lacoste. The respondent court personally
interrogated Ramon Esguerra, Samuel Fiji, and Mamerto Espatero by means of
searching questions. After hearing the testimonies and examining the documentary
evidence, the respondent court was convinced that there were good and sufficient
reasons for the issuance of the warrant. And it then issued the warrant.
The respondent court, therefore, complied with the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. At that point in time, it was
fully convinced that there existed probable cause. But after hearing the motion to
quash and the oppositions thereto, the respondent court executed a complete
turnabout and declared that there was no probable cause to justify its earlier issuance
of the warrants.
True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be
any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid
grounds. In this case, there was no compelling justification for the about face. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by the petitioner
should have been assessed more carefully because the object of the quashal was
the return of items already seized and easily examined by the court. The items were
alleged to be fake and quite obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal
prosecution. Moreover, an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is
neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited
for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the
testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses. The allegation of
Hemandas that the applicant withheld information from the respondent court was
clearly no basis to order the return of the seized items.
Hemandas relied heavily below and before us on the argument that it is the holder of
a certificate of registration of the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE
DEVICE". Significantly, such registration is only in the Supplemental Register.
A certificate of registration in the Supplemental Register is not prima facie evidence of
the validity of registration, of the registrant's exclusive right to use the same in
connection with the goods, business, or services specified in the certificate. Such a
certificate of registration cannot be filed, with effect, with the Bureau of Customs in
order to exclude from the Philippines, foreign goods bearing infringement marks or
trade names (Rule 124, Revised Rules of Practice Before the Phil. Pat. Off. in
Trademark Cases; Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws, 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 513-515).
Section 19-A of Republic Act 166 as amended not only provides for the keeping of
the supplemental register in addition to the principal register but specifically directs
that:
xxx xxx xxx
 The certificates of registration for marks and trade names
registered on the supplemental register shall be conspicuously
different from certificates issued for marks and trade names on the
principal register.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason is explained by a leading commentator on Philippine Commercial Laws:
The registration of a mark upon the supplemental register is not, as
in the case of the principal register, prima facie evidence of (1) the
validity of registration; (2) registrant's ownership of the mark; and
(3) registrant's exclusive right to use the mark. It is not subject to
opposition, although it may be cancelled after its issuance. Neither
may it be the subject of interference proceedings. Registration on
the supplemental register is not constructive notice of registrant's
claim of ownership. A supplemental register is provided for the
registration of marks which are not registrable on the principal
register because of some defects (conversely, defects which make
a mark unregistrable on the principal register, yet do not bar them
from the supplemental register.) (Agbayani, II Commercial Laws of
the Philippines, 1978, p. 514, citing Uy Hong Mo v. Titay & Co., et
al., Dec. No. 254 of Director of Patents, Apr. 30, 1963);
Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as notice that the
registrant is using or has appropriated the trademark. By the very fact that the
trademark cannot as yet be entered in the Principal Register, all who deal with it
should be on guard that there are certain defects, some obstacles which the user
must Still overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the mark or ask the courts
to vindicate his claims of an exclusive right to the use of the same. It would be
deceptive for a party with nothing more than a registration in the Supplemental
Register to posture before courts of justice as if the registration is in the Principal
Register.
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of the Patent office action
on application Serial No. 30954 that "registrant is presumed to be the owner of the
mark until after the registration is declared cancelled" is, therefore, misplaced and
grounded on shaky foundation, The supposed presumption not only runs counter to
the precept embodied in Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases but considering all the facts ventilated
before us in the four interrelated petitions involving the petitioner and the respondent,
it is devoid of factual basis. And even in cases where presumption and precept may
factually be reconciled, we have held that the presumption is rebuttable, not
conclusive, (People v. Lim Hoa, G.R. No. L10612, May 30, 1958, Unreported). One
may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered
(Parke, Davis & Co. v. Kiu Foo & Co., et al., 60 Phil. 928; La Yebana Co. v. Chua
Seco & Co., 14 Phil. 534).
By the same token, the argument that the application was premature in view of the
pending case before the Patent Office is likewise without legal basis.
The proceedings pending before the Patent Office involving IPC Co. 1658 do not
partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must first be definitely resolved.
Section 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be
presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal
action.
The case which suspends the criminal prosecution must be a civil case which is
determinative of the innocence or, subject to the availability of other defenses, the
guilt of the accused. The pending case before the Patent Office is an administrative
proceeding and not a civil case. The decision of the Patent Office cannot be finally
determinative of the private respondent's innocence of the charges against him.
In Flordelis v. Castillo (58 SCRA 301), we held that:
As clearly delineated in the aforecited provisions of the new Civil
Code and the Rules of Court, and as uniformly applied in numerous
decisions of this Court, (Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920);
Aleria v. Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949); People v. Aragon, 94 Phil.
357 (1954); Brito-Sy v. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 102 Phil 482
(1957); Mendiola v. Macadael, 1 SCRA 593; Benitez v.
Concepcion, 2 SCRA 178; Zapante v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510;
Jimenez v. Averia, 22 SCRA 1380.) In Buenaventura v. Ocampo
(55 SCRA 271) the doctrine of prejudicial question was held
inapplicable because no criminal case but merely an administrative
case and a civil suit were involved. The Court, however, held that,
in view of the peculiar circumstances of that case, the respondents'
suit for damages in the lower court was premature as it was filed
during the pendency of an administrative case against the
respondents before the POLCOM. 'The possibility cannot be
 overlooked,' said the Court, 'that the POLCOM may hand down a
decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the damage
suit will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of
action.') the doctrine of pre-judicial question comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
both penned and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
In the present case, no civil action pends nor has any been instituted. What was
pending was an administrative case before the Patent Office.
Even assuming that there could be an administrative proceeding with exceptional or
special circumstances which render a criminal prosecution premature pending the
promulgation of the administrative decision, no such peculiar circumstances are
present in this case.
Moreover, we take note of the action taken by the Patents Office and the Minister of
Trade and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court in the case of La Chemise
Lacoste S. A. v. Ram Sadhwani (AC-G.R. No. SP-13356, June 17, 1983).
The same November 20, 1980 memorandum of the Minister of Trade discussed in
this decision was involved in the appellate court's decision. The Minister as the
"implementing authority" under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the protection
of Industrial Property instructed the Director of Patents to reject applications for
Philippine registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants
other than its original owners or users. The brand "Lacoste" was specifically cited
together with Jordache, Gloria Vanderbilt, Sasson, Fila, Pierre Cardin, Gucci,
Christian Dior, Oscar dela Renta, Calvin Klein, Givenchy, Ralph Laurence, Geoffrey
Beene, Lanvin, and Ted Lapidus. The Director of Patents was likewise ordered to
require Philippine registrants of such trademarks to surrender their certificates of
registration. Compliance by the Director of Patents was challenged.
The Intermediate Appellate Court, in the La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v.
Sadhwani decision which we cite with approval sustained the power of the Minister of
Trade to issue the implementing memorandum and, after going over the evidence in
the records, affirmed the decision of the Director of Patents declaring La Chemise
Lacoste &A. the owner of the disputed trademark and crocodile or alligator
device. The Intermediate Appellate Court speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza stated:
In the case at bar, the Minister of Trade, as 'the competent
authority of the country of registration,' has found that among other
well-known trademarks 'Lacoste' is the subject of conflicting claims.
For this reason, applications for its registration must be rejected or
refused, pursuant to the treaty obligation of the Philippines.
Apart from this finding, the annexes to the opposition, which La
Chemise Lacoste S.A. filed in the Patent Office, show that it is the
owner of the trademark 'Lacoste' and the device consisting of a
representation of a crocodile or alligator by the prior adoption and
use of such mark and device on clothing, sports apparel and the
like. La Chemise Lacoste S.A, obtained registration of these mark
and device and was in fact issued renewal certificates by the
French National Industry Property Office.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, due process is a rule of reason. In the case at bar the order
of the Patent Office is based not only on the undisputed fact of
ownership of the trademark by the appellee but on a prior
determination by the Minister of Trade, as the competent authority
under the Paris Convention, that the trademark and device sought
to be registered by the appellant are well-known marks which the
Philippines, as party to the Convention, is bound to protect in favor
of its owners. it would be to exalt form over substance to say that
under the circumstances, due process requires that a hearing
should be held before the application is acted upon.
The appellant cites section 9 of Republic Act No. 166, which
requires notice and hearing whenever an opposition to the
registration of a trademark is made. This provision does not apply,
however, to situations covered by the Paris Convention, where the
appropriate authorities have determined that a well-known
trademark is already that of another person. In such cases, the
countries signatories to the Convention are obliged to refuse or to
cancel the registration of the mark by any other person or authority.
In this case, it is not disputed that the trademark Lacoste is such a
well-known mark that a hearing, such as that provided in Republic
Act No. 166, would be superfluous.
The issue of due process was raised and fully discussed in the appellate court's
decision. The court ruled that due process was not violated.
In the light of the foregoing it is quite plain that the prejudicial question argument is
without merit.
We have carefully gone over the records of all the cases filed in this Court and find
more than enough evidence to sustain a finding that the petitioner is the owner of the
trademarks "LACOSTE", "CHEMISE LACOSTE", the crocodile or alligator device,
and the composite mark of LACOSTE and the representation of the crocodile or
alligator. Any pretensions of the private respondent that he is the owner are
absolutely without basis. Any further ventilation of the issue of ownership before the
Patent Office will be a superfluity and a dilatory tactic.
The issue of whether or not the trademark used by the private respondent is different
from the petitioner's trade mark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in
the criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary
matter in an administrative proceeding.
The purpose of the law protecting a trademark cannot be overemphasized. They are
to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed, to
secure to him, who has been instrumental in bringing into market a superior article of
merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill, and to prevent fraud and imposition
(Etepha v. Director of Patents, 16 SCRA 495).
The legislature has enacted laws to regulate the use of trademarks and provide for
the protection thereof. Modern trade and commerce demands that depredations on
legitimate trade marks of non-nationals including those who have not shown prior
registration thereof should not be countenanced. The law against such depredations
is not only for the protection of the owner of the trademark but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of purchasers from confusion, mistake, or deception as
to the goods they are buying. (Asari Yoko Co., Ltd. v. Kee Boc, 1 SCRA 1; General
Garments Corporation v. Director of Patents, 41 SCRA 50).
The law on trademarks and tradenames is based on the principle of business integrity
and common justice' This law, both in letter and spirit, is laid upon the premise that,
while it encourages fair trade in every way and aims to foster, and not to hamper,
competition, no one, especially a trader, is justified in damaging or jeopardizing
another's business by fraud, deceipt, trickery or unfair methods of any sort. This
necessarily precludes the trading by one dealer upon the good name and reputation
built up by another (Baltimore v. Moses, 182 Md 229, 34 A (2d) 338).
The records show that the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner's products bearing
the trademark LACOSTE date back even before 1964 when LACOSTE clothing
apparels were first marketed in the Philippines. To allow Hemandas to continue using
the trademark Lacoste for the simple reason that he was the first registrant in the
Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international commerce and not
belonging to him is to render nugatory the very essence of the law on trademarks and
tradenames.
We now proceed to the consideration of the petition in Gobindram
Hemandas Suianani u. Hon. Roberto V Ongpin, et al. (G.R. No. 65659).
Actually, three other petitions involving the same trademark and device have been
filed with this Court.
In Hemandas & Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. No. 63504) the
petitioner asked for the following relief:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed (a)
that the Resolutions of the respondent Court of January 3, 1983
and February 24, 1983 be nullified; and that the Decision of the
same respondent Court of June 30, 1983 be declared to be the law
on the matter; (b) that the Director of Patents be directed to issue
the corresponding registration certificate in the Principal Register;
and (c) granting upon the petitioner such other legal and equitable
remedies as are justified by the premises.
On December 5, 1983, we issued the following resolution:
Considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for review, the respondent's
comment thereon, and petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court
Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
The Court further Resolved to CALL the attention of the Philippine
Patent Office to the pendency in this Court of G.R. No. 563796-97
entitled 'La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Oscar C. Fernandez
and Gobindram Hemandas' which was given due course on June
14, 1983 and to the fact that G.R. No. 63928-29 entitled
'Gobindram Hemandas v. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., et al.' filed on
May 9, 1983 was dismissed for lack of merit on September 12,
1983. Both petitions involve the same dispute over the use of the
trademark 'Chemise Lacoste'.
The second case of Gobindram Hemandas vs. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., et al. (G.R.
No. 63928-29) prayed for the following:
I. On the petition for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, an
order be issued after due hearing:
l. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company, attorneys-in-
fact, and Estanislao Granados from further proceedings in the
unfair competition charges pending with the Ministry of Justice filed
against petitioner;
2. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company and its
attorneys-in-fact from causing undue publication in newspapers of
general circulation on their unwarranted claim that petitioner's
products are FAKE pending proceedings hereof; and
3. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company and its
attorneys-in-fact from sending further threatening letters to
petitioner's customers unjustly stating that petitioner's products they
are dealing in are FAKE and threatening them with confiscation and
seizure thereof.
II. On the main petition, judgment be rendered:
l. Awarding and granting the issuance of the Writ of Prohibition,
prohibiting, stopping, and restraining respondents from further
committing the acts complained of;
2. Awarding and granting the issuance of the Writ of Mandamus,
ordering and compelling respondents National Bureau of
Investigation, its aforenamed agents, and State Prosecutor
Estanislao Granados to immediately comply with the Order of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XLIX, Manila, dated April 22, 1983, which directs the immediate
return of the seized items under Search Warrants Nos. 83-128 and
83-129;
3. Making permanent any writ of injunction that may have been
previously issued by this Honorable Court in the petition at bar: and
4. Awarding such other and further relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
As earlier stated, this petition was dismissed for lack of merit on September 12, 1983.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration, the Court on November 23, 1983 resolved to
deny the motion for lack of merit and declared the denial to be final.
Hemandas v. Hon. Roberto Ongpin (G.R. No. 65659) is the third petition.
In this last petition, the petitioner prays for the setting aside as null and void and for
the prohibiting of the enforcement of the following memorandum of respondent
Minister Roberto Ongpin:
MEMORANDUM:
FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
Philippine Patent Office
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 913 dated 7 October 1983 which strengthens the
rule-making and adjudicatory powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry and
provides inter alia, that 'such rule-making and adjudicatory powers should be
revitalized in order that the Minister of Trade and Industry can ...apply more swift and
effective solutions and remedies to old and new problems ... such as the infringement
of internationally-known tradenames and trademarks ...'and in view of the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court in the case of LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S.A., versus
RAM SADWHANI [AC-G.R. Sp. No. 13359 (17) June 1983] which affirms the validity
of the MEMORANDUM of then Minister Luis R. Villafuerte dated 20 November 1980
confirming our obligations under the PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY to which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory,
you are hereby directed to implement measures necessary to effect compliance with
our obligations under said convention in general, and, more specifically, to honor our
commitment under Section 6 bis thereof, as follows:
1. Whether the trademark under consideration is well-known in the
Philippines or is a mark already belonging to a person entitled to
the benefits of the CONVENTION, this should be established,
pursuant to Philippine Patent Office procedures in inter partes and
ex parte cases, according to any of the following criteria or any
combination thereof:
(a) a declaration by the Minister of Trade and Industry that' the
trademark being considered is already well-known in the
Philippines such that permission for its use by other than its original
owner will constitute a reproduction, imitation, translation or other
infringement;
(b) that the trademark is used in commerce internationally,
supported by proof that goods bearing the trademark are sold on
an international scale, advertisements, the establishment of
factories, sales offices, distributorships, and the like, in different
countries, including volume or other measure of international trade
and commerce;
(c) that the trademark is duly registered in the industrial property
office(s) of another country or countries, taking into consideration
the dates of such registration;
(d) that the trademark has been long established and obtained
goodwill and general international consumer recognition as
belonging to one owner or source;
(e) that the trademark actually belongs to a party claiming
ownership and has the right to registration under the provisions of
the aforestated PARIS CONVENTION.
2. The word trademark, as used in this MEMORANDUM, shall
include tradenames, service marks, logos, signs, emblems, insignia
or other similar devices used for Identification and recognition by
consumers.
3. The Philippine Patent Office shall refuse all applications for, or
cancel the registration of, trademarks which constitute a
reproduction, translation or imitation of a trademark owned by a
person, natural or corporate, who is a citizen of a country signatory
to the PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY.
4. The Philippine Patent Office shall give due course to the
Opposition in cases already or hereafter filed against the
registration of trademarks entitled to protection of Section 6 bis of
said PARIS CONVENTION as outlined above, by remanding
applications filed by one not entitled to such protection for final
disallowance by the Examination Division.
5. All pending applications for Philippine registration of signature
and other world famous trademarks filed by applicants other than
their original owners or users shall be rejected forthwith. Where
such applicants have already obtained registration contrary to the
abovementioned PARIS CONVENTION and/or Philippine Law, they
shall be directed to surrender their Certificates of Registration to
the Philippine Patent Office for immediate cancellation
proceedings.
6. Consistent with the foregoing, you are hereby directed to
expedite the hearing and to decide without delay the following
cases pending before your Office:
1. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1689-Petition filed by La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. for the cancellation of Certificate of Registration No.
SR-2225 issued to Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas
and Company;
2. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1658-Opposition filed by Games
and Garments Co. against the registration of the trademark Lacoste
sought by La Chemise Lacoste, S.A.;
3. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1786-Opposition filed by La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. against the registration of trademark
Crocodile Device and Skiva sought by one Wilson Chua.
Considering our discussions in G.R. Nos. 63796-97, we find the petition in G.R. No.
65659 to be patently without merit and accordingly deny it due course.
In complying with the order to decide without delay the cases specified in the
memorandum, the Director of Patents shall limit himself to the ascertainment of facts
in issues not resolved by this decision and apply the law as expounded by this Court
to those facts.
One final point. It is essential that we stress our concern at the seeming inability of Rafael D. de la Victoria for petitioner.
law enforcement officials to stem the tide of fake and counterfeit consumer items
flooding the Philippine market or exported abroad from our country. The greater Seno, Mendoza and Associates for respondents.
victim is not so much the manufacturer whose product is being faked but the Filipino
consuming public and in the case of exportations, our image abroad. No less than the
President, in issuing Executive Order No. 913 dated October 7, 1983 to strengthen
the powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry for the protection of consumers, ESGUERRA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
stated that, among other acts, the dumping of substandard, imitated, hazardous, and
cheap goods, the infringement of internationally known tradenames and trademarks,
Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul the order dated June 1,
and the unfair trade practices of business firms has reached such proportions as to
1970, of respondent Judge Hon. Mateo Canonoy, then of Branch III, Court of
constitute economic sabotage. We buy a kitchen appliance, a household tool,
First Instance of Cebu, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend
perfume, face powder, other toilet articles, watches, brandy or whisky, and items of
the trial of its Civil Case No. R-11320, entitled "Fernando Buenaventura, et al. v.
clothing like jeans, T-shirts, neck, ties, etc. — the list is quite length — and pay good
Roberto Ocampo", including the order denying his motion for reconsideration
money relying on the brand name as guarantee of its quality and genuine nature only
thereof. Petitioner further prays this Court to make permanent the preliminary
to explode in bitter frustration and genuine nature on helpless anger because the injunction issued on October 9, 1970, restraining respondent Judge from
purchased item turns out to be a shoddy imitation, albeit a clever looking counterfeit, further proceeding with Civil Case No. R-11320.
of the quality product. Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that
court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid
The records of this case establish the following facts:
counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect
the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and administrative
implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and On September 11, 1966, respondents Fernando Buenaventura, Jose Vasquez,
treaties. Adolfo Belderol and Potenciano Adobes, Jr., all members of the Cebu Police
Department, arrested and detained in the City Jail of Cebu, Edgar Ocampo
(petitioner's son) and Paul, Jade, Cesar and Julius, all surnamed Ocampo (his
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NOS. 63797-97 is hereby GRANTED. The order
nephews), together with one George Namok (a friend of the Ocampo boys), all
dated April 22, 1983 of the respondent regional trial court is REVERSED and SET
minors, for an alleged violation of Section 1 of Ordinance No. 345 which
ASIDE. Our Temporary Restraining Order dated April 29, 1983 is ma(i.e.
amended Ordinance No. 228 fixing curfew hours. This Ordinance penalizes the
PERMANENT. The petition in G.R. NO. 65659 is DENIED due course for lack of
"wandering, sauntering or loitering of minors in any street, wood or alley."
merit. Our Temporary Restraining Order dated December 5, 1983 is LIFTED and SET
Pursuant to said arrest, the City Fiscal of Cebu filed an information in the city
ASIDE, effective immediately.
court and the minors were convicted for violation of the said ordinance. On
appeal to the Court of First Instance, however, Judge Tantuico, on March 3,
SO ORDERED.
1969, noting the exception under Section 3 of Ordinance 228 which provides:
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ.,
The provisions of Section 1 hereof shall not be applicable to
concur.
minors attending or participating in, or going home from,
purely scholastic functions, commencement exercises,
G.R. No. L-32293 January 24, 1974 convocations, educational and religious programs or in
wholesome and decent assemblage, and during yuletide
ROBERTO OCAMPO, petitioner, masses, New Year's eve and Holy Week cults, during the
vs. hours mentioned therein.
FERNANDO BUENAVENTURA, JOSE VASQUEZ, ADOLFO BELDEROL,
POTENCIANO ADOBAS, JR., and JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondents.
acquitted the accused minors, ruling that since they came from a birthday party
considered as a wholesome and decent assemblage, the minors fell within the
exception and committed no violation of the ordinance in question.
Meanwhile, petitioner Roberto Ocampo on September 19, 1966, filed a
complaint with the City Mayor's office charging the respondents policemen
with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority and commission of a felony.
On August 8, 1967, the Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 157 exonerating
the policemen. On March 17, 1969, a complaint was lodged with the Police
Commission (POLCOM) for serious misconduct, abuse of authority and
commission of an act constituting a felony, which administrative case is still
pending up to the present.
On June 4, 1969, respondents herein filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner. On May 22, 1970, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits on the following grounds: (1)
existence of a prejudicial question and (2) that the action is premature. This
motion was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated June 1, 1970. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof having been also denied, the
instant petition was filed.
In the meantime respondent Fernando Buenaventura died and he was
substituted herein by his widow, Guillerma Cosca Buenaventura, and his heirs,
Carlos, Cora, Eva Araceli, Fernando, Jr., Rene Victor, Helen Grace, Flora
Vicente, and Jose Adolfo, all surnamed "Buenaventura".
The main question to be resolved is whether or not the court a quo abused its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial of
the case on the merits. The first ground thereof (prejudicial question) is entirely
inapplicable. In accordance with Article 36 of the Civil Code, a prejudicial
question must be decided before any criminal prosecution based on the same
facts may proceed.<äre||anº•1àw> There is no prejudicial question here since
there is no criminal prosecution involved, the petitioner's case before the
POLCOM being administrative in nature and the respondents' case before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu is a simple civil suit for damages not based on a
crime but on alleged harassment by the petitioner in charging them
administratively before the City Mayor and before the POLCOM. A careful
consideration of the record discloses that the principal issue in the complaint
for damages is the alleged malicious filing of the administrative cases by the
petitioner against the policemen respondents. The determination of this
question is primarily dependent on the outcome of the administrative case
before the POLCOM. The respondents' complaint for damages is based on their
claim that the administrative case filed against them before the POLCOM is
malicious, unfounded and aimed to harass them. The veracity of this allegation
is not for us to determine, for if We rule and allow the civil case for damages to
proceed on that ground, there is the possibility that the court a quo in deciding
said case might declare the respondents victims of harassment and thereby
indirectly interfere with the proceedings before the POLCOM. The respondents'
case for damages before the lower court is, therefore, premature as it was filed
during the pendency of the administrative case against the respondents before
the POLCOM. The possibility cannot be overlooked that the POLCOM may hand
down a decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the damage suit
will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of action. Of
persuasive force is the ruling in William H. Brown vs. Bank Of the Philippine
Islands and Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil. 309, 312, where this Court said:
... In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover damages upon the
ground that the detainer case has been filed, and is being
maintained, maliciously and without justification; but this
pretense affects the merits of said detainer case. Should final
judgment be eventually rendered in that case in favor of the
plaintiffs therein, such the one rendered in the municipal
court, the validity of the cause of action said lessors against
Brown, would thereby be conclusively established, and,
necessarily, his contention in the present case would have to
be rejected. Similarly, we can, not sustain the theory of Brown
in the case at bar, without prejudging the issue in the detainer
case, which is still pending: Until final determination of said
case, plaintiff herein cannot, and does not, have, therefore, a
cause of action — if any, on which we do not express our
opinion — against the herein defendants. In short, the lower
court has correctly held that the present action is premature
and, that, consequently, the complaint herein does not set for
a cause of action against the defendants.
On the ground that the suit for damages is premature, the trial court, instead of
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the trial on the merits,
should have held action thereon in abeyance pending determination of the case
before the POLCOM.
Respondents likewise plead res judicata to defeat this action, contending that
the administrative case before the POLCOM should have been dismissed as it
is barred by a prior judgment — that embodied in the City Mayor's
Administrative Order No. 157 — exonerating herein respondents policemen.
The argument is devoid of merit. A review of the essential requisites of res
judicata,1 viz: (1) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the subject matter and the parties; (2) the former judgment must be final; (3) it
must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be between the 1st and 2nd
actions [a] identity of parties; [b] identity of subject matter; and [c] identity of
cause of action, exposes the glaring weakness of respondents' contention. On
the first requisite alone, that of jurisdiction, respondents miserably failed to
meet the requirements of the rule invoked. The City Mayor of Cebu was without
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide administrative cases either under Republic
Act No. 557 (An Act Providing For the Suspension or Removal of the Members
of the Provincial Guards, City Police and Municipal Police by the Provincial
Governor, City Mayor Or Municipal Mayor), or under Republic Act 4864 (An Act
Creating the Police Commission, Amending and Revising the Laws Relative to
the Local Police System, and For Other Purposes). In Manuel v. De la Fuente,
etc., et al.,2 this Court said: "Of course, it should not be understood that the
City Mayor, for the purpose of determining whether he should exercise his
power of suspension conferred by Republic Act 557, may not conduct his own
investigation; but this inquiry cannot replace the investigation that should be
conducted under Republic Act No. 557 by the Municipal Board and which
should form the basis for final administrative action or decision by said Board
appealable to the Commissioner of Civil Service." The Court further said: "...
the obvious innovations introduced by Republic Act No. 557 lie in the fact that
the Municipal Board had been granted the exclusive power to investigate, with
the Mayor being conferred only the power to prefer charges against a member
of the city police ...; that the Municipal Board, not the Mayor, decides the case;
and that the decision may be appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
instead of to the Secretary of the Interior."3 (Emphasis Ours). The power to
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel
has been transferred to the POLCOM.
In the motion to dismiss filed before the Board of Investigators of the Police
Commission,4 respondents alleged that the proceedings in the city mayor's office
cannot be attacked, invoking for the purpose Section 26 of the Police Commission
Act, to wit:
Section 26. Saving Clause.— All pending administrative cases
involving police service and personnel shall be absorbed by the
Police Commission one hundred days after the publication of the
Police Manual containing rules and regulations relative to such
matters.
The trust of their argument is that the city mayor then had jurisdiction because his
decision was rendered on August 8, 1967, while the Police Manual was promulgated
later on December 30, 1967. But the ruling in Police Commission v. Hon. Judge Eloy
Bello,
et al.5 where this Court had occasion to elucidate on the "saving clause" of the
POLCOM Act, is relevant to the issue and disposes of the respondents' argument.
This Court said:
Section 26 of the Police Act is, as expressly stated therein, a mere
saving clause, and refers solely to the administrative cases
involving police service and personnel which were pending at the
time of the effectivity of the Act.
The Police Commission was required to absorb the said pending
cases within 100 days after it shall have published a Police
Manual. The said Section 26 may not be interpreted to mean that
the Board of Investigators of each city or municipality and the
Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the
purposes of the Act until after the lapse of the said 100 days,
because Section 28 provides that '(t)his Act shall take effect upon
its approval.' Since the Act was approved on September 8, 1966, it
became effective immediately on that date. (Emphasis Ours.)
Lastly respondent Judge in his order in question dated June 1,
1970, gave the following reason for denying the motion to dismiss
and/or suspension of the trial of the case on the merits: "...
considering that the said defendant has already filed his answer,
containing special defenses embodying the grounds stated in the
motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial ..., the said motion
to dismiss and/or suspension of trial is hereby denied." The denial
is apparently predicated on the prior filing of an answer.
As a general rule a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads
(Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the
defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the
contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any
stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action,6 as
in the case at bar where the complaint failed to state a cause of action as alleged by
petitioner in his very motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial. The respondent
Judge therefore, erred in denying said motion. The surrounding circumstance at the
time of the filing of said motion warranted suspension of the trial on the merits.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from, dated June 1, 1970, denying the motion to
dismiss and/or suspension of the trial of the case on the merits, including the order
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, is hereby set aside. The hearing of
Civil Case R-11320 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, shall be held in
abeyance pending determination of the administrative case against the respondents
before the POLCOM.

The Court's writ of preliminary injunction dated October 9, 1970, restraining

respondent court from proceeding with the damage suit against petitioner shall stand
until the POLCOM decides the said administrative case; if it is decided adversely
against respondents, the injunction shall become permanent, while if it is decided in
their favor, then this damage suit may proceed to trial and determination on its merits
by respondent court.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ.,

concur.1äwphï1.ñët