Systems Research and Behavioral Science
Syst. Res. 19, 599^602 (2002)
DOI:10.1002/sres.490
& Notes and Insights
In Response to Robert Kay: Luhmann’s
Ontology, Ontogeny, and Epistemology
Kenneth Bausch*
Executive Director, Institute for 21st Century Agoras
INTRODUCTION
Robert Kay (2001) has recently constructed a
welcome ‘new frame’ for applying autopoiesis to
social theory. The focus and brevity of his
presentation unduly truncate consideration of
major contributions made by Niklas Luhmann in
this area.
There are two halves in Luhmann’s theory:
ontology and ontogeny. The ontology specifies
three separate autopoietic systems: biological,
psychological, and social. The social systems are
further divided into society as a whole and
interactions. This is the half that is briefly
discussed by Kay. The second half, barely
mentioned by Kay, is an ontogeny that narrates
how expectations develop social structures.
In the realm of the ontogeny of knowledge,
Luhmann justifies radical constructivism in strict
accordance with autopoiesis by employing the
phenomenological concept of asymmetry.
ONTOLOGY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
In Social Systems, Luhmann (1995) melds two
dissonant theoretical perspectives: one global/
ontological, the other phenomenological/ontogenic.
Within the global perspective, he posits
three distinct autopoietic systems: biological,
psychological, and social. These distinct systems
* Correspondence to: Dr Kenneth Bausch, 2449 So. Barrington #202,
Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA. E-mail: kennethbausch@mediaone.net
Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
do not communicate with each other, but they do
structurally couple. Within this context, indivi-
duals can communicate with other individuals
but not with social systems and social systems
can communicate with each other but not with
individuals. Nevertheless, individuals do inter-
act with social systems and vice versa by way of
the mutual adaptations that they make with each
other as they structurally couple; that is, as they
adjust as system and environment to each other
in maintaining their autopoiesis.
Within this framework, he distinguishes
society as a whole and interactions as two
autopoietic social systems, each with distinctive
boundaries. Society is the universe of discourse
and culture that is produced in communication.
Interactions arise between individuals and
endure as long as the circle of communication
is maintained.
Society
Society is an autopoietic system based upon the
omnipresence and self-generation of communi-
cation. Communication and communicative
structures are the essence of society, according
to Luhmann. Society is a closed autopoietic
system because every communication produces
further communications in ever self-reproducing
iterations. This part of Luhmann’s theory is often
characterized as being independent of human
agency, value-free, and a meat-grinder (Kay,
for example, and Habermas, 1987). This global
NOTES AND INSIGHTS
conception is very powerful in explaining how
society differentiates into subsystems: monetary,
bureaucratic, legal, romantic, etc.
Interactions
Interactions are autopoietic systems consisting of
communications between other social systems.
We can consider the interacting social systems to
be individuals (for simplicity) because (as shown
in the following section) persons are social
systems in Luhmann’s conception. Interaction
systems are closed by the theme that is proposed
in a discussion and the members who participate
in the interaction. When the theme is dropped or
the individuals disperse, the interaction ceases.
Luhmann does not explore, to my knowledge,
the possible extension in time, space, and
complexity of interactions to become larger
organizations. In fact, he says precious little
about the kinds of associations, organizations,
and government that are actually at work in the
world. Because of this lack, commentators often
claim that Luhmann has little to say about the
real world. Such characterizations generally
ignore or play down the phenomenological side
of Luhmann’s corpus.
ONTOGENY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Luhmann unfolds a coherent narrative of the
origins and development of social systems. He
tells the story of how ‘persons’ come into
existence as social systems in situations of
‘double contingency’, and how persons develop
subsequent systems, such as roles, programs,
values, etc., by experimenting with expectations.
Expectations
All self-organizing systems maintain themselves
by means of expectations. Kauffman (1993) even
conceives of polymeric ‘agents’ creating models
of one another in an attempt to predict one
another’s behavior. In a similar way, Luhmann
states that autopoietic systems, in their ongoing
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2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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reproductive processes, make selections that
maintain and expand their meaning (their
organized complexity). They manage this selec-
tion process through a system of graduated
expectations that they develop in processes of
trial and error, memory, and adaptation.
Double Contingency
When humans are dealing with non-human
entities, this process is relatively simple because
such entities are rather predictable. In dealing
with other humans, however, the situation is
complicated. With non-humans, ego can test
what an entity will do and form solid predic-
tions: ‘An elevated rock will fall if it is not
supported (gravity)’ or ‘It is best to stay away
from rattlesnakes.’ In such cases, our predictions
remove contingency from situations; as we no
longer doubt that gravity exists. With humans,
when ego tries to predict what alter will do, he or
she finds out that alter is also trying to predict
what ego will do: a case of double contingency.
As ego finds out that alter is unpredictable, he
or she recognizes that alter is intelligent and free.
In the same recognition, he or she recognizes that
himself or herself is also contingent, intelligent,
and free. In this mutual recognition, ‘persons’ are
formed. Luhmann states that all culture and
civilization are built upon this recognition.
Evolution of Society
Participants in this domain of double contin-
gency lessen their risk by making their expecta-
tions ambiguous and tentative. In this way,
they take some control of their situations. Social
systems (such as persons) increase their levels of
acceptable insecurity in order to progress and
increase the range of choice of their members.
They make the insecurity bearable by using
the expectations of person, role, program, and
value. These expectations increase constraints on
individuals and give them freedom. In modern
society, freedom and constraint increase
together; the greater the type of constraints
(in the form of expectations), the more choice is
Syst. Res.19, 599^602 (2002)
Kenneth Bausch
Syst. Res.
had by societal members about how to respond
to them.
In dealing with their many expectations,
societies and individuals develop generalized
contingency plans that enable them to harbor
improbable expectations. Using cognitive and
normative strategies for dealing with disappoint-
ment, they create social structures that intertwine
risk and security. Their cognitive openness to
new information embodies their acceptance of
risk. Their normative rejection of unacceptable
and dangerous information expresses their
regard for security. Normative behavior reflects
the necessary circularity of living systems. Risky
behavior reflects the asymmetry that is necessary
for growth.
In this ontogenic manner, Luhmann builds the
major parts of his thought in Social Systems.
It seems that Luhmann has the ontology and
ontogeny of society correct in large measure. In
the domain of ontology, he has it right on both
extremes—global (society as a whole) and
particular (interactions)—a great accomplish-
ment. He does not, however, deal extensively
with the messy in-between of pragmatic histor-
ical reality. Everyday reality escapes his clear
formulations. It is likely that autopoiesis is a too
narrow theoretic basis for pragmatic social
theory.
In the area of ontogeny, he offers a convincing
narrative. He presents a methodology that can be
employed to deal with real-world theory and
practice.
ONTOGENY OF KNOWLEDGE
Luhmann develops his epistemology on the
basis of his ontogeny. He is a radical systemic
constructivist. He recognizes the utter circularity
of autopoietic knowledge and fights his way out
of the circle.
Asymmetries
In Luhmann’s account, we escape from circularity,
while not destroying it, by creating asymmetries
(hypotheses). In other words, we posit things to
Copyright
2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In Response to Robert Kay
NOTES AND INSIGHTS
be so even though we do not know that they are,
thus creating asymmetries (things outside of our
autopoietic circle). Then we test whether they
account for our experience. If an asymmetry is
confirmed in our experience, it is incorporated
into an enlarged autopoietic circle. Then the
process begins again. In academic psychology,
this process is dubbed the ‘theory-theory’ of
learning.
Redundancy
As hypotheses prove themselves to work time
and time again, they become redundant and
attain practical certainty. The more redundant
the hypothesis, the greater is its certainty and the
likelihood that it is a ‘fact’.
Facts have degrees of redundancy and cer-
tainty based upon the number and variety of
trials to which they are subjected. Some facts—
such as ‘We need to eat to stay alive’—approach
absolute certainty because of organic evolution-
ary experience over millions of years and our
own personal experience. Many physical and
biological laws fall into this category.
Other ‘facts’—such as ‘Johnny has ADHD’—
have infinitely less redundancy and certainty
because the concept ‘ADHD’ is ill defined and the
diagnosis is only an opinion. Social statements
generally fall into this less redundant category.
Ways to Assure Greater Certainty
The ‘facts’ and ‘laws’ of social science and
philosophy receive varying degrees of testing
and have corresponding degrees of certainty. In
addition to the testing of human evolutionary
experience, several formal methods of verifica-
tion are available.
Luhmann offers several ways that we use to
assure ourselves that our knowledge is true. First
of all, one supplies reasons for knowledge. Then
since these reasons ‘merely transform the circle
into an infinite regress’, one places one’s hopes in
approximating reality evermore closely. ‘If one in
turn justifies the reasons and keeps every step of
this process open to critique and ready for
Syst. Res.19, 599^602 (2002)
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NOTES AND INSIGHTS
revision, it becomes more improbable that such
an edifice could have been constructed without
reference to reality. The circularity is not elimi-
nated. It is used, unfolded, de-tautologized’
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 479).
Luhmann also answers a similar question:
‘How can one guarantee that observation main-
tains contact with reality when it claims to be
knowledge, even scientific knowledge?’
First, one can move the site of knowledge
claims from psychic systems to social systems.
Social systems can be made independent of
individual motives and reputations. The knowl-
edge of social systems ‘‘can be subjected to its
own conditionings, perhaps in the form of
‘theories’ and ‘methods.’ ’’ Knowledge can also
be evaluated on its productivity and its ability to
generate new knowledge. Second . . . One could
force global theories ‘‘to test on themselves
everything that they determine about their object’’
(Luhmann, 1995, pp. 484–485).
In these passages, Luhmann offers reasons for
certainty that are consonant with his own
thought and the general wisdom of philoso-
phers. One offers reasons, tests them, and hopes
to approximate reality ever more closely. As this
process goes on, one has good reason to believe
that one’s cognitive edifice is constructed with
reference to reality. One enlarges certainty by
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2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Syst. Res.
testing one’s ideas in dialogue with other
thinkers and cultures.
Luhmann’s epistemology, therefore, seems to
provide a solid basis for more detailed episte-
mological elaboration. The bases of certainty that
he lays down are not merely the best that are
available to autopoietic animals, but are very fine
indeed. For a more complete explanation, see
Bausch (2001).
I believe that this exposition of Luhmann’s
thought fits comfortably within Kay’s autopoie-
tic framework.
REFERENCES
Bausch K. 2001. The Emerging Consensus in Social
Systems Theory. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press:
New York.
Habermas J. 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (Lawrence FG, trans.). MIT Press:
Cambridge, MA (original work published 1985).
Kauffman SA. 1993. The Origins of Order: Self-Organiza-
tion and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University
Press: New York.
Kay R. 2001. Are organizations autopoietic? A call for a
new debate. Systems Research and Behavioral Science
18: 461–477.
Luhmann N. 1995. Social Systems (Bednarz J, Baecker
D, trans.). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA
(original work published 1984).
Syst. Res.19, 599^602 (2002)
Kenneth Bausch