HEARSAY EVIDENCE

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Salapuddin vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta; Extrajudicial Confessions; An extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered
as hearsay against them.—An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be
admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. Tamargo v Awingan,
610 SCRA 316 (2010), elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. The
exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of
a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the
confession. In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin
in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not
one of the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was
involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did
no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant
in the conspiracy, ruling thus: Respondent Gerry Salapuddin’s participation in the foregoing, cannot be
downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands
written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another,
associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence.

507
VOL. 708, OCTOBER 23, 2013 507
Da Jose vs. Angeles
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought
to be produced.―It bears stressing that the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus were not
identified by Celerina contrary to the findings of the CA but by Celine in her testimony before the RTC
on November 13, 2002 and Celine, under cross-examination, admitted by way of stipulation that she
had no participation in the preparation thereof. We thus agree with the RTC’s ruling that said cash
vouchers though admitted in evidence, whether objected to or not, have no probative value for being
hearsay. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay
evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and (3) absence of oath. Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only testify
on facts within his or her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a substantive prerequisite in
accepting testimonial evidence establishing the truth of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered
as proof of its contents has to be authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person
with personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document.

PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner, vs. MARILYN
MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA, respondents.

Same; Same; It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows
of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.―It is a basic
rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge,
i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely
learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not
of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral
testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; That the complainants alleged in the preface of their
affidavits that they “noticed and witnessed” the anomalous act complained of does not take their
statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule.―That the complainants alleged in the
preface of their affidavits that they “noticed and witnessed” the anomalous act complained of does not
take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still
“evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.” Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
Same; Same; Same; For the affiants’ failure to identify their sworn statements, and considering
the seriousness of the charges filed, their affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be
treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.―For the affiants’ failure to identify their
sworn statements, and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their affidavits must not be
accepted at face value and should be treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.374
Same; Same; Same; The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)/Progress report, having been
submitted by the officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis of their own personal
observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the complainants’ affidavits, is
hearsay.―The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their
duties not on the basis of their own personal observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis
of the complainants’ affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot rely on it.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot
be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative
agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial.―While administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision
of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial.

DELA LLANA VS BIONG

Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, cannot be given credence.—Even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition
of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of524 evidence depends on its relevance
and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of
Court. Dela Llana vs. Biong, 711 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and
PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY, respondents.

Same; Evidence; Admissions; Admission Against Interest; Being an admission against interest, the
documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.—
MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. It is clear
as daylight. The first letter was written barely four (4) months after the deed of sale was
accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed the declarations
contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits. Pursuant to
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations are
admissible against MERALCO. SEC. 26. Admissions of a party—The act, declaration, or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. In Heirs of
Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, 577 SCRA 6 (2009), it was written, thus: x x x Being an admission
against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption
that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true.
Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his
fault if it does not. Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds
that the letter and the internal memorandum presented, offered and properly admitted
as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission against
its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of
the documents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CAMALODING LABA y SAMANODING, appellant.

Citation: 689 SCRA 367

Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries Made in Official Records; Under Section 44 of Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts they state.―Neither will the non-presentation in court of Police Senior Inspector
Ebuen, the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory examination on the confiscated substance,
operate to acquit appellant. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the
court to decide. It has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it
wishes to present as witnesses. Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the
chemical analyst, and the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Sec. 44 of Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts they state.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR.,
namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO
BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III,
MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES
BARRUN-REJUSO, respondents.

Citation: 700 SCRA 658

Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence.―Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to
wit: SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.—The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be
received in evidence. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, 647 SCRA 132 (2011), we were
inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of
the PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such
that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

Avelino vs. People 701 SCRA 477 , July 17, 2013

The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan
as regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that
the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to
Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as
an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the
place where the empty shells were found is immaterial.