CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a

mayor's permit in the municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.

She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed
but it was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the
respondent judge.

Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed
against her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She
contends that criminal cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not
require preliminary investigation and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the
Prosecutor’s office. She also invoked Act No. 3226 “An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run”. Concluding that the case should have
been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2
month statutory period.

The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor’s office
it suspends the prescriptive period.

Issue:

Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was filed
on the prosecutor’s office?

Decision:

Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Ruling:

As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor’s office is sufficient to
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal’s office; the
running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a
penalty of arresto menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It must be the
filing of the case in court which will interrupt the period from running.

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, GR No. 102342, 1992-07-03

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Facts:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez,
in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990
The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied.
the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following
cases:
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom.
Section 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before
the fiscal by... the offended party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,"
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

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Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and... punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Issues:
the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal
ordinances.
Ruling:
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases"
appearing in... the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section,
that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by... that rule... the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules... on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights"... the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance,
for which the penalty cannot exceed six months,[8] and is thus covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of
the necessary judicial proceedings until it’s too late.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.
It was not interrupted by the filing... of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done... only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already prescribed.
2. PANAGUITON VS DOJ - 571 SCRA 549 G.R. NO. 167571, NOVEMBER 25, 2008

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FACTS:

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money from Luis Panaguiton.
On January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson jointly issued
in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in payment of the
said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored. Luis
Panaguiton made demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against Cawili
and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and
filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson alleged that he himself filed some complaints against
Cawili and they are not associates. Panaguiton showed documents proving the
signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a resolution, City
Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed
a partial appeal before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation. Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against
Tongson since the offense had already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the
Department of Justice thru Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But
on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez declared
that the offense had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time by
Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not that the offense had already prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies
to violation of special acts and that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be
interrupted when judicial proceedings are instituted.

HELD: No, the offense had not prescribed.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the
position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace,
thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed

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with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense
is halted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved

violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and
thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent
change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution
has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings"
should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person who may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four
(4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the
proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the
time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already
initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No.
3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with

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the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing
of the information against petitioner.

3. Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, the secretary of justice and the city prosecutor of lucena
city, petitioners, vs. Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents. G.r. no. 163797,
April 24, 2007

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003 reversing its Decision
dated January 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401, entitled "Rodrigo Padillo and
Marietta Padillo, Complainants-Petitioners, versus The Secretary of Justice, et al.,
Respondents."

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:

Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending
Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa
Padillo-Chua, served as the firm's manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother
of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.

One of Marissa's functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications for
approval by respondents. Once a loan application had been approved, respondents
would authorize the release of a check signed by them or their authorized signatory, a
certain Mila Manalo.

Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa
was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she
recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were
spurious. Marissa's modus operandi was to alter the name of the payee appearing on
the check by adding another name as an alternative payee. This alternative payee
would then personally encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts
received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their
personal accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to
the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees
included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount embezzled reached P7
million.

Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints
to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation, docketed as
I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and 98-1605.

In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo A. Datu (now
retired), disposed of the complaints as follows:

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WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding of a prima facie case of Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, let
an Information be filed against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua, Renita Chua, and
several John Does, the same to be filed with the Regional Trial Court.

The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla Correa, Giovani Guia,
Emmanuel Garcia, Zenaida Nantes, Cherrylyn Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando
Loreto, Cesar Salamat, Antonio Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva, Alexander
Asiado, Peter Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano Evaso, Edgar Sebastian, Crisencio Asi, Roberto
Ong and Gregorio Flancia is provisionally dismissed.
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson,
and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, docketed therein as Criminal
Cse No. 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59.

Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners,
respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution
dated January 3, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The City Prosecution Office of
Lucena City is hereby directed to file the Information of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents defined and penalized under Article 315
par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58 counts) against respondent Marissa
Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal of the Information of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against respondents Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua. Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the commission
of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence. There was no showing that he
abused the trust and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the questioned checks
were deposited in his bank account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found
no proof of conspiracy between her and Marissa.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the
Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that in issuing the Resolution dated January 3,
2000 directing the Prosecutor's Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding
Information only against Marissa, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to
withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several
Informations against petitioners.

On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners.

Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Revisiting its Decision, the

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Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2003, promulgated its Amended Decision granting
respondents' motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY,
the Court orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor, Lucena City to include Wilson Chua and
Renita Chua as accused in the said case.

SO ORDERED.

In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and
Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa's consistent
practice of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the respective accounts
of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband
and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and (3) Wilson
had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. This is supported by the affidavit
of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998.

Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for reconsideration of the Amended
Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same on May 28, 2004.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly
provides that "All criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for
this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it
necessarily follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the
prosecution thereof. In Suarez v. Platon, this Court described the prosecuting officer as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases, the
public prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to: (a)
determine whether a prima facie case exists; (b) decide which of the conflicting
testimonies should be believed free from the interference or control of the offended
party; and (c) subject only to the right against self-incrimination, determine which
witnesses to present in court. Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor
cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the evidence
before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound by his
oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to complainant's evidence, are
shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons
from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.

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We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor's exercise of his discretionary
powers is not absolute.

First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary
of Justice who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control
and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the
public prosecutor's decision may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the
President.

Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.

Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents,
ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that
only Marissa should be charged.

We agree.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. We have carefully examined the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable
cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice
either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa's practice
of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of
Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife
makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the
other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming
that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa's illegal activities.

Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou, not even the Supreme Court can order
the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule
is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the prosecutor, as in this case.

Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor of Lucena City to
include Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

4. PINOTE vs AYCO
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Facts

Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice Mayor Salvador to present evidence
consisting of the testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor
Pinote who was prosecuting the case.

Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center hence his
absence. On the subsequent hearings, he refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses despite being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the bbproceedings
conducted in his absence were void.

Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. Hence, an
administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote against Ayco.

R: considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies

the same on complainant’s failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution
despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No substantial prejudice
was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the
two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.

Office of the Court Administrator: finds respondent to have breached Section 5, Rule
110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure and accordingly recommends that he be
reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and
not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of
criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its
interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.

Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence
of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is
thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently
giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the
accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

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