CONCEPT OF THE STATE
Inland and external waters or the Maritime and Fluvial
Definition:
The STATE is a community of persons, more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an
independent government organized for political ends to which the
great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
Elements:
1. People – the inhabitants of the state.
-No legal requirement as to their number, it is agreed that they must
be numerous enough to be self-sufficing and to defend themselves
and small enough to be easily administered
MALCOLM DEFINE NATION as; - a people bound together by
common attractions and repulsions into a living organism possessed
of a common pulse, a common intelligence and inspiration, and
destined apparently to have a common history and a common fate.
2. Territory – is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth
inhabited by the people of the state.
-As a practical requirement, it must neither too big as to be difficult
to administer and defend nor too small as to be unable to provide
the needs of the population.
COMPONENTS:
1. Land mass or the Terrestrial domain;
2. Inland and external waters or the Maritime and Fluvial
domain;
3. Air space above the land and waters or the Aerial domain;
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRUZ – CHAPTER 10
COMPONENTS OF TERRITORY;
1. Land mass or the Terrestrial domain;
2.
domain;
3. Air space above the land and waters or the Aerial domain;
THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORIAL SEA:
THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE:
An archipelago shall be regarded as a single unit, so that the waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the state, and are subject to its exclusive
sovereignty.
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
CASES:
ARIGO vs. SWIFT, G.R. NO. 206510, 2004;
Facts: The name “Tubbataha” came from the Samal (seafaring
people of southern Philippines) language which means “long reef
exposed at low tide.” Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls
– the north atoll and the south atoll – and the Jessie Beazley Reef,
a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The
reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of
Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.
1

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue
of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on
August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the
heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage
Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems,
containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity
of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered
marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha’s outstanding universal
value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ
conservation of biological diversity; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area
of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,
otherwise known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act
of 2009” “to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and
scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations.” Under the “no-take”
policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many
human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including
fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within
the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area
Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making
and permitgranting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship
of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the
Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to
enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive
at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013,
the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13,
2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at
2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident,
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott
Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.
Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in
a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February
4, “reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured
Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States
will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused
by the ship.” By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had
finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral
reef.
Issue: Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within
territorial waters.
Held: Yes. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that
while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through
the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea. According to
Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS,
as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans”
as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations
by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in
the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. The
international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty
rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the
exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law,
2
regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the
oceans.” The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for
signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was
ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November
16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification. The UNCLOS
is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high
seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters
is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The
UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying
degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal
waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less
jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is
concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the
UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed
and subsoil. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice
Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and
disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to
it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or
other government ship operated for noncommercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or
damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by
a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions
of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles
30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship’s unauthorized
entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a nonparty to the UNCLOS, as
in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority – over 80% — of nation states are now
members of UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the world’s leading
maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS’
negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately voted
against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep
seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI.
In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the
bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding
decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions
satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part
XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President
Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing
agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite
consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors,
and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has
since withheld the consent required for the President to
internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
SAGUISAG VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO. 212426,
2016;
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an
executive agreement that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships
3
increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows
the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was
signed against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute with
China over the West Philippine Sea.
The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all
necessary requirements for the agreement to take force. The
agreement was signed on April 2014. President Benigno Aquino III
ratified the same on June 2014. It was not submitted to Congress
on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing
the constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now
contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it is
not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution
No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid
and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for
deliberation and concurrence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the
U.S. is constitutional.
RULING: YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not
need the Senate's concurrence. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.
Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty
duly concurred by Senate. They hinge their argument under the
following Constitutional provisions:
• Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all
the Members of the Senate.”
• Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate
xxx ”
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the
instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing
law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive
Agreements are defined as international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies
and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to
enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in
1999 – already allowed the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent
with the content, purpose, and framework of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to executive
agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already
deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual
in this jurisdiction.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at
the same time against the destructive forces of nature, the
Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the
friendships will take, are for the President to decide. The only
restriction is what the Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA
is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains
consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SAGUISAG VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESO – MR, GR NO.
212426, 2016;
FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive
Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
4
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines
and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move
that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with
the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the
1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.
Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently
petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that EDCA implements
the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly
limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider
arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities,
and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their
original petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA
to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite
the presence of these provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its
provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an
executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by
the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To
partially quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,
executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature;
or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the
Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic
variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and
designations of international agreements, ranging from the
traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms
that no longer necessitate ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act,
protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage,
convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact,
charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus
vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a
treaty and an international agreement or even an executive
agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international
rights and obligations.
5

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and executive
agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an
optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important
features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and
translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or
implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties.
The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function
of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted
by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new
international obligations that are not expressly allowed or
reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to
executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the
Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are
solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation through
the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a
statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty
takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is
treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with
either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of
international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy
of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the
source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell
within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged
with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the
arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court remains
unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.
We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully
conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA.
It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise.
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., vs. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER
OF BATANGAS, GR 180110, 2016;
PEOPLE vs. DELA PEÑA, GR 219581, 2018;
REPUBLIC vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN, GR
170867 / GR 185941, 2018;
GOVERNMENT:
-is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the state
is formulated, expressed and realized.
-No particular form.
-Provided that the government is able to represent the State in its
dealings with other states.
-Our Constitution requires our government to be democratic and
republican.
Democratic - is a system of government where the citizens exercise
power by voting.
Republican - form is defined as one in which the powers of
sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the
people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the
people, to whom those powers are specially delegated.
Functions:
Government perform 2 kinds of functions; Constituent and the
Ministrant;
1. Constituent - constitute the very bonds of society.
-Compulsory.
6
 2. Ministrant – functions are those undertaken to advance
the general interests of society, such as public works, public charity,
and regulation of trade and industry.
-Functions are optional.
DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE:
-one of the important tasks of the government is to act for the state
as (Parens patriae) or guardian of the rights of the people.
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, GR 199669, 2017;
FACTS:
The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for
prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner)
against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National
Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents),
which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which
amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the
granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating
them as tax deduction. which dismissed the petition for prohibition
filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the
Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council
on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the
Bureau of: Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which
sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends
the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of
20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and
persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as
tax deduction due to the reason that claiming it affects the
profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
drugstore operation in the Philippines while the respondents are
government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate
implementing rules and regulations for their effective
implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring
establishments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to
question the constitutionality of a law;
2. Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
3. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs
does not violate the petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the law
4. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague
and violates the petitioners right to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the constitutionality of a
law. Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the
remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they
have not been vested by the law. This is, however, not the lone
office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of
Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy
to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to
usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number of
jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail
the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does
not constitute stare decisis to the instant case, not because of the
petitioner's submission of financial statements which were wanting
7
in the first case, but because it had the good sense of including
questions that had not been raised or deliberated in the former case
of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to
PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442
and violation of the equal protection clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based
upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and
unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A.
No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under
Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with
Disability as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of
Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined as a person suffering
from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical
or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within
the range considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean
(1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an
individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act
No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK) vs.
QUEZON CITY, GR 225442, 2017;
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS:
1. De Jure Government – has rightful title but no power or
control, either because this has been drawn from it or because it has
not yet actually entered into existence.
2. De facto Government – is a government of fact, it actually
exercises power or control but without legal title.
3 Kinds of De Facto Government:
1. Voice of Majority – the government that gets possession
and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority,
the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of
the latter.
2. Rise in Insurrection – That established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state.
3. Military Forces who invade territory – That which is
established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES:
- Defines as the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of the government are exercised throughout the
Philippines.
-GOCC involve in proprietary functions cannot be considered part of
the government for purposes of exemption from application of
statue of limitations.
8
 SAGUISAG vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR212426, 2016;
SUPRA; (SUPRA)
ADMINISTRATION:
-Government must be distinguished from administration, which is
the group of persons in whose hands the reins of government are ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS
for the time being. WORKERS, INC. vs. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., GR 207132, 2016;
While Government is defined as the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised
throughout the Philippines. ACT OF STATE:
-is an act done by the sovereign power of a country, or by its
Administration = Transitional delegate, within the limits of the power vested in him.
-cannot be questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in
Government = Permanent a court of law.
-act done by the political departments of the government and not
subject to judicial review.
SOVEREIGNTY:
-is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by ROSAS vs. MONTOR, GR204105, 2015;
which that state is governed.
ROSAS VS. MONTOR, G.R. No. 204105. October 14, 2015
2 Kings of Sovereignty:
Doctrines/General Principles
1. Legal – is the authority which has the power to issue final
commands. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or
under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure
2. Political – is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country
sum of the influences that operate upon it. is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people.
Congress = Legal Sovereign
Different Sectors that mold the public opinion = Political Sovereign Petitioner:
GERONIMO S. ROSAS – Senior Immigration Officer and Alien Control
Officer of Cebu Immigration District Office, who was then also
Sovereign may be: designated as Regional Director

1. Internal – power of the state to control its domestic Respondents:

affairs. DILAUSAN MONTOR and IMRA-ALI M. SABDULLAH – employees of
the Bureau of Immigration, Cebu
2. External – power of the state to direct its relations with
other states, aka independence. FACTS:
 On December 7, 2004, Iranian nationals Jafar Saketi
Taromsari and Jalal Shokr Pour Ziveh, arrived in the
Philippines at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA).

9
 After staying in a hotel in Cebu City for a few days, they left
for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004.
 On December 16, 2004, Japanese immigration authorities
discovered that Taromsari and Ziveh had counterfeit or
tampered Mexican and Italian passports and used falsified
names: “Jaime Humberto Nenciares Garcia” for Ziveh and
“Marco Rabitti” for Taromsari.
 For using these fraudulent passports and lack of entry visa,
the Japanese immigration authorities denied entry to
Taromsari and Ziveh and sent them back to the Philippines.
 Taromsari and Ziveh arrived at MCIA on the same day at
6:45 p.m. and admitted at the detention cell of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) Cebu Detention Center.
 Petitioner Geronimo Rosas gave his report and an Exclusion
Order was issued against Taromsari and Ziveh on grounds
of “Not Properly Documented” and “No Entry Visa
 Security guards, Napilot and Ugarte received an order from
petitioner to escort the Iranian nationals from BI to MCIA
 On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released
from detention and brought by Napilot and Ugarte to the
MCIA for deportation. They were allowed to leave for
Tehran, Iran via Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia onboard Malaysian
Air Lines.
 On January 18, 2005, respondents Imra-Ali Sabdullah and
Dilausan S. Montor, employees of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI), Cebu, filed a Complaint-Affidavit12 before the OMB
against petitioner, Napilot and Ugarte for grave misconduct,
violation of Section 3(e)13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
and conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service.
Respondent’s Argument
 Respondents alleged that petitioner irregularly and
anomalously handled and disposed of the case involving two
restricted Iranian nationals by allowing them to leave the
country without initiating any proceeding for violation of
immigration laws considering that said aliens were potential
threats to the country’s national interest and security.
 It was further contended that the Iranian nationals should
have been charged for deportation because they violated
Section 37(a) (9), in relation to Sections 45 and 46 of PIA.
Petitioners’ Argument
 Petitioner denied the allegations against him and asserted
that he should not be made liable for acts that do not fall
within his area of responsibility.
 He pointed out that it is the immigration officers who are in-
charge of primary inspection of incoming and outgoing
passengers as well as the determination of whether a
passenger should be excluded, and the management,
control and supervision of such duties pertain to the Head
Supervisor, Mr. Casimiro P. Madarang III.
 He also averred that he did not have prior knowledge of the
two Iranian nationals’ previous entry to the country as he
was, in fact, not at the MCIA on that particular date and time
of their first arrival in the Philippines.
OMB decision: (Respondents won; Rosas was found guilty of
Grave Misconduct and penalty of Dismissal was imposed upon
him)
 It held that petitioner showed manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence in unduly
releasing the two Iranian nationals.
 Petitioner’s claim that he had no prior knowledge of the
unlawful entry was belied by his December 17, 2004
Memorandum. Napilot and Ugarte were acquitted from the
charges as they merely acted on petitioner’s orders and no
evidence was presented to suggest that they were in
conspiracy with the petitioner.
Petitioner assailed the OMB’s ruling in the CA, arguing that he should
not be held administratively liable for the release of the two Iranian
nationals pursuant to a validly issued exclusion order.
CA decision: (CA affirmed OMB decision)
ISSUE: WON petitioner's act of releasing and excluding the two
Iranian nationals without initiating any case for violation of
immigration laws is valid.
HELD:
 No, petitioner had the duty to initiate criminal
proceedings and deportation proceedings against the
two Iranian nationals rather than merely excluding
them.
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 Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude
aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self -preservation or public interest. In the
Philippines, aliens may be expelled or deported from the
Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by
the Constitution, the PIA of 1940, as amended, and
administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
 Exclusion and deportation are formal removal procedures
which ultimately results to an alien’s removal from the
territory provided for separately under Sections 29 and 37
of the PIA, respectively.
o Exclusion is the authorized removal of an alien by
immigration officers, performing primary inspection,
or by the immigration boards of special inquiry, by
secondary inspection, of any foreigner arriving in
the Philippines who, upon inspection and prior to
entry or admission, is barred by immigration laws,
rules and regulations from entering or being
admitted to the Philippines.
o Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are
governed by Sections 37 to 39 of the PIA. We have
stated that the power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good
and the domestic tranquility of the people.
 The two Iranian nationals, Taromsari and Ziveh, confessed
to have knowingly used falsified passports and obtained
entry into the Philippines by using the said fraudulent
immigration documents, both of which are grounds for
deportation proceedings. Upon being questioned why they
were sent back from Japan, they admitted that they entered
the Philippines previously using fraudulent passports.
 Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country
with the use of fraudulent passports and false
representations when they arrived on December 7, 2004,
Taromsari and Ziveh should have been ordered arrested and
formally charged with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in
relation to Section 45(c) and (d). Deportation proceedings
should have been initiated forthwith against these aliens.
 While the two Iranian nationals were initially held due to lack
of entry visas, after their admission that they used
fraudulent passports in entering the country, the filing of a
criminal action pursuant to Section 45 is proper, together
with the initiation of deportation proceedings. While both
exclusion and deportation ultimately removes a person from
our territory, Section 45 imposes an additional penalty —
deportation has an additional penalty in that it imposes a
fine. Indeed, that these aliens were released without
undergoing deportation proceedings as required by law is
highly irregular.
 In this case, petitioner had the duty under the law to
oversee the filing of criminal actions and deportation
proceedings against Taromsari and Ziveh and not merely
excluding them. The facts on record established that at the
time petitioner recommended their exclusion on December
17, 2004, he was already aware that said Iranian nationals
used the falsified Mexican and Italian passports in entering
and leaving the Philippines on December 7 and 14, 2004.
Such use of counterfeit passports by aliens entering our
country is a criminal offense under Sec. 45 of the PIA, as
amended.
 Instead of filing the appropriate criminal charge as
mandated by law, petitioner allowed Taromsari and Ziveh to
depart and return to Tehran via Malaysia. While claiming
that it was only on December 17, 2004 that he came to know
of the Iranian nationals’ detention for illegal entry into the
Philippines, official log book records43 show that petitioner,
along with security guards Napilot and Ugarte, brought the
two Iranian nationals to their detention cell on the same
night of their arrival from Japan on December 16, 2004 and
detained them there for three days. Custody over the two
Iranian nationals caught violating our immigration laws was
simply handed over by petitioner to the two security guards
whom he later instructed to escort the said offenders to the
airport to depart for Malaysia. In failing to initiate the proper
proceedings against the Iranian nationals and allowing them
to escape criminal charges and thorough investigation for
possible terrorist activities or human trafficking, petitioner
displayed a blatant disregard of established immigration
rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants
his removal from the service.
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