Nocum v.

Laguna Tayabas Bus Co

Nocum, plaintiff, was a passenger of the defendant’s Bus No. 120, then making a trip within the
barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, who got injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Plaintiff sued Laguna Tayabas for Breach of Contract of Carriage.

The Trial Court held Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable since it did not observe the extraordinary
or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the Civil Code. It further states that the
defense of fortuitous event is unavailing.

The Trial Court’s decision is based on the witness, Severino Andaya, who states that a man with box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus and the box was place under the seat. They left
Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion occurred, the plaintiff was thrown
out. There were 37 other passengers who got injured.

The bus conductor said that such box belongs to a passenger whom he didn’t know and states that it
contained miscellaneous items and clothes. From its appearance there was no indication that the
contents of the box were explosives and firecrackers.

The dispatcher said that they were not authorized to open the baggage of passengers because the
instruction from the management is to call the police if there were packages containing articles which
were against regulations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is liable for breach of contract of carriage?

RULING:

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is not liable for damages. In overland transportation, the common
carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the contents of packages or
bags, particularly those hand carried by passengers.

No doubt, the views of the trial court do seem to be in line with the reasons that the Code
Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft of the Civil Code. Indeed,
in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with the Commission that by requiring
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
by creating a presumption of negligence against them.

It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus
by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it and
according to the trial court “if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the
contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger
to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees
should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.”

However, the Supreme Court considered the opinion that the law does not require as much. Article
1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
“according to all the circumstances of each case.” In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same
qualification: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.”

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers, allowance
must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with
him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to
be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made
as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in
compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental
sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling
would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily
the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
 NEGROS NAVIGATION CO v CA (compare to mecena)
Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila and going to Bacolod.

Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several
of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found
and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought
for the death of other passengers. In Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1)
allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage,
(2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the
full extent.

Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and
trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the
record of this case.

Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit. Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this
Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should
be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal
circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if private
respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case.
Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presently presented.

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
award would naturally vary or differ in each case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages.
Korean Airlines v. CA
Facts:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially
listed as a “chance passenger”. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was
cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL officer
pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he was barred from taking the flight.
When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was unable to report
for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was
informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the
other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available,
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold KAL
liable for breach of contract
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to what extent
Held:
(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was aggravated in this
case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed"
passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus
causing him embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz
shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed through customs
and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to
Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:

a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed
breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-
appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for
moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped
off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely
and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to
moral damages.
c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been
fully established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so
expressly pleaded in the complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for
the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is not so
serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of P100,000
as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
PAL V CA
FACTS:

 October 23, 1988: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City. But, due to typhoon Osang,
the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
 PAL gave out cash assistance of P100 and P200 the next day.
 Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL’s expense because he did not
have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. He instead shared with a co-
passenger Andoni Dumlao and stayed at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao
 October 25, 1988: Pantejo discovered that co-passangers Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank were reimbursed by PAL for their hotel stay.
 He told Oscar Jereza, PAL’s Manager for Departure Services that he will
sue for discrimination and it was then that he offered P300.
 RTC: Ordered PAL to pay P300 actual damages, P150,000 moral
damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P15,000 attorney’s fees, and
6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until paid, plus
costs of suit
 CA: affirmed but deleted attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
ISSUE: W/N PAL was in bad faith so award for damages is proper

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION regarding the

computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards

 No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and

prejudicial conduct. More importantly, it has been sufficiently established
that it is petitioner’s standard company policy, whenever a flight has been
cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to
provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups.
 PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers
and in discriminating Pantejo. He was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government position
and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected
him to ridicule, shame and anguish. His refusal to accept the
P300.00 proffered as an afterthought when he threatened suit
was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that
his co-passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes
the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code.
 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the awards for actual,
moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons
meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable.
 interest of 6% imposed by respondent court should be computed from the date of rendition of
judgment and not from the filing of the complaint

Calalas v. CA

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned

and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.

Issues:

(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this caseN(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required
in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it
is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutescaso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause
of the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING: No.First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of
carriage. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver,
because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-
delict. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability
to a person where there is no relation between him and another party.
But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner
and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of
the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’
part, which makes him liable.
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 546

Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas,
Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at the left
side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left eye. He was then immediately brought by
private respondent’s personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.

Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks and the stroking of the bus by a bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one
such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not however, make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort, committed by a
stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of the family.

Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit,
conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao
residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of petitioner, and informed him about the plot of the Maranaos. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board
the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later
went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the
bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped
out of the vehicle.Caorong was shot to death as a result.

RTC dismissed the complaint stating that Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion
ofproviding its buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioner’s duty. The evidence
showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyondpetitioner’s control.

CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious
plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety precautions at all.One
available safeguard that could have absolved Fortunefrom liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel insensitive and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this
measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing totakenecessary precautions to
ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

RULING:

1. Petitioner is liable.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of
other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the
act.
• Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons
and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier is liable for
failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
• Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the
part of the victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither
an act of negligence or recklessness.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. Seizure of Petitioner’s Bus is not a Case of Force Majeure

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen,
is inevitable. To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to
take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in
the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second
requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case.
Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses,
petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the
bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liabilty.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so
the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come
from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated

Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
HELD: Mangune Spouses.

First defense: Last Clear Chance

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
Second defense: the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence

Respond cuourt said the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of
impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal
position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark
of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact. Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the
sudden U-turn executed by Manalo.

Thir defense: Substantial factor test

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Respondent court said the
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort
to avoid the accident.

It cannot be also said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel
was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50
kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in
3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in
only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision
is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due
to a fortuitous event.

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and
the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur supra.

However, The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his . In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his

BUSTAMANTE V CA

Facts:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor
No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite.
The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s seat to the last rear
seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent
act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the
liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of
Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrineof last clear chance as between the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability.

Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co

Nocum, plaintiff, was a passenger of the defendant’s Bus No. 120, then making a trip within the
barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, who got injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Plaintiff sued Laguna Tayabas for Breach of Contract of Carriage.

The Trial Court held Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable since it did not observe the extraordinary
or utmost diligence of a very cautious person as required by the Civil Code. It further states that the
defense of fortuitous event is unavailing.

The Trial Court’s decision is based on the witness, Severino Andaya, who states that a man with box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus and the box was place under the seat. They left
Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion occurred, the plaintiff was thrown
out. There were 37 other passengers who got injured.

The bus conductor said that such box belongs to a passenger whom he didn’t know and states that it
contained miscellaneous items and clothes. From its appearance there was no indication that the
contents of the box were explosives and firecrackers.

The dispatcher said that they were not authorized to open the baggage of passengers because the
instruction from the management is to call the police if there were packages containing articles which
were against regulations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is liable for breach of contract of carriage?

RULING:

Laguna Tayabas Bus Company is not liable for damages. In overland transportation, the common
carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an examination on the contents of packages or
bags, particularly those hand carried by passengers.

No doubt, the views of the trial court do seem to be in line with the reasons that the Code
Commission had for incorporating the above-quoted provisions in its draft of the Civil Code. Indeed,
in approving the said draft, Congress must have concurred with the Commission that by requiring
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
by creating a presumption of negligence against them.

It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in the bus
by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it and
according to the trial court “if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the
contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the passenger
to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista, employees
should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company regulations.”

However, the Supreme Court considered the opinion that the law does not require as much. Article
1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
“according to all the circumstances of each case.” In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same
qualification: “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.”

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers, allowance
must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the
passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with
him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to
be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing
appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made
as to the nature of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this,
constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in
compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
What must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental
sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling
would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily
the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
 NEGROS NAVIGATION CO v CA (compare to mecena)
Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila and going to Bacolod.

Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several
of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found
and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought
for the death of other passengers. In Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1)
allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage,
(2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the
full extent.

Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and
trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the
record of this case.

Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit. Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this
Court’s policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should
be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is
where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal
circumstances of the victims. For that matter, differentiation would be justified even if private
respondents had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case.
Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presently presented.

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
award would naturally vary or differ in each case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private respondents damages.
Korean Airlines v. CA
Facts:

Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially
listed as a “chance passenger”. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was
cleared for departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL officer
pointed at him and shouted, “Down! Down!” and he was barred from taking the flight.
When he asked for another booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was unable to report
for work and so he lost his employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was
informed that there are 2 seats possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the
other seat was won by Lapuz through lottery. But because only 1 seat became available,
it was given to Perico. The trial court adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with modification on the damages awarded.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold KAL
liable for breach of contract
(2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to what extent
Held:
(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed
passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight
No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a
breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was aggravated in this
case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed"
passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus
causing him embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz
shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed through customs
and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft.
In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to
Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected
when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because:

a. The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed
breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-
appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for
moral damages.
b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it "bumped
off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated him rudely
and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to
moral damages.
c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been
fully established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so
expressly pleaded in the complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for
the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper.

A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is not so
serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The assessment of P100,000
as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
PAL V CA
FACTS:

 October 23, 1988: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City. But, due to typhoon Osang,
the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
 PAL gave out cash assistance of P100 and P200 the next day.
 Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL’s expense because he did not
have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. He instead shared with a co-
passenger Andoni Dumlao and stayed at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao
 October 25, 1988: Pantejo discovered that co-passangers Superintendent
Ernesto Gonzales and Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine
National Bank were reimbursed by PAL for their hotel stay.
 He told Oscar Jereza, PAL’s Manager for Departure Services that he will
sue for discrimination and it was then that he offered P300.
 RTC: Ordered PAL to pay P300 actual damages, P150,000 moral
damages, P100,000 exemplary damages, P15,000 attorney’s fees, and
6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until paid, plus
costs of suit
 CA: affirmed but deleted attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
ISSUE: W/N PAL was in bad faith so award for damages is proper

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION regarding the

computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards

 No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and

prejudicial conduct. More importantly, it has been sufficiently established
that it is petitioner’s standard company policy, whenever a flight has been
cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to
provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups.
 PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers
and in discriminating Pantejo. He was exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment especially because of his government position
and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected
him to ridicule, shame and anguish. His refusal to accept the
P300.00 proffered as an afterthought when he threatened suit
was justified by his resentment when he belatedly found out that
his co-passengers were reimbursed for hotel expenses and he
was not. The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes
the former liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of
the Civil Code.
 Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the awards for actual,
moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons
meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable.
 interest of 6% imposed by respondent court should be computed from the date of rendition of
judgment and not from the filing of the complaint

Calalas v. CA

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned

and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and
driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of
carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court
held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.

Issues:

(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in
this caseN(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required
in the contract of carriage (3) Whether moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the
present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Thesecond, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of
the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.

(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it
is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's
contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutescaso fortuito. A caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a)
the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause
of the accident which negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING: No.First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of
carriage. In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination as a common carrier in violation of Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver,
because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of quasi-
delict. The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability
to a person where there is no relation between him and another party.
But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner
and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of
the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’
part, which makes him liable.
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 546

Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas,
Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at the left
side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left eye. He was then immediately brought by
private respondent’s personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.

Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks and the stroking of the bus by a bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one
such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not however, make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort, committed by a
stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of the family.

Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit,
conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao
residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations
manager of petitioner, and informed him about the plot of the Maranaos. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be taken.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on board
the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong later
went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline on the
bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the driver jumped
out of the vehicle.Caorong was shot to death as a result.

RTC dismissed the complaint stating that Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the suggestion
ofproviding its buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioner’s duty. The evidence
showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty. Caorong was
an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyondpetitioner’s control.

CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling:Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the devious
plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety precautions at all.One
available safeguard that could have absolved Fortunefrom liability was frisking of incoming
passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which Fortune failed to
do. The frisking system is not novel insensitive and dangerous places. Many companies adopt this
measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”

ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing totakenecessary precautions to
ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

RULING:

1. Petitioner is liable.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act of
other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in preventing the
act.
• Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the weapons
and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier is liable for
failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
• Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on the
part of the victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was neither
an act of negligence or recklessness.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. Seizure of Petitioner’s Bus is not a Case of Force Majeure

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be foreseen,
is inevitable. To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to
take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in
the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second
requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case.
Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses,
petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the
bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liabilty.

Phil. Rabbit bus lines vs. IAC.

FACTS.
1.The passengers boarded the jeep owned by the Mangune Spouses and driven by Manalo to
bring them to Carmen Rosales Pangasinan.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan Tarlack,The right rear wheel of the truck was detouch so
the driver steps on the brake as a result of which, the jeep
who is running unbalance made a uturn so that the front part face the south where it come
from and its rear face the north where it is going.
3. The bus of the petitioner driven by Delos Reyes bump the jeep resulting in the death of the
three passengers of the jeepney and injuries to others.
4. The two drivers was charged of multiple homicide before the MTC of SanMiguel Tarlack.
5. A probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo and the case of Delos Reyes
was dismissed and Manalo was convicted By the court of first
instance of Pangasinan.
6. Then the heirs of the deceased passengers filed a complaint for recovery of civil damages
before the court of first instance impleading both the defendant
and the respondent.
7. the CFI found Manalo guilty of negligence but this was reverse by the IAC.
ISSUE.
Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
According to the supreme court, The IAC erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance in
this case because this doctrine applies only in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vihicles and not in a suit where passengers demand
responsibility from a carries to enforce its contractual obligation.
So the decision of the IAC was set aside and the decision of the CFI was reinstated

Who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
HELD: Mangune Spouses.

First defense: Last Clear Chance

We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
Second defense: the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence

Respond cuourt said the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of
impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal
position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the
jeepney was abrupt. The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark
of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact. Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the
sudden U-turn executed by Manalo.

Thir defense: Substantial factor test

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Respondent court said the
defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort
to avoid the accident.

It cannot be also said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of
80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel
was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50
kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in
3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in
only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision
is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due
to a fortuitous event.

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and
the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur supra.

However, The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his . In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his

BUSTAMANTE V CA

Facts:

At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor
No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite.
The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s seat to the last rear
seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the
passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent
act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the
liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of
Appealsruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The principle of “last clear chance” applies “in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrineof last clear chance as between the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability.