GEORGE CULHI HAMBON, petitioner, vs CA and VALENTINO U CARANTES, respondents.

G.R. No. 122150 17 March 2003

Provision: Art. 35, Civil Code

FACTS: Petitioner George Hambon filed herein a complaint for damages against respondent for
the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him on
the night of December 9, 1985. However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence) filed previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for the
petitioner’s lack of interest and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil
liabilities of the respondent. After the trial, the RTC rendered decision, dated December 18, 1991,
ruling that the civil case was nor barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner
is entitled to damages. Respondent alleges that the dismissal of the criminal case includes that
of the civil action. The CA, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages on the grounds
that the Hambon failed to file civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal Case.
The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil case. According to the
appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the
criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication
on the merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling under
articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation
to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising from the same act or omission of the
accused pursuant to Rule III, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the failure to make reservation being
due to the fact that the criminal case was dismissed before the prosecution started to present
evidence for failure of the private complainant to appear despite notice.

HELD: Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal case.
In other words, the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability
whether arising from crimes (ex-delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Contrary to
private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only
regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the RPC, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally
liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring separate civil action, yet no
one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately. Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute
the civil action for damages in Crim Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R
for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed. Wherefore, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 8,1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
 FELIPE ROLDAN vs PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD, et. Al.
G.R. No. L-11973, June 30, 1959

Provision: Art. 44, Civil Code

Facts: Roldan is appealing the decision of the Court of first instance of Manila, dismissing his
complaint on the ground the action brought again by the members of the Philippine Veterans
Board, which was a mere agency of the government, was in effect a suit against the state and
that it was done without its consent. The plaintiff was a first grade Civil Service eligible. On March
26, 1953, he was appointed clerk in the Philippine Veterans Board, and he entered upon the
performance of his duties. Defendant Garcia, acting Administrative Officer of the Philippine
Veterans Board of which he was a member and signing for the Chairman, in a letter dated March
10, 1954 addressed to Roldan, among other things. The letter advised Roldan, the appellant, that
his services in the Board will terminate effective at the close of business on March 25, 1954
according to the provision of Section 2 of Act 2589 and the Cabinet Resolution dated December
23, 1946. So, Roldan was separated from the service on March 25, 1954 and in his place, Juan
Domingo was appointed. Roldan initiated Quo Warranto proceedings against Domingo and the
trial court decided in said case in favor of Roldan, declaring his ouster to have been illegal. The
decision became final and was executed resulting in the reinstatement of Roldan to his former
position on September 24, 1955. For the period of about 18 months he was out of the service
due to his separation. Roldan filed the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board its
five members to recover his back wages during said period plus moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 including P600.00 for attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Veterans Board and its five members liable of the complaint
of the plaintiff and must provide for the payment of the plaintiff’s back wages

RULING: The Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that RA No. 65 creating the
Philippine Veterans Board made said board a mere agency of the Government to carry out the
purposes of the said act; that the salaries of the employees of said Board, like that of the plaintiff,
were appropriated every year by law and that the salary corresponding to the position of Roldan
for the period when he was separated until he was reinstated had already been paid to Juan
Domingo. The Court added that neither the Philippine Veteran Board nor its members can
provide for the payment of Roldan’s back wages, having no power to do so under the law,
Congress being the only body that can make the appropriation. In support of its ruling the trial
court cited the case of Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) v. Philippines, 79 Phil., 819.
Accordingly, appellant contends that Philippine Veterans Board is a juridical entity within the
meaning of Article 44 of the Civil Code.