ALVAREZ vs. IAC
CA
GR No. 162784, May 7, 1990
FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes
was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other
private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left
the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to
Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in
question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar
produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and
Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.
On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773
and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to
plaintiffs the lots.
ISSUE: WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and
773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without
violation of law and due process.
RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the
rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding
effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our
Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees,
since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs
would have been entitled to receive.
"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony,
with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by
no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages.
RABADILLA vs.
GR No. 113725, June 29, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic)
piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of
subject Codicil.
ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate
of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. ALMEIDA
GR No. 162784
Principle: The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell[36]... with NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This
Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations
are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.
FACTS: When the petitioner received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it should have noted that
the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of the death of the author of the
instrument; in her words "sakaling ako ay bawian ng Diyos ng aking buhay." Hence, in such
period, all the interest of the person should cease to be heirs and shall be in the possession
of her estate until they are transferred to the heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code:
RULING: Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights, and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant
has already passed away. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita had an interest in the property and that
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interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them
later to her heirs, in accordance with a will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For
as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties a property already
initially paid for by the decendent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC.
GR L-8437. Nov. 28, 1956
FACTS: Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the Estate based on 20 different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased
K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor.
Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the 20 bonds it
executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 % interest thereon. CFI
dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on failure to state the cause of action.
ISSUE: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent
claims chargeable against the estate?
RULING: Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311), “Contracts take effect only as between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law.”
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Articles 774 & 776,NCC, provides, thereby confirming Art. 1311.
“ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.”
“ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.”
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is
that whatever payment is made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that
the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive “depersonalization” of patrimonial
rights and duties. Of the 3 exceptions fixed by Art 1311, the nature of obligation of the surety
or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract.
Creditor Luzon Surety Co. expects from Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds was the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to
disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a
payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety
Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some
one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The 2nd exception of Art. 1311, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being
exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily
implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the
provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate
that they are non-transferable. rd
The 3rd exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Art. 1311 exists when they are
“not transmissible by operation of law”. The provision makes reference to those cases where
the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death: legal support,
parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership & agency. By contract,
the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Art 2047 to 2084) contain
no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the
contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily
passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts give rise to contingent claims provable
against his estate under sec. 5, Rule 87. “The most common example of the contigent claim
is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is
insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever
against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the
obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety
the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed
something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in
part, he has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be reduced to
judgment.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
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reimbursement. Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin. Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee.
Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al.,
G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
FACTS: There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was
denominated as “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to
be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not
barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on
preterition did not apply because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to
the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition
for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
1. respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to
the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of
said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
2. the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
3. the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there
was no institution of an heir;
4. as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically
and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,
5. the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
RULING: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in
the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that
intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy
that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In
this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was
intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.
PRINCIPLE: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself.
Intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and
while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last expression bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Thus, the Supreme court
ordered for the allowance of the holographic will.
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VITUG vs CA
188 SCRA 755
FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of
the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A. naming
private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In said decision, the court upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug’s) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain
shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to
the estate, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the CA the
alleged advances were spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and
“increment thereto.”
Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly
no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in
question for inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through
a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.
On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance
mortis causa which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article
805 of the Civil Code,” and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a
prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?
HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should
be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act
by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies
with duties to take effect after his death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain
to the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the
nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we
rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party’s separate
properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it
was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation” and that it is no “cloak” to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited
by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an “and/or” account. In the case at bar, when
the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other,
which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband,
the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings
account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their
inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA, G.R. No.L-
7188, August 9, 1954
FACTS: The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in his own
handwriting, numbered and signed by the testator himself and attested by three (3) witnesses
on September 6, 1923. He died on January 14, 1943 in Cebu. The will was admitted to
probate on January 24, 1952. Some of the cousins and nephews, who would inherit the
estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
ISSUE: What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic will: the old Civil Code
when the will was executed or the new Civil Code which could have validated the will?
RULING: It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect August 30,
1950, provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance
of the law in force at the time it is made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be
judged not by the law enforced at the time when the petition is decided by the court but at the
time the instrument was executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution, just like in this case,
then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate. This is
because the general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
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Miciano v. Brimo
G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927
FACTS: Joseph Brimo, an alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in
the will thathis property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that
of his nation. The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased filed a scheme of
partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition. The
appellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the
deceased was a Turkish citizen, which his disposition should be in accordance with the laws
of his nationality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.
RULING: No. Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this
condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall
not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good
morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The
court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Hence, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property acc to Article 16.
According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, suchnational law of the testator is the one to
governhis testamentary dispositions. The provision in the will is not valid. Said condition then
is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective.
Cayetano v. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.
FACTS: The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing
with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and
testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void.
The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by
the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will
executed by an undisputed foreigner.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of
Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is
therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights,
to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article
1039, Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run
counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.