Memorial R-17

CNLU GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2019TEAM CODE- R17
13R13 R13
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

2019
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

CR. APP. NO. 1028 OF 2018
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 32 OF THE BHARAT’S CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 154 OF

THE CRPC
CBI & ORS…………………………………………….(APPELLANT)
V.
KALICHARAN & ORS……………………………………..(DEFENDENT)
CP. NO. 111 OF 2018
LORD JOGESHWAR TRUST & ORS………………………………………….(PETITIONER)
V.
STATE OF ARYA PRADESH……………………………………..(RESPONDENT)
BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.
th
4 ANMCC’19 Page 1
CNLU GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITY........................................................................................................iv
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................................vii
STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................viii
ISSUES RAISED.......................................................................................................................x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...............................................................................................xi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................1
Issue 1: The Appellants Have No Jurisdiction To Appeal In the Present Matter...................1
A.1 The Appellants have not been granted a certificate by the High Court of Arya
Pradesh to appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 132.............................................1
B.1 The Appellants have not been certified by the High Court of Arya Pradesh to appeal
before the Supreme Court under Art. 134..........................................................................1
C.1 No exceptional and special circumstances arise in the present case for the Supreme
Court to exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Art. 136................................................2
Issue 2: The Accused Persons Cannot Be Convicted For The Charge Of Murder U/S 302
Of The IPC.............................................................................................................................2
A.1 Circumstantial Evidence does not point towards the Guilt of the Accused................2
B.1 The prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.....4
Issue 3: The Allegation Against The Accused Persons Of Raping Riya Cannot Be Sustained
In Law....................................................................................................................................6
CP. No. 111 of 2018................................................................................................................9
Issue 1: The Prohibition Of Women To Enter The Shrine Is Not Violative Of The
Constitution Of Indiana..........................................................................................................9
A.1 The prohibition of women to enter the shrine constitutes a reasonable classification
under Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indiana......................................................................9
B.1 Constitutional morality in matters of religion protects the Right of disciplines Lord
Jogeshwara.......................................................................................................................11
C.1 The followers of Lord Jogeshwara constitute a religious denomination or any section
thereof...............................................................................................................................11
D.1 Opening Lord Jogeshwara Temple to women would not be a measure of social
reform as stipulated under Article 25(2) (b).....................................................................16
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
2
E.1 The Court cannot interfere in the essential and integral custom being followed in the
Jogeshwara Temple..........................................................................................................17
F.1 Rights of a group of devotees as constituting a religious denomination in the context
of a single temples............................................................................................................18
PRAYER..................................................................................................................................19
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
Cases
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. State of TN, (2016) 2 SCC 725..........................13
AS Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1765................................................14
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala ,1987 AIR 748.................................................................13
Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir.,AIR 2002 SC 316...................................................2
Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska ,604 P.2d 1068.......................................................................13
Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu ,(2014) 5 SCC 75.......................................17
G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2010 SC 2914.......................................................3
Habib Mohamma v. .State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51.......................................................1
Hem Chandra Halder v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 407................................................................3
HH Srimad Peralulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC
1586......................................................................................................................................14
Mohd. Hussain v. Dalipsinghi, (1969) 3 SCC 429.....................................................................2
N Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106............................................14
Nar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 457..............................................................................1
Narendra Pratap v. State of UP,(1991) 2 SCC 623.....................................................................2
Navaneethakrishnan v. The State by Inspector of Police, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 378..............3
Nawab Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 278.........................................................................1
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 706................3
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169....................................................................................1
Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment ,[2005] UKHL 15....................14
Robins v. National Trust Co., (1927) AC 515............................................................................4
Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271.............................................1
State of UP v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045.....................................................2
Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411........................................................1
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan,1963 AIR 1638................................14
Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth, (1943) 67 CLR 116......................................12
XBahadur Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 1209..........................................................5, 12
Chandan and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 599.................................................7, 12
Emperor v. Damapala, AIR 1937 Rang. 83................................................................................4
Goodyear India v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781.............................................................8
Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2001 (1) RCR (Crl.) 122.......................................................7
Kalwa v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0280/2018............................................................6
Molai and Anr. v. State of M.P. 2000 SCC (Crl.) 438................................................................7
Murugan v. State, AIR 2009 SC 72............................................................................................5
Noor Agra v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 (449)...........................................................5
Omychund v. Barker, 26 ER 15, 33............................................................................................5
Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A. P., AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2622....................................5
PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001..........................................12
Ram Bharose v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 704......................................................5
4
Sanjeev and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh,MANU/HP/1034/2015....................................6

Shangara Singh Ladha Singh v. State, AIR 1964 Punj 400.......................................................4
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 SC 765...........................................7
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 CAR 263 (SC).................................7
State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite, AIR 2009 SC 1066.............................................................5
State of Haryana v. Rewa Singh, MANU/PH/1164/2002..........................................................6
State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Ram Niwas and Anr. MANU/RH/0237/2006............................7
State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Zabbar, AIR 2011 SC 3013............................................................5
Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan 2001 (4) RCR (Crl.) 496.................................................7
Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006...........................................................8
Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors, AIR 1958 SC 255.......8, 11
D.C. Bhatia v. UOI, (1995) 1 SCC 104......................................................................................8
Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa ,(2006) 13 SCC 627..................................16
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of
Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282.................................................................................10, 12, 14
Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors, (2006) 4 SCC 748...............16
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707..................................................................15
Nallor Marthandom Vellalar v. Commr, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, AIR
2005 SC 4225...........................................................................................................................11
Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments, AIR 1999 Mad 393...........11
Ramchandra v. State of Odisha, AIR 1959 Ori 5.....................................................................11
Riju Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors, 7 (2015) 9 SCC 461............................16
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and Others, 1983 SCR (1) 729.............................................11, 15
Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors, (2008) 13 SCC 119.............................16
Seshammal and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCC 11...............................................16
Shayaro Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1...................................................................15
State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349.............................................................9
State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75...................................................................9
Books and Commentaries

D.D. BASU, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214 (Kamal Law House 2018).............................8
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL Law 1238 (LexisNexis 2018).........................................13
SARKAR, LAW OF EVIDENCE 2010 (LexisNexis 2016)..............................................................4
Statutes
1) Indian Evidence Act, 1872
2) Indian Penal Code, 1860
3) Constitution of India, 1950
5
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
App. Appeal
Art. Article
Cal Calcutta
Corp. Corporation
CP Curative Petition
Cr. Criminal
ed. Edition
ER English Reporter
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
No. Number
Ors Others
Punj Punjab
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

The Respondent has the honour to submit before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the
memorandum for the Respondent under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Article
136 of The Constitution of India reads as:
“Art. 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India.
2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.”
CP. No. 111 of 2018

The Respondent has the honour to submit before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the
memorandum for the Respondent under Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court of India
Handbook of Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure, 2017.
7
THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND

ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENT CASE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a land-locked country in Central Asia comprising of 7 states. Constitution of

Indiana protects matters of religious doctrine or belief. It also emphasizes on the secular
nature of Indiana’s polity.
2. Arya Pradesh is the largest state in Indiana. 80% of the people residing in Arya Pradesh
are disciples of Lord Jogeshwara whose temple is situated at Katra (capital of Arya
Pradesh). Since the deity is in the form of Nasthik Bramhachari it is therefore firmly
believed by majority of the population that young women between the age of 11 to 51
years should not offer worship in the temple so that even the slightest deviation from
celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not caused by the presence of such women.
The parliament of Indiana, by virtue of power conferred to it through Constitution of
Indiana, enacted the Lord Jogeshwara Temple (Prohibition on Entry of Women) Act in
1985.
3. On 01.05.2013 Reema and Riya, filed a PIL before the Supreme Court of Indiana seeking
issuance of direction to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 11 to 51
years to Lord Jogeshwara Temple. On 23.12.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana
pronounced its judgment allowing the entry of women into the Lord Jogeshwara shrine.
4. On 24.12.2016, Reema and Riya with some other women tried to enter Lord Jogeshawara
Temple for offering their prayers. They reached the gate of the temple. Pt. Kali Charan
had blocked the gate of the temple with his two sons Bhanu and Kalu.
5. While patrolling, the police discovered a suspicious SUV in an abandoned jungle, near
Mohini Bazar. In the morning, at around 5:30 a.m., Pt. Kali Charan called the police and
informed about a dead body lying near the Sanctum Sanctorum of Lord Jogeshwara
temple. Mrs. Radha identified the body as that of Reema. Subsequently, the body was sent
for post mortem.
6. The police arrested Pt. Kali Charan and his sons from the temple but Bhawani and Jagga
were missing. During preliminary investigation, the police discovered a dead body from
the jungle near Mohini Bazar on 31.12.2016 which was later identified as that of Riya.
The accused were thereafter charged for murder of both Reema and Riya.
8
7. During investigation, CBI recovered 3 Daraatis and 2 Lathis and sent the same for
forensic investigation. Meanwhile, CBI arrested Bhawani from his relative’s house
outside Katra.
8. The matter was tried by CBI Court and the Court found all accused guilty of abduction
and murder of Reema and Riya, and also for the rape of Riya. The Court sentenced all of
them to death. All the accused preferred an appeal against the order before the High Court
of Arya Pradesh. The High Court reversed the order of the Trial Court and acquitted all
the accused on the ground that prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond all
reasonable doubts. An appeal against the order of High Court of Arya Pradesh was filed
before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indiana in December, 2018, which had agreed to
hear the appeal. (Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018)
9. After the acquittal order passed by the High Court of Arya Pradesh, Pt. Kali Charan filed
a Curative Petition in the name of Lord Jogeshwara Trust against the order of Supreme
Court passed in year 2016 allowing entry of women into Lord Jogeshwara Temple, which
the Honourable Supreme Court has agreed to hear. (CP. No. 111 of 2018). Realizing that
the outcome of all the two cases (Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018) and (CP. No. 111 of 2018)
are interrelated, the Chief Justice of Indiana clubbed them and placed them before the
appropriate bench for hearing on 27.01.2019.
9
ISSUES RAISED
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE APPELLANTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO APPEAL IN THE PRESENT MATTER?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS CAN BE CONVICTED FOR THE CHARGE OF MURDER U/S
302 OF THE IPC?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS CAN BE CONVICTED FOR THE CHARGE OF MURDER U/S
302 OF THE IPC?
CP. No. 111 of 2018
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE PROHIBITION OF WOMEN TO ENTER THE SHRINE IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

ISSUE 1: THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO APPEAL IN THE PRESENT MATTER
The appellants do not have jurisdiction to appeal before the Supreme Court in this criminal
proceeding as [A] The Appellants have not been certified by the High Court of Arya Pradesh
to appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 134 and [B] No exceptional and special
circumstances arise in the present case for the Supreme Court to exercise its residuary
jurisdiction under Art. 136.
ISSUE 2: THE ACCUSED PERSONS CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR THE CHARGE OF MURDER
U/S 302 OF THE IPC.
No liability of murder can be attributed to the accused persons in the instant case as [A]
circumstantial evidence does not point towards the guilt of the accused and [B] The
prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE 3: THE ALLEGATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED PERSONS OF RAPING RIYA CANNOT
BE SUSTAINED IN LAW
The prosecution has not been able to bring home the charge against the accused beyond any
reasonable doubt as [A] the circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution, is not
reliable as it fails to fulfil the legal requirement and [B] there is no corroboration of evidence.
CP. No. 111 of 2018
ISSUE 1: THE PROHIBITION OF WOMEN TO ENTER THE SHRINE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
11
The prohibition of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years to enter shrine of Lord
Jogeshwara is not violative of Part III of the Constitution as [A] it is within the ambit of
permissible classification under Article 14 and it does not breach constitutional morality.
Further, [B] the followers of Lord Jogeshwara constitute a Religious Denomination or any
section thereof and thus the practices which are “essential” and “integral” to their rituals and
observances is to be protected by the Court. Furthermore, [C] opening Lord Jogeshwara
Temple to women would not be a measure of Social Reform as stipulated under Article 25(2)
(b) Moreover, [D] The Court cannot interfere in the essential and integral custom being
followed in the Jogeshwara Temple and Lastly, [E] the courts have recognised the rights of
group associated with one single temple as religious denomination.
12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018
ISSUE 1: THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO APPEAL IN THE PRESENT

MATTER.
It is humbly submitted that the appellant does not have jurisdiction to appeal before the
Supreme Court in this criminal proceeding owing to the following reasons:
A.1 The Appellants have not been granted a certificate by the High Court of Arya
Pradesh to appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 132.
The appellants do not have grounds to appeal against the decision of High Court of Arya
Pradesh, as the conditions1 under Article 132 of the Constitution are not being fulfilled;
1) The order appealed against should be a “judgement, decree or final order made by the
High Court in civil, criminal or other proceedings”.
2) The case should involve a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
The word, “involves” refers to considerable degree of necessity.
3) The question involved must be a substantial question of law. The word “substantial”
here denotes that there is difference of legal opinion. Further, there cannot be any
substantial question of law on a subject which has been finally and effectively decided
by the SC.
B.1 The Appellants have not been certified by the High Court of Arya Pradesh to appeal
before the Supreme Court under Art. 134.
The grant of certificate under Article 134(1) (c) is not a matter of course, the power must be
exercised after considering the questions of law or principles involved in the case, which
should require further consideration of the Supreme Court. Hence, if the case decided by the
HC on the face of it does not give rise to any such questions, then apparently there is no
justification for the HC to certify the case as fit one for appeal to SC. If a case does not
involve any question of law, then however difficult the question of fact may be, that would
1 VN SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 527 (Eastern Book Company 2018).
1
not justify the grant of certificate because if the HC had any doubt about the facts of a
criminal case, the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused2.
Henceforth, in ordinary cases which do not involve substantial question of law or principle in
affirming judgement, the HC would not be justified in granting certificate3.
C.1 No exceptional and special circumstances arise in the present case for the Supreme
Court to exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Art. 136.
The SC4 has held that it would not grant special leave petition under Article 136(1) unless it is
shown that special and exceptional circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice
has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant
review of the decision appealed against. Further, the SC would not interfere with the
concurrent finding of the courts subordinate to it unless, the findings are perverse or vitiated
by error of law, or there is gross miscarriage of justice5.
ISSUE 2: THE ACCUSED PERSONS CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR THE CHARGE OF

MURDER U/S 302 OF THE IPC.
It is humbly submitted that no liability of murder can be attributed to the accused person in
the instant case due to the following reasons:
A.1 Circumstantial Evidence does not point towards the Guilt of the Accused.
It is most respectfully contended that the acquittal by the High Court of all the accused for the
alleged murder of Riya and Reema on the ground of insubstantial evidence was a legally
sound verdict and ought to be upheld by this Hon’ble court. The case concerned herein is
entirely premised on circumstantial evidence. This Court has on earlier occasions, prescribed
certain exhaustive prerequisites to be fulfilled to ascertain the conclusiveness of such
evidence as the sole basis of conviction. These conditions are as follows:6
1) The circumstances from which guilt is established must be fully proved.

2) That all the facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
3) That the circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
2 Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411.

3 Nar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 457.
4 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169; Nawab Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 278; Sadhu Singh
Harnam Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271; Habib Mohamma v. .State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 SC 51.
5 Mohd. Hussain v. Dalipsinghi, (1969) 3 SCC 429; Narendra Pratap v. State of UP,(1991) 2 SCC 623.
6 State of UP v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045.
2
4) That the circumstances ought to, to an ethical certainty, truly exclude each hypothesis
except the one projected to be evidenced.
5) The evidence should prove the guilt of the culprit beyond a reasonable doubt.
The above principles were once again reiterated by this Hon’ble court in Bodh Raj v. State of
Jammu and Kashmir.7
The whole array of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution comprises primarily
of the testimony of certain witnesses and the alleged weapons recovered. However, it is
submitted that the prosecution has been unable to prove the whereabouts of any of the
accused at the estimated time of commission of the crime or any event leading up to the
alleged crimes. Nor has it been successful in establishing a concrete link of the alleged
weapons with alleged crimes purported to have been committed. Thus, it is arguable that
none of the circumstances stated to have existed, surrounding the alleged crimes, have been
proved.
When the veracity of the facts itself remain in question, their being consistent with the
hypothesis of the guilt of all the accused is rendered impossible. Moreover, even if it is
argued that the facts have been proved, they are grossly insufficient to infer any guilt of the
accused. There is deficiency of any evidence to rationally deduce that the alleged weapons
have been wielded by the persons accused or that they were even present at the scene of the
crime. In dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. 8 In
the lack of such incriminating evidence, no culpability can be attributed to the accused.
Circumstances of strong suspicion without more definitive evidence, are not sufficient to
justify a conviction, even though the accused offers no explanation to them. 9 This court in the
case of Padala Veera Reddy10, has effected a clear delineation between what “may be true”
and “must be true” that distinguishes conjectures from sure conclusions. Thus, the court shall
necessarily exercise great caution of mind while adjudging matters of such a nature so as not
to blur the line of distinction.
It is further imperative that the prosecution while placing the circumstances before the court,
should ensure that the series of events constitute a complete and logical sequence without any
7 Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir.,AIR 2002 SC 316.

8 G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2010 SC 2914.
9 Hem Chandra Halder v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 407.
10 Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 706.
3
pitfalls. This in turn, must clearly demonstrate that the accused are guilty as charged. 11 There
should be no likelihood of the innocence of the accused. In the present case, the
circumstances far from being determinative in nature, have left open the probability of
several conclusions that could be arrived upon. This is also violative of the fourth condition
enunciated above because even the slightest possibility of any other hypothesis cannot be
obliterated. Accordingly, with such flimsy circumstances, no absolute guilt of the accused
could be attached.
Most recently, in Navaneethakrishnan12, a bench of this court decisively held that any snap
noticed in the linkages created shall demolish the entire case construct of the prosecution.
This would not be effectual in recreating the entire crime scene before the court which is the
critical function of circumstantial evidence.
Without satisfaction of any of the above conditions, the guilt of the accused beyond any
reasonable doubt cannot be established. Thus, the accused persons cannot be convicted for
murder u/s 302 of IPC.
B.1 The prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
It is urged that the Hon’ble High Court acquitted all the accused in the instant case because
the said charges were not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
B.1.a Burden of Proof lies on the Prosecution.
The respondents most humbly submit that the burden to prove the guilt of an accused lies on
the prosecution. This can be derived from the ancient principle of ‘ei incumbit probation qui
dicit, non qui negat’ that is the burden of proving a fact rests on the party who substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue13 and not upon the party who denies it.14 The given
principle is enacted in and forms the core of section 101.15
In the instant case it is the prosecution which is belligerently asserting the guilt of the
accused. Applying the afore stated rule here demonstrates that since the prosecution is
asserting the existence of such inculpatory facts and circumstances, the burden rests upon it.
11 Id.
12 Navaneethakrishnan v. The State by Inspector of Police, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 378.
13 Robins v. National Trust Co., (1927) AC 515.
14 SARKAR, LAW OF EVIDENCE 2010 (LexisNexis 2016).
15 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 101, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
4
It is not for the accused persons to prove their innocence by establishing their denial of the
accusatory claims. It is always for the prosecution to bring out evidence or circumstances to
prove the guilt of the accused persons. 16 The term “burden of proof” has been used here to
mean the burden of establishing a case.17
Additionally, another essential test to determine on whom the burden of proof lies is
envisaged in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.18 It states that the burden lies on the side which
would fail if no evidence was adduced on either side. This also indicates that the burden to
prove the alleged charges against the accused is cast on the prosecution.
B.1.b Prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent thing to note at this juncture is that the sole reason for the High Court to acquit
all the accused was the inability of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The law decisively prescribes that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to
conviction of an innocent person. The basic criminal jurisprudence says that there is always a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. 19 No proper trail between all the
circumstances has been established by the prosecution so as to warrant the exclusion of any
other possibilities except the guilt of the accused. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction cannot be passed on the accused.20
It is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that more serious the offence, the
stricter is the degree of proof required. A higher degree of assurance, thus would be necessary
to convict an accused.21 Given the grave nature of charges inflicted upon all the accused
persons in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to substantiate their allegations with
concrete evidence. Falling below the required standard of proof, the case of the prosecution
ought to be struck down. The accused cannot be convicted merely on grounds of strong
suspicion.
The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases
is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt
of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
16 Shangara Singh Ladha Singh v. State, AIR 1964 Punj 400.
17 Emperor v. Damapala, AIR 1937 Rang. 83.
18 Supra note 14, at § 102, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
19 Omychund v. Barker, 26 ER 15, 33.
20 Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 1209.
21 Noor Agra v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 (449).
5
should be adopted.22 This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a series of
decisions.23 It becomes fairly conspicuous from all the alleged facts and circumstances, that
the inference of the guilt of the accused cannot be made conclusively.
Thus, the respondent contends that the ruling of the High Court was legally tenable and sound
in its reason. Owing to this, its acquittal of the accused persons should be upheld by this
Hon’ble Court.
B.1.c Mrs. Savita’s testimony against her husband, Bhawani does not hold any value in the
eyes of law
According to Section 122 of the Evidence Act, any communication by the Husband to the
Wife or vice-versa is prevented from being proved in a court of law. 24 Thus, the wife may not
divulge the communication of husband to the wife.
In Ram Bharose case25, according to the wife’s statement that on the early hours of the day of
murder, she saw her husband coming down from the roof of the house, taking a bath and
going out. Thereupon, the husband presented her with ornaments and upon enquiring as to
where did he get the ornaments from, the husband replied that he got it from the house of the
deceased. Venkataramma Iyer J., held that the wife could not testify the communication of the
husband to her. Thus, the section prohibits the wife or husband from disclosing the
communication between them during the course of marriage.
ISSUE 3: THE ALLEGATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED PERSONS OF RAPING RIYA CANNOT
BE SUSTAINED IN LAW
The respondent reaffirms the principle,26 that even in cases of rape, the onus is always on
prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence and testimonies of the
witnesses need to be corroborated with other evidence on record. Further, the case of the
prosecution has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by leading clear, cogent, convincing
and reliable piece of evidence27.
22 State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Zabbar, AIR 2011 SC 3013.

23 State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite, AIR 2009 SC 1066; Murugan v. State, AIR 2009 SC 72; Perla
Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A. P., AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2622.
24 Ram Bharose v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 704.
25 Ibid.
26 Kalwa v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/UC/0280/2018.
27 Sanjeev and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh,MANU/HP/1034/2015.
6
There is no direct evidence of the crime, the prosecution case rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence Further, an accused cannot be convicted without legal evidence and
the evidence led by the prosecution has failed to link the accused with the commission of the
crime. Moreover, in the current case, the chain of circumstances is not complete and does not
clearly point to the guilt of the accused. Hence, the prosecution has not been able to bring
home the charge against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt.28
A.1) The circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution, is not reliable as it fails
to fulfil the legal requirement.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court29 has given five principles which constitute the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
The Supreme Court30 has cautioned that “human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal
crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions". Thus, Supreme Court has held time and
again that between may be true and must be true there is a long distance to travel which must
be covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence by the prosecution before an
accused is condemned a convict.
A.2) No corroboration of evidence

28 State of Haryana v. Rewa Singh, MANU/PH/1164/2002.
29 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 CAR 263 (SC); Molai and Anr. v. State of M.P.
2000 SCC (Crl.) 438; Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2001 (1) RCR (Crl.) 122; Subhash Chand v. State of
Rajasthan 2001 (4) RCR (Crl.) 496.
30 Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 SC 765.
7
The Court has held that even in cases of rape, where there is no direct evidence, but only
circumstantial evidence or witnesses whose testimony cannot provide directly point to the
guilt of the accused, there is a need for corroboration from any other independent
circumstance or source of evidence, otherwise, there cannot be any conviction31.
31 Chandan and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 599; State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Ram Niwas and
Anr. MANU/RH/0237/2006.
8
CP. NO. 111 OF 2018
ISSUE 1: THE PROHIBITION OF WOMEN TO ENTER THE SHRINE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA
A.1 The prohibition of women to enter the shrine constitutes a reasonable classification
under Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indiana.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has well settled the principle of harmonious construction,
whereby, an enactment containing two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each
other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. Further, in
Venkataramana case32, the court held that two conflicting articles under part III of the
constitution should be read as such, that the rights of the denominational group do not get
negated or nullified. Moreover, a construction which reduces the provision as a “dead letter”
or “useless lumber” is not harmonious or beneficial construction33.
It is deposed that the provisions under part III of the Constitution as per the doctrine of liberal
interpretation34, especially Art. 14 and Art. 25 read along with Art. 26 should be construed
broadly and liberally and not narrowly in order to realise the protection awarded to religious
denominations such as the worshippers of Jogeshwara.
A.1.a Prohibition of women is a reasonable classification under Art. 14.
It is humbly submitted that women as a class were not prohibited to enter Lord Jogeshwara’s
temple. Instead, only a certain age group of women were restricted to visit the shrine, based
on a reasonable classification effected by the legislature. The others were free to enter the
temple to offer their worship. Thus, there was no restriction foisted on the entry of women in
absolute terms. Article 14 prohibits ‘class legislation’ and not classification for the purposes
of legislation as a whole.35 A statutory discrimination cannot be merely set aside if there are
facts on the basis of which the same can be justified. No question can be raised against the
legislative wisdom in such a case. 36 A two-fold test has been put into place to determine
32 Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors, AIR 1958 SC 255.
33 Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006.
34 Goodyear India v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781.
35 D.D. BASU, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214 (Kamal Law House 2018).
36 D.C. Bhatia v. UOI, (1995) 1 SCC 104.
9
whether a classification comes within the ambit of permissible classification under the law,
which is as follows:37
i. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; and

ii. It must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned
law.
However, there emerge certain difficulties in the application of the above stated test in
matters of religion. Religious freedom, being a fundamental right enshrined under Indiana’s
constitution, cannot be abandoned under any given circumstance. Article 25 specifically
provides the equal entitlement of every individual to freely practise their religion. Equal
treatment under Article 25 is conditioned by the essential beliefs and practises of any religion.
With this in view, the reasonability of any classification made cannot be tested on the
touchstone of Article 14 solely. In a secular polity like Indiana, the provision for right to
equality under Article 14 has to be read and interpreted in consonance with the religious
rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26.
The test when applied to the instant case reveals that:
First, the stipulated restriction on women in the age bracket of 10 to 50 years cannot be
denounced as an arbitrary one. It was well founded by taking account of the then prevailing
social conscientiousness while also being backed by the force of a widely recognised custom.
Secondly, the restriction in question has a very rational nexus with the object that the law
purports to achieve. It seeks to preserve the manifestation of the Lord as a ‘Naishtik
Brahmachari’ by preventing his austerity from being disturbed. The age-old practice of
disallowing women of this age group is an integral part of the religion. Considering the
underlying purpose of observing such a practice, it cannot be said to be derogatory of the
dignity or equality of women. Hence, the legislative restriction affords legal protection to this
religious practice under Article 26.
Thus, a harmonious construction of Articles 25 and 26 with Article 14, sufficiently

establishes that the restrictive practice is not vexatious and oppressive towards women. To the
contrary, it helps to strike a balance between these distinct fundamental rights ensuring that
none of these are infringed upon.
37 State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75; State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1968 SC 349.
10
B.1 Constitutional morality in matters of religion protects the Right of disciplines Lord
Jogeshwara.
Constitutional morality in a pluralistic society and secular polity such as Indiana would
reflect that the followers of various sects have the freedom to practise their faith in
accordance with the tenets of their religion. It is irrelevant whether the practise is rational or
logical. Notions of rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts. The
followers of Jogeshwaran denomination, or sect, submit that the worshippers of this deity in
Lord Jogeshwara Temple even individually have the right to practise and profess their
religion under Article 25(1) in accordance with the tenets of their faith, which is protected as
a fundamental right.
Equality and non-discrimination are certainly one facet of constitutional morality. However,
the concept of equality and non-discrimination in matters of religion cannot be viewed in
isolation. Under Indiana’s Constitutional scheme, a balance is required to be struck between
the principles of equality and non-discrimination on the one hand, and the protection of the
cherished liberties of faith, belief, and worship guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 to persons
belonging to all religions in a secular polity, on the other hand. Constitutional morality
requires the harmonisation or balancing of all such rights, to ensure that the religious beliefs
of none are obliterated or undermined. The respondent further submits that the SC 38 as an
institution is tasked with balancing the various fundamental rights, guaranteed under part III.
Constitutional morality in a secular polity would imply the harmonisation of the fundamental
rights, which include the right of every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to practise
their faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion, irrespective of whether
the practise is rational or logical.
C.1 The followers of Lord Jogeshwara constitute a religious denomination or any

section thereof.
The term ‘religious denomination’ in Article 26 means a religious sect having a common faith
and organisation and designated by a distinctive name39. Thus, in a case of denomination,
38 Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj & Ors v. The State of Gujarat & Ors, 1974
AIR 2098.
39 Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, 1954 AIR 282.
11
there must be a common faith of the community based on religion, and the community must
have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves.40
In order to form a religious denomination, the disciplines of Lord Jogeshwara fulfil three
conditions:41
1) The disciplines are a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which
they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being;
2) They have a common organisation;
3) They have a distinctive name
SC42 has held that a religious denomination must follow a common faith which should be
based on religious beliefs and should not be mere religious considerations of caste or
community or societal considerations. Thus, in the present case, the disciplines of Lord
Jogeshwara follow a common faith which is based on religion and it is not based on mere
consideration of caste. Moreover, the courts43 have opined that the term denomination can be
used in larger sense depending on the context and therefore all the followers of a religion may
quite appropriately be regarded as constituting a religious denomination.
However, the respondent humbly submits that in Sri Venkataramana Devaru case44, it was
held that, religion, in this formulation, is a much wider concept, and includes:
• Ceremonial law relating to the construction of temples;

• Installation of idols therein;
• Place of consecration of the principle deity;
• Where the other Devatas are to be installed;
• Conduct of worship of the deities;
• Where the worshippers are to stand for worship;
 Purificatory ceremonies and their mode and manner of performance;
• Who are entitled to enter for worship; where they are entitled to stand and worship;
and, how the worship is to be conducted.
The meaning ascribed to religious denomination by this Court in Commissioner, Hindu

Religious Endowments case, and subsequent cases is not a straight-jacket formula, but a
40 Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments, AIR 1999 Mad 393.
41 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and Others, 1983 SCR (1) 729.
42 Nallor Marthandom Vellalar v. Commr, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, AIR 2005 SC 4225.
43 Ramchandra v. State of Odisha, AIR 1959 Ori 5.
44 Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors, AIR 1958 SC 255.
12
working formula. It provides guidance to ascertain whether a group would fall within a
religious denomination or not. If there are clear attributes that there exists a sect, which is
identifiable as being distinct by its beliefs and practises, and having a collection of followers
who follow the same faith, it would be identified as a ‘religious denomination’.
In this context, respondent make a reference to the concurring judgment of Chinnappa Reddy,
J. in the decision of this court in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India wherein he noted that the
judicial definition of a religious denomination laid down by this court is, unlike a statutory
definition, a mere explanation. After observing that any freedom or right involving the
conscience must be given a wide interpretation, and the expressions ‘religion’ and ‘religious
denomination’ must be interpreted in a “liberal, expansive way”. Hence, from the above, it
can be concluded that the term “Religious denomination does not a fixed meaning or
definition, it has to be construed liberally, in order to award protected to religious
denomination under part III of the Constitution.”
C.1.a The ritual or practice of not allowing the women of menstruating age is an “essential”
and “integral” part of Jogeshwara Temple.
The respondent humbly submits that a religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules
for its follower to accept, but may also prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and
modes of worship which are regarded as an integral part of that religion45. Thus, if the
religion is to be venerated, then the practices annexed thereto are equally respectable and
have to be complied with46.
The temple of deity in question, Lord Jogeshwara is depicted on the form of Nasthik
Brachachari, that is, the Lord observes perpetual celibacy. Thus, he is always depicted in the
form of Yogi or Brahmachari. Hence, a practice and ritual has developed among the lord
Jogeshwara disciplines that in order to ensure Lord Jogeshwara celibacy and austerity are not
broken, women between the age of 11 to 51 years not allowed offer worship in the Temple
premises. This ritual and practice has now become an essential and integral part of system of
45 PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001; Commissioner Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282.; Venkataramana
Devaru v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
46 Commissioner, Hindu Religion Endowment, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra, AIR 1954 SC 282; Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth, (1943) 67 CLR 116.
13
faith surrounding Lord Jogeshwara and his temple in Katra. A similar system of faith is also
followed by women disciplines of Lord Jogeshwara.
The restriction on entry of women is a part of the essential practise of this temple, and the
pilgrimage undertaken. It is clearly intended to keep the pilgrims away from any distraction
related to sex, as the dominant objective of the pilgrimage is the creation of circumstances in
all respects for the successful practise of the spiritual self-discipline.
The limited restriction on the entry of women from 10 to 50 years, in the Jogeshwara Temple
is a matter of ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith and practise’, and the fundamental principles
underlying the ‘prathishtha’ (installation) of the Jogeshwara Akhara, as well as the custom
and usage of worship of the deity - Lord Jogeshwara.
C.1.b The test of determining “essential” and “integral” religious practices.
The development of ecclesiastical jurisprudence in India, as observed by the SC47revolves

around the principle that a religious group has a claimed right with regards to complete
autonomy along with prerogative in matters of exclusive determination of essential religious
practices and principles. This when applied in the present case would mean that whether a
religious activity is essential and integral to a religious, the court would have to answer the
question from the practices and belief of the community, and not the rationality or logic or
development of scientific principles48.
In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala 49, SC emphasised that for a religious practise to receive
protection under Article 25(1) it must be “genuinely”, and “conscientiously” held by persons
claiming such rights. This court had noted that such religious beliefs and practises must be
consistently and not “idly” held, and should not emanate out of “perversity”. In doing so, it
reaffirmed that the Constitutional fabric of India country permits religious beliefs and
practises to exist, regardless of whether or not they appeal to the rational sensibilities of
courts, or others. Further, decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska (USA) in Carlos Frank v.
State of Alaska50 where, the court held that it would be sufficient that a practise be deeply
rooted in religious belief for it to receive the protection of the free exercise clause under the
Constitution.
47 Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. State of TN, (2016) 2 SCC 725.
48 MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL Law 1238 (LexisNexis 2018).
49 Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala ,1987 AIR 748.
50 Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska ,604 P.2d 1068.
14
Moreover, the observation made by the SC in Tilkayat case51, wherein it held that in order to
determine whether a religious practice is essential and integral to the faith, the court must
look upon the views of the religious denomination howsoever irrational it may appear to
persons who do not share that religious belief. Further, as decided by the House of Lords in
Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment 52 , where the Lords held that the
court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the validity or legitimacy of asserted beliefs
on the basis of objective standards or rationality.
The Supreme Court53 has held that protection under Art. 25 an Art. 26 extends to rituals,
observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral part and the court when
deciding what really constitutes an essential part of religious practice has to be decided by the
court with reference to the doctrine of the particular practices regarded as part of the religion.
Thus, the test to be followed by the court is that whether the practice is regarded as essential
by the religious or not and the finding of the court on such as issue will always depend on the
evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and tenets of its religion54.
C.1.c Court cannot interfere with the religious practices of Lord Jogeshwara disciplines
under Article 25(2) as it would obliterate the essential and integral part of religious practice.
The freedom of religious denomination to manage its own religious affairs can be regulated
by a law contemplated by Art. 25(2), provided that such law does not obliterate the essential
part of the religious practice55. However, in the current case, allowing entry of women
between the ages of 11 to 51 years would obliterate the essential part of religious practice
surrounding the temple of Lord Jogeshwara as it would have the effect of breaking perpetual
celibacy state of Lord Jogeshwara who is a brahmachari deity.
C.1.d Personal views of judges are irrelevant in ascertaining whether a particular religious
belief or practise must receive the protection guaranteed under Article 25(1).
51 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan,1963 AIR 1638.

52 Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment ,[2005] UKHL 15.
53 N Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106; HH Srimad Peralulala Ethiraja Ramanuja
Jeeyar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586.
54 AS Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1765.
55 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Srirur Mutt, AIR 1
15
The role of courts in matters concerning religion and religious practises under Indiana secular
Constitutional set up is to afford protection under Article 25(1) to those practises which are
regarded as “essential” or “integral” by the devotees, or the religious community itself.
Further, judicial review of religious practises ought not to be undertaken, as the Court cannot
impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity. Doing so
would negate the freedom to practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs. It
would amount to rationalising religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of Courts.
In Bijoe Emmanuel case 56, The Hon’ble Court noted that the personal views of judges are
irrelevant in ascertaining whether a particular religious belief or practise must receive the
protection guaranteed under Article 25(1). The observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. are
instructive in understanding the nature of the protection afforded under Article 25, and the
role of the Court in interpreting the same. Chinnappa Reddy, J held the viewpoint that Article
25 is an article of faith in the Constitution, incorporated in recognition of the principle that
the real test of a true democracy is the ability of even an insignificant minority to find its
identity under the country’s Constitution. Chinnappa J further elaborated his viewpoint in SP
Mittal case,57 by holding any freedom or right involving the conscience must naturally
receive a wide interpretation and the expression religion and religious denomination must
therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal, expansive way.
Thereafter, Khehar CJI held in Shayara Bano case,58that it is not for a court to determine
whether religious practises were prudent or progressive or regressive. Religion and personal
law, must be perceived, as it is accepted by the followers of the faith.
D.1 Opening Lord Jogeshwara Temple to women would not be a measure of social
reform as stipulated under Article 25(2) (b).
The respondents humbly depose that in the current case, allowing entry of women between
the age of 11 to 51 years would amount to an interference in the religious activity rather than
it being a measure of social reform. Article 25 thus involves a separation between religious
activities and secular & social activities, in which the latter are not protected59.
56 1987 AIR 748.

57 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and Others, 1983 SCR (1) 729.
58 Shayaro Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
59 Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707.
16
E.1 The Court cannot interfere in the essential and integral custom being followed in the
Jogeshwara Temple.
It is humbly practise of restricting the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years is
an essential and integral part of the customs and usages of the temple, which is protected
under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Further, being a religious custom, it is also
immune from challenge under other provisions of part III of the Constitution60.
Lord Jogeshwara Temple in Katra is one of the most important temples in Arya Pradesh with
majority of the state population identifying themselves as disciplines of the Lord Jogeshwara.
The age-old custom, practice and tradition and custom that has evolved since the inception of
the Lord Jogeshwara temple in Katra of restricting the entry of women between the age of 10
to 50 years is attributable to the manifestation of the deity at the Lord Jogeshwara Temple
which is in the form of a ‘Naishtik Bramhachari’ or ‘eternal celibate’, who practises strict
penance, and the severest form of celibacy.
Moreover, the respondents humbly submit that the practise of not allowing not allowing
women between the age of 10 to 50 years may have started in antiquity, however, it
continuing since time immemorial without interruption, and has now a becomes a usage and
custom61. Further, the usage and custom in question in this case, is pre-constitutional, thus, as
per Article 13(3) (a) of the constitution, “law” includes custom and usage, and hence, would
have the force of law. Furthermore, the court has observed that “religious beliefs, customs
and practices based upon religious faiths and scriptures cannot be treated as void.62”
E.1.a. The custom and usage in question fulfils all the characteristics of valid custom.
The characteristics and elements of a valid custom are that it must be of immemorial
existence, it must be reasonable, certain and continuous63. Thus, the usage and practise
associated with the Jogeshwara Akhara is primary to preserve the sacred form and character
of the deity in question, Lord Jogeshwara. Hence, if any practise in a particular temple can be
traced to antiquity, and is integral to the temple, it must be taken to be an essential religious
practise of that temple.
60 Riju Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors, 7 (2015) 9 SCC 461.
61 Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council & Ors, (2006) 4 SCC 748; Bhimashya & Ors. v.
Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa ,(2006) 13 SCC 627; Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors, (2008) 13
SCC 119.
62 Riju Sharma Prasad Sharma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461.
63 Seshammal & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 2 SCC 11.
17
E.1.b. The form of the deity in any temple in Jogeshwara Temple is of paramount importance.
In Venkataramana Devaru case64, SC observed that Gods have distinct forms ascribed to
them, and their worship in terms of rituals, practices and ceremonies, differ according to the
form ascribed to the Deity.
F.1 Rights of a group of devotees as constituting a religious denomination in the context

of a single temples
The Hon’ble SC has identified the rights of a group of devotees as constituting a religious
denomination in the context of a single temple, as illustrated herein below:
• In Sri Venkataramana Devaruand v. The State of Mysore65, the Sri Venkataramana

Temple at Moolky was considered to be a denominational temple, and the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins were held to constitute a religious denomination.
• In Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu66, the Podhu Dikshitars were held
to constitute a religious denomination in the context of the Sri Sabanayagar Temple at
Chidambaram.
64 Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.

65 1958 AIR 255.
66 Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu ,(2014) 5 SCC 75.
18
PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel for the
Respondent humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge, hold and declare that
1. The Appellant has no jurisdiction in the present criminal proceeding against Pt. Kali
Charan;
2. The prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused in
the criminal matter of Murder and Rape under the Indian Penal Code;
3. The prohibition of women to enter the shrine is not violative of the Constitution of
Indiana and is permitted under reasonable classification under Art. 14;
4. To declare the disciplines of Lord Jogehswaran as a religious denomination or a
section thereof;
5. To declare the practice of restricting the entry of women between the age of 10 to 50
years as “essential” and “religious” practice of Lord Jogeshwara temple.
And pass any order that this Hon’ble court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for Respondent)
19

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CNLU GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2019TEAM CODE- R17

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY GENERAL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 32 OF THE BHARAT’S CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 154 OF

CBI & ORS…………………………………………….(APPELLANT)

KALICHARAN & ORS……………………………………..(DEFENDENT)

CP. NO. 111 OF 2018

LORD JOGESHWAR TRUST & ORS………………………………………….(PETITIONER)

STATE OF ARYA PRADESH……………………………………..(RESPONDENT)

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Sanjeev and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh,MANU/HP/1034/2015....................................6

Books and Commentaries

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

AIR All India Reporter

IPC Indian Penal Code

SCC Supreme Court Cases

UOI Union of India

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

“Art. 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

CP. No. 111 of 2018

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND

1. Indiana is a land-locked country in Central Asia comprising of 7 states. Constitution of

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

CP. No. 111 of 2018

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

U/S 302 OF THE IPC.

CP. No. 111 of 2018

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

Cr. App. No. 1028 of 2018

ISSUE 1: THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO APPEAL IN THE PRESENT

1 VN SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 527 (Eastern Book Company 2018).

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

ISSUE 2: THE ACCUSED PERSONS CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR THE CHARGE OF

1) The circumstances from which guilt is established must be fully proved.

2 Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411.

7 Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir.,AIR 2002 SC 316.

B.1.a Burden of Proof lies on the Prosecution.

22 State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Zabbar, AIR 2011 SC 3013.

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.

A.2) No corroboration of evidence

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

CP. NO. 111 OF 2018

ISSUE 1: THE PROHIBITION OF WOMEN TO ENTER THE SHRINE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF

A.1.a Prohibition of women is a reasonable classification under Art. 14.

i. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; and

The test when applied to the instant case reveals that:

Thus, a harmonious construction of Articles 25 and 26 with Article 14, sufficiently

C.1 The followers of Lord Jogeshwara constitute a religious denomination or any

• Ceremonial law relating to the construction of temples;

 Purificatory ceremonies and their mode and manner of performance;

The meaning ascribed to religious denomination by this Court in Commissioner, Hindu

C.1.b The test of determining “essential” and “integral” religious practices.

The development of ecclesiastical jurisprudence in India, as observed by the SC47revolves

51 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan,1963 AIR 1638.