Cabello v.

Sandigangbayan
G.R. No. 93885
14 March 1991

Doctrine: Culpa

FACTS: Petitioner, in his official capacity as postmaster of San Juan, Southern Leyte, was audited
of his cash and accounts for the period from August 29, 1984 to May 28, 1985. The audit
examination disclosed that petitioner incurred a shortage of P160,905.63. Required to produce
immediately the missing funds and to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours the fact
of shortage, petitioner neither restituted the missing sum nor made any written explanation As
a consequence, petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds before respondent
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that he can neither be convicted of malversation through negligence

since the information does not charge such mode of commission, hence "(o)f that mode of
committing malversation, he was not legally informed." He theorizes that an accused charged
with intentional malversation cannot be convicted of malversation through negligence.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty for malversation of public funds?

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that malversation may thus be committed either through a positive act
of misappropriation of public funds or property of passively through negligence by allowing
another to commit such misappropriation.

Any loss or shortage resulting from non-remittance, unlawful deposit or mis-application

thereof, whether he has a hand or not, shall be for his account. It is not an excuse that his
designated collection clerk was the one who failed to remit the questioned amount on time
because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest supervision on the person he
designated, otherwise, he would suffer the consequences of the acts of his designated
employee through negligence.

. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa

present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper.
 U.S v. Mcmann
G.R. No. 2229
1 July 1905

Doctrine: Intent
FACTS: The defendant, McMann, and one McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao,
employed by the Quartermaster's Department of the Army. On the day in question the defendant
had charge of some mules about one and one half miles from the camp. McKay went to the house
of a Moro, Amay Pindolonan, for the purpose of getting matches with which to light his cigar. He
attempted to enter, but was unable to do so on account of the opposition of the owner. A Moro
named Master, who was there at the time, was carving the head of a bolo with one hand, holding
the blade in the other. The defendant snatched the bolo from him, cutting his fingers. This Moro
left for the camp to report the matter to the authorities.
Defendant, who was either standing or sitting on the stairway which led into the house, the
latter raised his pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck him in the back of the head and killed
him instantly. The Moro at once jumped up, looked around to see where the shot came from, and
started to run, whereupon the defendant shot him.
defendant fired the shot which killed McKay is practically admitted by him in his testimony
and the fact is also proved by three or four eyewitnesses. Two of the Moros testified that they saw
him discharge his revolver at McKay.
ISSUE: Whether defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: YES. The SC ruled that the cause for the commission of the crime might be found perhaps
in this conversation, if we knew what it was. Or perhaps the defendant killed McKay because he,
the defendant, was drunk. But whatever the cause may have been it is not absolutely necessary for
us to find a motive therefor.

The question of motive is of course very important in cases where there is doubt as to
whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is
proved beyond all doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not
so important to know the exact reason for the deed.

We do not understand that the defendant claims that he intended to shoot the Moro when
he killed McKay, but even if this claim were made and supported, we do not see how it could
change the result in view of the fact that McKay was shot from behind without any warning and
with no intimation that an attack was to be made upon him or the Moro. What the rule would be
had McKay been facing McMann when the latter fired at the back of the Moro, we do not,
therefore, have to decide.
 U.S v. Carlos
G.R. No. 5476
15 January 1910

Doctrine: Intent

FACTS: On the night of the 30th day of December, 1903, a band of from ten to twenty men,
disguised as Constabulary soldiers, some armed with bolos and some with revolvers, entered the
barrio of Carmen. Pretending that they were officers of the law, forced their way into the house of
Felix Maris, made him and his son prisoners, and carried them off with their arms tied behind their
backs.

They went to the house of one of the headmen of the barrio and set it on fire. after capturing
all the inmates, brought their prisoners to an estero called the " Pasag," where they set them all at
liberty, except Felix Maris and Isabel Beltran. These two they took away in a boat, and carried to
a clump of manglares, at the edge of the estero, where Maris, still bound, was decapitated by one
of the band with a single stroke of a bolo, and the woman set at liberty, after some debate among
the members of the band as to whether they should or should not kill her also.

Defendant was positively and unmistakably identified as a member of the band which made
them prisoners upon the night in question. Attempt was made by the defense to prove an alibi

ISSUE: Whether the defendants’ race should be taken into consideration as an extenuating
circumstance.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the court largely influenced by the fact that the record fails to
disclose the motive for the commission of the crime, and by the further fact that it was
committed six years ago, at a period when any thousands of misguided persons were induced
to become members of roving bands, organized ostensibly for political purposes, but in many
cases, in truth and in fact, for robbery and pillage, and were thus drawn into a guilty
participation in the commission of grave and heinous offenses.
This rule, in effect, applies the principle involved in the provisions of article 11 of the
Penal Code, whereby the ignorance and lack of instruction of native offenders may in proper
cases be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstances.
It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive
for taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when
the commission of a crime is clearly proven conviction may and should follow even where the
reason for its commission is unknown, but in many criminal cases one of the most important
aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction
of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge the criminal act; and in
nearly every case wherein the law places the penalty to be imposed in the discretion of the
courts within certain limits, it will be found that a knowledge of the motive which actuated the
guilty person is of the greatest service in the exercise of this discretion.
 People v. Salamat
G.R. No. 103295
20 August 1993

Doctrine: Intent

FACTS: On July 22, 1991, at around 7:00 A.M., a police team composed of Cpl. Regalado, Pats.
Nepomuceno, Guevarra, Galang, Sales and Olog, accompanied by the confidential informant,
proceeded to the house of the suspect, herein appellant Rolando Salamat in order to effect service
of the search warrant.

A buy-bust operation was first conducted with Pat. Nepomuceno acting as poseur-buyer in the
company of the confidential informant. While the two were walking towards the house, they were
met by appellant who was then coming out of the house. Pat Nepomuceno testified that appellant
already knew him because he had on two occasions previously bought shabu from the latter as part
of the surveillance being then conducted on appellant's illegal activities

After examining the suspected shabu, Pat. Nepomuceno lighted his cigarette as a pre-arranged signal to
his companions, then around ten meters away, to move in. However, appellant resisted arrest and was
able to run inside the house and lock himself inside. Appellant was then brought to the police station
where he was investigated and subsequently detained. Appellant denies that he sold shabu to Pat.
Nepomuceno and claims that maybe the reason why he was so charged was because the father of Pat.
Napomuceno previously filed a case against him for robbery in band but the same was subsequently
dismissed

ISSUE: Whether Pat Nepomuceno is a credible witness.

HELD: YES. The SC ruled that, appellant would Like to impute ill motives to Pat. Nepomuceno in
testifying against him. Such allegation is nothing more than a desperate effort on the part of appellant
to exculpate himself from liability. We have said that motive is important when the identity of an
accused is in doubt, but when the perpetrator has been positively identified, as in this case, even
discounting such motive there is enough evidence to convict appellant.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were induced by
any motive other than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime,
the presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary
 People v. Bautista
G.R. No. 120898-99
14 May 1998

Doctrine: Intent

FACTS: Eduardo Datario, Barangay Captain of Dilan in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was fatally shot
by an assassin on the night of May 18, 1992 at around ten o'clock. At the time of the treacherous
assault, the victim was watching the sideshows of their barangay fiesta which were being held
within the school campus of the Dilan Elementary School.

Shortly thereafter, a gun report caused the people around to scamper in different directions.
In the few seconds prior to the ensuing melee, the deceased slumped to the ground with a gunshot
wound in the area of his chin which proved to be lethal. Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella,
who were beside the victim, were likewise hit apparently by the same bullet in succession, but they
fortunately survived. The same prosecution eyewitness recalled that as soon as the lone gun shot
rang out, he instinctively turned toward its source, and it was at the point that he saw the assailant.
That assailant, according to this witness, was herein appellant who was then on the other side of a
concrete fence which was more than five feet high.

Appellant asserted in court that he never knew personally the victims and, although
he himself could not specifically recall where he was at the time of the killing on May 18, 1992,
his neighbor, Norma Reyes, testified that he was then at their house as a guest at the birthday
celebration of her husband. Appellant was arrested was then brought to Lingayen, Pangasinan
where he was detained and it was there where he was tortured and forced to admit participation in
some unsolved killings, one of which was the murder of Eduardo Datario

ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD: NO. The SC ruled that it is also noteworthy that no motive was ever attributed to
appellant as to why he should kill the deceased or shoot the other victims since the evidence
shows beyond cavil that he did not even know any of them personally or had any previous
association or dealings with them. The rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary to impute a
crime to the accused if the evidence concerning his identification is convincing. A converso, if
the evidence of identification is unclear, then the jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of motive
is a paramount necessity.
 People v. Cordova
G.R. No. 83373-74
5 July 1993

Doctrine: Intelligence or Knowledge

FACTS: On 11 March 1988, the trial court promulgated its decision 26 finding accused Reynaldo
Cordova, Eduardo Cordova and Ernesto Estorque, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
The two Cordovas were held liable as principle while Estorque was found to be an accessory
after the fact.

Rodolfo Maguad testified that at around 7:00 o'clock on the night of the killing, he was at
the fishpond dikes near the house of the Barruelas inspecting the fishpond gates. While there, he
suddenly heard the voice of Marcelo Barruela who was at the second floor of the said house;
Barruela was conversing with some men who were outside the house. Rodolfo proceeded towards
the house but hid from the men because in the many years that he has stayed with the Barruelas, no
one has visited the latter at that time of the night.

Eduardo Cordova request Marcelo to bring them to Pontevedra in Marcelo's motorboat;

Marcelo, however, replied that he did not have enough gasoline for the trip. Eduardo Cordova
thereupon insisted that they be brought instead to Barangay Quiawa, also in Pontevedra. When
Marcelo asked Eduardo how many they were, the latter replied that they four. Marcelo then
instructed his farm help, Segundo (Godo) Maguad — Rodolfo's father — to prepare a torch
("moron"). After so instructing Segundo, Marcelo beamed a flashlight at the group and asked
Eduardo where his companions were. When Eduardo replied, "They are here," two persons
appeared, one of whom Rodolfo recognized as Reynaldo Cordova. The latter, who had a long
firearm with him, immediately fired six shots in rapid succession at Marcelo. Thereafter, Reynaldo
fired two more shots at Marcelo's house. The latter's wife, Teresita Barruela, who was also there,
told Rodolfo to report the incident to the police authorities in Pontevedra, Capiz.

Another witness,Norberto Javier, declared that at about 7:00 o'clock on the night of the
incident, he was fishing with his son along the Pontevedra river when he noticed a motorboat
carrying five men approach them. He identified the men as Eduardo Cordova, Reynaldo Cordova,
Isidro Cordova, Jr., Freddie Buenconsejo and Ernesto Estorque, Jr., the "driver" of the boat.
With a gun pointed at him, Eduardo asked him to put out his torch while Reynaldo asked for his
gasoline. Norberto got the container of gasoline in this banca and handed it over to Isidro. The
group then proceeded in the direction of Pontevedra. Later, while he was across that same place
where he had encountered the group, he saw the motorboat return, this time with only three men
on board. He no longer recognized these men

ISSUE: Whether Estorque is an accessory to the crime charged.

HELD: NO. For one to be held liable as an accessory, it is essential that he must have knowledge
of the commission of the crime. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as:
. . . . those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to the
habitually guilty of some other crime.

Nor could it be assumed that even if a conspiracy had existed among the assailants, Estorque could
be considered a part thereof for at most, his having been seen together with the other accused in the
motorboat is purely circumstantial evidence which, standing alone — for there is no evidence of
any other circumstance — does not sufficiently link him to such a conspiracy