SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES

CIVIL CODE

Article 1. Marriage as a Special Contract

Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case
for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including
religious freedom - may be enjoyed. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by
universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper,
immoral and contrary to good conscience," the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. (Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. P-02-
1651, 4 August 2003)

Article 34. Cohabitation for Five Years

Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, the second marriage of Pepito is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element. (Ninal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000)
Article 43. Natural Persons

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him is void for
lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Dumlao vs Quality
Plastics, G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976)

Article 40. Judicial Declaration of Nullity

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void." (Mercado v. Tan
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122)

Article 87. Prohibitions on Donation Between Spouses

While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected
by the latters de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of
the riceland, the Court find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of
the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. (Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No.
116668, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 341)
Article 149. Importance of Family

A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal
partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents
which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family. To preserve the institutions
of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). (Albano
v. Gapusan, A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976)

Article 173. Action to Claim Legitimacy

The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child
lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. Inasmuch as the right of action
accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may exercise
it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure
the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but
depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised
against the latter. The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any
time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted
to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after
action had been already instituted. (Conde v. Abaya, G.R. No. L-4275, 23 March 1909, 13 Phil.
249)

Article 305. Duty and Right to Make Arrangements

The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred.
In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States
when he died has no controlling significance. The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to
deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased
husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to
that end. Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors
the legitimate family. (Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014)