Consti Session 6

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J. July 1, 2015.]

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-36-SCC)
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL, complainant, vs. CLERK OF COURT

MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI
CITY, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
This resolves the complaint 1 of Baguan M. Mamiscal (Mamiscal) against

respondent Macalinog S. Abdullah (Abdullah), Clerk of Court, Shari'a Circuit
Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Originally, the complaint also
charged Judge Aboali J. Cali (Judge Cali), Presiding Judge, Shari'a Circuit Court,
Marawi City, for his participation in the subject controversy. On January 9,
2013, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges against Judge Cali for lack of
merit. 2
The Facts
In his complaint, Mamiscal averred that on September 26, 2010, he and
his wife, Adelaidah Lomondot (Adelaidah) had a heated argument. In a fit of
anger, Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq). 3 The
repudiation was embodied in an agreement 4 (kapasadan) signed by Mamiscal
and Adelaidah.
The next day, Adelaidah left their conjugal dwelling in Iligan City and
went back to her family's home in Marinaut, Marawi City. A few days later,
during the obligatory period of waiting ('iddah), 5 Mamiscal had a change of
heart and decided to make peace with his wife. For the purpose, he sent their
common relatives to see Adelaidah and make peace with her on his behalf. 6
Almost five (5) months later, however, on February 23, 2011, Adelaidah
filed 7 the Certificate of Divorce (COD), 8 dated September 26, 2010, with the
office of Abdullah for registration. Although unsigned, the certificate,
purportedly executed by Mamiscal, certified that he had pronounced talaq in
the presence of two (2) witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law for the
purpose of effecting divorce from Adelaidah. A notation on the certificate
stated that it was being filed together with the kapasadan. SDAaTC
On the same day, Abdullah, in the exercise of his duty as both Clerk of
Court and Circuit Civil Registrar, 9 issued the Invitation 10 notifying the couple
and their representatives to appear before the Shari'a Circuit Court on
February 28, 2011, in order to constitute the Agama Arbitration Council (AAC)
that would explore the possibility of reconciling the spouses. 11
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On March 24, 2011, Abdullah issued the Certificate of Registration of
Divorce 12 (CRD) finalizing the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD, questioning the validity of
t h e kapasadan on which the CRD was based. In his motion, Mamiscal
contended that the kapasadan was invalid considering that he did not prepare
the same. Moreover, there were no witnesses to its execution. He claimed that
he only signed the kapasadan because of Adelaidah's threats.
Mamiscal also questioned the validity of the COD, denying that he had
executed and filed the same before the office of Abdullah. Insisting that he
never really intended to divorce his wife, Mamiscal pointed out the fact that
on December 13, 2010, before the expiration of the 'iddah, he wrote his wife
13 to inform her that he was revoking the repudiation he made on September
26, 2010 and the kapasadan they entered into on the same day because he
did it on the "spur of the moment." 14
For Mamiscal, the CRD should be declared invalid considering that: a) he
was deprived of due process because the AAC, before which he and his
children were supposed to express their sentiments regarding the divorce, was
yet to be constituted; b) three days before the issuance of the CRD, Professor
Mustafa Lomala M. Dimaro, appeared before Judge Cali to discuss the
possibility of reconciliation between the parties; and c) their children, Adelah
Rima and Naim Mamiscal, prayed that the trial court advise their mother not
to proceed with the divorce. 15 In addition to the revocation of the CRD,
Mamiscal also prayed that Abdullah order the reconvening of the AAC and,
thereafter, grant the restoration of his marital rights with Adelaidah.
On April 20, 2011, Abdullah denied Mamiscal's motion. 16 In sustaining
the divorce between Mamiscal and Abdullah, Abdullah opined that it was
simply his ministerial duty to receive the COD and the attached kapasadan
filed by Adelaidah. Abdullah also noted that when the AAC was convened
during the February 28, 2010 hearing, only Mamiscal and his representatives
appeared. Considering the fact that Adelaidah manifested her opposition in
writing to any reconciliation with her husband and the fact that the 90-day
period of 'iddah had already lapsed, Abdullah ruled that any move to
reconstitute the AAC would have been futile because the divorce between
Mamiscal and his wife had already become final and irrevocable.
Contending that the issuance of the CRD was tainted with irregularity,
Mamiscal comes to this Court, through the subject complaint, charging
Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
The Charge
In his complaint, Mamiscal averred that Abdullah should not have
entertained or acted upon the COD and the kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. He
contended that under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, a divorce under talaq
could only be filed and registered by the male spouse, considering that female
Muslims could do so only if the divorce was through tafwid. 17
Moreover, Mamiscal alleged that Abdullah "fabricated and twisted the
facts" 18 when he declared that only Mamiscal and his representative appeared
when the AAC was convened. Mamiscal insisted that Adelaidah and her
relatives were also present during the hearing of February 28, 2010, and that
relatives were also present during the hearing of February 28, 2010, and that
the AAC was never convened because the parties agreed to reset the
proceedings so that they could explore the possibility of reconciling the
differences between them. Notwithstanding the ongoing mediation
proceedings, Abdullah proceeded to act on the COD and finalized the divorce
by issuing the CRD.
Finally, it was averred that Abdullah violated the Shari'a rules of
procedure when he initially refused to receive Mamiscal's motion for
reconsideration when it was first filed. Mamiscal also argued that Abdullah
should not have considered the opposition of Adelaidah when he denied his
attempt to seek reconsideration because he was never furnished a copy of
Adelaidah's opposition.
Abdullah's Comment
In his comment, 19 Abdullah countered that although he had the
authority to process the registration of the divorce as court registrar, he could
not be held responsible for the contents of the COD and the kapasadan
because his functions were only ministerial. Nevertheless, Abdullah asserted
that the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah had already attained
finality, not only because of the lapse of the required 'iddah, but also because
the kapasadan and Adelaidah's opposition both proved that there could be no
reconciliation between the spouses.
Abdullah also discounted any impropriety for processing the unsigned
COD, arguing that since it was accompanied by the kapasadan which bore the
signature of Mamiscal and his declaration that he was divorcing his wife by
talaq — there was nothing wrong with Adelaidah filing it with his office.
Moreover, with the lapse of the 'iddah, Abdullah argued that the COD had
remained to be nothing more than a formality for the purpose of registering
the divorce with the National Statistics Office (NSO) and its issuance using the
NSO security paper.
As to the allegations pertaining to the February 28, 2010 hearing,
Abdullah stated that he only conducted the same because it was required
under the Muslim Personal Code. Abdullah explained that he did not convene
the ACC anymore not only because Adelaidah or her representatives were not
present, but also because the divorcing couple's own children wrote to him
opposing the convening of the council.
As to Mamiscal's contention that he already revoked his repudiation of
his wife, Abdullah pointed out that his office was not informed of any
revocation of the divorce. According to Abdullah, if Mamiscal had indeed
revoked his repudiation, he should have complied with the provisions of Rule
II (1) (2) of NSO Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2001, which required
the husband to file five (5) copies of his sworn statement attesting to the fact
of revocation, together with the written consent of his wife.
In its report, 20 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
Abdullah guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be
fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same offense shall be dealt with severely.
On January 30, 2014, Abdullah filed a motion, 21 praying for the early
resolution of the complaint filed against him. Reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the said complaint, Abdullah claimed that he was due for
compulsory retirement on June 5, 2014.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must first be pointed out that while it may seem to be a
related issue, the validity of the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah is
not in issue here. Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce from
his wife is a matter that must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit Court
which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), 22 enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to
divorce.
Thus, Article 155 of the Muslim Code provides:
Article 155. Jurisdiction. — The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over;
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this
Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are
Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving
disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon
divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts,
(mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
[Emphases Supplied]
Consequently, in resolving the subject complaint, the Court shall confine
itself to the sole issue of whether or not Abdullah should be held
administratively liable for his actions in connection with the registration of
the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah. A priori to the resolution of the
foregoing issue is the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to
impose administrative sanction against Abdullah for his acts.
The Court rules in the negative.
The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital
events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil
Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and
is applicable to all persons residing in the Philippines. 23
To ensure the proper registration of all facets of the civil life of Muslim
Filipinos throughout the country, Article 81 of the Muslim Code provides:
Article 81. District Registrar. — The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as District
Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and
Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of
Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar
of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and
Conversions within his jurisdiction.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In view of the above-quoted provision, it becomes apparent that the
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two
hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit
Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction. Although the Constitution vests the
Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, 24 this power must be taken with due regard to other prevailing
laws.
Thus, Article 185 of the Muslim Code provides:
Article 185. Neglect of duty by registrars. Any district registrar or
circuit registrar who fails to perform properly his duties in accordance
with this Code shall be penalized in accordance with Section 18
of Act 3753.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 3753 25 is the primary law that governs
the registry of civil status of persons. To ensure that civil registrars perform
their duties under the law, Section 18 of C.A. No. 3753 provides: SDHTEC
Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the provisions of

this Act. — Any local registrar who fails to properly perform his duties
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations
issued hereunder, shall be punished for the first offense, by an
administrative fine in a sum equal to his salary for not less than fifteen
days nor more than three months, and for a second or repeated
offense; by removal from the service.
[Emphasis Supplied]
The same Act provides:
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. — The
director of the National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall
enforce the provisions of this Act. The Director of the National Library,
in his capacity as Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare
and issue, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for
carrying out the purposes of this Act, and to prepare and order printed
the necessary forms for its proper compliance. In the exercise of his
functions as Civil Registrar-General, the Director of the National Library
shall have the power to give orders and instructions to the local Civil
registrars with reference to the performance of their duties as such. It
shall be the duty of the Director of the National Library to report any
violation of the provisions of this Act and all irregularities,
negligence or incompetency on the part of the officers
designated as local civil registrars to the (Chief of the
Executive Bureau or the Director of the Non-Christian Tribes)
Secretary of the Interior, as the case may be, who shall take
the proper disciplinary action against the offenders.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
Prescinding from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that this Court
does not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action
against civil registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint
reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce
and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim
divorces. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender. 26 The fact that the complaint
charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court employee" is of no
moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of
the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Verily, unless
jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can
act on a matter submitted to it. 27
It bears to stress at this point that this Court can resolve the foregoing
jurisdictional issue even if the matter of jurisdiction was never raised by any
of the parties. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that jurisdiction, or the
power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case must first be
acquired by the court or an adjudicative body over the subject matter and the
parties in order to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits. 28
Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter and
jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution or by law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is
acquired by the court by virtue of the party's voluntary submission to the
authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes.
Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject
matter which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the
parties. 29
Having settled the foregoing issue, the following question now confronts
the Court: Who, among the various agencies and instrumentalities of the
government, is empowered with administrative supervisory powers in order
to impose disciplinary sanctions against erring civil registrars?
On this score, a recap of the legislative history surrounding our system
of civil registration is in order.
The system of civil registration was first established in the Philippines by
the revolutionary government on June 18, 1898 or barely six days after the
declaration of the country's independence from Spain on June 12, 1898.
Originally, the system was decentralized in the sense that civil registration
was purely a local government responsibility. It was only on February 27,
1931, when C.A. No. 3753 30 took effect and centralized the system of civil
registration in the country. Under this law, the director of the National Library
was made responsible as the Civil Registrar-General to exercise technical
supervision and ensure the proper establishment and maintenance of our civil
registry system.
Then, following C.A. No. 591, 31 the duties exercised by the director of
National Library with regard to matters concerning the system of civil
registration were transferred to the Bureau of Census and Statistics. This
bureau subsequently became the NSO, 32 whose Administrator concurrently
served as the Civil Registrar-General. 33 At present, the National Statistician is
empowered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10625, as Civil Registrar-General to
exercise technical supervision of civil registrars. 34
Due to the need to address the cultural peculiarities practiced by our
Muslim brethren, however, Congress saw the need to designate the Clerk of
Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court to act as the Circuit Registrar of Muslim
marriages, divorces, revocations of divorces, and conversions to Islam within
his jurisdiction. As earlier cited, Article 181 of the Muslim Code provides that:
The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of
Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within
his jurisdiction.
In order to ensure that Circuit Registrars remain faithful to their duties,
Article 82 of the Muslim Code tasks the Clerks of Court of the Shari'a District
Court to act as District Registrars and exercise technical supervision over
Circuit Registrars by requiring them to keep a proper recording of all matters
pertaining to the personal lives of Muslims. Thus: AScHCD
Article 82. Duties of District Registrar . — Every District Registrar

shall exercise supervision over Circuit Registrars in every Shari'a District.
He shall, in addition to an entry book, keep and bind copies of
certificates of Marriage, Divorce, Revocation of Divorce, and
Conversion sent to him by the Circuit Registrars in separate
general registers. He shall send copies in accordance with Act No.
3753, as amended, to the office of the Civil Registrar-General.
All these notwithstanding, the power of administrative supervision
over civil registrars remains with the National Government. As Section 2 of CA
No. 3753 provides:
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. — The
director of the National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall
enforce the provisions of this Act. The Director of the National Library,
in his capacity as Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare
and issue, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for
violation of the provisions of this Act and all irregularities,
negligence or incompetency on the part of the officers
designated as local civil registrars to the (Chief of the
Executive Bureau or the Director of the Non-Christian Tribes)
Secretary of the Interior, as the case may be, who shall take
the proper disciplinary action against the offenders.
[Emphasis Supplied]
It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that the
power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the
municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units. Under
the "faithful execution clause" embodied in Section 455 (b) (1) (x) 35 and
Section 444 (b) (1) (x) 36 of the Local Government Code, in relation to Section
479 37 under Article IX, Title V 38 of the same Code, the municipal and city
mayors of the respective local government units, in addition to their power to
appoint city or municipal civil registrars are also given ample authority to
exercise administrative supervision over civil registrars. Thus, when
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993 of the Office of the Civil Registrar-
General (OCRG) was passed to implement CA No. 3753 it was declared:
Rule 1. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar-General. — The
Civil Registrar-General shall have the following duties and powers:
a) To enforce the provisions of Act No. 3753;
b) To prepare and issue regulations for carrying out the purposes
of Act No. 3753 and other laws relative to civil registration,
and to prepare and order printed the necessary forms for its
proper compliance;
c) To give orders and instructions to the city/municipal civil
registrars with reference to the performance of their duties
as such; and
d) To report any violation of the provisions of Act No. 3753 and
other laws on civil registration, and all irregularities,
negligence or incompetency of city/municipal civil
registrar to the concerned mayor who shall take the
proper disciplinary action against the offender.
This authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative jurisdiction over
Circuit Registrars was also recognized generally, under Section 47 (2) of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 39 and specifically, under Rule 11 of
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1993 40 of the OCRG, and the more
recent Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2005 41 of the same office, which
applies specially to the registration of acts and events concerning the civil
status of Muslim Filipinos.
At this juncture, it should be remembered that the authority of the
Mayor to exercise administrative supervision over C/MCRs is not exclusive.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal. 42 Under Section 9 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the CSC is granted
original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases. Thus:
Section 9. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies . — The Secretaries
and heads of agencies, and other instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the
Commission over their respective officers and employees. . . .
Consequently, it behooves the Court to also forward the subject
complaint to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and to the CSC for
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah,
Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of
due process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming a court employee is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. The complaint of
Baguan M. Mamiscal against Macalinog S. Abdullah is hereby REFERRED to
the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Bersamin, * Del Castillo and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I join the ponencia in holding that the complaint against respondent

Macalinog S. Abdullah must be dismissed. I write separately to draw emphasis
on how this dismissal stems from the fundamental principle of separation of
powers.
Separation of powers is basic in our constitutional design. As explained
by this court in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission: 1
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. 2
The doctrine of separation of powers was also discussed in United States
v. Ang Tang Ho, 3 a case which was decided when the Philippines was still
under American rule:
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of
the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the
Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law.
The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the
Legislature is or is not constitutional. 4
Justice Antonio Carpio, quoting Justice Presbitero Velasco's dissent in
Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, et al. 5 noted in his own
dissenting opinion in Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay 6 that separation of powers entails ensuring that no
branch of government shall be controlled or subjected to the influence of
another:
Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments of
government to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a
logical corollary, equally important, that one branch should be left
completely independent of the others, independent not in the sense that
the three shall not cooperate in the common end of carrying into effect
the purposes of the constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each
shall never be controlled by or subjected to the influence of either of the
branches. 7 [Emphasis supplied]
More to the point, our recent decision in Gonzales III v. Office of the
President 8 noted that the principle of separation of powers extends to the
authority to discipline public officers and employees: caITAC
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional

determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional
guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure; the principle of separation of powers ; and the principle of
checks and balances. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
This is a point I echoed in my concurring and dissenting opinion in
Gonzales:
I agree with the positions of Justice Brion and Justice Abad in their
dissenting opinions on the September 4, 2012 decision that the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is of such a fundamental
and unequivocal nature. This independence is essential to carry out the
functions and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman. I agree with their
position that since those in the Executive branch are also subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman, providing the
Office of the President with the power to remove would be an
impediment to the fundamental independence of the Ombudsman.
We cannot allow a circumvention of the separation of powers by
construing Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution 10 as delegating
plenary and unbounded power to Congress. The exclusive power of the
Ombudsman to discipline her own ranks is fundamental to the
independence of her office. 11
The complaint subject of the present administrative matter charges
respondent Macalinog S. Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process,
dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Article VIII, Section
6 of the 1987 Constitution provides for this court's "administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." However, a careful
consideration of the complaint reveals that Abdullah is being held to account
for acts committed in the course of his performance of functions, not as clerk
of court but as a circuit (or civil) registrar. He is therefore being charged, not in
his capacity as an officer performing judicial functions, but as an officer
performing executive functions. In accordance with the principle of separation
of powers thus, the task of disciplining Abdulla does not fall upon this court.
As ably pointed out by Justice Jose C. Mendoza, Article 81 of Presidential
Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws 12
provides that clerks of court of Shari'a Circuit Courts shall also acts as circuit
registrars. In Justice Mendoza's language thus, clerks of court of Shari'a Circuit
Courts wear "two hats": 13 a judicial hat, in respect of their being clerks of
court; and an executive one, in respect of their being registrars. Indeed,
disciplining civil registrars is well beyond the power of this court.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws, making reference to Commonwealth
Act No. 3753, 14 itself recognizes that the power to discipline registrars is not
lodged with this court:
Art. 185. Neglect of duty by registrars. — Any district registrar or
circuit registrar who fails to perform properly his duties in accordance
with this Code shall be penalized in accordance with Section 18 of Act
No. 3753.
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 3753 provides:
Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the provisions of this Act.
— Any local registrar who fails properly to perform his duties in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued
hereunder, shall be punished for the first offense, by an administrative
fine in a sum equal to his salary for not less than fifteen days nor more
than three months, and for a second or repeated offense, by removal
from the service.
Moreover, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3753 provides for the
proper disciplining authority for civil registrars:
Section 2. Civil Registrar-General his duties and powers. — The director
of the National Library shall be Civil Registrar-General and shall enforce
the provisions of this Act. The Director of the National Library, in his
capacity as Civil Registrar-General, is hereby authorized to prepare and
issue, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, regulations for
violation of the provisions of this Act and all irregularities, negligence or
incompetency on the part of the officers designated as local civil
registrars to the (Chief of the Executive Bureau or the Director of the
Non-Christian Tribes) Secretary of the Interior, as the case may be, who
shall take the proper disciplinary action against the offenders.
Moreover, as noted by Justice Mendoza:
[T]he subject complaint should have been filed with the Regional
government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), for
it is empowered by Republic Act No. 6734 to exercise supervisory
power over "all line agencies and offices of the National Government"
which are not otherwise excluded therein. 15 (Citation omitted)
Clearly, the statutory provisions which vest executive functions in clerks
of court of the Shari'a Circuit Courts dangerously transgress the fundamental
constitutional boundaries between departments. It creates an enclave within
the judiciary that is not subject to the disciplinary power of this court but of
executive bodies. 16 Had it been raised as an issue in this case, I would have
had no hesitation to vote that they be declared unconstitutional. But, this is
not the lis mota of the present case. ICHDca
I concur in the ponencia. The complaint subject of this administrative

matter must be dismissed without prejudice. A copy of our disposition should
be served on the Department of Justice, the Senate President, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of the National Commission
on Muslim Filipinos.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special
Order No. 2079, dated June 29, 2015.
1. Rollo, pp. 1-28.
2. Id. at 95-96.
3. Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion
of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be
effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

(b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila);
(c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);
(d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);

(e) Redemption by the wife (khul');
(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid); or

(g) Judicial decree (faskh).
4. Rollo, p. 13.
5. Article 56, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines" defines 'iddah as the period of
waiting prescribed for a woman whose marriage has been dissolved by
death or by divorce the completion of which shall enable her to contract a
new marriage. In connection with divorce effected through talaq, Article 161
of the same Code provides, in part, that the talaq pronounced shall not
become irrevocable until after the expiration of the prescribed 'iddah. In case
of divorce, the obligatory waiting period ('iddah) equivalent to three (3)
monthly courses from the date of divorce, should be observed; see Articles
29 and 57 of P.D. No. 1083.
6. Rollo, p. 74.
7. See rollo, p. 15.

8. Id. at 14.
9. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 81. District Registrar. — The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a District Court shall,
in addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim
Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the
territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages,
Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations within his
jurisdiction.
Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. — Every Circuit Registrar shall:
a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and amount of
the dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and conversion
and such other documents presented to him for registration;
b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any information required of
him by the District Registrar;
c) Register conversions involving Islam;

d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document registered
upon payment of the required fees.
10. Rollo, p. 15.

11. Under Section 7, R.A. No. 1083 the Agama Arbitration Council is a body
composed of the Chairman and a representative of each of the parties to
constitute a council to take all necessary steps for resolving conflicts
between them.
12. Rollo, p. 49.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 20.

15. Id. at 20-21.
16. Id. at 4-5.

17. Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate [Art. 45 (f), P.D. No.
1083].
18. Rollo, p. 6.
19. Id. at 31-60.

20. Id. at 74-82.
21. Id. at 100-102.

22. Otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1083.
23. Preliminary Statement, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
24. Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

25. Otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status.
26. Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 233 Phil. 279, 282 (1987).

27. U.S. v. De La Santa, 9 Phil. 22, 26 (1907).
28. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, 556 Phil. 822, 836
(2007); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sps. Evangelista, 441 Phil. 445, 453
(2002).
29. Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 382, 386.
30. Otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status.
31. Entitled "An act to Create a Bureau of the Census and Statistics to consolidate
statistical activities of the government therein."
32. By virtue of Executive Order No. 121, series of 1987.

33. See <http://web0.psa.gov.ph/old/NCRV/civilregistration.html>; last visited
January 22, 2015.
34. SEC. 11. The National Statistician. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The National Statistician shall perform the following duties:
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) Provide overall direction in the implementation of the Civil Registry Law and
related issuances and exercise technical supervision over the local
civil registrars as Civil Registrar General;
xxx xxx xxx
35. Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation. —
(a) . . .
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the city mayor shall;
(1) . . .
(x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully
discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and
cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any
official or employee of the municipality who may have committed as offense
in the performance of his official duties;
xxx xxx xxx
36. Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
—
(a) . . .
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services,
and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx

(x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully
discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and
cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any
official or employee of the municipality who may have committed as offense
in the performance of his official duties;
xxx xxx xxx

37. Entitled "The Civil Registrar; Qualifications, Powers and Duties."
38. Appointed Local Officials Common to All Municipalities, Cities and Provinces.
39. Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — . . .
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or
office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.
40. RULE 11. Other Aspects of Registration. — All other aspects of registration such
as assigning of registry number, records keeping, submission of reports,
issuance of certifications, violation of civil registration laws, and
others shall be governed by Act 3753, Presidential Decree No.
1083, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993 and other
pertinent laws, circulars and issuances.
41. Rule 15. Penalty. — Any person found violating this Order shall be liable under
the existing civil registry laws, P.D. 1083, civil service laws and other
pertinent laws.
42. Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals , G.R. Nos. 176162 & 178845,
October 9, 2012 682 SCRA 353, 364, citing Article IX (B) Section 2, 1987
Constitution and Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 (6) and
(11).
1. 63 Phil. 139 (1936). [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
2. Id. at 156.
3. 43 Phil. 1 (1922). [Per J. Johns, En Banc].
4. Id. at 6.
5. 589 Phil. 387 (2008) Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

6. G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 90 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En
Banc].
7. Id. at 126-127.
8. G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, 714 SCRA 611 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
9. Id. at 655.
10. Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
11. J. Leonen, Dissenting in Gonzales III v. Office of the President , G.R. No. 196231,
January 28, 2014, 714 SCRA 611, 693 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
12. Art. 81. District Registrar. — The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a District Court shall,
in addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim
Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the
territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit
Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within his jurisdiction.
13. Draft ponencia, p. 7.

14. Com. Act No. 3753 (1930), Law on Registry of Civil Status.
15. Draft Ponencia, p. 9.

16. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 121, January 30, 1987, the Administrator of
the National Statistics Office has the over-all technical supervision over local
civil registrars.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-68635. May 14, 1987.]
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY

ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-
ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-
ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ABSOLUTE LACK OF

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD; NOT A CASE OF. — The argument premised on lack
of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process
abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al.,
110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-
type" proceeding. In the showcause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29,
1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the
reasons why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action. His Answer,
wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action against him be dismissed,
contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also
given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her
Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding against
her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were
afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Nothing more needed to have
been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing
was obviated (see People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos 63950-60, April 19, 1985,
135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be
heard, and were, in fact, heard.
2. ID.; JUDICIARY; SUPREME COURT; JUDGMENTS THEREOF MAY NOT BE PASSED
UPON OR DECLARED AS UNJUST BY OTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. — Atty.
Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per
Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting,
however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's
Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating
the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in
the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that
a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of
separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this
Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justiciable disputes, J :agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
p

'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound
practice."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM : p
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per
Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him
guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the
practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the
same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of
P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing
violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order
is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis;
that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies
of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this
Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated
positively; that the banner headline which appeared in the Daily Express is
regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that
he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law
practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would
not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the
press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written
stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy
articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent
justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference
scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any
further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the
Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was
serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a
scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the
Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that
he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side"
with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can
afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its
integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment
on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to
the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court
had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the
Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional
services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before
this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre
letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his
authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily
have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam
Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M.
Gonzales being competent to deal with the case before him; " that he takes
exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and
exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having
been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of
judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and or abetted and
could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when
these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder
on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty
that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the
record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the
complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her
main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process.
She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal
in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution
should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she
should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states
that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned
that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation
by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which
is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she
thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the
manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed
identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were
not a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division
Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused
my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any
violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful
investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her grievance to the
Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed
injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed
with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard
(Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does
not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the showcause Resolution of
this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient
opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected
to disciplinary action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the disciplinary action
against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva
Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements,
conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the
Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the
contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages,
double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty.
Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her
counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the
complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his
profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the
charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by
themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but
also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete
obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton
disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa
loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to
conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated (see People vs. Hon.
Valenzuela, G.R. Nos 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and
Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his
Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were
terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that
he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices;
and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing
Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant"
at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following
up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this
Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of
March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101
F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is "not a
resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the
latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and
for Ms. Maravilla-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. II).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to
Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition
for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the
Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the
Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy
thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and
Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to
return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on
Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie-up between the
corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court
failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one
called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the
Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not
have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step
for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting
Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did
"nothing of the sort." He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces
when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the
cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of
the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in
that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added
reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the
Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan,
forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this
Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on
subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical
pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204
of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate
Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on
the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and
extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which
it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and
irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the
dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His
apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the
charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with
insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose.
The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to
the full. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of
publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary
sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall,
deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of
collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter
of all justiciable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the
Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that
would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty
of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and
officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned
deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to
accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They
have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the
administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions
and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only
after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the
proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division
voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in
any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one
of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from
their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired. The
personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice
Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when
the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter
Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en
banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the
unmeritoriousness of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process
servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy
of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record.
Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing
at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server,
went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:
"4. That in spite of diligent efforts to locate the address of Ms. Eva
Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
"5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon
Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva
Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity;" . . . (p. 672,
Rollo, Vol. II).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy
of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
"2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the
address furnished at the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao,
Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to be
the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be identified, and told
me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further
that she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla
because the latter always gives the address of her house;
"3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same
place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned
unserved because she is not known in the place; . . ." (p. 674, Rollo, Vol.
II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for
Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St.,
Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a
resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious
elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before
this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G.
Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of
law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are
DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of
P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer
imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated
period.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-6749. July 30, 1955.]
JEAN L. ARNAULT , petitioner-appellee, vs . EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as

Director of Prisons , respondent- appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.

Torres and Solicitor Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; ISSUANCE WHEN

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY MAY BE INVOKED. — The judicial department of the
government has no right or power or authority to review the findings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process, much in the
same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application of the law, in what is known as the judicial
process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoked are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH RECALCITRANT WITNESSES. —
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
3. ID.; ID., ID.; LEGISLATURE'S AUTHORITY SUPREME COURT. — Provided the
contempt is related to the exercise of the legislature power and is committed in the
course of the legislature process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the each
of constitutional limitations the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial
interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881.).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE PROCESS DISTINGUISHED FROM JUDICIAL
PROCESS. — The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be
distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to courts of
justice for the meting out of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them.
The former falls exclusively within the legislative, the latter within the domain of the
courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or
process, While the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal
law.
5. ID.; ID.; PURGING OF CONTEMPT BY ANOTHER LIE IS REPETITION OF
OFFENSE. — No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or
falsehood; that would be a repetition of the offense. In the present case, the petitioner
gave the name, J.D.S., as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000
was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that that is the real
name of the person whose identity is being the subject of the injury. The Senate,
therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or
reiterated it. Hence, the Senate resolution of legislative power or an arbitrary exercise of
legislative discretion.
DECISION
LABRADOR , J : p
This an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that
the continued detention and con nement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in
pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the
reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of
the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate,
as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on
the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer, has purged himself of
contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations
for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the
Philippines. The purchase was effected on October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both
estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted
Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the
said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal
was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises." In the investigation conducted by the Committee in
pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the
purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner- appellee refused to answer this
question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and
imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the
Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000
and to answer questions pertinent thereto. In G. R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee
herein questioned the validity of the con nement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari
led in this Court. He contended that the Senate of the Philippines has no power to
punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
delivered the P440,000, that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt
beyond the term of the legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he
refused to answer is an incriminating question which the appellee is not bound to
answer. All the above-mentioned contentions were adversely passed upon by the
decision of this Court, so his petition for release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in con nement in Bilibid, petitioner-
appellee executed an af davit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life,
the events surrounding the acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D.
Santos. Upon the presentation of the said af davit to the said Senate Special
Committee, the latter subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess
D. Santos, and after said investigation and questioning the Committee adopted
Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:
"RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND
ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT
THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID
ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE
SENATE.
"WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines,
transcending divisions of party and faction in the national interest, adopted a
Resolution ordering the detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of
contempt of the Senate by revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of
P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and by
answering other pertinent questions in connection therewith;
"WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said
Jean L. Arnault, and the report thereon rendered by the Senate Special Committee
on the said deal, the Senate holds and finds that, despite numerous and generous
opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the said Jean L.
Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the
person to whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other
pertinent questions in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estate
deal;
"WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean
L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for
contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a
judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate
to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said
power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully
justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he
had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
"WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the
said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing
contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such
that, were they to be condoned or over-looked, the power and authority of the
Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because
they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
"WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to
whom the said Jean L. Arnault gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and the further information which
the Senate requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and
contumaciously withholds, is required for the discharge of its legislative
functions, particularly so that adequate measures can be taken to prevent the
repetition of similar frauds upon the Government and the People of the
Philippines and to recover said amount; and
"WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy,
the Senate holds and finds that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and
contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is trifling with its
proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of the
Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at
any time by revealing the truth; now therefore, be it.
"Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find,
as it hereby holds and finds, that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of
contempt of the Senate, and has in no way altered his situation since he has
committed to coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th
day of May, 1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of
Prisons to hold the said Jean L. Arnualt, in his custody, and in confinement and
detention at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment,
until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to the satisfaction,
and until order to that effect, of the Senate of the Philippines or of its Special.
Committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
"Adopted, November 8, 1952:" (Exhibit O)
In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance,
petitioner-appellee alleges: (1) That the acquisition by the Government, through the
Rural Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not
illegal nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact bene cial to the
Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the
Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period
longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed under
the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that petitioner-appellee
purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to
whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in
corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justi ed in nding that the petitioner-
appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the
legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the con nement may be
considered as having been accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for
petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is
bene cial to the government and is neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To
our mind, two questions are decisive of this case. The rst is: Did the Senate Special
Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court
review said nding? And the second is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is
the continued con nement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in
Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the rst question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and
refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially changed
since he was committed to prison." In the rst resolution of the Senate Special
Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the
persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent questions
related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee did not
believe petitioner's statement that the person to whom he delivered the above-
mentioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The court a quo,however,
arrogating unto itself the power to review such nding, held that the "petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in
the human esh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate Committee is not borne
to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate abused its
discretion in making its conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing
that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his release and have his case
endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial department for investigation and
prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the ndings of legislative
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
"The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative
ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it
may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means
are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution
makes legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means
adopted by the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible to
attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of the police power
of the state in the judicial department. It has been said that the methods,
regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with the
public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the determination of the
legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional
rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a
constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has
been properly exercised." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to
do, much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial
realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law,
in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct con ict with
the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution.
They only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there
has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary
exercise of the legislative discretion.
"Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the
executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives
its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the
popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere." (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs.
Vera, et al 65 Phil, 56; See also Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner
prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process
has been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because
of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life,
liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully
been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard
personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution
ordering his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the
Philippines Senate have the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the
continued con nement of the petitioner? In the supposition that such power and
authority exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the
name Jess D. Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the
Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the
name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440,000 was
delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and
contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity. Although the
resolution studiously avoids saying that the con nement is a punishment, but merely
seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may be inferred
from the con ning made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant
and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a
way, therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justi ed
by the language of the resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us is whether the
Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the
circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-
38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we
had ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer
a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i. e.,
by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contented by petitioner
that if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body,
because he refused to reveal the identity of the person in accordance with the demands
of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish him, for the punishment for his
refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the law, i.e., by the
institution of a criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to
punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by
the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions
(Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the United
States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its earlier decision
(See Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two
decades ago held that such power and authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs.
MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was whether or not the
Senate could order the con nement of a private citizen because of the destruction and
removal by him of certain papers required to be produced. The court said:
"First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to

punish for contempt may never be exerted, in the case of a private citizen, solely
qua punishment. The argument is that the power may be used by the legislative
body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the performance
of its duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been
removed, or its removal has become impossible; and hence that there is no power
to punish a witness who, having been requested to produce papers, destroys them
after service of the subpoena. The contention rests upon a misconception of the
limitations upon the power of the Houses of Congress to punish for contempt. It
is true that the scope of the power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is
of a nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of the legislature. This may
be lack of power, because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed.
377, there was no legislative duty to be performed; or because, as in Marshall vs.
Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas.
1918B, 371, the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to obstruct
the legislative process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct
the legislative process, the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or
that its removal has become impossible is without legal significance.
"The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was
exerted by Congress as early as 1795; and since then it has been exercised on
several occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the colonial
assemblies, in intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the
Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6
Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242, decided in 1821, it was held that the House had power to
punish a private citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has been
found in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been
successfully challenged on the ground that, before punishment, the offending act
had been consummated or that the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The
statement in the opinion in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S.
Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, supra, upon which MacCrachen
relies, must be read in the light of the particular facts. It was there recognized that
the only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the character of the
offense; and that the continuance of the obstruction, or the likelihood of its
repetition; are considerations for the discretion of the legislators in meting out the
punishment.
"Here, we are concerned not with an extension of congressional privilege,
but with vindication of the established and essential privilege of requiring the
production of evidence. For this purpose, the power to punish for a past contempt
is an appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col. Cas.
296, Fed. Cas. No. 10,375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions
expressed from time to time in congressional debates, in opposition to particular
exercise of the contempt power concerned, not the power to punish, as such, but
the broad, undefined privileges which it was believed might find sanction in that
power. The ground for such fears has since been effectively removed by the
decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of congressional privilege are
subject to judicial review. Melbourn vs. Thompson 103 U. S. 163, 26 L. ed. 377,
supra; and that the power to punish for contempt may not be extended to
slanderous attacks which presents no immediate obstruction to legislative
processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A.
1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371 supra."
The principle that Congress or any o ts bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base
intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish a de ance of its power and authority? When
the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making
each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for
every act of refusal, every act of de ance, every act of contumacy against it, the
legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy,
because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed
against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt
with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority
must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the
courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon
them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the
domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative
power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the
criminal law.
We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the
legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the
legislature's authority to deal with the de ant and contumacious witness should be
supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a
mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations,
the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshal vs. Gordon,
supra).
The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of
contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he had
previous]y been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be considered as
having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testi ed
truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person
guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be
repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the
person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee
refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being
the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner
continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted
as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the intelligence of the
honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of de ance
and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate
resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an
arbitrary power.
One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as
the period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by
law punishment for contempt, i.e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now
entitled to be released. This claim is not justi ed by the record. Petitioner was originally
con ned by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed
his af davit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee.
The latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the
petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i.e., ve months after the last
resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is
not true, therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period prescribed
in the criminal law.
Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coercive nature, in
the sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the
fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippines
Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record, it is
improper for the courts to declare that the continued con nement is an abuse of the
legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing
the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered
to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-
appellee.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L,., JJ., concur in the result.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992.]
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (Second District of Bataan) ,

petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD , respondents.
Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS TO FIX TARIFF

RATES AND OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS. — Under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may
be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. There is explicit constitutional
permission (Section 28[2] of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix
"within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant
congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104
and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President
explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
2. TAXATION; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; CUSTOMS DUTIES; NAME GIVEN TO
TAXES ON THE IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION OF COMMODITIES. — Customs duties
which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are
frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been
held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation
of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported
to, a foreign country."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AFFORDED TO LOCAL INDUSTRIES. — The levying of
customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting
local industries — where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable
goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the effect
of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely,
if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties,
which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public
funds — have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or
social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a
particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed
here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and
imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil
production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At
the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are
raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL STANDARDS SET FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY
DELEGATED TO THE PRESIDENT. — Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however,
insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be
secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local
industries" is the sum total or the alpha and omega of "the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a
confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section
401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the
very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the
national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local
industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the
purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient
service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose
upon the community.
5. ID.; ID.; TARIFF RATES AND CUSTOM DUTIES; LEVIED UPON ARTICLES NOT
PRODUCED IN THE PHILIPPINES. — Tariff rates are commonly established and the
corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not
found at all and not produced in the Philippines. In such cases, customs duties may be
seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to
discourage any importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs
duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing
local industries to protect.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 475 AND 478,
CONSTITUTIONAL. — Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be
substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that
reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of
constitutionality and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled.
DECISION
FELICIANO , J : p
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased
from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of
Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate
the process required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy
on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and
27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff
Commission, following the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and
to present evidence in support of their respective positions.
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on 15 August 1991
reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five
percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. cdtai
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President
a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for
consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive
Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned
additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a
special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per
liter of imported oil products. prLL
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the
validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as
follows:
"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments."
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401
of the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to
petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only
when necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to restrain the implementation of those Executive
Orders. We will examine these questions in that order.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order
No. 517 did not render the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517
which is dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:
"Section 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. — The additional duty in the nature
of ad valoremimposed on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of
Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the
selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex À' hereof, shall
continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad valorem."
Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order
No. 475 and to the special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per
liter of imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478. prcd
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may
be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides as follows:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government."(Emphasis supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the

President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to x
"within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the
President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section
104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:
"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the
rates of import duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all
subsequent amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees
are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of
duty indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically
provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one
hundred per cent ad valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four
Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff
Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national

security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or
remove existing protective rates of import duty (including any necessary change
in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case
shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per
cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher than a
maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota
or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an
additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem
whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff
Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a
gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of
this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section. LexLib
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA

pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an
additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall
conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings
wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present,
produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and
recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality
concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings and recommendations to
the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty

within the limits fixed in subsection à' shall include the authority to modify the
form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or
specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal
competing foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used
as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a
copy of all customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The
Commission or its duly authorized representatives shall have access to, and the
right to copy all liquidated customs import entries and other documents
appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall take effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of
additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect
at the discretion of the President." (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in
Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, by contending that the President is
authorized to act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries and
products for the sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." 2
He goes on to claim that:
"E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of
local industries and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security. On the contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to
crude oil, an essential product which we do not have to protect, since we produce
only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise
government finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution, as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code." 3
(Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either
Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and
absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two
(2) words, one found in Section 401 (a) (1): "existing protective rates of import duty," and
the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): " protection levels granted in
Section 104 of this Code . . . ." We believe that the words "protective" and "protection" are
simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner
seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which
this Court may take judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which administers the
Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or
producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There
is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still comparable
levels of revenue for the government — The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation
[PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very
much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory
purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the
importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise
imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on
imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries —
where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods.
Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the effect of
producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if
ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties,
which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public
funds 6 — have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or
social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a
particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed
here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and
imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil
production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At
the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are
raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional
and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however,
insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be
secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local
industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a
confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section
401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the
very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the
national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local
industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the
purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient
service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose
upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the
corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not
found at all and not produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete
with such articles and commodities: among the more interesting examples are ivory
(Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); olives
(Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter
7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8, 8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01);
aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.01); special diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human
medicine and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens,
etc (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be imposed
either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any
importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied
and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to
protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be
conceded to be substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues,
are not, for that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the
presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled.
7
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's
additional contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared
unconstitutional and illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products
equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C . J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. This provision also existed in substantially identical terms in the 1973 Constitution
(Article VIII, Section 17 [2]), and the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 22 [2]).
2. Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12; underlining in the original.

3. Rollo, pp. 13-14.
4. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955); Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Miling Co., Inc., et al., 17
SCRA 632 (1966); Progressive Development Corp. v. Quezon City , 172 SCRA 629 (1989).
5. U.S. v. Sischo, 262 Fed. 1001 (1919); Flint v. Stone Tracey Company, 220 US 107 (1910);
Keller-Dorian Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 153 F 2d 1006 (1946). The
close affinity of "customs duties" and "taxes" was stressed almost a century ago in the
following excerpt from Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company (158 US 601; 39
Law Ed. 1108 [1895]):
"Cooley, on Taxation, p. 3, says that the word `duty ' ordinarily `means an indirect tax,
imposed on the importation, exportation, or consumption of goods;' having à broader
meaning than customs, which is a duty imposed on imports or exports;' that `the term
impost also signifies any tax, tribute or duty, but it is seldom applied to any but the
indirect taxes. An excise duty is an inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or
sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain trades or to deal in certain commodities."
(Underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)
6. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. City of Manila, et al., 118 Phil. 380 (1963).
7. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 905 (1968); See also:
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).
8. Rollo, pp. 14-16.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . NAG TANG HO , defendant-

appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ORGANIC LAW. — By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the
Constitution of the United States, all powers are vested in the Legislature, Executive,
and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive; and of
the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law; the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law; and the
Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
2. POWER. — Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is
supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the judiciary only to say when any Act of
the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
3. THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power
and it is valid. One the other hand, if the act within itself does not de ne a crime and is
not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it law or a crime,
the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and avoid.
4. No CRIME TO SELL. — After the passage of Act No. 2868, and without any
rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price
and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to
sell rice at any price.
5. CRIME BY PROCLAMATION. — When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the
violation of the Proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because of the Proclamation by the Governor-
General.
6. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — In so far as Act No. 2868 undertakes to authorize
the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation xing the price and to
make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional and
void.
7. CONSTITUTION. — The Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. It stability protects the rights, liberty, and property rights of the rich and the
poor alike, and its construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions.
8. PRIVATE RIGHTS. — In the instant case, the law was not dealing with
Government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights which are
sacred under the Constitution.
9. PRIVATE PROPERTY. — In the instant case, the rice was the personal,
private property of the defendant. The Government had not bought it, did not claim to
own it, or have any interest in it at the time the defendant sold it to one of his
customers.
10. POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE. — By the organic act and subject
only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the
Philippine Islands.
11. OPINION LIMITED. — This opinion is con ned to the right of the
Governor-General to issue a proclamation xing the maximum price at which rice
should be sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and to that extent
holds that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or
undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of Act No.
2868.
DECISION
JOHNS , J : p
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868,
entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in palay, rice,
and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of States.
to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for
this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
"Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of States, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act. to wit:
"(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay rice
or corn.
"(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or
sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the
Government itself.
"(c) To x, from time to time, the quantities of palay, rice, or corn that a
company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand.
"(d) ...
"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in the other manner
obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the
prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . .
."
Section 3 de nes what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or
corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice of de ne any
basis for fixing the price.
"SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the
regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be
punished by a ne of not more than ve thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case
of companies or corporations, the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
"SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the
provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other
laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
"Upon the cessation of the reasons foe which such proclamation was issued,
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of States, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended
by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the
prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the ling
of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the
Governor-General's proclamation."
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation xing the price at
which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was led against the defendant, NAG Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
"The undersigned accuses NAG Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No.
53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation
with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said NAG Tang Ho. voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro
Trinidad, one Janet of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80). which is a price
greater than that xed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No.
2868. Contrary to law."
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to ve months'
imprisonment and to pay a ne of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming
that the lower court erred in nding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force
and effect, in nding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.
The o cial records show that Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was
approved July 30,1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st
of August, 1919; and that the law was rst published on the 13th of August, 1919; and
that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far
as it authorizes the Governor-General to x the price at which rice should be sold. It will
be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice
or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary
rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as
to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn." The Legislature does not specify or de ne what is "an extraordinary rise." That is
also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-
General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and
promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of
this Act." It does not specify or de ne what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in
force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say the Legislature itself has
no in any manner speci ed or de ned any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause,"
and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what a
temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act
Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a
proclamation xing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who,
with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been
an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United
States all power are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of
the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the
Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to executive or construe
the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary
has no power to make or executive the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power
of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to
say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without
deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to x the price at which rice is to be
sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated
by Act. No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature,
and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not
de ne a crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it
a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and avoid.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Grainer Cases
(94 U. S.. 183-187; 24 L, ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
"Railroad companies are engaged in public employment affecting the public
interest and, under the decision in Mun vs. Ill., ante subject to Legislative control as to
their rates of fare and freight unless protect by their charters.
"The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to established reasonable maximum rates
of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads
of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the State."
It was there for the rst time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility,
and that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum
freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a
similar law, providing for and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and
determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was
attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive
opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ribs.
Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
"Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs . —
Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse
commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares rates for the transportation of
persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by
mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published
by them, no issue can be raise or inquiry had on that question.
"Same — Constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority
thus given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and
judgment, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative
power."
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
—
"That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers
and property shall be equal and reasonable."
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission
to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate.
Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the commission a crime.
The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held —
"That the legislature itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too
well settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
"The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power
to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to
carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law.
"The legislature enacts that all freight rates and passenger fares should be just
and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to x these rates at whatever it deemed
equal and reasonable.
"They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to
what the law shall be, — which would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred
upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and
under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has
passed upon the expediency of the law, and what it shall be. The commission is
intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor
unmade a single provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the
law, and with no other power."
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in Doling vs Lancaster Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.'
"The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide de nitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use
as an act in conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
"The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all
its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of
the legislature, so that, in form and substances, it is a law in all its details in presenting,
but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event."
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United
States vs. Grimed (220 U. S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a
forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture " . . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will
insure the objects of such reservation; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and
to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of
this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
"In refusing permits to use s forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon
stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely asserts and enforces
the proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulations of
the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative,
power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to
allow persons having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary
control is altogether different from governmental authority."
The opinion says:
"From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed
conferring upon executive o cers power to make rules and regulations, — not for
the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did
govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress
had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under
such general provisions power to ll up the details' by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which be punished by ne
imprisonment xed by Congress, or by penalties xed by Congress, or measured
by the injury done.
"That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution.'
"If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation the rule, the
defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the
regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's property. In
doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by
Congress."
"The subject as to which the Secretary can regulate are de ned. The lands
are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make provision to protect them
from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the
occupancy and use and to use to preserve the forests from destruction.' A
violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is
made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating
legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Grainer Cases," it was held that a railroad
company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for
such reasons the Legislature had the power to x and determine just and reasonable
rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the
legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the
facts what were just and reasonable rates, and that in vesting the commission with
such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy
of re insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide de nitely
and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated.''
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra, dealt with rules and
regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government
land in the forest reserve. These hold that the legislature only can enact a law, and that
it cannot delegate its legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental
principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and
of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain
act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend."
"All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P. M. each day and remain
closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the
president."
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526 128 A. S. R., 1100, 1 the Supreme Court of that
State says:
"We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons: First, because it
attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an executive o cer, and allows him, in
executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among
persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a
law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A
legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative o cer power to make a
law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be
suspended in its operation upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by
an administrative of board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives
power to the president to decide arbitrarily, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative
discretion in him, and cannot be sustained."
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules
and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it
at any price, even at a peso per "Janet," and that he would not commit a crime, because
there would be no law xing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be
a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice
at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the
Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the
sale of it at any price was not crime.
The Executive Order 1 provides"
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby xed, for the
time being as follows:
"In Manila —
"Palay at P6.75 per sack of 1/2 kilos, or 29 centavos per Janet.
"Rice at P15 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 63 centavos per Janet.
"Corn at P8 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 34 centavos per Janet.
"In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall
be the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and
necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasures or their deputies.
"In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing
provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply
or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the
place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be
determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
"(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities,"
The law says that the Governor-General may x "the maximum sale price that
industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special
law.
The proclamation undertakes to x one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippines Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers
and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the
Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and
their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and executive all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities."
The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the
power delegation of a power, and was even a subdelegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the
Governor-General to x one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only
purports to authorize him x the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which
is general and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of
rice xed in the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be
one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a matter of common knowledge,
and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price,
which varies with grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the
grade quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, xes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 63
centavo per Janet," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade
or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is con ned to palay, rice and corn. They are
products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which singles out palay, rice or corn from the
numerous, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle,
the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to x the price of meat,
eggs chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other of the Islands. In the very
nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise,
there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must
be equal and uniform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a oating law, which, in the
discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a oating crime to
sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion
of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing
the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice
or corn," and under certain unde ned conditions to x the price at which rice should be
sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should
be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or
define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay
or corn." Neither did it specify or de ne the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different
grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale" of one Janet of
rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than xed by
Executive Order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868 in so far as it undertakes
to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, xing the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is
unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and
pro teering, which worked a severe hardship, on the poorer classes, and that an
emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a
particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against,
its constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. Its stability
protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that
protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The
fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine
Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We make the board
statement that no state or nation, living under a republican form of government, under
the terms and conditions speci ed in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating
the power to any one, to x the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never
be delegated under a republican form of government.
In the xing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was
not dealing with government property. It was dealing with private property and private
rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon
the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the
Governor-General to x the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine
Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or
different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the
provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the stubborn fact remains that
at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was
in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United
States Government undertook to, and did, x the price at which wheat and our should
be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at
the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that
in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the
wheat and our, and took possession of it, either or constructive, and the government
itself became the owner of the wheat and our, and xed the price to be paid for it. That
is not case. Here, the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant,
who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim
to own the rice, or have any interest in it. and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the
personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the
interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken a solemn oath to
uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the
changing winds or emergency conditions. Again we say that no state or nation under a
republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the
conditions stated, to x the price at which a private person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy. will
ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of that particular portion of Act No.
2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional
limitations, the power Legislature, which is elated by a direct vote of the people of the
Philippine Island. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General
to x the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner and
under the conditions stated is a delegation of legislative power in violation of the
organic law.
This opinion is con ned to the particular question here involved, which is the right
of the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to x the
price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portion
of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the
constitutionality of any of the remaining of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So
ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM , J., with whom concur AVANCENA and VILLAMOR JJ., concurring :
I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the
rst place, as to the facts, — one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a violation of a
law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged violation
thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was not
published until August 13, 1919, and the order was not published until August 20,1919.
In the second place, as to the law, — one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or
an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt. (U. S. vs Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255 U. S., 81,
holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended,
invalid.)
In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would
respectfully invite attention to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis [1914, 233 U. S., 389), concerning the legislative
regulation of the prices charged by businesses affected with a public interest, and to
another decision of the United States Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs.
Clark [1892] U. S., 649], which adopts as its own the principle laid down in the case of
Locke's Appeal [1873], 72 Pa. St., 491). namely: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law: but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be know to
law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls legislation.
Footnotes
1. Village of Little Chute vs. Van Camp.

1. Executive Order No. 53, series of 1919.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114714. April 21, 1995.]
THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC.,

ALSTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP
MANAGEMENT, INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE
(INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN
OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL
COMPANY, INC., LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS
SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME SERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN
(PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-
PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR
MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED
(MANILA) CORPORATION , petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR and
THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON , respondents.
Rexilito B. Bermudez for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PRINCIPLE OF SUBORDINATE

LEGISLATION; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. — Well established in our jurisdiction that, while
the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature nds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. This is the principle of
subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in People vs. Rosenthal, (68
Phil. 328 [1939]) and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, (70 Phil
22 [1940]). That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the su cient and
valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can
no longer be disputed.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS; NOT
VIOLATED BY LEGISLATION BASED ON REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION. — It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws
is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classi cation. And for the classi cation
to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities
between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to
social, civic, and spiritual activities.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
3. ID.; ID.; RULE IN LABOR CASES; NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS; WHEN
APPLICABLE. — The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is
not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted
in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and
public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise
by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though
contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond
the power of the State to regulate and control them. Verily, the freedom to contract is not
absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not
only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly
subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are
impressed with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides: ART. 1700. The
relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. The
challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No.
797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down
on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-
established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract
clause.
4. ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE; CONCEPT. — The executive order creating the POEA was
enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which
have been greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under
a separate Article. The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the
new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma. Social justice is identi ed with the broad scope of the police power of the
state and requires the extensive use of such power. In Calalang vs. Williams, (70 Phil. 726
[1940]), this Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice
thus: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justi able, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition
of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in
our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION;
ATTAINED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY IMMEDIATELY UPON EFFECTIVITY OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 797 DECLARING ITS CREATION. — Section 4 of E.O. No. 797 indubitably
declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Thus upon the effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the
POEA attained its juridical personality. The appointment of the third member "who shall be
well versed in the eld of overseas employment," provided for in paragraph (b) of the said
Section, was not meant to be a sine qua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the
validity of the acts of the Board. As a matter of fact, in the same paragraph the President is
given the "discretion [to] designate a Deputy Administrator as the third member of the
Board."
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. , J : p
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of
1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to x and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the
standards for its exercise.
(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional

because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
(4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by
the law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the
POEA.
Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January 1994, 1 reads as

follows:
GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01
SERIES OF 1994
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Administration to afford protection to Filipino
overseas contract workers, including seafarers and their families, promote their
interest and safeguard their welfare;
WHEREAS, the Administration under its mandate has the power and function to
secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers
and ensure compliance therewith; prcd

WHEREAS, the minimum compensation and other bene ts in cases of death,
disability and loss or damage to crew's effects provided under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for seafarers which was revised in 1989 are now becoming
very much lesser than the prevailing international standards and those given to
unionized seafarers as provided by their collective bargaining agreements;
WHEREAS, the Tripartite Technical Working Group convened for the purpose of
deliberating the compensation and bene ts provided under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for seafarers has recommended for the upgrading of the
said compensation and benefits;
WHEREAS, for the interest of Filipino seafarers and their families, there is an
urgent need to improve and realign the minimum compensation and other
bene ts provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers in
order to keep them at par with prevailing international standards and those
provided under collective bargaining agreements.
NOW, THEREFORE, the POEA Governing Board, in a meeting duly convened,
hereby resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other bene ts as
speci ed under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2
of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which shall henceforth
read as follows:
I. "Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his bene ciaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to
the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each
child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at
the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a

declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be
doubled. The employer shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance
coverage for this purpose."
xxx xxx xxx

III. The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted
to US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the seafarer.
IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other bene ts herein provided
shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel, provided, that the
cause of action occurs after this Resolution takes effect.
V. This Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 1994 2 by POEA

Administrator Felicisimo Joson and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning
agencies, shipowners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed them
that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and other
bene ts in Part II, Section C, paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Appendix
1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which adjustments
took effect on 20 March 1994, and that:
IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other bene ts . . . shall apply
to any Filipino seafarer already on-board any vessel, provided, that the
cause of action occurs after the said compensation and bene ts take
effect.
The Tripartite Technical Working Group mentioned in the Resolution, which

convened on 7 January 1994, was composed of the following:
1. DA Crescencio M. Siddayao, POEA
2. Dir. Angeles T. Wong, POEA
3. Dir. Jaime P. Jimenez, POEA

4. Dir. Lorna O. Fajardo, POEA
5. OIC Salome Mendoza, POEA

6. Capt. Gregorio Oca, AMOSUP
7. Atty. Romeo Occena, PSU-ALU-TUCP
8. Mr. Vicente Aldanese, FAME

9. Capt. Emmanuel L. Regio, PAMAS
10. Atty. Rexlito Bermudez, COMMA

11. Atty. Alexandro M. Cruje, POEA
12. Mr. Jay Rosauro Baluyot, POEA

13. Ms. Magdalena Sarcos, POEA
14. Atty. Augusto Arreza, FSA 3
In their comment, the public respondents contend that the petition is without
merit and should be dismissed because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution
and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or
power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA; 4 (b) the "non-appointment" of the third member of the Governing
Board does not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been functioning
"under the advisement of the Tripartite Technical Working Group which group is
incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e., seafarer employers and/or
associations of manning agencies including herein petitioner," for which reason "third
member complement . . . has been substantially represented by said technical working
group"; 5 and (c) the consensus on the increase in the rates of compensation and other
bene ts was arrived at after appropriate consultations with the shipowners and the
private sector; the Board therefore soundly exercised its discretion. cdrep
In view of the importance of the issues raised, we gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioners did,
while the public respondents opted to adopt their comment as their memorandum.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contended by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA. 6 The petitioner in that case assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 02 of the POEA (effective 1 February 1984) which prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring
of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. The challenged resolution and
memorandum circular here merely further amended Memorandum Circular No. 02,
which was earlier amended in 1989 per Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1989. 7
In sustaining the rule-making authority of the POEA and in holding against the
claimed in rmity of delegation of legislative power, Eastern rst considered the history
of the charter of the POEA and then discussed separately the above constitutional
issues thus:
[T]he petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that
no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as
earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially
the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to

the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. .
..
xxx xxx xxx

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the
authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative power, however,
such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule
and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has rami ed its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required
direct and e cacious, not to say, speci c solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
xxx xxx xxx
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by " ling in" the details which the Congress may not have
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a signi cant number of the cases
without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there
is a su cient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." 8
The POEA mandate referred to as providing the reasonable standard for the
exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority is found in the statement of powers and
functions of the said office in paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit:
(a) The Administration shall formulate and undertake in coordination where
necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic program
for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers
taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements, and to protect
their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
seamen. This adjudicatory function shall be undertaken in appropriate
circumstances in consultation with the Construction Industry Authority of
the Philippines. The governing Board of the Administration, as hereinunder
provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.
It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws
is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature nds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be
met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 9 This is
the principle of subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in People vs.
Rosenthal 1 0 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission . 1 1 Thus
in Calalang vs. Williams, 1 2 this Court stated:
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had
occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not
only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased di culty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental
powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater
powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive o cials, not only in the execution of the laws, but
also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the su cient
and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No.
797 can no longer be disputed. 1 3
There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the
Constitution. To support its contention of inequality, the petitioners claim
discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen
and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. LexLib
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal

protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classi cation.
And for the classi cation to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 1 4 There
can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino
overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers
and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular
violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the
social justice provisions of the 1973, Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced
and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article. 1 5 The
Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by the
President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma.
1 6 Social justice is identi ed with the broad scope of the police power of the state and
requires the extensive use of such power. 1 7 In Calalang vs. Williams, 1 8 this Court,
speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice thus:
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justi able, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle
of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not

absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be
asserted in a court of justice; it has no, application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not
prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare
of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters
cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them. 1 9
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them
be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from
time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 2 0 And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the
State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest.
Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
ARTICLE 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid

implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the
State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause.
To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to
subordinate the police power to the contract clause. LLpr
The last issue concerns the contention that without the appointment by the
President of the third member of the governing board, the POEA cannot legally function
and exercise its powers. This contention merits scant consideration. Section 4 of E.O.
No. 797 indubitably declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Thus upon the
effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the POEA attained its juridical personality. The appointment
of the third member "who shall be well versed in the eld of overseas employment,"
provided for in paragraph, (b) of the said Section, was not meant to be a sine qua non to
the birth of the POEA, much less to the validity of the acts of the Board. As a matter of
fact, in the same paragraph the President is given the "discretion [to] designate a
Deputy Administrator as the third member of the Board."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 29-30.
2. Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 31-33.

3. Annex "2" of Comment (Minutes of the Seabased Tripartite Technical Working Group's
Meeting Held on 07 January 1993 [sic] at Deputy Administrator Siddayao's Conference
Room); Rollo, 82-84.
4. 166 SCRA 533 [1988].
5. Rollo, 70-71.
6. Supra note 4.
7. Annex "1" of Comment; Rollo, 75-81.
8. Supra note 4, at 542-545.
9. People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, 1129-1130 [1957], citing Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726 [1940]; Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 22
[1940]; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; and
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 [1919].
10. Supra note 9.
11. Supra note 9.
12. Supra note 9, at 732.
13. In the past, this Court has held the following, inter alia, as sufficient standards for
purposes of subordinate legislation: public welfare in Municipality of Cardona vs.
Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]; necessary in the interest of law and order in Rubi vs.
Provincial Board, supra note 9; public interest in People vs. Rosenthal, supra note 9;
justice and equity in Antamok GoldFields Mining Co. vs. CIR, 70 Phil. 340 [1940]; public
convenience and welfare in Calalang vs. Williams, supra note 9; justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case in International Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs. Pangil
Federation of Workers, 70 Phil. 602(1940]; simplicity, economy and efficiency in
Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 [1952]; and national interest in Free
Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108 SCRA 757 [1981].
14. People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 [1939].
15. Article XIII.
16. Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. V, 945, 1010. See Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs.
NLRC, 200 SCRA 246 [1991].
17. ENRIQUE N. FERNANDO, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed. [1977], 79-80;
Philippine Apparel Worker's Union vs. NLRC, 106 SCRA 444 [1981].
18. Supra note 9, at 734-735.
19. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 281 [1930 ed.].
20. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, vol. Two, Eighth Ed.,
1236-1237; Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 54-55 [1950].

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.]
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN , respondents.
[G.R. No. 178628. July 16, 2008.]
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,

respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
These consolidated petitions 1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May
2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 2
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The rst legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities. 3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No.
6734 (R.A. 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054). 4 Although under
the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's rst legislative district, it is
not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM
in the plebiscite held in November 1989. SDECAI
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, 5
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the rst district
of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are
hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a
distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. TESICD
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of
the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial o cials of the Province of Maguindanao shall
continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or
where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both
provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial o cials shall have
preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time
being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold o ce until their
successors shall have been elected and quali ed in the next local elections;
Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving
at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in
accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in
the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother
province. acSECT
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities 6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus,
what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao's rst legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. ICDSca
The voters of Maguindanao rati ed Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite

held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province"
under MMA Act 201. CHIEDS
In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao". Resolution No. 07-0407,
which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC's Law Department under a
Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, 7 provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to
adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment
of the appropriate law by Congress , to maintain the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
(Emphasis supplied) aScIAC
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC

promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao's rst
legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of
MMA Act 201. 8
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City)." 9
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nulli cation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that o ce. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution 1 0 and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 1 1 Thus, Sema asserted that
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No.
7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao's rst legislative district despite
the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanao's reapportioned rst legislative district. 1 2 Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress'
power to create or reapportion legislative districts. CHDAaS
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial,
power and (2) Sema's prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became
moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent
Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certi cate of candidacy
led on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City". Respondent Dilangalen
added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not
apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative
districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao's rst legislative district.
Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion
Maguindanao's rst legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit
as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to
mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within
a city. 1 3
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents'
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902. HAaScT
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No.
177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the a rmative on the following grounds: (a)
the Court in Felwa v. Salas 1 4 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that
statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of
the Constitution, without a reapportionment;" (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160
(R.A. 7160) "a rms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation
of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative
district in newly created provinces. aSDHCT
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined
causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-
executing". Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso
facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the
absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the
following grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in R.A. 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of R.A.
9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative
district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the
Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section
461 of R.A. 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is
not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives. TcaAID
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the a rmative, whether a province created under Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. 1 5
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R.
No. 177597 led their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral
arguments. 1 6 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of R.A.
9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: CITcSH
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is constitutional
(a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions,
through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as
an amendment to Section 6 of R.A. 7160. 1 7 However, Sema concedes that, if taken
literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly
of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in R.A. 7160 in the
creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. 1 8 Thus,
Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards . . . that do not comply with the minimum criteria
" under R.A. 7160. 1 9
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054
is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of R.A. 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and EHCcIT
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent
Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and
Section 6, 2 0 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was
withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of R.A.
9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of
a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and
respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it
unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional. CcTIDH
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the
Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the
House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law".
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily —
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and TIHDAa
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of

Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits —
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
is constitutional; and cSIADa
(2) if in the a rmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional

Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R. No. 177597 and G.R. No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the rst legislative district of
Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City). DCaSHI
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by
"any tribunal, board, or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 2 1 On the
other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board,
o cer, or person to perform an act "which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty." 2 2
True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. 2 3 Nor is there a law which speci cally enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City". These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 2 4 2005jur
Respondent Dilangalen's Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen's proclamation as
winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen's election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of
ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with
the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court's ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the o ce in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
EcSCAD
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units — province, city,
municipality or barangay — must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria xed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not con ict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no con ict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, 2 5
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under
the Local Government Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or
municipalities. 2 6 EIaDHS
Under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers
because the power to create local government units is not one of the express
legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 2 7 In the
present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that con icts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member . . . " ADaSEH
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will

violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create
a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The
threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer
is in the negative. HCaIDS
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past 2 8 Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by
law , who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. TEHIaA
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied) ECaAHS
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to

increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that
Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies
enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased,
and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law
passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC 2 9 we held that the "power of redistricting
. . . is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws", and thus
is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can
enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body. SaCDTA
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to
create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic
Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over: ASaTHc
(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.
DEcTCa
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous

regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of R.A. 9054 amending the ARMM Organic
Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power . . .
except on the following matters: . . . (k) National elections . . . . ." Since the
ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the
rst representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity
of the law. 3 0 ADCTac
Indeed, the o ce of a legislative district representative to Congress is a

national o ce , and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a
national o cial . 3 1 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national o ce when its legislative powers extend
only to its regional territory. The o ce of a district representative is maintained by
national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-
evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative
body that it can only create local or regional o ces, respectively, and it can never
create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national o ce is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage
of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction . . . ." SHEIDC
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized

the exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA
Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law , the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
aTIAES
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus,
the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative . (Emphasis supplied) aCTcDH
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution . The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) EASCDH
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29
October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives
in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the
statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which
cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (R.A.
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus: caHCSD
The Constitution ordains:

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred
and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but
each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make
an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that xed by law for
the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the quali ed electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory."
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into

existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province — for "each
province shall have at least one member" in the House of
Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative
districts within a province . The requirements concerning the apportionment of
representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of
creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the
creation of provinces, under the rst method. This is deducible, not only from the
general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of
Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment . cSaCDT
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other

conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the
consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts
prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into
other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative
districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements. 3 2 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of R.A. 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress
creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the
new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly . SDECAI
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does
not emanate alone from Congress' power to reapportion legislative districts, but also
from Congress' power to create provinces which cannot be created without a
legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by
operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each
province shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives.
This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create
legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other
legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative
body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create
legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a
legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power
to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to
Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the rst legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000,
it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving
rst legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand . . ., shall have at least one representative." EacHSA
Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of

the House of Representatives. Under Section 19, 3 3 Article VI of R.A. 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria xed in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, namely: minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or
minimum population of 250,000. 3 4 The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative
body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); SHCaDA
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on

one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because
the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section
461 (a) (ii) of R.A. 7160 that every province created must have a population of at
least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the
House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. IHEaAc
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No.
177597 highlights the absurdity of Sema's position that the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and
pack Congress with their own representatives [?] CIaHDc
Atty. Vistan II: 3 5

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create . . . provinces . . .
and, therefore, they can have thirty- ve (35) new representatives in the
House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you
are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?] cDAISC
Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty- ve (35) new provinces,
there may be . . . [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], . . .,
and they will each have one representative . . . to Congress without any
national law, is that what you are saying? ITSaHC
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives
without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor . 3 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article
X on regional autonomy, 3 7 nor Congress in enacting R.A. 9054, envisioned or intended
these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. ESTcIA
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative

districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution
which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created . . . shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member", refers to a province created by
Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province
increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only
Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 3 8
district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives.
Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House,
there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-
list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district
representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there
is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, . . . ." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (R.A. 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution". This
follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall
be created . . . within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" .
TEaADS
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily
involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply
with the criteria established in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays
does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this
issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for
being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution,
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national o ce like the o ce of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. acCITS
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the
geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article
X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID. ESTAIH
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED. TCEaDI
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Nachura and

Reyes, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., join the separate opinion of
Justice Tinga.
Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ., join the dissent of Justice Tinga.
Tinga, J., please see dissenting concurring opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part — close relationship to a party.
Separate Opinions
TINGA, J., dissenting and concurring :
I agree that the petitions should be denied, but on a wholly different basis from
that offered by the majority. I cannot accede to the majority's conclusion, burnished by
reasoning most strained, that the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (Regional Assembly) should be deprived of the power delegated to it
by Congress to create provinces. With this ruling, the Court has dealt another severe
blow to the cause of local autonomy. CTaSEI
Our Constitution, in re ection of the sovereign wisdom of the people, has

prescribed local government rule as a tool for national development and welfare. The
majority is unfortunately unmindful of these considerations. The Regional Assembly
and the government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao exercised
constituent functions in establishing the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and providing
for its local government. The majority did not bother to hear their side in these
petitions, which after all, never put in issue the constitutionality of the creation of the
province. The people of Shariff Kabunsuan, by sovereign desire and constitutional
design, rati ed through a plebiscite the province named in honor of the revered gure
who introduced Islam to Central Mindanao. The majority has annihilated the province
with nary a word of comfort or concern for its citizens. Sadly, there will be no shelter for
the Court from the impact of this decision, which unduly stretches the Constitution to
deny the will of the duly elected members of the Regional Assembly, that of the
constituents they represent, and most of all, that of the people of Shariff Kabunsuan.
I.
We are dealing with two consolidated petitions which essentially raise the same
arguments, but were brought forth by two different parties laboring under different
circumstances. The petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S.A. Sema, a
congressional candidate in the 2007 legislative elections who posits that the newly-
created province of Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its own exclusive legislative
district. The petitioner in G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto F. Marquez, suing in his capacity as
a taxpayer and a resident of Cotabato City, 1 argues that with the creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan, his home city cannot be conjoined with Shariff Kabunsuan to create just
one legislative district for both territories.
IcDESA
As narrated by the majority, 2 four (4) days prior to the 14 May 2007 elections,
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 7902,
whereby it resolved to maintain the composition of what had been the First District of
Maguindanao, composed of Cotabato City, a chartered city, and several other
municipalities, even though these municipalities formerly belonging to Maguindanao
have since been constituted as part of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan, which was
created by the Regional Assembly by virtue of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
in August of 2006.
Both petitioners challenge the notion of fusing Cotabato City, which is not a part
of ARMM, with the ARMM municipalities which now constitute the new province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, into one legislative district. To resolve that question on the merits, it
is inevitable that the Court examine the validity of the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the rst place, and the majority has fully adopted that approach. However, there are
signi cant impediments that weigh down both petitioners, and supply the cogent
reason for the more prudent approach which is to dismiss the petitions outright. DHcSIT
It is clear that both petitioners rely on constitutional issues in support of their

petitions as they posit that under the Constitution Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its
own separate legislative district. It is cardinal that the Court's power of judicial review
may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 3
With respect to Sema, it is plainly evident, as argued by private respondent Rep.
Didagen P. Dilangalen, that she is estopped from bringing forth the present petition. On
29 March 2007, she led her Certi cate of Candidacy before the COMELEC, declaring
her candidacy a Member of the House of Representatives representing "the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan w/ Cotabato City." 4 She recognized under oath that she was seeking
election for a legislative district that encompassed both Shariff Kabunsuan and
Cotabato City, and she should be consequently barred from disavowing the very district
which she undertook to serve if elected. Sema appears to have campaigned for election
in this conjoined district, and was accordingly defeated by Dilangalen, her votes from
both Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City included in the tally. SIHCDA
It would indeed be di cult to assess injury for purposes of locus standi on the
part of Sema by reason of the assailed COMELEC Resolution, which after all, rea rms
the very legislative district whose seat in Congress she had sought to be elected to. Her
standing to raise the present petition is materially affected by her express consent and
active campaign for election from the legislative district which she now seeks to
invalidate. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show
"not only that the law is invalid, but also that he or she has sustained or is in immediate,
or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement", that
party has been or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he or she is
lawfully entitled. 5 Sema's prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district,
belie the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that
affirmed that very legislative district.
On the part of Marquez, he rst raised his present claims through the petition in
G.R. No. 179608, which was led with this Court in July 2007, or more than two months
after the May 2007 elections. As a result, could no longer ask that the holding of the
said elections in the conjoined district be restrained, and instead seeks that new or
special elections be conducted. AEDcIH
As earlier noted, among the requisites for the Court to be able to exercise judicial
review in constitutional cases is that the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest possible opportunity. 6 Clearly, his petition was not timely led at the earliest
possible opportunity, which would have been at a point prior to the May 2007 elections.
Worse, he led his petition after the voters in the affected districts had already elected
a candidate of their choosing, a sovereign act which he seeks to annul. Considering the
grave implications of the step he seeks, as well as the fact that such recourse usually
smacks of opportunism and bad faith, it is but proper for the Court to decline review
unless all the established requisites for judicial review for constitutional cases have
indeed been met. Marquez does not meet this Court's exacting standards.
Moreover, Marquez does not have a valid cause of action before this Court. His
prayer is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new congressional elections for
Cotabato City. The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep. Dilangalen, by virtue
of his electoral victory, lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the COMELEC does not have the requisite power
to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power. Only Congress,
which was not impleaded as a party to Marquez's petition, has the power to set
congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if ever. Even assuming that Congress
was impleaded, it would be improper for this Court to compel Congress by judicial at
to pass a law or resolution for the holding of such elections. AHaETS
In sum, Marquez's petition should be dismissed outright for having been led out
of time, for lack of cause of action, and for not impleading a real party-in-interest.
II.
One might argue that it is imperative for the Court to resolve the substantive
issues, since the situation may emerge again. However, the exception in exercising
judicial review if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review applies only if the
case is "moot and academic", 7 and not when the petitioners lack the requisite standing,
have no cause of action, and have failed to join a proper party, which is the case here. In
addition, it is entirely possible that between now and the next elections, either Congress
or the Regional Assembly would pass new legislation concerning the composition or
status of Shariff Kabunsuan, thereby changing the legal complexion and factual milieu
of the situation. If that occurs, the questions that will be facing the Court then should a
challenge be mounted may very well be different from those currently befacing us. HTCAED
However, it is apparent that the ponente wishes to settle these cases on the
merits. In doing so, he frames two issues — whether Congress can delegate to the
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces; and whether the Regional Assembly
has the power to create legislative districts. However, with due respect, the majority's
discussion makes quite an easy leap when it abruptly fuses these two issues. Worse,
the majority fails to take into account certain fundamental constitutional principles
which have immense bearing in these cases. The resulting analysis is incomplete and
uninformed of the full constitutional milieu under which these petitions should be
resolved.
My own framework rstly considers two important principles which underlie the
issues presented before us — the rule on delegation of powers, and the constitutionally-
ordained paradigms of local government and local autonomy. Without the in uence of
these principles, any resulting analysis of the two issues cast by the majority will be
atomistic in nature. HcSDIE
III.
The laws we are presently impelled to interpret involve multiple instances of
Congress delegating power to the Regional Assembly. Explicity, Rep. Act No. 9054
delegates to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and other local
government units, though subject to certain speci ed limitations. The majority likewise
asserts that through that mechanism, Congress has also delegated to the Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts.
The fundamental principles on delegation of powers bear review.
The Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. 8 Traditionally, the
delegation of Congress of its legislative powers had been frowned upon. "A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what
has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another." 9
However, the strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has, in recent
times, been relaxed, if not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory
jurisdiction of administrative agencies. In every industrialized nation, administrative
agencies, which are generally part of the executive branch, have been granted
considerable lawmaking power. 1 0 "Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal
adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need
to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in
their specialized elds — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies." 1 1
In the context of delegation of legislative powers to local governments, a noted
authority on the subject has this to say:
The state legislative power — that is, the exercise of the policy-making judgment
and discretion on state matters that state constitutions vest and recognize in the
legislature — cannot be delegated to some other person or body but must rest
with the legislature itself. Thus, the legislature cannot delegate to a commission
the power to determine the form of government, powers and functions of
proposed municipalities since these matters require legislative judgment. But the
details of organization of its own government can be left to a
municipality, limited only by general state law; and such basic state
powers as the police power, taxing power, and power of eminent
domain can be, and almost always are, delegated to local governments
for their use for local purposes. The rule against delegation of state
legislative authority is no barrier to the delegation of powers of local
self government to local units. . . . 1 2
Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-
delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative
powers to Congress it also speci cally conditions the emergence of certain rights,
duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such
constitutional predicate. These include the prohibition of political dynasties as may be
de ned by law, 1 3 the reasonable conditions prescribed by law relating to full public
disclosure of all the State's transactions involving public interest; 1 4 the manner by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; 1 5 the date of regular elections
for members of Congress; 1 6 the manner of conduct of special elections to ll in
congressional vacancies; 1 7 the authorization of the President to exercise emergency
powers; 1 8 the system for initiative and referendum; 1 9 the salaries of the President and
Vice-President; 2 0 the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts; 2 1 and on
many other matters of grave import. cTCADI
May these speci ed functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These

speci c functions are non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the
Constitution to Congress. Perhaps it is possible to segregate these particular functions
to those which would, even absent constitutional de nition, anyway fall within the
plenary legislative power, and those which are not plenary in nature but were especially
designated to Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and no
other body, can carry out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall
within the plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize
that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks. With respect to
the non-plenary functions assigned to Congress, it is clear that the assignment implies
the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of specific, wholly original functions.
There shall be further discussion on this point in relation to the questions
currently presented. Before we get there, I wish to emphasize a second constitutional
principle, local governance and autonomy, that should likewise bear on our
deliberations. SDTaHc
IV.

The 1987 Constitution ushered in a new era in local government rule for all
citizens, and local autonomy rule for Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera region. This
new paradigm is crystallized under Article X of the Constitution.
Section 2, Article X guarantees that the territorial and political subdivisions in the
Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized
through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers of local
governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government units
to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the
national internal revenue. 2 2 Local government rule, in constitutional contemplation, is a
live being that exists to counterbalance the rule of the national government, and is not a
mere palliative established in the Constitution to soothe the people with the illusion of
having a more direct say in their governance. EcIaTA
By constitutional design, local government rule for the people of Muslim

Mindanao and the Cordilleras is even more enhanced, as they are assured of their own
autonomous regions. Section 15, Article X of the Constitution mandated that "[t]he shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting
of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics . . ." Following the Constitution, Congress in 1989 passed
Republic Act No. 6734, "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao", leading to the creation of the ARMM. In 2001, Congress
further strengthened the Organic Act with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9054, which
among others, empowered the Assembly to create provinces. The Organic Acts
possess a special status within Philippine laws. While they are classi ed as statutes,
the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy a rmation by a
plebiscite, and thus could not be amended by ordinary statutes without any plebiscite.
23
In Disomangcop v. Datumanong, 2 4 the Court explained at length the vital

constitutional purposes of local autonomy:
. . . According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which
drafted the provisions, it "is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary
system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country
. . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain
national strength through decentralization." DCcHAa
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow
the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.
These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
xxx xxx xxx
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary sessions in

their own inimitable way. Thus, Commissioner Bias Ople referred to the
recognition that the Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras "do not belong to the
dominant national community" as the justi cation for conferring on them a
"measure of legal self-su ciency, meaning self-government, so that they will
ourish politically, economically and culturally", with the hope that after achieving
parity with the rest of the country they would "give up their own autonomous
region in favor of joining the national mainstream". For his part, the Muslim
delegate, Commissioner Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity of cultures as the
framework for nation-building. Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of
Commissioner Ponciano Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:
. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of struggle

against oppression and exploitation. For so long, their names and
identities have been debased. Their ancestral lands have been ransacked
for their treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures have been de led, their
very lives threatened, and worse, extinguished, all in the name of national
development; all in the name of public interest; all in the name of common
good; all in the name of the right to property; all in the name of Regalian
Doctrine; all in the name of national security. These phrases have meant
nothing to our indigenous communities, except for the violation of their
human rights. AacSTE
xxx xxx xxx
Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of the

decision to be made by every single one of us in this Commission. We have
the overwhelming support of the Bangsa Moro and the Cordillera
Constitution. By this we mean meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy. We propose that we have a separate Article on the autonomous
regions for the Bangsa Moro and Cordillera people clearly spelled out in
this Constitution, instead of prolonging the agony of their vigil and their
struggle. This, too is a plea for national peace. Let us not pass the buck to
the Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our hands of our
responsibility to attain national unity and peace and to settle this problem
and rectify past injustices, once and for all.
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino
Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been ghting for it. Their political
struggle highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary
system to their aspirations. The Moros' struggle for self-determination dates as
far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present, the struggle
goes on. ASHECD
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious

peace and order problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically,
autonomy, decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have become
politically acceptable answers to intractable problems of nationalism, separatism,
ethnic conflict and threat of secession. 2 5
Petitioner Sema points out that among the terms in the Final Peace Agreement
between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front was that
amendments be introduced to the original Organic Act, including one which authorized
the Assembly to "create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units in the area of autonomy in accordance with the criteria laid down by
law subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political units affected." 2 6 Indeed, it could hardly be argued that the
challenged power of the Assembly was animated by nakedly sel sh political purposes.
It was, in fact, among the terms negotiated with care by the Philippine Government with
the leading armed insurgency group in Muslim Mindanao towards the higher purpose of
providing a permanent peace agreement in the strife-torn region. It does come with a
measure of surprise and disappointment that the Solicitor General has reached a
position that rejects the Final Peace Agreement negotiated by the Government and the
MNLF. CDHSac

Disomangcop further crystallizes the interplay between regional autonomy and
national sovereignty, to the extent that the former is accommodated under the latter.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local
government unit vis-Ã -vis the central government. TCHcAE
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a

right to political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations
between a certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples
to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own
cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the community's internal
decision-making processes and the management of collective matters by
themselves.
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself re ecting a preference for

homogeneous, independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal application
without massive disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a means
to an end — that end being a democratic, participatory political and economic
system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority communities
are protected — its continuing validity is more easily perceived. IaAHCE
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to

the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from
the central government.
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a

common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely
their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own
business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance
regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from
within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to
them to decide internal community affairs. ATcaID
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more

positive means for national integration. It would remove the wariness among the
Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the
unhampered implementation of the development programs in the region. Again,
even a glimpse of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission could lend
a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true decentralization:
MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations to
come, not only for the present but for our posterity. There is no harm in
recognizing certain vital pragmatic needs for national peace and solidarity,
and the writing of this Constitution just happens at a time when it is
possible for this Commission to help the cause of peace and reconciliation
in Mindanao and the Cordilleras, by taking advantage of a heaven-sent
opportunity. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of the

Philippines that Mindanao autonomy will be granted to them as soon as
possible, more or less, to dissuade these armed men from going outside
while Mindanao will be under the control of the national government, let us
establish an autonomous Mindanao within our effort and capacity to do
so within the shortest possible time. This will be an answer to the Misuari
clamor, not only for autonomy but for independence. cDCHaS
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the
consideration of the Congress of the organic acts and their passage is that
we live in abnormal times. In the case of Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, we know that we deal with questions of war and peace. These
are momentous issues in which the territorial integrity and the solidarity of
this country are being put at stake, in a manner of speaking.
We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social

Justice can contribute to a climate of peace so that any civil strife in the
countryside can be more quickly and more justly resolved. We are
providing for autonomous regions so that we give constitutional
permanence to the just demands and grievances of our own fellow
countrymen in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao. One hundred thousand
lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this day, the Cordilleras
is being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a peaceful and militant
struggle.TAScID
xxx xxx xxx
Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how sympathetic

to the Philippines, to contribute to the settlement of this issue, I think the
Constitutional Commission ought not to forego the opportunity to put the
stamp of this Commission through de nitive action on the settlement of
the problems that have nagged us and our forefathers for so long. 2 7
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization, which typically involves

delegated power wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to
more local governments. 2 8 Decentralization of power involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous, which
are free to chart their own destiny and shape their future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. 2 9 What the Constitution contemplated with respect to the
ARMM was political autonomy. As explained by Justice Cortes for the Court:
It must be clari ed that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37
SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was
no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the
Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185),
which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.] cADaIH
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim

Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy to these regions . Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18]. 3 0
Disomangcop further elaborates on the import of political autonomy as it relates

to the ARMM:
[B]y regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean "meaningful and
authentic regional autonomy". As articulated by a Muslim author, substantial and
meaningful autonomy is "the kind of local self-government which allows the
people of the region or area the power to determine what is best for their growth
and development without undue interference or dictation from the central
government".
To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over
autonomous regions. In essence, the provision also curtails the power of
Congress over autonomous regions. Consequently, Congress will have to re-
examine national laws and make sure that they re ect the Constitution's
adherence to local autonomy. And in case of con icts, the underlying spirit which
should guide its resolution is the Constitution's desire for genuine local
autonomy. CcTIAH
The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was con rmed in
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, [ 3 1 ] wherein this Court held that "the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signi es nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' 'control' over local
government affairs." 3 2
Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local

autonomy, even as such paradigm partakes of a constitutional mandate. If anything,
these provisions should dissuade against a re exive dismissal of the provisions of the
Organic Acts. It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of
the Constitution. It is repeatedly emphasized within Article X that the grant of local
autonomy and the subsequent exercise of powers by the autonomous government
must remain within the con nes of the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no
constitutional bar against the exercise of the powers of government by the
autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao, particularly by the Regional Assembly,
then there is no basis to thwart the constitutional design by denying such powers to
that body. aCITEH
Having laid down the essential constitutional predicates, I shall proceed to dwell
on the core issues raised. May Congress delegate to the Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces? Assuming that such delegation is not barred by the Constitution,
may the exercise of such power by the Regional Assembly give rise to separate
legislative districts for such provinces thus created?
V.
There should be little debate on the origins of the power to create provinces,
which had existed as a political unit in the Philippines since the Spanish colonial period,
and which all our Constitutions have recognized as a basic level of local governments.
Ever since the emergence of our tripartite system of democratic government, the
power to create provinces have always been legislative in character. They are created
by the people through their representatives in Congress, subject to direct affirmation by
the very people who stand to become the constituents of the new putative province. DSHTaC
May such power be delegated by Congress to a local legislative body

such as the Regional Assembly? Certainly, nothing in the Constitution bars
Congress from doing so. In fact, considering the constitutional mandate of
local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in
furtherance of the constitutional design.
The only constitutional provision that concerns with the creation of provinces is
Section 10, Article X, which reads:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. ISAcHD
Nothing in this provision speci cally limits the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays to Congress alone. The provision does embody a
signi cant limitation — that the creation of these political subdivisions must be in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, a law which is
enacted by Congress. It would thus be proper to say that the Constitution limits the
ability to set forth the standards for the creation of a province exclusively to Congress.
But to say that the Constitution con nes to Congress alone the power to establish the
criteria for creating provinces is vastly different from saying that the Constitution
con nes to Congress alone the power to create provinces. There is nothing in the
Constitution that supports the latter proposition.
Section 10, Article X does not speci cally designate Congress as the body with
the power to create provinces. As earlier stated, the power to create these political
subdivisions is part of the plenary legislative power, hence such power can be
exercised by Congress even without need of speci c constitutional assignation. At the
same time, the absence of constitutional language committing Congress with the
function of creating political subdivisions ultimately denotes that such legislative
function may be delegated by Congress. CaDATc
In fact, the majority actually concedes that Congress, under its plenary legislative
powers, "can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no con ict arises with any
provision of the Constitution." 3 3 As is pointed out, such delegation is operationalized
by the LGC itself, which confers to provincial boards and city and municipal councils,
the general power to create barangays within their respective jurisdictions. The
Constitution does not con ne the exercise of such powers only to the national
legislature, and indeed if that were the case, the power to create barangays as granted
by the LGC to local legislative bodies would be unconstitutional.
Traditionally, it has been the national legislature which has exercised the power
to create provinces. However, the 1987 Constitution ushered in a new era in devolved
local government rule, and particularly, a regime of local autonomy for Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. We recognized in Disomangcop v. Datumanong, thus:
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine
society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to
free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist
approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably assimilationist in
character despite channels being open for minority representation. As a result,
democracy becomes an irony to the minority group. 3 4

It bears reemphasizing that the Constitution also actualizes a preference for
local government rule, and thusly provides:
The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
quali cations, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units . 3 5
Attuned with enhanced local government rule, Congress had, through

Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative
assembly the power to create provinces , albeit prudently withholding any ability to
create legislative districts as well. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 reads:
Section 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities or
Barangay. — The Regional Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish, or
substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays in
accordance with the criteria laid down by the Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, subject to the approval by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Regional
Assembly may prescribe standards lower than those mandated by Republic Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, in the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or
barangay. Provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays created, divided, merged,
or whose boundaries are altered without observing the standards prescribed by
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall not be entitled
to any share of the taxes that are allotted to the local governments units under the
provisions of the code.TCADEc
The nancial requirements of the provinces, cities and municipalities, or

barangays so created, divided, merged shall be provided by the Regional
Assembly out of the general funds of the Regional Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the voters of
the areas affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries are
being altered as required by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, shall, however, be observed. aDIHCT
Because this empowerment scheme is in line with a policy preferred by the

Constitution, it becomes utterly necessary to pinpoint a speci c constitutional
prohibition that bars Congress from authorizing the Regional Assembly to create
provinces. No such constitutional limitation exists, and it is not the province,
duty or sensible recourse of this Court to nullify an act of Government in
furtherance of a constitutional mandate and directly rati ed by the affected
people if nothing in the Constitution proscribes such act.
The constitutionality of the delegated power of the Regional Assembly to create
provinces is further a rmed by the provisions in the Constitution concerning the
mandatory creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, as found in Sections
15 to 21, Article X. The organic act enacted by Congress for the autonomous region is
to de ne the basic structure of government. 3 6 Section 20 speci cally allows the
organic act of autonomous regions to provide for legislative powers over, among
others, administrative organization; creation of sources of revenues; economic, social
and tourism development; and such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. The creation of provinces
within the autonomous region precisely assists these constitutional aims under Section
20, enhancing as it does the basic administration of government, the delivery of
government services, and the promotion of the local economy. aSHAIC
In addition, Section 17, Article X states that "[a]ll powers, functions, and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions
shall be vested in the National Government". The original Organic Act for Muslim
Mindanao did not grant to the regional government the power to create provinces, thus
at that point, such power was properly exercised by the National Government. But the
subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional Assembly the
power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local government units
which had been exercised by the National Government.
The majority does not point to any speci c constitutional prohibition barring
Congress from delegating to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces. It
does cite though that Article 460 of the LGC provides that only by an Act of Congress
may a province be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered. However, Republic Act No. 9054, which was passed ten (10) years after the
LGC, unequivocally granted to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. aSIDCT
Any argument that the LGC con nes to Congress the creation of provinces is
muted by the fact that ten years after the LGC was enacted by Congress, the same
legislative body conferred on the Assembly that same power within its territorial
jurisdiction, thus amending the LGC to the extent of accommodating these newly-
granted powers to the Assembly.
There actually is an obvious unconstitutional dimension to Section 19, albeit one
which is not in point in this case. The provision states in part "[t]hat Regional Assembly
may prescribe standards lower than those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration
of the boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays." That proviso is
squarely inconsistent with Section 10, Article X, which accords to the LGC the sole
criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local
government units. Said proviso thus cannot receive recognition from this Court. ESITcH
It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of
Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus
this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the
petitions at bar.
VI.
The majority unfortunately asserts that Congress may not delegate to the
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, despite the absence of any
constitutional bar in that respect. The reasons offered for such conclusion are actually
the same reasons it submits why the Regional Assembly could not create legislative
districts, as if the power to create provinces and the power to create legislative
districts were one and the same. In contrast, I propose to pinpoint a speci c
constitutional provision that prohibits the Regional Assembly from creating, directly or
indirectly, any legislative district without affecting that body's delegated authority to
create provinces. CIHTac
Let us review this issue as presented before us. Notably, Republic Act No. 9054
does not empower the Regional Assembly to create legislative districts, and MMA Act
No. 201, which created Shariff Kabunsuan, speci cally disavows the creation of a new
district for that province and maintains the old legislative district shared with Cotabato
City. It is the thesis though of the petitioners that following Felwa v. Salas, 3 7 the
creation of the new province ipso facto established as well an exclusive legislative
district for Shariff Kabunsuan, "by operation of the Constitution."
How exactly does a legislative district come into being? In theory, Congress does
not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except
by reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within three
years following the return of the census, 3 8 but this Court has likewise recognized that
reapportionment can also be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. 3 9 Still, even in exercising this limited power through the constitutionally
mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own discretion for the
standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general reapportionment made
by Congress violate the parameters set forth by the Constitution, such act may be
invalidated by the Court, as it did in Macias v. COMELEC. 4 0
There is another constitutional provision which is of critical importance in
considering limitations in the creation of legislative districts. Section 5 (1), Article VI
states that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fty members, unless otherwise xed by law." The provision
textually commits that only through a law may the numerical composition of Congress
may be increased or reduced. SAHIDc
The Court has previously recognized that such law increasing the membership of
the House of Representatives need not be one speci cally devoted for that purpose
alone, but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city with a population of
more than 250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 4 1 the Court pronounced that the law
converting Mandaluyong into a city could likewise serve the purpose of increasing the
composition of the House of Representatives:
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number
of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless
otherwise provided by law". The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the
present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
42
This point was reemphasized by the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC: 4 3

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos . In said
case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through
a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fty
(250) members, unless otherwise xed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. 4 4
From these cases, it is evident that a law creating the province of Shariff
Kabunsuan may likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition of the House
of Representatives. In addition, Congress generally has the power to delegate the
power of creating local government units to the appropriate local legislative
assemblies. The critical question now is thus whether Congress may delegate to local
legislative assemblies the power to increase the composition of the House of
Representatives? The answer is no. cDEICH
I have already pointed out that when the Constitution speci cally designates a
particular function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such function, as the same
is non-delegable. The power to increase the composition of the House of
Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which
may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to rule
that Congress may delegate the power to increase the composition of the House of
Representatives, there would be no impediment for us to similarly rule that those other
speci c functions tasked by the Constitution to Congress may be delegated as well. To
repeat, these include gravely important functions as the enactment of a law de ning
political dynasties; the enactment of reasonable conditions relating to full public
disclosure of all the State's transactions involving public interest; the manner by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for
members of Congress; the provision for the manner of conduct of special elections to
fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to exercise emergency
powers; the prescription of a system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the
President and Vice-President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower
courts.
Considering that all these matters, including the composition of the House of
Representatives, are of national interest, it is but constitutionally proper that only a
national legislature has the competence to exercise these powers. And the Constitution
does textually commit to Congress alone the power to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives. cSIACD
Accordingly, the petitioners' position cannot be sustained, as Shariff Kabunsuan

cannot acquire its own legislative district unless Congress itself accedes to the
passage of a law that establishes the same. The contrary position is in denigration of
the Constitution, which limits to Congress alone the non-delegable power to x or
increase the composition of the House of Representatives. For that, I concur with the
result of the majority.
Felwa cannot apply to these petitions. Its pronouncement that the creation of a
province automatically leads to the creation of a legislative district "by operation of the
Constitution" can only apply when the province is created by Congress itself, since there
is no other constitutional impediment to the emergence of the legislative district.
However, in cases where it is a body other than Congress which has created, although
validly, the legislative district, the Constitution itself bars the emergence of an
accompanying legislative district, as this will result in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representatives which can only be accomplished through a law passed by
Congress. IcaHCS
VII.

Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional
Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of
that body to exercise such power. I had earlier identi ed as unconstitutional the
discretion of the Regional Assembly to create local government units based on a lower
standard than that prescribed under the LGC. Another clear limitation is that the
creation of provinces cannot be authorized without the rati cation through a plebiscite
by the people affected by such act, a requirement imposed by the Organic Act itself and
by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
The majority itself had raised an alarmist tone that allowing the Assembly to
create provinces would not lead to the unholy spectacle of whimsical provinces
intended as personal efdoms and created irrespective of size, shape and sense. In
fact, allowing the Regional Assembly to create provinces will not lead to hundreds or
thousands, or even tens or dozens of new provinces. Any new province will have to
meet the same criteria set forth by the LGC for the creation of provinces. SacTCA
To stress how implausible the scenario of dozens-hundred-thousands of ARMM

provinces actually is, it bears reviewing what exactly is the criteria set forth under the
LGC for the creation of provinces. An Assembly-created province, just as with any other
putative province, following Section 461 of the LGC, must possess the following
requisites: (a) an average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Php20,000,000.00, such income including the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income; (b) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certi ed by the Lands Management Bureau (excepting when comprised of two (2) or
more islands or when separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province), or a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as
certi ed by the National Statistics O ce; (c) that the creation of the province shall not
reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed under the Code. These
standards, which should bear upon the Assembly, would preclude the emergence of
dozens, hundreds or thousands of provinces within the relatively confined spaces of the
present Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
IX.
The concerns raised by the majority on how allowing the Assembly to create
provinces would affect the composition of the national Congress are valid issues, yet
the approach it adopts is to treat autonomy as invisible and inconsequential, instead of
the countervailing constitutional principle that it actually is. It is an approach that will
exacerbate political and regional tensions within Mindanao, especially since it shuns the
terms of the negotiated peace. This decision today, sad to say, is a decisive step
backwards from the previous rulings of this Court that have been supportive of the
aims of regional autonomy. AEIHaS
Except for the result, which I join, I respectfully dissent.

Footnotes
1. In G.R. No. 177597, for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; in G.R. No.
178628, for "declaratory relief " and for the writs of prohibition and mandamus. aAcHCT
2. The petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema (Sema), further seeks to compel
the COMELEC to exclude from the canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of the legislative district in question in the 14 May 2007 elections. On
the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto Marquez, prays that the
Court order the COMELEC to conduct a special election for representative of the "First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City".
3. Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, and Upi.
The second legislative district is composed of 19 municipalities (Talitay, Talayan,
Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay,
Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas,
Gen, S.K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan and
Paglat). TaEIAS
4. The enactment of the organic acts for the autonomous regions of the Cordilleras and
Muslim Mindanao is mandated under Sections 18 and 19, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
5. The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities or Barangay.
— The Regional Assembly may create , divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter
boundaries of provinces , cities, municipalities, or barangay in accordance with the
criteria laid down by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. The Regional Assembly may prescribe standards lower than those
mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, in
the creation , division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundaries of provinces ,
cities, municipalities, or barangay. Provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay created,
divided, merged, or whose boundaries are altered without observing the standards
prescribed by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall not be
entitled to any share of the taxes that are allotted to the local governments units under
the provisions of the Code. CHTAIc
The nancial requirements of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay so created,

divided, or merged shall be provided by the Regional Assembly out of the general funds
of the Regional Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the voters of the areas
affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries are being altered as
required by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall, however,
be observed.
The Regional Assembly may also change the names of local government units, public places
and institutions, and declare regional holidays. (Emphasis supplied) aDcETC
Before the enactment of R.A. 9054, the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays was vested in Congress (for provinces, cities and municipalities) and in the
sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod (for barangays). (See
Sections 384, 448, and 460 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991).
6. Sultan Mastura (created from Sultan Kudarat), Northern Kabuntulan (created from
Kabuntulan) and Datu Blah Sinsuat (created from Upi).
7. The Memorandum reads in pertinent parts:
The record shows the former province of Maguindanao was divided into two new provinces
(Shariff Kabunsuan and Maguindanao), in view of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
(MMAA) No. 201, which authority was conferred to under Section 17, Article VI of
Republic Act No. 9054 giving the ARMM, thru its Regional Legislative Assembly, the
power to legislate laws including the enactment of the Local Government Code of
ARMM. IaDcTC
The newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprises the municipalities of Barira,
Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan
Mastura, Upi and Datu Blah, including Cotabato City [which] belongs to the rst district
of Maguindanao province.
It must be emphasized that Cotabato City is not included as part of ARMM although
geographically located within the rst district of the former Maguindanao province.
Cotabato City is not voting for provincial o cials. This is the reason why Cotabato City
was not speci cally mentioned as part of the newly created province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
Geographically speaking since [sic] Cotabato City is located within the newly created province
of Shariff Kabunsuan having been bounded by municipalities of Sultan Kudarat, Datu
Odin Sinsuat and Kabuntalan as its nearest neighbors. Following the rule in establishing
legislative district, it shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory.
However, legally speaking, it may arise question of legality [sic] if Cotabato City will be
appended as part of the newly created Shariff Kabunsuan province. Under our
Constitution [it is] only Congress that shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided for under Section 5 (1) of Article VI.
xxx xxx xxx
In order to avoid controversy on the matter, pending the enactment of appropriate law by
Congress, it would be prudent and logically feasible to maintain status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.CHTcSE
8. Resolution No. 7845 pertinently provides:

WHEREAS, the Province of Maguindanao consists of two legislative districts, with Cotabato
City as part of the first legislative district.
WHEREAS, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 provided for the creation of the new
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprising the municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu
Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura and Upi, all
of the rst legislative district of the mother Province of Maguindanao, except Cotabato
City which is not part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; while the
remaining municipalities of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan,
Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu
Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah
Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat, all of the second legislative district of the
mother Province of Maguindanao, shall remain with said province;
WHEREAS, the last paragraph of Section 5 of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy (MMA) Act No.
201 provides that "(e)xcept as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain.";
WHEREAS, by reason of said provision of MMA Act No. 201, the rst legislative
district of the Province of Maguindanao is now made up of Cotabato City
only, and its second legislative district, the municipalities of Talisay, Talayan,
Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay,
Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu
Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan,
Pagagawan, and Paglat [.] (Emphasis supplied)
In the earlier Resolution No. 7801, dated 11 January 2007, the COMELEC allocated one
legislative seat each for the provinces of Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan for the
14 May 2007 elections.
9. Resolution No. 7902 reads in full:
This pertains to the amendment of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6, 2007,
entitled, "IN THE MATTER OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ATTY. WYNNE B. ASDALA,
ACTING DIRECTOR III, LAW DEPARTMENT, RELATIVE TO THE
STUDY/RECOMMENDATION OF SAID DEPARTMENT RE: CONVERSION OF THE FIRST
DISTRICT OF MAGUINDANAO INTO A REGULAR PROVINCE PER MINUTE RESOLUTION
NO. 07-0297 DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2007". The dispositive portion of which reads:
"Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate
law by Congress, to maintain status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First District of Maguindanao".
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to amend the pertinent portion of
Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 to now read, as follows[:]
["]Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the
district shall be known as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
(formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City) ."
Let the Executive Director advise the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato City
accordingly. (Emphasis in the original)
TcDHSI
10. "Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative".
11. "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election". cSDIHT
12. Consistent with her claim that Cotabato City is not part of Shariff Kabunsuan's legislative
district, petitioner led with the COMELEC a petition for the disquali cation of
respondent Dilangalen as candidate for representative of that province (docketed as
SPA No. A07-0).
13. Respondent Dilangalen asserts, and petitioner does not dispute, that as of 2000, Cotabato
City had a population of 163,849, falling short of the minimum population
requirement in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fty
thousand , or each province, shall have at least one representative ", (Emphasis
supplied) AEcTaS
14. 124 Phil. 1226 (1966).

15. As provided in the Resolution of 16 October 2007.
16. The Court also required Sema to submit with her Memorandum the certi cations from the
Department of Finance, the Lands Management Bureau, the National Statistics
O ce, and the Department of the Interior and Local Government that at the time of
the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan on 28 August 2006 it met the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of R.A. 7160. DCESaI
17. "SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. — A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by
law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city or municipality, or any other
political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or
sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code."
18. "SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
STIcaE
19. Rollo, p. 229.
20. "SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them".
21. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

22. Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
23. See, however, Macabago v. Commission on Elections (440 Phil. 683 [2002]) where the
Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will lie to question the
constitutionality of an election regulation if the COMELEC has acted capriciously or
whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. HcSaAD
24. Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571 (2001); Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-32717, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
25. Sections 385 and 386, R.A. 7160.
26. Sections 441, 449 and 460, R.A. 7160.
27. Section 20, Article X, Constitution. SDaHEc
28. See Section 2, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and Section 5, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution.
29. 312 Phil. 492, 501 (1995).

30. Section 48 of Republic Act No. 8507 (Charter of Parañaque City) provides:
Section 48. Legislative District. — As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Parañaque shall have
its own legislative district with the rst representative to be elected in the next
national election after the passage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied) HIAcCD

Section 50 of Republic Act No. 7839 (Charter of City of Pasig) provides:
Section 50. Legislative District. — As highly urbanized, the City of Pasig shall have its own
legislative district with the rst representative to be elected in the next national
elections after the passage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 58 of Republic Act No. R.A. 9230 provides:
Section 58. Representative District. — The City of San Jose del Monte shall have its own
representative district to commence in the next national election after the effectivity
of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9355 provides:
Section 7. Legislative District. — The Province of Dinagat Islands shall constitute one,
separate legislative district to commence in the next national election after the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
31. In his Concurring Opinion in Paras v. Commission on Elections (332 Phil. 56, 66 [1996]),
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stated:
The term "regular local election" must be con ned to the regular election of elective local
o cials, as distinguished from the regular election of national o cials. The elective
national o cials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and
Congressmen . The elective local o cials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of
provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the
Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and members of
the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional o cials of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective o cials deemed
recognized by Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and quali cations of all elective regional, provincial, and city o cials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal o cials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o cials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) ECTSDa
32. Supra note 13 at 1235-1236.

33. See note 3.
34. Section 461 provides: "Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certi ed by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certi ed by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certi ed
by the National Statistics O ce: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the
land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-recurring income."
35. Atty. Edgardo Carlos B. Vistan II, counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 177597. aDSIHc
36. TSN (27 November 2007), pp. 64-69.
37. Unlike the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution mandates, in Section
15, Article X, the creation of autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and Muslim
Mindanao to foster political autonomy. See Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 495.
38. Website of House of Representatives as of 12 May 2008.
TINGA, J., dissenting and concurring:
1. G.R. No.178628, Rollo, p. 5.
2. See ponencia, infra.

3. Montesclaros ,et al., v. Comelec, et al., 433 Phil. 620, 633 (2002), citing Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
4. Rollo, p. 23.
5. See e.g., Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 3 at 478. DTCSHA
6. See Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 652, 664 citingArceta v.
Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 140.
7. See Albaña v. Commission on Elections, 478 Phil. 941, 949 (2004); Acop v. Guingona, Jr. ,
433 Phil. 62, 67 (2002); Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482, 505-506.
8. CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 1.
9. Gerochi v. DOE, G.R. No. 159796, 17 July 2007, 527 SCRA 696, 719.
10. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN AND M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th
ed.), at 365. aCHDST
11. Gerochi v. DOE, supra note 9 at 720.
12. O. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (2nd ed., 2001), at 184-185. Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted.
13. CONST., Art. II, Sec. 26.

14. CONST., Art. II, Sec. 28.
15. CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 23. EcTIDA


20. CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 6. aSDHCT
21. CONST., Art. VIII, Secs. 1 & 2.

22. See Art. X, Secs. 5, 6 and 7.
23. Disomangcop v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 149848, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 203.
24. Supra note 23.
25. Id. at 227-229. AHaETS
26. G.R. No. 177597 Rollo, pp. 217-218.

27. Id. at 230-232.
28. Disomangcop v. Datumanong, supra note 23 at 233.
29. Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989, 170 SCRA 786, 794—795.
3 0 . Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 79956 and 82217, 29
January 1990, 181 SCRA 495, 506. SEcAIC
31. G.R. Nos. 93252, 93746, 95245, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 271, 281.
32. Disomangcop v. Datumanong, supra note 23, at 235-236.
33. Id. at 17.

35. CONST., Art. X, Sec. 3. EHSADa
36. CONST., Art. X, Sec. 18.

37. 124 Phil. 1226 (1966).
38. See CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 5(1).
39. See Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627, 7 March 1995, 242 SCRA 211,
217.
40. 113 Phil. 1 (1961). ASaTHc
41. G.R. No. 114783, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 106.

42. Id., at 112.
43. G.R. Nos. 118577 and 118627, 7 March 1995, 242 SCRA 211.
44. Id. at 217.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 211140. January 12, 2016.]
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO , petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER

FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN 1 B.
BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES , respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J : p
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one
party is the son of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what
ought to be done as dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus led under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn
B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap), Secretary General, House of Representatives, and
Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque.
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May
13, 2013 elections in accordance with nal and executory resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;" 2 thus, he seeks the
following reliefs:
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the
proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; and allow
petitioner to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and
exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque
representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN]
BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of
Regina O. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein
petitioner, in her stead; and
CAIHTE
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,

PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING
her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position. 3
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, led with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition 4 to deny due course or cancel the Certi cate of
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made
several material misrepresentations in her COC , i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of
Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she
is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (iv) that her date
of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible
for the o ce she seeks to be elected to." 5 The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-
053 (DC) , entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition;
hence, Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED . Accordingly, the Certi cate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED . 6
Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and
national elections were held on May 13, 2013.
The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc a rmed the resolution
of the COMELEC First Division, to wit:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED . 7
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15,
2013.
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on
May 16, 2013.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution,
the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the
winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco led an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No.
13-028 , entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also led
against Reyes in the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027 , entitled "Christopher
P. Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certi cate of Finality 8 in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC) , which provides:
NOW, THEREFORE , considering that more than twenty-one (21) days
have lapsed since the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the
Supreme Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the Commission en
banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and
EXECUTORY . 9
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes led before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 207264 , entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and
Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division cancelling her Certi cate of Candidacy (for material
misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco led a Petition for Certiorari before the
COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-010 , entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs.
New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone
District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of
the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void .
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in
SPC No. 13-010.
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264 , this Court promulgated a Resolution
dismissing Reyes's petition, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the instant petition is DISMISSED ,
nding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc a rming the
27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld. 10DETACa
Signi cantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which
has jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid
proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office. 11
On June 28, 2013, Tan led a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) , wherein he prayed that:
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate
EXECUTION of this Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013
and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
12
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed o ce and started
discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010 , acting on the motion for reconsideration of
Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition
and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The
dispositive part reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for
reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of
the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and
effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed
the winning candidate for the position of representative in the House of
Representatives for the province of Marinduque. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) , the COMELEC En Banc, issued an
Order (i) granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii)
directing the reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation
by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the
instant Motion. Accordingly, a new composition of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be composed of the
following:
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz — Chairman
2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan — Vice Chairman
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas — Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the
parties, the convening of the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session
Hall, 8th Floor, PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
Further, Director Ester Villa or-Roxas is directed to submit before the New
Provincial Board of Canvassers (NPBOC) a certi ed true copy of the votes of
congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and
Local Elections.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to
furnish copy of the Certi cate of Proclamation to the Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG) and the House of Representatives. 14
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein
petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts.
15
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally
convened in a joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members
of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker
Belmonte, Jr.
On July 23, 2013, Reyes led a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of
Petition "without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will
be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum." 16
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration 17 (of this Court's June
25, 2013 Resolution in G.R. No. 207264 ) led on July 15, 2013, was denied by this
Court, viz.:
WHEREFORE , The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal
of the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered. 18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes led a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264. aDSIHc

On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for
reconsideration and was denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two
letters to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the o ce of Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
requesting, among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative
of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010 , acting on the Motion for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED
to implement and enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the
July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certi cate of
Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of
Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certi ed true copy of the writ of execution
be personally served and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation and enforcement of the
aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the
July 16, 2013 Certi cate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board of
Canvassers of the Honorable Commission. 19
the COMELEC issued an Order 20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all
copies of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certi cate of
Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certi cate of
Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
for the latter's information and guidance.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
reiterating the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
reiterating his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from
the Roll of Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all
the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused
to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and
o ce of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she continues to
discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED
and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of
petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and allow him to assume
said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.
B. Whether or not respondent SG Barua-Yap can be COMPELLED,
DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of
respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include the name
of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of
PERMANENT INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit
respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the
functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said
office. 21
As to the rst and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-de ned
and clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." 22 He
insists that the nal and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC),
and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nulli cation of respondent Reyes's
proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the
congressional seat.
Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. "to administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise
the prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque representative;" 23 and (ii)
respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name . . . as the duly elected member
of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members." 24
Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia , 25 citing a statement of this
Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives has the ministerial
duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of
the Fourth District of Leyte.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged
ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. 26
With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and
unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and
serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances,
bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative
since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several hundreds of
thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent
and prohibit [her] from usurping the position." 27 ETHIDa
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo
warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she
usurped the subject o ce; and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of o ce and enters his name in the
Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public o ce, the
petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the
Court over Quo Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives.
She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it
is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part
of [Velasco]." 29 She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and quali cations of
Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an
abundance of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is divested of
jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had
already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto cases 30 led against Reyes by several
individuals.
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original
jurisdiction to annul [her] proclamation." 31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven
granting for the sake of argument that the proclamation was validly nulli ed, [Velasco]
as second placer cannot be declared the winner . . ." as he was not the choice of the
people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) led an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.
The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:
I.
UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT
REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER
ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election
protest led against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions
become nal and executory, respondent Reyes may not be restrained from
exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent
Reyes's name from the Roll of Members of the House.
II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT
PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013
ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE
REPRESENTATIVE.
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be
compelled by mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to
petitioner and register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House.
III.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. 32
The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need
for this Court to revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013
both in G.R. No. 207264, given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the same;
and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this Court has
in the past revisited decisions already nal and executory; there is no hindrance for this
Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
Despite the nality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22,
2013 Resolution, upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there
has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw its recognition of
respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence of any speci c
order or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable
Court's disposition in Reyes v. COMELEC that required any action from the
House. Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker
Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been
filed against respondent Reyes:
(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto) , entitled Noeme Mayores Tan &
Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto) , entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;
(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto) , entitled Christopher Matienzo v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and cSEDTC
(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco
v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. 33
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the
assumption of o ce of the winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction
between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide
that the appropriate cases should be led before it within 15 days from the date
of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the
HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of o ce, at noon of June 30
following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests led on
or after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules
for having been led out of time, where the winners have already been
proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June 14. 34
In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on
December 14, 2015 dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037, 35 the twin
petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion
for Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED . The September
11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE .
Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction. 36
In the said Resolution, the HRET held that "the nal Supreme Court ruling in G.R.
No. 207264 is the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution."
37
To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the
dismissal of a Petition-In-Intervention led by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin
petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing
and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against . . .
Respondent [Reyes] to proceed." 38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration of
the said September 11, 2014 HRET Resolution based on the argument that the latter
was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No.
207264.
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that —
The Tribunal's Jurisdiction
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present
petitions for quo warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how
the Tribunal should resolve the same vis-à-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R.
No. 207264.
The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their
petitions. They pray that "after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare
Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as
Member of the House of Representatives, representing the Province of
Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal
to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads
for the outright dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court
nal ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too
for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of evidence by
the contending parties.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of [House]
Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and quali cations of the
Members of the House of Representatives."
xxx xxx xxx
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on
May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly
cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and
residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nulli ed her proclamation. When
Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in
its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC,
resulting in the nulli cation of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we
would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions. The
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member
of the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of o ce, so the
Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No.
207264, thus:
. . ., the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC , the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives . . . .
SDAaTC
xxx xxx xxx

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a
Member of the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC
and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed o ce as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and quali cations
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. . . .
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office . . . .
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid
proclamation is the rst essential element before a candidate can be considered
a Member of the House of Representatives over which the Tribunal could
assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as
Regina Reyes' proclamation was nulli ed by the COMELEC, which nulli cation
was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without
power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes
"cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared
by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:
". . . there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner
[Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the
petitioner's oath of o ce is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of o ce, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office."
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected.
Being the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design,
the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication; . . . . As a rule, all
decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to
and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all
other courts, must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the
Supreme Court. 39
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article
177 (Usurpation of O cial Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015,
has been led in court, 40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
41
The Issue
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the
specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.
The Ruling
The petition has merit.
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of
this petition to re-litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are
reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22,
2013.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily
apparent that this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo
warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
the use or exercise of a franchise or o ce and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where
the action is led by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the
controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession
of the o ce. 42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the nal and
executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the nal and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certi cate of
Candidacy; and (iii) the nal and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-
010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the
winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not
convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person
may le a veri ed petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, o cer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law speci cally
enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or o ce to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a
ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, o cer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-de ned, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof. 43 acEHCD
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an o cer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public o cer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. 44
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of o ce to Velasco and to
register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives,
respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence nal and executory resolutions
of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 a rming the nal and executory resolutions of the
COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certi cate of Candidacy. There is
likewise a nal and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring
null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as
settled and beyond dispute — Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for
the Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul
her proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve
any questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her quali cations
as a Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she has already been
proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
But the con uence of the three acts in this case — her proclamation, oath and
assumption of o ce — has not altered the legal situation between Velasco and
Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC nally
decided to cancel the Certi cate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14,
2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-
eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque —
for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the
election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner . That particular decision of
the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes's proclamation, and which was
a rmed by this Court's nal and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and
October 22, 2013.
This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of
the COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes's COC, still proclaimed her as the winning
candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a
couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said
decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued
proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
That Velasco now has a well-de ned, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
of the present petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts
that should be taken into consideration:
First . At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the
COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity
of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy
which is to seek a restraining order within a period of ve (5) days as required by
Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was forthcoming,
the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
Second . This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent
Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these
Resolutions are already final and executory.
Third . As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been challenged or
questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.
Fourth . When Reyes took her oath of o ce before respondent Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. in open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes's proclamation and treating it as a material fact in
deciding this case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her
and Velasco.
Fifth . In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to
serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be
recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET's December 14, 2015 Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo
warranto led against Reyes. Its nding was based on the existence of a nal and
executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not a bona de member
of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this
Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections 45
— SDHTEC
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of

petitioner's submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes]
could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of
o ce is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of o ce, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.
xxx xxx xxx
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already nally disposed of
the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May
2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case
on petitioner's quali cations to run for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives. . . . ."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who
continues to argue on the basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion
gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the
proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT
ANY BASIS. " (Emphasis supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
HRET is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available
remedy to any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the
House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the leadership of the latter
of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme
Court.
Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions led against
Reyes before the HRET had actually no bearing on the status of nality of the decision
of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the
HRET's December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-de ned, clear and
certain right to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge
and recognize the nal and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of
the COMELEC by administering the oath of o ce to Velasco and entering the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court
is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration
of the oath of o ce to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of
Members, are ministerial in character vis-à-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case.
As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the
part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to
recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the
COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the rst time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful
Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said
Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In
Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, 46 the Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
may le a veri ed petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or o ce to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it
must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial
act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, o cer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-de ned, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an o cer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public o cer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing
the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part
of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes
in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered
the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not
been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory. AScHCD
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands
that its Decision be obeyed by all o cials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF , the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise
register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of o ce. This decision shall be
immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated May 14,
2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certi cate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No.
13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-
010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
and (v) Velasco's Certi cate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the
rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque;
hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for
the enforcement of the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the public respondents, this
Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, are all legally bound by
this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly
cancelled Reyes's COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for
the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite
one-year residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our
dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be led in every direction by any and all
registered voters not a party to a case to question the nal decision of this Court. Such
restricted interpretation of res judicata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling
in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a
proper party to invoke the Court's nal judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the
subject position. 47
It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been
adjudicated and take judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be
elected to the subject position had already been long a rmed by this Court. Any ruling
deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of Law and should
not be countenanced.
In view of nality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC
No. 13-010, there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of
this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia, 48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all o cials of the
land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion."
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED . Public respondent Hon.
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath
of o ce of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B.
Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register the name of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of o ce. This Decision shall be
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY .
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the concurring opinion of J. Leonen.
Velasco, Jr., * Peralta, * Del Castillo, * Mendoza, * Perlas-Bernabe * and Jardeleza, *
JJ., took no part.
Brion, J., See: dissenting opinion.
Perez, J., I concur and submit a concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
BRION , J., dissenting :
Before the Court is the petition for mandamus 1 led by Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco 2 (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., (as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Speaker Belmonte), Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap), and Representative Regina Ongsiako-Reyes (Reyes).
I. THE PETITION
The petition seeks to compel: Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in
favor of Velasco and allow him to assume o ce as Representative for Marinduque and
exercise the powers and prerogatives attached to the o ce; and Sec. Gen Barua-Yap to
remove the name of Reyes, and register his name in her place, in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives (HOR). It also seeks to restrain Reyes from further
exercising the powers and prerogatives attached to the position and to direct her to
immediately vacate it.
Velasco asserts that "he has a well-de ned and clear legal right and basis
to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." He argues that the nal and
executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") in SPA No. 13-
053 and SPC No. 13-010 and of the Court in G.R. No. 207264 , with his
proclamation as Representative of Marinduque, grant him this clear legal right to claim
and assume the congressional seat.
Because of this clear legal right, Velasco reasons out that Speaker Belmonte
has the ministerial duty to "administer the oath to [him] and allow him to
assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat . . . " Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap, on the hand, has the ministerial duty to "register [his] name . .
. as the duly elected member of the [HOR] and delete the name of respondent
Reyes from the Roll of Members." Velasco cites Codilla v. De Venecia 3 to support
his claim.
He claims that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully
neglecting the performance of these ministerial duties, thus, illegally excluding him
from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Marinduque Representative.
As regards Reyes , Velasco asserts that the "continued usurpation and
unlawful holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice
and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has already received the salaries,
allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the [o ce] since June
30, 2013 up to the present . . . ."
For these reasons, he argues that a writ of mandamus should be issued to
compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform their ministerial duties;
and that a TRO and a writ of permanent injunction should also be issued to restrain,
prevent, and prohibit Reyes from usurping the position that rightfully belongs to him.
II. THE PONENCIA'S RULING
The ponencia grants the petition; it views the petition merely as a plea to the
Court for the enforcement of what it perceives as clear legal duties on the part of the
respondents. caITAC
To the ponencia, any issue on who is the rightful Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque has been settled with the nality of the rulings in G.R. No.
207264, SPA No. 13-035, and SPC No. 13-010.
Recognizing it settled that Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the
Marinduque Representative position, the ponencia concludes that the administration of
oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the HOR are no longer
matters of discretion on the part of Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. Hence,
the writ of mandamus must issue.
III. MY DISSENT
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to object to the ponencia's GRANT of the
petition, as I disagree with the ponencia's premises and conclusion that Velasco is
entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. I likewise believe that Velasco's petition
should be dismissed because:
(1) he failed to satisfy the requirements for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus; and
(2) the grant of the writ is a patent violation of the principle of the separation
of powers that will disturb, not only the Court's relations with the HOR, a co-equal
branch of government. As well, it will result in upsetting the established lines of
jurisdiction among the Comelec, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), and the Court.
Needless to state, the HOR may very well have its own views about the admission
of its Members and can conceivably prefer its own views to those of the Court on
matters that it believes are within its competence and jurisdiction to decide as an equal
and separate branch of government.
Additionally, as I reminded the Court in my writings on the cases affecting
Velasco, the Court should be keenly aware of the sensitivity involved in handling the
case. Velasco is the son of a colleague, Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco,
who is also the Chair of the HRET . Thus, we should be very clear and certain if we
are to issue the writ in order to avoid any charge that the Court favors its own.
IV. DISCUSSION
IV.A. Mandamus: Nature and Concept
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction,
in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein speci ed, which duty results from the o cial station of the party to whom the
writ is directed, or from operation of law. 4
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued only in cases of
extreme necessity where the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an
adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the
act to be compelled. 5
As a peremptory writ, mandamus must be issued with utmost circumspection,
and should always take into consideration existing laws, rules and jurisprudence on the
matter, particularly the principles underlying our Constitution.
Moreover, the remedy of mandamus is employed to compel the performance of
a ministerial duty after performance of the duty has been refused. As a rule, it cannot
be used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion; if at all, the obligated o cial
carrying the duty can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act in a particular
way. The courts can only interfere when the refusal to act already constitutes inaction
amounting to grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, palpable excess of
authority, or other causes affecting jurisdiction. 6 HTcADC
IV.A.1. Mandamus as a remedy under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of mandamus is governed by Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 3, mandamus is the remedy available when "a tribunal,
corporation, board, o cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or o ce to which
such other is entitled, [and ], there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."
The person aggrieved by the unlawful neglect or unlawful exclusion of the
tribunal, corporation, board, o cer, or person may le the petition for mandamus with
the proper court.
IV.A.2. Ministerial v. discretionary acts
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means the power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting o cially, under certain circumstances,
uncontrolled by the judgment or sense of propriety of others. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public o cer and gives him the right to decide how and when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. 7
In contrast, a purely ministerial act or duty is one which an o cer or tribunal
performs under a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment on
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 8 The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. 9
A ministerial act is one as to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
who must perform. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted
or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a precise act accurately marked out,
enjoined upon particular officers for a particular purpose. 10
IV.B. Requirements for the issuance of
the writ of mandamus
In the light of its nature, the writ of mandamus will issue only if the following
requirements are complied with:
First, the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act
demanded.
The clear and unmistakable right that the writ of mandamus requires pertains to
those rights that are well-de ned, clear and certain. The writ contemplates only those
rights which are founded in law, are speci c, certain, clear, established,
complete, undisputed or unquestioned, and are without any semblance or
color of doubt. 11
In situations where the right claimed, or the petitioner's entitlement to it, is
unclear, the writ of mandamus will not lie. The writ of mandamus will not issue to
establish a right or to compel an o cial to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not clearly entitled. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases, or to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or to which substantial doubt exists. 12
Second , it must be the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is
mandated by law.
The act must be clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of the
respondent's o cial station. It must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. 13
Third , the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined
by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of the right or
office.
Fourth , the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary.
Fi f t h and last , there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
IV.C. Velasco's petition and the
requirements for the issuance
of the writ of mandamus
Velasco failed to comply with all ve requirements for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus.
IV.C.1. No showing of any clear and
unmistakable right
Velasco failed to show that he has a clear, established, and unmistakable right to
the position of Representative of Marinduque. Any right that Velasco may claim to hold
is, at most, substantially doubtful or is in substantial dispute; in either case, the
existence of doubt renders the Court unjustified in issuing a writ in Velasco's favor.
Velasco's cited legal grounds for the issuance of the writ of mandamus in his
favor are the nal rulings in the following cases: SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes v.
Comelec , and SPC No. 13-010 . Thus, a look into what these cases really are and what
they say is in order. HEITAD
IV.C.1.a. SPA No. 13-053 ( Socorro B. Tan v.

Regina Ongsiako-Reyes ) and Reyes v.
Comelec , G.R. No. 207264
SPA No. 13-053 involved the petition led by Socorro B. Tan before the
Comelec to deny due course to or cancel Reyes' CoC on the ground of the alleged
material misrepresentations Reyes made. Velasco was not a party to this case.
The Comelec cancelled Reyes' CoC in its May 14, 2013 resolution (in SPA No. 13-
053). Note should be taken of the fact that this May 14, 2013 Comelec ruling became
nal and executory only on May 19, 2013 or "five (5) days after its promulgation" per
Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure, in relation with Paragraph
2, Section 8 of Resolution No. 9523; and that the Comelec itself did not enjoin Reyes'
proclamation. As a result, the Comelec, itself, proclaimed Reyes on May 18, 2013 .
I point out that in the June 25, 2013 resolution in Reyes v. Comelec , this Court
expressly characterized SPA No. 13-053 to be summary in nature . 14
Reyes assailed the Comelec rulings in SPA No. 13-053 before this Court via a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 207264 ( Reyes v. Comelec or
"Reyes" ) . The Court's majority, in this June 25, 2013 resolution, dismissed respondent
Reyes' petition outright based solely on the face of the petition and its annexes.
Reyes carries several features that the Court should be aware of:
First . Reyes was a petition that respondent Reyes led to question the
Comelec's cancellation of her CoC in SPA No. 13-053. Respondent Reyes cited the
violation of her right to due process and the Comelec's grave abuse of discretion as
grounds for her petition.
Second . Only Tan (the petitioner before the Comelec) was the party respondent
before the Court in Reyes; Velasco was not a party to the case as he was not a party to
the challenged Comelec ruling.
Third . The Court did not see it t to hear the respondent Tan (let alone Velasco
who was not a party) before issuing its outright dismissal, although the Court
subsequently heard Tan's arguments in her comment to herein respondent Reyes'
motion for reconsideration (compelled perhaps by the vigorous dissent issued against
the outright dismissal). 15
Under the circumstances of the outright dismissal of the petition, the belated
attempt at hearing Tan on the motion for reconsideration, however, does not change
the character of the Court's rulings and proceedings as summary.
Fourth . In dismissing the petition outright , the Court only considered the
Reyes petition itself, the assailed Comelec rulings (SPA No. 13-053), and the petition's
other annexes. The outright dismissal was made despite the plea from the Dissent
that the case be fully heard because it would bene t the son of a sitting
Justice of the Court .
Fifth . The Court's majority also chose not to hear anymore the HRET , the
Comelec , or the O ce of the Solicitor General on petitioner Reyes' positions and
arguments, particularly on the issue of the delineation of jurisdiction between the
HRET and the Comelec .
Sixth . The Court's rulings — both in the June 25, 2013 outright dismissal of the
Reyes petition and the October 22, 2013 resolution on the motion for reconsideration —
never declared nor recognized Velasco as the duly elected Representative of
Marinduque .
Seventh . The rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes v. Comelec did not consider
and rule on any matter other than the material misrepresentation she allegedly
committed.
Thus, any legal effect that these rulings carry should not be extended to matters
outside of the issues and matters speci cally addressed by these rulings, as these
extraneous rulings are obiter dicta.
Speci cally, these rulings and their legal effects cannot extend to Reyes' election,
returns, and quali cation as Marinduque Representative. Nor should these rulings vest
in Velasco the title to hold the position, even assuming that petitioner Reyes' CoC was
properly cancelled.
In resolving the present mandamus petition, the Court must appreciate that
Velasco's cited rulings are simply summary determinations of the alleged material
misrepresentation committed by Reyes in her CoC, and cannot be used as basis for the
requested issuance of the writ.
Eight . In the outright dismissal of Reyes' certiorari petition, the Court's majority
declared that the Comelec retained its jurisdiction over respondent Reyes and the CoC
cancellation proceeding against her because respondent Reyes was not a member of
the HOR over whom the HRET can exercise its jurisdiction.
The majority reasoned out that a candidate is considered a Member of the HOR
only after the candidate has been proclaimed, has taken the proper oath, and has
assumed office.
This declaration is noteworthy because of the intervening factual
developments that signi cantly altered the consequent legal effects of: (1) the
Comelec's rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and of the Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec; and
(2) the subsequent Comelec actions and rulings affecting respondent Reyes' right to
hold her congressional seat.
These intervening factual developments, more fully discussed below, is another
reason why the Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus for the reason alone that
the rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and in Reyes v. Comelec had become nal and
executory .
Lastly, the Court should sit up and take notice because of the Reyes'
pronouncement on the jurisdictional divide between the HRET and the Comelec, a
matter more extensively discussed below.
IV.C.1.b. SPC No. 13-010 ( Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers
[PBOC] of the Lone District of
Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako-Reyes ) ATICcS
SPC No. 13-010 was the petition that Velasco led before the Comelec on May
20, 2013, to declare respondent Reyes' May 18, 2013 proclamation void.
The Comelec dismissed SPC No. 13-010 on June 19, 2013.
On July 9, 2013, however, the Comelec issued a resolution reversing its June 19,
2013 resolution; this reversal declared void and without legal effect respondent Reyes'
proclamation.
In between these dates — i.e., from May 20, 2013, when Velasco initiated SPC No.
13-010 before the Comelec, and the Comelec's July 9, 2013 resolution — respondent
Reyes had already taken her oath (on June 7, 2013) and had assumed office on June 30,
2013. Signi cantly, as of June 30, 2013, when respondent Reyes assumed o ce, the
challenge to respondent Reyes' proclamation stood dismissed by the Comelec and
was entered in its records.
Thus, as of June 30, 2013, respondent Reyes was the candidate the
Comelec recognized as the duly proclaimed winner of the Marinduque
congressional seat . She was proclaimed pursuant to the electorate's mandate
through the majority of the votes cast in Marinduque. More importantly, at the time
Reyes assumed the o ce on June 30, 2013 — after she had been proclaimed and had
taken her oath — there was no standing challenge against her proclamation.
Signi cantly, the records of Reyes show that soon after assumption to o ce on
June 30, 2013, she started discharging the functions of her o ce by ling bills with the
HOR.
These developments and dates are pointed out because of their critical
signi cance. In resolving the present petition, the Court cannot simply undertake a
mechanistic reading of the cited rulings and on this basis rely on the nality doctrine.
The Court must appreciate that at the time respondent Reyes assumed o ce on June
30, 2013, the Comelec had cast aside the challenge to her proclamation and her oath
was properly taken.
To be sure, the Comelec eventually declared respondent Reyes' proclamation
void, but this reversal happened only on July 9, 2013, and only after Reyes had taken her
oath and assumed o ce based on a standing proclamation. The proclamation, oath,
and assumption effectively altered the legal situation as respondent Reyes —
instead of being a mere candidate waiting for proclamation — had already become a
Member of the HOR whose election, returns, and quali cation are subject to the
jurisdiction of the HRET.
This altered legal situation cannot but affect how the petition for mandamus
should be resolved.
IV.C.1.c. The intervening factual
developments; Reyes v. Comelec
versus the present petition
Another critical point the Court should not fail to consider in determining whether
Velasco has a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus are the various factual
developments that intervened (from the Comelec's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and the
Court's ruling in Reyes v. Comelec, to the ling of the present petition) that substantially
and substantively differentiate the present mandamus case from Reyes v. Comelec.
These factual developments are:
First , while respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed the o ce of
Representative of Marinduque after the Comelec cancelled her CoC in SPA No. 13-053,
she did not simply accept the cancellation and forthwith proceeded to question it
before this Court through a petition for certiorari entitled Reyes v. Comelec . This
petition was still pending at the time respondent Reyes took her oath and assumed
o ce (on June 30, 2013); by then the case was pending based on the motion for
reconsideration that respondent Reyes led against the Court's June 25, 2013
Resolution. As a result, Reyes had already assumed o ce even before Reyes v.
Comelec became final and executory.
It must be noted, too, that respondent Reyes' oath and assumption to o ce also
occurred before the Comelec (in SPC No. 13-010 led by Velasco) declared void
respondent Reyes' proclamation as Marinduque Representative. The Comelec ruling
only came on July 9, 2013. As discussed above, respondent Reyes took her oath and
assumed o ce (on June 30, 2013) when the standing Comelec ruling in SPC No. 13-
010 (to cancel respondent Reyes' proclamation) was the June 19, 2013 dismissal of
the Velasco petition.
Thus, as of June 30, 2013, Reyes had taken her oath and had assumed o ce
based on a subsisting proclamation. The Comelec declared her proclamation void only
on July 9, 2013; prior to this declaration, there was no pending legal challenge that
could have impeded her oath and assumption of office.
Second , the Comelec granted Tan's motion for execution, in SPA No. 13-053,
and directed the proclamation of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of
Marinduque, only on July 10, 2013 . Velasco was proclaimed by the new PBOC much
later — on July 16, 2013 .
These dates are stressed because when the Comelec took actions to enforce
SPA No. 13-053 and to proclaim Velasco as the duly elected Representative of
Marinduque, Reyes was already a member of the HOR — she had by then been
proclaimed, taken her oath, and assumed office. TIADCc
Signi cantly, these developments were not considered in Reyes v.

Comelec ; neither were they considered in SPC No. 13-010 . In these lights, I
submit that this mandamus petition is not a continuation of Reyes v. Comelec and
should not be resolved on the basis of the bare nality of SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes v.
Comelec, and of SPC No. 13-010.
Since the present case substantially and substantively differs from Reyes v.
Comelec, the latter's finality (as well as the finality of the Comelec rulings in SPA No. 13-
053 that Reyes v. Comelec passed upon) should not control the resolution of the
present petition and must not be determinative of Velasco's right to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus.
Moreover, as I stated above, these intervening factual developments signi cantly
altered the consequent legal effects of the Comelec's rulings in SPC No. 13-053 and of
this Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec, the Comelec's ruling in SPC No. 13-010, and the
subsequent Comelec actions and rulings affecting respondent Reyes' right to hold her
congressional seat.
IV.C.1.d. The proper appreciation of SPA No.
13-053, Reyes v. Comelec and SPC
No. 13-010 vis-a-vis the intervening
factual developments in the context
of the present petition
If only for emphasis, I call attention again to the fact that as of June 30, 2013,
Reyes had been proclaimed, had taken her oath, and assumed o ce as the elected and
proclaimed Representative of Marinduque.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Electoral Tribunal of
the HOR shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of [its] Members." 16
I highlight, too, that in Reyes v. Comelec , the majority declared that a winning
candidate becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the HRET only after he or she
becomes a member of the HOR. The majority stressed that a candidate becomes a
member of the HOR only after he or she has been proclaimed, taken his or her
oath, and assumed the office .
In other words, the majority in Reyes v. Comelec required the concurrence of all
three events — proclamation, oath, and assumption to o ce — to trigger the
jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning candidate's
election, returns, and qualifications. All three events duly took place in the case of
respondent Reyes , such that the HRET at this point should have jurisdiction over
questions relating to respondent Reyes' election, even on the basis of the majority's
own standards.
(Note in this regard that in my Dissent in Reyes v. Comelec , I considered this
majority action a "major retrogressive jurisprudential development that can
emasculate the HRET."
I still maintain that the proclamation of the winning candidate — the last
operative act in the election process that is subject to Comelec jurisdiction — triggers
and opens the way for the HRET's own jurisdiction.
This was the position I took, backed up by jurisprudence, 17 in my Dissent in
Reyes v. Comelec. I said:
[T]he proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that
triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the
winning candidate's election, returns and quali cations . . . the proclamation of
the winning candidate divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the
quali cations of the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a
proper proceeding (i.e., quo warranto) before the HRET, who, by constitutional
mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the [HOR]).
Thus, even by the Court majority's own standard 18 as de ned in Reyes v.
Comelec, respondent Reyes became a member of the HOR as of June 30, 2013. To
reiterate, respondent Reyes was proclaimed on May 16, 2013. She then took her oath
on June 7, 2013, and assumed o ce on June 30, 2013, pursuant to a subsisting
proclamation. The Comelec ruling that declared respondent Reyes' proclamation void
came only after she had already fully complied with Reyes v. Comelec 's de ned
standard.
In these lights, the Comelec had already been divested of jurisdiction over any
issue that may have affected respondent Reyes' proclamation (including all consequent
legal effects her proclamation carries) at the time the Comelec declared her
proclamation void on July 9, 2013. As well, the Comelec was already without
jurisdiction when it granted Tan's motion for execution on July 10, 2013, and
proclaimed Velasco (through the new PBOC) as the duly elected Marinduque
Representative on July 16, 2013. 19
Under Section 2 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the
"exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and
quali cations of all elective regional, provincial, and city o cials . . . ." In other
words, the Constitution vests the Comelec this exclusive jurisdiction only with respect
t o elective regional, provincial, and city o cials . The Comelec, by express
constitutional mandate, has no jurisdiction over the election, returns, and
quali cations of members of the HOR (or of the Senate) as Article VI vests
this jurisdiction with the HRET (or the SET) .
The validity of the proclamation of respondent Reyes who became a member of
the HOR on June 30, 2013, and the right of either respondent Reyes or Velasco to hold
the contested congressional seat are election contests relating to a Member's
election, returns, and quali cations. By Reyes v. Comelec 's own de ned standard, the
jurisdiction over these election contests affecting respondent Reyes already rested
with the HRET beginning June 30, 2013. AIDSTE

To be sure, the validity of this Comelec resolution in SPC No. 13-010 was never
challenged before this Court such that the ruling lapsed to nality. Under existing legal
principles, the Court cannot pass upon the validity of this Comelec ruling without
violating the doctrine of nality of judgments and the principle of separation of powers
with the principle of judicial non-interference that it carries.
Nonetheless, the Court also cannot and should not simply rely on this Comelec
ruling to grant Velasco's present mandamus petition and compel the HOR to admit him
as its member. The fact that these Comelec rulings and actions all occurred after Reyes
had fully complied with the restrictive Reyes v. Comelec standard creates substantial
doubt on their validity and e cacy. In view of these substantial doubts, the Court
should consider them with utmost caution.
In this respect, I submit that any legal signi cance the Court may accord to the
Comelec's ruling in SPC No. 13-010 (as well as its July 10, 2013 execution order) in
considering Velasco's present move to compel, via mandamus, the HOR to admit him
as its member must be limited to:
one, the fact of their issuance;
two, the fact that the Comelec declared void Reyes' proclamation on July 9, 2013;
and
three, the fact that Velasco was proclaimed on July 16, 2013,
without prejudice to whatever ruling that the HRET and this Court may render in the
future on the validity or invalidity of the Comelec rulings that were made after HOR
jurisdiction had vested.
Any other legal signi cance which these rulings may have on the right of either
Reyes or Velasco to the congressional seat must now be left to the judgment and
discretion of the HRET which must appreciate them in a properly filed action.
Additionally and nally on this point, the HRET now has jurisdiction to rule upon
all questions relating to respondent Reyes' election, returns, and quali cations that
may still be t and proper for its resolution in accordance with existing laws and its
own rules of procedure. This Court itself cannot assume jurisdiction over any aspect of
HRET jurisdiction unless it relates to a matter led or pending with us on a properly
led petition, taking into account the clear conferment and delineation of the Court's
jurisdiction and those of the HRET under the Constitution.
In sum , the Comelec's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and SPC No. 13-010, and the
Court's rulings in Reyes v. Comelec did not establish a clear and unmistakable right in
Velasco's favor to the position of the Representative of Marinduque.
At most, Velasco's right to hold the congressional seat based on these rulings is
substantially doubtful. Unless this substantial doubt is settled, Velasco cannot claim as
of right any entitlement, and cannot also compel the respondents to admit him, to HOR
membership through the Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus.
In the absence of any other clear and unmistakable legal source for his claimed
right to the contested congressional seat, Velasco's petition must necessarily fail.
IV.C.1.e. Reyes' holding of the office could not
have worked injustice and seriously
prejudiced Velasco with her receipt
of the salaries, allowance, bonuses,
and emoluments that pertain to the
office.
Finally, I nd tenuous Velasco's claim that Reyes' continued holding of the
contested Congressional seat has "worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in
that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that
pertain to the [office] since June 30, 2013 up to the present . . . ."
This argument clearly forgets that public o ce is a public trust. 20 Public service
and public duty are and must be the primary and utmost consideration in entering the
public service. Any remuneration, salaries, and bene ts that a public o cer or
employee receives in return must be a consideration merely secondary to public
service.
Accordingly, any salary, allowance, bonus, and emoluments pertaining to an
office must be received by one who is not only qualified for the office, but by one whose
right to the o ce is clearly and unmistakably without doubt and beyond dispute. In the
case of an elective public o ce, this right is, at the very least, established by the
mandate of the majority of the electorate. More importantly, of course, the right to
receive the salaries, allowances, bonuses, and emoluments that pertain to an o ce
must be received by one who actually perform the duties called for by the office.
Here, Velasco may be quali ed for the o ce. His right to hold the congressional
seat, however, is at most substantially doubtful or in substantial dispute; worse, he has
not performed the duties of the o ce. In short, Reyes' receipt of the salaries, etc. that
pertain to the congressional seat obviously could not have worked injustice to and
seriously prejudiced him.
IV.C.2. Clear, established, and specific
legal duty and unlawful neglect
in the performance of ministerial
acts
For the same factual and legal reasons discussed above, I submit that Velasco
likewise failed to show that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have the clear
and speci c duty, founded in law, to administer the required oath, to allow Velasco to
assume the duties of the o ce, and to register his name in the Roll of Members as the
duly elected Representative of Marinduque. He also failed to show that the respondents
unlawfully refused or neglected to admit him as member. AaCTcI
At the very least, he failed to show that the respondents have the clear and
speci c legal duty to allow a second-placer candidate like him whose right to the
contested congressional seat is substantially doubtful, to assume the o ce until such
time that all doubts are resolved in his favor.
Thus, in the absence of any law speci cally requiring Speaker Belmonte and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap to act, and to act in a particularly clear manner, the Court cannot
compel these respondents to undertake the action that Velasco prays for via a writ of
mandamus.
Additionally, the HOR in this case simply acted pursuant to law and jurisprudence
when it admitted respondent Reyes as the duly elected Representative of Marinduque.
After this admission, the HOR and its o cers cannot be compelled to remove her
without an order from the tribunal having the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all
contests affecting HOR members, of which Reyes has become one. This tribunal, of
course, is the HOR's own HRET.
IV.C.3. Absence of any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy
Lastly, I submit that Velasco failed to show that there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law to secure to
him the congressional seat.
I reiterate and emphasize once more that respondent Reyes became a Member
of the HOR on June 30, 2013, after her proclamation, oath, and assumption to o ce.
Whether the Court views these circumstances under the restrictive standard of Reyes v.
Comelec to be the legally correct standard or simply the applicable one 21 under the
circumstances of the petition, respondent Reyes undoubtedly has complied with the
conditions for HOR membership that Reyes v. Comelec laid down.
Since Reyes is a member of the HOR, any challenge against her right to hold the
congressional seat or which may have the effect of removing her from the o ce —
whether pertaining to her election, returns or qualifications — now rests with the HRET.
Viewed by itself and in relation to the surrounding cited cases and
circumstances, Velasco's present petition cannot but be a challenge against
respondent Reyes' election, returns, and quali cations, hiding behind the cloak of a
petition for mandamus. In other words, although presented as a petition that simply
seeks to enforce a nal Court ruling, the petition is an original one that ultimately seeks
to oust Reyes from the congressional seat. The relationships between and among the
cited cases and the present case, read in relation with the relevant developments, all
point to this conclusion.
Thus, rather than recognize this roundabout manner of contesting respondent
Reyes' seat, the Court should recognize this kind of challenge for what it really is — a
challenge that properly belongs to the domain of the HRET and one that should be
raised before that tribunal through the proper action. The Court, in other words, should
acknowledge that it has no jurisdiction to act on the present petition.
Under the 2011 Rules of the HRET, 22 the proper actions in coming before the
HRET are: (1) a veri ed petition of protest (election protest) to contest the election or
returns of the member; or (2) a verified petition for quo warranto to contest the election
of a member on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. 23 Both petitions should be led within fteen (15) days after the
proclamation of the winner, 24 save in the case of a petition for quo warranto on the
ground of citizenship which may be led at any time during the member's tenure. 25 The
failure to le the appropriate petition before the HRET within the prescribed periods will
bar the contest. 26 These are the rules that must guide Velasco in his quest for a
remedy.
To be sure, though, this remedy has been within Velasco's knowledge and
contemplation as on May 31, 2013, 27 he led an election protes t before the HRET,
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028. 28 Very obviously, he recognized that, as early as
May 31, 2013, any challenge against respondent Reyes's election, returns, or
quali cations should be raised before the HRET — the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of HOR members.
Why he now appears to have glossed over this legal reality in the present petition
(especially since Reyes is now a clearly recognized member of the HOR after satisfying
the restrictive Reyes v. Comelec standard) is a question I would not dare speculate on;
only the attendant facts and the legal realities can perhaps su ciently provide the
answer. 29
In reality, two other cases — both of them quo warranto petitions — were
subsequently led against Reyes. The rst is HRET Case No. 13-036 entitled "Noeme
Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes." The second is
HRET No. 13-037 entitled "Eric Del Mundo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 14, 2014, the HRET issued a resolution in HRET Case No. 13-036 and
HRET No. 13-037 stating that "the proclamation of Representative Reyes as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque is and
remains valid and subsisting until annulled by HRET."
In a modi ed ponencia circulated on January 11, 2016 (for deliberation
on January 12, 2016), it was alleged that the HRET promulgated a Resolution
on December 14, 2015, dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037 — the
twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes.
Allegedly, the HRET held that "the nal Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264 is
the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." The HRET
ruling allegedly reversed its own ruling of September 11, 2014 that ordered the
dismissal of the petition of Victor Vela Sioco in the twin petitions for quo warranto for
"lack of merit," and for the hearings in the petitions against Reyes to proceed.
EcTCAD
Under these attendant facts, the circumstances surrounding the Reyes-Velasco

dispute becomes more confused and all the more should this Court refrain from acting
on the present petition.
If indeed there is already a HRET ruling as alleged, then the proper remedy now is
for the HRET to present this ruling, certi ed as a nal and executory one, to the HOR for
that body's action in light of its own Tribunal's decision.
To state the obvious, the admission of a member and his or her exclusion is
primarily an internal affair that the HOR should rst resolve before this Court should
step in through the coercive power of a writ of mandamus. The principles of separation
of powers and judicial non-interference demand that the Court respect and give due
recognition to the HOR in its internal affairs.
By granting the petition and issuing a writ of mandamus, the Court, not only
disrespects the HOR, but sows confusion as well into the HRET's jurisdiction — a
jurisprudential minefield in the coming elections.
IV.D. The Separation of Powers
Principle Demands the Dismissal
of the Present Petition.
IV.D.1. The principle of separation of
powers.
An issue that the Court cannot but recognize in the present case is whether it can,
under the circumstances of this case, compel a House of Congress — a co-equal
branch — to act. The resolution of this issue calls for the consideration of several
principles, foremost of which is the principle of separation of powers that underlie our
governmental structure.
The Constitution does not speci cally provide for the principle of separation of
powers. Instead of a distinct express provision, the Constitution divides the
governmental powers among the three branches — the legislative, the executive, and
the judiciary. Under this framework, the Constitution confers on the Legislature the duty
to make the law, on the Executive the duty to execute the law, and on the Judiciary the
duty to construe and apply the law. 30
Underlying the principle of separation of powers is the general scheme that each
department is supreme within their respective spheres of in uence, and the exercise of
their powers to the full extent cannot be questioned by another department. Outside of
these spheres, neither of the great governmental departments has any power; and
neither may any of them validly exercise any of the powers conferred upon the others.
31
Thus, as a fundamental principle, the separation of powers provides that each of

the three departments of our government is distinct and not directly subject to the
control of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate; and the
power to abrogate is the power to usurp. 32 In short, for one branch to control the other
is to usurp its power. In this situation, the exercise of control by one department over
another would clearly violate the principle of separation of powers.
In this light, the question that we ask next is: whether the Court can compel
Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap — who are admittedly o cers of the HOR —
to perform the acts speci cally prayed for by Velasco via mandamus. To properly
answer this question, we must hark back to our earlier discussion of mandamus, and
consider it in the context of the principle of separation of powers.
IV.D.2. Mandamus against a co-equal branch
Over and above the usual requirements of mandamus earlier discussed, it must
be appreciated that the remedy of mandamus is essentially a discretionary remedy that
is contingent upon compelling equitable grounds for its grant. As a peremptory writ, a
presumption exists strongly against its grant; it will and must issue only in the most
extraordinary of circumstances and always with great caution.
In the context of the separation of powers principle, I submit that the Court must
proceed with greater caution before issuing the writ against a co-equal branch,
notwithstanding the concurrence of the requirements.
As a general rule, mandamus will not lie against a coordinate branch . 33
The rule proceeds from the obvious reason that none of the three departments is
inferior to the others; by its very nature, the writ of mandamus is available against an
inferior court, tribunal, body, corporation, or person. With respect to a coordinate and
co-equal branch, the issuance can be justi ed only under the Court's expanded
jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution 34 and under the most
compelling circumstances and equitable reasons . 35
I submit that no grave abuse of discretion intervened in the present case to
justify resort to the Court's expanded jurisdiction. Neither are there compelling and
equitable reasons to justify a grant as there is a remedy in law that was available
to petitioner Velasco (for reasons of his own, he has failed to pursue the remedy
before the HRET to its full fruition) and that is available now — to present the nal
rulings in the cited HRET cases to the HOR for its own action on an internal matter it
zealously guards.
The Comelec petition to contest respondent Reyes' proclamation was led by
Velasco, but this was a case solely addressing respondent Reyes' proclamation and
voiding it. Beyond this, the ruling made no other directive. But even given all these, there
is indisputably the live question of whether the Comelec still had jurisdiction when it
issued its rulings as Reyes had by then become a member of the HOR. At the very least,
this complication leaves the continued validity of the Comelec ruling in doubt. HSAcaE

Another point to consider is the ling and withdrawal by Velasco of an election
protest case with the HRET against respondent Reyes. By doing this and despite the
withdrawal of his petition, Velasco recognized the jurisdiction of the HRET. Can he now
turn around and simply say that the Comelec and the Court are, after all, correct in its
rulings and that he would now avail of these rulings although he was never a party to
them? I provide no answers but again this development effectively brings the propriety
of Velasco's use of mandamus within the realm of doubt.
A further point to consider is that Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are
o cers of the HOR chosen by its members. 36 As HOR o cers, their acts made in the
performance of their duties and functions are acts of the HOR. The acts Velasco wants
this Court to compel Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform pertain to
their o cial positions. Hence, any mandamus that will be issued against them is a
mandamus issued against the HOR. As I have stated before, mandamus does not and
will not lie against a coordinate branch.
Notably, under the attendant facts, signi cantly altered by the intervening factual
developments and the consequent legal considerations, the acts sought to be
performed — the exclusion of sitting members and the admission of replacement
members — are not ministerial acts for which mandamus will lie. That much is implied,
if not directly held, as early as Angara v. Electoral Commission, 37 and many other cases
relating to this situation followed. 38 Their common thread is that Congress takes the
admission (or exclusion) of its members as a very serious concern that is
reserved for itself to decide, save only when a superior law or ruling with
undoubted validity intervenes . Such freedom from doubt, however, is not apparent
in the present petition.
Appeal to "compelling and equitable circumstances" that call for the
application of the equitable remedy of mandamus is, at best, a murky proposition in
light of the circumstances surrounding the May 2013 Marinduque election situation as
a whole.
It should not be forgotten that Reyes won by a convincing margin over Velasco,
but the latter chose to ght his electoral battle in the Comelec, bypassing thereby the
verdict against him of the people of Marinduque. The merits of the Comelec ruling is
likewise not beyond doubt from the point of view of the imputed due process
violations, as the Dissent in Reyes and the close vote in Court showed.
In any case, mandamus is, by its nature, a discretionary remedy that can be
denied when no compelling equitable grounds exist. In particular, in situations where
the constitutional separation-of-powers principle is involved, mandamus, as a rule, will
not lie against a co-equal branch notwithstanding the petitioner's compliance with the
requirements necessary for its grant, as discussed above. To justify the issuance of the
writ, the petitioner must not only comply with the requirements; the petitioner must,
more importantly, show that mandamus is demanded by the most compelling
reasons or circumstances and by the demands of equity. These exception-
inducing factors, as discussed above, are simply not present in this case.
Thus, the Court cannot dictate action under the present petition without
committing gross usurpation of power. The risk for the Court in ruling under these
circumstances is to be accused of ruling under a situation of doubt and uncertainty in
favor of the son of a colleague. In a worse scenario, Congress — even if it does not
frontally rebuff the Court — may raise issues that would effectively disregard the writ
issued by the Court. While no constitutional crisis may result, the Court would have
tested the limits of its constitutional powers and failed. The situation does not bode
well for the Court's integrity, reputation, and credibility — the essential attributes that
allow it to occupy the moral high ground in undertaking its functions within the
Constitution's tripartite system.
The better view, under the circumstances and as posited above, is to
allow internal matters within the HOR to take their natural course. This
position best addresses the confused situation that is the Marinduque May
2013 elections, while respecting the interests of all concerned parties,
including those of the Court's.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the present petition for mandamus must be dismissed as petitioner
Velasco failed to comply with all ve requirements for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus. Most importantly, the petitioner's speedy remedy to address his situation
lies with the HRET and the HOR, not with the Court. In any case, the remedy of
mandamus does not lie against the HOR, a co-equal branch, under the circumstances of
the case and would be an unwarranted intrusion and impermissible usurpation by this
Court of the authority and functions of the HOR and of the HRET.
For these reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition.
PEREZ , J., concurring :
T h e ponencia, upon which this concurrence hinges, postulates that the

administration of oath and the registration of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Velasco
(Velasco) in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of
respondents House Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Belmonte) and Secretary
General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Barua-Yap). 1 Hence, the petition for mandamus must be
granted.
I join the ponencia in the vote to grant the instant petition.
I
Preliminarily, the theory of respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes) — that the
instant petition is in actuality an election contest, a veiled action for quo warranto — is
rejected.
While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, there exists a
clear distinction between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the
remedy to try the right to an o ce or franchise and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties. 2 In the case at
bench, I concur with the ponencia that the present petition seeks the "enforcement of
clear legal duties" as it does not seek to try disputed title. 3 It no longer puts in issue
the validity of Reyes's claim to o ce — a question that has long been resolved by the
Court in its twin Resolutions in the antecedent case of Reyes v. COMELEC (Reyes) , 4
docketed as G.R. No. 207264, wherein the Court sustained the polling commission's
cancellation of respondent Reyes' Certi cate of Candidacy (CoC) on the ground that
she does not possess the necessary eligibility to hold elective o ce as a member of
Congress. In Reyes, the Court pronounced in no less than categorical terms that: 5
As to the issue of whether the petitioner failed to prove her Filipino
citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, su ce it to say
that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in nding her
ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Our edict became nal and executory, as a matter of course, upon denial of
Reyes' motion for reconsideration on October 22, 2013. There is, consequently, no
"disputed title" to speak of which ought to be resolved through a quo warranto
proceeding.
Instead, the primordial issue, in this case for mandamus, is whether or not
respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap can and should be compelled (1) to swear in
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the lone legislative district of
Marinduque, and (2) to include petitioner's name and delete that of Reyes' in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. Petitioner asserts that in the
aftermath of Reyes, his clear and enforceable legal right to assume o ce must be
recognized.
The claim is meritorious.
It is a fundamental precept in remedial law that for the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to be issued, it is essential that the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required . 6 As will be demonstrated, it is beyond cavil that the dual
elements for the mandamus petition to prosper evidently obtain in the case at bar.
a. Petitioner's clear legal right
Well-settled is that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled by mandamus must be clear and
complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of this rule means a right clearly
founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law. 7 AcICHD
Here, petitioner indubitably established his right to be acknowledged as a

member of the House of Representatives. To elucidate, there were only two (2)
candidates in the 2013 congressional race for the Lone District of Marinduque:
petitioner Velasco and respondent Reyes. In the initial canvassing results, Reyes
garnered more votes than Velasco. 8 Before she could be proclaimed the winner,
however, the COMELEC First Division, acting on the Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancel the Certi cate of Candidacy 9 led by one Joseph Socorro Tan and docketed as
SPA No. 13-053, 10 by Resolution dated March 27, 2013, cancelled Reyes' CoC. 11
Borrowing the words of the Court in Reyes:
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that
she made in her COC, [Reyes] is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her
failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public o cer
authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position
of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. (Emphasis and
words in brackets added)
The division ruling, in no time, was elevated to the COMELEC en banc, only to be
affirmed on May 14, 2013. 12 Reyes would receive a copy of the en banc Resolution two
(2) days later on May 16, 2013. Nevertheless, she would only assail the ruling via
petition for certiorari with the Court on June 7, 2013. Needless to say, no injunctive writ
was issued by the Court in the interim. There was, effectively, no restraint against the
enforcement of Reyes' disquali cation, a legal bar to a valid proclamation. As held in
Reyes: 13
It is error to argue that the ve days should pass before the petitioner is
barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent.
Her certi cate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be
proclaimed because there was a nal nding against her by the COMELEC. She
needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the nal nding.
After the ve days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need
for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have
to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in cancelling her certi cate of candidacy and that a restraining
order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable
injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation,
there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to
permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her
hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En
Banc decision that was nal on 14 May 2013 and nal and executory ve days
thereafter.
SPA No. 13-053 eventually made its way to this Court (the Reyes case), docketed
as G.R. No. 207264, but We dismissed Reyes' petition and subsequent motion for
reconsideration questioning the ndings of the COMELEC for lack of merit on June 25,
2013 and October 22, 2013, respectively. 14 Undeterred, Reyes, on November 27, 2013,
led a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for Reconsideration, which
was treated as a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading.
Unavoidably, the motion was denied on December 3, 2013, serving as the final nail in the
coffin, laying the highly-contested issue regarding Reyes' eligibility to rest. 15
Upon resolving with nality that Reyes is ineligible to run for Congress and that
her CoC is a nullity, the only logical consequence is to declare Velasco, Reyes' only
political rival in the congressional race, as the victor in the polling exercise. This nds
basis in the seminal case of Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea), 16 wherein it was held that a
void CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. 17 Hence,
as concluded in Aratea: 18
Lonzanida's certi cate of candidacy was cancelled, because he was
ineligible or not quali ed to run for Mayor. Whether his certi cate of candidacy
is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation
on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certi cate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one quali ed
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections — Antipolo, who therefore
received the highest number of votes.
Thus, notwithstanding the margin of votes Reyes garnered over Velasco, the
votes cast in her favor are considered strays since she is not eligible for the
congressional post, a non-candidate in the bid for the coveted seat of Representative
for the Lone District of Marinduque. Following the doctrinal teaching in Aratea, Velasco,
as the only remaining quali ed candidate in the congressional race, is, for all intents and
purposes, the rightful member of the lower house.
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), however, echoing the
position of the OSG and that of the respondents, asserts in his Dissent that Velasco is a
second-placer during the elections who is not entitled to hold the subject position. The
honorable Justice suggests that petitioner cannot seek refuge under the Court's
pronouncements in Aratea and the subsequent cases of Jalosjos v. COMELEC 19 and
Maquiling v. COMELEC 20 because the positions involved in the said cases were not for
members of Congress. 21
What the Dissent failed to take into account though is the most signi cant
similarity of the present petition to the above-mentioned cases — that there exists a
nal and executory decision of the COMELEC ordering the cancellation of the CoC of
the candidate who committed false material representations therein and declaring
them ineligible to hold public o ce. In all these cases, and as it should likewise be in
this case, the Court ruled that the CoC was deemed void ab initio and as such:
"If the certi cate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who led such void certi cate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a rst-placer in
the elections. If a certi cate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day,
or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for
that candidate are stray votes. If a certi cate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate
should also be stray votes because the certi cate of candidacy is void from the
very beginning. . . ." 22
In Maquiling , this Court also said:
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all
in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will
of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
quali cations and disquali cations of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any
of the disquali cations nor lacks any of the quali cations set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.
xxx xxx xxx
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disquali cation is not a
prerequisite for the disquali cation to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate's disquali cation is not necessary
before a quali ed candidate who placed second to a disquali ed one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the
first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disquali ed candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed o ce is of no moment. The subsequent disquali cation based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the ling of the certi cate of candidacy
voids not only the COC but also the proclamation. 23
In Velasco v. COMELEC, this Court further expounded:
. . . . Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the
resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a
Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the
obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC quali cations if they know
that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election
victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal
command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered
inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate
into o ce despite his or her lack of the quali cations Congress has determined
to be necessary. CAIHTE
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim
that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a
nal judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material
misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his quali cation. For these
violations, he must pay the ultimate price — the nulli cation of his election
victory. He may also have to account in a criminal court for making a false
statement under oath, but this is a matter for the proper authorities to decide
upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in
the past by the clari cation that COC defects beyond matters of form and that
involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the bene t of our ruling that
COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory
after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law
requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality.
Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating
both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the
will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice
between provisions on material quali cations of elected o cials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe
and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always
tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly
gnaw at the rule of law. 24
Therefore, considering that Reyes' CoC was cancelled and was deemed void ab
initio by virtue of the nal and executory decisions rendered by the COMELEC and this
Court, Velasco is a not second-placer as claimed by the Dissent; rather, Velasco is the
only placer and the winner during the May elections and thus, for all intents and
purposes, Velasco has a clear legal right to o ce as Representative of the Lone District
of Marinduque.
Unconvinced, Justice Leonen would protest in his Dissent that petitioner Velasco,
a non-party to SPC No. 13-053 and G.R. No. 207264, is a stranger to the case and
cannot be bound by Our factual findings and rulings therein. 25
The proposition is devoid of merit. aScITE
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, pertinently

reads:
Section 1 . Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certi cate of
Candidacy . — A veri ed Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certi cate
of Candidacy for any elective o ce may be led by any registered voter or
a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on
the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as
required by law is false. . . . (emphasis added)
By lodging a petition for denial or cancellation of CoC, a voter seeks to ensure
that the candidate who purports to be quali ed to represent his or her constituents is
indeed eligible to do so. Such petition, therefore, is for and in bene t of the electorate,
and not for one's personal advantage. This is in clear consonance with the afore-quoted
rule, which never required the petition to be led by a candidate's political rival.
Otherwise stated, it is not required for petitioner Tan in SPA No. 13-053 to have a claim
to the contested electoral post to be permitted by law to challenge the validity of
Reyes' CoC. At the same time, petitioner Velasco herein is not under any legal obligation
to intervene in SPA No. 13-053 and G.R. No. 207264 before he could bene t directly or
indirectly from the ruling. Unlike civil cases which only involve private rights, petitions to
deny or cancel certi cates of candidacy are so imbued with public interest that they
cannot be deemed binding only to the parties thereto. Indeed, it would be an absurd
situation, after all, to declare Reyes ineligible only insofar as Tan is concerned, and
presumed eligible as to the rest of the Marinduqueños, including Velasco.
Furthermore, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 3 . Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
o cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may le a
veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be speci ed by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
Apparently, there is nothing in foregoing provision which requires that the person
applying for a writ of mandamus should establish that he or she was the prevailing
party litigant to a prior case (i.e., a petitioner, respondent or an intervenor) to be entitled
to the writ's issuance. Contrary to the opinion espoused in the Dissent, Sec. 3, Rule 65
merely requires the applicant to establish a clear legal right to the ministerial function
to be performed, without distinction on whether this right emanates from a nal
judgment in a prior case or not. Thus, there is no basis to the opinion that Velasco
should have been a party in Reyes in order for this Court to grant a writ of mandamus in
his favor.
b. Respondent Belmonte and
Barua-Yap's ministerial duties
Anent the second element for mandamus to lie, it is critical that the duty the
performance of which is to be compelled be ministerial in nature, rather than
discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an o cer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. 26 The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed. 27

Without a doubt, petitioner herein seeks the performance of a ministerial act,
without which he is unjustly deprived of the enjoyment of an o ce that he is clearly
entitled to, as earlier discussed. It must be borne in mind that this petition was brought
to fore because, despite repeated demands from petitioner and their receipt of the
"Certi cate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the
position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque,"
respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap refused to allow Velasco to sit in the Lower
House as Marinduque Representative.
The non-discretionary function of respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap is
underscored in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia (Codilla) , 28 wherein the Court held that the
House Speaker and the Secretary General of the Lower House are duty-bound to
recognize the legally elected district representatives as members of the House of
Representatives. In the concluding statements of Codilla, the Court, speaking through
retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno, instructs that: HEITAD
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing
the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part
of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes
in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered
the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not
been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands
that its Decision be obeyed by all o cials of the land. There is no
alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion .
29 (Emphasis in the original)
As in Codilla, the fact of Reyes' disquali cation can no longer be disputed herein,
in view of the consecutive rulings of the COMELEC and the Court in SPA No. 13-053,
G.R. No. 207624, and SPA No. 13-010. Reyes' ineligibility and Velasco's consequent
membership in the Lower House is then beyond the discretion of respondents
Belmonte and Barua-Yap, and the rulings upholding the same must therefore be
recognized and respected. To hold otherwise — that the Court is not precluded from
entertaining questions on Reyes' eligibility to occupy Marinduque's congressional seat
— would mean substantially altering, if not effectively vacating, Our ruling in Reyes that
has long attained nality, a blatant violation of the immutability of judgments. Under the
doctrine, a decision that has acquired nality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modi ed in any respect, even if the modi cation is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle
must immediately be struck down. 30 Justice Leonen, however, urges this Court to
revisit, nay re-litigate, Reyes two (2) years after the date of its nality and abandon the
same, in clear contravention of the doctrine of immutability and nality of Supreme
Court decisions.
It matters not that respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap are non-parties to
Reyes. It is erroneous to claim that Our nal ruling therein is not binding against
Belmonte and Barua-Yap on ground that that they were neither petitioners nor
respondents in the said case, 31 and that they were not given the opportunity to be
heard on the issues raised therein. 32 Again, SPA No. 13-053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA
No. 13-010 are not civil cases and do not involve purely private rights which requires
notice and full participation of respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap. It must also be
noted that the said case originated as petition to deny or cancel Reyes' COC, which
does not require the participation of the Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives. In fact, there is nothing in BP 881, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
nor in Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the
Speaker and Secretary General to be included either in the original petition for
cancellation of CoC or when the case is elevated to this Court via petition for certiorari.
In any event, the fact that they were not made parties in Reyes does not mean that the
public respondents are not bound by the said decision considering that the same
already form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 33
The Dissent endeavors to divert our attention to the peculiarities of Codilla that
allegedly preclude the Court from applying its doctrine in the case at bar. It was noted
that (i) the petitioner in Codilla acquired the plurality of votes, which according to the
dissent is the primary reason for the grant of the petition; 34 (ii) that respondent Reyes'
proclamation was never nulli ed in SPA 13-053; 35 and (iii) that the second placer rule
was not yet abandoned when Codilla was promulgated. 36
With all due respect, the arguments are bereft of merit. Their rehashed version
fails to persuade now as they did before in Reyes. ATICcS
First , the ruling on Codilla was not primarily hinged on the plurality of votes
acquired by petitioner therein, but on the certainty as to who the lawfully elected
candidate was. To reiterate the holding in Codilla: "the issue of who is the rightful
Representative . . . has been nally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter." (Emphasis added) Hence, it
became ministerial on the part of then House Speaker Jose de Venecia and then
Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to swear in and
include the name of petitioner Eufrocino Codilla (Codilla) in the Roll of Members.
Acquiring the plurality of votes may be one way of asserting one's claim to o ce,
but the cancellation of the CoC of the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes is likewise a viable alternative in light of Aratea. Thus, in spite of the initial
determination that Velasco failed to obtain the plurality of votes, he could still validly
claim that his right to be seated as Marinduque's Representative in Congress has been
settled by virtue of Reyes' disqualification.
Second , the ruling in Reyes may have been silent as to the validity of her
proclamation, but the Dissent failed to take into account the developments in SPC No.
13-010, wherein Velasco assailed the proceedings of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC) and prayed before the COMELEC that the May 18, 2013
proclamation of Reyes be declared null and void. 37
On June 19, 2013, the COMELEC would deny Velasco's petition. But on
reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc, on July 9, 2013, made a reversal and declared
null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes, and, in the very
issuance, declared petitioner Velasco as the winning candidate. 38 And so it was that on
July 16, 2013, Velasco would be proclaimed by a newly constituted PBOC as the duly
elected member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, in
congruence with the COMELEC's rulings in SPA No. 13-053 and SPC No. 13-010. 39
This proclamation was never questioned by Reyes before any judicial or quasi-judicial
forum.
This sequence of events bears striking resemblance with the factual milieu of
Codilla wherein Codilla, on June 20, 2001, seasonably moved for reconsideration of the
June 14, 2001 order for his disquali cation and additionally questioned therein the
validity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria Locsin (Locsin). On the next day, he would
lodge a separate petition challenging the validity of Locsin's proclamation anew. The
petition, however, would suffer the same fate of being initially decided against his favor.
It will not be until August 29, 2001 when the COMELEC en banc, by a 4-3 vote, would
reverse the rulings that disquali ed Codilla and upheld the validity of Locsin's
proclamation. Notably, Locsin did not appeal from this Resolution annulling her
proclamation and so the COMELEC en banc's ruling then became final and executory.
Thereafter, on September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc reconstituted the
PBOC of Leyte to implement its August 29, 2001 Resolution, and to proclaim the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte. So it was that on September 12,
2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed winner of the congressional race.
With the nality of the COMELEC ruling disqualifying Locsin and nullifying her
proclamation, and the consequent proclamation of Codilla as the lawfully elected
Representative of the 4th District of Leyte, the Court saw no legal obstacle in directing
then House Speaker Jose de Venecia and then Secretary General Roberto Nazareno of
the House of Representatives to swear in and include petitioner Codilla's name in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. This very same outcome in Codilla
should be observed in the present case.
Third, that the second placer rule was not yet abandoned when Codilla was
decided is inconsequential in this case. As earlier discussed, what is of signi cance in
Codilla is the certainty on who the rightful holder of the elective post is. It may be that
when Codilla was decided, plurality of votes and successional rights, in
disqualifications cases, may have been the key considerations, but as jurisprudence has
been enriched by Aratea and by the subsequent cases that followed, 40 the quali ed
second placer rule was added to the enumeration. Synthesizing Aratea with Codilla,
petitioner Velasco may now successfully invoke the quali ed second placer rule to
prove the certainty of his claim to o ce, and compel the respondent Speaker and
Secretary General to administer his oath and include his name in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives. TIADCc
With the presence of the twin requirements, the extraordinary writ of mandamus
must be issued in the case at bar.
II
We now discuss the collateral issues raised.
The Dissent cites the cases of Tañada v. COMELEC (Tañada), Limkaichong v.
COMELEC (Limkaichong), and Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC (Vinzons-Chato) , to
persuade Us to revisit the ruling in Reyes v. COMELEC , and divest the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes' quali cation in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Similarly, respondents raised the issue of
jurisdiction arguing that the proclamation alone of the winning candidate is the
operative act that triggers the commencement of HRET's exclusive jurisdiction, 41 and
insisted that to rule otherwise would result in the clash of jurisdiction between the
HRET and the COMELEC. 42
On the outset, I express my strong reservations on revisiting herein the issue on
the HRET's jurisdiction, which has already been settled with nality in Reyes, for it is
not at issue in this petition for mandamus . I SHARE THE OBSERVATION BY THE
PONENCIA THAT RESPONDENTS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS PETITION TO RE-
LITIGATE WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED IN REYES AND DOES NOT SEEM TO RESPECT
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT THAT HAS BEEN ISSUED THEREIN ON OCTOBER 22, 2013.
Nevertheless, assuming in arguendo that there is no impropriety in taking a second look
at the issue in this case, I see no irreconcilability between Reyes, on the one hand, and
the cases cited in the Dissent, on the other.
As a review, the doctrine in Reyes is that the HRET only has jurisdiction over
Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, the following requisites must concur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. 43
Our ruling in Reyes does not run in con ict with Tañada , which was decided by
the Court en banc by a unanimous vote, as our esteemed colleague pointed out. As held
in Tañada:
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been
proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of
Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and
assumed o ce past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without
jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the
conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein
discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and
"returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET's sole
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) cSEDTC
Hence, the Court's ruling in Tañada , disclaiming jurisdiction in favor of the HRET,
is premised on the concurrence of the three (3) requirements laid down in Reyes. In any
case, Tañada is a Minute Resolution not intended to amend or abandon Reyes, as was
made evident by the subsequent case Bandara v. COMELEC, 44 to wit:
It is a well-settled rule that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed o ce as a Member of the House of
representatives, the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
over election contests relating to his/her election, returns, and quali cation
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Consequently, the instant
petitions for certiorari are not the proper remedies for the petitioners in both
cases to question the propriety of the National Board of Canvassers'
proclamation, and the events leading thereto.
Limkaichong is even more blunt as the Court decided the case with the following
opening statement: 45
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath ,
and assumed o ce as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins .
. . . . (Emphasis in the original)
And in Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC: 46
. . . [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of o ce and assumed his
post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a
clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people's mandate. (Emphasis added)
Verily, Reyes delineated the blurred lines between the jurisdictions of the
COMELEC and the HRET, explicitly ruling where one ends and the other begins. Our
ruling therein was not wanting in jurisprudential basis and is in fact supported by cases
cited by in the Dissent no less. AIDSTE
Certainly, the principle in Reyes does not offend Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution nor does it undermine the adjudicatory powers of the HRET. On the
contrary, it strictly adheres to the textual tenor of the constitutional provision, to wit:
Section 17 . The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of their respective Members . Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis added)
It has to be emphasized that the Court, in deciding Reyes, did not divest the
Senate and House of Representative Electoral Tribunals of their jurisdiction over their
respective members, but merely set the parameters on who these "Members" are. The
jurisprudence earlier reviewed are in unison in holding that to be considered a "Member"
within the purview of the constitutional provision, the three indispensable elements
must concur.
As to the alleged clash of jurisdiction, the Court, in its October 22, 2013
Resolution in Reyes, explained:
"11. It may need pointing out that there is no con ict between the
COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner's being a Representative of
Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner's
certi cate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter
can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the
COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court
grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for
grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is
no longer any certi cate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that
sense, the HRET's constitutional authority opens, over the quali cation of its
MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation,
the rst and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction
over the quali cation of the Member of the House of Representatives is original
and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings
in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should
be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of
repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of
Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who
shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certi cate of candidacy of
petitioner. The petitioner [Reyes] is not, cannot, be that representative .
And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in
the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision
on the quali cations of the Member. 47 (Emphasis and words in brackets
added)
It thus appears that there is no con ict of jurisdiction, and that if a quo warranto
case should be led before HRET as espoused by the respondents and in the Dissent, it
cannot be one against Reyes who never became a member of the House of
Representatives over whom the HRET could exercise jurisdiction.
III
The Dissent also claims that when respondent Reyes was proclaimed by the
PBOC as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque of May 18,
2013, petitioner Velasco should have continued his election protest via a quo warranto
petition before the HRET. 48
This suggestion is legally awed considering that the HRET is without authority
to review, modify, more so annul, the illegal acts of PBOC. On the contrary, this authority
is lodged with the COMELEC and is incidental to its power of "direct control and
supervision over the Board of Canvassers." 49 Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper
entity that can legally and validly nullify the acts of the PBOC. As held by this Court held
in Mastura v. COMELEC: 50
"Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises direct
supervision and control over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers. In
Aratuc v. Commission on Elections 51 we held —
"While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the
Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers
has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the
Commission and by this Court . . . as an appeal, the fact of the
matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such
actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any speci c provision of law, for there is none such
provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the
above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative
law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting
citation here, that a superior body or o ce having supervision and
control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to
do or ought to have done. . . ."
Furthermore, the illegal proclamation of the PBOC cannot operate to
automatically oust the COMELEC of its supervisory authority over the PBOC. As clearly
explained in Reyes: AaCTcI
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy —

that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already nally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May
2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner's quali cations to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representative . We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept
the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction
when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc
decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot
by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC
En Banc which a rmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division ." 52
(Emphasis supplied.)
It must likewise be noted that the COMELEC en banc's May 14, 2013 Decision in
SPA No. 13-053 was already nal as "there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's quali cations to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representative," and in the absence of a restraining order from this Court, it
became executory. Thus, as held in Reyes, it was an error for the PBOC to proclaim
Reyes, a non-candidate, on May 18, 2013. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Sereno in
her Concurring Opinion in the said case: 53 acEHCD
"On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already resolved the
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certi cate of Candidacy
led against Reyes. Based on Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, this Resolution was already nal and should have become executory
five days after its promulgation. But despite this unrestrained ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc the PBOC still proclaimed Reyes as the winning
candidate on 18 May 2013 .
On 16 May 2013, petitioner had already received the judgment
cancelling her Certi cate of Candidacy. As mentioned, two days
thereafter, the PBOC still proclaimed her as the winner. Obviously, the
proclamation took place notwithstanding that petitioner herself
already knew of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution .
It must also be pointed out that even the PBOC already knew of the
cancellation of the Certi cate of Candidacy of petitioner when it proclaimed her.
The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 9 July 2013 and submitted to this
Court through the Manifestation of private respondent, quoted the averments in
the Verified Petition of petitioner therein as follows:
. . . While the proceedings of the PBOC is suspended or in
recess, the process server of this Honorable Commission, who
identi ed himself as PEDRO P. STA. ROSA II ('Sta. Rosa,' for
brevity), arrived at the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Marinduque where the provincial canvassing is
being held.
. . . The process server, Sta. Rosa, was in possession of
certi ed true copies of the Resolution promulgated by the
Commission on Elections En Banc on 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-
053 (DC) entitled Joseph Socorro B. Tan vs. Atty. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes' and an Order dated 15 May 2013 to deliver the same to the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque. The said Order was
signed by no less than the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, the Honorable Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
. . . Process Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II immediately
approached Atty. Edwin Villa, the Provincial Election Supervisor
(PES) of Marinduque, upon his arrival to serve a copy of the
aforementioned Resolution dated 14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC). Despite his proper identi cation that he is a process server
from the COMELEC Main O ce, the PES totally ignored Process
Server Pedro Sta. Rosa II.
. . . Interestingly, the PES likewise refused to receive the
copy of the Commission on Elections En Banc Resolution dated
14 May 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) despite several attempts to
do so.
. . . Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption
of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary
to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes
as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of
Marinduque.
This narration of the events shows that the proclamation was in
contravention of a COMELEC En Banc Resolution cancelling the
candidate's Certificate of Candidacy .
The PBOC, a subordinate body under the direct control and
supervision of the COMELEC, cannot simply disregard a COMELEC En
Banc Resolution brought before its attention and hastily proceed with
the proclamation by reasoning that it has not o cially received the
resolution or order .
xxx xxx xxx
The PBOC denied the motion to proclaim candidate Velasco on the
ground that neither the counsel of petitioner nor the PBOC was duly furnished or
served an official copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013
and forthwith proceeded with the proclamation of herein petitioner, whose
Certi cate of Candidacy has already been cancelled, bespeaks mala de on its
part. SDHTEC
As early as 27 March 2013, when the COMELEC First Division cancelled

petitioner's Certi cate of Candidacy, the people of Marinduque, including the
COMELEC o cials in the province, were already aware of the impending
disquali cation of herein petitioner upon the nality of the cancellation of her
Certificate of Candidacy. When the COMELEC En Banc a rmed the cancellation
of the certi cate of candidacy on the day of the elections, but before the
proclamation of the winner, it had the effect of declaring that herein petitioner
was not a candidate.
Thus, when the PBOC proclaimed herein petitioner, it proclaimed
not a winner but a non-candidate .
The proclamation of a non-candidate cannot take away the
power vested in the COMELEC to enforce and execute its decisions. It
is a power that enjoys precedence over that emanating from any other
authority, except the Supreme Court, . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, at that moment, the COMELEC is not only bestowed with the authority,
but more so, duty-bound to rectify the PBOC's mistake. Consequently, the COMELEC En
Banc, in its July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010, nulli ed the proclamation of
Reyes, proceeded to constitute a special PBOC and on July 9, 2013, proclaimed
Velasco as the winning Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque for the
2013-2016 term. As emphasized in the ponencia, this proclamation of Velasco was
never questioned before this Court and likewise became final and executory. 54 HSAcaE
The Dissent makes much of the cases questioning Reyes' eligibility that are
pending before the HRET, and argues that the Court should deny the instant petition
and defer to the action of the electoral tribunal. 55
The argument is specious.
It is of no moment that there are two quo warranto cases currently pending
before the HRET that seek to disqualify Reyes from holding the congressional o ce. 56
These cases cannot oust the COMELEC and the Court of their jurisdiction over the issue
on Reyes' eligibility, which they have already validly acquired and exercised in SPA No.
13-053 and Reyes. The petitioners in the quo warranto cases themselves recognize the
enforceability of the COMELEC and the Court's ruling in SPA No. 13-053 and Reyes, and
even invoked the rulings therein to support their respective petitions. They seek not a
trial de novo for the determination of whether or not Reyes is eligible to hold o ce as
Representative, but seek the implementation of the nal and executory decisions of the
COMELEC and of the High Court. Interestingly, Reyes merely prayed for the dismissal of
these cases, but never asked the HRET for any a rmative relief to counter the
executory rulings in SPA No. 13-053, G.R. No. 207264, and SPA No. 13-010.
IV
All told, We cannot turn a blind eye to the undisputed fact that the Court's
pronouncements in Reyes and the pertinent resolutions of the COMELEC have
established that the title and clear right to the contested o ce belongs to petitioner. In
reinforcing this conclusion, the ponencia aptly observed that: 57
. . . In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., the nal and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264, the nal and executory resolutions
of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes' Certi cate of
Candidacy, and the nal and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No.
13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque, it cannot be claimed that the present
petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
It has thus been conclusively proven that Velasco is the winning candidate for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque during the May 2013
Elections. As a consequence, when respondents Belmonte and Barua-Yap received the
"Certi cate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the
position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque"
issued by the COMELEC in favor of the herein petitioner, they should have, without
delay, abide by their respective ministerial duties to administer the oath in favor of the
petitioner and to register his name in Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
for the 2013-2016 term. Upon their unlawful refusal to do so despite repeated
demands from petitioner, the extraordinary writ of mandamus ought to lie. HESIcT
In the end, Reyes has no legal basis whatsoever to continue exercising the rights
and prerogatives as the Lone District Representative of Marinduque as there is at
present no pending action or petition which was instituted by her either before the
HRET or the Court challenging petitioner Velasco's proclamation. Respondents
Belmonte and Barua-Yap must thus honor the rights of petitioner and execute the nal
COMELEC and Supreme Court Resolutions in accordance with and furtherance of the
rule of law.
May I just be permitted one last word.
In what was in all ill designed as a master stroke, Reyes, after all have been said
and done by this Court in the petition, she herself led, submitted a motion to withdraw
that petition, G.R. No. 207264, Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan. 58 I had
the opportunity to say, in the Court's denial of her motion to reconsider the dismissal of
her petition, that:
xxx xxx xxx
The motion to withdraw petition led AFTER the Court has acted thereon,
is noted. It may well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the
case is terminated. When petitioner led her Petition for Certiorari, jurisdiction
vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it
acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral
withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court
issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere
expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's
Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against
tri ing with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her
interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her
predilections the supremacy of the law. AcICHD
I cannot be moved one bit away from the conclusion, then as now, that parties to
cases cannot tri e with our Court processes. If we deny the petition at hand, we will
ourselves do for Reyes what we said in judgment cannot be done by her.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, I register my vote to GRANT the petition.
LEONEN , J., concurring :
I concur in the result.

The quo warranto cases 1 led before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal have been dismissed in the Resolution 2 dated December 14, 2015. The proper
constitutional body, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, has already ruled
on the basis of Lord Allan Jay Velasco's (Velasco) claim to a seat in Congress. There is
thus no pending proceeding nor matter that bars this court from issuing the writ of
mandamus in favor of Velasco.
Under the situation attendant in this case, I therefore concur in the grant of the
Petition for Mandamus.
I
Election contests assailing Regina Ongsiako Reyes' (Reyes) title as a member of
the House of Representatives were led. Velasco led an electoral protest before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. 3 For reasons only he understood, he
opted to withdraw his case against Reyes before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and, instead, after Reyes had taken her oath and proceeded to
represent the Lone District of Marinduque, filed the present Petition for Mandamus.
However, three quo warranto cases were also led against Reyes before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. 4
When Velasco led this Petition for Mandamus, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal had yet to rule on Velasco's title to a seat in Congress. The quo
warranto cases were still pending before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
While election contests were pending before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, this Petition for Mandamus was, in effect, an election contest. 5 It
was a procedural vehicle to raise "contests relating to the election, returns, and
quali cations" 6 of a Member of the House of Representatives. This action set up the
title of Velasco to a public o ce. Velasco claims a clear and better legal right as
against the occupant. An election contest is a suit that can be led by a candidate to
question the title of an incumbent to a public office. 7
The power to be the "sole judge" 8 of all these contests is vested by our
Constitution itself in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to the exclusion of
all others. 9
The Constitution clearly provides:
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman. 10 TAIaHE
An election contest, whether an election protest 11 or petition for quo warranto,

12 is a remedy "to dislodge the winning candidate from o ce" 13 and "to establish who
is the actual winner in the election." 14 The action puts in issue the validity of the
incumbent's claim to the office.
A contest contemplated by the Constitution settles disputes as to who is
rightfully entitled to a position. 15 It is not this court but the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal that has sole jurisdiction of contests involving Members of the House
of Representatives. This can be led through (a) an election protest under Rule 16 of
the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and (b) quo
warranto under Rule 17 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
Thus, while the petitions for quo warranto were pending before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court did not have the jurisdiction to rule on this
Petition for Mandamus. A grant of the writ of mandamus would have openly de ed the
Constitution and, in all likelihood, would muddle the administration of justice as it would
have rendered the quo warranto cases properly pending before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal moot and academic. We would have arrogated upon
ourselves the resolution of then pending House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
cases.
II
Notwithstanding the pendency of the quo warranto cases before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Velasco relies on the Decision in Reyes v.
Commission on Elections 16 upholding the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
and a rming the Resolution of the Commission on Elections cancelling Reyes'
Certificate of Candidacy for the grant of the writ of mandamus.
The Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Reyes v. Commission on
Elections 17 was denied by a divided court. 18 Five justices 19 voted to deny the Motion
for Reconsideration led by Reyes, and four justices 20 voted to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On the same day that the Resolution was promulgated, this court En Banc
decided Tañada, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 21 by a unanimous vote . 22 In
Tañada, this court once again upheld the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal "over disputes relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of
the proclaimed representative[.]" 23 The issue on the validity of the proclamation of a
Member of Congress is included in the term "returns." We said:
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating
to the election, returns, and quali cations of the proclaimed representative in
favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns, and quali cations" refers to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. In particular, the term
"election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "quali cations"
refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
CoC. 24 (Citation omitted)
In Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections, et al.: 25
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly
maintained that Limkaichong's proclamation was tainted with irregularity,
which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case,
was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of
its jurisdiction. The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato, to
the effect that: cDHAES
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico

has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of o ce as a
Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress);
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost
jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by
petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and
alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are
matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and
discretion of the HRET. Signi cantly, the allegation that
respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest
the HRET of its jurisdiction:
. . . [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of o ce and assumed his post as congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity
of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's
mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner
Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to
usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In ne, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not
prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a
member's qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the
congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one's
eligibility/ineligibility/quali cation/disquali cation is to le before the HRET a
petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period
provided by the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections , we ruled
that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to le an electoral protest
with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. 26 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
In Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections, 27 this court ruled that:
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and quali cations ends,
and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections,
the remedy of the petitioner is to le an electoral protest with the HRET . 28
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
When Reyes was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque on May 18, 2013, Velasco
should have continued his election protest or led a quo warranto Petition before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. 29 Instead, Velasco led a Petition to
annul the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers and the proclamation of
Reyes on May 20, 2013 before the Commission on Elections. 30 At that time, the
Commission on Elections no longer had jurisdiction over the Petition that was led
after Reyes' proclamation.
Any alleged invalidity of the proclamation of a Member of the House of
Representatives does not divest the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal of
jurisdiction. 31
Should there have been pending cases at the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, we should have deferred to the action of the constitutional body given the
competence to act initially on the matter. Thus, in the Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v.
Commission on Elections:
In case of doubt, there are fundamental reasons for this Court to be
cautious in exercising its jurisdiction to determine who the members are of the
House of Representatives. We should maintain our consistent doctrine that
proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this Court or the
Commission on Elections and vests it on the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). ASEcHI
The rst reason is that the Constitution unequivocably grants this

discretion to another constitutional body called the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). This is a separate organ from the Judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
The second fundamental reason for us to exercise caution in determining
the composition of the House of Representatives is that this is required for a
better administration of justice. Matters relating to factual ndings on election,
returns, and quali cations must rst be vetted in the appropriate electoral
tribunal before these are raised in the Supreme Court. 32
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of contests
involving Members of the House of Representatives. 33 This is a power conferred by the
sovereign through our Constitution.
Again, as in my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on Elections: 34
This Court may obtain jurisdiction over questions regarding the validity
of the proclamation of a candidate vying for a seat in Congress without
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of a constitutional body, the electoral tribunal.
"[The remedies of] certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case [to annul the
proclamation of a candidate] considering that there is an available and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; [that is, the ling of an electoral
protest before the electoral tribunals]." These remedies, however, may lie only
after a ruling by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal or the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
However, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal already ruled on the
two quo warranto cases against Reyes that were consolidated. 36 The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the
petitions for quo warranto relying on this court's Decision in Reyes v. Commission on
Elections. 37 In their Resolution, the House of Representatives pronounced:
Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes'
proclamation was nulli ed by the COMELEC, which nulli cation was upheld
by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to
assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives ," as declared by
the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. 38 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
The tribunal dismissed the quo warranto cases holding that the Commission on
Elections' cancellation of Reyes' certi cate of candidacy resulted in the nulli cation of
her proclamation. 39 Thus:
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion
for Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED . The September
11, 2014 Resolution of Tribunal is hereby R E V E R S E D and SET ASIDE .
Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction. 40 (Emphasis in the original)
In effect, the decision by the sole judge of all electoral contests acknowledges
Reyes' lack of quali cations. While maintaining my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on
Elections, I now acknowledge that there is no other remedy in law or equity to enforce a
final decision of this court except through mandamus.
Applying Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. de Venecia , 41 this Petition for Mandamus should be
granted.
III
Aratea v. Commission on Elections 42 quali ed the second-placer rule. The
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes would be entitled to the position
if the Certi cate of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes
had been initially declared valid at the time of ling but had to be subsequently
cancelled. 43 Additionally, if the Certi cate of Candidacy of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes was void ab initio, the votes of the candidate should be
considered stray and not counted. 73 This would entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to the position. 74 Thus:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be
proclaimed winner if the rst-placer is disquali ed or declared ineligible should
be limited to situations where the certi cate of candidacy of the rst-placer was
valid at the time of ling but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the
ling of the certi cate of candidacy. If the certi cate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who led such void certi cate of candidacy was
never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate
are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never
be a rst-placer in the elections. If a certi cate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled, on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence
holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certi cate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all
votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certi cate of
candidacy is void from the beginning. This is the more equitable and logical
approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certi cate of candidacy that is
void ab initio. Otherwise, a certi cate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to
defeat one or more valid certi cates of candidacy for the same position. 75
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)ITAaHc
The Decision in Aratea was subsequently reiterated in Jalosjos, Jr. v.

Commission on Elections 76 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections. 77
ACCORDINGLY , I vote to GRANT the Petition for Mandamus.
Footnotes
* No part.
1. Originally cited as "Emilia."
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 3-4.
3. Id. at 25-26.
4. Docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC).
5. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 31-32.
6. Id. at 42.
7. Id. at 47.
8. Id. at 65-67.
9. Id. at 67. Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Resolution No. 9523, provides that a decision or resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special cases shall become nal
and executory ve (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued
by the Supreme Court. Section 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certi cates of candidacy, to declare a
candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, shall become nal and
executory after the lapse of ve (5) days from promulgation, unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.
10. Id. at 82.
11. Id. at 74.
12. Id. at 106.
13. Id. at 267.

14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. at 109. Certi cate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for the
Position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque.
16. Rollo (G.R. No. 207264), pp. 409-412.
17. Id. at 308-376.

18. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 122.
19. Id. at 269.
20. Id. at 269-272.
21. Id. at 12-13.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id. at 16-17.

24. Id. at 20.
25. 442 Phil. 135, 189-190 (2002).
26. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 21.
27. Id. at 24-25.
28. Nacionalista Party v. De Vera , 85 Phil. 126 (1949); Pilar v. Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Communications, 125 Phil. 766 (1967); Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, 129 Phil. 7 (1967); Topacio v. Ong , 595 Phil. 491 (2008); Señeres v.
Commission on Elections, 603 Phil. 552 (2009).
29. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 314.
30. HRET Case Nos. 13-036 to 37, entitled "Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac
v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes" and "Eric Del Mundo Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes,"
respectively.
31. Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 344.
32. Id. at 385-386.
33. Id. at 398-399.
34. Id. at 397.

35. Petitioner Velasco's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments.
36. Id., Annex "D," p. 5.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 3-5.

40. Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City.
41. Petitioner Velasco's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments, Annex "B."
42. Austria v. Amante , 79 Phil. 780, 783 (1948); Caraan-Medina v. Quizon , 124 Phil. 1171,
1178 (1966); Castro v. Del Rosario, 125 Phil. 611, 615-616 (1967).
43. Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 25 at 189.
44. Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768, 801 (2009), citing Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia ,
supra note 25 at 189.
45. G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 219.
46. Supra note 25 at 188-190.

47. Cañero v. University of the Philippines, 481 Phil. 249, 270 (2004).
48. Supra note 25 at 190.
BRION, J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, pp. 3-26.
2. Petitioner Velasco is the son of incumbent Supreme Court Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
3. 442 Phil. 139 (2002).

4. Feria-Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, (2001), p. 486, citing 34 Am. Jur. Mandamus, S. 2.
5. See Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales , G.R. No. 188056, January
8, 2013.
6. Feria-Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, (2001), p. 486.
7. See Feria-Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated (2001), p. 487 (citation omitted).

8. See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768 (2009).
9. Id.
10. See Feria-Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated (2001), p. 488 (citation omitted).
11. See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete , 607 Phil. 768 (2009); Asia's Emerging Dragon
Corporation v. Republic , 602 Phil. 722 (2009). See also Feria-Noche, Civil Procedure
Annotated (2001), p. 488 (citation omitted).
12. S ee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc ., G.R. No.
178407, March 18, 2015; and Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768 (2009).
13. See Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, supra note 11.
14. See Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 538-539.

15. See Dissenting Opinion of J. Brion, joined in by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, and Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Marvic Mario Victor F.
Leonen.
16. See also Rule 14 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
17. S e e Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections , 601 Phil. 751 (2009); Jalosjos v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012; and
Perez v. Comelec , 548 Phil. 712 (2007). See also Guerrero v. Commission on
Elections, 391 Phil. 344 (2000); Vinzons-Chato v. Commission on Elections , 548 Phil.
712 (2007); and Aggabao v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 344 (2000).
18. See J. Brion's Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Comelec, June 25, 2013 Resolution.
19. See J. Brion's Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Comelec, June 25, 2013 Resolution. Pertinent
are the following discussions:
The ponencia's holding on the COMELEC's jurisdiction vis-a-vis the HRET is inconsistent
with the HRET Rules
The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact that
triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET is also supported by the HRET Rules. They state:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. — The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
RULE 15. How Initiated. — An election contest is initiated by the ling of a veri ed
petition of protest or a veri ed petition for quo warranto against a Member of the
House of Representatives. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo warranto include an election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. — A veri ed petition contesting the election or returns of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall be led by any candidate who has
duly led a certi cate of candidacy and has been voted for the same o ce, within
fteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party ling the protest
shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the
protestee. . . .
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A veri ed petition for quo warranto contesting the election of
a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be led by any registered voter of
the district concerned within fteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation of
the winner. The party ling the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the
adverse party shall be known as the respondent[.]
Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is concerned, the
proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as the reckoning
point as well as the trigger that brings any contests relating to his or her election,
return and qualifications within its sole and exclusive jurisdiction.
In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction
(because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed o ce), the
majority effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdiction as it allows the ling of
an election protest or a petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to o ce
by the candidate (i.e., on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of
the present case, any election protest or a petition for quo warranto led after June
30 or more than fteen (15) days from Reyes' proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall
certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been led out of time under
the HRET rules.
20. See Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution.
21. As I discussed in my Dissenting Opinion to the June 25, 2013 Resolution in Reyes v.
Comelec, this reasonable standard is the proclamation of the winning candidate.
There, I said that: "[t]he proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative fact
that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the winning
candidate's election, returns and qualifications."
22. Issued pursuant to the HRET's rule-making that necessarily ows from the general power
granted to it by the Constitution as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of its members (see Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]).
23. See Rules 16 and 17 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
24. See Rule 16, paragraph 1, and Rule 17, paragraph 1 of the 2011 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
25. See Rule 17, paragraph 2 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
26. See Rule 19 of the 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. It reads:
RULE 19. Periods Non-Extendible. — The period for the ling of the appropriate petition,
as prescribed in Rules 16 and 17, is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
27. In fact, also on May 31, 2013, a quo warranto petition was led by a certain Matienzo
before the HRET against Reyes; this was docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027.
28. See rollo, p. 399. As of April 1, 2014, the HRET records show that Matienzo v. Reyes and
Velasco v. Reyes have been withdrawn.
29. A possible answer may be drawn from these facts: first, the two quo warranto petitions —
HRET Case No. 13-036 entitled "Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes" ( led on July 13, 2013) and HRET No. 13-037 entitled " Eric
Del Mundo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes" ( led on December 13, 2013) — led against
Reyes have been pending before the HRET, of which a Member of this Court,
Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, is petitioner Velasco's father, for more or less
two years without any action by the HRET. The only action the HRET has taken so far
in these cases was in relation with the petition-for-intervention led by Victor Vela
Sioco seeking the dismissal of the quo warranto petitions for lack of jurisdiction
where it required (via Resolution No. 14-081) Reyes to comment thereon.
Second, the HRET has recently revised its Rules of Procedure incorporating the restrictive
Reyes v. Comelec standards that requires the concurrence of proclamation, oath, and
assumption of o ce before the elected candidate is considered a member of the
HOR over whom the HRET can exercise jurisdiction. The 2015 HRET Rules of
Procedure was published in the Philippine Star on November 1, 2015, and took effect
fteen days thereafter. Rule 80 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for its application to
all pending actions save "when substantive rights are affected as may be determined
by the Tribunal."
Third, per the November 5, 2015 letter-petition — Urgent Follow-Up on the Petition for
Recall of the Designation of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. to the HRET — to the
Court En Banc by Reyes' counsel Rogue and Butuyan Law O ces (letter signed by H.
Harry L. Rogue, Jr., Joel Ruiz Butuyan, and Roger R. Rayel), the HRET has deferred
action on its February 3, 2015 manifestation/motion that from thereon it shall act as
Reyes' lead counsel and been refusing to furnish it copies, at their expense, of all
documents, pleadings etc. pertaining to the two quo warranto cases.
30. See Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, citing U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
31. See Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law.
32. See Alejandrino v. Quezon, et al., 46 Phil. 83 (1924).
33. Id.
34. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution reads in full:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
35. Supra note 32.
36. See Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. It reads:
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other o cers as it may deem
necessary. [emphases supplied]
37. 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
38. S ee Suanes v. The Chief Accountant, Accounting Division, Senate, et al ., 81 Phil. 818
(1948) ; Co v. Electoral Tribunal , 276 Phil. 758 (1991); Lazatin v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 250 Phil. 390 (1988); Vilando v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 671 Phil. 524 (2011); Duenas v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 619 Phil. 730 (2009), to name a few.
PEREZ, J., concurring:
1. Ponencia, p. 13.
2. Lota v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14803, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 715, 718.
3. Ponencia, p. 12.
4. G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522, 538, and G.R. No. 207264, October 22,
2013, 708 SCRA 197.
5. Id.
6. Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc. , G.R. No. 163088, July 20, 2006,
495 SCRA 763, 777.
7. Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, No. L-3261, December 29, 1949, 85 Phil. 272, 275.
8. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 11.

9. Filed on October 10, 2012.
10. Petition for Cancellation of Certi cate of Candidacy, entitled Joseph Socorro Tan v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
11. See Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4 at 529.
12. Id. at 530.
13. Footnote No. 3 of the October 22, 2013 Resolution distinguished between a final judgment
and one that is nal and executory in the following wise: "The concept of ' nal'
judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become nal' (or 'executory' as of
right [ nal and executory]), is de nite and settled. A ' nal' judgment or order is one
that nally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered,
the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done
by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist
of the ling of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal)
and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
' nal' or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ' nal and executory.' See
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 302, 307 (1987)."
14. Supra note 4.
15. Ponencia, p. 6.
16. G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105.
17. See also Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223.
18. Supra note 16.
19. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1.
20. G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
22. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 19 at 32.
23. Maquiling v. COMELEC, supra note 20 at 462-463.
24. Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.
26. Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013, 688 SCRA
403, 424.
27. Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc., supra note 6.
28. G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639, 681.
29. Id.
30. FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 66 , G.R. No. 161282,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50, 56.
31. Memorandum for the OSG in behalf of public respondents, p. 9.
32. Ibid., p. 12.
33. Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines.

35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Ponencia, p. 4.
38. Id. at 4-5.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Jalosjos Jr., v. COMELEC, supra note 19; Maquiling v. COMELEC, supra note 20.
41. Memorandum of the OSG, p. 16.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 4 at 535.
44. G.R. Nos. 207144 and 208141, February 3, 2015.
45. Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32 and 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41, April
1, 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 8-9.
46. G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 180, citing Guerrero v. COMELEC , G.R. No.
105278, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 36, 43.
47. G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 231-232.
49. Section 227, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 227. Supervision and control over board of canvassers . — The
Commission shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers.
50. G.R. No. 124521, January 29, 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499-500.
51. G.R. Nos. L-49705-09 and L-49717-21, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
53. Chief Justice Sereno, Concurring Opinion, supra note 4 at 243-248, dated October 22,
2013.
54. Ponencia, p. 12.
56. HRET Case No. 13-036, entitled "Noeme Mayores Lim and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes," and HRET Case No. 13-037, entitled "Eric D. Junio v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes".

57. Ponencia, p. 12.
58. October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 233.
1. Rollo, p. 788, Regina Ongsiako Reyes' Memorandum. These cases were docketed as HRET
Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037.
2. Petitioner's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, annex D.
3. Rollo, p. 630, Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte and Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-
Yap's Memorandum. The case was docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028.
4. Id. at 629-630.
5. HRET Rules, rule 15. The action led may be an election protest or quo warranto under the
HRET Rules.
6. CONST., art. VI, sec. 17.
7. HRET Rules, rules 15-17.

9. CONST., art. VI, sec. 17. See also Angara v. Electoral Commission , 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per
J. Laurel, En Banc].
11. HRET Rules, rule 16 provides:

RULE 16. Election Protest. — A veri ed petition contesting the election or returns of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall be led by any candidate who has
duly led a certi cate of candidacy and has been voted for the same o ce, within
fteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party ling the protest
shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the
protestee.
No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and su cient
reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly. Thus,
where there are two or more protests involving the same protestee and common
principal causes of action, the subsequent protests shall be consolidated with the
earlier case to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In case of objection to the
consolidation, the Tribunal shall resolve the same. An order resolving a motion for or
objection to the consolidation shall be unappealable.
The protest is veri ed by an a davit that the a ant has read it and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief or based on veri able
information or authentic records. A veri cation based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," is not a sufficient verification.
An unveri ed election protest shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to
file the protest.
An election protest shall state:
1. The date of proclamation of the winner and the number of votes obtained by the
parties per proclamation;
2. The total number of contested individual and clustered precincts per municipality or
city;
3. The individual and clustered precinct numbers and location of the contested precincts;
and
4. The speci c acts or omissions complained of constituting the electoral frauds,

anomalies or irregularities in the contested precincts.
12. HRET Rules, rule 17 provides:
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A veri ed petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall be led by any registered voter of the district
concerned within fteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation of the winner.
The party ling the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse
party shall be known as the respondent.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, a petition for quo
warranto may be led by any registered voter of the district concerned against a
member of the House of Representatives, on the ground of citizenship, at any time
during his tenure.
The rule on veri cation and consolidation provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply to
petitions for quo warranto.
13. Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 461 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
14. Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 279 Phil. 877, 898 (1991) [Per J.
Paras, En Banc].
16. G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
17. G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
18. Id. at 234.
19. The ve justices were Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Associate Justices
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, Roberto A. Abad, Jose P. Perez, and Bienvenido L.
Reyes.
20. The four justices were Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.
21. G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 188 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
22. Id. at 196.
23. Id. at 195.
24. Id. at 195-196.

25. 601 Phil. 751 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
26. Id. at 782-783.
27. 548 Phil. 712 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

28. Id. at 725-726.
29. HRET Rules, rules 16-17.
30. Rollo, p. 574, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco's Consolidated Reply. The Petition was docketed
as SPC No. 13-010.
31. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al. , 660 Phil. 225, 267 (2011) [Per J. Villarama,
Jr., En Banc].
32. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 207264,
October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 327-344 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
34. G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
35. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 207264,
October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 342 [Per J. Perez, En Banc], quoting Barbers v.
Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 570, 585 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
36. Rollo, p. 788, Regina Ongsiako Reyes' Memorandum. HRET Case No. 13-036 was entitled
Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes . HRET
Case No. 13-037 was entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
37. G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522 [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
38. Petitioner's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, annex D, p. 4. Annex D refers to HRET
Resolution in HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 5.
41. 442 Phil. 139 (2002) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

* Note from the Publisher: Footnote sequence copied verbatim from the official copy.
42. G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
43. Id. at 146.
73. n Id.
74. Id.
75. Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1,
31-32 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
76. G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
77. G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420 [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the o cial copy. Irregular numerical
sequence.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 219603. January 26, 2016.]
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO , petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA
PICHAY , respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
This special civil action for certiorari 1 assails the Decision dated 18 March 2015
2 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 3 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), in HRET Case No. 13-022, declaring respondent Philip A. Pichay
(Pichay) eligible to hold and serve the of ce of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.
The Facts
On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032
and 161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, " convicting Pichay by nal
judgment of four counts of libel. 4 In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a
ne in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision became nal and
executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as ne for
each count of libel.
On 9 October 2012, Pichay led his certi cate of candidacy for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.
On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) led a
petition for disquali cation under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was
convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado argued that when
Pichay paid the ne on 17 February 2011, the ve-year period barring him to be a
candidate had yet to lapse. CAIHTE
In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged that the
petition for disquali cation was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certi cate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code, and it was led out of time. He admitted his conviction by nal judgment
for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral
turpitude. He argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his
conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the
publishing company.
On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado led a motion to suspend the proclamation of
Pichay before the Comelec.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur
proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, obtaining a total of seventy-six thousand
eight hundred seventy (76,870) votes.
On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado led an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto
before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of
Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by nal judgment of four counts of libel,
a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed since he served
his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. In his Answer,
Pichay claimed that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him ineligible
because ineligibility only pertained to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution.
In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed the
petition for disqualification filed against Pichay because of lack of jurisdiction.
On 16 July 2013, Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad
cautelam petition into a regular petition for quo warranto.
On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place and the parties
waived the presentation of their evidence upon agreement that their case only involved
legal issues.
The HRET Decision
In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had jurisdiction over the
present quo warranto petition since it involved the eligibility of a Member of the House
of Representatives due to a disquali cation under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. However, the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines
which found that Pichay directly participated in any way in writing the libelous articles,
aside from being the president of the publishing company. Thus, the HRET concluded
that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that the crime
did not involve moral turpitude.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: DETACa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition (for Quo

Warranto) is DISMISSED, and respondent Philip A. Pichay is DECLARED
ELIGIBLE to hold and serve the of ce of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
In Resolution No. 15-031 dated 3 August 2015, the HRET denied Ty-Delgado's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit considering that no new matter was raised
which justified the reversal or modification of the Decision.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Ty-Delgado raises the following issues for resolution:
[I]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING RESPONDENT
PICHAY'S CONVICTION OF LIBEL DID NOT SHOW THAT MORAL TURPITUDE IS
INVOLVED, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 161032 ENTITLED "ERWIN TULFO V.
PEOPLE AND ATTY. CARLOS T. SO" AND IN G.R. NO. 161176 ENTITLED
"SUSAN CAMBRI, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL." HEITAD
[II]
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENT PICHAY INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED
FROM HOLDING THE POSITION OF MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES BY REASON OF HIS CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
[III]
FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY FALSELY REPRESENTED
IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR
CONGRESSMAN BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE RENDERED HIM INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.
[IV]
FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY SHOULD BE DEEMED TO
HAVE NEVER BECOME A CANDIDATE SINCE HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
IS VOID AB INITIO.
[V]
FAILING TO DECLARE THAT SINCE THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO
QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CANDIDACY, THE
JURISPRUDENCE ON A "SECOND PLACER" BEING PROCLAIMED AS WINNER
SHOULD THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF A "FIRST PLACER" IS
CANCELLED, SHOULD APPLY.
[VI]
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY
FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DELGADO WAS THE SOLE
LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, THUS SHE MUST BE
DECLARED THE RIGHTFUL WINNER IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS AND MUST BE
MADE TO ASSUME THE SAID POSITION. 6
We find merit in the petition.
A sentence by nal judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by nal judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disquali ed to be a candidate and to hold
any office , unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disquali cations to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of ve years
from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
ATICcS
Moral turpitude is de ned as everything which is done contrary to justice,

modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 7 Although not
every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general
rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.
8
In Villaber v. Commission on Elections , 9 we held that violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude because a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on the private duties he owes his fellow men or
society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or good morals. In Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections , 10 we held that the
crime of fencing involves moral turpitude because actual knowledge by the "fence" that
property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature,
are crimes of moral turpitude. In Magno v. Commission on Elections , 11 we ruled that
direct bribery involves moral turpitude, because the fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an of cial duty in exchange for some favors denotes a malicious intent on
the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general.
In Zari v. Flores , 12 we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes involving moral
turpitude. The Revised Penal Code de nes libel as a "public and malicious imputation of
a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." 13 The law recognizes
that the enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the
possession of life, liberty or property. 14
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 15 Malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjusti able harm. 16 Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the
crime of libel. 17 To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to
have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not. 18 Reckless disregard of what is false or not
means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or
possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity. 19
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo
v. People of the Philippines , 20 the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four
defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they
were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the ling of
the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. 21 Thus, Pichay clearly
acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjusti able harm. He
committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he
owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is "contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals."
The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "signi cant that
[Pichay] has raised no issue against libel being a crime involving moral turpitude, and
has taken issue only against ascribing moral turpitude to him despite his being only the
President of the publishing company." 22 Thus, Pichay insists that, since he was only the
publisher of the libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to
payment of ne, the circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral
turpitude. TIADCc
The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means,
shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall
be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were
the author thereof." 23
The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature
or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's criminal liability from the
others' criminal liability only because he was the president of the company that
published the libelous articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability
was the same as that of the others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as
that imposed on the author of the libelous articles.
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as
publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the
publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees
whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually
appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually
concerned in the publication or not. 24
Although the participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in point in
time and in degree, both author and publisher reneged on the private duties they owe
their fellow men or society in a manner contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.
Contrary to Pichay's argument, the imposition of a ne does not determine
whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on
Elections, 25 we held that a crime still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of
imprisonment imposed is reduced to a ne. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , 26 we
explained that a ne was imposed on the accused since they were rst time offenders.
cSEDTC
Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disquali ed under Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Under Section 12, the disquali cation shall be removed after the expiration of a
period of ve years from his service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec , 27 we held that
the ve-year period of disquali cation would end only on 25 May 2010 or ve years
from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the ne he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan. In this case, since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the ne on
17 February 2011, the ve-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay
is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disquali cation under Section 12, which
became nal on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his
eligibility when he led his certi cate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013
elections. Pichay's disquali cation under Section 12 is a material fact involving the
eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certi cate of candidacy
shall state that the person ling it is announcing his candidacy for the
of ce stated therein and that he is eligible for said of ce ; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post of ce
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certi cate of candidacy are true to the best of
his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy. — A
veri ed petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certi cate of
candidacy may be led by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false . The petition may be led at any time not later than twenty- ve,
days from the time of the ling of the certi cate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fteen days before the
election. (Emphases supplied)
In Fermin v. Comelec , 28 we likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code since they both
deal with the eligibility or quali cation of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a Section 78 petition is led before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is led after proclamation of the winning candidate. This is also similar to a
quo warranto petition contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines filed before the HRET. 29
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certi cate
of candidacy is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material
quali cations required for the elective of ce. 30 This is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. 31
In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections , 32 we held that if a candidate is not actually
eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public
of ce, and he still states under oath in his certi cate of candidacy that he is eligible to
run for public of ce, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certi cate of
candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by nal judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective
public of ce constitutes false material representation as to his quali cation or
eligibility for the office. SDAaTC
A person whose certi cate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his
certi cate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. 33 In both Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections 34 and Aratea v. Commission on Elections, 35 we proclaimed the second
placer, the only quali ed candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes,
for the position of Mayor. We found that since the certi cate of candidacy of the
candidate with the highest number of votes was void ab initio, he was never a candidate
at all, and all his votes were considered stray votes.
Accordingly, we nd that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his
conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed
on the day he led his certi cate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were
considered stray votes. Thus, the quali ed candidate for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13
May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared
the winner. Based on the Provincial Canvass Report, the quali ed candidate for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid
votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado. 36
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court
or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it
is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the
members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to
check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits grave
abuse of discretion. 37 AaCTcI
WHEREFORE , we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the

Decision dated 18 March 2015 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 13-022. Respondent Philip A.
Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the of ce of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary
Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the winner for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13
May 2013 elections. Considering that the term of the present House of Representatives
will end on 30 June 2016, this Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., * Peralta * and Bersamin, * JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
* No part.
1. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, pp. 3-49.
2. Signed by Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., (took no part for
being the ponente of Tulfo v. People of the Philippines ), Diosdado M. Peralta
(dissented) and Lucas P. Bersamin (dissented), Representatives Franklin P. Bautista,
Joselito Andrew R. Mendoza, Ma. Theresa B. Bonoan, Wilfrido Mark M. Enverga, Jerry
P. Treñas, and Luzviminda C. Ilagan. Id. at 51-69.
3. Id. at 79. Notice issued by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
4. 587 Phil. 64, 99-100 (2008). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176 are
DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be
imposed upon petitioners shall be a ne of six thousand pesos (PhP6,000) for each
count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of
actual damages and exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision dated November
17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600 is modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court nds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY
SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL , as de ned in Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to pay a ne of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in
case of insolvency.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn
Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4) defamatory
articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said
articles being libelous per se , they are hereby ordered to pay complainant
Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(PhP1,000,000) as moral damages . The claim of actual and exemplary damages is
denied for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
5. Rollo, p. 67.
6. Id. at 11-13.
7. Teves v. Commission on Elections , 604 Phil. 717 (2009); Villaber v. Commission on
Elections, 420 Phil. 930 (2001); Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections , 327 Phil.
1144 (1996) citing Zari v. Flores , 183 Phil. 27 (1979); International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760.
8. Id.
9. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, supra.
10. Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, supra.
11. 439 Phil. 339 (2002).
12. 183 Phil. 27 (1979).

13. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 353.
14. Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912).
15. Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004).
16. Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1 (1999).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, supra note 4.
21. Id. citing United States v. Montalvo, 29 Phil. 595 (1915).

22. Rollo, p. 76. Justice Lucas P. Bersamin penned the dissenting opinion in the HRET and
Justice Diosdado M. Peralta joined the dissent.
23. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 360.

24. United States v. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1 (1910).
25. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, supra note 7.
26. Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, supra note 4.
27. Teves v. Commission on Elections, supra note 7.

28. 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
29. Rule 17 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides: "RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A veri ed petition
f o r quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall be led by any registered voter of the district concerned within
fteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party ling the
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known
as the respondent.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, a petition for quo
warranto may be led by any registered voter of the district concerned against a
member of the House of Representatives, on the ground of citizenship, at any time
during his tenure."
30. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 706 Phil. 534 (2013); Fermin v.
Comelec, supra.
31. Fermin v. Comelec, supra.
32. 696 Phil. 601 (2012).

33. Id.; Aratea v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 700 (2012).
34. Supra.
35. Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra.
36. Rollo, p. 183. The candidates for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections are
the following: (1) Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado, who garnered a total of 55,489 votes;
(2) Victor T. Murillo, who garnered a total of 1,777 votes; and (3) Philip A. Pichay,
who garnered a total of 76,870 votes.
37. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18684. September 14, 1961.]
LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO,

ROGACIANO MERCADO and MARIANO PERDICES , petitioners, vs . THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity
as National Treasurer , respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for petitioners.

Barrios, Garcia & Apostol for respondent Commission on Elections.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiazon for respondent National Treasurer.
SYLLABUS
1. REDISTRICTING STATUTES; WHO CAN BRING ACTION TO TEST VALIDITY.

— Citizens who are deprived of an election franchise to which they are entitled under the
Constitution by an apportionment act, have sufficient interest to test its validity.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO REVIEW APPORTIONMENT LAWS. — District
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts. The constitutionality of a
legislative apportionment act is a judicial question.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS OF APPORTIONMENT; PRELIMINARY CENSUS
ENUMERATION. — Apportionment of legislative district may legally rest on o cial
census enumeration even if not yet final.
4. ID.; ID.; AVOIDANCE OF STATUTE; DISPROPORTIONMENT OF
REPRESENTATION. — Republic Act No. 3040 that gave provinces with less number of
inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is declared
invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the
Constitution.
DECISION
BENGZON , C.J : p
Statement of the case. — Petitioners request that respondent o cials be

presented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions representative
districts in this country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was
passed by the House of Representatives without printed nal copies of the bill having
been furnished the Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was
approved more than three years after the return of the last census of our population;
and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the
several provinces.
Admitting some allegations but denying others, the respondents aver they were
merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to
be constitutional. The respondent National Treasurer further avers that petitioners have
no personality to bring this action; that a duly certi ed copy of the law creates the
presumption of its having been passed in accordance with the requirements of the
Constitution (distribution of printed bills included); that the Director of the Census
submitted an o cial report on the population of the Philippines in November 1960,
which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the principle
of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.
After hearing the parties and considering their memoranda, this Court reached
the conclusion that the statute should be declared invalid, and, aware of the need of
prompt action, issued its brief resolution of August 23, partly in the following language:
"Whereas such Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said constitutional
provision in several ways namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal
with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four
members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; . . .;"
"Whereas such violation of the Constitutional mandate renders the law

void;
"Therefore, without prejudice to the writing of a more extended opinion

passing additionally on other issues raised in the case, the Court resolved, without
any dissent, forthwith to issue the injunction prayed for by the petitioners. No
bond is needed."
What with the reservation announced in the resolution, and what with the motion
for reconsideration, this is now written fully to explain the premises on which our
conclusion rested.
Personality of the petitioners. — Petitioners are our members of the House of
Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincial
governor of Negros Oriental. They bring this action in behalf of themselves and of other
residents of their provinces. They allege, and this Court nds, that their provinces had
been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were given less
representative districts than the number of their inhabitants required or justi ed:
Misamis Oriental having 387,839 inhabitants, was given one district only, whereas
Cavite with 379,902 inhabitants, was given two districts; Negros Oriental and Bulacan
with 598,783 and 557,691 respectively, were allotted 2 representative districts each,
whereas Albay with 515,961 was assigned 3 districts.
The authorities hold that "citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an
elective franchise as they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment
act, have a su cient interest to proceed in a court to test the statute. (18 Am. Jur.
199.)
Therefore, petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the
aggrieved provinces have personality to sue.
In Stiglitz vs. Schardien (Ky) 40 S.W. (2d) 315, the right of a citizen to question
the validity of a redistricting statute was upheld. The same right was recognized in
Jones vs. Freeman (Okla.) 146 P. (2d) 564, the court saying that each citizen has the
right to have the State apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and to be
governed by Legislative fairly representing the whole body of electorate and elected as
required by the Constitution.
Colegrove vs. Green, 328 U.S. 549, on which respondents rely, appear to be
inconclusive: three against three. The seventh justice concurred in the result even
supposing the contrary was justiciable."
The printed-form, three-day requirement. — The Constitution provides that "no bill
shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in
its nal form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
except when the President shall have certi ed to the necessity of its immediate
enactment."
Petitioners presented certi cates of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives to show that no printed copy had been distributed three days before
passage of the bill (on May 10, 1961) and that no certi cate of urgency by the
President had been received in the House.
The respondents claim in their defense that a statute may not be nulli ed upon
evidence of failure to print, because "it is conclusively presumed that the details of
legislative procedure leading to the enrollment that are prescribed by the Constitution
have been complied with by the Legislature." They further claim that the certi cates of
the Secretary of the House are inadmissible, in view of the conclusive (enrolled-bill)
presumption, which in several instances have been applied by the courts. In further
support of their contention, sec. 313 (2) of Act 190 might be cited. 1
On the other hand, it may be said for the petitioners, that such printed-bill
requirement had a fundamental purpose to serve 2 and was inserted in the Constitution
not as a mere procedural step; and that the enrolled-bill theory, if adopted, would
preclude the courts from enforcing such requirement in proper cases.
We do not deem it necessary to make a de nite pronouncement on this question,
because the controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-to-
inhabitants.
Population Census. — According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law,
make an apportionment (of Members of the House) within three years after the return
of every enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which later became
Republic Act 3040, was based upon a report submitted to the President by the Director
of the Census on November 23, 1960. It reads:
"I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population
of the Philippines as a result of the population enumeration which has just been
completed. This is a report on the total number of inhabitants in this country and
does not include the population characteristics. It is the result of a hand tally and
may be subject to revision when all the population schedules shall have been
processed mechanically.
The Census of Population is the rst of a series of four censuses which

include housing, agriculture and economics in addition to population. These four
censuses together constitute what is known as the Census of 1960. Like
population, the housing and agricultural censuses are undergoing processing,
while the economic census is now under preparation.
Until the nal report is made, these gures should be considered as o cial
for all purposes."
Petitioners maintain that the apportionment could not legally rest on this report
since it is merely "preliminary" and "may be subject to revision." On the other hand,
respondents point out that the above letter says the report should be considered
"o cial for all purposes." They also point out that the ascertainment of what
constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for Congress action. This issue does
not clearly favor petitioners, because there are authorities sustaining the view that
although not nal, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be
considered o cial, in the sense that Governmental action may be based thereon even
in matters of apportionment of legislative districts (Cahill vs. Leopold [Conn.] 103 Atl.
2d 818) (See also Elliott vs. State, 1 Pac. 2d 370; Ervin vs. State, 44 S.W. 2d 380;
Herndon vs. Excise Board, 295 Pac. 223; Holcomb vs. Spikes, 232 S.W. 891.)
Apportionment of Members. — The Constitution directs that the one hundred
twenty Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants." In our resolution on August 23, we held that this provision was violated by
Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger
number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato
with a bigger population got three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both
Manila and Cotabato got more than both ve members having been assigned to it; (d)
Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three
only; (e) Bulacan vs. with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants
(515,691) got three, and (f) Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only,
while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances
of unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela,
Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then Capiz, La Union and
Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas, Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte
with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was
given 5.
Such disproportion of representation has been held su cient to avoid
apportionment laws enacted in States having Constitutional provisions similar to ours.
For instance, in Massachusetts, the Constitution required division "into representative
district . . . equally, as nearly as may be, according to the relative number of legal voters
in the several districts." The Supreme Judicial Court of that state found this provision
violated by an allotment that gave 3 representatives to 7,946 voters and only 2
representatives to 8,618 voters, and further gave two representatives to 4,854 voters
and one representative to 5,598 voters. Chief Justice Rugg said:
"It is not an approximation to equality to allot three representatives to
7,946 voters, and only two representatives to 8,618 voters, and to allot two
representatives to 4,854 voters, and one representative to 5,596 voters . . .
"Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before
the courts, it has been held to the contrary to the constitution. It has been
said to be 'arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of
equality.' Houghton Country vs. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638, 647, 653, 16 LRA 432,
52 N. W. 951; Giddings vs. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 13, 16 LRA 402, 52 N. W. 944;
Barker vs. State, 133 Ind. 178, 197, 18 LRA 567, 32 NE 836, 33 NE 119;
Denney vs. State, 144 Ind. 503, 535, 31 LRA 726, 42 N. E. 929."
Other cases along the same line upholding the same view are these:
1. Stiglitz vs. Schardien, supra, wherein twelve districts entitled to but six
were given twelve representatives, and twelve districts given twelve only were actually
entitled to twenty-two.
2. Jones vs. Freeman, supra, wherein districts entitled to only 3 senators
were given 7, and districts entitled to 15 were assigned seven only.
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves
existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship,
consider the question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts.
"The Constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial
question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it
is political question." (Parker vs. State ex rel. Powell, 18 L. R. A. 567, 133 Ind.
178, 32 N. E. 836; State ex rel. Morris vs. Wrightson, 22 L. R. A. 548, 56 N. J.
L., 126, 28 Atl. 56; Harmison vs. Balot Comrs. 42 L. R. A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179,
31 S. E. 394)
"It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so
exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court
from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly
brought before it." (Indiana-Parker vs. Powell (1882) 133 Ind. 178, 18 L. R. A.
567, 32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. 119; Denney vs. State (1896) 144 Ind. 503; 31 L. R.
A. 726, 42 N. E. 929; Marion County vs. Jewett (1915) 184 Ind. 63, 110 N. E.
553.) (Kentucky-Ragland vs. Anderson (1907) 125 Ky. 141, 128 Am. St. Rep.
242, 100 S. W. 865.) (Massachusetts-Atty. Gen. vs. Suffolk County
Apportionment Comrs. etc.)
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the
political situation does not render it political instead of judicial. (Lamb vs. Cunningham,
17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90.)
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up
constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations,
because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt
that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of
duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the
precepts of the Constitution.
Needless to say, equality of representation 3 in the legislature being such an
essential feature of republican institutions, and affecting so many lives, the judiciary
may not with a clear conscience stand by to give free hand to the discretion of the
political departments of the Government. Cases are numerous wherein courts
intervened upon proof of violation of the constitutional principle of equality of
representation.
"An injunction to prevent the secretary of state from issuing notices of
election under an unconstitutional apportionment act gerrymandering the
state is not a usurpation of authority by the court, on the ground that the
question is a political one, but the constitutionality of the act is purely a
judicial question." (State ex rel. Adams County v. Cunningham, 15 L.R.A. 561,
81 Wis. 440, 51 N. W. 724.)
"The fact that the action may have a political effect, and in that sense
effect a political object, does not make the questions involved in a suit to
declare the unconstitutionality of an apportionment act political instead of
judicial." (State ex re. Lamb v. Cunningham, 17 L.R.A. 145, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.
W. 48.)
"An unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the

courts, notwithstanding the fact that such statute is an exercise of political
power." (Denney vs. State ex rel. Basler, 31 L.R.A. 726, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N. E.
929.)
"The constitutionality of a statute forming a delegate district or
apportioning delegates for the house of delegates is a judicial question for
the courts, although the statute is an exercise of political power." (Harmison
v. Ballot Comrs. 42 L.R.A. 591, 45 W. Va. 179, 31 S. B. 394.) [3 L.R.A. Digest
p. 2737.]
Conclusion. — For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring
that Republic Act 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore
void.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. ". . . Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and
of the due enactments thereof." (Italics ours.)
2. To prevent fraud, trickery, deceit and subterfuge in the enactment of bills (59 Corpus
Juris 54).
3. "lies at the foundation of representative government" (18 Am. Jur. 192).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.]
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers) , respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS , intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO , intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS) , intervenor.
[G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.]
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO , petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari
and mandamus, 1 assails the Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL).
The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT led before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3 assails NBC Resolution No.
07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, led a motion to intervene in both G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT led a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution,
docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT led its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". 7 There were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT led a
memorandum on 19 July 2007. aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens' Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July
2007, had o cially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six
hundred fty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/ 15,283,659

tabulated
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% 102,430

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar,
Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided, nally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be
pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receiving more than the required
two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of
Restraining Order) has been led before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included
in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.
SATDHE
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act
Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Women's Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC
Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained
at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC
No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the
additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC
Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13)
quali ed parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected
maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total
party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received
but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List Projected total number of votes
1 BUHAY 1,178,747
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13)
quali ed parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the " rst party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC,
reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC; acITSD
WHEREAS, quali ed parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one
guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
————————————— = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
————— = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other quali ed parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in
Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = —————— x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List Percentage Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos.
6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained
at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 9
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution led by the Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041
(PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number — twenty percent (20%) — of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed. CaDEAT
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the rst party-list representative
seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes
of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In ne, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF
PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining
how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall
seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial
Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National
and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results".
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED. 1 0
BANAT led a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not le a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 1 1
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations
as quali ed parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 1 2
Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 1 3 and An Waray. 1 4 Per the certi cation 1 5 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed
as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disquali cation of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been
filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. SaHIEA
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it
merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 1 6
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying
parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;
C.Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case of Veterans
Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to quali ed party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues
involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation. 1 7
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we de ned the following issues in our
advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a
ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? 1 8

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly
stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each quali ed party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a quali ed party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total
number of votes". 1 9 ITSacC

However, because the formula in Veterans has aws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation", this Court is
compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law". The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point,
we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available to Number of seats available to
legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
————————————
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district
is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
———— x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature .
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the
formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there
are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats " under the Party-List System. Veterans
produced the First Party Rule, 20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula 2 1 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 2 2 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, nally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations,
or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The rst interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
BANAT described this procedure as follows: ASEIDH
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including
those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec
Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained;
provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and
after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list
groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. 2 3
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the
seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 2 4
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats". 2 5 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being lled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats
allotted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the quali ed parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a quali ed party by the total votes of all quali ed
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a quali ed party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a rst round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated
to the concerned party-list. After all the quali ed parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until
all the seats are filled up. 2 6
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections. 2 7
Rank Party Votes

Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234
3 CIBAC 755,686
4 GABRIELA 621,171
5 APEC 619,657
6 A TEACHER 490,379
7 AKBAYAN 466,112
8 ALAGAD 423,149
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883
10 BUTIL 409,160
11 BATAS 385,810
12 ARC 374,288
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261
14 ABONO 339,990
15 AMIN 338,185
16 AGAP 328,724
17 AN WARAY 321,503
18 YACAP 310,889
19 FPJPM 300,923
20 UNI-MAD 245,382
21 ABS 235,086
22 KAKUSA 228,999
23 KABATAAN 228,637
24 ABA-AKO 218,818
25 ALIF 217,822
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058
27 AT 197,872
28 VFP 196,266
29 ANAD 188,521
30 BANAT 177,028
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531
32 BANTAY 169,801
33 ABAKADA 166,747
34 1-UTAK 164,980
35 TUCP 162,647
36 COCOFED 155,920
37 AGHAM 146,032
38 ANAK 141,817
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356
40 PM 119,054
41 AVE 110,769
42 SUARA 110,732
43 ASSALAM 110,440
44 DIWA 107,021
45 ANC 99,636
46 SANLAKAS 97,375
47 ABC 90,058

48
49 KALAHI
APOI 88,868
79,386
50 BP 78,541
51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
52 BIGKIS 77,327
53 PMAP 75,200
54 AKAPIN 74,686
55 PBA 71,544
56 GRECON 62,220
57 BTM 60,993
58 A SMILE 58,717
59 NELFFI 57,872
60 AKSA 57,012
61 BAGO 55,846
62 BANDILA 54,751
63 AHON 54,522
64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
65 AGBIAG! 50,837
66 SPI 50,478
67 BAHANDI 46,612
68 ADD 45,624
69 AMANG SCIAaT 43,062
70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
71 BABAE KA 36,512
72 SB 34,835
73 ASAP 34,098
74 PEP 33,938
75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
76 VENDORS 33,691
77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
78 ALMANA 32,255
79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130
80 AAPS 26,271
81 HAPI 25,781
82 AAWAS 22,946
83 SM 20,744
84 AG 16,916
85 AGING PINOY 16,729
86 APO 16,421
87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
88 ATS 14,161
89 UMDJ 9,445
90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
91 LYPAD 8,471
92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
93 KASAPI 6,221
—————
TOTAL 15,950,900
=========
The rst clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the rst 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2.The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list. 2 8
Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed

Garnered Garnered over Seat
Total Votes
for Party-List,
in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS 2 9 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP IDTHcA 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
——
Total 17
===
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. The 17 quali ed party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each", or the
guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes ". This is where petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the
first party . This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats , the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional . This Court nds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates
the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the rst 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives". 3 0
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering su cient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-
List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next
in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3.Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) plus Applying

Garnered Garnered Seat Seats (C), in the three
over whole seat
Total integers cap
Votes for
Party List,
in %
(First (Second
Round) Round)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9 31 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
—— ——
Total 17 55
==== ====
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning
party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are lled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with su cient number of votes
for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections . The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the
district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can eld candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also eld sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted,
of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they eld candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate
in this Constitution .
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can eld candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or
not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited
to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve". Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. DAETHc
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE.
. . . In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we
have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so
that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they
will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact
mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment
will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC
the names of representatives of mass organizations a liated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that
they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic
Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies
and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations
should not combine, reenforce, in uence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for
sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-
Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to
the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 3 2 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party
when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. cDaEAS
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups. 3 3 In de ning a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party", R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the
Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major
political parties can thus organize, or a liate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
sherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this sherfolk wing can eld its sherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Quali cations of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
elections, able to read and write, bona de member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty- ve (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration
of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity" 3 4 as
there is no nancial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, 3 5 that is, if the nominee represents the sherfolk, he or she must be a sherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the lling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fty members, unless
otherwise xed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being lled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a quali ed party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-
041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. ECISAD
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., certify that J. Quisumbing joined the Chief Justice's Opinion.-RSP
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., join the Chief Justice in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO , C.J., concurring and dissenting :
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to nd their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as
genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying premise that the party-list system was espoused
and embedded in the Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of major political parties to the party-list
system.
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 1 with regard to the computation of seat allotments
and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it bene ts the party-
list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political
parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence this dissent.
To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 2
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the disquali cation of the major political parties on the ground
that the party-list system was intended to bene t the marginalized and underrepresented, and not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled through then Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any
duly registered political party, organization or group may participate, the role of the Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized
and underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-style" party-list elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a
social justice vehicle, the Court batted for the empowerment of the masses, thus —
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity.
It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity
to be elected and to represent the speci c concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The
State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory achieved by the marginalized in the political arena in
Ang Bagong Bayani . In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list system is open to all political
parties, as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors. 3 Buttressing his view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that
the major political parties also fall within the term "political parties" in the De nition of Terms in Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. 4 Likewise, he holds that the quali cations of a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the said law do not
specify any nancial status or educational requirement, hence, it is not necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity". 5 It is then concluded that major political parties may now participate in the party-list system.
With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost
deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission,
these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people rati ed. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in
interpreting the Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary , we held:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members , and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. 6 aSTAcH
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause. 7 We should
strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some words idle and nugatory. 8 The harmonization of Article
VI, Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under
Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, 9 the President was permitted to ll by appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation
under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw
how the elected Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral representation and
delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by
the people. 1 0 To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the President was given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely
plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the process of
drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation". 1 1 Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the
marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional
mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good"; 1 2 the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making; 1 3 the right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their
full potential in the service of the nation; 1 4 the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
bene ts in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; 1 5 the right of teachers to professional advancement; 1 6 the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and
policies, 1 7 and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy. 1 8
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is
borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results
con rmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission 1 9 that major political parties would gure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties 2 0 made it to the top 50. These
seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155
parties (including those whose quali cations were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties
2 1 or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled
them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out
of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%. 2 2
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt
them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our
people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have
the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system
electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.
NACHURA , J., concurring :
I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the in exible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-
list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 1 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement —
xed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system — presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative
objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the people's broadest representation in Congress, 2 the raison d'etre for the adoption of the
party-list system.
Article VI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides:
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations .
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. SEHTIc
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section. 3
This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system 4 of representation by allowing different sectors, parties,
organizations and coalitions to win a legislative seat. It diversi es the membership in the legislature and "gives genuine power to the people". 5
As aforesaid, the Constitution desires the people's widest representation in Congress.
To determine the total number of seats that will be allocated to party-list groups based on the foregoing constitutional provision, this
Court, in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 6 declared:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list
lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives, including those under the party-list." We thus
translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives

——————————— x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
On the basis of this formula, the number of party-list seats is not static; it could add up to a substantial gure depending on the additional
number of legislative districts which Congress may create. Thus, for instance, the ponencia states that "since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives", based on the following computation:
220
————— x .20 = 55
.80
To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 11 7 of which sets,
among others, the inviolable parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition, must obtain at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system in order to claim one seat in the House of Representatives. This is referred to as the threshold vote, or the
minimum vote requirement.
Here lies the crux of its unconstitutionality.
Given this xed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives which may be occupied by party-list
representatives can never exceed fifty (50), because:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list system)
——————————————————— = 50
2%
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district
representatives.
I see a scenario in the future when, because of the inexorable growth in the country’s population, Congress should see t to increase the
legislative district seats to 400. If that happens, there would be a corresponding adjustment in party-list representation that will translate to
100 party-list seats, applying the formula in Veterans Federation Party, viz.:
400
————— x .20 = 100
.80
Yet, by virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of seats that the political parties, organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50.
This is not an unlikely scenario. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court's decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in
the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that gure (of 55) can never be realized,
because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%. DTcACa
This, to my mind, stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941. A legal provision that poses an insurmountable barrier to
the full implementation and realization of the constitutional provision on the party-list system should be declared void. As Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno says in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, "(W)e should strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid
rendering some word idle and nugatory". 8
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote
requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party.
I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed —
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than
owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of
the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people
su cient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented. 9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of
additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the xed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not
adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the
fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not
mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by
Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental
law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional
provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a
constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, what then do we use as the norm for a minimum vote requirement to entitle a political party, sectoral
organization or coalition, to a party-list seat in the House of Representatives?
I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to the minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we abide by
the sensible standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to
the increase in the number of party-list seats. Thus, at present, considering that there are 55 seats allocated for party-list groups, the formula
should be:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
—————————————————— = 1.818%
55 party-list seats
The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we
presented above should ever come to pass, and there are 100 seats allocated for party-list groups, then the threshold vote should be 1%, based
on the following computation: cEITCA
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
————————————————— = 1%
100 party-list seats
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of
Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people's representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it
would not violate the Constitution.
Time changes and laws change with it. 1 0 And the Constitution —
must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from being a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation. 1 1
Thus, with respect to the xed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all
enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated. 1 2
Footnotes
1.Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 86-87. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo
A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
3.Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 103-108. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.,
Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
5.396 Phil. 419 (2000).

6.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-986; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-815. Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
7.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 70.
8.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 88-92.

9.Id. at 150-153.
10.Id. at 86-87.
11.Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), p. 112.

12.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 158-159. NBC Resolution No. 07-74, 24 July 2007.
13.Id. at 160-161. NBC Resolution No. 07-87, 3 August 2007.
14.NBC Resolution No. 07-97, 4 September 2007.

15.Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certi cation should have included An Waray, which was proclaimed on 4 September 2007 under
NBC Resolution No. 07-97.
16.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14.

17.Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22.

18.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.
19.Supra note 5 at 424.
20.Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining

Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the rst party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the rst party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be
entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the rst party is entitled
is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
———————— = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party -list system
If the proportion of votes received by the rst party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the rst party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the rst party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the
proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the rst party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would
prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank
and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum
number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine
the number of additional seats of the other quali ed parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above
formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the rst party received a signi cantly
higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining
twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the rst party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional

Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other quali ed parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction: HCSEIT
No. of votes of
concerned party
———————
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
————————
Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ——————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
xxx xxx xxx
Incidentally, if the rst party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the rst one is
multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by
the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional
slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
21.Id. at 475-481.
22.The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided in Section 10 of R.A. No. 7941.
23.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.

24.Id. at 48.
25.Id. at 1076.
26.Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.

27.Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
28.Id.
29.Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.

30.Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.
31.The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine and below is less than one.
32.II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August 1986).
33.Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 350 (2001).
34.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).
35.Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

PUNO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
1.G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
2.Id.
3.II Record, Constitutional Commission, 25 July 1986, pp. 256-257.
4.Section 3.
5.Main opinion, p. 33.

6.G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337.
7.Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.
8.Id.
9.Article XVIII.
10.V Record, Constitutional Commission, 1 October 1986, p. 332.
11.Id. at 330.
12.Article XIII, Section 1.
13.Article XIII, Sec. 16.
14.Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to section 14.
15.Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to Article II, Sec. 18.

16.Article XIV, Sec. 5.
17.Article XIV, Sec. 17.
18.Article II, Sec. 20.

19.Id., at 562.
20.As noted in Bagong Bayani: Nationalist People's Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, Aksyon Demokratiko, Partido ng
Masang Pilipino, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan and Liberal Party. DScTaC
21.Nationalist People's Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
22.Party List Canvass Report No. 26, Commission on Elections.
NACHURA, J., concurring:

1.Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR", approved on March 3, 1995.
2.Section 2, R.A. 7941, provides:
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible". (Emphasis supplied.)
3.Emphasis supplied.
4.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698, 716.
5.Id. at 717.
6.G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000; 342 SCRA 244.
7.In full, the provision reads:
"Section 11.Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the rst ve (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
"In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
"(a)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
"(b)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
8.Citing Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.

9.Id. at 290. AaEcHC
10.Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 314-315.
11.Isagani A. Cruz, "A Quintessential Constitution", San Beda Law Journal, April 1972.
12.Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704, 730-731.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010.]
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON

REMOTO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
. . . [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that
others may make different choices — choices we would not make for ourselves,
choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us.
However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and
the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core
value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
de nitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox — philosophical justi cations about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, led by Ang Ladlad LGBT
P a r t y (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December
16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad rst applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again led a
Petition 5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
. . . This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner de nes the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
. . . a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly

disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
. . . refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and

sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This de nition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise
also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2,
2008: CcADHI
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in

the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age'. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the
history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,

relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which de nes
nuisance as 'Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which . . . (3) shocks, de es; or disregards
decency or morality . . .
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: 'The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art. 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that 'Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy' are inexistent and void from
the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and

indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a ne ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and ne,
shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly

contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their

knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,

exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes;
(2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet tra c in and
use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit lms, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.THADEI
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating

immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of
its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article
that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, 9 three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlad's Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for
the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.
Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per
se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-
list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
bene t the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention
of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance
and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation's — only
that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of
their under representation. Until the time comes when L a dl a d is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities
is bene cial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the
party-list system will remain just that .
II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine
jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and
bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. . . . Signi cantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to
protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the
case of race or religion or belief. EcHTCD
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is

elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike .
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Public Morals

. . . There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group's
moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based,
but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are
not publicly accepted moral norms .
V.Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the
land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F: "Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, * Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission .
. . or anything else . . . which shocks, de es or disregards decency or morality . . .
." These are all unlawful. 1 0
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) to le
its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 1 1
Instead of ling a Comment, however, the OSG led a Motion for Extension, requesting
that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 1 2 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG
later led a Comment in support of petitioner's application. 1 3 Thus, in order to give
COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to le its own
comment. 1 4 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, led its Comment on
February 2, 2010. 1 5
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing
the Assailed Resolutions. 1 6
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) led a
Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention. 1 7 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to
intervene. DcaECT
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. led his Motion to Intervene 18
which motion was granted on February 2, 2010. 1 9
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justi ed the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines'
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELEC's allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classi cation. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner's
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained
that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to bene t the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the rst time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of
the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors speci cally enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 2 0 "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not
whether a sector is speci cally enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and
a liate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon veri cation by its eld
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner
does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 2 1
EaISTD
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner's
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's right to procedural due
process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal
of Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 a liates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 2 2
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
• Abra Gay Association
• Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB)-Aklan
• Albay Gay Association

• Arts Center of Cabanatuan City-Nueva Ecija
• Boys Legion-Metro Manila
• Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
• Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila

• Cebu Pride-Cebu City
• Circle of Friends
• Dipolog Gay Association-Zamboanga del Norte
• Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
• Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)-Metro

Manila
• Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila

• Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)-Lanao del Norte
• Iloilo City Gay Association-Iloilo City
• Kabulig Writer's Group-Camarines Sur
• Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
• LUMINA-Baguio City
• Marikina Gay Association-Metro Manila
• Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)-Metro Manila
• Naga City Gay Association-Naga City
• ONE BACARDI AaITCS
• Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila

• PUP LAKAN
• RADAR PRIDEWEAR
• Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.-Metro Manila

• San Jose del Monte Gay Association-Bulacan
• Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family-Rizal
• Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)-Metro Manila
• Soul Jive-Antipolo, Rizal
• The Link-Davao City

• Tayabas Gay Association-Quezon
• Women's Bisexual Network-Metro Manila
• Zamboanga Gay Association-Zamboanga City 2 3
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD
LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. In fact, if COMELEC's ndings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist
in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we nd that Ang Ladlad has su ciently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not quali ed to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality, or
lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters." 2 4 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justi cation is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." 2 5 We thus nd that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justi cation
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 2 6
. . . The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may in uence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make
it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have
a compelling in uence on those engaged in public deliberations over what
actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and
moral codes with a compelling in uence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner,
harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian
or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justi cation to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. . . . Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
in uence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
exible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 2 7
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny

Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality
and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: aIcCTA
Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists
of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth.
Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a
bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized
society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence. 2 8
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is
not di cult to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen t to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. 2 9
The Assailed Resolutions have not identi ed any speci c overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a nding
by the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing
immoral acts." 3 0 The OSG argues:
. . . A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate
to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its
hands full of disquali cation cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 3 1
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We,
of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to
society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion
of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also nd the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws imsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code de nes a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, de es, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. 3 2 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a su cient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justi cations give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as
a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
"nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classi cation. "Equality," said
Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 3 3 The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances. 3 4
Recent jurisprudence has a rmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classi cation as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 3 5 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 3 6 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges . . . have followed the 'rational
basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classi cations and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution." 3 7
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes su cient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority — is not a legitimate
state interest that is su cient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that
Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would bene t the
nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our nding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that
any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
3 8 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
or differentiated treatment. We have not received su cient evidence to this effect, and
it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. 3 9 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 4 0
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled
in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every
aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of
opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments
may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in
this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments
is nally crystallized into law, the laws will largely re ect the beliefs and
preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless,
in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it speci es
— including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small
— not only for a majority, however large — but for each of us" — the majority
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one. aAcDSC
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does
not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts. 4 2 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have re ected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts,
may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive
conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." 4 3
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs,
in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the
law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking
or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 4 4 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to nd solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 4 5 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even de ant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration
the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at
its most liberal, re ect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and
we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality
through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly
denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
quali cations of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A denial of the petition for registration . . . does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not
be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that

the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting,
if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public o ce is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. . . . 4 7
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its quali cations to
participate in the party-list system, and — as advanced by the OSG itself — the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in
the political process with other equally-quali ed party-list candidates, we nd that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International
Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly signi cant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as

follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general

application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not speci cally enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." 4 8 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements. 4 9
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to

electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and
the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective o ce ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justi able on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
of political a liation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of
any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and
explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons
from elective office. 5 0
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now
to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
5 1 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not re ective of the current state of
international law, and do not nd basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 5 2
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status. ATDHSC
We also hasten to add that not everything that society — or a certain segment of
society — wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate
that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs
that identi es many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international
law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights"
language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of
a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are — at best — de
lege ferenda — and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so
much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more
than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.
53
As a nal note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in ux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own
view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, unin uenced by public opinion, and con dent in the knowledge that our democracy
is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE , the Petition is hereby GRANTED . The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE . The Commission on Elections is directed to
GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED .
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,
Perezand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., Pls. see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Abad.
Brion, J., joins dissent of J. Corona.
Abad, J., I certify that J. Abad wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO , C.J., concurring :
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr.

Justice Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion
to underscore some points that I deem significant. EScIAa
FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run

afoul of the non-establishment clause 1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on
the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal — much less constitutional —
terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party principally
on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian 2 and
Muslim 3 ) beliefs." To be sure, the COMELEC's ruling is completely antithetical to the
fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily
secular [,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions ." 4 As we explained in
Estrada v. Escritor , 5 the requirement of an articulable and discernible secular
purpose is meant to give esh to the constitutional policy of full religious freedom for
all, viz.:
Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to
know, but often, to act in accordance with man's "views of his relations to His
Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment
of this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the a rmative
"establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the "war of all sects
against all"; the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social
contract produced by religious truce.
Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or "public morals" in the
Revised Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral character" in the
Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred
to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
in uence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform
to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion;" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore
requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance
upon religious justi cation is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 6
(citations omitted and italics supplied)
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the

constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights . 7 Ang Ladlad's right of political participation was unduly
infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of
its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a
morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement" 8
with religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether
Christian or Muslim" 9 since the "moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have
slipped into society and . . . are now publicly accepted moral norms." 1 0 However, as
correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen t to
disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has
legislated to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy
grounds. 1 1 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality,
crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.
Some people may nd homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and
offensive. Nevertheless, private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be
attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas , 1 2 opined:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by
religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they
aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations
do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the . . . law. "Our obligation is to de ne the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code." 1 3
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad's de nition of the term
"sexual orientation," 1 4 as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex
with men, 1 5 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual
individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate
exercise of personal liberty . For, the "ability to [independently] de ne one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all
depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 1 6 As Mr. Justice
Blackmun so eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 1 7
(overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen years later in Lawrence v.
Texas ): 1 8
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality[.]"1 9 The fact that individuals
de ne themselves in a signi cant way through their intimate sexual relationships
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds. 2 0 AEITDH
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of

giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of
the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in
holding that the clearly important state interest in public education should give
way to a competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal
schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no
assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are
'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or
interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different." 2 1 The Court
claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is
the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others. (italics supplied)
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 2 2 Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. 2 3 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause. 2 4 At the heart
of liberty is the right to de ne one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. 2 5 Beliefs about these matters could not
de ne the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
2 6 Lawrence v. Texas 2 7 is again instructive:

To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
de ne the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It su ces for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
con nes of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. When sexuality nds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice. (italics supplied)
THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize
homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal
protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most
liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government
need only show that the challenged classi cation is rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classi cation based on gender or sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classi cation , as to trigger a heightened level of
review .
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection
challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classi cations and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is
a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 2 8 However, Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , 2 9 carved out
an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial scrutiny than mere rationality,
viz.:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classi cation, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classi cation violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our
fundamental law, the Court ruled in favor of the Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. in this wise:
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power,
we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and- le
employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. IEHTaA
xxx xxx xxx

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653
is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of
the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the
class of rank-and- le personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and- le are also
discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in
1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP,
DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees
from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute signi cant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the
scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classi cation — albeit made
indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws — between the
rank-and- le of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classi cation must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The
proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the
coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and- le employees of the BSP
stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude
the rank-and- le employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so
unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because
the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right
to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can
only be invoked against a classi cation made directly and deliberately, as
opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several
other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis con ned to determining the validity within
the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-Ã -vis the grouping, or the lack
thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justi ed on

the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests
"on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determination — even those that have been declared
to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy
determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and
overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the
SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-
le so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and- le employees were denied
(not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the
law is not only super cial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and- le and the
seven other GFIs.
xxx xxx xxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and- le and the rank-and- le of the
other seven GFIs de nitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination — no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs
from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as
unalikes without any rational basis.
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision,
and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence
and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in
international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection
clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the
Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor,
compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws re ect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." DAEIHT
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise

proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test
of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often
skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution speci cally provides that labor is entitled to "humane
conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace — the factory, the o ce or the eld — but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would
be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of

everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of
work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a
minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of
equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction
the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who
work with substantially equal quali cations, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
xxx xxx xxx

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress
in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental
right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and
watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to
strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This
is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or
the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck
down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary
grade or o cer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic
class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a bene t speci cally
withheld from the lower grades. O cers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer,
low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and- le employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank — possessing higher
and better education and opportunities for career advancement — are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not
all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are
less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the
o cers — who have the real economic and nancial need for the adjustment.
This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal
protection grounds is subject to one of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of
review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classi cation utilized and the
nature of the right affected. 3 0 ATaDHC
If a legislative classi cation disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon

the exercise of a "fundamental right," then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the
statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classi cation has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 3 1 Over the years,
the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for equal
protection purposes include classi cations based on race, religion, alienage, national
origin, and ancestry. 3 2 The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation
affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades
because traditional political processes may have broken down. 3 3 In such a case, the
State bears a heavy burden of justi cation, and the government action will be closely
scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose. 3 4
On the other hand, if the classi cation, while not facially invidious, nonetheless
gives rise to recurring constitutional di culties, or if a classi cation disadvantages a
"quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review. 3 5 To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justi cation for the
classi cation must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. 3 6
Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy. 3 7

If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be
tested for mere rationality. 3 8 This is a relatively relaxed standard re ecting the Court's
awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one. 3 9 The presumption is in favor of the classi cation, of the
reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if
any such grounds exist, on which the State acted. 4 0
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative
classi cations warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has looked to four factors, 4 1 thus:
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by
the legislation; 4 2
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a
typical class member's ability to contribute to society; 4 3
(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond
the class members' control; 4 4 and
(4) The political power of the subject class. 4 5
These factors, it must be emphasized, are n o t constitutive essential
element s of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain
weight. 4 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a exible manner; it
has neither required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case. 4 7 Indeed, no single
talisman can de ne those groups likely to be the target of classi cations offensive to
the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny;
experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide. 4 8
In any event, the rst two factors — history of intentional discrimination and
relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute — have
always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied. 4 9 They have been
critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group
is a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 5 0 However, the last two factors — immutability of
the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group — are considered simply to
supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny
exists. 5 1
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classi cations based on
sex or gender — albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis — have been previously
held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classi cation on the basis
of sexual orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect
classification that prompts intermediate review.
The rst consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of
purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation. 5 2 One cannot, in
good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to
be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual
orientation. 5 3 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration for party-
list accreditation in fact state: TaCDIc
6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence

perpetuated against the LGBT Community, among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or
guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of
behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch
lesbians to be raped[, so as] to "cure" them into becoming straight
women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school,
NGOs, and choirs because of their identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused
admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended or are
automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work bene ts once
one's sexual orientation and gender identity is (sic) revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who

are already of age, are broken up by their parents or guardians using
the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on
gays and lesbians to "reform" them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric
counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the de-listing (sic) of
homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-
identity as women and dress as such, are denied entry or services in
certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against
gay men, but were not acknowledged by police as hate crimes or
violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testi ed

that as a young gay person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of
sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not report
to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents.
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden

placed on lesbian and gay people as a class is "more likely than others to re ect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective." 5 4
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to
the person's ability to contribute to society. 5 5 Heightened scrutiny is applied when the
classi cation bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor indicates
the classi cation is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice. 5 6 Insofar as
sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of
Public Health , 5 7 viz.:
The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a
person's ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts
have acknowledged, as well. . . . If homosexuals were a icted with some sort of
impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire
phenomenon of 'staying in the [c]loset' and of 'coming out' would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. . . . In this critical respect, gay persons
stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-
suspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the
distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or
capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in
society. 5 8
Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears

no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society." 5 9 Indeed,
because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities"; 6 0 the
observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national
origin — all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional
protection — "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to re ect prejudice
and antipathy" 6 1 is no less applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to
perform and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation. 6 2 DECSIT
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members
of a class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is
whether the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or
otherwise beyond their control. 6 3 Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay
persons from others and quali es them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group
is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism,
namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex. 6 4
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because
the inability of a person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different
treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "'basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.'"
6 5 However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to
those instances in which the trait de ning the burdened class is absolutely impossible
to change. 6 6 That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is
satis ed when the identifying trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]." 6 7
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to
repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory
treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's
identity. 6 8 Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all] only at
the expense of signi cant damage to the individual's sense of self," classi cations
based thereon "are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable
characteristic." 6 9 Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait
that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or
susceptible to self-help. 7 0
The nal factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or
politically powerless." 7 1 However, the political powerlessness factor of the level-of-
scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness. 7 2
Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the group lacks su cient
political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through
traditional political means." 7 3
Applying this standard, it would not be di cult to conclude that gay persons are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress.
7 4 The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe — even
though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or
perform in society — that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will
suffice to eliminate that discrimination. 7 5 Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT community
plays a role in the political process, it is apparent that their numbers re ect their status
as a small and insular minority. 7 6
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping. 7 7
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the
intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and
intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected 7 8 (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and
trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based classi cation
undertaken for its own sake cannot survive. 7 9
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in
the party-list system because it is not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector"
enumerated either in the Constitution 8 0 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. 8 1 However, this
position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC , 8 2 where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive .
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the
LGBT community as marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history
(and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my
humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation
encompasses social marginalization as well . To hold otherwise is tantamount to
trivializing socially marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the State's
benevolence" and denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of
representative democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to bene t them." 8 3 The
party-list system could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
CORONA , J., dissenting :
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I

believe the basic issue here is simple: does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify,
under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the party-list system? IaHCAD
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks

accreditation by the respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization of
a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding that
petitioner is not a marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on Elections
denied its petition.
A SYSTEM FOR MARGINALIZED
AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a
tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording
opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping
of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that
the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the
advancement of the common good and of our nation's democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-
list system was designed?
THE TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND OF RA 1 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the
fundamental law be consulted. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the
course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5.. . .
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of Representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector . (emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may
qualify as "marginalized" to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties , and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will bene t the nation as a whole , to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals .
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not
later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may,
motu propio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization; AcSHCD
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of
its o cers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. (emphasis supplied)
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS

As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list
system and defined its meaning in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission
on Elections: 2
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that a n y political party — or any organization or group
for that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941 . . . .
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"
the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole .
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
as exempli ed by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5 . Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-de ned constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identi able electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit
of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identi ed
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those
Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system , Filipino-style. ECTHIA
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under

the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941 , which
states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register

as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition veri ed by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is
not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system . It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, quali ed or specialized by those in
immediate association.
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position
to treat them similarly de es reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-
list system as representatives of their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality
is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
speci c concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past —
the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate , as indeed many of
them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the

remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute , but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented ,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for
the bene t of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied

and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented . It cannot let that icker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the quali cation of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list system. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the party-
list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in
the past (e.g., labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and
even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They
are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral
interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the
national interest . That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of "marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole ."
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national
interest (and therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole) be determined? Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno's opinion 3 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections 4 offers valuable insight:
. . . Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the
major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is
aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and bene ts in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement;
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their
cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and
policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.
DIECTc
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to
national interest and therefore bene cial to the nation as a whole because the
Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these sectors in the
nation's life. In other words, the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
under the party-list scheme has been carefully re ned by concrete examples involving
sectors deemed to be signi cant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with
a constitutional bond, that is, speci c sectors subject of speci c provisions in the
Constitution, namely, labor, 5 peasant, 6 urban poor, 7 indigenous cultural communities,
8 women, 9 youth, 1 0 veterans, 1 1 sherfolk, 1 2 elderly, 1 3 handicapped, 1 4 overseas
workers 1 5 and professionals. 1 6
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet
traditionally and historically marginalized sectors promotes the national interest. The
Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.
The long-mu ed voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their
respective interests are intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the
national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular
sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a
whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance
through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something
constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and
historically decisive role in Philippine society.
A UNIFYING THREAD
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise
of its function as o cial interpreter of the Constitution, the Court should always bear in
mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe the Constitution from
what appears upon its face. 1 7
With regard to the matter of what quali es as marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." On the other hand, the law speaks of "labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals." 1 8
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and
underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941)
cannot be without signi cance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the
Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very rst of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party's eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties,
sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941." 1 9
For this reason, I submit the majority's decision is cryptic and wanting when it
makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner:
The crucial element is not whether a sector is speci cally enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-

case basis not tethered to the enumeration of the Constitution and of RA 7941 invites
the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless rmly anchored on the fundamental law and
the implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship oating aimlessly in the
ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves of ux and tipped by shifting
winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the Constitution
and RA 7941 did not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the signi cance of the enumeration in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is clearly explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party:
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
as exempli ed by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law ; namely,
"labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5 . Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
xxx xxx xxx
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under

the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941 , which
states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition veri ed by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals." cITaCS
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is

not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system . It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, quali ed or specialized
by those in immediate association . 2 0 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
More importantly, in de ning the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3 (d) of RA

7941 limits "marginalized and underrepresented sectors" and expressly refers to the
list in Section 5 thereof:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — . . .
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA

7941. (Its charges of violation of non-establishment of religion, equal protection, free
speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed resolutions of the
Commission on Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must rise
or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with
established rules of statutory construction and the Court's pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the party
list system is limited and quali ed . Hence, other sectors that may qualify as
marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to the sectors
mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors quali ed to participate in the party-list system refer only to
the labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other
related or similar sectors .
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the
fundamental law and of its implementing statute. It is coherent with the mandate of the
Constitution that marginalized sectors quali ed to participate in the party-list system
but not mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be
provided by law" duly enacted by Congress . It is also consistent with the basic
canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or
phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and speci c words of the same class,
the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to
persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
speci cally mentioned. 2 1 Moreover, it reins in the subjective elements of passion and
prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral or religious implications as
it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system? What are the family
resemblances that would characterize them? 2 2
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the
pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT, the
following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and
historically regarded as vital to the national interest but they have long
been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity
of sectors to those expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 is a
constitutional provision speci cally recognizing the special
signi cance of the said sectors (other than people's organizations,
unless such people's organizations represent sectors mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941) 2 3 to the advancement of the national interest;
and
(d) while lacking in well-de ned political constituencies, they must have
regional or national presence to ensure that their interests and
agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more
importantly, to the nation as a whole.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
PETITIONER IS NOT A MARGINALIZED SECTOR
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a
marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. However, the
Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the
contentious issues of morality, religion, equal protection, and freedom of expression
and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules that petitioner is
a quali ed marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing its
accreditation and participation in the party-list system.
I disagree. cTECIA
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly
considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included
in the sectors mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of
RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot
establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not
even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an
altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioner's interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition
of its members' sexual orientation as a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an
interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest. At
best, petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual
orientation on the national human rights agenda. However, an emergent awareness is
but a con rmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition. 2 4 Moreover, even
the majority admits that there is no "clear cut consensus favorable to gay rights
claims." 2 5
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs
through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It
lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that
speci cally recognizes the LGBT sector as specially signi cant to the national interest.
This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary link of a particular
sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the
promotion of the LGBT agenda and "gay rights" as a national policy as bene cial to the
nation as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from extensively
invoking foreign practice and international conventions rather than Philippine laws)
states:
We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, re ect a clear cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims. . . . 2 6
This is so unlike the signi cance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941
which are, without doubt, indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this
Court can only apply and interpret the Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to
create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political
departments if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on
the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3 (d) and (5) of the said law
instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as quali ed marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and
delity to the Court's duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only
sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5
of RA 7941 are quali ed to participate in the party-list system. That is the tenor of the
Court's rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT. As there is no
strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar
conclusion in this case.
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly
adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized
sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no
power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of
interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to
determine "such other [marginalized] sectors" quali ed to participate in the party-list
system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the
LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress' determination
on the matter is proper.
A FINAL WORD
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner's
claim of discriminatory and oppressive acts against its members. I am in no position to
make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or to
access our political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the interests
of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and other moral issues may change
over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of
such matters is the best. 2 7 But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing and
insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is something else. Considering
the facts, the law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement
to use the party-list system as a vehicle for advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be
given no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system
has a well-de ned purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors
whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation's but which interests have not
been su ciently brought to public attention because of these sectors'
underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court's task is to respect that
legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand
such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of
political will and not of judicial judgment. TAaCED
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.

ABAD , J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the same conclusion following a different
path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more
about what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the
party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming
overnight proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct
part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 1 the Court laid down guidelines for
accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass
for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad's petition
for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it
to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this
point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC's claim in its comment on the
petition that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not marginalized and underrepresented
since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors speci ed in the Constitution
and in R.A. 7941. 2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and
underrepresented group of people like those representing labor, peasant, sherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. This is effectively the COMELEC's frame
of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELEC's proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is
inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of
Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court's reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC
now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941 is not
exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was
envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the
identity of the sectors that will make up the party-list system is found in the examples it
gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities,
the women, and the youth segments of society. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides:
(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth , and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector ." (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in
Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard for screening and identifying those who may
qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
w h i c h will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well
de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (Underscoring supplied.)
The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or

organizations . . . lack well de ned political constituencies . . . who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as the Court said in Ang
Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining whether the party seeking
accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and underrepresented." 3
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a de nition of the term "marginalized
and underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang
Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in
adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term — marginalized and
underrepresented — from its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution
itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the
labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and
the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of
what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than
by an abstract description of them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an
elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a gathering of "animals." Here, it looked at
the samples of quali ed groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
minorities, women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them
all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The
examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and
youth) should be the starting point in any search for de nition. Congress has added six
others to this list: the sherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas
workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941
provides: HcTSDa
Sec. 5. Registration. — . . . Provided, that the sector shall include

labor, peasant, fisherfolk , urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped , women, youth, veterans , overseas workers, and
professionals .
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of quali ed

parties, it should be evident that they represent the working class (labor, peasant,
sherfolk, overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically
d e p r ive d (urban poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the
vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans).
This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are
marginalized and underrepresented.
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just
lobby or interest groups. They must have an authentic identity that goes beyond mere
similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their members
belong to the same industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or
wish to promote public support for their mutual interests. The group should be
characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as
these apply to their groups. This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing
with them seats in the House of Representatives so they can take part in enacting
beneficial legislation.
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941
merely provide by examples a sense of what the quali ed organizations should look
like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not
exclusive. For instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they
advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the extreme left
of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as quali ed
sectors.
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow
rather than a speci c de nition of the class of people they seek to represent. For
example, the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower de nition than the broad
and more abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more speci c
and concrete de nition like "carpenters," "security guards," "microchips factory
workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See
the other illustrations below.
Broad *Narrow Specifically Defined Groups
Definition Definition
Working Class Labor Carpenters, security guards, microchip
factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers
Economically Urban Informal settlers, the jobless, persons
Deprived Poor displaced by domestic wars
The Vulnerable Women Working women, battered women, victims of
slavery
Work Impaired Handi- Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on
Capped wheelchairs
* The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A.
7941 for the party-list system is the second, the narrow de nition of the sector that the
law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is that, if
any of the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory
workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within the sector desires to
apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for
the seat allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of Representatives. This is the
apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.
An interpretation that will allow concretely or speci cally de ned groups to seek
election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the
mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat
altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the
country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There
will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part
in the party-list system must state if they are to be considered as national, regional, or
sectoral parties. Thus: ESCDHA
Sec. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register

as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition veri ed by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, . . . .
This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample
sectors provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-
list applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural
minorities) or a national presence (all the rest).
The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of
provinces, cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group representing the sugar plantation
workers of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not
represent the inherently national character of the labor sector.
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to
claim that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must
present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity,
advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject those who put up
building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so
they can get through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular
legislative district.
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and
underrepresented," exempli ed by the working class, the service class, the
economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or some
such similar class of persons.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for
genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly de ned
as shown above. If such party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with
other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent
regional or national presence.
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party
applying for accreditation must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally
accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, 5 the
Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by
and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against,
and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's petition on religious and moral
grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs
have been documented. At home, effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical
abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of
behavior, while lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived a iction.
LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are suspended and put on
probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or bene ts which
are otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry
for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party
accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.
Ang Ladlad represents a narrow de nition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete
and speci c de nition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities
are our brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who have suffered in silence all these
years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or
acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized
and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement in crafting
legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and
effective representation which is the very essence of our party-list system. cIETHa
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Footnotes
1.319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).
2.Rollo, pp. 33-40.
3.Id. at 41-74.
4.An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).
5.Rollo, pp. 89-101.
6.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
7.Ang Ladlad outlined its platform, viz.:
As a party-list organization, Ang Ladlad is willing to research, introduce, and work for the
passage into law of legislative measures under the following platform of government:

a) introduction and support for an anti-discrimination bill that will ensure equal rights for
LGBTs in employment and civil life;
b) support for LGBT-related and LGBT-friendly businesses that will contribute to the national
economy;
c) setting up of micro- nance and livelihood projects for poor and physically challenged
LGBT Filipinos;
d) setting up of care centers that will take care of the medical, legal, pension, and other needs
of old and abandoned LGBTs. These centers will be set up initially in the key cities of the
country; and
e) introduction and support for bills seeking the repeal of laws used to harass and legitimize
extortion against the LGBT community. Rollo, p. 100.
8.Id. at 36-39. Citations omitted. Italics and underscoring in original text.
9.Id. at 77-88.
* Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.
10.Id. at 50-54. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
11.Id. at 121.
12.Id. at 129-132.
13.Id. at 151-283.
14.Id. at 284.
15.Id. at 301-596.
16.Id. at 126.
17.Id. at 133-160.
18.Id. at 288-291.
19.Id. at 296.
20.Supra note 6.
21.It appears that on September 4, 2009, the Second Division directed the various COMELEC
Regional O ces to verify the existence, status, and capacity of petitioner. In its
Comment, respondent submitted copies of various reports stating that ANG LADLAD
LGBT or LADLAD LGBT did not exist in the following areas: Batangas (October 6, 2009);
Romblon (October 6, 2009); Palawan (October 16, 2009); Sorsogon (September 29,
2009); Cavite, Marinduque, Rizal (October 12, 2009); Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del
Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi (October 19, 2009); Biliran, Leyte, Southern Leyte, Samar, Eastern
Samar, Northern Samar (October 19, 2009); Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte,
Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon (October 25, 2009); Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, La Union,
Pangasinan (October 23, 2009); North Cotabato, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat (October 23, 2009); Aklan, Antique, Iloilo and Negros Occidental (October 25,
2009); Bohol, Cebu, Siquijor (October 24, 2009); Negros Oriental (October 26, 2009);
Cordillera Administrative Region (October 30, 2009); Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Dinagat Islands, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur (October 26, 2009); Cagayan de Oro,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental, Lanao del Norte (October 31, 2009); Laguna
(November 2, 2009); Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro (November 13, 2009); Quezon
(November 24, 2009); Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley,
Davao Oriental (November 19, 2009); Caloocan, Las Piñas, Makati, Mandaluyong,
Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Parañaque, Pasay, Pasig, Pateros, Quezon City,
San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela (December 16, 2009). Rollo, pp. 323-596.
22.Id. at 96.
23.Id. at 96-97.
24.BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 346 (2009).
25.Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003), citing Smith, S., "The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse", 140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
REVIEW, 149, 160 (1991).
26.455 Phil. 411 (2003).
27.Id. at 588-589.
28.Rollo, p. 315.
29.In Anonymous v. Radam, A.M. No. P-07-2333, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 12, citing
Concerned Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 448,
we ruled that immorality cannot be judged based on personal bias, speci cally those
colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that
they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.
30.Rollo, pp. 178.
31.Id. at 179-180.
32.CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 699.
33.POLITICS VII. 14.

34.Abakada Guro Party v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005, 2005, 469
SCRA 1, 139.
35.In BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 139-140
(2009), Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. writes:
For determining the reasonableness of classi cation, later jurisprudence has developed three
kinds of test[s] depending on the subject matter involved. The most demanding is the
strict scrutiny test which requires the government to show that the challenged
classi cation serves a compelling state interest and that the classi cation is necessary
to serve that interest. This [case] is used in cases involving classifications based on race,
national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote, interstate migration, access
to courts, and other rights recognized as fundamental.
Next is the intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny test which requires government to show that
the challenged classi cation serves an important state interest and that the
classi cation is at least substantially related to serving that interest. This is applied to
suspect classifications like gender or illegitimacy.
The most liberal is the minimum or rational basis scrutiny according to which government
need only show that the challenged classi cation is rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest. This is the traditional rationality test and it applies to all
subjects other than those listed above.
36.487 Phil. 531, 583 (2004).
37.Id. at 584. See also Mid-States Freight Lines v. Bates, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 568.
38.The OSG argues that "[w]hile it is true that LGBTs are immutably males and females, and
they are protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike, it cannot be
denied that as a sector, LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns." Rollo, p.
183.
39.Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
40.Supra note 26.
41.In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the US Supreme Court rst upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that criminalized oral and anal sex in private
between consenting adults when applied to homosexuals. Seventeen years later the
Supreme Court directly overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
holding that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today."
In Lawrence, the US Supreme Court has held that the liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter into intimate relationships,
whether or not said relationships were entitled to formal or legal recognition.
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
su cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this
protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.
In similar fashion, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the avowed state
interest in protecting public morals did not justify interference into private acts between
homosexuals. In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court held that laws criminalizing same-
sex sexual conduct violated the right to privacy enshrined in the European Convention.
The Government are in effect saying that the Court is precluded from reviewing Ireland's
observance of its obligation not to exceed what is necessary in a democratic society
when the contested interference with an Article 8 (Art. 8) right is in the interests of the
"protection of morals". The Court cannot accept such an interpretation. . . . .
. . . The present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life. Accordingly, there must
exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities
can be legitimate . . . .
. . . Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked,
offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, this
cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting
adults alone who are involved. (Norris v. Ireland (judgment of October 26, 1988, Series A
no. 142, pp. 20-21, Â§ 46); Marangos v. Cyprus (application no. 31106/96, Commission's
report of 3 December 1997, unpublished)).
The United Nations Human Rights Committee came to a similar conclusion in Toonen v.
Australia (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)), involving a complaint that Tasmanian laws
criminalizing consensual sex between adult males violated the right to privacy under
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee
held:
. . . it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept
of 'privacy' . . . any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and
be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.
42.See Toonen v. Australia, (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the European Court of Human Rights, construing the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Norris v. Ireland,
13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993). See also, L.
and V. v. Austria (2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55) and S.L. v. Austria (2003-I 71; (2003) 37
EHRR 39), where the European Court considered that Austria's differing age of consent
for heterosexual and homosexual relations was discriminatory; it 'embodied a
predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority',
which could not 'amount to sufficient justification for the differential treatment any more
than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour'.
43.See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (1980) and Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M
University, 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984).
44.Case of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria Application No.
5941/00; Judgment of January 20, 2006. Note that in Baczkowski and Others v. Poland,
Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of May 3, 2007, the ECHR unanimously ruled that
the banning of an LGBT gay parade in Warsaw was a discriminatory violation of Article
14 of the ECHR, which provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.
It also found that banning LGBT parades violated the group's freedom of assembly and
association. Referring to the hallmarks of a "democratic society", the Court has attached
particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it
has held that although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of
a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.
45.Case of Freedom & Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, Application No. 23885/94;
Judgment of December 8, 1999.
46.Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention) provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8,
and 11 which entered into force on September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1,
1990, and November 1, 1998, respectively.
* Note that while the state is not permitted to discriminate against homosexuals, private
individuals cannot be compelled to accept or condone homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc. (515 U.S. 557 (1995)), the US Supreme Court discussed whether anti-
discrimination legislation operated to require the organizers of a private St. Patrick's Day
parade to include among the marchers an Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual
group. The court held that private citizens organizing a public demonstration may not be
compelled by the state to include groups that impart a message the organizers do not
want to be included in their demonstration. The court observed:
"[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized
marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much
claim to unquali ed social acceptance as heterosexuals . . . . The parade's organizers
may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to
unquali ed social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for
wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils
down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that
choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control."
So, too, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (530 U.S. 640 [2000]), the US Supreme Court held
that the Boy Scouts of America could not be compelled to accept a homosexual as a
scoutmaster, because "the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not "promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the
group does not accept, the organization's message is undermined; the organization is
understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with
them. The scoutmaster's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
47.Rollo, pp. 197-199.
48.In Toonen v. Australia, supra note 42, the Human Rights Committee noted that "in its view
the reference to 'sex' in Articles 2, paragraph 2, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual
orientation."
49.The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has dealt with the matter
in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it issues to explicate the full meaning of
the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In General
Comments Nos. 18 of 2005 (on the right to work) (Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, November
24, 2005), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water) (Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, E/C.12/2002/11, November
26, 2002) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest attainable standard of health)
(Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right
to the highest attainable standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, August 14, 2000), it has
indicated that the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex
and sexual orientation.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the issue in a General
Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it stated that, "State parties have the
obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the
Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with
regard to ''race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status''. These grounds also cover [ inter
alia] sexual orientation". (Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4:
Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, July 1, 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4).
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), has, on a
number of occasions, criticized States for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. For example, it also addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and
recommended that, "lesbianism be reconceptualized as a sexual orientation and that
penalties for its practice be abolished" (Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding Kyrgyzstan, February 5,
1999, A/54/38 at par. 128).
50.General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right
of equal access to public service (Art. 25) December 16, 1996. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7.
51.The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to
sexual orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of
abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains
29 Principles adopted by human rights practitioners and experts, together with
recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, civil society,
and the United Nations.
52.One example is Principle 3 (The Right to Recognition Before the Law), which provides:
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Persons of
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects
of life. Each person's self-de ned sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to
their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and
freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo medical procedures, including sex
reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal therapy, as a requirement for legal
recognition of their gender identity. No status, such as marriage or parenthood, may be
invoked as such to prevent the legal recognition of a person's gender identity. No one
shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or
gender identity.
States shall:
a) Ensure that all persons are accorded legal capacity in civil matters, without discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and the opportunity to exercise that
capacity, including equal rights to conclude contracts, and to administer, own, acquire
(including through inheritance), manage, enjoy and dispose of property;
b) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to fully
respect and legally recognise each person's self-defined gender identity ;
c) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that
procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity papers which indicate a
person's gender/sex — including birth certi cates, passports, electoral
records and other documents — re ect the person's profound self-de ned
gender identity ;
d) Ensure that such procedures are e cient, fair and non-discriminatory, and respect the
dignity and privacy of the person concerned;
e) Ensure that changes to identify documents will be recognized in all contexts where the
identification or disaggregation of persons by gender is required by law or policy;
f) Undertake targeted programmes to provide social support for all persons experiencing
gender transitioning or reassignment. (Emphasis ours)
53.See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,
G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265, where we explained that "soft law"
does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter
III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression
of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that in uence state behavior. Certain
declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.
PUNO, C.J., concurring:
1.Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: "No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights."
2.The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passage from the
Bible to support its holding: "For this cause God gave them up into vile affections: for
even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
themselves that recompense of their error which was meet." (Romans 1:26-27)
3.The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passages from the
Koran to support its holding:
• "For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women: ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7:81)
• "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84)
• "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief!" (29:30)
4.Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003).
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
8.Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9.COMELEC's Comment, p. 13.
10.Id.
11.See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
12.Id.
13.Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120
L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
14.Ang Ladlad de ned "sexual orientation" as a person's capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals
of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender." (italics supplied)
15.Paragraph 24 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration stated, in relevant part: "In 2007, Men
Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated at 670,000."
16.Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, as cited in the Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, infra.
17.478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841.
18.Supra note 11.
19.Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2638, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973);
See also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 97 S.Ct. 2010,
2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977).
20.See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 637 (1980); cf. Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S., at 153, 93 S.Ct., at 726.
21.Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1537, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
22.Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 11.

23.Id.
24.Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, supra note 13.
25.Id.

26.Id.
27.Supra note 11.
28.Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 583
(2004).
29.Id.
30.Pace Membership Warehouse, Div. of K-Mart Corp. v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504.
31.16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Â§ 857, citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S. Ct.
1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460
U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 9 Ed. Law Rep. 23 (1983); Christie v. Coors
Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997); Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578
(Iowa 1997); Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 282 Mont. 424, 938 P.2d 658 (1997);
Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1997).
32.Murray v. State of Louisiana, 2010 WL 334537. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 112 S.Ct.
2184, 2186 (1992) (holding classi cation based on religion is a suspect classi cation);
Graham v. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (1971) (holding classi cation based on
alienage is a suspect classi cation); Loving v. Virginia, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967)
(holding classi cation based on race is a suspect classi cation); Oyama v. California,
68 S.Ct. 269, 274-74 (1948) (holding classi cation based on national origin is a suspect
classification); Hirabayashi v. U.S., 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943) (holding classification based on
ancestry is a suspect classification).
33.Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974).
34.Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 89 S. Ct. 557, 21 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1969); McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S.
184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964).
35.Supra note 31.
36.United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735, 751
(1996).
37.Murray v. State of Louisiana, supra note 32. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982) (holding classi cations based on gender calls for
heightened standard of review); Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1463 (1977) (holding
illegitimacy is a quasi-suspect classification).
38.Supra note 31.

39.Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S. Ct. 1898, 52 L. Ed. 2d
513 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49
L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); Costner v. U.S., 720 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1983).
40.Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996); Cornerstone Christian Schools v. University
Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 243 Ed. Law Rep. 609 (5th Cir. 2009); Independent
Charities of America, Inc. v. State of Minn., 82 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1996); Bah v. City of
Atlanta, 103 F.3d 964 (11th Cir. 1997).
41.Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009) citing the following passage from Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1982):
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classi cations as "suspect."
Some classi cations are more likely than others to re ect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated
on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional
understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal
justice under the law. Classi cations treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal. Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have
historically been "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." The experience of our
Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups.
Our response to that experience is re ected in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or
caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.
42.See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32, 116 S.Ct. at 2274-75, 135 L.Ed.2d at 750
(observing "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1973)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion)); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 2729,
91 L.Ed.2d 527, 533 (1986) (noting subject class had "not been subjected to
discrimination"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 at 443, 105 S.Ct. at
3256, 87 L.Ed.2d at 332 (mentally retarded not victims of "continuing antipathy or
prejudice"); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49
L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976) (considering "history of purposeful unequal treatment" (quoting
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36
L.Ed.2d 16, 40 (1973)).
43.See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320 (certain
classifications merely "reflect prejudice and antipathy"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1098 (1982) ("Care must be
taken in ascertain-ing whether the statutory objective itself re ects archaic and
stereotypic notions."); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525
(considering whether aged have "been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
686, 93 S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.").
44.Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives "do not exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that de ne them as a discrete
group"); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. at 3255-56, 87 L.Ed.2d at 322
(mentally retarded people are different from other classes of people, "immutably so, in
relevant respects"); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct. at 2396, 72 L.Ed.2d at 801 (children
of illegal aliens, unlike their parents, have "legal characteristic[s] over which children can
have little control"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 49
L.Ed.2d 651, 660 (1976) (status of illegitimacy "is, like race or national origin, a
characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual");
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) ("[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth. . . .").
45.Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives of primary
household are "not a minority or politically powerless"); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at
445, 105 S.Ct. at 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d at 324 (refusing to nd "that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, 36
L.Ed.2d at 40 (considering whether minority and poor school children were "relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process").
46.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135,
957 A.2d 407 (2008).
47.Varnum v. Brien, id., citing, among others, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34, 104 S.Ct.
1879, 1882-83, 80 L.Ed.2d 421, 426 (1984) (foregoing analysis of political power);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2125 n. 11, 53 L.Ed.2d 63, 71 n. 11
(1977) (jettisoning immutability requirement and scrutinizing classi cation of resident
aliens closely despite aliens' voluntary status as residents); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505-06,
96 S.Ct. at 2762-63, 49 L.Ed.2d at 660-61 (according heightened scrutiny to
classi cations based on illegitimacy despite mutability and political power of
illegitimates); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14, 96 S.Ct. at 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525 (omitting
any reference to immutability); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 25, 93 S.Ct. at
1292, 36 L.Ed.2d at 38 (omitting any reference to immutability); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
685-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1770-71, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591-92 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(scrutinizing classi cation based on gender closely despite political power of women);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-42
(1971) (foregoing analysis of immutability); see also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at
2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (referring to whether members of the class "exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group").
48.Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., infra.
49.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41.
50.Id.
51.Id.
52.Id.; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
53.Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, id.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57.Supra note 46.
58.See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (for
purposes of federal constitution, mental retardation is not quasi-suspect classi cation
because, inter alia, "it is undeniable . . . that those who are mentally retarded have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world"); Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (age is not suspect classi cation
because, inter alia, "physical ability generally declines with age"); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ("[i]t is an
unfortunate fact of life that physical [capacity] and mental capacity sometimes diminish
with age").
59.L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) Â§ 16-33, p. 1616.
60.Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.Supp. 1543, 1548 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 1985 Resolution of the
American Psychological Association), 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993).
61.Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249.
62.Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
63.Id.
64.Id.
66.Id.
67.Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

68.Id. citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.
69.Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
70.Id.
72.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41, citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note
46.
73.Id.
75.Id.
76.Id.
77.Id.
78.Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620.
79.Id.
80.Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states, in relevant part:
SECTION 5. . . .
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (italics supplied)
81.On the other hand, Section 5 of RA 7941 provides:
SECTION 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (italics supplied)
82.G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
83.Id.
CORONA, J., dissenting:
1.Republic Act.
2.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
3.The Chief Justice's stance is the o cial stance of the Court on the matter because majority
of the members of the Court sided with him on the issue of disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
4.G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258-259.
5.Section 18, Article II; Section 3, Article XIII.

8.Section 22, Article II; Section 5, Article XII.
10.Section 13, Article II; Section 3 (2), Article XV.
11.Section 7, Article XVI.
12.Paragraph three of Section 2, Article XII, Section 7, Article XIII.

13.Section 11, Article XIII.
14.Sections 11 and 13 XIII.
16.Section 14, Article XII.
17.Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA
317, 337.
18.See proviso of the first paragraph of Section 5, RA 7941.
20.Supra note 2.
21.Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999).
22.The notion of family resemblances (familienÃ¤hnlichkeit) was introduced by the leading

analytic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his book Philosophical Investigations. As
used in this opinion, however, family resemblances speci cally refer to the DNA, the
basic component unit, that identi es a sector as a member of the family of marginalized
and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 5 of RA 7941.
23.The reason behind this exception is obvious. If all people's organizations are automatically
considered as marginalized and underrepresented, then no sector or organization may
be disquali ed on the grounds of non-marginalization and lack of underrepresentation.
The Court's guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party would have been
unnecessary after all and, worse, the constitutional requirement that the sectors qualified
to participate in the party-list system be determined by law would have been merely
superfluous and pointless.
24.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25.Decision, p. 23.
26.Id.
27.Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 29 (J. Scalia, dissenting).
ABAD, J.:
1.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
2.Comment, pp. 2-6.
3."In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino style." Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, supra note 1, at 334.
4.Section 5. Registration. — . . . Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, sherfolk,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
5.http://www.aglbical.org/2STATS.htm.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 191998. December 7, 2010.]
WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES , petitioners, vs .

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 192769. December 7, 2010.]
LIZA L. MAZA and SATURNINO C. OCAMPO , petitioners, vs .

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 192832. December 7, 2010.]
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST, represented by TEODORO CASIÑO ,

petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN MIGUEL
"MIKEY" ARROYO of Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List , respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION , J : p
We resolve the three (3) consolidated 1 special civil actions for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition that commonly aim to disqualify respondent Juan Miguel
"Mikey" Arroyo as the nominee of the Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) in the May 10,
2010 elections.
The Factual Antecedents
The common factual antecedents, gathered from the pleadings, are brie y
summarized below.
On November 29, 2009, AGPP led with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Subsequently, on March 23, 2010, AGPP led its Certi cate of Nomination together
with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees. 2
On March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807 3 which
prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list
nominee for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections. 4
Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees
must submit documentary evidence 5 to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent. It likewise provides that
the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list groups and nominees to make
the required documentary submissions, if not already complied with prior to the
effectivity of the Resolution, not later than three (3) days from the last day of ling of
the list of nominees. 6 cEDaTS

Under Section 10 of the same Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio effect
the disquali cation of party-list nominees who violate any of the limitations mentioned
in Section 7 of the Resolution. 7 Section 8 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure also states that the COMELEC may cancel motu proprio the registration of
any party registered under the party-list system for failure to comply with applicable
laws, rules or regulations of the Commission. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
8646, 8 in relation to Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, the deadline for submitting the
requirements mentioned in Section 6 of the latter Resolution was on March 29, 2010. 9
On March 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan
Muna Party-List, represented by Teodoro Casiño, (collectively referred to as certiorari
petitioners) led with the COMELEC a petition for disquali cation 1 0 against Arroyo,
pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, 1 1 in relation with Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 1 2 (the Party-List System Act). 1 3
The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization
factually and truly represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the nominee
must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this regard the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. 1 4 On this basis, the certiorari petitioners concluded that
Arroyo cannot be considered a member of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector, particularly, the sector which the AGPP represents — tricycle drivers and
security guards — because he is not only a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an
incumbent member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the House's
Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural
Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National
Defense and Security, Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and
Means. 1 5
In his Answer, Arroyo counter-argued that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over
issues involving the quali cations of party-list nominees; Section 9 of RA 7941 merely
requires that the party-list nominee must be a bona de member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election. 1 6
When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the May 10, 2010 elections
with their respective Nominees," Arroyo was listed as AGPP's first nominee.
On March 30, 2010, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Neri
Colmenares, led with the COMELEC another petition for disquali cation against
Arroyo. 1 7 It alleged that Arroyo is not quali ed to be a party-list nominee because he
(a) does not represent or belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector; (b)
has not been a bona de member of AGPP ninety (90) days prior to the May 10, 2010
elections; (c) is a member of the House of Representatives; and that (d) AGPP is not a
legitimate and qualified party-list group and has no authority to nominate him. 1 8
In his Answer, Arroyo reiterated that the COMELEC does not have jurisdiction
over cases involving the quali cations of party-list nominees. He stated as well that he
is a bona fide member of AGPP at least ninety (90) days prior to the elections. 1 9
DIEAHc
Meanwhile, on April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.

Rosales (mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter
requesting for a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance
with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. On the same day, the COMELEC Law
Department replied that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted any
documentary evidence required by Resolution No. 8807. 2 0
Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested the
COMELEC and its Law Department to act, consistently with Section 10 of Resolution
No. 8807, and declare the disquali cation of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. 2 1 They also wrote
the COMELEC on April 20, 2010, reiterating their letter-request dated April 7, 2010. The
COMELEC failed to respond to both letters. 2 2
The COMELEC Second Division Ruling
In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petitions for disquali cation against Arroyo. 2 3 It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941
merely requires the nominee to be "a bona de member [of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
elections." 2 4 It found that Arroyo (a) became a member of the party on November 20,
2009; (b) actively participated in the undertakings of AGPP and adhered to its
advocacies; and, (c) actively supported and advanced the projects and programs of the
AGPP by regularly attending its meetings, livelihood and skills program, and farmers'
day activities. 2 5
The COMELEC en banc Ruling
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division's ruling in its
July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution. 2 6 It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in
order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a bona de member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and must likewise be at least twenty- ve (25) years
of age on the day of the election. 2 7 The COMELEC en banc also held that Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA
7941. 2 8 Thus, it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the requirements mandated by
Section 9 of RA 7941. 2 9
On May 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners led with this Court their Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, 3 0 docketed as G.R. No. 191998 . 3 1 They sought to compel the
COMELEC to disqualify motu proprio the AGPP nominees for their failure to comply
with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from giving due
course to the AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On July 23 and 29, 2010, the certiorari petitioners elevated their case to this
Court via two (2) separate petitions for certiorari, 3 2 docketed as G.R. Nos. 192769
3 3 and 192832 , 3 4 to annul the COMELEC Second Division's May 7, 2010 joint
resolution and the COMELEC en banc's July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that
dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPP's nominee. jur2005
In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required
percentage of votes su cient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP's
first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. 3 5
On July 21, 2010, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
proclaimed Arroyo as AGPP's duly-elected party-list representative in the House of
Representatives. 3 6 On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of o ce, as AGPP's
Representative, 3 7 before Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes. His
name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
38
On July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto 3 9 were
led with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo's
eligibility as AGPP's representative in the House of Representatives. On September 7,
2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing
Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions. 4 0
The Petitions
T h e mandamus petitioners in G.R. No. 191998 argue that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in failing to order the motu proprio
disquali cation of AGPP despite its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
under Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807; and, (b) in giving due course to the
participation of AGPP and its nominees in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On the other hand, the certiorari petitioners in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832
contend in common that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in failing
to disqualify Arroyo as AGPP's nominee since: (1) he does not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector he claims to represent; (2) he is not a bona
fide AGPP member for at least ninety (90) days preceding the May 10, 2010 elections;
(3) in light of these preceding reasons, he would not be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislations for the sector he seeks to
represent; and (4) his nomination and acceptance of nomination as AGPP's nominee
violate AGPP's continuing undertaking upon which its petition for registration and
accreditation was based and granted.
I n G.R. No. 192832 , the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the
Court: (a) direct the COMELEC en banc to review all its decisions in cases for
disquali cation of nominees and cancellation of registration of party-list groups led in
the May 10, 2010 elections, as well as those which have not been resolved, in line with
the eight-point guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani; 4 1 and (b) order
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Elias R.
Yusoph to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for their open de ance of
the Court's Decisions in Ang Bagong Bayani 4 2 and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC. 4 3
The Case for the Respondents
I n G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 , Arroyo counter-argues that the petitions
should be dismissed outright because upon his proclamation, oath and assumption to
o ce as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction over
issues relating to his quali cations now lies with the HRET as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives.
Similarly, the COMELEC, through the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), prays
for the dismissal of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 for lack of
jurisdiction in view of Arroyo's proclamation and assumption to o ce as a Member of
the House of Representatives.
Despite notice, the OSG failed to comment on the G.R. No. 191998 petition.
We deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of the parties'
submissions.
Issues
The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the
COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's
registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to
AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPP's votes,
and proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question
of Arroyo's quali cations as AGPP's nominee after his proclamation and assumption to
office as a member of the House of Representatives. EICSDT
Our Ruling
We dismiss the petitions.
For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998 ), the mandamus
petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
o cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
speci cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o ce, trust, or station, or
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law , the person aggrieved
thereby may le a veri ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be speci ed by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the
condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."
Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807
(quoted below), any interested party may le with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against a party-list nominee:
Section 2. Grounds for Disquali cation . — Any nominee (a) who does not
possess all the quali cations of a nominee as provided for by the Constitution,
existing laws or (b) who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a nominee .
Section 4. When to le Petition . — The petition under item (a) of Section 2
shall be led ve (5) days after the last day for ling of the list of
nominees , while under item (b) thereof shall be led any day not later than
the date of proclamation .
Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any interested party may le a veri ed

complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list organization:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may
motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: IHCESD
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association


(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its o cers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate remedy"
that the mandamus petitioners should have taken. Speci cally, they should have led
the proper petition for disquali cation, pursuant to Section 2 (b) of Resolution No.
8807, any day not later than the date of proclamation.
As to the remedy of ling a complaint for cancellation of registration, we note
that neither Section 6 of RA 7941 nor Section 8, Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure speci es the period within which a complaint for cancellation of registration
should be led. Whether or not the mandamus petitioners can still le a petition for
cancellation of AGPP's registration at this point in time, however, is a question we are
not prepared to rule upon; in fact, we need not resolve this question since it is not
raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
We note that in lieu of ling the above formal petition that Resolution No. 8807
and RA 7941 provide, the mandamus petitioners opted to confine themselves to writing
letters to ask the COMELEC to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution No.
8807. While these moves are technically objections to Arroyo and to the AGPP's
registration, they cannot in any way be considered formal petitions for disquali cation,
unlike the present petition which is a formal petition (whose clear intent is similarly to
disqualify Arroyo). Unfortunately for the mandamus petitioners, a petition for
mandamus is not the correct remedy under the circumstances as the immediately
applicable remedy is a petition for disquali cation or for cancellation led with the
COMELEC, as pointed out above. ACTaDH
In ling the present petition, the mandamus petitioners also violated the rule on
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts. 4 4 While this is not an ironclad rule as it admits of
exceptions, 4 5 the mandamus petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions
apply. The filing of a petition for mandamus with this Court, therefore, was premature. It
bears stressing that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, may be used only in cases
of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford
relief. 4 6
Thus, we nd the mandamus aspect of G.R. No. 191998 improperly led under
the standards of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Even the substantive merits of the mandamus petition in G.R. No. 191998 , i.e.,
its patent intent to disqualify Arroyo, fail to persuade for the reasons more fully
discussed below, in relation with the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and
192832 .
As to the prohibition aspect of G.R. No. 191998 — i.e., to prevent the COMELEC
from canvassing AGPP's votes, and from proclaiming it a winner — we nd that this has
been mooted by the supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after
it secured the required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections. The
prohibition issue has been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in light
of the supervening events. A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon (in this case,
the prevention of the speci ed acts) can no longer be done. Under the circumstances,
we have to recognize the futility of the petition and to dismiss it on the ground of
mootness since we cannot provide the mandamus petitioners any substantial relief. 4 7
We move on to the principal issue raised by the certiorari petitions in G.R. Nos.
192769 and 192832 — whether jurisdiction over Arroyo's quali cations as AGPP
nominee should now properly be with the HRET since Arroyo has been proclaimed and
has assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court.
The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
quali cations of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of o ce;
they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. In Abayon v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 4 8 the Court said: ESTDcC
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identi es who the
"members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed

of not more than two hundred and fty members , unless
otherwise xed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who , as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . (Underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members
. . . who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who . . . shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations ." This means that, from the Constitution's
point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into o ce, not
their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through
that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress
by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or
parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly bene t
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties , and who lack well-de ned political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives . Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible . (Underscoring supplied)EHSTcC
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the
House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote
for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court also held in the same case that:

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the quali cations of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona de member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular quali cation of a
nominee — the need for him or her to be a bona de member or a representative
of his party-list organization — in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
xxx xxx xxx
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the quali cations of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members " of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their quali cations. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed o ce as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his quali cations ends and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.
Similarly applicable is our ruling in Perez v. Commission on Elections 4 9 where we

acknowledged that the Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of
the private respondent who was already a member of the House of Representatives.
We said: ATCEIc
As already stated, the petition for disquali cation against private respondent was
decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following
day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private
respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath
of o ce on May 17, 1998, petitioner still led a motion for reconsideration on
May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this
could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of
proceedings for disquali cation even after the elections if the respondent has not
been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the
motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further
consideration of petitioner's action. In the same vein, considering that at the
time of the ling of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent
was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has
no jurisdiction over the same . Pursuant to Art. VI, Â§17 of the
Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of
private respondent's ineligibility . As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized
by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unquali edly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the
1987 Constitution. 5 0
In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPP's rst nominee, has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of o ce as a Member of the House of
Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the ling of two (2) petitions for quo
warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the HRET. Thus, following the lead of
Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions
and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon
Arroyo's qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
In light of these conclusions, we see no need to further discuss the other issues
raised in thecertiorari petitions.
WHEREFORE , we RESOLVE to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 191998 for
prematurity and mootness. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 192769 and 192832 are
likewise DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., is on o cial leave, per Special Order No. 916 dated November 24,
2010.
Footnotes
1.Per our October 12, 2010 Resolution.
2.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 106.
3.Rules on Disquali cation Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations
Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 107.
5.Which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the

nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement
of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization,
political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/s showing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certi cation that the nominee/s is/are a bona de member of the party-list
group/organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-
list/organization but is/are also a bona de member/s of said marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
6.COMELEC Resolution No. 8646 provides that March 26, 2010 is the last day for party-list
groups to submit the names of the party's nominees.
7.Section 7. Limitations to party-list nominations. — The following are the limitations to the list
of nominees filed by a registered party.
1. A person may be nominated by one (1) party in one (1) list only;
2. Only persons who have given their consent in writing and under oath may be named in the
list;
3. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective o ce in the same election, or has
lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately-preceding election; and
4. No change of name or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the list
has been submitted to the Commission, except in valid substitution.
8.Calendar of Activities and Periods of Prohibited Acts in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections.
9.Supra note 6.
10.Docketed as SPA No. 10-001 (DCN).

11.Rules on Disquali cation Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections, promulgated on November 11, 2009.
12.Entitled "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-
List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
13.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 38.
14.G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
15.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 38.
16.Id. at 39.
17.Docketed as SPA No. 10-003 (DCN).
18.Rollo (G.R. No. 192832), pp. 55-56.

19.Id. at 56.
20.Rollo (G.R. No. 191998), p. 6.
21.Ibid.
22.Id. at 6-7.
23.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), pp. 37-43.

24.Id. at 41-42.
25.Id. at 42-43.
26.Id. at 60-88. The Consolidated Resolution was penned by Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer;
and concurred in by Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph, Lucenito N. Tagle and Armando C.
Velasco; while Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal dissented.
Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, on the other hand, abstained from voting.
27.Id. at 71.
28.Ibid.
29.Id. at 72.
30.Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

31.Rollo (G.R. No. 191998), pp. 3-15.
32.Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

33.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), pp. 3-34.
34.Rollo (G.R. No. 192832), pp. 3-50.
35.Rollo (G.R. No. 192769), p. 125. Proclamation dated July 21, 2010, Annex "1" of Arroyo's
Comment.
36.On May 31, 2010, the COMELEC issued NBC Resolution No. 10-009, proclaiming AGPP as
one of the winning party-list organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections, having
obtained 269,009 votes and entitled to one (1) seat in the House of Representatives. See
http://comelec. les.wordpress.com/2010/07/nbc_res_10-009.pdf (last visited
November 19, 2010).
37.Id. at 126. Oath of Office dated July 21, 2010, Annex "2" of Arroyo's Comment.
38.Id. at 127. Certification dated July 21, 2010, Annex "3" of Arroyo's Comment.
39.Id. at 108. HRET Case No. 10-060, entitled "Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Petitioner v. Juan
Miguel 'Mikey' Arroyo, Respondent," and HRET Case No. 10-061, entitled "Danilo
Antipasado, Petitioner v. Juan 'Mikey' Arroyo and Ang Galing Pinoy, Respondents."
40.Ibid.
41.Supra note 14.
42.Ibid.
43.G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 211.

44.Republic of the Phils. v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 424 Phil. 372, 399 (2002).
45.These exceptions are:

1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. (Buston-
Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 573.)
46.ACWS, Ltd. v. Dumlao, 440 Phil. 787, 803 (2002).
47.Quizon v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 635,
640.
48.G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010.

49.375 Phil. 1106 (1999).
50.Id. at 1115-1116.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot ,

petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 203818-19. April 2, 2013.]
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB) , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.]
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),

represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo ,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.]
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its

President Michael Abas Kida , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.]
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.

(KAKUSA) , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.]
1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE) ,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.

(ARARO) , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.]
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP

(ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin,
the party's Secretary General , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON

[G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) , petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.]
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI)

formerly PGBI , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC ,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.]
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.]
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-

IPRA), represented by its Secretary General, Ronald D. Macaraig ,
[G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.]
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG

MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG
NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its
Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura , petitioner, vs.
[G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.]
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni

Cataluña Causing , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.]
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,

President , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.]
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY represented by its President

Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.]
ABROAD PARTY LIST , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V.
SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO
TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.]
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President

Simeon T. Silva, Jr. , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.]
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. ,

[G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.]
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON

[G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.]
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC. , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON

[G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS EN BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.]
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF

MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.]
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS

MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael
Ryan A. Enriquez , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.]
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED FEDERATION OF FARMERS

AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC. , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.]
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD)

PARTY-LIST , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.]
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its

Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr. , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.]
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented by Homer Bueno, Fitrylin

Dalhani, Israel de Castro, Dante Navarro and Guiling Mamondiong ,
petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.]
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM) PARTY-LIST,

represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik , petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.

[G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.]
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,

respondent.
[G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING ADVANCEMENT FOR

NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA) , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.]
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND TRANSPARENCY

(SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo , petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.]
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA,

PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY) , petitioner,
vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES,
JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA.
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners
thereof, respondents.
[G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.]
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION (AKIN) , petitioner, vs.

[G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.]
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by its Secretary General,

Rodolfo T. Tuazon , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.]
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA ,

[G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.]
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye

Maybelle Lorenz , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.]
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,

DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.]
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G.

Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo , petitioner,
[G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.]
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH

ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW) , petitioner, vs.
[G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.]
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) , petitioner, vs.

[G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.]
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented
herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. ,
[G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.]
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS
BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSION , respondents.
[G.R. No. 204426. April 2, 2013.]
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND

HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson
and Commissioners , respondents.
[G.R. No. 204428. April 2, 2013.]
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General,

Bernardo R. Corella, Jr. , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 204435. April 2, 2013.]
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP) , petitioner,

[G.R. No. 204436. April 2, 2013.]
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented by its Party President,

Rolex T. Suplico , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC , respondent.
[G.R. No. 204455. April 2, 2013.]
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. ,

[G.R. No. 204484. April 2, 2013.]
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary

General, Roger M. Federazo , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204485. April 2, 2013.]
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS

OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA) , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON
[G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.]
1ST KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1ST

KABAGIS) , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.

[G.R. No. 204490. April 2, 2013.]
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP) , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON

DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition 1 led by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-
list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13
November 2012, 2 20 November 2012, 3 27 November 2012, 4 4 December 2012, 5 11
December 2012, 6 and 19 February 2013. 7
The Facts
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
A.Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's
resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not considered
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) marginalized and underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track record; and
- Failure of the nominees to qualify
under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong
Bayani.
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and loan

(PLM) Savings and Loan association cannot be considered
Association, Inc. marginalized and underrepresented;
(Manila Teachers) and
- The first and second nominees are
not teachers by profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its members
(PLM) Local Athletics belong to the marginalized; and
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to qualify.
Inc. (ALA-EH)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 1 0
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to qualify:
(PLM) Advocating although registering as a regional
Autonomy Party political party, two of the nominees
(1AAAP) are not residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do not
belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
5 204367 Akbay12-104 - Failure of the group to show that its

(PL)
Kalusugan nominees belong to the urban poor
(AKIN), Inc. sector.
6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a marginalized

(PP) (AAB) sector of society, despite the
formation of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region 8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in representing
peasants and farmers; and
- Nominees are neither farmers nor
peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 13
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the party

(PP), Party (AI) represents a marginalized and
12-165 underrepresented sector, as the
(PLM) Province of Iloilo has district
representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its five
nominees.
8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that the group can

(PL) Organizations, represent 14 Networks and sectors;
Associations of
the Philippines, - The sectors of homeowners'
Inc. (ALONA) associations, entrepreneurs and
cooperatives are not marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong to the
B.Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC Division's resolutions denying registration of groups and organizations
9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track record as an

(PL) Mamamahayag organization;
(ALAM)
- Failure to show that the group
actually represents the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the group
can represent all sectors it seeks to
represent.
10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party- - The group reflects an advocacy for

(PP) List the environment, and is not
(KALIKASAN) representative of the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- There is no proof that majority of
its members belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented;
- The group represents sectors with
conflicting interests; and
sector which the group claims to
represent.
11 204394 12-145
Association of - Failure to prove membership base
(PL)
Guard, Utility and track record;
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities that
Domestic sufficiently benefited its intended
Helper, constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong to any
and Nanny of the of the sectors which the group seeks
Philippines, Inc. to represent.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 2012 1 8
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the group

(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as Region

12 has district representatives; and
- Failure to show a track record of
undertaking programs for the welfare
of the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, 1 9 the COMELEC En Banc a rmed the

COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB)
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However,
PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does
not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an
organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 2 0 SDHCac
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,
2 1 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the o cial ballot for
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 2 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that led manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 2 3 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC
disquali ed the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
Resolution dated 10 October 2012 2 4
1203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and accreditation

19(PLM) Political Party as a political party, but denied
12-177 (AKB) participation in the May 2013 party-list
(PLM) elections
- Failure to represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already has
representatives in Congress; and
- The nominees are not marginalized
and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 11 October 2012 25
2 20376612-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong to the
sectors which the party represents;
and
- The party failed to file its Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures
for the 2010 Elections.
Cancelled registration and
3 20398112-187 Association for
accreditation
(PLM) Righteousness - Failure to comply, and for violation
Advocacy on of election laws;
Leadership
(ARAL) - The nominees do not represent the
sectors which the party represents;
and
- There is doubt that the party is
organized for religious purposes.
4 20400212-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to qualify;
and
- Failure of the party to prove that
majority of its members belong to
the sectors it seeks to represent.
5 20431812-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs The sectors of drug counsellors and
Foundation lecturers, veterans and the youth,
(UNIMAD) are not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track record; and
- Failure of the nominees to qualify
as representatives of the youth and
young urban professionals.
6 20410012-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector it seeks to
Brotherhood, represent; and
Inc. (1 BRO-
PGBI) - The nominees do not belong to a
marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
7 20412212-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military fraternity;
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community volunteer
GUARDIANS) workers is too broad to allow for
meaningful representation; and
- The nominees do not appear to
belong to the sector of community
volunteer workers.
8 20426312-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven and nominees do
Farmers and not belong to the sector of farmers
Fishermen and fishermen, the sector sought
International, to be represented; and
Inc. (A
BLESSED - None of the nominees are registered
Party-List) voters of Region XI, the region
sought to be represented.
9 20396012-260 1st Consumers Cancelled registration

(PLM) Alliance for - The sector of rural energy consumers
Rural Energy, is not marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party's track record is related
to electric cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
sector of rural energy consumers.
10 20392212-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a marginalized
Cooperatives and underrepresented sector; and
(APEC)
sector that the party claims to
represent.
11 20417412-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
(AT) - The incumbent representative in
Congress failed to author or
sponsor bills that are beneficial to
the sectors that the party represents
(women, elderly, youth, urban poor);
and
marginalized sectors that the party
seeks to represent.

(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant and
Reconstruction, urban poor sectors that the party
Inc. (ARARO) represents differ;
sectors that the party seeks to
represent;
- Failure to show that three of the
nominees are bona fide party
members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution to
participate in the party-list elections.
13 20424012-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration

(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for more
Magsasaka ng than a year immediately after the
Pilipinas May 2010 elections;
Movement
(AGRI) - The nominees do not belong to the
sector of peasants and farmers that
the party seeks to represent;
- Only four nominees were submitted
to the COMELEC; and
- Failure to show meaningful activities
for its constituency.
14 20393612-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka- - Failure to show that majority of its
Partido Tinig ng members are marginalized and
Masa (AKMA- underrepresented;
PTM)
- Failure to prove that four of its nine
nominees actually belong to the
farmers sector; and
- Failure to show that five of its nine
nominees work on uplifting the lives
of the members of the sector.
15 20412612-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent and
Agilang Certificate of Nomination were not
Pilipinong signed by an appropriate officer of
Magsasaka the party;
(KAP)
- Failure to show track record for the
farmers and peasants sector; and
- Failure to show that nominees
actually belong to the sector, or
that they have undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 20436412-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that nominees
Ordinaryong actually belong to the sector, or
Tao Para sa that they have undertaken meaningful
Lupa, Pabahay, activities for the sector.
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 20414112-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that majority of
(for God, its members are marginalized
Country and and underrepresented; and
People)
Association of - Failure to prove that two of its
the Philippines, nominees actually belong to the
Inc. (BANTAY) marginalized and underrepresented.
18 20440812-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from urban poor
Country — Urban youth to urban poor) necessitates
Poor Youth a new application;
Advancement
and Welfare - Failure to show track record for
(PACYAW) the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that majority of its
members and officers are from the
urban poor sector; and
- The nominees are not members of the
urban poor sector.
19 20415312-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers and
Party (PASANG operators, who may have conflicting
MASDA) interests; and
- Nominees are either operators or
former operators.
20 20395812-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that majority of
na Walang Sala, its officers and members belong to the
Inc. (KAKUSA) marginalized and underrepresented;
- The incumbent representative in
Congress failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the sector
that the party represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt);
and
- The nominees did not appear to be
21 20442812-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the summary
hearing;
and
- The nominees did not appear to be

(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an identifiable
(ANAD) marginalized and underrepresented
sector;
- Only three nominees were submitted
to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to submit its Statement of
Contribution and Expenditures for
the 2007 Elections.
23 20423912-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy group and
Daughters of does not represent the marginalized
Mother Earth and underrepresented;
(GREENFORCE)
- Failure to comply with the track
record requirement; and
- The nominees are not marginalized
citizens.
24 20423612-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not belong to the
sector that the party seeks to
represent (urban poor and peasants
of the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees reside in
the National Capital Region; and
record requirement.
25 20434112-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its nominees
are members of the indigenous people
in the Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party's nominees
reside in the Mindanao and
Cordilleras; and
- Three of the nominees do not appear
to belong to the marginalized.
26 20435812-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group which
Advancement may not be allowed registration
for National under the party-list system; and
Progress
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the nominees
actually belong to the sector.
27 20435912-272 Social Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are disqualified from
Active Reform representing the sectors that
and Transparency the party represents;
(SMART)
record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether majority
of its members are marginalized and
underrepresented.
28 20423812-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to 2010;
- Failure to represent any sector; and
- Failure to establish that the nominees
are employed in the construction
industry, the sector it claims to
represent.
29 20432312-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track record of
trying to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the sector
of professionals.
30 20432112-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track record
of enhancing the lives of the
marginalized and underrepresented
farmers which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the party's
nominees do not belong to the
farmers sector.
31 20412512-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five nominees
Alliance, Inc. are members of the indigenous
(A-IPRA) people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide members.

32 20421612-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with private
Federation, Inc. and government agencies and is
(COCOFED) not marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various projects; and
- The nominees are not members of
the marginalized sector of coconut
farmers and producers.
33 20422012-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track record of
(ABANG continuously representing the
LINGKOD) peasant farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its members
actually belong to the peasant farmers
sector; and
- Failure to show that its nominees are
marginalized and underrepresented,
have actively participated in programs
for the advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
34 20415812-158 Action Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Brotherhood for accreditation
Active - Failure to show that the party is
Dreamers, Inc. actually able to represent all of
(ABROAD) the sectors it claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete track
record of its activities since its
registration; and
- The nominees are not part of any of
the sectors which the party seeks to
represent.
35 20437412-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives assistance from
Magsasaka the government through the
(BINHI) Department of Agriculture; and
- Failure to prove that the group is
36 20435612-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative sectors
are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party's nominees neither appear
to belong to the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have actively
participated in the undertakings of
the party.
37 20448612-194 1st Kabalikat ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bayan accreditation
Ginhawang - Declaration of untruthful statements;
Sangkatauhan
(1st KABAGIS) - Failure to exist for at least one year;
and
- None of its nominees belong to the
labor, fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural communities
sectors which it seeks to represent.
38 20441012-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers and
Koalisyon (1- operators, who may have conflicting
UTAK) interests; and
- The party's nominees do not belong
to any marginalized and
39204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration

204425(PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election laws
12-191 in the because its nominees had a term-
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. sharing agreement.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were
able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include
the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the o cial ballot for the 13 May 2013
party-list elections. CSAaDE
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This
Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status
Quo Ante Orders, namely :
G.R. No. SPP No. Group
Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
12-177 (PLM)
Association for Righteousness
203981 12-187 (PLM)
Advocacy
on Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC)
203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural
Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)
203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na
203958 12-015 (PLM)
Walang
Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian
Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
Alliance for Nationalism and
204094 12-185 (PLM)
Democracy
(ANAD)
204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
1-Bro Philippine Guardians
204100 12-196 (PLM)
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)
204141 12-229 (PLM) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God,
Country and People) Association of
the
Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY)
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa
204240 12-279 (PLM)
Magsasaka
ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
Philippine Coconut Producers
204216 12-202 (PLM)
Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 (PLM) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer,
Inc. (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines,
204122 12-223 (PLM)
Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Against Drugs
Foundation (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 (PLM) Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc.
(A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
204126 12-263 (PLM) Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang
Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong
204364 12-180 (PLM)
Tao
Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay
at
Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 (PLM) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
204239 12-060 (PLM) Green Force for the Environment Sons
and Daughters of Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Indigenous Masses
(ALIM)
204358 12-204 (PLM) Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Advancement for National Progress
(AAMA)
204359 12-272 (PLM) Social Movement for Active Reform
and Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper,
Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper,
Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 (PLM) Pilipino Association for Country —
Urban Poor Youth Advancement
and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 (PLM) Association of Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc.
(ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 (PLM) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 (PLM) Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para
sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy
Party (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 (PLM) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 (PLM) 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
204421, 12-157 (PLM) Coalition of Senior Citizens in the
204425 12-191 (PLM) Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165 (PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks
and Associations of the Philippines,
Inc.
(ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party
(PASANG MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: rst, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 4 9
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision
new parameters in the quali cation of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the
party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC
in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are quali ed to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. 5 0 The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list
group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of

the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation ." 5 1 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read
in light of the following discussion among its framers: SEDaAH
MR. MONSOD:
....
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal
for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation . Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid
the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made
aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which
sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the
Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that
they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats.
And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, shermen, workers,
students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identi ed here as
"sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The
problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the
Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector
should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the
longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become
because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the
farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are
many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a
farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of
the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of
sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some
people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these
problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system,
there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers
can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register
and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there
is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to
be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be
a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each
party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and
register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a
party, organization or coalition.ScCIaA
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of
the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30
percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of
these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15
names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to
meet the minimum quali cations of a Member of the National Assembly.
At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes;
KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who
has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote quali es and the 50 seats are
apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of
the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justi cation for that? When we allocate legislative
districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it
is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four
labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or ve of them get one percent, they are not entitled to
any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get ve
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those
are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may
not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They
may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have
votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or six representatives in
the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts.
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the
party list system.EcHaAC
BISHOP BACANI:
Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of

party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to
sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD:
As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not
even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the
party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system . . . . . CcAHEI
xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited
to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify
for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or
must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner

mentioned can eld candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also eld sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted,
of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can eld district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clari ed on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they eld candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in
this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify? EaSCAH
MR. VILLACORTA.

MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can eld candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political

parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines .
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent
the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto
ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that
under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?CDHaET
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may eld sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party
list system.
MR. MONSOD.

MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang

labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:
Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent

problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO elds
a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political
party is really organized along a speci c sectoral line. If such is
veri ed or con rmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists
are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging
to such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting
claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims
of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This
proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be
summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this
matter are final and unappealable . 5 2 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate
in the party-list system "[F]or as long as they eld candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution ."
53 DTAaCE
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list
system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his
Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,
subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions —
the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum
of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half
were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the di culty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He
was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with
electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be
represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that
pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest
would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and
more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the rst ve major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating
in the party-list system for the rst party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting
19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted
down . The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 5 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors
was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only
allowed for the rst three consecutive terms. 5 5 There can be no doubt whatsoever that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list
system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list
system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in
the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not
compete in legislative district elections. TaDSHC
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the
party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more
that two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations .
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations ." The commas after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they
would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because
it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not
be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5 (1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate
from sectoral parties .
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups : (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the rst three consecutive terms of Congress after the rati cation of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is
not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that
the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the rst "three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the rst three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that quali es under the three groups constituting the party-list
system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained
in Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed:
the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. De nition of Terms. — (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or

a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. DCIEac
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,

regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 de nes a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers
to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government ." On the other hand, Section 3
(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector ." R.A. No.
7941 provides different de nitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors . To
require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial at, ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-
list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. aHcACT
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is

clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No.
7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is su cient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens .
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly , handicapped, women ,
youth , veterans, overseas workers, and professionals . " 5 6 The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
"professionals" are not by de nition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the
elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-de ned political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into
sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the
law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section
6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or
organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
o cers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating

to elections;

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of

the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented " appears only once in R.A. No.
7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 5 7 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through
the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned
political constituencies ," to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the speci c implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not de ne or require that the sectors, organizations or
parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret
that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would
lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 with its speci c implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions
of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented " should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature , economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong
to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented . Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or in rmity." It is su cient that
one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More speci cally, the economically
"marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 5 8 TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-de ned political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
t h e sectoral parties for labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and
underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will
give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both
in economic and ideological status , will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list
system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and in rmity," even as
they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that eld candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack "well-de ned political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-
list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties .
This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who "lack well-de ned political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have
members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives.'" However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline,
that "the political party . . . must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the
COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings o cially organized by major political
parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited
major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their
sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the " rst ve (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 5 9 Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since
the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections . However,
major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-de ned
political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and those who "lack well-de ned political constituencies" as members of the House of
Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate
in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-
de ned political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives,
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-de ned political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list
elections, a major political party that elds candidates in the legislative district elections
must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, o cers and members, a majority of whom must
belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the quali cations of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Quali cations of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona de member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty- ve

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona de member of the party or organization which he

or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona de
party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have
a track record of advocacy for such sector .
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying
those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identi ed in
Section 5 of RA 7941 . . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA

7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disquali ed under Section 6
of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its o cers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: TCcIaA
"SEC. 9. Quali cations of Party-List Nominees. — No person

shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona de member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty- ve (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-

ve (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in o ce until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must

represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees . . . . .
Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the

formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation
as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani
ruling further. In BANAT, the majority o cially excluded major political parties from
participating in party-list elections, 6 0 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties
can participate in party-list elections. TEacSA
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate
in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "
[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law." 6 1 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion
and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not
have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT,
this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In
BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are quali ed to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections . For this purpose, we suspend our rule 6 2 that a party may appeal to this Court
from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not eld candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that elds candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.cdtai

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-de ned political constituencies."
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-de ned
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-de ned political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-de ned
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona- de members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disquali ed if some of their nominees are disquali ed, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups
or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disquali ed by the COMELEC because as political or
regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the
sectors they represent may have been disquali ed, although they may have a track record
of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disquali ed because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disquali ed because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at
least one remaining quali ed nominee. As discussed above, the disquali cation of
petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully,
and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to
what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write
the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE , all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED . The 13 petitions, which
have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections only for determination whether petitioners are quali ed to register under the
party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been
granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots,
are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are
quali ed to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on
Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED .
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I dissent; Ang Bagong Bayani should be upheld, not reversed. See
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relative's participation in party list election.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also with the additional grounds cited in Justice
Brion's concurring opinion for revisiting the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and his erudite
analysis of the aim of the party-list system under the Constitution and law and its
implications on political parties, party-list registrants and nominees.
Brion, J., see: separate opinion.
Peralta, J., I join separate opinion of J. Brion.
Abad, J., I join J. A.D. Brion in his separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but these was a grave abuse of discretion but only
with respect to the disqualification of nominees separate from the party organization.
Reyes, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
SERENO , C.J., concurring and dissenting :
The party-list system is primarily a

tool for social justice.
I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized
and underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national
and regional parties or organizations to invade what is and should be constitutionally and
statutorily protected space. What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list
system under the 1987 Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere
political plurality, but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged. DSEaHT

The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was
not done in a vacuum. It comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still
is struggling to come to terms with much social injustice that has been perpetrated over
centuries against a majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its own
governments.
This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled
during the Martial Law years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment that
the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987 Constitution must be
appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed . The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is appropos
since it is a document that not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To
harken to the words of Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, n President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
THE PRESIDENT :My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:
xxx xxx xxx

My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in favor of the
Constitution drafted by this Constitutional Commission because I believe that
the document is a worthy and inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino
people of today, tomorrow, and for posterity.
The reasons I will give have been given by most of the Members of this
Constitutional Commission this evening. But permit me to restate them just to
stress the reasons why I am voting in favor. EDSAac
For the rst time in the history of constitution-making in our country,

we set forth in clear and positive terms in the Preamble which is the
beacon light of the new Charter, the noble goal to establish a just and
humane society . This must be so because at present we have to admit that
there are so few with so much and so many with so little. We uphold the Rule of
Law where no man is above the law, and we adhere to the principles of truth,
justice, freedom, equality, love and peace. Yes, for the rst time and possibly
this is the rst Constitution where "love" is enshrined. This is most signi cant at
this period in our national life when the nation is bleeding under the forces of
hatred and violence, brothers ghting against brothers, Filipinos torturing and
killing their own countrymen. Without love, there can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of government with

three branches each independent and coequal of each other affording a check
and balance of powers. Sovereignty resides in the people.
xxx xxx xxx
For the rst time, and possibly this is the rst and only Constitution which
provides for the creation of a Commission on Human Rights entrusted with the
grave responsibility of investigating violations of civil and political rights by any
party or groups and recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter also
sets forth quite lengthily provisions on economic, social and cultural rights
spread out in separate articles such as the Articles on Social Justice ,
Education and Declaration of Principles. It is a document which in clear
and in unmistakable terms reaches out to the underprivileged, the
paupers, the sick, the elderly, disabled, veterans and other sectors of
society. It is a document which opens an expanded improved way of
life for the farmers, the workers, shermen, the rank and le of those
in service in the government. And that is why I say that the Article on
Social Justice is the heart of the new Charter. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good ." 3 As explained by this Court: cSHIaA
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in
the Constitution . The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in
protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of
national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take a rmative action in the direction of
greater equality. . . . [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no
lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards
achieving a reasonable measure of equality .
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justi cation that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection
to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also
on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice
calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated . 4
(Emphasis supplied)
That is also why the 1987 Constitution is replete with other social justice provisions,
including Sections 9, 10, 13, 14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5 (1)
(2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of Article XII, and Article XIII. As aptly
pointed out by Commissioner Guingona in his sponsorship speech for the approval of the
entire draft of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was the underlying philosophy of the
drafters when crafting the provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution which is re ective
of the spirit of our time -a spirit of nationalism, a spirit of liberation, a spirit of
rising expectations. DSETcC
On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and women from
different walks of life with diverse backgrounds and orientations, even with
con icting convictions, but all sharing the same earnest desire to serve the
people and to help draft a Constitution which will establish a government that
the people can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that guarantees
individual rights and serves as a barrier against excesses of those in authority.
xxx xxx xxx
A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its authenticity and
authority from the sovereign will; the power of the people precedes it. As such, it
should re ect the norms, the values, the modes of thought of our society,
preserve its heritage, promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished
liberties and guard against the encroachments of would-be dictators. These
objectives have served as the framework in the work of drafting the 1986
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A signi cant innovation, as far as the legislative department is concerned, refers

to the composition of the members of the House of Representatives.
Representation in the Lower House has been broadened to embrace various
sectors of society; in effect, enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted
by members who shall be elected in the traditional manner, representing
political districts, as well as by members who shall be elected through the party
list system.
xxx xxx xxx

The institutions through which the sovereign people rule themselves are
essential for the effective operation of government. But these are not enough in
order that the body politic may evolve and progress. There is need for an
underlying socio-economic philosophy which would direct these
political structures and serve as the mainspring for development. So it
is that the draft Constitution contains separate Articles on Social
Justice and National Economy and Patrimony .
Talk of people's freedom and legal equality would be empty rhetoric as long as
they continue to live in destitution and misery, without land, without
employment, without hope. But in helping to bring about transformation, in
helping the common man break away from the bondage of traditional society,
in helping restore to him his dignity and worth, the right to individual initiative
and to property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission President, the
Honorable Cecilia Muñoz Palma, refers to as the "heart of the
Constitution," provides that Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that would reduce social, economic and
political inequalities . The same article addresses the problems of (1) labor —
local and overseas, organized and unorganized — recognizing the rights of all
workers in the private as well as in the public sector, the rank and le and the
supervisory, to self-organization, collective bargaining and peaceful and
concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law; (2) the
farmers, the farm workers, the subsistence shermen and the shworkers,
through agrarian and natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas, through urban land
reform and housing; (4) the health of the people, through an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development; (5) the women, by ensuring the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and (6) people's
organizations, by facilitating the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms. caIEAD
xxx xxx xxx

These are some of the provisions which we have constitutionalized. These are
some of the innovations that we have introduced. These are the ideas, values
and institutions which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national transformation and
development, the driving force for what we pray would be our irreversible march
to progress. In brief, this is what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission have drafted under the able, rm and dedicated leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muñoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument suited to the
circumstances of our time. It is also a Constitution that does not limit its
usefulness to present needs; one which, in the words of U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Marshall, and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to
come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our efforts would
pave the way towards the establishment of a renewed constitutional
government which we were deprived of since 1972, that these efforts would
ensure that the triumph at EDSA so deservingly won by the people shall
continue to be enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts
would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution — a Constitution which
is the repository of the people's inalienable rights; a Constitution that enshrines
people's power and the rule of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish
in this fair land a community characterized by moral regeneration, social
progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and concern for one
another; a Constitution that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure
for the people a better life founded on liberty and welfare for all.
TAIaHE
Mr. Presiding O cer, on behalf of this Commission's Sponsorship Committee, I

have the honor to move for the approval of the draft Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines on Second Reading. 5
It is within this historical and textual milieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all the
other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made clear. 6
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided
for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena. 7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:
First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists
is that representatives should be selected to 'mirror' the characteristics of those
being represented — in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics
judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably
in some recent democratic debates focused on the need for special
representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social groups
within democratic assemblies . The applicability of this idea of 'mirror'
representation is not con ned to debates about representing marginalized
minorities within nation-states; Iris Young further applies this model of
representation to global politics, arguing that global representation should be
based on representation of the various 'peoples' of the world, each of which
embodies its own distinctive identity and 'perspective'. In practice, special
representation for certain social groups within a 'mirror' framework can be
combined with election mechanisms in various ways — such as by according
quotas of elected representatives to designated social groups. But
since the selection of these 'social groups' for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting
legitimate representatives, occurring prior to the electoral process, such
'mirror' representation is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for
selecting representative agents . 8 (Emphasis supplied) AEcIaH
Two months after their initial debates on the form and structure of government that
would best promote equality, the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political
equality and provided for sectoral representation in the party-list system of the legislature.
Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list system. 9
MR. VILLACORTA:. . . On this rst day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher
in a new chapter in our national history by giving genuine power to our people in
the legislature . . .
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system
sought to address: 1 0
MR. TADEO:. . . Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people's power. Kaya kami
naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil sa people's power — nasa amin ang people, wala
sa amin ang power. Ganito ito kahalaga.
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature is supposed to implement or give esh to the needs and
aspirations of the Filipino people.
SDTIaE
Ganoon kahalaga ang National Assembly kaya't napakahalaga noong Section

5 and Section 31 ng ating Constitution. Our experience, however, has shown
that legislation has tended to bene t more the propertied class who
constitutioes a small minority in our society than the impoverished majority, 70
percent of whom live below the poverty line. This has come about because the
rich have managed to dominate and control the legislature, while the basic
sectors have been left out of it. So, the critical question is, how do we ensure
ample representation of basic sectors in the legislature so that laws re ect their
needs and aspirations?

RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Not only is it a "social justice tool", as held in Ang Bagong Bayani, 1 1 but it is primarily so .
This is not mere semantics but a matter of legal and historical accuracy with material
consequences in the realm of statutory interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections. I shall discuss below my position in relation to the second, fourth and sixth
parameter enunciated in the ponencia.
"Marginalized and underrepresented"
under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies
national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Under the second parameter, "[n]ational parties or organizations and regional parties
or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector." In a nutshell, the ponencia interprets
"marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral
parties or organizations, and not national and regional parties or organizations.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of
"marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to divorce national
and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice,
which objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941. TcDIEH
Second, Section 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives."
On its face, it is apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" quali es "sectors",
"organizations" and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction,
the import of "social justice" that has developed in various decisions is that when the law is
clear and valid, it simply must be applied; but when the law can be interpreted in more
ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be favored. 1 2
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is a countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties. To
quote:
MR. OPLE:
So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a party list
system is that it is a countervailing means for the weaker
segments of our society, if they want to seek seats in the
legislature, to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more
entrenched and well-established political parties , but he is
concerned that the mechanics might be inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD:
Not only that ; talking about labor, for example — I think Commissioner Tadeo
said there are 10 to 12 million laborers and I understand that organized
labor is about 4.8 million or 4.5 million — if the laborers get together, they
can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would have 10 seats under the
party list system.
MR. OPLE:
So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open to all and
would not agree to a party list system which seeks to accommodate, in
particular, the so-called sectoral groups that are predominantly workers
and peasants? prcd
MR. MONSOD:
If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within the 50, and I am
assuming that maybe there are just two major parties or three at the most,
then it is already a form of opening it up for other groups to come in. All we
are asking is that they produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The whole
purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who
have a national constituency who may never be able to win a seat
on a legislative district basis . But they must have a constituency of at
least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the National Assembly. 1 3
[emphasis supplied]
However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well-
established political parties and organizations to compete with the weaker segments of
society, which is the very evil sought to be guarded against.
The ponencia's second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among
others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941, and
the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to allow
national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations to participate in the party-list
system. To require national and regional parties and organizations to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented makes them effectively sectoral parties and
organizations and violates this intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations the same by requiring that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," they become the same. By analogy, people can be treated similarly but
that does not make them identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, only 50% of the seats are allocated during the rst three consecutive terms
of Congress after the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution to representatives from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows that the other 50% would be
allocated to representatives from sectors which are non-marginalized and
underrepresented. DTcACa
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the
former is true. This is not so since the latter 50% can very well include representatives
from other non-enumerated sectors, or even national or regional parties and organizations,
all of which can be "marginalized and underrepresented."
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, from participating in the party-list
system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties are
necessarily non-marginalized or underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how
"marginalization and underrepresentation" is de ned. The ponencia appears to be
operating under a preconceived notion that "marginalized and underrepresented" refers
only to those "economically" marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to de ne the phrase "marginalized
and underrepresented," primarily because it already constitutes su cient legislative
standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of its
discretion to determine the qualification of a party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC
must be upheld. This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that,
"the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized and
underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these
regulations are germane to the objects and purposes of the law and not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then the standard may be
deemed sufficient. 1 4 TAaIDH
We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those
who are marginalized and underrepresented today may no longer be one later on.
Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever evolving concept, created to address
social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our Constitution. 1 5
Con ning its de nition to the present context may unduly restrict the COMELEC of its
quasi-legislative powers which enables it to issue rules and regulations to implement the
election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it
by Congress. 1 6
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution,
because the legislature is certain to nd it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. 1 7 The growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased di culty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only
execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest. 1 8 This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in
People v. Rosenthal 1 9 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission .
20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of
the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized and
underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the
party "violates or fails to comply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it
must be rst established that "marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a
requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of
"marginalization and underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry
su cient legal signi cance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of a
legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers.
This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus de nes legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and speci es the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to
be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. 2 1 Consequently, we have held that "public welfare" 2 2 and "public interest" 2 3 are
examples of such su cient standards. Therefore, that it appears only once in RA 7941 is
more than sufficient, since a standard could even be an implied one. TaCIDS
National, regional and sectoral

parties or organizations must both
represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and lack "well-
defined political constituencies".
The fourth parameter in the ponencia states:
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-de ned political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communites, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-de ned political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.

First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a well-de ned political
constituency" as a requirement along with "marginalization and underrepresentation." They
are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and organizations
intending to run in the party-list elections must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it
means to be "marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well-de ned political
constituency." For reasons discussed above, the exact content of these legislative
standards should be left to the COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to
address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our
Constitution. IDSaTE

The disqualification of a nominee
should not disqualify the party-list
group provided that: (1) it meets
Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong
Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the
new parameters set in the ponencia ,
that they validly qualify as national,
regional or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3)
nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I
would like to explain my position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the
ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disquali ed if some of their nominees are disquali ed, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disquali cation of a party-list group due to the
disquali cation of its nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations
regarding the nominee's quali cations. Otherwise, the disquali cation of a nominee
should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline
Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters
set in the ponencia , that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral
party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains quali ed, for
reasons explained below . IaESCH
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would bene t them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of
Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature." 2 4 Because of this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret
Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial power to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the disquali cation of a
single nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws
as a disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a
violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the
laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by
the COMELEC. Thus, any disquali cation of a party-list group based on the disquali cation
of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee's
quali cations. This also nds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers
declaring "untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second quali cation mentioned above, party-list groups should have
at least one quali ed nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to
participate in the elections. This is because if all of its top three nominees are disquali ed,
even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the elections,
and should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it would still have no one to
represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its disquali ed nominee
through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation
to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on "the list of names submitted by the respective parties . . . according to
their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a party-list group's nominees is determined by
the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of which reads: cHDAIS
. . . No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed

after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list.
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list
group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of
the nominees is changed through substitution, which according to Section 8 is done by
placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names that
come after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect, the
new list with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among the
nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the rst to the last, in
accordance with Section 13.
If any/some of the nominees is/are disquali ed, no substitution will be allowed.
Thus, their ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC
in determining the one/s that will represent the winning party-list group in Congress. This
means that if the rst nominee is disquali ed, and the party-list group is able to join the
elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the rst
nominee's place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets
enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can represent it.
Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang
Bagong Bayani 2 5 (alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it
quali es as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization) and has established the
quali cation of at least one (1) of its top three (3) nominees, to participate in the elections
is a better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with the policy of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve proportional
representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature" 2 6 while providing su cient disincentives for
party-list groups to ood the COMELEC with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only
requires that they submit not less than five (5). cEaCTS
It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system
introduced in BANAT v. COMELEC, 2 7 will allow more party-list groups to be represented in
Congress.
Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.
The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes
the following facts: (1) 35 party-list groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million
votes were cast for the party-list system; and (3) there are 50 seats in Congress reserved
for the party-list representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to
distribute the 50 seats reserved in the House of Representatives given the foregoing facts
and the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 party-list groups.
Rank Party-list Votes % 1st Round 2nd Round Total #
(guaranteed (additional
group Garnered of seats
seats) seats)
1 AAA 1,466,000 7.33% 1 2 3
2 BBB 1,228,000 6.14% 1 2 3
3 CCC 1,040,000 4.74% 1 1 2
4 DDD 1,020,000 3.89% 1 1 2
5 EEE 998,000 3.88% 1 1 2
6 FFF 960,000 3.07% 1 1 2
7 GGG 942,000 2.92% 1 1 2
8 HHH 926,000 2.65% 1 1 2
9 III 910,000 2.57% 1 1 2
10 JJJ 796,000 2.57% 1 1 2
11 KKK 750,000 2.42% 1 1 2
12 LLL 738,000 2.35% 1 1 2
13 MMM 718,000 2.32% 1 1 2
14 NNN 698,000 2.13% 1 1 2
15 OOO 678,000 2.12% 1 1 2
16 PPP 658,000 2.06% 1 1 2
17 QQQ 598,000 2.02% 1 1 2
18 RRR 482,000 1.95% 1 1
19 SSS 378,000 1.89% 1 1
20 TTT 318,000 1.54% 1 1
21 UUU 294,000 1.47% 1 1
22 VVV 292,000 1.44% 1 1
23 WWW 290,000 1.43% 1 1
24 XXX 280,000 1.37% 1 1
25 YYY 274,000 1.37% 1 1
26 ZZZ 268,000 1.34% 1 1
27 1-A 256,000 1.24% 1 1
28 1-B 248,000 1.23% 1 1
29 1-C 238,000 1.18% 1 1
30 1-D 222,000 1.11% 1 1
31 1-E 214,000 1.07% 1 1
32 1-F 212,000 1.06%
33 1-G 210,000 1.05%
34 1-H 206,000 1.03%
35 1-I 194,000 1.02%
—————————— ———— ———— ———
20,000,000 17 33 50
========= ==== ==== ===
We explained in BANAT that the rst clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. 7941
guarantees a seat to the party-list groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system." In our hypothetical scenario, the party-list groups
ranked 1st to 17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes cast for the party-list
system. In effect, all 17 of them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of these so-
called guaranteed seats to the "two percenters" is what BANAT calls the " rst round of
seat allocation."
From the rst round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats
allocated to the two percenters will be subtracted from "20% of the members of the House
of Representatives" reserved by the Constitution for party-list representatives, which in this
hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to
establish the quali cation of their rst nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in
what BANAT termed as the "second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the
distribution/allocation of these seats are fairly simple. If a party-list group's percentage is
multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is no less than 2, then
that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with the 3-seat
limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top two party-
list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming, again, that the 2nd
and 3rd nominees of both AAA and BBB are quali ed, then only 29 will be left for
distribution. TAIDHa
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of
votes cast in favor of the remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the
only thing that matters is the group's ranking. The party-list group that comes after BBB
will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party-list group, per rank,
continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat allocation stops at
this point. In the table above, the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list group that
ranked 31st in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are quali ed.
What happens if one or some of the nominees are disquali ed? Following the proposed
method, if one or two of the party-list groups with guaranteed seats have a disquali ed
rst nominee, their second nominee, if quali ed, can still represent them in Congress
based on the second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groups — whether or not entitled
to guaranteed seats — are disquali ed, then those party-list groups, which without the
disquali cation of these nominees would not be entitled to a seat, would now have a
higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed
seat and the additional seats for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1.
With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a seat in its favor, assuming
that its rst nominee is quali ed. If I-E's rst nominee is disquali ed, then we will proceed
to the party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. This method is followed down the line until all 50
seats are allocated. TSHcIa
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list
groups represented in Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time
using a "non-two percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at
least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of seat allocation, it was granted
1 seat. To be able to send a representative in Congress, RRR's rst nominee should be
quali ed to sit. Assuming that its rst nominee was disquali ed, its second or third
nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will now go
to I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the
elections despite the disquali cation of some of its nominees, provided that there remains
a quali ed nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not only is this the better
policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by law.
Only nine of the petitions should be
remanded.
Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand of
all petitions to the COMELEC for reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz.:
. . . Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court . (Emphasis supplied) ATaDHC
The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencia's guidelines focus mainly on two (2)
grounds used by the COMELEC to cancel registration: (1) the standard of marginalized and
underrepresented as applied to national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations;
and (2) the quali cation of nominees. From such examination, we can conclude that, in
relation to the other grounds used by COMELEC to cancel registration (other than those
two grounds mentioned above), the doctrines remain unchanged. Thus, a remand of those
petitions is unnecessary, considering that the acts of the COMELEC pertaining to their
petitions are upheld. The ponencia even admits that COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose
registration was cancelled on the basis of applying the standard of "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the quali cation of nominees wherein the "new parameters" apply.
If other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those with "new parameters," — say,
for example, failure to prove track record, a remand would be uncalled for because the
doctrine pertaining to the other grounds remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9)
petitions should be ordered remanded to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions, the
COMELEC cancelled the registration of the party-list groups solely on the ground that their
nominees are disqualified. In making such a pronouncement, the COMELEC merely used as
yardstick whether the nominees actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented,
and not whether they could qualify as advocates, and for this reason, I recommend that the
following cases be REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:
1. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
2. Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
3. Aangat Tayo (AT)
4. A Blessed Party-List (a.k.a. Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc.) [A BLESSED]
5. Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6. Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7. Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO BAHAY)
8. Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9. 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)
Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponencia's take that the
phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" quali es only sectoral parties, still, a remand
of all the petitions remain uncalled for. Out of the 52 petitions, there are only 11 party-list
groups which are classi ed as national or regional parties. 2 8 Thus, if we were to strictly
apply the ponencia's guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to be remanded. TcEaAS
The COMELEC did not violate

Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC can decide election cases en banc. To recall, the Resolution allows the
COMELEC en banc, without a motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic
review of a decision of a COMELEC division granting a petition for registration of a party-
list group or organization; and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for those already
accredited and which have manifested their intent to participate in the 2013 national and
local elections for the purpose of determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani 2 9 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers
which can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of COMELEC's
administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for reconsideration in Section
3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2
(5) is not quasi-judicial but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true
distinction between the two. In a number of cases, this Court has had the opportunity to
distinguish quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 3 0
we held that: EDaHAT
The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially

management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not entail an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and
a decision or resolution thereon . This is to be distinguished from "quasi-
judicial function", a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion
of public administrative o cers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their o cial action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature . [emphasis supplied]
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary investigation

before the public prosecutor, that also entail the "opportunity to be heard, the production
and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon," but are not considered
quasi-judicial in the proper sense of the term. As held in Bautista v. CA: 3 1
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation
performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of
Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul.
In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true
only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an
o ce in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of
a court. Here is where the similarity ends .
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different
from other quasi-judicial proceedings . A quasi-judicial body has been
de ned as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
or rule-making."
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the scal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the scal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal .
Hence, the O ce of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its
decisions approving the ling of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve
appeals with nality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable ne, the only remedy of
petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense
in the trial of the case. (emphasis supplied)aDHScI
While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the exercise of the former has for its
purpose the adjudication of rights with nality. 3 2 This makes it akin to judicial power
which has for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 3 3
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for
reconsideration is to look at it through the lens of an election case. The phrase "all such
election cases" in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, viz.:
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in
Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and quali cations of all elective regional,
provincial, and city o cials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal of o cials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o cials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction. 3 4
As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already de ned it under the penumbra
of election as follows: SDHAEC
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a

post-election scenario . Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective
in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.
xxx xxx xxx

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and quali cations of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally de ned as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could le an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario .
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, de ned by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the quali cations of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. (Emphasis
supplied) 3 5
In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections , 3 6 it was also held that the primary purpose
of an election case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate.
Thus, there must rst be an election before there can be an election case. Since the
national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic
review and summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an
election case. For this reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under Section 3 is not
required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-
IPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitions of all the
other Petitioners should be dismissed.
BRION , J., concurring :
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to re ect my views on the various questions

submitted to the Court through consolidated petitions before us.
For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out under
the following structure: IHaSED
I. The Case and the Issues

II. Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions
A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani
2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
B. Nominees
C. On the observation of the Chief Justice
D. Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III. Preliminary Matters
A. The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of jurisdictional error that
warrants reviewing COMELEC's action
B. COMELEC's power to register and to cancel registration of a party-list
group is an exercise of its administrative powers
IV. Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text
b. Constitutional text summarized
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation aDcHIS
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act

C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. Ang Bagong Bayani
b. Banat
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA
7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective
a.2. From the statutory perspective
b. Party participation under the party-list system
b.1. Impact on political parties
c. The parties and their nominees
c.1. Refusal or cancellation of registration due to nominee
problems
c.2. party nominee relationship
E. Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for COMELEC Action
I.A The Cases
The Court resolves fty-three (53) consolidated petitions for
certiorari/prohibition led under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by various party-list groups
and organizations. They commonly assail the COMELEC's resolutions, either cancelling
their existing registrations and accreditations, or denying their new petitions for party-list
registration. AcIaST
Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by new party-list applicants

under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (dated February 21,
2012). These petitions were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the
COMELEC Division's resolutions.
The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought by previously registered
and accredited party-list organizations whose registrations/accreditations have been
cancelled. These petitioners participated in previous elections and cannot participate in
the May 2013 election if the cancellation of their registration/accreditation would stand.
The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC and the disregard of the relevant provisions of the Constitution
and RA No. 7941 , variously questioned —
a. the COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No.
9513 to conduct an automatic review of its Division's rulings despite
the absence of motions for reconsideration, in disregard of Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
b. with respect to the cancellation of previous registration/accreditation
of party-list groups or organizations, the denial of due process and
the violation of the principle of res adjudicata; further, the COMELEC's
cancellation of their existing registration/accreditation is claimed to
be an exercise of its quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC Division,
not the COMELEC En Banc, can exercise at the first instance;
c. the COMELEC En Banc's appreciation of facts and its application of
the guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani, which either addressed defects
or de ciencies on the part of the parties or of their nominees and
which resulted in the refusal or cancellation of
registration/accreditation. cEaDTA
I.B. The Issues

Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court's consideration may be
condensed as follows:
1. Whether the COMELEC En Banc may automatically review the
decision of the COMELEC Division without the requisite ling of a
motion for reconsideration under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
and
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying or
cancelling the registration/accreditation of the petitioners, mainly
relying on the eight point guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS
II.A. On reliance on Ang Bagong
Bayani and its Guidelines.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC ' s 1 intrinsically awed
interpretation of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions is the main source
of the present controversy. Its constricted interpretation of the statutory phrase
"marginalized and underrepresented" has invited more questions than answers that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in fact sought to avoid.
II.A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani.
I take the position that it is time to re-visit this oft-cited ruling before the
party-list system is further led astray.
First , the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional
framers' intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and
underrepresented parties (i.e., those who cannot win in the legislative district elections and
in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect themselves there, but
who — nationally — may generate votes equivalent to what a winner in the legislative
district election would garner) the chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to
elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a system other than the
legislative district elections. HTScEI
Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text and made a slanted
read ing of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. By these means, it erroneously
concluded that the party-list system is primarily intended as a social justice tool, and was
not principally driven by intent to reform electoral system. Thus, under its First Guideline,
Ang Bagong Bayani solely viewed the party-list system from the prism of social
justice , and not from the prism of electoral reform as the framers of the
Constitution originally intended .
Second . In the constitutional deliberations, the proponents of the electoral reform
concept were opposed by those who wanted a party-list system open o nly to sectoral
representation, particularly to sectoral groups with social justice orientation.
The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents nevertheless opened the system
to sectoral representation and in fact gave the social justice groups a head-start by
providing for their representation through selection in the first three elections.
In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution made a textual commitment to
open the party-list system to registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations . The Article on the Commission on Elections also pointedly provided
that there shall be a "free and open party system," a n d votes for parties,
organizations or coalitions shall only be recognized in the party-list system .
II.A.2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties may run in the party-list
elections but maintains under its Second Guideline that they must qualify as marginal
and underrepresented as this phrase is understood in the social justice context.
This is totally incorrect .
Based on the reasons discussed above and further expounded below, even major
political parties can participate in party-list elections because the party-list system is
open to all registered political, national, regional, sectoral organizations and parties,
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and by law. Further, both
political and sectoral parties have equal roles and participation in the party-list system;
again, they are subject to the same limitations imposed by law (the Constitution and RA
No. 7941) and are separately burdened only by the limitations intrinsic to their respective
natures. To summarize: TaIHEA
a) For political parties (whether national or regional) : to be

classi ed as political parties, they must advocate an ideology or
platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of
government. The application of the further requirement under RA No.
7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing the adoption of
their principles of governance, they must regularly nominate and
support their leaders and members as candidates for public o ce)
shall depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e., in
the legislative district elections) and lack of constituency
requirements fully apply, but there is no reason not to presume
compliance with these requirements if political parties are not
participants in any legislative district elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they
form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a coalition in the
party-list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what
the party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in both
electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly
through a coalition. No prohibition, however, exists against informal
alliances that they can form with party-list parties, organizations or
groups running for the party-list elections. The party-list component
of these informal alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-
list elections.
b) For sectoral parties and organizations , they must belong to the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on
social justice characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or
characteristics speci c to their sectors although they do not require
or need to identify with any social justice characteristic. In either case,
they are subject to the "marginalized and under-represented" and the
"constituency" requirements of the law through a showing, supported
by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is actually characterized
as marginal and under-represented.
These parties and organizations are additionally subject to the
general overriding requirement of electoral marginalization and
under-representation and the constituency requirements of the
law, but there is no reason why compliance with these requirements
cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any legislative
district elections.
ACETIa
c) Compliance with COMELEC Rules . To justify their existence, all

party-list groups must comply with the requirements of law, their own
internal rules on membership, and with the COMELEC's Rules of
Procedure. They must submit to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) their constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require. 2
To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the party-list system — as
principally espoused by Commissioner Christian Monsod and duly approved by the
Commission's vote — maintained its electoral reform objectives while signi cantly
contributing to the social justice thrust of the Constitution.
It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Re ections , that this
Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987
Constitution] arose." I recognize the social justice content of the party-list provisions in the
Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these provisions the primacy that both the
framers of the Constitution and Congress did not see fit to accord.
B. On Nominees
Third . Considering the Constitution's solicitous concern for the marginalized and
under-represented sectors as understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941's
requirement of mere bona de membership of a nominee in the party-list group, a
nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented
status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate
of the interest and concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
This classi cation of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and
organizations which are marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice sense or
in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics. To be consistent with the
sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of the members of the
party must actually belong to the sector represented, while nominees must be a
member of the sectoral party or organization . ETDHSa
Since political parties are identi ed by their ideology or platform of government,

bona fide membership , in accordance with the political party's constitution and by-laws,
would suffice .
In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most tangible
link of the nominees to their respective parties and to the party-list system.
Subject to the above, the disquali cation of the nominee does not necessarily
mean the disquali cation of the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the quali cation that the law's 3 requirement of the submission of a list
containing at least ve (quali ed) nominees is mandatory, and a party's inexcusable
failure to comply with this requirement warrants the refusal or cancellation of its
registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C. On the Observations of
the Chief Justice
As my fourth and nal point , the "textualist" approach that the Chief Justice
objects to, has been driven, and is fully justi ed, by the above reading of the Constitution
and the law.
As a basic constitutional point , the business and principal function of this Court
(and of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and
the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and Congress (through RA No.
7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of the Constitution
and the law, and through the intents the framers; both were considered and cited to ensure
that the constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The whole Judiciary,
including this Court, can only apply these policies in the course of their assigned task of
adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the words only in case
of ambiguity. HSEcTC
This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for
social justice or for any ideology for that matter, as advocacy is not the task
assigned to us by the Constitution . To play the role of advocates, or to formulate
policies that fall within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a
violation of our sworn duty.
D. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion
As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court
suspended the Rules of Court in considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of the
clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the Majority unanimously found.
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I vote to
VACATE the ruling of the COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our nding
of patent violation of the Constitution after revisiting and overturning the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I re ect for the record my view that a grave abuse of
discretion exists.
Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases — namely, the petitioners and
the COMELEC — relied upon and were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its standards, in light of what the
text and intents of the Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a result different from
what Ang Bagong Bayani reached. HIEASa
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong considerations

were used in ruling on the consolidated petitions, resulting in gross misinterpretation
and misapplication of the Constitution . This is grave abuse of discretion that
taints a decision maker's action, 4 in nitely made worse in this case because the
Constitution itself is involved.
An added basis for a nding of grave abuse of discretion pertains speci cally to the
COMELEC's refusal or cancellation of registration of the party-list group based, solely or
partly, on the disquali cation of the nominee. As discussed below, this action and any
refusal or cancellation of registration is completely devoid of basis in fact and
in law and in this sense constitutes grave abuse of discretion .
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC in
accordance with the terms of this Separate Opinion. AcHaTE
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

A. The existence of jurisdictional
error that warrants reviewing
COMELEC's action
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or
quasi-judicial powers, on the other hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved party
is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65. Court action under this
rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law, the COMELEC en banc decision is final
and executory and should stand unless nullified by this Court through a writ of certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the
tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of
discretion is in keeping with the o ce of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the
tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it de es exact de nition, generally refers
to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 5
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC
merely complied with the prevailing jurisprudence (in particular. with the Court's
pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and Banat v. COMELEC ), then it could
not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with grave abuse of
discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when the respondent is exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the present case. CITDES
This rationalization, however, is only super cially sound as the gross

misinterpretation and misapplication of the Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in
its role and duty as guardian of the Constitution. Where a misinterpretation or
misapplication of the Constitution occurs, the result is a constitutional violation that this
Court cannot be prevented from addressing through the exercise of its powers through the
available medium of review under the Rules of Court. To hold otherwise is to countenance
a violation of the Constitution — a lapse that cannot and should not happen under our legal
system.
Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application of a
prevailing rule or doctrine negates a nding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a
glaring error in the doctrine's interpretation of the Constitution , then the Court
would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying down a new doctrine that
would operate prospectively but at the same time dismissing the petition for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this is a course of action the Court cannot take
if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn duty to hold the Constitution inviolate. For the
Court, action under these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed to be
heard about its right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional
dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The
Court's previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the resolution of a similar matter in
the future, but this prior ruling cannot in exibly bind the Court in its future actions. As the
highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past
actions, particularly when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate
authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution. 6
cDIaAS
Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in stone
and do not remain un-erased and applicable for all times under all circumstances. The
Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a sense a continuing one as these are made and
re ned in the cases before the Court, taking into account what it has said on the similar
points in the past. This is the principle of stare decisis that fosters the stability of rulings
and decisions. This principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies even if an
incisive examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a faithful
interpretation of the Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation. In this
excluded circumstance, both the rule of reason and the commands of the Constitution
itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need be, overturned. 7 Indeed, if the act
done is contrary to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of discretion cannot
be doubted. 8
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani
ruling does not rest on rm constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of the text
of the constitution and its myopic view of constitutional intent led it to a grave error never
envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act
in accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court — i.e., allowing political parties to
participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are "marginalized
and under-represented" (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in
recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly
included in the list of nominees — the Court would not be violating the principle of
prospectivity. 9
The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity — both in the application of law
and of judicial decisions enunciating new doctrines — is the protection of vested rights and
the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior ruling, the prospective
application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in good faith on
the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
CTHDcE
Obviously, the force of this rationale nds no application in this case, for, a ruling
overturning Ang Bagong Bayani broadens the base of participation in the party-
list system of election based on the text and intent of the Constitution. Thus, no one can
claim that the application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election would operate to the
prejudice of parties who relied on the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized and
under-represented sectors (as the term in understood in Ang Bagong Bayani) continue to
be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, subject to the determination of parties'
individual circumstances by the COMELEC.
B. COMELEC power to register
and to cancel registration of a
party-list group is an exercise of
its administrative powers
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 — i.e., to
conduct summary hearings for the purpose of determining the registered parties'
continuing compliance with the law and the regulations and to review the COMELEC
Division's ruling granting a petition for registration — is appropriately an exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative power rather than its quasi-judicial power. In the exercise of
this authority, the COMELEC may automatically review the decision of its Divisions, without
need for a motion to reconsider the grant of a petition for registration; it may also conduct
summary hearings when previously registered party-list groups le their manifestation of
intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al. 1 0 already provides us ample
guidance and insights into what distinguishes administrative and quasi-judicial powers
from one another. On the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari (which can only be
invoked when the respondent exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions) would lie
against a public school committee whose function was to determine the ranking of
selected honor students for its graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and
said: ScHADI
From the [foregoing], it will be gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or o cer
may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some speci c rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or o cer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties . As pointed out by
appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that
provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their
pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 1 1 (citation omitted; emphases
ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for
registration or the determination of a registered party's continuing compliance with
existing laws, rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a right or the presence of a
con ict of rights. In a registration or compliance proceeding, an applicant simply attempts
to prove its possession or continued possession of the requisite quali cations for the
purpose of availing the privilege of participating in an electoral exercise. Thus, no real
adjudication entailing the exercise of quasi-judicial powers actually takes place.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata in these registration
proceedings necessarily weakens any claim that adjudication, done in the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions, is involved. Each election period is sui generis — a class in itself,
and any registration or accreditation by a party-list group is only for the purpose of the
coming election; it does not grant any registered party-list group any mantle of immunity
from the COMELEC's power of review as an incident of its power to register. To hold
otherwise would emasculate the COMELEC as an independent constitutional commission,
and weaken the crucial role it plays in our republican democracy.
IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS
I take the rm position that this Court should now revisit its ruling in Ang Bagong
B ay ani before our party-list system drifts any farther from the text and spirit of the
constitutional and statutory commands. HEScID
These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting this approach and my
conclusions.
A. The Constitutional Provisions
on the Party-list System
a. The Constitutional Text.
The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with the party-list system of
election are Section 5 (1) and (2) of Article VI , and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution .
The cited Article VI section reads:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law , shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations .
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector. [emphasis, underscores and italics ours] EHcaDT
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, is the article on the
COMELEC, and the cited sections quoted below are its provisions related to the party-list
system.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Register , after su cient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens'
arms of the Commission on Elections. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution. [emphases and italics ours]
These provisions are speci cally mentioned and shall be cited throughout this Separate
Opinion as they are the essential take-off points in considering, appreciating and
implementing the party-list system.
b. The Constitutional Text Summarized
Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the Constitution relating to the party-list
system essentially provide that:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
elected from legislative districts , and those who are elected
through a party-list system . ICAcaH
2. T h e members of the House of Representatives under the

party-list system are those who are elected, as provided by law ,
thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation.
3. The members under the system shall be elected through
registered national, regional, sectoral parties and
organizations , thus, textually identifying the recognized component
groupings in the party-list system; they must all register with the
COMELEC to be able to participate.
4. To be voted under the party-list system are the component
political parties, organizations and coalitions , in contrast with
the individual candidates voted upon in legislative district elections.
5. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives , including those in the party-
list.
6. F o r three consecutive terms after the rati cation of the
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be lled as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
minorities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
7. The Constitution allows a free and open party system that shall
evolve according to the free choice of the people, within the limits of
the Constitution.
c. Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general in their
terms. However, they are not, in fact, as bare as they would seem, as the words used carry
meanings and intents 1 2 expressed during the deliberations and the voting that took
place to determine what the Constitution would exactly provide. 1 3
Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent that led to the
modi cation of the system of legislative district elections that the country has used even
before the 1935 Constitution.
The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative district system that remains
described in the Constitution as election by district "apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 1 4 AIcaDC
The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list

system in terms of its purpose , as follows: 1 5
The purpose of this is to open the system . In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
place or fourth place in each of the districts . So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts .
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the
party list system . [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the Commissioner's subsequent
statement when he said —
The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for those who have a
national constituency who may never be able to win a seat on a legislative
district basis. But they must have a constituency of at least 400,000 in order to
claim a voice in the National Assembly. 1 6
thus, leaving no doubt on what the party-list system conceptually is and why it
was established.
B. RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
Following the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon Aquino
appointed representatives of the sectors mentioned in the Constitution, namely: labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth, who acted as the
party-list representatives for the first three (3) elections under this Constitution.
In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act , as
the law that would implement the party-list election scheduled for May 1998. The law at
the same time eshed out the mechanics for party-list elections, in accordance with the
terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided for: SHECcT
a. a declaration of the policy behind the law;

b. a de nition of terms , speci cally de ning the terms national,
political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their coalitions ;
c. the requisites and terms for registration ; the grounds for refusal
and cancellation of registration ; and the certi ed list of registered
parties;
d. the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives ;
e. the manner of voting ;
f. t h e number and procedure for the allocation of party-list
representatives; and
g. the proclamation of the winning party-list representatives , their
term of o ce; the limitation on their change of a liation; their rights;
and the provisions in case of vacancy.
Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the party-list system as:
a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system. 1 7 (emphases and
italics ours)
and clarified the State's policy, objectives and means , as follows:
a.the promotion of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof;
b.with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties , and who lack well-de ned
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole , to
become members of the House of Representatives; and
c.for the development and guarantee of a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature under the simplest scheme possible. 1 8 IaSCTE
RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly de ned the component groupings recognized

by law in the party-list system, as follows:
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party
when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated [labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals] whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
19 (emphases and italics ours)
Notably, the de nitions carried no signi cant quali cations, preferences, exclusions
or limitations by law on what the recognized party-list groupings should be, although
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined the grounds for disqualification.
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. The Ang Bagong Bayani Case
In 2001, the rst judicial test in the implementation of the party-list system came
through the Ang Bagong Bayani case where the petitioners sought the disquali cation of
the private respondents, among whom were major political parties. The Court resolved,
among others, the following issues:
1.whether political parties may participate in party-list elections; and
2.whether the party-list system is exclusive to "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors and organizations. DTISaH
The majority ruling held that political parties may participate in party-list
elections, provided that the requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the Constitution and RA No. 7941. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies , identifying them, non-exclusively, as the labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. The party-list nominees , as well, must be Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties .
Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the guidelines for the party-list
system, summarized below:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identi ed in
Section 5 of RA 7941 . In other words, it must show — through its constitution,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record
— that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
con ict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disquali ed merely on
the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. .
..
xxx xxx xxx
Third, [by an] express constitutional provision[,] the religious sector may
not be represented in the party-list system. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disquali ed under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government . By
the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group
of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government. . . .
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so . Section 9 of RA 7941 [contains
the quali cations of party-list nominees, with special age-related terms for youth
sector candidates].
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees . . . . [U]nder Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." . . .
Eighth , . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation
as a whole. 2 0 (italics and emphases ours) DAHSaT
b. BANAT Case
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
Commission on Elections 2 1 is essentially a case on the computation of the allocation of
seats based on the party-list votes. Despite the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling, the question of
whether the Constitution prohibits political parties from participating in the
party-list elections remained a live issue in this case.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to disallow major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly ; thus, effectively
reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major political parties may participate in the
party-list system, provided they represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno cited two reasons for disallowing the participation of major
political parties:
1.Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political
parties from participating in the election of their representatives are aligned with the
constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.
2.Allowing major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process will suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray
the democratic spirit of the Constitution.
The minority view 2 2 took the position that neither the Constitution nor RA No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. It maintained
that, on the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings, and this Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from party-list elections, in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
TIEHSA
Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. The
other major political parties can thus organize or a liate with their chosen sector or
sectors, provided that their nominees belong to their respective sectors. Nor is it
necessary that the party-list organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution, and
in rmity," as there is no nancial status or educational requirement in the law. It is enough
that the nominee of the sectoral party belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; that is, if the nominee represents the sherfolk, he must be a sherfolk, if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.
D. The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA
7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of the Constitution and of the
law to stress these terms for later comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani . In this manner,
Ang Bagong Bayani's slanted reading of the Constitution and the laws can be seen in bold
relief. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of the constitutional intent,
based on the statements of a constitutional commissioner that were quoted out
of context, to justify its reading of the constitutional intent . 2 3 Speci cally, it relied
on the statements of Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral representation, and
glossed over those of Commissioner Monsod and the results of the deliberations, as
re ected in the resulting words of the Constitution. 2 4 Thus, its conclusion is not truly
re ective of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. This error is fatal as its
conclusion was then used to justify his interpretation of the statute, leading to a bias for
the social justice view. SaDICE
a. The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System

a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.
The aim of the party-list provision , Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is
principally to reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of
electing the members of the House of Representatives. The innovation is a party-list
system that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to allow those who
could not win in the legislative district elections a fair chance to enter the House of
Representatives other than through the district election system.

Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral reform — not to provide a
social justice mechanism that would guarantee that sectors (described in social justice
context by its constitutional deliberation proponents as "marginalized") would exclusively
occupy, or have reserved, seats in the House of Representatives under the party-list
system. This is one glaring error that is evident right from the opening statement of Ang
Bagong Bayani when it described the party-list system as "a social justice tool." While the
party-list system can indeed serve the ends of social justice by providing the opportunity —
through an open, multi-party system — for the social justice sector groups that have no
chance to win in legislative district elections, the party-list system was not established
primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution itself
which do not provide for exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral groups in the
party-list system. If at all, the constitutional text only provided a guarantee of 50%
participation for speci ed sectoral groups, but the guarantee was only for the rst
three (3) elections after the ratification of the Constitution. 2 5
The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted
con rm the primacy of electoral reform as against social justice objectives. The electoral
reform view was espoused by the author of the provision, Commissioner Monsod, and his
proposed amendment 2 6 met vigorous objections from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum and
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have guaranteed or reserved seats for
the "marginalized" sectors in order to prevent their "political massacre" should the Monsod
amendment be allowed. 2 7 TAESDH
When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized sector
won. Eventually, what was conceded to the latter was what the Constitution, as worded
now, provides — i.e., "For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from" the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of "marginalized" would be applied to the party-list system,
the term should apply to the national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations that cannot win in the traditional legislative district elections
(following the explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming
marginalization in the social justice context or because of their special interests or
characteristics. The term, of course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they indeed
cannot win on their own in the traditional legislative district elections. These aspects of the
case are further discussed and explained below.
a.2. From the Statutory Perspective.
Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system
innovation does not vary or depart from the basic constitutional intents. The objective
continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the promotion of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives. 2 8
It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words "marginalized and
underrepresented" made their formal appearance in the party-list system. It was used in
the context of de ning one of the aims of the system, i.e., to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties , and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives . ECSaAc
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory
recognition that accommodates the sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social
justice senses) character into the party-list system (i.e., in addition to the primary electoral
reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution), but nevertheless does not render
sectoral groups the exclusive participants in party-list elections. As already mentioned, this
conclusion is not justi ed by the wording, aims and intents of the party-list system as
established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term "marginalized and underrepresented" (understood in
the narrow sectoral context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a party, group or
organization for participation in the party-list election, except for those in the sectoral
groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or organizations necessarily are
subject to this requirement. For all parties, sectors, organizations or coalition, however, the
absolute overriding requirement — as justi ed by the principal aim of the system —
remains to be a party, group or organization's inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning . To clearly express the logical
implication of this statement, a party, group or organization already participating in the
legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed for itself a fair chance of
winning and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections. CSDcTH
b. Party Participation under the Party-list System

The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system
are those who would be elected, as provided by law , thus, plainly leaving the mechanics
of the system to future legislation. They are likewise constitutionally identi ed as the
registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations , and are the party-
list groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free and open party
system that should be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people within
the limits of the Constitution. 2 9
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully
foster proportional representation that would lead to the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-de ned constituencies; but (3)
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
bene t the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack of well-de ned
constituencies."
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" has been partly discussed above and
would merit further discussion below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,
3 0 on the other hand, defined the term "proportional representation" in this manner: CIDTcH
[I]t refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as

exempli ed by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 3 1
As well, the case de ned the phrase "who lack well-de ned political constituency" to
mean:
refers to the absence of a traditionally identi able electoral group, like voters of
a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again
to those with disparate interests identi ed with the "marginalized or
underrepresented. 3 2
Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term "marginalized
and underrepresented," clearly showing how, in its view, the party-list system is bound to
this descriptive term. As discussed above, Ang Bagong Bayani's use of the term is not
exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of the party-list system. This error
becomes more glaring as the case applies it to the phrases "proportional representation"
and "lack of political constituency."
For clarity, Section 2 — the only provision where the term "marginalized and
underrepresented" appears — reads in full: HaAISC
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties , and who lack well-de ned political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
As de ned in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a sectoral
party, or a coalition of parties (Section 3 [b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from
sectoral parties or organizations — which generally advocate "interests or concerns" — a
political party is one which advocates "an ideology or platform, principles and
policies" of the government . In short, its identi cation is with or through its program of
governance.
Under the verba legis or plain terms rule of statutory interpretation 3 3 and the
maxim ut magis valeat quam pereat , 3 4 a combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3
shows that the status of being "marginalized and underrepresented" is not limited merely
to sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. The law itself
recognizes that the same status can apply as well to "political parties."
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the
party-list system comes to mind as it provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with
the relationship and inter-action between sectoral representation and the party-list system
as a whole: cACEaI
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system.

Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors . Let
us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How
do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has
two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative
of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be
put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao . One need not
be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or
each organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say,
500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the
justi cation for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are
saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is
no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a
sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly . It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor
groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one
percent or ve of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any
representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get ve percent of the
vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of
a party list system.TcEaAS
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able
to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
xxx xxx xxx
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we
speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring
to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list
system, we do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors
would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system .
BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much. 3 5 (emphases and underscores

supplied)
These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the discussion on the party-list
system of election resumed on July 25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod proposed an
amendment 3 6 (that substantially became Section 5 [1], Article VI of 1987 Constitution)
that further clarified what this innovative system is.
Thus, the words "marginalized" and "underrepresented" should be understood in the
electoral sense , 3 7 i.e., those who cannot win in the traditional district elections and who,
while they may have a national presence, lacked "well-de ned political constituency" within
a district su cient for them to win. For emphasis, sectoral representation of those
perceived in the narrow sectoral (including social justice) sense as "marginalized" in
society is encapsulated within the broader multiparty (party-list system) envisioned by the
framers.
This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the concerns
of the marginalized sector (in the narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those
"underrepresented" (in the legislative district) as a result of the winner-take-all system
prevailing in district elections — a system that ineluctably "disenfranchises" those groups
or mass of people who voted for the second, third or fourth placer in the district elections
and even those who are passive holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of "underrepresented" when it used a
broad qualitative requirement in de ning "political parties" as ideology or policy-based
groups and, "sectoral parties" as those whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that — contrary once again
to what Ang Bagong Bayani holds — proportional representation refers to the
representation of different political parties, sectoral parties and organizations
in the House of Representatives in proportion to the number of their national
constituency or voters, consistent with the constitutional policy to allow an
"open and free party system" to evolve .
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself notably
anchored on the "open and free party system" mandated by Article IX-C of the Constitution.
For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never noted this part of Section 2 and its
signi cance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor provided by Section
6, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It appears to have simply and conveniently focused on
the rst sentence of the Section and its constricted view of the term "marginalized and
underrepresented," while wholly xated on a social justice orientation. Thus, it opened its
ruling, as follows:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give
more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to bene t them. It intends
to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients
of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. 3 8 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood

statement that offers little opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely and
exclusively can be misleading . To begin with, the creation of an avenue by which
"sectoral parties or organizations" can meaningfully join an electoral exercise is, in and by
itself, a social justice mechanism but it served other purposes that the framers of the
Constitution were addressing. Looking back, the appeal to the social justice concept to
make the party-list elections an exclusive affair of the "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" (as de ned in Ang Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-
system is antithetical to sectoral representation. This was effectively the argument of the
proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in the constitutional party-list
debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-determination of the
sectors' political massacre. This issue, however, has been laid to rest in the constitutional
debates and should not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it through the
Judiciary. TEAaDC
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a
multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral
representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are concepts that
comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system. Thus, both the text
and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral
representation under the party-list system; what was provided was an avenue for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the electoral system — it is an
invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance on what democracy and
republicanism can offer.
Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and
exchange of ideas, philosophies and interests within a broader context. By allowing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the numbers, to participate together
with other political parties and interest groups that we have characterized, under the
simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-list we have today, the framers
clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse among the greater portion of the society and
hoped to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1. Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political parties
are not only "not excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed
by law to participate. This participation is not impaired by any "marginalized and
underrepresented" limitation understood in the Ang Bagong Bayani sense. DaHISE
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral

sense , i.e., they are parties espousing their unique and "marginalized" principles of
governance and who must operate in the party-list system because they only have a
"marginal" chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This de nition assumes
that the political party is not also a participant in the legislative district elections
as the basic concept and purpose of the party-list innovation negate the
possibility of playing in both legislative district and party-list arenas .
Thus, parties — whether national, regional or sectoral — with legislative district
election presence anywhere in the country can no longer participate as the party-list
system is national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral systems can be
allowed anywhere.
c. The Parties and Their Nominees
c.1. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party Registration Due
to Nominee Problems
The COMELEC's refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of parties
based on Section 6 of RA No. 7941 is a sore point when applied to parties based on the
defects or de ciencies attributable to the nominees. On this point, I maintain the view that
essential distinctions exist between the parties and their nominees that cannot
be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of Positions, however, the need to make a
distinction between the two types of nominees is relevant only to sectoral parties and
organizations. DAaIEc
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners on

the ground that their nominees are not quali ed implies that the COMELEC viewed the
nominees and their party-list groups as one and the same entity ; hence, the
disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the disqualification of his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ig no r es the factual and legal reality that the party-list
group, not the nominee, is the candidate in the party-list election, and at the same time
blurs the distinction between a party-list representative and a district representative. DEICTS
c.2.The Party-Nominee Relationship

That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is not
a disputed point. Our essential holding, however, is that a party-list group, in order to be
entitled to participate in the elections, must satisfy the following express statutory
requirements:
1. must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties ;
2. has no well-defined political constituencies; and
3. must be capable of contributing to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the House of Representatives are
those who are elected from legislative districts, and those who are elected through a
party-list system (Section 5 [1], Article VI) where the votes are in favor of a political
party, organization or coalition (Section 6, Article IX-C).
These requirements embody the concept behind the party-list system and
demonstrate that it is a system completely different from the legislative district
representation. From the point of view of the nominee, he or she is not the
candidate, the party is the entity voted for . This is in far contrast from the legislative
district system where the candidate is directly voted for in a personal electoral struggle
among candidates in a district. Thus, the nominee in the party-list system is
effectively merely an agent of the party . 3 9 It is the party-list group for whom the right
of suffrage 4 0 is exercised by the national electorate with the divined intent of casting a
vote for a party-list group in order that the particular ideology, advocacy and concern
represented by the group may be heard and given attention in the halls of the legislature. ISaTCD
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the in rmities of the nominee that
do not go into the quali cations of the party itself should prejudice the party. In fact, the
law does not expressly provide that the disquali cation of the nominee results in the
disquali cation of a party-list group from participating in the elections. In this regard,
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its o cers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
IacHAE
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. [italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be
correctly applied, the law, rules and regulations that the party violated under Section 6 (5)
of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant refusal or cancellation of
registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a party's failure to
submit its list of ve quali ed candidates, after being noti ed of its nominees'
disquali cation, that refusal or cancellation of registration may be warranted. Indeed, if the
party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this simple requirement of the law
(Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration deserves to be denied or an existing one
cancelled as this omission, by itself, demonstrates that it cannot then be expected to
"contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." 4 1
The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group
to which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the
party-list group. However, unlike the political parties' o cial candidates — who can, for
whatever reason, disa liate from his party and run as an independent candidate — the
linkage between a nominee and his party-list group is actually a one-way mirror
relationship . The nominee can only see (and therefore run) through the party-list group 4 2
but the party-list group can see beyond the nominee-member.
While the nominee is the entity "elected" to Congress, a companion idea that cannot
be glossed over is that he only carried this out because of the nomination made by the
party to which he belongs and only through the unique party-list system. Note in this
regard that the registration with the COMELEC confers personality (for purposes of
election) on the party-list group itself — and to no other. Note, too, that what the
Constitution and the law envision is proportional representation through the group and the
latter, not the nominee, is the one voted for in the elections. Even the manner of his
nomination and the duties his o cial relation to his party entails are matters that are
primarily determined by the party's governing constitution and by-laws. To be sure,
political dynamics take place within the party itself prior to or after the period of
registration that transcend the nominee's status as a representative. These realities render
indisputable that a party has the right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee who fails to
keep his bona fide membership in the party — i.e., keeping true to the causes of the party —
even while the nominee is serving in Congress. HTCAED
The preceding discussions show that the COMELEC's action of apparently treating
the nominee and his party as one and the same is clearly and plainly unwarranted and
could only proceed from its commission of grave abuse of discretion, correctible under
Rule 65.
These distinctions do not discount at all the position or the role of the party-list
nominee; it is from the list of nominees submitted by the party that party-list
representatives are chosen should the party obtain the required number of votes. In fact,
once the party-list group submits the list of its nominees, the law provides speci c
grounds for the change of nominees or for the alteration of their order of nomination.
While the nominee may withdraw his nomination, we ruled it invalid to allow the party to
withdraw the nomination it made 4 3 in order "to save the nominee from falling under the
whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations." 4 4 cSICHD
We also recognize the importance of informing the public who the nominees of the
party-list groups are as these nominees m a y eventually be in Congress. 4 5 For the
nominees themselves, the law requires that:
1. he has given his written consent to be a nominee;
2. he must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
3. he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election;
4. he must be able to read and to write;
5. he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election; and
6. he must be at least twenty- ve (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link between the party and its nominee
i s only the latter's bona de membership in the party that wishes to
participate in the party-list system of election. Because of this relationship,
membership is a fact that the COMELEC must be able to con rm as it is the
link between the party the electorate votes for and the representation that
the nominee subsequently undertakes in the House of Representatives . To
illustrate, if a sectoral party's nominee, who does not "actually share the attribute or
characteristic" of the sector he seeks to represent, fails to prove that he is a genuine
advocate of this sector, then the presence of bona de membership cannot be
maintained.
To automatically disqualify a party without affording it opportunity to meet the
challenge on the eligibility of its nominee or to undertake recti cations deprives the party
itself of the legal recognition of its own personality that registration actually seeks. aSTAHD

The quali cations of a nominee at the same time that it determines whether
registration shall be granted. 4 6 When under the COMELEC's lights, the shadow cast by the
party-list nominee is not truly reflective of the group he/she is supposed to represent, what
the COMELEC must do is to give the party the opportunity to eld in the ve quali ed
candidates. The COMELEC acts with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately
cancels or refuses the registration of a party without affording it the opportunity to
comply.
In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral representation, the law provides
that a nominee-representative who changes his a liation during his term forfeits his seat.
Likewise, in providing for the rule in case of vacancy for seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the reason for the vacancy is broad enough to include not only the valid
causes provided for in the party's constitution and by-laws (such as the non-possession of
the necessary quali cations), but likewise includes the situation where the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal nds that the nominee-representative unquali ed for
failure to measure up to the necessary statutory and other legal requirements. 4 7 If these
can be remedied without affecting the status of the party itself, no reason exists why the
registration of a party-list group should automatically be cancelled or refused by reason of
individual failures imputable and affecting only the nominee.
Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its nominees
cannot be wholly considered as one identi able entity, with the fault attributable and
affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on the otherwise quali ed
collective merit of the party. If their identi cation with one another can be considered at all,
it is in the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a re ection of the other — i.e., the
party-list group acts in Congress through its nominee/s and the nominee in so acting
represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it is there for. TCAScE
E. Observations on Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections.

Essentially, the Re ections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not need to
be further discussed at this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One point,
however, that needs to be answered squarely is the statement that this Separate Opinion is
not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987 Constitution] arose."
The Re ections asserted that the heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social
Justice," citing, in justi cation, the statements endorsing the approval of the 1987
Constitution, particularly those of Commissioner Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the
1986 Constitutional Commission; President Munoz Palma described the Constitution as
reaching out to the social justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a
whole and did not focus solely on the electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in
the discussions above, I have no problem in accepting the social justice thrust
of the 1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole , shows special concern for
social justice compared with the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The
Re ections, however, apparently misunderstood the thrust of my Separate
Opinion as already fully explained above .
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in the
present case are the Constitution's electoral provisions, speci cally the elections for the
House of Representatives and the nation's basic electoral policies (expressed in the Article
on the Commission on Elections) that the constitutional framers wanted to reform.

What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform,
was to "open up" the electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not
otherwise participate under the then existing system — those who were marginalized in the
legislative district elections because they could not be elected in the past for lack of the
required votes and speci c constituency in the winner-take-all legislative district contest,
and who, by the number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district elections,
showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in the legislative district
would garner. This was the concept of "marginalized and underrepresented" and the "lack
of political constituency" that came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to the
present wordings of the Constitution. RA No. 7941 subsequently faithfully re ected these
intents. DIEcHa
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those belonging to
speci cally-named sectors ( i.e., the marginalized and underrepresented in the social
justice sense) should be given a head-start — a "push" so to speak — in the rst three (3)
elections so that their representatives were simply to be selected as party-list
representatives in these initial elections.
Read in this manner, the party-list system as de ned in the Constitution cannot but
be one that is "primarily" grounded on electoral reform and one that was principally driven
by electoral objectives. As written, it admits of national and regional political parties
(which may be based on ideology, e.g., the Socialist Party of the Philippines), with or
without social justice orientation. At the same time, the system shows its open embrace of
social justice through the preference it gave to the social justice sectors (labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector) in the rst three elections after
rati cation of the Constitution, and to the labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals, in the RA No. 7941 definition of sectoral party.
The objection regarding the "textualist" approach has been fully discussed in the
Summary of Positions and need not be repeated here.
F. The Eleven-Point Parameters for the COMELEC
I close this Opinion by outlining the eleven-point parameters that should guide
the COMELEC in the exercise of its power to register parties under the party-list system of
elections. For ease of application, these parameters refer back to the Ang Bagong Bayani
guidelines, particularly on what points in these guidelines should be discarded and what
remains intact and effective. TcDIEH
In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on Elections (disqualifying

political parties from participating in the party-list elections), the petitioners
understandably attempted to demonstrate, in one way or another, that they represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as the term is understood in Bagong Bayani.
As discussed in this Separate Opinion, however, the requirement of being marginalized and
underrepresented should be understood, not only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also in
the broader electoral sense.
We likewise take note of the fact that this is the rst time that the Court ever
attempted to make a categorical de nition and characterization of the term "marginalized
and under-represented," a phrase that, correctly understood, must primarily be interpreted
in the electoral sense and, in case of sectoral parties and organizations, also partly in the
special interests and social justice contexts. The COMELEC understandably has not been
given parameters under the present pronouncements either in evaluating the petitions for
registration filed before it, on one hand, or in determining whether existing party-list groups
should be allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Hence, the need for the
following parameters as we order a remand of all these consolidated petitions to the
COMELEC.
1. Purpose and Objective of Party-list System . The primary
objective and purpose of the party-list system (established under the
Constitution and RA 7941 is electoral reform by giving marginalized
and under-represented parties (i.e., those who cannot win in the
legislative district elections and in this sense are marginalized and
may lack the constituency to elect themselves there, but who —
nationally — may generate the following and votes equivalent to what
a winner in the legislative district election would garner), the chance to
participate in the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the
House of Representatives through a system other than the legislative
district elections. DcIHSa
At the same time, the party-list system recognizes sectoral

representation through sectoral organizations (that, as de ned did
not require or identify any social justice characteristic but were still
subject to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and the
"constituency" requirements of the law), and through sectors
identi ed by their common "social justice" characteristics (but which
must likewise comply with the "marginalized and underrepresented"
and "constituency" requirements of the law).
2. For political parties (whether national or regional) : a) to be
classi ed as political parties, they must advocate an ideology or
platform, principles and policies, for the general conduct of
government. The application of the further requirement under RA No.
7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing the adoption of
their principles of governance, they must regularly nominate and
support their leaders and members as candidates for public o ce)
shall depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
b) The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense
(i.e., in the legislative district elections) and the lack of constituency
requirements fully apply to political parties, but there is no reason not
to presume compliance with these requirements if political parties
are not participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party-list Elections . Major
political parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections,
cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a
coalition with party-list parties and run as a coalition in the party-list
elections. ADaECI
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what the

party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in both electoral
arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly through a
coalition.
No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they can
form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for the
party-list elections. The party-list component of these informal
alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-list elections.
The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of the political party
evidently render the rst and second Ang Bagong Bayani
guideline invalid, and signi cantly affects the fourth guideline .
To stress, political parties are not only "not excluded" from the party-
list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by law to participate
without being limited by the "marginalized and underrepresented"
requirement, as narrowly understood in Ang Bagong Bayani.
3. Sectoral parties, groups and organizations must belong to the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on
social justice characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or
characteristics speci c to their sectors although they do not require
or need to identify with any social justice characteristic.
In either case, they are subject to the "marginalized and under-
represented" and the "constituency" requirements of the law through a
showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a sector that is
actually characterized as marginal and under-represented. aCSEcA
Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are additionally subject to

the general overriding requirement of electoral marginalization
and under-representation and the constituency requirements
of the law, but there is no reason why compliance with these
requirements cannot be presumed if they are not participants in any
legislative district elections.
4. Registration with the COMELEC.
Political parties (whether national or regional, already registered with
the COMELEC as regular political parties but not under the party-list
system) must register under the party-list system to participate in the
party-list elections. For party-list registration purposes, they must
submit to the COMELEC their constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information that the COMELEC may require. 4 8
Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or organizations already
registered under the general COMELEC rules for registration of
political parties (but not under the party-list system), must register
under the party-list system to be eligible to participate in the party-list
elections, and must likewise submit relevant documentation that the
COMELEC shall require.
Political and sectoral parties, groups or organizations already
previously registered and/or accredited under the party-list
system , shall maintain their previous registration and/or
accreditation and shall be allowed to participate in the party-list
elections unless there are grounds for cancellation of their
registration and/or accreditation under Section 6, RA 7941. aSIAHC
5. Submission of Relevant Documents . The statutory requirement on

the submission of relevant documentary evidence to the COMELEC is
not an empty and formal ceremony. The eighth (8th) Ang Bagong
B ayani guideline relating to the ability of the party-list group (not
just the nominee but directly through the nominee or indirectly
through the group) to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation remains wholly
relevant and should be complied with through the required
submissions the COMELEC shall require.
The platform or program of government, among others, is very
important considering the signi cant role the party-list group itself, as
a collective body, plays in the party-list system dynamics even as its
nominee or nominees is the one who is considered "Member" of the
House of Representatives. The statutory recognition of an
"appropriate legislation" bene cial to the nation injects the meaningful
democracy that the party-list system seeks to add stimulus into.
6. Party Disquali cation . Political parties and sectoral parties and
organizations alike must not possess any of the disqualifying grounds
under Section 6, RA 7941 to be able to participate in the party-list
elections.
Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani guideline merely reiterates
the rst ground for cancellation or refusal of registration under
Section 6, RA 7941 — that the party-list group is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association, organized for religious
purpose — and the same ground is retained under these
parameters .
7. Compliance with Substantive Requirements . To justify their
existence, all party-list groups must comply with the substantive
requirements of the law speci c to their own group, their own internal
rules on membership, and with the COMELEC's Rules of Procedure. aTcIAS
8. Prohibited Assistance from Government . The party or

organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by the government. It must be independent
of the government. This is the fifth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline .
While this requirement only contemplated of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the narrow sense in Ang Bagong Bayani,
no reason exists not to extend this requirement even to political
parties participating in the party-list elections.
To emphasize, the general overriding requirement in the party-list
elections is inability to participate in the legislative district
elections with a fair chance of winning . If a political party at the
very least obtains the assistance of the government, whether
nancially or otherwise, then its participation in the party-list system
defeats the broad electoral sense in which the term "marginalized"
and "underrepresented" is understood as applied to political parties.
9. Quali cation of Party-list Nominee . The sixth Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline , being a mere faithful reiteration of Section 9 of RA
7941 (quali cation of a party-list nominee), should remain. In addition,
the party-list nominee must comply with the proviso in Section 15 of
RA 7941.
10. Party and Nominee Membership . For sectoral parties and
organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong Bayani guideline — i.e.,
that the nominees must also represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors — refers not only to the actual possession
of the marginalized and underrepresented status represented by the
sectoral party or organization but also to one who genuinely
advocates the interest or concern of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector represented by the sectoral party or
organization.IHTASa
To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the

framers, majority of the members of the sectoral party or
organization must actually belong to the sector represented.
For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona de
member of the group they represent.
11. Effects of Disquali cation of Nominee . The disquali cation of a
nominee (on the ground that he is not a bona de member of the
political party; or that he does not possess the actual status or
characteristic or that he is not a genuine advocate of the sector
represented) does not automatically result in the disquali cation of
the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the
nding of disquali cation of its nominee or to ll in a quali ed
nominee before cancellation or refusal of registration is ordered.
Consistent with Section 6 (5) and Section 8 of RA 7941, the party-list
group must submit a list containing at least ve nominees to the
COMELEC. If a party-list group endeavors to participate in the party-
list elections on the theoretical assumption that it has a national
constituency (as against district constituency), then compliance with
the clear requirement of the law on the number of nominees must all
the more be strictly complied with by the party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured a
Status Quo Ante Order (instead of mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion in
the ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the remand of their petitions is only for
the academic purpose of determining their entitlement to registration under the party-list
system but not anymore for the purpose of participating in the 2013 elections. IDSaTE
Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40 petitions 4 9 that
obtain the number of votes required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives
would still be subject to the determination by the COMELEC of their quali cations based
on the parameters and rationale expressed in this Separate Opinion.
REYES , J., concurring and dissenting :
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers
a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor,
even those in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The
State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating
this social justice vehicle. 1
The Court is tasked to resolve the fty-three (53) consolidated Petitions for
Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition led under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations. The petitions
assail the resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that
either cancelled their existing registration and accreditation, or denied their new petitions
for registration under the party-list system. 2 TEDHaA
Of the fty-three (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are instituted by new applicants to the
party-list system, whose respective applications for registration and/or accreditation led
under Republic Act No. 7941 3 (RA 7941) and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 4 dated
February 21, 2012 were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the
resolutions of a division of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by party-list groups or organizations that
have been previously registered and accredited by the COMELEC, with most of them
having been allowed to participate under the party-list system in the past elections. These
40 petitions involve the COMELEC's recent cancellation of their groups' registration and
accreditation, which effectively denied them of the chance to participate under the party-
list system in the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners' desire and intent to participate as
candidates in the party-list system of representation, which takes its core from Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5.1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations .
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector .aAHISE
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters that shall govern the party-
list system, including the registration of party-list groups, the quali cations of party-list
nominees, and the election of party-list representatives. In 1998, the country's rst party-
list election was held. Since then, the Court has been called upon on several instances to
resolve controversies on the system, oftentimes on questions involving the quali cations
of party-list groups and their nominees. Among the landmark cases on these issues is Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 5 decided by the Court in 2001, wherein the
Court laid down the eight-point guidelines 6 in the determination of the quali cations of
party-list participants.
Pursuant to its speci c mandate under Section 18 of RA 7941 to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the]
Act," the COMELEC issued on February 21, 2012 Resolution No. 9366. About 280 7 groups,
comprised of new applicants and previously-registered party-list groups, formally signi ed
their intent to join the party-list system in the May 13, 2013 elections.ESCDHA
As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the registration of organized groups

that are not yet registered under the party-list system, among the groups that led with the
COMELEC their respective petitions for registration were: (1) Alab ng Mamamahayag
(ALAM) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204139 ; (2) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 204367 ; (3) Ako An Bisaya (AAB) , petitioner in G.R. 204370 ; (4) Alagad ng Sining
(ASIN) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204379 ; (5) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204394 ; (6) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204402 ; (7) Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and
Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204426 ; (8) 1 Alliance Advocating
Autonomy Party (1AAAP) , herein petitioner in G.R. No. 204435 ; (9) Manila Teachers
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204455 ;
(10) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALONA) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204485 ; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204490 . The political parties Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI) , petitioner in
G.R. No. 204436 , and Partido ng Bida (PBB) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204484 , also
sought to participate for the rst time in the party-list elections, although their petitions for
registration were not filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.
Party-list groups that were previously registered and accredited merely led their
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366. Among these parties
were: (1) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum) , petitioner in G.R. No. 203766 ; (2) AKO
Bicol Political Party (AKB) , petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203818-19 ; (3) Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), petitioner in G.R. No. 203922 ; (4) Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM) , petitioner in G.R. No. 203936 ; (5)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA) , petitioner in G.R. No.
203958 ; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 203960 ; (7) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO) , petitioner
in G.R. No. 203976 ; (8) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership (ARAL) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 203981 ; (9) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 204002 ; (10) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) , petitioner in G.R. No.
204094 ; (11) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) , petitioner in
G.R. No. 204100 ; (12) 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204122 ; (13) Agapay ng Indigenous
Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204125 ; (14) Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204126 ; (15)
The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country, and People) Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204141 ; (16) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party
(PASANG MASDA) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204153 ; (17) Action Brotherhood for Active
Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204158 ; (18) Aangat Tayo Party-List
Party (AT) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204174 ; (19) Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204216 ; (20) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
LINGKOD) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204220 ; (21) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204236 ; (22) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 204238 ; (23) Green Force for the Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204239 ; (24) Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204240 ; (25) Blessed
Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204263 ; (26) United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(UNIMAD) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204318 ; (27) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204321 ; (28) Bayani Party List (BAYANI) , petitioner in G.R. No.
204323 ; (29) Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM) , petitioner in G.R. No.
204341 ; (30) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204356 ; (31) Alliance
of Advocates in Mining Advancement for National Progress (AAMA) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 204358 ; (32) Social Movement for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART) ,
petitioner in G.R. No. 204359 ; (33) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa,
Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204364 ; (34)
Binhi — Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI) , petitioner in G.R.
No. 204374 ; (35) Pilipino Association for Country — Urban Poor Youth Advancement and
Welfare (PACYAW) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204408 ; (36) 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-
UTAK) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204410 ; (37) Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204421 and G.R. No.
204425 ; (38) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG) , petitioner in G.R. No. 204428 ; and (39) 1st
Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS) , petitioner in G.R. No.
204486 . SaHTCE
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 , which provides for
additional rules on the Commission's disposition of the new petitions and manifestations
of intent that were led with it under Resolution No. 9366. Resolution No. 9513, entitled In
the Matter of: (1) The Automatic Review by the Commission En Banc of Pending Petitions
for Registration of Party-List Groups; and (2) Setting for Hearing the Accredited Party-List
Groups or Organizations which are Existing and which have Filed Manifestations of Intent
to Participate in the 2013 National Elections, reads in part:
WHEREAS , it is necessary and indispensable for the Commission En Banc
to review and a rm the grant of registration and accreditation to party-list groups
and organizations in view of its role in ensuring that only those parties, groups, or
organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the
party-list system is registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system
of representation;

WHEREAS , Section 4, Rule 1 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure
authorize[s] the suspension of the Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice and in order to obtain the speedy disposition of all matters pending before
it; and
WHEREAS , Section 19 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure on
Motions for Reconsideration should be suspended in order for the Commission En
Banc to fulfill its role as stated in the Ang Bagong Bayani case. EDATSC
NOW THEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the Commission on

Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, and Republic Act No. 7941 or the "Party List System Act", hereby
RESOLVES to promulgate the following:
1. In all pending cases where a Division grants the Petition for

Registration of a party-list group or organization, the records shall
be forwarded to the Commission En Banc for automatic review
within five (5) days from the promulgation of the Resolution without
need of a motion for reconsideration. It shall be understood that a
party-list group shall not be deemed accredited without a rmation
from the Commission En Banc of the Division's ruling. For this
purpose, the provisions of Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be suspended .
2. To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En
Banc, for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with
the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang
Bagong Bayani case, and, if non-compliant, cancel the registration
of the following:
(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already
registered and accredited and will participate in the May 13,
2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has
not passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for
Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and
retained in the list of Registered Party-List Parties per
Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and
which have led their respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the
May 13, 2013 Elections.
With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the COMELEC'S determination of the
continuing compliance of registered/accredited parties that have filed their manifestations
of intent, the Commission En Banc scheduled summary hearings on various dates, and
allowed the party-list groups to present their witnesses and submit their evidence. 8 After
due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc issued the following resolutions: DACaTI
1. Resolution 9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12-154

(PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and accreditation of AKB 1 0 as
a political party, but denied its participation in the May 2013 party-list
elections. The COMELEC's ruling is founded on several grounds. First,
the party does not represent or seek to uplift any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. From its constitution and by-laws, the party
seeks to represent and uplift the lives of Bicolanos, who, for the
COMELEC, cannot be considered or even associated with persons
who are marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the provinces in
the Bicol Region already have their respective representatives in
Congress. To allow more representatives for the Bicolanos and the
Bicol Region would violate the rule on proportional representation of
"provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio." 1 1 Third, AKB 's nominees, a businessman, three
lawyers and an ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and
underrepresented; thus, they fail to satisfy the seventh guideline in
Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution 1 2 dated October 11, 2012, which covers
SPP No. 12-161 (PLM), SPP No. 12-187 (PLM), SPP No. 12-
188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-220 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of Atong
Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and UNIMAD .
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaum 's 1 3 nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party represents, i.e., the urban poor,
consumer, women and youth. While these include the women and
youth sectors, ve of the party's six nominees are all male, and all of
its nominees are above 30 years 1 4 of age. Further, the COMELEC
ruled that the personal circumstances of the nominees belie the claim
that they belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its rst nominee 1 5
served as vice-president in a multinational corporation; (2) its second
nominee 1 6 is the owner of a corporation engaged in the business of
pineapple contract growing with Del Monte Philippines; (3) its third
n o m i n e e 1 7 is the owner and manager of two business
establishments; and (4) its sixth nominee 1 8 is an electrical engineer
and three-term member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Finally, the COMELEC cited the party's
failure to le its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures when it
participated in the 2010 Elections, despite having been ordered to do
so during the summary evidentiary hearing. HAaECD
In ruling against ARAL , 1 9 the COMELEC cited the party's "failure to

comply, and for violation of election laws, rules and regulations
pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941, in connection with the
fourth, sixth, and seventh guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani ." 2 0 The
Commission explained that while the party seeks to represent the
women and youth sectors, only the rst of its seven nominees is a
woman, and only its second nominee is below 30 years of age. The
Commission further took note that: rst, some of its activities were
jointly conducted with religious organizations, and second, its fth
nominee is a pastor. "Although these circumstances are not su cient
proof that the organization is itself a religious sect, denomination or
association and/or is organized for religious purposes, one
nevertheless cannot but hold doubt." 2 1
The registration of ARC 2 2 was cancelled for the failure of its nominees
to qualify. The party claims to represent landless farmers, agrarian
reform bene ciaries, sherfolk, upland dwellers, indigenous people
and Bangsa Moro people. 2 3 However, none of its nominees belongs
to any of these sectors. In addition, the party failed to prove that a
majority of its members belong to the sectors that it seeks to
represent. The party's advocacy for the "development of the rural
sectors" is also not limited to the cited sectors, as it may even include
sectors that are not marginalized and underrepresented. DTAIaH
U N I M A D 2 4 claims to represent "the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors which include young professionals like
drug counsellors and lecturers, veterans and the youth, among
others." 2 5 For the COMELEC, however, such sectors are not
marginalized and underrepresented. The ght against illegal drugs is
an issue that interests the general public, and not just particular
sectors of the society. There are also existing laws, such as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and various specialized government agencies,
such as the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), that already address the problem of
illegal drugs. In cancelling UNIMAD's registration, the COMELEC also
cited the party's failure to establish its track record as an
organization. Furthermore, while the party claims to represent the
youth and young professionals, none of its nominees is aged below
thirty years.
SPP No. 12-196 (PLM), SPP No. 12-223 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-257 (PLM)
The main reason for the cancellation of 1BRO-PGBI 's 2 7 registration
was its failure to de ne the sector that it seeks to represent. An
a davit executed by its second nominee indicates that the party
represents professionals, while its Manifestation of Intent indicates
that it is multi-sectoral. For the COMELEC, such differing statements
from the party reveal that 1BRO-PGBI does not really intend to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. Instead, it
only seeks to represent its members, and that it is more of a
"fraternity/brotherhood composed mostly of military men with
esoteric learnings." 2 8 The party's nominees also did not appear to
belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector, being a
barangay captain, consultant, guidance counselor, lawyer and retired
captain/security consultant. cSEaDA
The registration of 1 G ANAP/G UARDI ANS 2 9 was also cancelled,

following the COMELEC's nding that it is a military fraternity. The
Commission also cited the following grounds: rst, there is a "glaring
similarity between 1GANAP/GUARDIANS and 1BRO-PGBI;" 3 0 second,
"it wishes to protect the interests of its members; however, it failed to
establish . . . the group's service outside the walls of its
'brotherhood';" 3 1 third, the "community volunteer workers" sector
which it seeks to represent is too broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and fourth, its nominees do not appear to belong to
the said sector.
A BLESSED Party-List 3 2 claims to represent farmers and shermen
in Region XI. The COMELEC resolved to cancel its registration after
nding that three of its seven nominees are "not themselves farmers
and shermen, [and] none of its nominees are registered voters of
Region XI, the particular region which they seek to represent." 3 3
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of 1-CARE 3 5 on the following
grounds: (1) rural energy consumers, the sector which 1-CARE
intends to represent, is not marginalized and underrepresented; (2)
the party's track record and activities are almost exclusively related to
electric cooperatives and not to rural energy consumers; and (3) its
nominees, all of whom are/were high-level o cials of various electric
cooperatives in the country, do not belong to the sector of rural
energy consumers.
5. Resolution 3 6 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-201
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of APE C 3 7
on the following grounds: (1) a review of its constitution and by-laws
shows that it does not represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as it is merely an economic lobby group for
the electric power industry; and (2) all of its nominees, being an
employee, electrical engineer, sugar planter and retired government
employee, do not appear to belong to the sector that the party claims
to represent. DHTECc

(PLM)
In cancelling AT 's 3 9 registration and accreditation, the COMELEC ruled
that: rst, the party, which represents the sectors of women, elderly,
youth, labor and urban poor, does not appear to have a bona de
intention to represent all these sectors, as it has, in fact, failed to uplift
the welfare of all these sectors through the authorship or sponsorship
by its incumbent representative in Congress of house bills that are
bene cial to the elderly, youth and urban poor; and second, its
nominees, being all professionals, do not belong to any of the
marginalized sectors that the party seeks to represent.
SPP Case No. 12-288 (PLM)
The COMELEC's resolution to cancel ARARO 's 4 1 registration and
accreditation was founded on the following: (1) the separate interests
of the peasant and urban poor sectors, which the party both
represents, differ and even oftentimes con ict; (2) most of its
nominees cannot be considered members of any of these sectors, as
they reside "in the gated subdivisions of Metro Manila"; 4 2 hence, such
nominees can be considered more as landowners, and not farmers as
they claim themselves to be; (3) the party failed to show that three of
its nominees 4 3 are among its bona de members; (4) Its nominee
Quirino De La Torre (De La Torre) appeared to be a farmland owner,
rather than an actual farmer; and (5) It failed to present any document
to show that its Board had resolved to participate in the May 2013
elections, and that De La Torre was authorized to sign and le with the
COMELEC the documents that are required for the said purpose. CASTDI

SPP Case No. 12-279 (PLM), SPP No. 12-248 (PLM), SPP No.
12-263 (PLM), SPP No. 12-180 (PLM), SPP No. 12-229 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-217 (PLM), SPP No. 12-277 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO
BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA and KAKUSA .
I n AGRI 's 4 5 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for more than a year
immediately after the May 2010 elections, AGRI stopped existing as
an organization, and this constitutes as a ground to cancel
registration under Section 6 of RA 7941; (2) its nominees did not
appear to actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of peasants and farmers, which the party seeks to represent;
(3) it submitted a list of only four nominees, instead of ve as
mandated by Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no showing that it
undertook meaningful activities for the upliftment of its constituency.
AKMA-PTM 's 4 6 registration as a party to represent the farmers sector
was cancelled for its failure to show that majority of its members and
o cers belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented. There
was also no proof that its rst to fourth nominees, 4 7 who were an
educator and persons engaged in business, actually belonged to a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Its fth to ninth nominees,
although all farmers, had not been shown to work on uplifting the lives
of the members of their sector. CAIHTE
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP 4 8 (formerly Ako Agila

ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka, Inc. — Ako Agila) on the following
grounds: (1) its Manifestation of Intent and Certi cate of Nomination
were not signed by an appropriate o cer of the party, as required by
Section 3, Rule 2 of Resolution No. 9366; (2) it failed to show that it
has continued to work for the betterment of the lives of the members
of the sectors it represents, i.e., farmers and peasants; and (3) it
failed to show that its nominees actually belong to the sectors which
the party represents, or that they have undertaken meaningful
activities which address the concerns of said sectors.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AKO BAHAY 4 9 for its
failure to prove that its nominees actually belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector that the party seeks to represent, i.e.,
the urban poor, or to have engaged in meaningful activities that tend
to uplift and enrich the lives of the members of said sector.
BANTAY 5 0 claims to represent the "peasants, urban poor, workers and
nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting security of the
country against insurgency, criminality and their roots in economic
poverty." 5 1 The COMELEC held that the party failed to prove that the
majority of its members belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented. In addition, there was no proof that its rst and
third nominees, a dentist and private sector
employee/businesswoman, respectively, actually belonged to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors which BANTAY seeks to
represent. ESDHCa
The registration of PA C YAW 5 2 was cancelled on the following

grounds: rst, since the party desired to change the sector to
represent, i.e., from the "urban poor youth" sector to the "urban poor"
sector, it needed to le a new application for registration; second, it
failed to show a credible track record of working for the interests of
the marginalized and underrepresented; third, it failed to prove that
majority of its o cers and members were from the urban poor
sector; and fourth, its nominees are also not members of the urban
poor sector.
PASANG MASDA 's 5 3 registration was cancelled on two grounds.
First, it represents both drivers and operators, who may have
con icting interests that may adversely affect the party's mandate to
represent both sectors. Second, its nominees are all operators or
former operators, making the COMELEC question the party's capacity
to represent the interests of drivers.
The registration of KAKUSA , 5 4 a party "organized to represent persons
imprisoned without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt," 5 5 was
cancelled by the COMELEC for lack of proof that majority of its
o cers and members belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. The Commission also took note of its failure to
show that its incumbent representative has been working on any
legislation in Congress to uplift the lives of those whom the group
allegedly represents. The party showed no credible track record, and
its nominees, being persons engaged in business, did not appear to
be marginalized and underrepresented. AECDHS
9. Resolution 56 dated October 30, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-256

(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled AG 's 5 7 registration and accreditation on three
grounds. First, the party failed to appear during the summary hearing
scheduled by the COMELEC. For the Commission, such failure shows
the party's "wanton disregard for the rules and regulations of [the]
Commission" 5 8 and constitutes a su cient ground to cancel its
registration under Rule 2, Section 2 (f) 5 9 of Resolution No. 9366.
Second, the party does not intend to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as evidenced by its lack of track record. In
addition, nowhere in its constitution, by-laws and platform of
government does it state the marginalized and underrepresented
sector that it seeks to represent. It is only in its Memorandum later
submitted to the COMELEC that it mentions aiding the marginalized
sectors of security guards, drivers, vendors, tanods, small-scale
businesses and the jobless. Third, its nominees do not belong to any
of the mentioned sectors.
10. Resolution 60 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-
185 (PLM)
ANAD ' s 6 1 registration and accreditation were cancelled by the
COMELEC on several grounds. First, it does not represent an
identi able marginalized and underrepresented sector, judging from
the party's declared "advocacies to publicly oppose, denounce and
counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society, in industries,
in the academe and in the labor sector; to publicly oppose, denounce
and counter all acts of terrorism and insurgency; to preserve, protect
and promote the democratic principles of good government and
governance by peaceful and democratic means under a regime of law
and order; to generate and provide avenues for the development of
skills of its members as aide in providing income opportunities;
develop and implement livelihood programs for its members." 6 2
Second, the party submitted a list of only three nominees, in violation
of Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366 that requires the
submission of a list of at least ve nominees. Third, its nominees do
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. Fourth, it failed
to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 National and Local Elections.
11. Omnibus Resolution 6 3 dated November 7, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-060 (PLM), SPP No. 12-254 (PLM) and
SPP 12-269 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K and ALIM . DECcAS
The ruling against G RE E NFO RCE 6 4 was based on the following

grounds: (1) the party is only an advocacy group composed of
environmental enthusiasts intending to take care of, protect and save
Mother Earth and the country's natural reserves from destruction or
degradation; (2) even if a liberal stance is adopted on the meaning of
sectoral representation, the accreditation of GREENFORCE still
merits cancellation for the party's failure to prove its continuing
compliance with the track record requirement; (3) based on their
certi cates of acceptance, the personal circumstances of
GREENFORCE 's nominees demonstrate that they cannot be
classi ed as marginalized citizens. The rst and second nominees are
businessmen, the third and fourth nominees are lawyers, leaving only
the fth nominee, a sh farmer, as the only marginalized citizen
among the nominees.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of FIRM 24-K 6 5 after nding
that its nominees do not belong to the sectors which the party
represents. It pointed out that while FIRM 24-K supposedly
represents the urban poor and peasants in the National Capital
Region, only two of its nominees actually reside therein. Also, the
COMELEC held that FIRM 24-K failed to prove its track record as an
organization; that the photographs it submitted, showing its tree-
planting activities, are self-serving and incapable of exhibiting an
organized program for the urban poor. DTCSHA
ALIM 's 6 6 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish that its
nominees, or at least a majority of them, are members of the
indigenous people sector which the party seeks to represent. Only its
rst nominee submitted a certi cate from the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), which con rmed his membership with
the Itawes Indigenous Cultural Communities. In addition, the
COMELEC explained that while ALIM 's president, Fatani Abdul Malik,
testi ed that their party speci cally represents the indigenous
masses from Mindanao and the Cordilleras, only two of the party's
ve nominees hailed from those areas. Finally, the party had nominees
who did not appear to belong to a "marginalized class," being a
businessman, lawyer and real estate developer.
12. Reso lut io n 67 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-204
(PLM)
In cancelling the registration of AAMA , 6 8 the COMELEC held that the
sectors it represents, namely, employees, either skilled or ordinary
labor, professionals directly engaged in mining activities or
occupation incidental thereto and non-government groups advocating
advancement of responsible mining for national progress, is a
speci cally de ned group which may not be allowed registration
under the party-list system. In addition, AAMA failed to establish that
its nominees actually represent and belong to said sectors, that they
have actively participated in the activities of AAMA , that they truly
adhere to its advocacies, and are bona fide members of the party.
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of SMART 7 0 after nding that
its nominees are disquali ed from representing the sectors which the
party represents, i.e., workers, peasants, youth, students, women,
professionals and those belonging to sectors such as domestic
helpers, vendors, drivers and construction workers, since: rst, the
party claims to represent the youth sector, yet four of its ve
nominees are more than 30 years of age while its fth nominee would
be more than 30 years of age on May 13, 2013; second, the party
claims to represent the women sector, yet four out of its ve
nominees are male; and third, its nominees are composed of
businessmen, a doctor, an executive chef and a computer
programmer, who are thus not marginalized. Also, the COMELEC
observed that the party's activities do not speci cally cater to the
interest and needs of the sectors which it represents. Lastly, the lack
of restrictions in the class of persons who may join SMART casts
doubt as to whether a majority its members are indeed marginalized
and underrepresented. EcaDCI
14. Resolution 71 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-173

(PLM)
The COMELEC held that the registration and accreditation in 2010 of
A B P 7 2 as a party-list group was defective. The party was initially
accredited by the COMELEC in 2009 as a regional political party. In
November 2009, it only led a Manifestation of Intent to participate in
the May 2010 elections, instead of a petition for registration under
Section 5 of RA 7941. Acting on the recommendation of its Law
Department, the COMELEC accredited ABP as a party-list group on
January 15, 2010. The COMELEC then ruled that ABP could not be
accredited for the May 2013 Elections as a party-list group sans the
ling of a petition for registration. Also, the COMELEC held that ABP
does not represent any sector. While it claimed during the summary
evidentiary hearing that it represents construction workers and
professionals, its constitution and by-laws indicate that its
membership is composed of men and women in Region V. Lastly,
none of ABP 's nominees are employed in the construction industry.
210 (PLM)
BAYANI 7 4 claims to represent "the marginalized and underrepresented
professional sector [comprised] of millions of jobless and
underemployed professionals such as the registered nurses,
midwives, engineers, lawyers, [certi ed public accountants], among
others." 7 5 Its registration and accreditation were cancelled by the
COMELEC on the ground of its failure to prove a track record of trying
to uplift the marginalized and underrepresented sector of
professionals. In addition, the party's second nominee, 7 6 being a
businessman, was declared unquali ed to represent the sector of
professionals.
252 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of AANI 7 8 were cancelled on several
grounds. First, the party has failed to establish a track record of
enhancing the lives of the marginalized and underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent. Its activities that include relief
operations and consultative meetings did not appear to primarily
bene t the said sector. Second, more than majority of the party's
nominees are not farmers, contrary to the seventh guideline in Ang
Bagong Bayani that a party's nominees must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector to be represented. HDITCS

292 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of A-IPRA , 80 which claims to
represent and advance the interests of indigenous peoples, were
cancelled on the ground of its failure to prove that its ve nominees
are "indeed indigenous people; have actively participated in the
undertakings of A-IPRA ; truly adhere to its advocacies; and most of
all, that the said nominees are its bona fide members." 8 1
202 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
COCOFED 8 3 on several grounds. First, the party is already a liated
with a number of coconut agencies, both private and government.
COCOFED admits that it sits in the board of the United Coconut
Association of the Philippines (UCAP), the Philippine Coconut
Research and Development Foundation (PCRDF), Coconut Investment
Co. (CIC), Cocofed Marketing Corporation (CMC) and the Quezon
Coconut Planters Savings and Loan Bank (QCPSLB). Such
circumstance negates the claim that it is still marginalized. Second, a
party-list group must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded by the government. Contrary to this guideline,
COCOFED openly admits that it is assisted by the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) in various farmer-oriented projects. Third,
COCOFED 's nominees are not members of the marginalized sector
of coconut farmers and producers, which the party claims to
represent. HcISTE

(PLM)
ABANG LINGKOD ' s 8 5 registration was cancelled for its failure to
establish a track record of continuously representing marginalized
and underrepresented peasant farmers. Further, the party failed to
show that its members actually belong to the sector which it claims
to represent. As regards the quali cation of ABANG LINGKOD 's
nominees, there was a failure to show that they are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented, that they have actively
participated in programs for the advancement of peasant farmers,
and that they truly adhere to the advocacies of ABANG LINGKOD .
158 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of AB RO AD 8 7 were cancelled on
several grounds. First, the party was accredited as a regional multi-
sectoral party to represent the sectors of labor, overseas workers,
professionals, urban poor and peasants. However, the documents
submitted by the party indicate that it only advances the welfare of
the labor, overseas workers and professionals sectors, and fails to
champion the causes of the urban poor and peasants sectors. In
addition, while the party was registered way back in September 2009,
the documents presented to prove its track record only show its
activities beginning January 15, 2011. The COMELEC held, "(w)hat
transpired from September 4, 2009 to December 2010 is a puzzle to
u s . ABROAD could have already carried out its purposes and
platform of government in this period of time to promote the
interests of its members, but it did not." 8 8 Third, ABROAD 's
nominees do not fall under any of the sectors which the party seeks
to represent.
21. Resolution 8 9 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-
228 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of B INHI 9 0
on the following grounds: (1) the party's component organization, the
Cabanatuan City Seed Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(CCSGMPC), being a cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), cannot be considered as a
marginalized or underrepresented sectoral organization as it already
receives ample assistance, attention and protection from the State
through the CDA; (2) being a cooperative, the party receives
assistance from the government through the Department of
Agriculture, in violation of the fth guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani;
and (3) while it may appear from the documents submitted during the
summary evidentiary hearing that BINHI /CCSGMPC indeed promotes
the interests and concerns of peasants, farmers and farm tillers, there
is no proof, however, that the group, as a whole, is marginalized and
underrepresented. cADEHI
136 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of B UTIL 9 2 were cancelled on two
grounds. First, in the Judicial A davit submitted by its Secretary
General to the Comelec, it is stated that the party represents
"members of the agriculture and cooperative sector." For the
COMELEC, BUTIL failed to establish that the "agricultural and
cooperative sectors" are marginalized and underrepresented. Second,
the party's nominees neither appear to belong to the sectors which
they seek to represent, nor to have actively participated in the
undertakings of the party. DcCEHI
23. Reso lut io n 93 dated December 3, 2012 in SPP No. 12-194

(PLM)
1st KABAGIS 9 4 was found by the COMELEC to have ceased to exist
after the 2010 elections. The documents which it submitted to prove
its continued existence were substantially the same as those it
presented to support its petition for registration in 2009.
Furthermore, 1st KABAGIS appeared to have "recycled the
documentation of its activities in 2009 to deliberately mislead the
Commission to believe that it has existed continuously." 9 5 For the
COMELEC, these circumstances constitute su cient grounds for the
cancellation of the party's registration, as provided in Section 6 (6)
and (7) of RA 7941 on a party's declaration of untruthful statements in
the petition and failure to exist for at least one year. Finally, the
COMELEC took note that while 1st KABAGIS intends to represent
the labor, sherfolks and the urban poor indigenous cultural
communities sectors, none of its ve nominees belong to any of
these sectors.
24. Reso lut io n 96 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-198
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled 1-UTAK 's 9 7 accreditation, holding that: First,
the party does not factually and truly represent a marginalized sector
considering that drivers and operators, which 1-UTAK seeks to both
represent, have diametrically opposing interests. The advocacy of
drivers pertains to wages and bene ts while operators are mainly
concerned with their pro ts. Second, the party's nominees do not
belong to any marginalized and underrepresented sector. The party
did not even include among its nominees a representative from the
drivers' sector.
25. Reso lut io n 9 8 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS , 9 9 the COMELEC
explained that, rst, its nominees during the May 2010 elections had
agreed on a term-sharing agreement, which circumvented Section 7,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that mandates a three-year term
for members of the House of Representatives. The term-sharing
agreement was also declared contrary to public policy since a given
term of public o ce cannot be made subject to any agreement of the
parties; it is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be
made subject of any private agreement. The Commission further cited
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, and emphasized
that a violation or failure to comply with laws, rules and regulations
relating to elections is, pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA 7941, a ground
for the cancellation of a party's registration.
TASCEc
26. Resolution 1 0 0 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 11-002

The COMELEC En Banc a rmed the COMELEC Second Division's
resolution to grant the registration and accreditation of P B B 1 0 1 as
an NCR Political Party, but prohibited it from participating in the 2013
party-list elections based on the following grounds: (1) the party does
not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector, as it is
composed of businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and
ordinary citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social
justice, and environmental protection and utilization for sustainable
development; (2) it failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and (3) it failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an
automatic review of the COMELEC divisions' resolutions favoring new registrants also
resulted in the COMELEC En Banc's issuance of several resolutions. It reversed the rulings
of the Commission's divisions through the issuance of the following:
(PLM)
ASIN ' s 1 0 3 petition for registration was denied by the COMELEC En
B anc on the following grounds: rst, the "artists" sector, which is
among the sectors which ASIN seeks to represent, is not considered
marginalized and underrepresented under RA 7941 and relevant
jurisprudence; second, ASIN failed to prove its track record as an
organization, there being no su cient evidence to show that it had
performed acts that tend to advance the interest of the sectors which
it seeks to represent; and third, ASIN failed to show that its nominees
are quali ed under the provisions of RA 7941 and the guidelines laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution 1 0 4 dated November 27, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-041 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-011 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied the registration of Manila Teachers
and ALA-EH .
In denying Manila Teachers' 1 0 5 petition, the COMELEC En Banc
reasoned that a non-stock savings and loan association cannot be
considered a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the
party-list system of representation, for being neither a part of the
"working class," "service class," "economically deprived," "social
outcasts," "vulnerable" and "work impaired." 1 0 6 Furthermore, the
COMELEC held that a non-stock savings and loan association is
mandated to engage, exclusively, in the legitimate business of a non-
stock savings and loan association; thus, the very foundation of its
organization would be forfeited should it pursue its party-list
campaign. 1 0 7 Even granting that Manila Teachers may seek
registration under the party-list system as a group representing public
school teachers, the fact that its rst and second nominees are not
teachers by profession adversely affects the party's application.aDSIHc
The denial of ALA-EH 's 1 0 8 petition was based on its failure to show
that its members, particularly businessmen, sports enthusiasts,
donors and hobbyists, belong to an identi able group of persons
which the law considers as marginalized. Further, the COMELEC En
Banc ruled that the group's nominees did not appear to be quali ed,
as they were individuals doing nancially well in their respective
businesses that do not contribute to the welfare of Filipino athletes
and sports enthusiasts. 1 0 9
3. Resolut ion 110 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-057
(PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied 1AAAP 's 1 1 1 petition on the ground of
the failure of the party's nominees to qualify. While the group seeks
registration as a regional political party under Region XI, its third and
fourth nominees 1 1 2 are not residents of the said region. For the
C O M E L E C En Banc, such circumstance disquali es them as
nominees, for "it would be di cult for the said nominees to represent
the interest of 1AAAP 's supposed constituency who are residents
and voters of Region XI." 1 1 3 In addition, the group failed to satisfy the
second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani, with the Comelec En Banc
taking note that four 1 1 4 of its ve nominees do not belong to any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. cdasia

(PL)
AKIN 1 1 6 claims to be an organization of health workers and social
workers from urban poor communities. The denial of its petition is
founded on the group's failure to show that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector. Its rst and second nominees 1 1 7 are lawyers,
its second nominee 1 1 8 is a retired government employee, its fourth
nominee 1 1 9 is an accountant/social volunteer worker, and its fth
nominee 1 2 0 is a secretary.
(PP)
AAB 1 2 2 applied for registration as a regional political party in Region
VIII, allegedly with "constituencies [composed of] the men and
women (registered voters) of Region VIII, its provinces, cities,
municipalities and all other Bisayans from the other parts of the
Philippines whose roots can be traced to the Bisayan Regions of
Region VIII . . . ." 1 2 3 In denying AAB 's petition, the COMELEC En Banc
cited the following grounds: rst, the records do not show that the
group represents a marginalized sector of the society, other than by
its claim to have formed a sectoral wing, the Association of Bisayan
Farmers-R8 (ABF-R8), registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 4, 2012 and aiming to pursue legislation
and programs for the bene t of the Bisayan farmers in Region VIII;
second, AAB's alleged constituencies in Region VIII are not
underrepresented because they already have their district
representatives in Congress; third, granting that ABF-R8 is a
legitimate sectoral group of AAB , it has been in existence only since
May 4, 2012, putting into question its track record of representing
peasants and farmers; and fourth, its nominees are neither farmers
nor peasants — three are lawyers, and the two others are company
employees. HAECID
6. Resolution 1 2 4 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP Case Nos. 12-

009 (PP) and 12-165 (PLM)
Although the COMELEC En Banc a rmed AI 's 1 2 5 registration as a
regional political party in Region VI, it denied the party's registration
under the party-list system on several grounds. First, the party failed
to show that it represents a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, considering that the Province of Iloilo already has "no less than
ve (5) incumbent district representatives in Congress." 1 2 6 Second,
the party made untruthful statements in the Memorandum it led with
the COMELEC, when it claimed that some of its nominees are
members of its sectoral wings Patlad-Cayos Farmers' Association
(Patlad-Cayos) and Alyansa ng Industriya ng Bigas (ANIB), composed
of farmers and NFA-accredited retailers, respectively. The COMELEC
En Banc took note that none of its nominees are farmers and food
retailers, judging from their occupations or professions as declared in
the certi cates of acceptance to their nominations. Third, AI 's fourth
nominee 1 2 7 has withdrawn his acceptance to his nomination, while
its rst 1 2 8 and fth 1 2 9 nominees have led their certi cates of
candidacy for local elective positions in Iloilo.
7. Resolution 130 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-175
(PL)
ALONA 1 3 1 claims to be an aggrupation of citizen groups composed of
homeowners' associations, urban poor, elderly organizations, young
professionals, overseas Filipino workers, women, entrepreneurs,
cooperatives, sherfolk, farmers, labor, transport, vendors and youth
groups. In ruling against the party's petition, the COMELEC En Banc
cited: rst, the group's failure to establish how it can represent all
these fourteen (14) sectors which have different, even con icting,
causes and needs; second, the sectors of homeowners associations,
entrepreneurs and cooperatives are not marginalized and
underrepresented; and third, three of the party's nominees, a
businessman and two lawyers, do not belong to any marginalized and
Among the petitioners, only the petitions for registration of ALAM, KALIKASAN,
PPP and GUARDJAN were denied by a division of the COMELEC in the rst instance. The
divisions' rulings were elevated to the COMELEC En Banc by virtue of motions for
reconsideration , which were resolved via the following Resolutions:
1. Resolution 1 3 2 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP 12-127 (PL)
The COMELEC En Banc a rmed the COMELEC Second Division's
nding that ALAM 1 3 3 failed to su ciently prove its track record as
an organization, and to show that it actually represents and seeks to
uplift the marginalized and the underrepresented. Further, the
COMELEC En Banc ruled that the myriad of sectors which ALAM
seeks to represent, i.e., community print journalists, news dealers,
news sellers, newsboys, tribesmen who learned to love the liberty of
the press, B'laan tribesmen who cry for ancestral lands, urban poor or
informal settlers, drivers and small-time operators of transport units,
poor residents in urban barangays, and labor and jury system
advocates, is too broad and unrelated to one another. Although there
is no prohibition against multi-sectoral representation in the party-list
system, a party, organization or coalition which seeks registration
must be capable of serving fully all the sectors which it seeks to
represent. HcaDIA

061 (PP)
KALIKASAN , 1 3 5 a group which claims to be a pro-environment
political party representing the sectors of workers, informal settlers,
women, youth, elderly, sherfolks, handicapped, overseas workers
and ordinary professionals who are most vulnerable to the effects of
climate change and environmental degradation, 1 3 6 was denied
registration, on the following grounds: (1) the principles and
objectives stated in its constitution and by-laws re ect an advocacy
for the protection of the environment rather than for the causes of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent; (2)
there is no proof that majority of its membership belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented; (3) it seeks to represent sectors
with con icting interests; and (4) its nominees do not belong to any
of the sectors which the party claims to represent.
(PL)
GUARDJAN 's 1 3 8 petition for registration was denied on the ground of
its failure to prove its membership base and solid track record. The
group failed to present the activities that su ciently bene ted its
intended constituency of guards, utility helpers, aiders, riders, drivers,
domestic helpers, janitors, agents and nannies. Its nominees were
also found to be unquali ed, as they do not belong to any of the
sectors which GUARDJAN seeks to represent; rather, they are the
owner, consultant or manager of agencies which employ security
guards. For the COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance will only result
in a con ict of interest between the owners or managers of security
agencies on one hand, and the security guards on the other.
4. Resolution 139 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 12-073
(PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc a rmed the ndings of the COMELEC First
Division, which cited in its Resolution 1 4 0 the failure of P P P 1 4 1 to
show a constituency of marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
The group claims to represent the entire four provinces and ve cities
of Region XII, all already belonging to eight congressional districts,
and already represented by eight district congressmen. Furthermore,
the group has failed to show a track record of undertaking programs
that are aimed at promoting the welfare of the group or any sector
that it claims to represent. IcTCHD
The issuance by the COMELEC En Banc of the foregoing resolutions prompted the
filing of the present petitions, which delve primarily on the following contentions:
First, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 9513. The petitioners challenge the
COMELEC En Banc's authority under the Resolution to conduct an automatic review of its
division's resolutions notwithstanding the absence of a motion for reconsideration. For the
petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc cannot dismiss with the procedural requirement on the
ling of motions for reconsideration under Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure before it can review a decision or resolution rendered by any of its divisions in
quasi-judicial proceedings.
As regards the COMELEC's resolve to determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, the continuing compliance of previously-registered and accredited party-list
groups, the COMELEC En Banc denied the parties of their right to due process and has
violated the principle of res judicata that should have otherwise worked in the petitioners'
favor. Further, the COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers, which they claim to
include the cancellation of existing registration and accreditation, could not have been
exercised at the rst instance by the COMELEC En Banc, but should have been rst
decided by a division of the Commission.
Second, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in refusing or cancelling the petitioners' registration and
accreditation under the party-list system. The petitioners assail the COMELEC En Banc's
appreciation of facts and application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence, especially the
eight-point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani, in determining their sectors', groups' and
nominees' respective qualifications.
Given the common questions and the similarity in the issues that are raised in the 53
subject petitions, the Court has resolved, through its Resolutions of November 13, 2012,
November 20, 2012, November 27, 2012, December 4, 2012, December 11, 2012 and
February 19, 2013 to consolidate the petitions, and require the COMELEC to comment
thereon.
With the petitioners' inclusion in their respective petitions of prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
also ordered, via the afore-mentioned resolutions, the issuance of Status Quo Ante Orders
(SQAOs) in all the petitions. HDATCc
The O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the respondent COMELEC,
filed its Consolidated Comments on the petitions. In refuting the petitioners' claim of grave
abuse of discretion against the COMELEC, the OSG submitted the following arguments:
142
First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing party-list groups' or
organizations' compliance with the requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by
jurisprudence on the party-list system. The OSG cites Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution which enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC, giving
emphasis on paragraph 1 thereof that gives the Commission the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, and paragraph 5
that cites the Commission's power to register political parties, organizations or coalitions.
Second, the COMELEC's review of the parties' quali cations was a valid exercise by
the COMELEC of its administrative powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc could have, even
at the first instance, ruled on it.
Third, the requirements of due process were satis ed because the petitioners were
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC's resolve to suspend
its own rules was sanctioned by law, as it was aimed for a speedy disposition of matters
before the Commission. Furthermore, no petitioner had previously questioned the
procedure that was adopted by the COMELEC on the review of the parties' registration;
instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the Commission's jurisdiction and actively
participated in its proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds for denial and cancellation of a
group's registration, as provided by statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG
speci cally cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and the eight-point guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. TADCSE
Fifth, the COMELEC's ndings of fact in each petitioner's case are supported by
substantial evidence; thus, are nal and non-reviewable as provided in Section 5, Rule 64 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In précis, the fty-three (53) consolidated petitions concern two main issues: the
procedural issue as to the COMELEC En Banc's power to automatically review a decision
of its division without the requisite ling of a motion for reconsideration, and the
substantive issue as to the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in denying or
cancelling the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system of the
petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencia's rulings on the procedural issue; however,
consistent with afore-quoted pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, 1 4 3 I
signify my strong dissent on major points in the ponencia's resolution of the substantive
issue, including its discussions on the nature of the party-list system and its disposition on
the quali cations of political parties which seek to participate under the party-list system
of representation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the new standards that the ponencia now
provides for party-list groups, the remand of all 53 petitions to the COMELEC is
unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect
The Powers and Functions of the
COMELEC
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in
the enforcement and administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its
history in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of the COMELEC had
continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times. In Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections, 1 4 4 the Court briefly noted:
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency
whose powers have been increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one,
to re ect the country's awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and
protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935
Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMELEC were de ned as follows:
HSaIDc
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive

charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election o cials. All law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so
required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.
...
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973
Constitution:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and quali cations of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote,
administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, the
appointment of election o cials and inspectors, and the
registration of voters.
cCAaHD
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987
Constitution, . . . 1 4 5
Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the authority of the COMELEC is
evident in the grant of several other powers upon the Commission, speci cally under
Section 2, Article IX-C thereof which reads:
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and quali cations of all elective
regional, provincial, and city o cials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal o cials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, nal orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections
contests involving elective municipal and barangay o ces shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election
officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
aTCAcI
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law

enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
5. Register, after su cient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government
shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition
to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a veri ed complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies. IDAESH
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any o cer or

employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to,
its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive
report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and speci c powers. Section 2 (1) of Article
IX-C partakes of the general grant of the power to the COMELEC to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." The authority given to the COMELEC under this provision
encapsulates all the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in
providing this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide latitude in dealing
with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the performance of its
functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 1 4 6 The rest of the enumeration in the
mentioned provision constitutes the COMELEC's specific powers.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELEC's powers can further be
classi ed into administrative, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and, in limited instances,
judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the Commission embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
quali cations. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. 1 4 7 cTSDAH
In Baytan v. COMELEC, 1 4 8 the Court had the occasion to pass upon the
classification of the powers being exercised by the COMELEC, thus:
The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3),
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not
prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether
en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's
administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the
COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc
can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this
has been the practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in
Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and quali cations of all elective regional,
provincial, and city o cials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal o cials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay o cials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction. 1 4 9 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction on the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is
crucial to the procedure which has to be observed so as to stamp an o cial action with
validity. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution
mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases rst by division and upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc. 1 5 0 Section 3 of Article IX-C states: DAaIEc
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC
may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through any
of its divisions. 1 5 1
The Issuance of Resolution No. 9513
as an Implement of the Power to
Register Political Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions
One of the speci c powers granted to the COMELEC is the power to register
political parties, organizations and coalitions articulated in Section 2 (5) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, thus:
(5) Register, after su cient publication, political parties, organizations,
or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
xxx xxx xxx
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized. Registration and the formal

recognition that accompanies it are required because of the Constitution's concern about
the character of the organizations o cially participating in the elections. 1 5 2 Speci cally,
the process of registration serves to lter the applicants for electoral seats and segregate
the quali ed from the ineligible. The purity of this exercise is crucial to the achievement of
orderly, honest and peaceful elections which the Constitution envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The
COMELEC does not simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes to its
o ce and manifests its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the
possession of quali cations. The party seeking registration must rst present its
qualifications before registration will follow as a matter of course.
TAacIE
Similar with all the speci c powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its
general power to enforce and administer election laws is being realized. The exercise of
this power must thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in ful lling its
duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who possess the
qualifications set by the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it imperative to promulgate
Resolution No. 9513. The said Resolution seeks to manage the registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions that are aspiring to participate in the 2013 National
and Local Elections, with the objective of ensuring that only those parties, groups or
organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system are registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of
representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En Banc to automatically review all
pending registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions and to set for
summary evidentiary hearings all those that were previously registered to determine
continuing compliance. To effectively carry out the purpose of the Resolution, the
COMELEC suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, speci cally the
requirement for a motion for reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number of applicants for
registration as party-list group, organization or coalition were denied registration by the
COMELEC En Banc, while several others that were previously registered and/or accredited
were stripped of their status as registered and/or accredited party-list groups,
organizations or coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that the action of the COMELEC
En Banc was well-within its authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble understanding of the nature
of the powers being exercised by the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed
depends. Indeed, in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the COMELEC En Banc does not have the
authority to assume jurisdiction without the ling of a motion for reconsideration. The
ling of a motion for reconsideration presupposes that the case had been heard, passed
upon and disposed by the COMELEC Division before the same is subjected to review of
the COMELEC En Banc. cITaCS
In Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, 1 5 3 the Court defined quasi-judicial power, to wit:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the
power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
judicial functions the administrative o cers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their o cial action and exercise of discretion
in a judicial nature. Since rights of speci c persons are affected, it is elementary
that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed
in the conduct of the proceedings. 1 5 4
To be clear, the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers in deciding election

contests where, in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, it holds hearings and
exercises discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertains the facts from the
parties' submissions, determines the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the
basis of all these, decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. 1 5 5
However, the registration of political parties, organizations and coalitions stated in
Section 2 (5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution involves the exercise of administrative
power. The Court has earlier declared in Baytan that Sections 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)
and (9) of Article IX-C pertain to the administrative powers of the COMELEC. 1 5 6 It
reiterated this pronouncement in Bautista v. COMELEC 1 5 7 where it further deliberated on
the distinctions between the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC.
And recently, in Magdalo v. COMELEC, 1 5 8 it made a categorical pronouncement that the
power of the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups
to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. 1 5 9
Distinguishing the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is relevant
because of the different set of rules that applies to each. For instance, in Canicosa v.
COMELEC, 1 6 0 the Court stressed that matters falling under the administrative jurisdiction
of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc. On the other hand,
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution underscores the requirement for a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action in quasi-judicial
proceedings. DAHSaT
The COMELEC's determination as to whether a party is a political party entitled to

registration is an exercise of its constitutional power of administering the laws relative to
the conduct of elections. 1 6 1 The same principle applies in the registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions. In the process of registration, the COMELEC
determines whether the applicant possesses all the quali cations required under the law.
There are no contending parties or actual controversy. It is merely the applicant proving his
qualifications to participate in the elections.
The foregoing ratiocination, however, does not suggest that the COMELEC En Banc
can forthwith act on pending petitions for registration and subject previously-registered
party list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary hearings to
determine continuing compliance simply because it is administrative in nature. Indeed, it
may do so, but only with respect to the latter group.
I distinguish between (1) new or pending petitions for registration (referred to as
the rst group ), and; (2) previously registered and/or accredited party-list groups,
organizations and coalitions (referred to as the second group ).
As regards the rst group , the COMELEC En Banc cannot directly act on new
petitions for registration as there is a speci c procedure governing the performance of
this function. It bears noting that pursuant to the authority vested in the COMELEC to
promulgate rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of cases, 1 6 2 it drafted
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which will govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Commission. Under Section 32 of the said Rules, the registration of
political parties or organizations is classi ed under Special Proceedings, together with
annulment of permanent list of voters and accreditation of citizen's arms of the
Commission. In relation to this, Section 3 of Rule 3 states: SCaDAE
Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The

Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions
in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt,
a n d special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arm of the
Commission. (Emphasis ours)
The same rule applies to the registration of party-list groups, organizations or

coalitions. Thus, petitions for registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions
are rst heard by the COMELEC Division before they are elevated to the En Banc on motion
for reconsideration. It is this requirement for a motion for reconsideration of the
resolutions of the COMELEC Division granting new petitions for registration that the
COMELEC suspended in Resolution No. 9513. In doing so, the COMELEC resorted to
Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. — In the interest of justice and in
order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Surely, the suspension of the rule will serve the greater interest of justice and public
good since the objective is to purge the list of registrants of those who are not quali ed to
participate in the elections of party-list representatives in Congress. Ultimately, it will help
secure the electoral seats to the intended bene ciaries of RA 7941 and, at the same time,
guard against y-by-night groups and organizations that are seeking for the opportune
time to snatch a chance. By virtue of the suspension of the requirement for motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc may then automatically review pending petitions
for registration and determine if the quali cations under the law are truly met. It is a
measure that was pursued in order that the COMELEC may ful ll its duty to ensure the
purity of elections. And, as the rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the COMELEC's
performance of its duties, it must never be a stumbling block in achieving the very purpose
of its creation.
With respect to the second group , the COMELEC En Banc may directly order the
conduct of summary evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance considering
that there is no speci c procedure on this matter. The petitioners cannot invoke Section 3,
Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure since this provision relates only to new
petitions for registration. Absent a special rule or procedure, the COMELEC En Banc may
directly act or perform an otherwise administrative function, consistent with our
pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject previously-registered and/or
accredited party-list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary hearing
emanates from its general power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election 1 6 3 and duty to ensure "free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections." 1 6 4 Part and parcel of this duty is the maintenance of a list of
quali ed candidates. Correlative to this duty of the COMELEC is the duty of the candidate
or, in this case, the registered party-list groups, organizations or coalitions to maintain
their qualifications. TEDaAc
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public o ce is a privilege, it is
incumbent upon aspiring participants in the party-list system of representation to
satisfactorily show that they have the required quali cations stated in the law and
prevailing jurisprudence. Speci cally, a party-list group or organization applying for
registration in the rst instance must present su cient evidence to establish its
quali cations. It is only upon proof of possession of quali cations that registration
follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration. Party-list groups and
organizations that are previously allowed registration and/or accreditation are duty-bound
to maintain their qualifications.
In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 1 6 5 the Court emphasized:
Quali cations for public o ce are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
o ce but during the o cer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 1 6 6
It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a candidate who was
allowed to participate in the elections and hold o ce does not give him a vested right to
retain his position notwithstanding loss of quali cation. The elective o cial must maintain
his qualifications lest he loses the right to the office he is holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public o ce
does not exempt him from establishing his quali cations once again in case he bids for
reelection. He must maintain and attest to his quali cations every time he is minded to join
the electoral race. Thus, he is required to le a certi cate of candidacy even if he is an
incumbent elective o cial or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding
elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions must also establish their continuing compliance with the requirements of the
law which are speci c to those running under the party-list system of representation.
Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to participate in the election. The basis
of the right to participate in the elections remains to be the possession of quali cations.
Resolution No. 9513 is a formal recognition of the COMELEC's duty to ensure that only
those who are quali ed must be allowed to run as party-list representative. It cannot be
defeated by a claim of previous registration.
Therefore, it is my view that the COMELEC cannot be estopped from cancelling
existing registration and/or accreditation in case the concerned party-list group or
organization failed to maintain its quali cations. Being the authority which permits
registration and/or accreditation, it also has the power to cancel the same in the event that
the basis of the grant no longer exists. SHADcT
Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res

Judicata
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration
and existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. 1 6 7
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of
four (4) elements, viz.: (1) the former judgment or order must be nal; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the rst and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action. 1 6 8
Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division, allowing the registration of the
applicant party-list groups and organizations do not partake of a nal judgment or order. A
nal judgment or order is one that nally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis
of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is right. Once rendered, the task of the Court
is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. 1 6 9 ETHCDS
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be considered an adjudication on

the merits since they do not involve a determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the ultimate facts disclosed in the pleadings or in the issues presented
during the trial. 1 7 0 They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that the applicant party-
list or organization possesses the quali cations for registration. They do not involve the
settlement of con icting claims; it is merely an initiatory procedure for the conduct of
elections. On the other hand, previous registration and/or accreditation only attests to the
fact that the concerned party-list group, organization or coalition satisfactorily proved its
quali cations to run as party-list representative in the immediately preceding elections. It
does not, however, create a vested right in favor of the registered party-list group,
organization or coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also become final as to exempt the
party-list group or organization from proving his quali cations in the succeeding elections.
As in individual candidate, a party-list group, organization or coalition desiring to
participate in the elections must possess the required quali cations every time it
manifests its intent to participate in the elections. It must prove and attest to its
possession of the required qualifications every time it bids for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even made more apparent by the
fact that the group, organization or coalition which was denied registration may still apply
for registration in succeeding elections and even be allowed registration provided that the
quali cations are met. The same holds true with previously registered and/or accredited
party-list group, organization or coalition which was stripped of its registration and/or
accreditation.
Procedural due process was properly
observed.
There is even no merit in the petitioners' claim that their right to procedural due
process was violated by the COMELEC's automatic review and conduct of summary
evidentiary hearings under Resolution No. 9513. ASCTac
As regards the rst group , I have explained why I deem the COMELEC's suspension
of its own rules on motions for reconsideration justi ed, given its duty to ensure that votes
cast by the electorate in the party-list elections will only count for quali ed party-list
groups, in the end that the system's ideals will be realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative proceedings is that a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side satis es the requirements of due process. Its
essence is embodied in the basic requirements of notice and the real opportunity to be
heard. 1 7 1
Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the minimum
requirements of due notice and hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal
and/or cancellation of a party, organization or coalition's registration under the party-list
system. It reads:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing , the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were denied of their right to
procedural process. We shall not disregard the proceedings that ensued before the
COMELEC's divisions, before whom the groups were given due notice and the ample
opportunity to present and substantiate their plea for registration. The COMELEC En
Banc's resolution to later review the resolutions of its divisions did not render insigni cant
such due process already accorded to the groups, especially as we consider that the En
Banc decided on the basis of the evidence submitted by the groups before the divisions,
only that it arrived at factual findings and conclusions that differed from those of the latter.
T h e second group 's right to procedural process was also unimpaired,
notwithstanding the COMELEC's conduct of the summary evidentiary hearings for the
purpose of determining the parties' continuing compliance with rules on party-list groups.
The notice requirement was satis ed by the COMELEC through its issuance of the Order
dated August 2, 2012, 1 7 2 which noti ed the party-list groups of the Commission's resolve
to conduct summary evidentiary hearings, the dates thereof, and the purpose for which the
hearings shall be conducted. The speci c matters that are expected from them by the
Commission are also identified in the Order, as it provides:
To simplify the proceedings[,] the party-list groups or organizations thru
counsel/s shall submit the following:
1. The names of witness/es who shall be the Chairperson,
President or Secretary General of the party-list groups,
organization or coalition;
ICTaEH
2. Judicial A davit/s of the witness/es to be submitted at

prior to the scheduled hearing; and
3. Other documents to prove their continuing compliance
with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines
in the Ang Bagong Bayani case . 173 (Emphasis supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners' claim that they were not informed of the
grounds for which their existing registration and/or accreditation shall be tested,
considering that the parameters by which the parties' quali cations were to be assessed
by the COMELEC were explained in the Order.
That the parties were duly noti ed is further supported by their actual participation
in the scheduled hearings and their submission of evidence they deemed su cient which,
in turn, satisfied the requirement on the opportunity to be heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated petitions is that the COMELEC
erred in assessing their quali cations which eventually led to the denial of their petitions
for registration and cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence is imperative.
The Party-List System of
Representation
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch position that the party-list
system, being a complement of the social justice provisions in the Constitution, is primarily
intended to bene t the marginalized and underrepresented; the ideals of social justice
permeates every provision in the Constitution, including Section 5 (2), Article VI on the
party-list system. cCaDSA
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to bene t them. 1 7 4 It is not simply a mechanism for electoral
reform . To simply regard it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and
existing electoral system is a super cial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from
which the law breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the
underprivileged and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to become
partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.
The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically underscored in the 1987
Constitution. The strong desire to incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the pillars
of the present Constitution was brought forth by the intent to perpetually safeguard
democracy against social injustices, desecration of human rights and disrespect of the
laws which characterized the dark pages of our history. It is reminiscent of the uni ed and
sel ess movement of the people in EDSA who, minuscule in power and resources, braved
the streets and reclaimed their freedom from the leash of dictatorship. The gallantry and
patriotism of the masses and their non-negotiable demand to reclaim democracy are the
inspirations in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a state which recognizes social
justice at the forefront of its policies brought them to propose a separate article on social
justice and human rights. Initially, the proposed provision defined social justice as follows:
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic, political,
moral imperative, shall be the primary consideration of the State in the
pursuit of national development. To this end, Congress shall give the
highest priority to the formulation and implementation of measures
designed to reduce economic and political inequalities found among
citizens , and to promote the material structural conditions which promote and
enhance human dignity, protect the inalienable rights of persons and sectors to
health, welfare and security, and put the material wealth and power of the
community at the disposal of the common good. DTIACH
SECTION 2. Towards these ends, the State shall regulate the

acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its fruits, promote the
establishment of self-reliant, socio-political and economic structures determined
by the people themselves, protect labor, rationalize the use and disposition of
land, and ensure the satisfaction of the basic material needs of all. 1 7 5
(Emphasis supplied)
In her sponsorship speech, Commissioner Nieva delved into the primacy of the
promotion of social justice in the ideals that the Constitution will carry. She explained:
Our Committee hopes that social justice will be the centerpiece of the 1986
Constitution. The rationale for this is that social justice provides the material and
social infrastructure for the realization of basic human rights the enhancement of
human dignity and effective participation in democratic processes. Rights, dignity
and participation remain illusory without social justice.
Our February 1986 Revolution was not merely against the dictatorship nor
was it merely a ght for the restoration of human rights; rather, this popular
revolution was also a clamor for a more equitable share of the nation's resources
and power, a clamor which reverberated in the many public hearings which the
Constitutional Commission conducted throughout the country.
If our 1986 Constitution would enshrine the people's aspirations as
dramatically expressed in the revolution and ensure the stability, peace and
progress of our nation, it must provide for social justice in a stronger and more
comprehensive manner than did the previous Constitutions. IcaHCS
xxx xxx xxx

In Sections 1 and 2, the provisions mandate the State to give social justice
the highest priority to promote equality in the social, economic and political life of
the nation through the redistribution of our resources, wealth and power for the
greater good. 1 7 6
Further in the deliberations, Commissioner Bennagen remarked on the aspects of

social justice, viz.:
MR. BENNAGEN: . . .
We did not fail to incorporate aspects of attitudinal change, as well as
structural change, and these are fairly evident in the rst two sections. As
indicated in Section 1, we did emphasize that social justice should be a
social, economic, political and moral imperative. The moral component
is important because we feel that a justice provision should be on the
side of the poor, the disadvantaged, the so-called deprived and the
oppressed . This is a point that has been raised a number of times especially by
social scientists. Speci cally, I would like to mention Dr. Mahar
Mangahas who, in his extensive studies on social justice, feels that the
State itself has been a major source of injustice and that, therefore, the
State should be able to correct that and must assume a moral stance in
relation to the poor, the deprived and the oppressed, a moral stance
that we feel should also permeate the bureaucracy, the technocracy and
eventually, with the changes in structures, also the whole of our
Philippine society . 1 7 7 (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the ends discussed by the framers of the Constitution, they came up
with Article XIII which speci cally deals with Social Justice and Human Rights. Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution carries the positive command to the Congress to uphold
social justice. It reads:
Section 1.The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
xxx xxx xxx
One of the modes by which the Constitution seeks to achieve social justice is
through the introduction of the party-list system. Sections 5 (1) and (2), Article VI thereof
provide:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations .
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis ours) cDIHES
Considering that the provisions on party-list system of representation are not self-
executing, the Congress enacted RA 7941. The said law de ned the parameters of the
party-list system, the procedural guidelines and the quali cations of those intending to
participate in the exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean to depart
from the impetus which impelled the members of the Constitutional Commission to
provide for this scheme of representation — social justice. The underlying principle
remains to be the reduction of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power. Certainly, there could be no other intended bene ciaries for this provision than the
powerless and underprivileged. It could not have been intended for those who already have
the power and resources who may be lesser in number but are in command of the
machinery of the government.
As so fervently declared in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system of
is a social justice mechanism, designed to distribute political power. In the said case, the
Court held:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law
to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them
to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to bene t them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. 1 7 8
The objective to hold the party-list system for the bene t of the marginalized and
underrepresented is expressed in clear language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It reads:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a
whole , to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis ours) AHECcT
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of registered national, regional

and sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions in the party-list elections are quali ed by
three (3) limiting characteristics: (1) they must consist of Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations or coalitions; (2) who lack well-
de ned political constituencies, (3) but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole. The term
"marginalized and underrepresented" effectively limits the party-list system to
sectors which directly need support and representation . The law could not have
deemed to bene t even those who are already represented in the House of
Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the powerful and the
underprivileged. In empowering the powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality in
favor of the marginalized and underrepresented if genuine social justice must be achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and underrepresented, which was
rst articulated by former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani, was
later a rmed and reiterated by no less than another former Chief Justice of this Court,
Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite separate opinion in BANAT v. COMELEC. 1 7 9 He forcefully
articulated:

History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to nd
their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as genuine functional
representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying
premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded in the
Constitution , and it is within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of
major political parties to the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid
grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to
the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More
than the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are
expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people rati ed.
Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in
interpreting the Constitution . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to
harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause. We should strive to
make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some
words idle and nugatory. The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with
related constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the
people as regards the party-list system . Thus, under Section 7 of the
Transitory Provisions, the President was permitted to fill by appointment the seats
reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system from a list of
nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result of historical
precedents that saw how the elected Members of the interim Batasang
Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral
representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground
that they could not rise to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by
the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the President was
given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for
sectoral representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be
part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law which will stipulate and
provide for the concept of sectoral representation." S i m i l a rl y, l i m i t i n g the
party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political
parties from participating in the election of their representatives is
aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good" ; the right of
the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and bene ts in keeping with its
role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration
of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans
and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national
economy. DaCTcA
xxx xxx xxx

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and
underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system
that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma . In
ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and
powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties
who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we
allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their
sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will
serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to
frustrate the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold inviolable the
safeguards of social justice embedded in the Constitution .
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for
electoral reform. It could not have been that too simplistic . Far from being merely
an electoral reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the primacy of
social justice in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only
implementing the speci c mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not
be disengaged from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned
provision was not simply to reform the electoral system but to initiate the equitable
distribution of political power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the populace who
sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance to participate in legislation and
advance their causes. DCSETa
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further elaborated by the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani, which outlined the eight-point guidelines for screening party-list
participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to the quali cations of the (1) sector, (2)
party-list group, organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These key considerations
determine the eligibility of the party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in
the party-list system of representation. Thus, for purposes of registration and continuing
compliance, three (3) basic questions must be addressed:
(1) Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized and
underrepresented?
(2) Is the party, organization or coalition quali ed to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sector?
(3) Are the nominees quali ed to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented party, organization or coalition?
I n seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be the key considerations for
qualifying as a party-list group, organization or coalition. TEDAHI
The sector must be marginalized and

underrepresented.
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State in enacting the law.
Tersely, the state aims to promote proportional representation by means of a Filipino-style
party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1) who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. 1 8 0
RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition
must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized and
underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or condition,
are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of institutional
power, their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the government's
priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and social services and are oftentimes
victims of economic, social and political inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are subsumed under the term
"marginalized and underrepresented" and may register as a party-list group, organization
or coalition. It states:
SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
veri ed by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform
or program of government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
i n cl u de labor peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers, and professionals . (Emphasis ours) CDaSAE
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12) sectors that are considered
marginalized and underrepresented: labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. The enumeration is, however, not exclusive. During the drafting of our
Constitution, the members of the Commission expressed reluctance to provide an
enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors because of their
apprehension that the longer the enumeration, the more limiting the law becomes. 1 8 1
Instead of an enumeration, then Commissioner Jaime Tadeo suggested the criteria by
which the determination of which sectors are marginalized can be based, viz.:
1. The number of people belonging to the sector;
2. The extent of marginalization, exploitation and deprivation of social
and economic rights suffered by the sector;
3. The absence of representation in the government, particularly in the
legislature, through the years;
4. The sector's decisive role in production and in bringing about the
basic social services needed by the people. 1 8 2

The Constitutional Commission saw it t to provide a set of standards which will
approximate the sectors that the Constitution regards as marginalized and
underrepresented and evaded a de nite enumeration. The reason is that a speci c
enumeration is antithetical to the purpose of the party-list system. The party-list system of
representation endeavors to empower the underprivileged sectors, tap their innate
potentials and hone them to become productive and self-sustaining segments of the
society. Sooner, they are expected to graduate from their status as marginalized and
underrepresented. During the process, some formerly self-su cient sectors may drift to
the bottom and regress to become the new marginalized sectors. The resilience in the
enumeration of the sectors accommodates this eventuality. STADIH
Qualifications of the Party-List

Group, Organization or Coalition
Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines for screening party-list
participants inAng Bagong Bayani, ve (5) pertain to the quali cations of the party-list
group, organization or coalition. The first point in the enumeration reads:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups identi ed in Section 5 of RA 7941.
In other words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
by laws, history, platform of government and track record — that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a con ict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors. 1 8 3
Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to represent the marginalized
and underrepresented to qualify as a party-list group. There must be proof, credible and
convincing, to demonstrate the group's advocacy to alleviate the condition of the sector.
ECTIcS
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence showing the party's relation
to the causes of the sector goes to the uniqueness of the party-list system of
representation. In the party-list system of representation, the candidates are parties,
organizations and coalitions and not individuals. And while an individual candidate seeks to
represent a district or particular constituency, a party-list group vying for seats in the
House of Representatives must aim to represent a sector. It is thus important to ascertain
that the party-list group, organization or coalition re ects the ideals of the sector in its
constitution and by-laws. It must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to
undertake in its platform of government. Moreover, its track record must speak of its rm
advocacy towards uplifting the marginalized and underrepresented by undertaking
activities or projects directly addressing the concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively
represents the marginalized and underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to
represent various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to address the
multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-sectoral
party-list group undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some
of the sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it supposedly represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a meaningful and
effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Equally important is that the majority of the membership of the party-list group,
organization or coalition belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. This
means that a majority of the members of the sector must actually possess the attribute
which makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the primary reason why party-list
groups are even allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the House of
Representatives, who are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to the
members of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected. This intention is put to
naught if at least the majority of the members of the party-list do not belong to the same
class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the party-list applicant to present all the
evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a convincing proof of legitimate
membership of a majority of the marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to believe
otherwise and may thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing registration.
EcICDT
The second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani underscores the policy of the state to
hold the party-list system of representation exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented, a distinguishing feature which sets our system apart from systems of
party-list representation in other jurisdictions. The guideline states:
Representatives." . . . 1 8 4
The second guideline was an offshoot of the declaration of policy in RA 7941.

Speci cally, Section 2 of the statute emphasized the state's policy of promoting
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . to
become members of the House of Representatives. As it is exclusively for the
marginalized and underrepresented, it is an in exible requirement that the group applying
for registration must represent a sector. The rationale behind this quali cation was
highlighted in Ang Bagong Bayani, thus:
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst
are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity. It was for them
that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
speci c concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice
in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-
list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past —
the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground
movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out
and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. 1 8 5
cHEATI
RA 7941 also provides that a party desiring to register and participate in the party-
list elections must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. While the law
did not restrict the sectors that may be subsumed under the term "marginalized and
underrepresented", it must be construed in relation to the sectors enumerated in RA 7941,
the enabling law of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: labor, peasant,
sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. Based on the foregoing, a mere
association of individuals espousing shared "beliefs" and "advocacies" cannot
qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented sector .
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" is descriptive of the sector that may
join the party-list elections. A sector pertains to a "sociological, economic or political
subdivision of the society" 1 8 6 which consists of individuals identi ed by the activity,
status or condition, or attribute that speci cally pertains to them. It is identi ed by a
common characteristic pertaining to the individuals composing the same. ESHAcI
On the other hand, an association of individuals espousing a common belief or

advocacy is aptly called a group , not a sector. Speci cally, advocacy groups consist of
individuals engaged in the "act of pleading for, supporting, or recommending active
espousal" 1 8 7 of a cause. Contrary to a sector which is identi ed by a common
characteristic of the members, advocacy groups are identi ed by the causes that they
promote. The members coalesced to pursue causes or ful l patriotic ends that do not
specifically pertain to them, but even to those who are not part of their circle.
Certainly, it takes far more than beliefs and advocacies before a group of individuals
can constitute a sector. There are underlying sociological and economic considerations in
the enumeration of the sectors in the Constitution and RA 7941. These considerations
must be strictly observed lest we deviate from the objectives of RA 7941 of providing a
meaningful and effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. To
relegate the contemplation of the law of what is a "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" to a mere association of individuals espousing a shared belief or advocacy, is to
disregard the essence of the party-list system of representation and the intent of the law
to hold the system exclusive for the marginalized and underrepresented.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, political parties may apply for registration
and/or accreditation as a party-list provided that they are organized along sectoral lines.
1 8 8 This pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani was expounded in BANAT by referring to
the exchange between the members of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system . . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under
the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only? TCaEAD
MR. VILLACORTA.

In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can eld candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also eld sectoral candidates
for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system .
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can eld district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they eld candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution .
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify? aIAcCH
MR. VILLACORTA.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can eld candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines .
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent
the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto
ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that
under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?aEACcS
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may eld sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party
list system .
MR. MONSOD.
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines . 189 (Emphasis

supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
expressed his approval of keeping the party-list system of representation exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To further safeguard the sanctity of the
purpose of the law, he conveyed his vehement objection to the participation of major
political parties in the party-list system of representation because of the likelihood that
they will easily trump the organizations of the marginalized. He opined:
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding
the major political parties from participating in the election of their
representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good"; the right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and bene ts in keeping with its
role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration
of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans
and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national
economy.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to
our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-
list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to
campaign and be voted for. The results con rmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties
would gure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which
participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. 1 9 0 (Citations
omitted)
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided in BANAT to revert to its ruling in the 2000 case
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 1 9 1 that major political parties are barred from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. ATHCac
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I maintain that major political parties
have advantages over minority political parties and sectoral parties in the party-list
elections. By their broad constituency and full resources, it is easier for these major
political parties to obtain the required percentage of votes for party-list seats, a
circumstance which, in turn, only weakens the minority parties' chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjusti ed to absolutely
disqualify from the party-list system the major political parties solely by reason of their
classi cation as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not be
without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to participate in the
party-list system if they do not eld candidates in the election of legislative district
representatives. The justi cation therefor is reasonable. The party-list system was
adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by their limited resources and
citizens base per district, nd di culty in placing representatives in Congress. Major
political parties that eld candidates for district representatives can do so with ease, given
that they satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, for their classi cation, to wit: (a) the established record of the said parties,
coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into account, among other things, their
showing in past elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective o cials belonging to
them ninety (90) days before the election; (c) their identi able political organizations and
strengths as evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability to ll a complete slate
of candidates from the municipal level to the position of the President; and (e) other
analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and strengths.
As the Court explained in Ang Bagong Bayani:
(T)he purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system, in order to
enhance chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in
the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. Logic
shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it — those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and
who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it
would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it —
those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district
elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood
when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the bene t of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only
for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is
not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already ll the ranks of
Congress. 1 9 2
The contemplated limitation against the major political parties who wish to
participate may then allay the fear contemplated by the justi cation given in BANAT for the
disqualification. TASCDI
Nonetheless, a guiding principle remains the same: the party-list system must be
held exclusive for the marginalized and underrepresented. Regardless of the structure or
organization of the group, it is imperative that it represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Thus, it is my submission that political parties which seek to
participate in the party-list system must observe two rules: (1) they must be
organized along sectoral lines; and (2) they must not eld in candidates for
district representatives .
The importance of the requirement for representation of marginalized and
underrepresented sector cannot be overemphasized. The very essence of the party-list
system of representation is to give representation to the voiceless sectors of the society.
It is the characteristic which distinguishes party-list representatives from the regular
district representatives in Congress.
That a party-list group must represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector is the only hurdle which keeps all other organizations
from joining the party-list elections . If this lone lter we have against y-by-night
organizations will be junked, then the COMELEC will be ocked with petitions for
registration from organizations created to pursue sel sh ends and not to the bene t of the
voiceless and neglected sectors of the society.
The move to open the party-list system free-for-all will create a dangerous
precedent as it will open the doors even to illegitimate organizations .
Organizations aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt the law and organize
themselves as a political party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The
organization need only to register as a political party to dispense with the stringent
requirement of representing a sector. It will automatically be off the hook from the danger
of being disquali ed on the ground that it is not representing a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Other organizations, even those organized as sectoral parties,
may follow through and may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to
become political parties instead because it is the easier way to be allowed participation in
the party-list elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the marginalized and
underrepresented are lagged behind. acCTIS
The second requirement for political parties is that they must not eld in candidates
for district representatives. The reason is that the party-list system is solely for the
marginalized and underrepresented. Certainly, political parties which are able to eld in
candidates for the regular seats in the House of Representatives cannot be classi ed as
such.
The third guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani expresses the proscription against the
registration of religious groups as party-list groups. The idea is that the government acts
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 1 9 3 Despite the
prohibition, members of a religious group may be nominated as representative of a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The prohibition is directed only against
religious sectors registering as a political party 1 9 4 because the government cannot have a
partner in legislation who may be driven by the dictates of faith which may not be capable
of rational evaluation.

The fourth and fth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani pertain to disqualifying
circumstances which can justify the denial of the petition for registration of party,
organization or coalition, thus:
Fourth , a party or an organization must not be disquali ed under Section
6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
IAETDc

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its o cers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth , the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature
of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. . . . 1 9 5
To be eligible for registration, the party, organization or coalition must prove that it
possesses all the quali cations and none of the disquali cations stated in the law. The
grounds for disquali cation stated in Section 6 of RA 7941 pertain to acts, status or
conditions which render the applicant group an unsuitable partner of the state in alleviating
the conditions of the marginalized and underrepresented. These disqualifying
circumstances are drawn to further implement the state policy of preserving the party-list
system exclusively for the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941. ACTESI
On the other hand, the disquali cation mentioned in the fth guideline connotes that
the party-list group must maintain its independence from the government so that it may be
able to pursue its causes without undue interference or any other extraneous
considerations. Verily, the group is expected to organize and operate on its own. It must
derive its life from its own resources and must not owe any part of its creation to the
government or any of its instrumentalities. By maintaining its independence, the group
creates a shield that no influence or semblance of influence can penetrate and obstruct the
group from achieving its purposes. In the end, the party-list group is able to effectively
represent the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented, particularly in the
formulation of legislation intended for the benefit of the sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani bear on the
qualifications of the nominees, viz.:
Sixth , the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Quali cations of Party-List Nominees. — No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona de member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty- ve (25) years of age on the
day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty- ve (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh , not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat,
under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely,
the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can
those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented. AcSCaI
Eighth , as previously discussed, while lacking a well-de ned political

constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole. . .
. 196
Except for a few, the basic quali cations of the nominee are practically the same as
those required of individual candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He
must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the Philippines
for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; (d)
able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days before the day of election; (f) at least twenty ve
(25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a nominee for the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty- ve (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not
required that the nominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular district since it
is the party-list group that is voted for and not the appointed nominees. He must, however,
be a bona de member of the party-list group at least ninety (90) days before the
elections.
The nominee must be a bona fide
member of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector
In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied registration to the party, organization
or coalition on the ground that the nominee does not belong to the sector he wishes to
represent. The quandary stems from the interpretation of who are considered as one
"belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented." The COMELEC supposed that
before a person may be considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector," he must actually share with the rest of the membership that
common characteristic or attribute which makes the sector marginalized and
underrepresented. SHAcID
The construction seemed logical but to be consistent with the letter of the law, it
must be harmonized with Section 9 of RA 7941, the speci c provision dealing with the
quali cations of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from the quali cations
similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts, the
nominee is required to be a bona de member of the party, a status he acquires when he
enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety (90) days before the
election. From the point in time when the person acquires the status of being a bona de
member, he becomes one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector."
It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of
nominees:
1. One who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which makes
the sector marginalized or underrepresented (the first type);
2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the
causes of the sector he wishes to represent (the second type).
The rst type of nominee is one who shares a common physical attribute or status
with the rest of the membership. That he possesses this common characteristic of
marginalization is what entitles him to nomination as representative of the group. This is
because of the reasonable presumption that those who have experienced the
inadequacies in the sector are the ones who can truly represent the same. However, there
are instances when this strict construction becomes impracticable, if not altogether
impossible. For instance, a representation from the organization of skilled workers
working abroad is di cult to comply with without the nominee being excluded from the
literal de nition of who belongs to the sector. The strict interpretation also discourages
growth, as in the nominee from the urban sector, since the moment he rises from his
status as such, he becomes disqualified to represent the party. HTSaEC
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An advocate or one who is publicly
known to be pursuing the causes of the sector is equally capable of ful lling the objective
of providing a genuine and effective representation for the marginalized and
underrepresented. He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has always shown
genuine concern for those who have less in life. Unlike the rst type of nominee who
shares a common characteristic with the members of the group, the advocate shares with
them a common aspiration and leads them towards achieving that end. He serves as a
catalyst that stirs movement so that the members of the sector may be encouraged to
pursue their welfare. And though not bound with the group by something physical, he is
one with them in spirit and heart. He is known for his genuine commitment and sel ess
dedication to the causes of the sector and his track record boldly speaks of his advocacy.
At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing ratiocination translates to a more
lenient entry for those aspiring to become a nominee. However, the standard of scrutiny
should not change and nominees shall still be subject to the evaluation by the COMELEC of
their quali cations. They bear the burden of proof to establish by concrete and credible
evidence that they are truly representative of the causes of the sector. They must present
proof of the history of their advocacy and the activities they undertook for the promotion
of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to demonstrate, through their track record,
their vigorous involvement to the causes of the sector.
The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove his advocacy through his track
record. To be clear, the track record is not a mere recital of his visions for the organization
and the trivial activities he conducted under the guise of promoting the causes of the
sector. He must actually and actively be espousing the interests of the sector by
undertaking activities directly addressing its concerns. DSATCI
In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, 1 9 7 the Court enumerated the list of evidence which the
party-list group and its nominees may present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence
in consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that
the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent,
which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing

active participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of the
party-list group/organization for the advancement of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies

of the party-list group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches,
written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the
nominee/s showing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the
party-list group/organizations);
c. Certi cation that the nominee/s is/are a bona de member
of the party-list group/organization for at least ninety (90) days
prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-
list/organization but is/are also a bona de member/s of said
marginalized and underrepresented sector. 1 9 8
Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the rst or second type, proof of his
track record is required. The requirement is even more stringent for the second type of
nominee as he must convincingly show, through past activities and undertakings, his
sincere regard for the causes of the sector. The history of his advocacy and the reputation
he earned for the same will be considered in the determination of his qualification. aEcHCD
Admittedly, the foregoing clari cation partakes of a new guideline which the
COMELEC failed to take into consideration when it conducted automatic review of the
petitions for registration and summary evidentiary hearings pursuant to Resolution No.
9513.

Disqualification of the nominee and
its effects
In a number of resolutions, the COMELEC disquali ed some party-list groups on the
ground that one or some of its nominees are disquali ed. Apparently, the COMELEC is of
the impression that the group, upon ling their petition for registration, must submit
names of at least ve (5) nominees who must all be qualified. In the instances when some
of the nominees were found to be suffering from any disquali cation, the COMELEC
deemed the party to have committed a violation of election laws, rules and regulations and
denied its petition for registration.
I agree with the majority that the construction made by the COMELEC is misplaced.
It is the COMELEC's supposition that when the party-list group included a
disquali ed nominee in the list of names submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have
committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5) 1 9 9 of RA 7941. This feeble deduction,
however, is not within the contemplation of the law. The mentioned provision does not
suggest that all kinds of violations can be subsumed under Section 6 (5) and justify the
disquali cation of the group. To warrant such a serious penalty, the violation must be
demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. It must be taken
to refer to election offenses enumerated under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code or any other acts or omissions that are inconsistent with the ideals
of fair and orderly elections. It does not intend to cover even innocuous mistakes or
incomplete compliance with procedural requirements. AHSEaD
Accordingly, it is a mistake on the part of the COMELEC to suppose that failure to

comply with Section 8 of RA 7941 is within the contemplation of Section 6 (5) thereof.
Section 8 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. — Each registered
party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-
ve (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than ve (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
xxx xxx xxx
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it must be given its plain and
literal meaning. A reading of the provision will show that it is simply a procedural
requirement relating to the registration of groups, organizations and coalitions under the
party-list system of representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant under the party-list
system to submit a list of nominees, not less than ve, at least forty- ve (45) days before
the election. The group's compliance with this requirement is determinative of the action
of the COMELEC. In case of failure to comply, the COMELEC may refuse to act on the
petition for registration. If the applicant, on the other hand, tendered an incomplete
compliance, as in submitting a list of less than ve (5) nominees, the COMELEC may ask it
to comply or simply regard the same as a waiver. In no way can the mere submission of
the list be construed as a guarantee or attestation on the part of the group that all of the
nominees shall be quali ed especially that the assessment of quali cations is a duty
pertaining solely to the COMELEC. In the same way, the provision did not intend to hold the
group liable for violation of election laws for such a shortcoming and to mete out the same
with the penalty of disquali cation. Such an absurd conclusion could not have been the
intention of the law. DHSEcI

Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disquali ed to
represent the group but this should not automatically result to the disquali cation of the
latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same signi cance which the law
holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to
emphasize that the formation of party-list groups organized by the marginalized and
underrepresented and their participation in the process of legislation is the essence of the
party-list system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still the
fact that the party-list group satis ed the quali cations of the law that is material to
consider. That one or some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the quali cations for the
position should not unreasonably upset the existence of an otherwise legitimate party-list
group. The disquali cation of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify
for an o ce or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the quali cations of the party-
list group itself with defect.
The point is that the party-list group must thus be treated separate and distinct
from its nominees such that quali cations of the latter must not be considered part and
parcel of the quali cations of the former. The features of the party-list system of
representation are reflective of the intention of the law to treat them severally.
To begin with, the electorate votes for the party-list group or organization itself, not
for the individual nominees. 2 0 0 The nominees do not le a certi cate of candidacy nor do
they launch a personal campaign for themselves. 2 0 1 It is the party-list group that runs as
candidate and it is the name of the group that is indicated in the ballot. The list of
nominees submitted to the COMELEC becomes relevant only when the party-list group
garners the required percentage of votes that will entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any
rate, the party-list group does not cease in existence even when it loses the electoral race.
And, should it decide to make another electoral bid, it is not required to keep its previous
list of nominees and can submit an entirely new set of names. aCTcDS
Further, there are separate principles and provisions of law pertaining to the
quali cations and disquali cations of the party-list group and the nominees. The
quali cations of the party-list group are outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while the grounds
for the removal/cancellation of registration are enumerated in Section 6 of RA 7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the quali cations of the nominees.
As to their disquali cation, it can be premised on the ground that they are not considered
as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector" or that they lack one
or some of the quali cations. They may also be disquali ed under Section 15 2 0 2 and
Section 8 2 0 3 of RA 7941, particularly under the second paragraph thereof. Even after the
COMELEC's determination, interested parties may still question the quali cations of the
nominees through a petition to cancel or deny due course to the nomination or petition for
disquali cation under Sections 1 2 0 4 and 2, 2 0 5 Rule 5 of the COMELEC Resolution No.
9366, respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of
the members of the party-list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely
dependent upon the will of the party. 2 0 6 More often than not, the choice of nominees is
grounded on trust and con dence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of quali cations
under the law. The method or process by which the members of the party-list group
choose their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or guidelines can be
imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their representatives lest
we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the party-list groups' freedom to choose
their nominees when it disquali ed some of them on the ground that their nominees are
disquali ed. While the COMELEC has the authority to determine the quali cations of the
nominees, the disquali cation of the group itself due to the failure to qualify of one or
some of the nominees is too harsh a penalty. The nexus between the COMELEC's outright
disquali cation of the group due to the disquali cation of the nominees and the avowed
objective of RA 7941 of encouraging the development of a "full, free and open party-list
system" is extremely hard to decipher. AHDaET
In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action of the COMELEC in
disqualifying the party-list group due to the disquali cation of one or some of the
nominees. There is simply no justi able ground to support this action. It is unthinkable
how the COMELEC could have conceived the thought that the fate of the party-list group
depends on the quali cations of the nominees, who are mere agents of the group,
especially that the agency between them is still subject to the condition that the group
obtains the required percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Until this condition is realized, what the nominees have is a mere
expectancy. ScEaAD
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission

on Elections, 2 0 7 the Court emphasized the three-seat limit rule, which holds that each
quali ed party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled only to a
maximum of three (3) seats. 2 0 8 The rule is a reiteration of Section 11 (b) 2 0 9 of RA 7941.
Relating the principle to Section 8, it becomes more apparent that the action of the
COMELEC was made with grave abuse of discretion. It bears noting that while Section 8
requires the submission of the names of at least ve (5) nominees, Section 11 states that
only three (3) of them can actually occupy seats in the House of Representatives should
the votes they gather su ce to meet the required percentage. The two (2) other nominees
in the list are not really expecting to get a seat in Congress even when the party-list group
of which they are members prevailed in the elections. If at all, they can only substitute
incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate the o ce. Therefore, if the right
to o ce of three (3) of the nominees is based on a mere expectancy while with the other
two (2) the nomination is dependent on the occurrence of at least two (2) future and
uncertain events, it is with more reason that the disquali cation of one or some of the
nominees should not affect the qualifications of the party-list group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated petitions, the party-list group
submitted a list of nominees, with less than ve (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA 7941.
In some other petitions, only some out of the number of nominees submitted by the party-
list group quali ed. Again, Section 8 must be construed as a procedural requirement
relative to registration of groups aspiring to participate in the party-list system of
representation. In case of failure to comply, as in non-submission of a list of nominees, the
COMELEC may deny due course to the petition. In case of incomplete compliance, as when
the party-list group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view that the COMELEC must ask
the group to comply with the admonition that failure to do so will amount to the waiver to
submit 5 names. The implication is that if the party-list group submitted only one quali ed
nominee and it garners a number of votes su cient to give it two (2) seats, it forfeits the
right to have a second representative in Congress. Therefore, for as long as the party-list
group has one (1) quali ed nominee, it must be allowed registration and participation in
the election. The situation is different when the party-list group submitted a list of
nominees but none quali ed and, upon being asked to submit a new list of names, still
failed to appoint at least one (1) quali ed nominee. In this case, the party can now
reasonably be denied registration as it cannot, without at least one quali ed nominee, ful ll
the objective of the law for genuine and effective representation for the marginalized and
underrepresented, a task which the law imposes on the quali ed nominee by participating
in the "formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole." 2 1 0 More importantly, the party-list group's inability to eld in quali ed nominees
casts doubt on whether the group is truly representative of the marginalized and
underrepresented. Considering that the majority of the group must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented, it should not have any trouble appointing a quali ed
nominee. ADaSET
Ruling on each of the petitions

As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL
the petitions to the COMELEC , completely disregarding the ground/s for the
cancellation or denial of the party-list groups' registration, and even on the supposition
that the ponencia had substantially modi ed the guidelines that are set forth in the Ang
Bagong Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of the party-list groups
whose remaining ground for denial or cancellation of registration involves the
new guideline on the quali cations of a party's nominees . While I agree on
modifying the quali cations of major political parties, no remand is justi ed on this ground
since none of the 52 2 1 1 petitioners is a major political party. On all other issues, the
standard of grave abuse of discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justi ed, the tribunal or administrative
body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of
discretion. 2 1 2 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections , 2 1 3 the Court recognized that along
with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under Section 5,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that ndings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be nal and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree
of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. 2 1 4
Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS the petitions for failure to
substantiate grave abuse of discretion, and to AFFIRM THE COMELEC's DENIAL OR
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION , of the following party-list groups: GREENFORCE,
KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1-CARE, ALA-EH, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN, Manila Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY, GUARDJAN,
PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD, AKMA-PTM, BAYANI, FIRM 24-
K, KAP, COCOFED, AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST KABAGIS, ARAL, BINHI,
SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong Paglaum, ANAD, PBB, PPP, 1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and
AI .
The COMELEC's conclusion on the said groups' failure to qualify, insofar as the
grounds pertained to the sectors which they seek to represent and/or their capacity to
represent their intended sector finds support in established facts, law and jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND , I nd grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in ruling on the disquali cation of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO on the supposed failure of these parties to substantiate their eligibility as a
group, speci cally on questions pertaining to their track record and the sectors which
they seek to represent. IHSTDE

Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in a certiorari case the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence presented to it, in exceptional cases,
as when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps
the limits of discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only
obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to
one of jurisdiction. 2 1 5 To this exception falls the COMELEC's disquali cation of 1-UTAK,
PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO .
1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1-UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various transport drivers and
operators associations nationwide with a common goal of promoting the interest and
welfare of public utility drivers and operators. 2 1 6 On the other hand, PASANG MASDA is
a sectoral political party that mainly represents the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of jeepney and tricycle drivers and operators across the National Capital Region.
2 1 7 Contrary to the conclusion that was inferred by the COMELEC from the common
circumstance that 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA represent the sectors of both public
utility drivers and operators, it is not a su cient ground to cancel their respective
registration as party-list group.
To a great extent, the supposed con ict in the respective interests of public utility
drivers and operators is more apparent than real. It is true that there is a variance in the
economic interests of public utility drivers and operators; the former is concerned with
wages while the latter is concerned with pro ts. However, what the COMELEC failed to
consider is that the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and operators are aligned with each
other in several instances. To name a few: rst, the effects of uctuation in the prices of
petroleum products; second, their bene t from petitions for fare increase/reduction; and
third, the implications of government policies affecting the transportation sector such as
tra c rules and public transport regulation. In these instances, it is mutually bene cial for
drivers and operators of public utility vehicles to work together in order to effectively lobby
their interests. Certainly, the interrelated concerns and interests of public utility drivers and
operators far outweigh the supposed variance in their respective economic interests. HIcTDE
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the registration of 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA as party-list groups on the
ground of the sectors which they aim to represent.
BUTIL
Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled the
registration of BUTIL on the alleged ground that the party failed to prove that the
"agriculture and cooperative sectors," which the party represents, are marginalized and
underrepresented. 2 1 8
In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted that the Secretary-General of
BUTIL , Wilfredo A. Antimano a rmed in his judicial a davit that BUTIL is an organization
"representing members of the agriculture and cooperative sectors." From this declaration,
the COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture and cooperative sectors are not enumerated
in RA 7941, it is incumbent upon BUTIL to establish the fact that the sectors it is
representing are marginalized and underrepresented. Since the party failed to discharge
this burden, the COMELEC cancelled the party's registration.
I stress, however, that in determining whether the group represents a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, all of the evidence submitted by the party should be duly
considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimano's statement in his judicial a davit that
BUTIL represents the "agriculture and cooperative sectors" should be read in conjunction
with the other documents submitted by the party, including the oral testimony that was
given by the party's witness. Signi cantly, during the clari catory hearing conducted by the
Commission En Banc on August 23, 2012, Antimano explained: ScCEIA
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit na
magsasaka at maliliit na mangingisda sa kanayunan.
xxx xxx xxx
Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang inyong
nire-represent?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
Pati maliliit na mangingisda?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa
karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong maliliit na mangingisda na nag-
aalaga ng maliliit na . . . 2 1 9
aTIAES
It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that Antimano's reference to the
"agriculture and cooperative sector" pertains to small farmers and shermen. Likewise, on
the basis of the evidence on record, the term "cooperative" in Antimano's a davit should
be taken to refer to agricultural cooperatives which, by their nature, are still comprised of
agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small agricultural workers as marginalized
and underrepresented. Based on the records, BUTIL appears to fully adhere to and work
towards their cause. I also give due consideration to the fact that since the party-list
system was rst implemented in 1998, the party had been able to obtain the necessary
votes for at least one seat in the House of Representatives. This a rms the party's
constituency that may deserve a continued representation in Congress.
AT
AT is an incumbent party-list group that claims to represent six (6) marginalized
sectors — labor, urban poor, elderly, women, youth and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).
220 In disqualifying AT , the COMELEC found that its incumbent representative,
Congresswoman Daryl Grace J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that will uplift the
welfare of all the sectors it claims to represent. 2 2 1
In so ruling, however, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in failing to
appreciate that effective representation of sectors is not con ned to the passage of bills
that directly identify or name all of the sectors it seeks to represent. In the case of AT ,
there is evidence that it adopted and co-sponsored House Bills that advanced the
interests, not only of the sectors it represents, but even other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. 2 2 2 AT also established with su ciency an exceptional track
record that demonstrates its genuine desire to uplift the welfare of all of the sectors it
represents. 2 2 3 It is broad enough to cover legislation which, while directly identifying only
some of the sectors as main bene ciaries, also bene ts the rest of the sectors it seeks to
represent.
ARARO
ARARO is a party-list group that seeks to represent peasants and the urban poor. It
was disquali ed by the COMELEC on the ground that these two sectors involve con icting
interests, for instance, in the matter of land use.
However, I do not see, and the COMELEC failed to show, how the issue of land use
can be con icting between these sectors. Peasants generally belong to the class of
marginal farmers, sherfolk and laborers in the rural areas. On the other hand, the urban
poor, as the term connotes, are those in the urban areas. While they may have different
interests and concerns, these are not necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELEC's conclusion that ARARO 's alliances with
other sectoral organizations "muddle" the sectors it represents. 2 2 4 These are mere
alliances, i.e., ties. It does not necessarily follow that ARARO , because of these ties, will
also represent the interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO 's platform continually
focuses on the enhancement of the welfare of the peasants and the urban poor, there can
be an effective representation in their behalf.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to nullify the COMELEC's
cancellation of the registration of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on
the ground of these parties' supposed failure to prove their eligibility to represent their
intended sectors.
The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the outright
cancellation of the ve parties' registration on the ground of the supposed failure of their
nominees to qualify. I have fully explained that the quali cation of a party-list group shall
be treated separate and distinct, and shall not necessarily result from the quali cation of
its nominees. ADScCE
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned actions of the COMELEC shall not
be construed to automatically restore the ve parties' registration and accreditation, which
would otherwise allow their participation in the May 2013 elections. As has been
discussed, each party must still be able to eld in quali ed nominees, as it is only through
them that the party may perform its legislative function in the event that it garners the
required percentage of votes for a seat in the House of Representatives. With this
circumstance, and considering a new guideline on nominees' quali cations, I then nd the
necessity of remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM, A-IPRA, AKIN, A
BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY
The denial of the registration of AKIN , and the cancellation of the registration of
ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY were based solely on the
alleged failure of their respective nominees to prove that they factually belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector that their parties seek to represent. I reiterate
that a party-list group must be treated separate and distinct from its nominees; the
outright disquali cation of the groups on the said ground is not warranted. The
COMELEC's ruling to the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the COMELEC's resolve to deny AKIN 's
registration and cancel the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY . Nonetheless, as in the case of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and
ARARO , this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration under the party-list
system. CITcSH
I submit that in view of my stand regarding the quali cations of nominees,

speci cally on the two types of quali ed nominees, it is only proper that the petitions that
involve the ground of disquali cation of the nominees be remanded to the COMELEC to
afford it the opportunity to revisit its rulings. In so doing, the COMELEC may be able to
assess the facts and the records, while being guided by the clari cation on the matter. It
must be emphasized, however, that not all of the petitions necessitates a remand
considering that from the records, only ten (10) out of the fty-three (53) consolidated
petitions solely involved the disquali cation of the party's nominees. The bulk of the
petitions consist of cancellation or denial of registration on the ground (1) that the party-
list group does not represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, or; (2) that the
group itself, on the basis of the pertinent guidelines enumerated in Ang Bagong Bayani,
failed to qualify. If the ground for the denial or cancellation of registration is
disquali cation on the basis of sector or group, it is a futile exercise to delve into the
quali cations of the nominees since notwithstanding the outcome therein, the party-list
group remains disquali ed. It is well to remember that the law provides for different sets
of quali cations for the party-list group and the nominees. The law, while requiring that the
party-list group must have quali ed nominees to represent it, treats the former as
separate and distinct from the latter, not to treat them as equals but to give a higher
regard to the party-list group itself. Thus, in the event that the nominees of the party-list
group fail to qualify, the party-list group may still be afforded the chance to ll in quali ed
nominees to represent it. The reverse, however, is not true. The lack of quali cations, or the
possession of disqualifying circumstances by the group, impinges on the legitimacy or the
existence of the party-list group itself. Absent a quali ed party-list group, the fact that the
nominees that are supposed to represent it are qualified does not hold any significance.
Even though the ponencia modi es the quali cations for all national or regional
parties/organizations, IT STILL IS NOT NECESSARY TO REMAND ALL THE
PETITIONS . It bears stressing that of the 52 petitioners, only eleven are national or
regional parties/organizations . The rest of the petitioners, as indicated in their
respective Manifestations of Intent and/or petitions, are organized as sectoral parties or
organizations.
The party-list groups that are organized as national parties/organizations are:
1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) 2 2 5
2. Bantay Party-List (BANTAY) 2 2 6
3. Allance of Bicolnon Party (ABP) 2 2 7
On the other hand, the following are regional parties/organizations:
1. Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB) 2 2 8
2. Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM) 2 2 9
3. Ako an Bisaya (AAB) 2 3 0 DTcHaA
4. Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN) 2 3 1

5.1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP) 2 3 2
6. Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI) 2 3 3
7. Partido ng Bayan and Bida (PBB) 2 3 4
8. Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP) 2 3 5
Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencia's ratiocination, it does not
follow that a remand of all the cases is justi ed; as we have pointed out the ponencia has
been able to explain the necessity of a remand of only eleven petitions for further
proceedings in the COMELEC, in addition to the ten petitions that I have recommended for
remand.
WHEREFORE , in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to:
1.PARTLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 204410, G.R. No. 204153, G.R. No.
204356, G.R. No. 204174, G.R. No. 204367, G.R. No. 204341, G.R. No. 204125,
G.R. No. 203976, G.R. No. 204263 and G.R. No. 204364 . The assailed Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-198 (PLM), SPP No. 12-
277 (PLM), SPP No. 12-136 (PLM), SPP No. 12-232 (PLM), SPP No. 12-104 (PL), SPP No.
12-269 (PLM), SPP No. 12-292 (PLM), SPP No. 12-288 (PLM), SPP No. 12-257 (PLM) and
SPP No. 12-180 (PLM) shall be NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright
disquali cation of the parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-
IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY , respectively, NULLIFIED
insofar as these declared the outright disquali cation of the parties 1-UTAK, PASANG
MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-
BAHAY , respectively, and their cases shall be REMANDED to the COMELEC, which shall
be DIRECTED to: (a) allow the party-list groups to present further proof that their nominees
are actually quali ed in light of the new guideline on the quali cation of nominees, (b)
evaluate whether the nominees are quali ed to represent the group, and (c) grant or deny
registration depending on its determination; caITAC
2.DISMISS the petitions in G.R. No. 204139, G.R. 204370, G.R. No. 204379,
G.R. No. 204394, G.R. No. 204402, G.R. No. 204426, G.R. No. 204435, G.R. No.
G.R. No. 203766, G.R. Nos. 203818-19, G.R. No. 203922, G.R. No. 203936, G.R.
No. 203958, G.R. No. 203960, G.R. No. 203981, G.R. No. 204002, G.R. No.
204408, G.R. No. 204421, G.R. No. 204425, G.R. No. 204428 and G.R. No.
204486 .
LEONEN , J., concurring and dissenting :
I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in so far as there is no nding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
National political parties may participate in party list elections, provided that they
have no candidate for legislative districts. The constitution disquali es political parties,
which have candidates for legislative districts, from the party list system. 1 I also agree
that they need not be organized sectorally and/or represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented".
We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article VI section 5 (1) and (2) in
the light of article II section 1 of the Constitution. We now bene t from hindsight as we are
all witness to the aftermath of the doctrines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC 2 as qualified by Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 3 and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC. 4 TAEDcS
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always created space for "national,
regional and sectoral parties and organizations" to join the party list system. It is textually
clear that national political parties or regional organizations do not need to be organized
on sectoral lines. Sectoral parties or organizations belong to a different category of
participants in the party list system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the
party list system "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups" as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. 5 This law is unconstitutional in so far as it makes a
requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support
those who are candidates for legislative districts and those that participate in the party list
system. It is inconsistent for national political parties who have candidates for legislative
districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear implication from the text of article
VI, section 5 (1) of the Constitution.
The insistence on the criteria of "marginalized and underrepresented" 6 has caused
so much chaos to the point of absurdity in our party list system. It is too ambiguous so as
to invite invidious intervention on the part of COMELEC, endangering the fundamental
rights to suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with the text of the Constitution
makes more sense under the present circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi relevant to our
present cases in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC 7 and BANAT v.
COMELEC. 8
I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nulli cation of COMELEC Resolution No.
9513, s. August 2, 2012. This will have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty
nine (39) existing party list groups that have already registered for the 2010 elections
especially those that have won seats in the current Congress. This will also automatically
remand the thirteen (13) cases of new party list registrants for proper processing and
evaluation by the Commission on Elections. cHCSDa
Textual analysis
of the relevant provisions
Different kind of political party in the party list system
The core principle that de nes the relationship between our government and those
that it governs is captured in the constitutional phrase that ours is a "democratic and
republican state". 9 A democratic and republican state is founded on effective
representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must
be given full consideration. 1 0 We must always be sensitive in our crafting of doctrines lest
the guardians of our electoral system be empowered to silence those who wish to offer
their representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our people to mature as
citizens in our electorate.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the light of these overarching
consideration.
Article VI, section 5 (1) provides:
"(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
inhabitants, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations ." (emphasis provided)
There are two types of representatives in the House of Representatives. Those in the
rst group are "elected from legislative districts". Those in the second group are "elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations." TaCDIc
The differences in terms of representation are clear.

Those who are elected from legislative districts will have their name in the ballot.
They present their persons as the potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual
quali cations that will be assessed by COMELEC on the basis of the Constitution and
relevant statutes. Should there be disquali cation it would be their personal
circumstances, which will be reviewed, in the proper case, by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The individual representative can lose subsequent elections for
various reasons, including dissatisfaction from those that initially elected him/her into
office.
Incidentally, those who present themselves for election by legislative districts may
or may not be supported by a registered political party. This may give them added political
advantages in the electoral exercise, which includes the goodwill, reputation and resources
of the major political party they a liate with. However, it is not the nature of the political
party that endorses them that is critical in assessing the quali cations or disquali cations
of the candidate.
The elected district representative in the House of Representative is directly
accountable to his/her electorate. The political party s/he a liates with only shares that
political accountability; but, only to a certain extent. Good performance is usually rewarded
with subsequent election to another term. It is the elected representative, not the political
party that will get re-elected. We can even take judicial notice that party a liation may
change in subsequent elections for various reasons, without any effect on the quali cation
of the elected representative.
The political party that a liates those who participate in elections in legislative
districts organize primarily to have their candidates win. These political parties have
avowed principles and platforms of government. 1 1 But, they will be known more through
the personalities and popularity of their candidates. 1 2 Often, compromises occur in the
political party's philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate. TIaCcD
This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.
The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our
country, one where voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-
nominees secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party list system's intentions
are broader than simply to "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented
become lawmakers themselves". 1 3
Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed
individual candidate over platforms and political programs. 1 4 Political parties were
convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the national to the local level that
gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement
the electoral campaigns of their members. 1 5 Most elections were choices between
competing personalities often with very little discernible differences in their interpretation
and solutions for contemporary issues. 1 6 The electorate chose on the bases of
personality and popularity; only after the candidates were elected to public offices will they
later nd out the concrete political programs that the candidate will execute. Our history is
replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked cohesion on the
basis of principle. 1 7 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and marginalized large
parts of our population.
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have
been intended to enhance and further entrench the same system. It is the party or the
organization that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a
democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can
delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve.
Genuine political parties enable true representation, and hence, provide the potential for us
to realize a "democratic and republican state". ISDCHA
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party list groups that have
maintained organizational integrity to pose candidates for higher o ces, i.e. the Senate.
We can take judicial notice that two of the candidates for the 2013 senatorial elections —
who used to represent party list groups in the House of Representatives — do not have the
resources nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the same mould as many of the usual
politicians who view for that position. It is no accident that the party list system is only
con ned to the House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to mature genuine
political parties and give them the experience and the ability to build constituencies for
other elective public offices.
In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by constitutionally entrenching the
ability of political parties and organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the
bene t of those who have been marginalized and underrepresented in the past. It makes it
possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to principle and platform
rather than their family a liation. It encourages more collective action by the membership
of the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the party be controlled only by a
select few.
Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst . . . who
wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity" 1 8 that the party list system was enacted.
Rather, it was for everyone in so far as attempting a reform in our politics. TcSICH
But, based on our recent experiences, requiring "national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations" that participate in the party list system to be representatives of
the "marginalized and underrepresented sector" and be "marginalized and
underrepresented themselves" is to engage in an ambiguous and dangerous ction that
undermines the possibility for vibrant party politics in our country. This requirement, in fact,
was the very requirement that "gut the substance of the party list system". 1 9
Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to appreciate the true context
of the party list system.
No requirement that the party or organization be "marginalized and
underrepresented"
The disquali cation of two "green" or ecological parties 2 0 and two "right wing"
ideological groups 2 1 (currently part of the party list sector in the present Congress) is
based on the assessment of the COMELEC en banc that they do not represent a
"marginalized" sector and that the nominee themselves do not appear to be marginalized.
It is inconceivable that the party list system framed in our Constitution make it
impossible to accommodate green or ecological parties of various political persuasions.
Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those who are
marginalized or underrepresented. Neither do they only have for their constituency those
"who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity". 2 2 In truth, all of us, regardless of
economic class, are constituents of ecological advocacies.
Also, political parties organized along ideological lines — the socialist or even right
wing political parties — are groups motivated by a their own narratives of our history, a
vision of what society can be and how it can get there. There is no limit to the economic
class that can be gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political
platforms. Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they have the
constituency that can win them a seat will enrich the deliberations in that legislative
chamber. Having them voice out opinions — whether true or false — should make the
choices of our representatives richer. It will make the choices of our representatives more
democratic.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the bene t of those who are marginalized
and underrepresented, but they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic class.
Just a glance at the history of strong political parties in different jurisdictions will show
that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will provide their rationale
and continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform
their movement forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may
care for the marginalized and underrepresented, but they are not themselves — nor for
their effectivity in the House of Representatives should we require that they can only come
from that class. DCESaI
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement

of their platforms. Rather, it should be seen as clear examples where interests and
advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative
districts, cry out for representation. Surely, it should be the electorate, not the COMELEC,
which should decide whether their groups should participate in our legislative
deliberations. That these groups could be excluded even before the vote is not what the
party list system is all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering
clearly show why the text of article VI, section 5 (2) provides:
"(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list shall be lled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sectors ."
(emphasis provided)
What is plain from a reading of the text is that the quali cation as to reserved seats
is applicable only for the "three consecutive terms after the ratification" of the Constitution.
Only one-half of the seats within that period is reserved to the "sectors" that were
enumerated, clearly implying that there are other kinds of party list groups other
than those who are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form
or the other is clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its
rationale and its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these provisions.
Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC
We are aware of the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec. 2 3 In that case, the
Court en banc declared that political parties may participate in the party list system but
that these political parties must be organized sectorally to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented". DEAaIS
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from his fundamental principle
that:
". . . The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party list system, as laid down in the Constitution and
RA 7941." 2 4

The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation of a statute at par with
the text of article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) the Constitution , thus:
"The foregoing provision on the party list system is not self-executory. It is, in
fact, interspersed with phrases like 'in accordance with law' or 'as may be
provided by law'; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution." 2 5
The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in

the context of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made
clear. 2 6 To claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete the
very framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of our
constitution. The phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by law" is not
an invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent
assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from the text
of the constitution in the light of its context in the document and considering the
contemporary impact of relevant precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the workings of the policy through
law. The Constitution remains the fundamental and basic law with a more dominant
interpretative position vis-a-vis statute. It has no equal within our normative system. DCScaT
Article VI, sections 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete Constitutional framework
for the party list system.
Congress cannot add the concept of "proportional representation". Congress cannot
pass a law so that we read in the text of the Constitution the requirement that even
national and regional parties or organizations should likewise be sectoral.
Certainly Congress cannot pass a law so that even the one-half that was not
reserved for sectoral representatives even during the rst three consecutive
terms after the rati cation of the Constitution should now only be composed of
sectoral representatives .
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming from Justices Mendoza and
Vitug when Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC was decided in 2001. 2 7 Only six (6) justices
concurred with the reasoning of the ponencia. Two justices voted only in the result. Five (5)
justices dissented. Four (4) of them joining the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente
Mendoza. There was no majority therefore in upholding the reasoning and ratio decidendi
proposed by the ponencia in that case. It was a divided court, one where there was a
majority to sustain the result but not enough to establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues were tackled in the case of
BANAT v. COMELEC in 2009. 2 8
Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was to prevent major political
parties from dominating organizations of the marginalized. Citing the concurring and
dissenting opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:
". . . . There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to
our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the
party list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially
allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results con rmed the fear expressed
by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political
parties would gure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162
parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top
50." 2 9 cDHCAE
The premise of course was the argument that major political parties that support
candidates for legislative districts were to be allowed to participate in the party-list
system. This is not the reading proposed today of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
opinion failed to foresee that even parties and organizations that claim to represent the
"marginalized" could crowd out each other further weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a clear vote, we also do so
with the benefit of hindsight.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe to the concept of
"marginalized and underrepresented". It is too ambiguous. There can be no consistent
judicially discernible standard for the COMELEC to apply. It thus invites invidious
intervention from COMELEC to undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to
vie for representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of the electorate.
COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and
beyond its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a de nition of what it is
to be socially marginalized. No empirical studies have informed COMELEC's determination
as to which groups are "underrepresented" in government. In fact, there is no indication as
to what the characteristics of an individual's or group's identity would lead the COMELEC
en banc to consider that they were a "sector".
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following are not marginalized or
underrepresented sectors: "Bicolanos", 3 0 "young professionals like drug counselors and
lecturers", 3 1 rural energy consumers, 3 2 "peasants, urban poor, workers and nationalistic
individuals who have stakes in promoting security of the country against insurgency
criminality and their roots in economic poverty", 3 3 "persons imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt", 3 4 those who advocate "to publicly oppose, denounce and
counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society"; 3 5 "environmental enthusiasts
intending to take are of, protect and save Mother Earth", 3 6 "agricultural and cooperative
sectors"; 3 7 "businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and ordinary citizens advocating
genuine people empowerment, social justice, and environmental protection and utilization
for sustainable development"; 3 8 "artists"; 3 9 "Bisayans"; 4 0 Ilonggos. 4 1 SCEDaT
What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex cathedra sans any standard what
were the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors." This, in my opinion, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. We are now asked to con rm their
actions. We are asked to a rm that COMELEC knew what a "marginalized and
underrepresented sector" was when they saw one.
COMELEC's process was a modern day inquisition reminiscent of the medieval hunt
for heretics and witches, a spectacle which may in a few cases weed out the sham
organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless fraught with too many vulnerabilities that
cannot be constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our Constitution, we should not
lend our imprimatur to both the basis and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this
case.
After all, we have a due process clause still in place. 4 2 Regardless of the nature of
the power that COMELEC deployed — whether it was administrative or quasi-judicial — the
parties were entitled to have a standard that they could apply in their situation so that they
could properly discern whether their factual situation deserved registration or
disqualification. ACIDSc
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a standard. Even Rep. Act No.
7941 was ambiguously worded. 4 3 There was no workable de nition of "marginalized",
"underrepresented" and "sector." 4 4
Neither would it have been possible for Congress to de ne these concepts. In the
rst place, our decisions have not given them guidance. In the second place, we could not
give guidance because it is not in the Constitution and could not be derived from its
provisions. This is also apart from the reality that "identity", "sector", "marginalized" and
"underrepresented" are heavily contested concepts in the elds of social science and
philosophy. 4 5
The fallacy of representation by "marginalized and underrepresented" groups
It is possible under our system for a party list group representing indigenous
peoples to be elected by peoples who do not belong to their sector but from a vote-rich
legislative district. The same is true with a party list group allegedly of security guards. 4 6
They, too, can get elected without the consent of majority of all the security guards in this
country but simply from the required number allowed by our formula in BANAT v.
COMELEC. 4 7 In practice, we have seen the possibility for these "marginalized and
underrepresented" party list groups being elected simply by the required vote in some
legislative districts.
This sham produces the failure in representation. It undermines the spirit of the
party list system, violates the principle of representation inherent in a democratic and
republican state, and weakens — rather than strengthen — the abilities of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" to become lawmakers themselves. Constitutional construction
cannot lose sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will undermine the very spirit of
the text of our Constitution. 4 8
Allowing the existence of strong national and regional parties or organizations in the
party list system have better chances of representing the voices of the "marginalized and
underrepresented. It will also allow views, standpoints and ideologies sidelined by the
pragmatic politics required for political parties participating in legislative districts to be
represented in the House of Representatives. It will also encourage the concept of being
multi-sectoral and therefore the strengthening of political platforms. EDcIAC
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain full fealty to the textual
content of our Constitution. It is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." 4 9 Nothing more, nothing less.
Requirements for Party List Groups
Preferably, party list groups should represent the marginalized and
underrepresented in our society. Preferably, they may not be marginalized themselves but
that they may also subscribe to political platforms that have the improvement of those
who are politically marginalized and economically destitute as their catapulting passion.
But, this cannot be the constitutional requirements that will guide legislation and actions
on the part of the Commission on Elections.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:
First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented". However, they will have to clearly show how their plans will impact on
the "marginalized and underrepresented". Should the party list group prefer to represent a
sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani 5 0 and BANAT 5 1 will apply to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list system must not
also be a participant in the election of representatives for the legislative districts. In other
words, political parties that eld candidates for legislative districts cannot also participate
in the party list system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms guided by a vision
of society, an understanding of history, a statement of their philosophies and how this
translates into realistic political platforms; aICcHA
Fifth, the parties or organizations — not only the nominees — must have concrete
and veri able track record of political participation showing their translation of their
political platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must be organized
solely for the purpose of participating in electoral exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as three (3) years,
prior to their registration. Within that period they should be able to show concrete
activities that are in line with their political platforms;
Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active membership roster so as
to be able to mount a credible campaign for purpose of enticing their audience (national,
regional or sectoral) for their election;
Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have participated in the political
activities of the organization;
Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is not only
democratically elected but also one which is not dominated by the nominees themselves;
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected through a transparent
and democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the party or
organization must be clear and should not point to a few dominant contributors
speci cally of individuals with families that are or have participated in the elections for
representatives of legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be able to win within the
two elections subsequent to their registration;
Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and CacEIS
Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization.

Disqualification of existing registered party list groups
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC
With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is
clearly reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The
Constitution in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members . . ."
A more speci c provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered

political party list groups should prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the "sole judge" clearly
shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest. 5 2
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote to:
(1) GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC Resolution No. 9135 and all
the COMELEC Resolutions raised in these consolidated cases; and
(2) REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper proceedings in line with our
decision.
Footnotes
1.Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 1079-1080.
3.Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), pp. 176-177.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 145-148.
5.Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), unpaginated.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), pp. 26-35. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
9.Rollo (G.R. No. 204455), pp. 38-55; rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 127-144. Signed by Chairman Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph
dissenting; Commissioner Armando C. Velasco also concurred except for Ala-Eh.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim with Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
15.Rollo (G.R. No. 204139), pp. 505-512. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco.
Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim also voted in favor.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R.
Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took
no part.
18.Rollo, (G.R. No. 204490), pp. 71-78. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Rene V. Sarmiento concurred but took no part in
Ang Ating Damayan. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
20.PBB's petition is docketed as G.R. No. 204484 before this Court, and as SPP No. 11-002
before the COMELEC.
21.In the Matter of Clarifying the Inclusion in the Party-List Ra e of New Groups Denied
Accreditation but were Able to Obtain a Status Quo Ante Order from the Supreme Court.
22.(2) To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the
guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, of non-compliant, cancel the registration of
the following:
(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited and will
participate in the May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc has not
passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of
Registered Party-List Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and
which have led their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections. (Boldface and italics in the original)
23.412 Phil. 308 (2001).

24.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), pp. 83-87. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph,
and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
25.Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), pp. 75-99; rollo (G.R. No. 203981), pp. 47-70; rollo (G.R. No. 204002), pp.
53-76; (G.R. No. 204318), pp. 23-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian
Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
28-43. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco. Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert
S. Lim also concurred but did not sign. Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
28.Rollo (G.R. No. 203922), pp. 92-101. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N.
Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. penned a Separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
29.Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), pp. 158-164. Signed by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N.
Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned an extended opinion.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
31.Rollo (G.R. No. 204240), pp. 47-69; rollo (G.R. No. 203936), pp. 128-150; rollo (G.R. No. 204126),
pp. 51-73; rollo (G.R. No. 204364), pp. 34-56; rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 31-53; rollo (G.R. No.
204408), pp. 46-68; rollo (G.R. No. 204153), pp. 24-46; rollo (G.R. No. 203958), pp. 26-48.
Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito
N. Tagle. Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in favor.
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but inhibited in KAKUSA.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Christian
Robert S. Lim also concurred but did not sign. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in
favor but was on o cial business at the time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca took no part.
Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on o cial
business.
29-46. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C.
Velasco was on official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S.
Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on o cial
business.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph.
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but was on o cial business at the
time of signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
business.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on o cial business. Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim penned a separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner
Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
business.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian
Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle penned a Dissenting Opinion and joined by
Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph. Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
48.Rollo (G.R. No. 204421), pp. 43-50; rollo (G.R. No. 204425), pp. 21-28. Signed by Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim,
and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.
Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
49.G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
50.II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 566-567 (1 August 1986).
51.II Record, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986).
52.II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86 (22 July 1986), 256-257 (25 July 1986).
53.II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 257 (25 July 1986).
54.412 Phil. 347, 350 (2001).
55.Party-List System: The Philippine Experience, Fritzie Palma Tangkia and Ma. Araceli Basco
Habaradas, Ateneo School of Government and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Philippine
O ce, April 2001, http://library.fes.de/pdf- les/bueros/philippinen/50076.pdf
(accessed 30 March 2013).
56.Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
TheCOMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fteen (15)
days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60)
days before election.
57.Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided the simplest
scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied)
58.The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSDB) classi es the population into three
income groups: the high income, the middle income, and the low income group. See
Table 2. Annual Family Income of the Low, Middle, and High Income Classes: 1997,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/papers/contributed%20papers/cps-12/cps12-
01.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).
59.Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 provides in part:

. . . For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the rst ve (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx.
60.G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258 citing CONSTITUTION, Art.
XIII, Sec. 1.
61.Id. at 251.
62.Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SERENO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
1.G.R. Nos. 83896, 83815, 22 February 1991.

2.Vol. V, R.C.C No. 106, 12 October 1986.
3.Emphasis supplied.
4.Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 148208, 15
December 2004.
5.VOL V, R.C.C No. 106, 12 October 1986.

6.See Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012.
7.CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO, EQUAL DIGNITY & RESPECT: THE SUBSTANCE OF EQUAL
PROTECTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2012), 265 [hereinafter, PUNO].
8.TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND

REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES (2008), at 166-167.
9.Puno, 265.
10.Id.
11.G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001.
12.See Perez-Rosario v. CA , G.R. No. 140796, 30 Jun 2006; BERNAS, PRIMER ON THE 1987
CONSTITUTION (2006), 488.
13.Volume II, R.C.C., 258-259, 25 July 1986.
14.Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, 18 October 1988.
15.Gandara Mill Supply v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126703, 29 December 1998.

16.Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, 3 December 2009.
17.Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, 21 April 1995.
18.Id.
19.G.R. No. 46076, 46077, 12 June 1939.
20.G.R. No. 47065, 26 June 1940.
21.Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Ople, G.R. L-67573, 19 June 1985.
22.Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
23.People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).
24.Section 2, Republic Act No. 7941.
25.Supra.
26.Section 2, Republic Act No. 7941.
27.G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009.
28.The national parties are Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), Bantay Party-List
(BANTAY), and Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP). On the other hand, the regional parties
are Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB), Akyson Magsasaka — Partido Tining ng Masa
(AKMA-PTM), Ako an Bisaya (AAB), Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN), 1 Alliance
Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), Partido ng Bayan and
Bida (PBB), and Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP).
29.G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001.
30.G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41, 1 April 2009.
31.G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001.
32.Dole Philippines v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30 November 2006.

33.1987 CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 1.
34.Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191084, 25 March 2010.
35.Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004.
36.G.R. No. 181478, 15 July 2009.
BRION, J., concurring:
1.412 Phil. 308, 342 (2001).
2.RA No. 7941, Section 5.
4.Varias v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189078, Feb. 11, 2010.
5.Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
6.See: De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.
7.See: Justice Arturo Brion's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council. See also Justice Reynato Puno's Dissenting Opinion in Lambino v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, where he stated:
". . . Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The rst, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the
higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our
Constitution."
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
exibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: " Stare decisis is not . . . a universal
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not in exible. Whether it shall be
followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of
stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that
should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This
stance re ects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts'
limited resources.
8.Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No.
159139, January 13, 2004.
9.Articles 4 and 8 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
10.143 Phil. 209 (1970).
11.Id. at 219.
12.In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (460 Phil. 830, 885-886), the Court held:
"where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers . [italics, emphasis and underscore supplied]
13.The deliberations, together with voting on the various issues raised and the wording of the
constitutional text of the party-list provision, took place on July 22, 1986, July 25, 1986
and August 1, 1986.
14.1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5 (1).
15.II RECORD of the CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 86.
16.Id. at 259.
17.RA No. 7941, Section 3 (a).
19.RA No. 7941, Section 3 (b) to (f).
20.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 342-345.
21.G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
22.See ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
23.II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, p. 561. Stated by Commissioner Villacorta
prior to the approval of the amendment that became Section 5 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
Mr.Villacorta. I would like to report that the proponents of sectoral representation and of
the party list system met to thoroughly discuss the issues and have arrived at a
compromise formula.
On this rst day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter in
our national history by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature .
Commissioner Monsod will present to the Committee on the Legislative the amendment
to Section 5 which we have agreed upon. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The underlined and boldfaced portion was lifted out of context in Ang Bagong Bayani.
24.See Dissent of J. Vicente V. Mendoza which discussed the Villacorta and Monsod positions,
as well as the statements of Commissioners Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople, based on the
record of the Constitutional Commission.
25.1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5 (2).
26.On July 25, 1986.
27.II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 255, 561-562. See also the Dissents of
Justice Jose C. Vitug and Justice Vicente Mendoza in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4.
28.See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.
29.Pages 19-23 of this Separate Opinion.
30.Supra note 4.
31.Id. at 333.
32.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 334.
33.Per Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (supra note 7, at 884-885): verba legis
signi es that "wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. . . . We look to the
language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the signi cance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum." (emphasis, underscore and italics ours)
34.Id. at 887, "ut majis valeat quam pereat " — the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. "It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together." (Citing Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary , G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991, 194
SCRA 317.)
In other words, the Court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
If,however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof. (Id.)
35.II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 85-86.

36.Id. at 252.
37.See Justice Vicente Mendoza's Dissent in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, supra note 4, at 369-370.
38.412 Phil. 322 (2001).
39.Separate Dissenting Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 354.
40.1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V. In Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC (407 Phil. 618, 636 [2001]),
the Court characterized the requirement of registration as an "indispensable
precondition" to the exercise of the right of suffrage. The Court said: "Proceeding from
the signi cance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner — one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times."
41.See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.
42.In fact, a nominee's change of party a liation during his term results in the forfeiture of his
seat in Congress (see Section 15 of RA No. 7941). If the party-list group fails to obtain a
seat in Congress, the law nevertheless requires a nominee to be a bona de member of
the party-list group.
43.Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621
SCRA 385, 412.
44.Ibid.
45.Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 177271 and
177314, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1, 16-17.
46.For party-list groups already previously registered, the COMELEC can determine the
qualifications of their nominees once they file a Manifestation of Intent to participate.
47.See Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 42; and Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, supra note 45.
49.The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 204421 and 204425 refer to one and the same party-list group,
only that they are represented by different personalities, claiming to be the legitimate
officers of the party.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:

1.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308 (2001).
2.Resolutions dated November 13, 2012, November 20, 2012, December 4, 2012, December 11,
2012 and February 19, 2013.
3."An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor".
4.Rules and Regulations Governing The: 1) Filing of Petitions for Registration; 2) Filing of
Manifestations of Intent to Participate; 3) Submission of Names of Nominees; and 4)
Filing of Disquali cation Cases Against Nominees or Party-List Groups of Organizations
Participating Under the Party-List System of Representation in Connection with the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections Thereafter.
5.Supra note 1.
6.First, the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identi ed in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show
— through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disquali ed merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. . . .

xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth,the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. . . .
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so.
xxx xxx xxx
Seventh,not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. . . .
Eighth,. . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. . . .
7.Consolidated Comment dated December 26, 2012, p. 54.
8.Order dated August 9, 2012; rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 16-19.
9.Rollo (G.R. No. 203818), pp. 83-87; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and
Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no
part.
10.SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM).
11.Rollo (G.R. No. 203818), p. 86.
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
13.SPP No. 12-161 (PLM).
14.Section 9 of RA 7941. . . . In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must be twenty- ve
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed
to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
15.Rodolfo P. Pancrudo, Jr.

16.Pablo Lorenzo III.
17.Victor G. Noval.
18.Melchor P. Maramara.
19.SPP No. 12-187 (PLM).
20.Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 59.
21.Id. at 60.
22.SPP No. 12-188 (PLM).
23.Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 61.
24.SPP No. 12-220 (PLM).
25.Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 66.
26.R o l l o (G.R. No. 204100), pp. 52-67; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.,
Yusoph and Christina Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no
part.
27.SPP No. 12-196 (PLM).
28.Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 60.
29.SPP No. 12-223 (PLM).
30.Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 62.
31.Id.
32.SPP No. 12-257 (PLM).
33.Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 65.
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim; Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no
part.
35.SPP No. 12-260.
part.
37.SPP No. 12-201 (PLM).
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco;
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim concurred; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, no part.
39.SPP No. 12-232 (PLM).
40.Rollo (G.R. No. 203976), pp. 21-37; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.,
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Christian
Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph, also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
41.SPP No. 12-288 (PLM).
42.Id. at 28.
43.Joel C. Obar, Jose F. Gamos and Alan G. Gonzales.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Christian
Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph, also voted in favor; Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
45.SPP No. 12-279 (PLM).

46.SPP No. 12-248 (PLM).
47.Margarita Delos Reyes Cojuangco, Dam Michael Abas Kida, Catherine Domingo Trinidad,
Saidamen Odin Limgas.
48.SPP No. 12-263 (PLM).
49.SPP No. 12-180 (PLM).

50.SPP No. 12-229 (PLM).
51.Rollo (G.R. No. 203958), p. 39.
52.SPP No. 12-217 (PLM).
53.SPP No. 12-277 (PLM).
54.SPP No. 12-015 (PLM).
55.Rollo (G.R. No. 203958), p. 44.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle and Armando C. Velasco;
Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim concurred; Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, took no part.
57.SPP No. 12-256 (PLM).
58.Rollo (G.R. No. 204428), p. 36.
59.Sec. 2. Grounds for opposition to a petition for registration. — The Commission may deny
due course to the petition motu proprio or upon veri ed opposition of any interested
party, after due notice and hearing, on any of the following grounds: . . . f. It violates or
fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; . . . .
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
61.SPP No. 12-185 (PLM).
62.Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), p. 34.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert
S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
64.SPP No. 12-060 (PLM).
65.SPP No. 12-254 (PLM).
66.SPP No. 12-269 (PLM).
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian
Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca; Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento on
official business.
68.SPP No. 12-204 (PLM).
part.
70.SPP No. 12-272 (PLM).
Robert S. Lim; Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
on official business.
72.SPP No. 12-173 (PLM).
S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
74.SPP No. 12-210 (PLM).
75.Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 44-45.
76.Alvin V. Abejuela.
S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
78.SPP No. 12-252 (PLM).
Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
80.SPP No. 12-292 (PLM).
81.Rollo (G.R. No. 204125), p. 47.
82.Rollo (G.R. No. 204216), pp. 23-28; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca.
83.SPP No. 12-202 (PLM).
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
85.SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S.
Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
87.SPP No. 12-158 (PLM).

88.Rollo (G.R. No. 204158), p. 62.
part.
90.SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).
Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim, with Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca taking no part.
92.SPP No. 12-136 (PLM).
93.Rollo (G.R. 204486), pp. 42-47; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert
S. Lim; Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
94.SPP No. 12-194 (PLM).
95.Rollo (G.R. 204486), p. 46.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim,
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting, and
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca taking no part.
97.SPP No. 12-198 (PLM).
98.Rollo (G.R. No. 204421), pp. 43-50; Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
99.SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
101.SPP No. 11-002.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R.
Yusoph, dissenting.
103.SPP No. 12-099 (PLM).
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco (concurred except for SPP No.
12-011 ALA-EH), Christian Robert S. Lim (concurred with reservation on issue of
jurisdiction) and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle
and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
105.SPP No. 12-238 (PLM).
106.Rollo (G.R. No. 204426), p. 143.

107.Id. at 133.
108.SPP No. 12-011 (PLM).
109.Rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 134-135.
Yusoph, dissenting.
111.SPP No. 12-057 (PLM).
112.Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong and Herculano C. Co, Jr.
113.Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), p. 53.
114.1st Nominee, Atty. Pantaleon D. Alvarez, is a lawyer, business, former DOTC Secretary and
Congressman; 2nd Nominee, Emmanuel D. Cifra, is a general manager/president; 3rd
Nominee, Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong, is a lawyer; 4th Nominee, Herculano C. Co., Jr., is a
businessman.
Yusoph, dissenting.
116.SPP No. 12-104 (PL).
117.Camelita P. Crisologo and Benjamin A. Moraleda, Jr.
118.Corazon Alma G. De Leon.
119.Imelda S. Quirante.
120.Flordeliza P. Penalosa.
Yusoph, dissenting.
122.SPP No. 12-011 (PLM).
123.Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), p. 44, citing AAB's Petition dated February 8, 2012.
Yusoph, dissenting.
125.SPP No. 12-009 (PP).
126.Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), p. 53.
127.Lyndeen John D. Deloria.
128.Rolex T. Suplico.
129.Francis G. Lavilla.
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim;
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting; Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
131.SPP No. 12-175 (PL).
Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle and Armando C. Velasco;
Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim voted in favor, but were on
o cial business at the time of signing; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no
part.
133.SPP No. 12-127 (PL).
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim.
135.SPP No. 12-061 (PP).
136.Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), p. 35.
137.Rollo (G.R. No. 204394); Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and
Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
138.SPP No. 12-145 (PL).
Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
140.Id. at 61-70.
141.SPP No. 12-073 (PLM).
142.Comment dated December 26, 2012, pp. 35-36.
143.Supra note 1.
144.G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692.
145.Id. at 709-710.
146.Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 377 Phil. 297, 312 (1999).
147.Dissenting Opinion of J. Pardo, Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, 407 Phil. 618, 669, citing
Digman v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 650 (1983).
148.444 Phil. 812 (2003).
149.Id. at 824-825, citing Commission on Elections v. Silva, Jr. , 286 SCRA 177 (1998); Pimentel
vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 586 (1998); Commission on Elections vs.
Noynay, 292 SCRA 254 (1998); Domalanta vs. Commission on Elections, 334 SCRA 555
(2000).
150.Bautista v. COMELEC, 460 Phil. 459, 476 (2003), citing Canicosa v. COMELEC, 347 Phil.
189 (1997).
151.Canicosa v. COMELEC, 347 Phil. 189, 201 (1997).
152.Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections, 620 SCRA 393, 431 (2010).
153.G.R. No. 161115, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 332.
154.Id. at 369-370.
155.Mendoza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692, 710, citing
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 83578, March
16, 1989, 171 SCRA 348; Midland Insurance Corporation v. IAC, No. L-71905, August 13,
1986, 143 SCRA 458; Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights , G.R. No. 96681,
December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, on the activities encompassed by the exercise of
quasi-judicial power.
156.Supra note 155, at 824.
157.Supra note 157.
158.G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012.
159.Id., citing Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677 (2004).
160.347 Phil. 189 (1997).

161.Santos v. COMELEC, 191 Phil. 212, 219 (1981).
162.Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
163.Section 2 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
164.Section 2 (3), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
165.G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 593.
166.Id., citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.
167.Montemayor v. Bundalian , 453 Phil. 158, 169 (2003), citing Dinsay vs. Cioco, 264 SCRA
703 (1996).
168.Baricuatro v. Caballero, G.R. No. 158643, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 70, 76.
169.Philippine Business Bank v. Chua , G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 635,
648, citing Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75000, February
27, 1987, 148 SCRA 280.
170.Supra note 175.
171.See Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29,
2010.
172.Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 16-19.
173.Id. at 19.
174.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1.

175.Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
176.Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
177.Ibid.
179.586 Phil. 210.
180.Id. at 333.
181.Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2., July 22, 1986, RCC No. 36, p. 85.
182.Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2., July 25, 1986, RCC No. 39, p. 255.
183.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1 at 342.
184.Ibid.
185.Id. at 336-337.
186.Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986), p. 2053.
187.Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 2A, p. 294.
188.Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Volume 2, 7-25-1986, RCC No. 39, p. 257.
189.Id. at 247-248.
190.Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno, BANAT v. Comelec, supra note 186 at 258-
259.
191.396 Phil. 419 (2000).
192.Supra note 1 at 337-338.
193.Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618
SCRA 32, 59.
194.Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 1 at 343.
195.Id. at 343-344.
196.Id. at 345.
197.G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012.
198.Ibid.
199.Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules and regulations relating to elections;
xxx xxx xxx
200.Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010,
621 SCRA 385, 409.
201.Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to December 5, 1994, Volume
II, Nos. 23-45, p. 143.
202.Section 15. Change of A liation; Effect. — Any elected party-list representative who
changes his political party or sectoral a liation during his term of o ce shall forfeit his
seat; Provided, that if he changes his political party or sectoral a liation within six (6)
months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.
203.Section 8. Nomination of Party-list Representatives. — . . .
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for
any elective o ce or a person who has lost his bid for an elective o ce in the
immediately preceding election. . . .
204.SEC. 1. Petition to deny due course and/or cancellation; Grounds. — A veri ed petition
seeking to deny due course the nomination of nominees of party-list groups may be led
by any person exclusively on the ground that a material misrepresentation has been
committed in the qualification of the nominees.
205.SEC. 2. Petition for disquali cation, Ground; — A veri ed petition seeking the
disquali cation of nominees of party-list groups may be led by any person when the
nominee has been declared by nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having:
a. Given money or other material consideration to in uence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
b. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
c. Spent in the campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law;
d. Solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code; or
e. Violated any of Sections 83, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
206.Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to December 5, 1994, Volume
II, Nos. 23-45, p. 157.
207.396 Phil. 419 (2000).
208.Id. at 424.
209.Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. —
a. ...
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party list system shall be entitled to one set each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their number of votes; Provided, nally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
210.Section 2, RA 7941.
211.The 53 consolidated petitions include 2 petitions filed by SENIOR CITIZENS.
212.Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319 (2002).
213.G.R. No. 191938, June 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
214.Id. at 766-767.

215.Id. at 767.
216.Rollo (G.R. No. 204410), p. 79.
217.Rollo (G.R. No. 204153), p. 5.
218.Rollo (G.R. No. 204356), p. 61.
219.Id. at 77-79.
220.Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), p. 173.
221.Id. at 160.
222.Id. at 544-613.
223.Id. at 839-1494.
224.Rollo (G.R. No. 203976), p. 28.
225.Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), p. 146.
226.Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), p. 74.
227.Rollo (G.R. No. 204238), p. 170.
228.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 203818-19), p. 119.
229.Rollo (G.R. No. 203936), p. 73.
230.Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), p. 92.
231.Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), p. 72.
232.Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), p. 91.
233.Rollo (G.R. No. 204436), p. 186.

234.Rollo (G.R. No. 204484), p. 60.
235.Rollo (G.R. No. 204490), p. 79.
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. (1).
2.G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
3.G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.
4.G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009. 586 SCRA 211. But, by a vote of 8 joining the opinion of
Puno, C.J. the court upheld Veterans disallowing political parties from participating in
the party list elections.
5.Republic Act No. 7941 (1995).
6.Supra note 2, see first, second and sixth and seventh requirements:
"First,
the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identi ed in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented . . .
"Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives.' In other
words, while they are not disquali ed merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
"Sixth,
the party or organization must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so . . ."
"Seventh,not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees . . ."
7.Supra note 2.
8.Supra note 4; Infra note 29.

9.CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 1.
10.See Moya v. Del Fiero, G.R. No. L-46863, November 18, 1939.
11.See for instance, Lande, Carl H., Parties and Politics in the Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol. 8,
No. 9 (Sep 1968) pp. 725-747 or Teehankee, Julio, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in
Electoral Politics in Southeast Asia, Aurel Croissant, ed., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002.
12.Id.; Lo, Barnaby, Fame, Family Dominate Key Philippines Election, CBS News, May 10, 2010,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20004523-503543.html> (visited March 7,
2013).
13.See CONSTITUTION, Art. IX (C), Sec. 6.
14.Supra note 11.
15.Id.
16.Supra note 12.
17.Supra note 11.
18.Supra note 2.
19.See Supra note 2. (This was the ostensible justi cation for not allowing all "national,
regional and sectoral parties and organizations" as provided in the Constitution to
participate).
20.GREENFORCE in G.R. No. 204239 and KALIKASAN in G.R. No. 204402.
21.ANAD in G.R. No. 204094 and BANTAY in G.R. No. 204141.
22.Supra notes 2 & 4.
23.Supra note 2.
24.Id., 359 SCRA 698, 717.
25.Id., 359 SCRA 698, 718.
26.Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
27.See supra note 2 at 733-761.
28.See supra note 4. (Voting to disallow major political parties from participating directly or
indirectly in the party list system were eight justices, namely: Puno, Quisumbing Ynares-
Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, and Leonardo-de Castro.
Voting to allow major political parties in the party list system were seven justices,
namely: Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin).
29.Id., per Puno Concurring and Dissenting opinion at 258-259.
30.COMELEC Resolution dated October 20, 2012, SPP No. 12-154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-177
(PLM), G.R. No. 203818 (Ako Bikol Political Party, AKB).
31.COMELEC Omnibus Resolution dated October 11, 2012, SPP 12-220 (PLM), G.R. No. 203981
(UNIMAD).
32.COMELEC Resolution dated October 16, 2012, SPP 12-260 (PLM), G.R. No. 203960 (1-CARE).
33.COMELEC Resolution dated October 24, 2012, SPP 12-229 (PLM), G.R. No. 203958
(BANTAY).
34.COMELEC Resolution dated October 24, 2012, SPP 12-015 (PLM), G.R. No. 203958
(KAKUSA).
35.COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12-185 (PLM), G.R. No. 204094 (ANAD).
36.COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12-060 (PLM), G.R. No. 204239
(GREENFORCE)
37.COMELEC Resolution dated November 28, 2012, SPP 12-136 (PLM), G.R. No. 204356
(BUTIL).
38.COMELEC Resolution dated December 5, 2012, SPP 11-002, G.R. No. 204484 (PBB).
39.COMELEC Resolution dated November 23, 2012, SPP 12-099, G.R. No. 204379 (ASIN).
40.COMELEC Resolution dated November 29, 2012, SPP 12-011 (PP), G.R. No. 204370 (AAB).
41.COMELEC Resolution dated December 4, 2012, SPP 12-009 (PP), G.R. No. 204379 (AI).
42.See CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.
43.See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Secs. 2-3.
44.See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Sec. 3.

45.See for instance, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (2011).
46.ANG GALING PINOY (AG) in G.R. No. 204428.
47.Supra note 4.
48.See for instance Association of Small Landowners v. DAR , G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
[per Cruz J.] on allowing payment of just compensation in cash and bonds: ". . . We do
not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has in uenced our decision on
this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement."
49.CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. 1.
50.Supra note 2.
51.Supra note 4.
52.See Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.]
AGAPITO A. AQUINO , petitioner, v s . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON, and JUANITO ICARO , respondents.
Haydee B. Yorac, R.A.V . Saguisag and Clarence D. Guerrero for petitioner.

Felix D. Carao, Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Pete Quirino Quadra for private respondents Move Makati and Mateo B. Bedon.
SYLLABUS
1. ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION OVER QUALIFICATION

CASES OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUES
EVEN AFTER THE ELECTION. — Petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's quali cations
to run for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the
petition for disquali cation is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet — unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner
avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in
directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second
Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree. Petitioner conveniently confuses the
distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a
member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Under Section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
quali cations of their respective Members. The electoral tribunal clearly assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and quali cations of
candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of o ce cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the
proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction
with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances
mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and
(petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of
election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
quali cation" nds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT;
CANDIDATE MUST PROVE THAT HE HAS ESTABLISHED NOT JUST RESIDENCE BUT
DOMICILE OF CHOICE. — Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when
it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this
deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera,
(73 Phil. 453 [1941]) is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That
purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence
in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin
or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold
question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in
the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his
election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES. — We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter
"must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice." The
Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives
should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than
one (1) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction. In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
(199 SCRA 692 [1991]) this Court held that the term "residence" has always been
understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLEAR AND POSITIVE PROOF SHOWING A SUCCESSFUL
ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE MUST BE ESTABLISHED; CASE AT BAR. — While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the
fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati
(and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner)
in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire a new residence or domicile "but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under
the conditions stated above, the lack of identi cation — sentimental, actual or otherwise —
with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was
effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution,
in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out: [T]he
lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a
quali cation for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a commencement date of
his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of
choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. Moreover, his assertion that he
has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona de intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and de nite acts which correspond with the
purpose. These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In
the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
5. ID.; ELECTORAL REFORM LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646); EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION;
OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WILL NOT RESULT IN THE SUSPENSION
OR TERMINATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. —
Under Section 6 of R.A. 6646, not only is a disquali cation case against a candidate
allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction),
but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or
termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of
Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disquali cation cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of
Section 6 to cases involving disquali cation based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P.
881.
6. ID.; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE; DOES NOT ENTITLE THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE
RECEIVING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED ELECTED. — In the
more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]); Abella v. Comelec (201
SCRA 253 [1991]); and Benito v. Comelec, (235 SCRA 436 [1994]), this Court reiterated
and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes , and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving the majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that a
minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we
put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that: The fact that a candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disquali ed or not
eligible for the o ce to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
o ce. The votes cast for a dead, disquali ed, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote
the winner into o ce or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in sincere belief that that candidate was alive, quali ed, or eligible; they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
PADILLA, J ., separate concurring opinion:
1. ELECTION LAW; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT;
CANDIDATE MUST PROVE THAT HE HAD ACTUALLY AND PHYSICALLY RESIDED IN THE
PLACE TO BE VOTED UPON. — In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, J . Padilla have
maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year"
m eans actual a n d physical presence in the legislative district of the congressional
candidate, and that said period of one year must be satis ed regardless of whether or not
a person's residence or domicile coincides. To my mind, petitioner should be declared
disquali ed to run as representative in the 2nd district of Makati City in the 8 May 1995
elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein as his domicile of choice, but
because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided therein for
a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.
Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila
could never have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and
suddenly, seemingly not contented with these residences, he rents a condominium unit in
Makati, and calls it his domicile of choice — all these without adding clear and convincing
evidence that he did actually live and reside in Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May
1995 — and that he no longer lived and resided in his other residences during said one year
period. It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone,
established only the alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise,
the lease contract tells us that petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati
City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995, but it does not prove that petitioner actually
and physically resided therein for the same period, in the light of his admission that he
maintained other residences in Metro Manila.
2. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; VOTES CAST IN FAVOR OF SAID CANDIDATE
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. — J . Padilla agrees with the proposition advanced by the
Solicitor General that Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly provides that votes cast for a disquali ed
candidate shall not be counted. There can be no dispute that if a nal judgment is rendered
before the election, declaring a particular candidate as disquali ed, such disquali ed
candidate shall not be voted for and votes cast for him shall not be counted, thus posing
no problem in proclaiming the candidate who receives the highest number of votes among
the quali ed candidates. But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical
enough in stating: "if for any reason" no nal judgment of disquali cation is rendered
before the elections, and the candidate facing disquali cation is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction to hear
and try the case up to nal judgment, hence, the power to even suspend the proclamation
of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. It thus appear clear
that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a nal judgment of disquali cation in
terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the disquali ed
candidate shall not be voted and, if voted, the votes case for him shall not be counted. Ubi
lex non ditinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHOULD BE
PROCLAIMED. — At this point, what J . Padilla said in Marcos, supra, follows: "What
happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disquali ed? Then, votes
cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the
highest number of votes. It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the
second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disquali ed," but that the
law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a
result of the votes cast for the disquali ed candidate not being counted or considered. As
this law clearly re ects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case.
It has been stated that "the quali cations prescribed for elective o ce cannot be erased
by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, most especially when it is mandated by no less than the
Constitution." Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates, should be proclaimed. cdasia
FRANCISCO, J ., concurring and dissenting opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; PROCLAMATION OF WINNER IN THE CONTESTED ELECTION AN
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO VEST JURISDICTION THEREON. — Section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies only to the
members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts necessary for an electoral
candidate's rightful assumption of the o ce for which he ran are his proclamation and his
taking an oath of o ce. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the
House of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction to declare his disquali cation and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it
indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of
o ce. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to Congressional members
is further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure, and HRET decisions
consistently holding that the proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the
essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
2. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS; RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT; DECISION TO TRANSFER LEGAL RESIDENCE MUST BE BONA FIDE AND
UNEQUIVOCAL. — Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus,
petitioner asserts that if he decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for
public o ce then he is entirely free to do so. This argument to hold water, must be
supported by clear and convincing proofs that petitioner has effectively abandoned his
former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co. v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner
from childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained Conception,
Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and thereafter
claimed the same to be his new domicile. This claim, however, is dismally unsupported by
the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a period of two years on the
third oor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove his intent
to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an intention
to remain inde nitely or permanently in the new place. This element is lacking in this
instance. Worse, public respondent Commission even found that "respondent Aquino
himself testi ed that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other
'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City (citing TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 92)." Noting that
petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional consecutive
two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and continue his political
career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to
establish legal residence comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. To
acquire, to effect a change of domicile, the intention must be bona de and unequivocal
(28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in my view, miserably failed to show a bona fide and unequivocal
intention to effect the change of his domicile.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES PROVIDED BY THE CONSTITUTION NOT BRUSHED ASIDE BY THE
ENACTMENT OF R.A. No. 7854. — The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify
non-compliance with the constitutional quali cation on residency. Petitioner explains his
theory in this wise: ". . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH
WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND
BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI." Apparently,
this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act No. 7854, an act converting the municipality of
Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995, established a
Second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional
candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely four (4) months old
then the one (1) year residence quali cation provided by the Constitution is inapplicable.
Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie his own theory. Originally, he
placed in his certi cate of candidacy an entry of ten (10) months residence in Makati.
Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen (13) days to correct what he
claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of this representation. If
petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence he initially
wrote would have more than su ciently quali ed him to run in the barely four-month old
Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply with the
one year constitutional requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days for
full measure. Petitioner apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal impossibility),
but at the same time played it safe in the other (the constitutional one year residence
requirement). And that is not all. If we were to adhere to petitioner's theory of legal
impossibility, then residents in that district shorn of the constitutional six months
residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) would have certainly quali ed to vote. That would have legitimized the entry
and electoral exercise of ying voters — one of the historic nemeses of a clean and honest
election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the constitutional
quali cation of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of
the constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative
enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The
constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to
which every state must conform and harmonize.
4. ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION THEREOF CANNOT BE

QUESTIONED IF THE PARTY ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN. —
It is not right for a party who has a rmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an a rmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape an adverse decision. Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail.
5. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE; VOTES CAST IN HIS FAVOR SHALL NOT BE
COUNTED. — It has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a
substitute winner. Justice Francisco nds the proposition quite unacceptable. A
disquali ed "candidate" is not a candidate and the votes which may have been cast in his
favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal consequence. A disquali ed person like the
petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short, no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had
therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim rst place for he has nothing to base his right.
The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in that votes cast for a
disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are considered stray (Section 211, Rule
24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of quali ed candidates can one be
chosen as rst placer and not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disquali ed
candidate, cannot be a rst placer as he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a
disquali ed candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a quali ed
candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a quali ed candidate should not be penalized
alongside a disquali ed candidate. With this in mind, the other quali ed candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the district. Justice Francisco feels that the Labo doctrine ought to be
abandoned.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting opinion:

1. ELECTION LAWS; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (BATAS PAMBANSA 881); PETITION TO
DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; RULE PROVIDED
UNDER SECTION 78 THEREOF NOT SUPERSEDED BY RULE 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES
OF PROCEDURE. — The petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy under Section 78.
Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a
material representation contained in the petitioner's certi cate of candidacy is false. What
is being attacked therein is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence quali cation in
the new Second Legislative District of Makati City where he sought to be elected for the
o ce of Congressman. The rule governing disquali cation cases on the ground of
ineligibility, which is also invoked by the private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15 February 1993. The amendment allows the ling of
a petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he does not possess all the
quali cations provided for by the Constitution or by existing laws. In its original form, the
rule only applied to petitions for disquali cation based on the commission of any act
declared by law to be a ground for disquali cation. The rule as thus amended now reads
as follows: Rule 25 — Disquali cation of Candidates SECTION 1. Grounds for
Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the quali cations of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate. The italicized portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must
have deemed necessary to ll up a procedural hiatus in cases of disquali cations based
on other grounds in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on
Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992]) that Rule 25 refers only to disquali cations under
Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as
follows: We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition
for disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing
a certi cate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3,
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
refers to Disquali cation of Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any
candidate who commits any act declared by law to be ground for disquali cation may be
disquali ed from continuing as a candidate. The grounds for disquali cation is expressed
in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code. The petition led by private respondent Ututalum with
the respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made
a false representation in his certi cate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disquali cation as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certi cate of
candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the ling of the petition at any time
after the last day for the ling of certi cates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment. cdtai
2. ID.; ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646); PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE
TO OR CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDATES; "PROCEDURE HEREINABOVE
PROVIDED" MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 7 REFERS TO THE EFFECT OF
DISQUALIFICATION CASES. — Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the
petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be applied by virtue of Section 7 thereof. The "procedure
hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disquali cation cases. It
can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance
candidates and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act.
Heretofore, no law provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying
to such cases, through Section 7 of R.A. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of
nuisance candidates is prudent and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be
decided before the day of the election; hence, only summary proceedings thereon can
adequately respond to the urgency of the matter.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF DISQUALIFICATION; RULE PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6 MERELY
SUPPLEMENTS SECTION 72 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE. — Section 6 merely
supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code by granting the COMELEC or the
Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to suspend the proclamation if the
evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in its majority opinion "the phrase
'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6
ought to be applicable only to disquali cation cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC NOT AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE HEARING THE CASE AFTER
THE ELECTION EVEN WITH THE AMENDMENT OF RULE 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE. — The amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the
only rule governing petitions led before election or proclamation for the disquali cation
of a candidate on the ground that he lacks the quali cations provided for by the
Constitution or by law, does not, as can be gathered from Section 5 thereof, authorize the
COMELEC to continue hearing the case after the election.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE CANNOT BE APPLIED TO A CASE WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE
REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL AND CITY OFFICIALS AND WHERE SUSPENSION OF
PROCLAMATION IS NOT WARRANTED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF STRONG EVIDENCE OF
GUILT OR INELIGIBILITY. — Even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 is applicable to disquali cation cases based on the ground of lack of
quali cation, it cannot be applied to a case which does not involve elective regional,
provincial, and city o cials, and where suspension of proclamation is not warranted
because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility. In such a case, the
candidate sought to be disquali ed but who obtains the highest number of votes has to be
proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the
remedy of the opponent is to contest the winning candidate's eligibility within ten days
from proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay o cials; the regional trial
courts, in the case of municipal o cials (Section 2[2], Article IX-C, Constitution; Section
253, paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the
case of Congressmen; the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17,
Article VI, Constitution); and the Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the President or
Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII, Constitution). If what is involved is an elective
regional, provincial, or city o cial, and the case cannot be decided before the election, the
COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disquali ed,
proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto, since such a case
properly pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2[2], Article IX-C,
Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg. 881). But even granting for the sake of argument that
Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, are applicable, the order of
suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15 May 1995 is null and void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was before the COMELEC en
banc at that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing the
petition to disqualify the petitioner and declaring him quali ed for the position. That
decision is a direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence of the petitioner's
guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en banc reversed
the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence of the petitioner's
ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had disquali ed
the petitioner.
VITUG, J ., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SCOPE OF POWER TO
ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT
OF ELECTION. — The Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound
to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
(Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include
to its authority pass upon the quali cation and disquali cation prescribed by law of
candidates to an elective o ce. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly
placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3,
Constitution).
2. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT THEREOF NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT
EXCEPT IN CASE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The matter before us speci cally
calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. This issue
(whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact
or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The ndings and judgment of the
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by
this Court.
3. ELECTION LAWS; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES; RESIDENCE; SYNONYMOUS WITH
DOMICILE. — Justice Vitug does not nd much need to do a complex exercise on what
seems to him to be a plain matter. Generally. the term "residence" has a broader
connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's o cial
duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a
considerable length of time.) For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil
rights and the ful llment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of
his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is
that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court , Branch 7 ,
Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus: "In election cases, the Court treats domicile and
residence as synonymous terms, thus: (t)he term 'residence' as used in the election law is
synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only an intention to reside in a xed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
'Domicile' denotes a xed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, however,
may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an inde nite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual."

4. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE, NOT MERELY A
MINISTERIAL FUNCTION. — The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional
elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signi es
that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
"member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on
whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election
exercise. He believes, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which,
being adequately de ned, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The
COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the
facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly
done.
5. ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE; DOES NOT ENTITLE THE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES TO BE DECLARED WINNER. —
There the Court held in Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435): ". . . it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. 'Sound policy dictates that
public elective o ces are lled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that o ce, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disquali ed or not eligible for the o ce to which he
was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective o ce. The votes cast for a dead,
disquali ed, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into o ce or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, quali ed, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.'
MENDOZA, J ., separate opinion:
1. ELECTION LAW; ELECTORAL REFORM LAW OF 1987 (R.A. 6646) EFFECT OF
DISQUALIFICATION CASES; SUSPENSION OF PROCLAMATION APPLIES TO THOSE WHO
ARE GUILTY OF USING "GUNS, GOONS OR GOLD" TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF
ELECTIONS. — The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending the
proclamation of petitioner should he obtain the highest number of votes for
Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to have been
issued pursuant to 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to order the
suspension of the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As explained
in my separate opinion in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers to proceedings
under § 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides for the disquali cation of
candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been referred to as "guns,
goons or gold" to in uence the outcome of elections. Since the disquali cation of
petitioner in this case was not sought on this ground, the application of 6 of R.A. No. 6646
is clearly a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES,
ENTITLED TO BE DECLARED THE WINNER. — In the event the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is declared ineligible, the one who received the next highest
number of votes is entitled to be declared the winner.
3. ID.; OMNIBUS ELECTION LAW (BP 881); PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR
CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; MAY BE FILED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GROUND
THAT A MATERIAL REPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN THE CERTIFICATE IS FALSE. — The
petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC may not be justi ed under 78 of the OEC
which authorizes the ling of a petition for the cancellation of certi cates of candidacy
since such a petition may be led " exclusively on the ground that a material representation
contained [in the certi cate] as required under Section 74 is false." There was no allegation
that in stating in his certi cate of candidacy that he is a resident of Ampola St., Palm
Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner made any false representation. cdll
DECISION
KAPUNAN , J : p
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is
to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice,
expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in nding solutions
which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all
elective o ces are lled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's quali cations however becomes
inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino led his Certi cate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among
others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz.:
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: _____ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said O ce; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that the facts
therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, led a
petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence quali cation as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI
of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA
No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disquali cation was led, petitioner led
another certi cate of candidacy amending the certi cate dated March 20, 1995. This time,
petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certi cate that he had resided in the constituency where
he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner led his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal
of the disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein
petitioner testi ed and presented in evidence, among others, his A davit dated May 2,
1995, 5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6
A davit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28, 1995 7 and A davit of Daniel Galamay dated
April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disquali cation, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for Disquali cation against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the O ce of
Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon led a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3)
candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered
thirty eight thousand ve hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another
candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty ve thousand nine hundred ten (35,910)
votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon led an Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they led an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution
dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's
proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,
the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend
the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning
number of votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the
City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration led by the petitioners on May
7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the Commission.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise
directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to
calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00
in the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED. 11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner led his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to
lift order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner led a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion
to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein
he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the
determination of the quali cations of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc
issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of
the case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to
suspend its rules, to accept the ling of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the
parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the
Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disquali ed as a
candidate for the O ce of Representative of the Second Legislative District of
Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional
quali cation of residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation
of the respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this
Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent. LLcd
Upon the nality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati
shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of
election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining quali ed candidates,
who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 1 4 assailing the orders dated May 15,
1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the
COMELEC en banc. Petitioner raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17,
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING
ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE
THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE
FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY
NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY
CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN
A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE
CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED
CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR
PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL
SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR A PERSON WHO
WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE WINNER. 15
I
In his rst three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8,
1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
quali cations to run for member of the House of Representative. He claims that
jurisdiction over the petition for disquali cation is exclusively lodged with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet — unresolved question of
jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse
of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in
the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the
House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of
votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes

jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and quali cations of
candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of o ce cannot be said to be a member
of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.
While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in
conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct
of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise
from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to
pass upon the question of quali cation" nds no basis in law, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A.
6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to quali cations of candidates.
Section 6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disquali cation Case . — Any candidate who has been
declared by nal judgment to be disquali ed shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
nal judgment before an election to be disquali ed and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disquali cation case against a candidate
allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction),
but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or
termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of
Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disquali cation cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of
Section 6 to cases involving disquali cation based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P.
881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certi cate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas
Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove
that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice." 1 7
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives
should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than
one (1) year prior to the elections. 1 8 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 1 9 this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the quali cations of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a resident thereof,' that is,
in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis
ours) (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that 'resident' has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some di culty especially considering that the
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote
as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and
not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier de nition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from
the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera 2 2 is "to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who
have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be
imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not
petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by
the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he
was domiciled in the same. Llibris
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certi cate of Candidacy for
the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that election. 2 3 At the time, his certi cate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certi cate places Concepcion,
Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 2 5 Thus, from data
furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political
career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of
record up to the time of ling of his most recent certi cate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its
disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile
especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and
respondent Aquino himself testi ed that his intention was really for only one (1)
year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City . 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other
residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a
resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" 2 7 is not to acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 2 8 The absence of
clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identi cation — sentimental, actual or otherwise —
with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was
effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically
pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot,
by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do
better. 2 9
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to
Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona de
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These requirements are hardly met
by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from
Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the
one year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and
lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out
from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of
Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the
new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed
take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of
taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did
in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disquali ed from running in the Senate
because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where
he could run for public o ce. Nothing wrong with that, but he must rst prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing its Order
instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate
receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the " rst" among
the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings
behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not
only to our reversing the doctrines rmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs.
Comelec 3 1 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who
cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the
elections. Had petitioner been disquali ed before the elections, the choice, moreover,
would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the
campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of
the playing eld would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could
not be considered the rst among quali ed candidates because in a eld which
excludes the disquali ed candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from
one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes 3 2 we declared as valid,
votes cast in favor of a disquali ed, ineligible or dead candidate provided the people
who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that at the time of the elections
said candidate was either quali ed, eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor of a
disquali ed, ineligible or dead candidate cannot be considered stray votes,
consequently, the candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be
proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 3 3 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-
candidate in view of his unlawful change of party a liation (which was then a ground
for disquali cation) cannot be considered in the canvassing of election returns and the
votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes because a disquali ed
candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result,
this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 3 4 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the
candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the
candidate who ran for the position is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective o ces are lled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that o ce, and it is
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 3 5 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling

in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disquali ed candidate fall
within the category of invalid or non-existent votes because a disquali ed candidate is
no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v.
Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec; 3 6 Abella v. Comelec; 3 7 and
Benito v. Comelec, 3 8 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes
and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next higher number
of votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be
declared elected to the o ce. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement
in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disquali ed or not eligible for the o ce to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective o ce. The votes cast
for a dead, disquali ed, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into
o ce or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in sincere belief that that candidate was alive, quali ed, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC
that: 3 9
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
o ce of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the o ce of
mayor in the belief that he was then quali ed to serve the people of Baguio City
and his subsequent disquali cation does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-
elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253
[1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to

deny due course to the certi cate of candidacy of Larrazabal and
was led before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains
that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona de candidate .
The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that
she was a quali ed candidate for the position of governor . Her
votes was counted and she obtained the highest number of votes.
The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event a
candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who
obtains the highest number of votes is disquali ed for not
possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election
as provided by law,the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated
position (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R No. 105111) originally led a disquali cation
case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to
petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City
from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent
Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disquali cation having yet to
attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private

respondent, who led the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission

on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disquali ed as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decisions was
supported by eight members of the Court then (Cuevas, J.,
ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-
Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.).
Re-examining that decision, the Court nds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine rst announced in 1912 in Topacio vs . Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office. LexLibris
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disquali ed, the
votes intended for the disquali ed candidate should, in effect, be considered null
and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom,
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City
opted to elect petitioner Labo bona de without any intention to misapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then quali ed to be the person
to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disquali ed and cannot assume
the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the o ce. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is
not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certi ed by
the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We
cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up
in an election in which the winner has been disquali ed is actually the winner among the
remaining quali ed candidates because this clearly represents a minority view
supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English court
decisions. 4 0 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though
obviously quali ed, could receive votes so measly and insigni cant in number that the
votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer"
could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally
repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the
votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insigni cant,
voters' preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among
quali ed candidates, should the equation change because of the disquali cation of an
ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though
ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates
other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an
election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast
where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
In ne, we are left with no choice but to a rm the COMELEC's conclusion
declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of
Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's nding that
petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987
Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through
their representatives, they dictate the quali cations necessary for service in
government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential quali cations
for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute
for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our
Order restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of
Makati City is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED. CDta
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Feliciano, J ., is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA , J ., concurring :
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second
district of Makati City for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995
elections. However, I do not fully subscribe to its proposition that petitioner's residence (in
Makati) should be his "domicile of choice."
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:
"No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least
twenty- ve years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the
legislative district of the congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be
satisfied regardless of whether or not a person's residence or domicile coincides. LLjur
To my mind, petitioner should be declared disquali ed to run as representative in the 2nd

district of Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his
residence therein as his domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that
he had actually and physically resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.
Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having
maintained other residences in Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in
Makati's 2nd district. 1 This clear admission made by petitioner against his interest
weakens his argument that "where a party decides to transfer his legal residence so he can
qualify for public office, he is free to do so." (see p. 20, Petition).
Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila
could never have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and
suddenly, seemingly not contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium
unit in Makati, and calls it his domicile of choice — all these without adding clear and
convincing evidence that he did actually live and reside in Makati for at least one year prior
to 8 May 1995 — and that he no longer lived and resided in his other residences during said
one year period.
It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone,
established only the alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise,
the lease contract tells us that petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati
City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995, but it does not prove that petitioner actually
and physically resided therein for the same period, in the light of his admission that he
maintained other residences in Metro Manila.
In light of petitioner's disquali cation, the corollary issue to be resolved is whether or not
jurisdiction continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of
Canvassers "to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining quali ed
candidates" after petitioner had been declared post 8 May 1995 as disqualified.
I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646
clearly provides that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:
"SECTION 6. Effect of Disquali cation Case . — Any candidate who has been
evidence of his guilt is strong."
There can be no dispute that if a nal judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a
particular candidate as disquali ed, such disquali ed candidate shall not be voted for and
votes cast for him shall not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the
candidate who receives the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates.
But what about afterthe election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if for any
reason" no nal judgment of disquali cation is rendered before the elections, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the
Comelec or the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to nal
judgment, hence, the power to even suspend the proclamation of the erstwhile winning
candidate when evidence of his guilt is strong. dctai
It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a nal judgment of
disquali cation in terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical
effect: the disquali ed candidate shall not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.)
At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:
"What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disquali ed? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of R.A. 6646 does not make the second placer
the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disquali ed," but that the law
consider him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as
a result of the votes cast for the disquali ed candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly re ects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the quali cations
prescribed for elective o ce cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility"
most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution."
Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates, should be proclaimed
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition. CDTInc
FRANCISCO , J ., concurring and dissenting :
I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Kapunan. I wish, however, to express my views on some issues raised by the
petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction over the disquali cation suit, (2) domicile, (3) theory of
legal impossibility, and (4) "second placer rule."
Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) can declare his disquali cation, especially after the elections.
To bolster this stand, the cases of Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET,
181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 (1988); and Lachica v. Yap , 25
SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as supporting authorities. To my mind, this position
is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous
that HRET jurisdiction applies only to the members of the House of Representatives.
The operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful assumption of the
o ce for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of o ce. Petitioner
cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of Representatives for the
purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to declare his
disquali cation and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that
he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of o ce. Clearly,
petitioner's reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused involved
Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the
jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is further
established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure, 1 and HRET decisions 2
consistently holding that the proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the
essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's
jurisdiction is now barred by estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer,
as well as in his Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum led before the
COMELEC's Second Division, petitioner never assailed COMELEC's lack of jurisdiction
to rule on his quali cation. On the contrary, he asked that the disquali cation suit
against him be dismissed on the following grounds: that it was led outside the
reglementary period; that the one year residence requirement of the 1987 Constitution
is inapplicable due to the recent conversion of the municipality of Makati into a city
under R.A. No. 7854; that he committed a simple inadvertence in lling up his certi cate
of candidacy; that the proper procedure to attack his quali cation is by a quo warranto
proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in Makati for more than a year;
and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a hearing conducted
by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g.
a davits, amended certi cate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that
he is quali ed for the position. Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the
COMELEC En Banc's May 15, 1995 Order suspending the proclamation of the winner,
petitioner led his Comment/Opposition with Urgent Motion To Lift Order of
Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the COMELEC's order of
suspension. On May 19, 1995, petitioner again led a Memorandum and averred that
the recent conversion of Makati into a city made the one-year residence requirement
inapplicable; that he resided in Makati for more than a year; that quo warranto is the
right remedy to question his quali cation. In passing, petitioner also alleged that the
issue on his quali cation should be " properly" ventilated in a full-dress hearing before
the HRET, albeit praying for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration for utter
lack of merit (and not for lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of his
proclamation. It was only on June 01, 1995, in his Motion to File Supplemental
Memorandum and Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation, when the petitioner raised COMELEC's alleged lack of jurisdiction to
resolve the question on his quali cation. Clearly then, petitioner has actively
participated in the proceedings both before the COMELEC's Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc asking therein a rmative reliefs. The settled rule is that a party who
objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-
jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. 3 Where a party voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the
court had no jurisdiction. 4 In Jimenez v. Macaraig, 5 the Court, citing Crisostomo v.
Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in
this wise:
"The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo ( People
vs. Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot
adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of
estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of
the laws. It should deter those who are disposed to tri e with the courts by taking
inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541, [1953])." 6
It is not right for a party who has a rmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an a rmative relief to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision. 7 Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail. LLcd

Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petitioner
asserts that if he decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public
o ce then he is entirely free to do so. This argument to hold water, must be supported
by a clear and convincing proofs that petitioner has effectively abandoned his former
domicile and that his intention is not doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]).
Petitioner from childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati,
and thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This claim, however, is
dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a
period of two years on the third oor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my
view, does not prove his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to
establish domicile must be an intention to remain inde nitely or permanently in the new
place. 8 This element is lacking in this instance. Worse, public respondent Commission
even found that "respondent Aquino himself testi ed that his intention was really for
only one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City ([citing]
TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 92)." 9 Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for
senator due to the constitutional consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place
where he could further and continue his political career and sudden transfer thereto
make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish legal residence comes
from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. 1 0 To acquire, or effect a change of
domicile, the intention must be bona de and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in
my view, miserably failed to show a bona de and unequivocal intention to effect the
change of his domicile.
The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the
constitutional qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:
". . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS
WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE
ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S
DISTRICT IN MAKATI." 1 1
Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act No. 7854, an act converting the
municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995,
established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a
Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely
four (4) months old then the one (1) year residence quali cation provided by the
Constitution is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie
his own theory. Originally, he placed in his certi cate of candidacy an entry of ten (10)
months residence in Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen
(13) days to correct what he claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity
of this representation. If petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten
months residence he initially wrote would have more than su ciently quali ed him to
run in the barely four-month old Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true
intent of petitioner to comply with one year constitutional requirement for residence,
adding an extra thirteen (13) days for full measure. Petitioner apparently wanted to
argue one way (theory of legal impossibility), but at the same time played it safe in the
other (the constitutional one year residence requirement). And that is not all. If we were
to adhere to petitioner's theory of legal impossibility, then residents in that district
shorn of the constitutional six months residence requirement for prospective voters
(Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) would have certainly quali ed to vote.
That would have legitimized the entry and electoral exercise of ying voters — one of
the historic nemeses of a clean and honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to
petitioner's contention that the constitutional quali cation of candidates should be
brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7854 will indubitably violate the
manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of the constitution outlined under
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative enactment, it has to be emphasized,
cannot render nugatory the constitution. The constitution is superior to a statute. It is
the fundamental and organic law of the land to which every statute must conform and
harmonize.
Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a
substitute winner. I nd the proposition quite unacceptable. A disquali ed "candidate" is
not a candidate and the votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray
votes of no legal consequence. A disquali ed person like the petitioner receives no vote or
zero vote. In short, no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in
law, to claim rst place for he has nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as
provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in that votes cast for a disquali ed candidate shall not be
counted as they are considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is
only from the ranks of quali ed candidates can one be chosen as rst placer and not from
without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disquali ed candidate, cannot be a rst placer as he
claims himself to be. To count the votes for disquali ed candidate would, in my view,
disenfranchise voters who voted for a quali ed candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a
quali ed candidate should not be penalized alongside a disquali ed candidate. With this in
mind, the other quali ed candidate who garnered the highest number of votes should be
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district. I feel that the Labo doctrine
ought to be abandoned.
I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court dated June 6, 1995. cdll
DAVIDE, JR. , J ., dissenting :
In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A.

Aquino and of proceeding to hear the disquali cation case against him, the majority
opinion relies on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of
Section 7 thereof to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
I disagree.
In the rst place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:
SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy . —
A veri ed petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certi cate of
candidacy may be led by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be led at any time not later than twenty- ve days from the time of
the ling of the certi cate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private
respondents that a material representation contained in the petitioner's certi cate of
candidacy is false. What is being attacked therein is the petitioner's lack of the one-year
residence quali cation in the new Second Legislative District of Makati City where he
sought to be elected for the office of Congressman.
The rule governing disquali cation cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is
also invoked by the private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended on 15 February 1993. The amendment allows the ling of a
petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he does not possess all the
quali cations provided for by the Constitution or by existing laws. In its original form,
the rule only applied to petitions for disquali cation based on the commission of any
act declared by law to be a ground for disquali cation. The rule as thus amended now
reads as follows:
Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates
SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess
all the quali cations of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
SECTION 2. Who May File Petition for Disquali cation . — Any citizen of
voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political
parties may le with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law.
SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be led any day
after the last day for ling of certi cates of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation.
SECTION 4. Summary Proceeding. — The petition shall be heard summarily
after due notice.
SECTION 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass.
— If the petition, for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be
decided before the completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent
may be included in the counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence
of guilt is strong, his proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact
that he received the winning number of votes in such election.
The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have
deemed necessary to ll up a procedural hiatus in cases of disquali cations based on
other grounds in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on
Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992]) that Rule 25 refers only to disquali cations under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This Court explicitly stated therein
as follows:
We do not agree with private respondent. Ututalum's contention that the petition
for disquali cation, as in the case at bar, may be led at any time after the last
day for ling a certi cate of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disquali cation of
Candidates; and Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits
any act declared by law to be a ground for disquali cation may be disquali ed
from continuing as a candidate. The grounds for disquali cation as expressed in
Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are the following:
SECTION 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been

declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by nal judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disquali ed to be a candidate and to hold
any o ce, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. LLcd
SECTION 63 [sic]. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an

action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to
in uence, induce or corrupt the voters or public o cials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86
and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disquali ed from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the o ce. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
quali ed to run for any elective o ce under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
The petition led by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certi cate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disquali cation as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly
covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to
cancel certi cate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the
ling of the petition at any time after the last day for the ling of certi cates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule
issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no
legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code which is a legislative enactment.
Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113
fall under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot
be applied by virtue of Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disquali cation Case . — Any candidate who has been
receives the winning number of votes in such elections, the Court or Commission
evidence of his guilt is strong.
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certi cate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny
due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer

to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of
disqualification cases. It can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said
Act on nuisance candidates which reads as follows:
SECTION 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. — (a) A veri ed petition
to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be led personally or through duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same
o ce within ve (5) days from the last day for the ling of certi cates of
candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
(b) Within three (3) days from the ling of the petition, the Commission shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any.
(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons
within which to le his veri ed answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition,
serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
(d) The Commission may designate any of its o cials who are lawyers to hear
the case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu
of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together
with a davits or counter-a davits and other documentary evidence. The hearing
o cer shall immediately submit to the Commission his ndings, reports, and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such submission of
evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within ve (5) days from
receipt thereof.
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after ve (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be nal and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city
or municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general
public in the political subdivision concerned.
and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no
law provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such
cases, through Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of
nuisance candidates is prudent and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they
be decided before the day of the election; hence, only summary proceedings thereon
can adequately respond to the urgency of the matter.
Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
providing as follows:
SECTION 72. Effects of disquali cation cases and priority . — The Commission
and the courts shall give priority to cases of disquali cation by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a nal decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.dctai
Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disquali ed shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to
be disquali ed and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to
suspend the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in
its majority opinion "the phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest
that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disquali cation cases
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code."
Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule
governing petitions led before election or proclamation for the disquali cation of a
candidate on the ground that he lacks the quali cations provided for by the Constitution or
by law, does not, as can be gathered from Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to
continue hearing the case after the election.
Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 is applicable
to disquali cation cases based on the ground of lack of quali cation, it cannot be applied
to a case which does not involve elective regional, provincial, and city o cials, and where
suspension of proclamation is not warranted because of the absence of strong evidence
of guilt or ineligibility. In such a case, the candidate sought to be disquali ed but who
obtains the highest number of votes has to be proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the
COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the remedy of the opponent is to contest the
winning candidate's eligibility within ten days from proclamation in a quo warranto
proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in
the case of barangay o cials; the regional trial courts, in the case of municipal o cials
(Section 2[2], Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881); the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Congressmen; the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution); and the Supreme
Court en banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII,
Constitution).
If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city o cial, and the case
cannot be decided before the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation
of the candidate sought to be disquali ed, proceed with the case by treating it as a
petition for quo warranto, since such a case properly pertains to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2[2], Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, B.P.
Blg. 881).
But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No.
6646, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, are applicable, the order of suspension of the
petitioner's proclamation issued on 15 May 1995 is null and void for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. What was before the COMELEC en banc at that stage
was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing the petition to
disqualify the petitioner and declaring him quali ed for the position. That decision is a
direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt is
strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en banc reversed the
decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence of the petitioner's
ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had
disqualified the petitioner.
Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet
on the private respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's
proclamation. In fact, in that order the COMELEC en banc admitted that the said
motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:
Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration led on May
7, 1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent
(May 10, 1995) led on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For
Reconsideration of the Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution
dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which cannot be resolved without hearing,
without violating the right of the respondent to due process. . . .
For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not
existed and could not, therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through
its resolution of 2 June 1995 whose dispositive portion reads in part: "[c]onsequently,
the order of suspension of the respondent should he obtain the winning number of
votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May 1995 is now made permanent."
Absent a valid nding before the election or after the canvass of election returns
that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should
not have suspended the proclamation of the petitioner. After the completion of the
canvass the petitioner should have been proclaimed.
This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc a rmed
before the elections, or on 7 May 1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April
1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.
Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the
COMELEC en banc must be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City
Board of Canvassers of Makati, must be ordered to immediately proclaim the
petitioner, without prejudice to the right of his opponents to le a petition for quo
warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and quali cations of the Members of the
House of Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).
In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the
petitioner's disqualification will no longer be proper. cdlex
I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged
order and resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board
of Canvassers of Makati City to reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning
candidate, without prejudice on the part of any aggrieved party to le the appropriate
action in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Romero andBellosillo, JJ ., concur. Llibris
VITUG , J ., separate opinion:
I nd what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all
material respects to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I
have there said in my separate opinion.
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up
ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to
ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution
belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become
outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we
owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be,
the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution
might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless,
either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of
Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:
"SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty- ve years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election."
"SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and quali cations of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman."
The Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to

enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
(Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should
include its authority to pass upon the quali cation and disquali cation prescribed by
law of candidates to an elective o ce. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are
expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec.
3, Constitution).
The matter before us speci cally calls for the observance of the constitutional
one-year residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such
compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to
such determination. The ndings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with
the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic
heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not nd much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a
plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that mean
permanent (domicile), official (place where one's o cial duties may require him to
stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time).
For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the ful llment of
civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence
(see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore
announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court , Branch 7 , Tacloban City
(226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
"In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: '(t)he term 'residence' as used in the election law is synonymous with
'domicile,' which imports not only an intention to reside in a xed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.' 'Domicile' denotes a xed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In
order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an inde nite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual."
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signi es that the protestee must
have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections
dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A
ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately de ned, does
not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is
tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may
be required by law before a proclamation is properly done. LLpr
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue
encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on
matters which, by no less than a constitutional at, are explicitly within their exclusive
domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's
peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up
with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and quali cation" of
its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the
applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 , each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
"xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 6. Effect of Disquali cation Case . — Any candidate who has been
evidence of his guilt is strong."
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

"xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 72. Effects of disquali cation cases and priority . — The Commission
and the courts shall give priority to cases of disquali cation by reason of
violation of this Act to the end that a nal decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
"Any candidate who has been declared by nal judgment to be disquali ed shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by nal judgment before an election to
be disquali ed, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office."
I realize that in considering the signi cance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not
so much the speci c instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly
convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast
in favor of the disquali ed candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be
counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine
rst enunciated in the case of Topacio vs . Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although
later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC
(137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos
(136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]),
Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings.
Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred
in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on o cial
leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
"Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who led
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
"The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was disquali ed as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J. , ponente,
with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and
Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote.
(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
"Re-examining that decision, the Court nds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine rst announced in 1912 in Topacio v . Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee,
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
"'. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not, acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
'Sound policy dictates that public elective o ces are lled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that o ce, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
'The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disquali ed or not eligible for the
o ce to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective o ce. The votes cast for a
dead, disquali ed, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into o ce or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, quali ed, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.' (at pp. 20-
21)"
Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA , J ., separate opinion:
For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case, G.R.
No. 119976, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, I am of the
opinion that the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over petitions for
disquali cation of candidates based on alleged ineligibility for the o ce to which they
seek election.
The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending the
proclamation of petitioner should he obtain the highest number of votes for
Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to have been
issued pursuant to § 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to
order the suspension of the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
As explained in my separate opinion in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers
to proceedings under § 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides for the
disquali cation of candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been
referred to as "guns, goons or gold" to in uence the outcome of elections. Since the
disquali cation of petitioner in this case was not sought on this ground, the application
of § 6 of R.A. No. 6646 is clearly a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justi ed under §
78 of the OEC which authorizes the ling of a petition for the cancellation of certi cates
of candidacy since such a petition may be led " exclusively on the ground that a
material representation contained [in the certi cate] as required under Section 74 is
false." There was no allegation that in stating in his certi cate of candidacy that he is a
resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner
made any false representation.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over
SPA No. 95-113; that its proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned
orders, are void; and that the quali cations of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati may only be
inquired into by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on
the question whether, in the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is declared ineligible, the one who received the next highest number of votes is
entitled to be declared the winner.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the
proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the
questioned orders, dated May 6, 1995, May 15, 1995, and the two orders both dated
June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner Agapito A. Aquino to be ineligible for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati and direct the
City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates.
Narvasa, C .J ., concurs.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 61.
2. Id., at 56-60.
3. Id., at 63.
4. Petition, Annex H; Rollo, p. 65.

5. Id., Annex I; Rollo, p. 71.
6. Id., Ibid.
7. Id., Annex K, Id., at 74.
8. Id., Annex L, Id., at 75.

9. Petition, Annex "D"; Rollo, p. 55.
10. Id., at 7-8 citing the completed canvass of election returns by the Board of Canvassers of
Makati City as source.
11. Id., Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 30-31.
12. Id., Annex "B"; Id., at 32-33.
13. Id., Annex "C"; Id., at 48-49.
14. The petition led on June 6, 1995 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to enjoin public respondents from reconvening and determining the winner out of the
remaining quali ed candidates for Representative of the Second Congressional District
of Makati City. As prayed for a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on
June 6, 1995.
15. Id., at 12-14.

16. B.P. 881, Sec. 231 provides:
The respective Board of Canvassers shall prepare a certi cate of canvass duly signed and
a xed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a
statement of the votes received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof,
shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the
province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute
an election offense.
17. Rollo, p. 35.

19. 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
20. Id., at 713-714.
21. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 62.

22. 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
23. Rollo, pp. 35-36.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id., at 37.
27. Id., at 34-37.
28. Resolution, p. 3.
29. Id.
30. 18 Am. Jur 211-220.
31. 176 SCRA 1 [1989].

32. 23 Phil. 238 [1912].
33. 103 SCRA 687 [1981].
34. 136 SCRA 435 [May 14, 1985].
35. 137 SCRA 740 [July 23, 1985].

36. 176 SCRA 1 [1989].
37. 201 SCRA 253 [1991].
38. 235 SCRA 436 [1994].

39. 211 SCRA 297 [1992].
40. In England, where the election system is open and the voters known, knowledge of a
candidate's ineligibility or disquali cation is more easily presumed . . . and upon the
establishment of such disquali cation on the part of the majority candidate, the one
receiving the next highest number of votes is declared elected. King v. Hawkins, 10 East
211; King v. Parry , 14 Id. 549; Gosling v. Veley , 7 Q.B. 406; French v. Nolan, 2 Moak 711;
Reg v. Cooks, 3 E1. & B1. 249; Rex v. Monday, 2 Cowp. 530; Rex v. Foxcroft, Burr. 1017. In
a few states in the United States the settled law is directly opposite that taken by the
Court in Labo and Abella, supra. For example, in Indiana, ballots cast for an ineligible
candidate are not counted for any purpose. They cannot be counted to defeat the
election of an opposing candidate by showing that he did not receive a majority of votes
cast in such election. Votes made in favor of an ineligible candidate are considered
illegal, and have no effect upon the election for any purpose. Consequently the quali ed
candidate having the highest number of legal votes is regarded as entitled to o ce.
Price v. Baker, 41 Id., 572, See also, Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93 and Carson v. Mcphetridge,
15 Id., 327.
PADILLA, J., concurring:

1. See p. 4 Annex "C", Petition; Comelec En Banc Resolution dated 2 June 1995.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Rule 16. Election Protest. — A veri ed petition contesting the election of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be led by any candidate who has duly led a certi cate
of candidacy and has been voted for the same o ce, within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
Rule 17. Quo Warranto. — A veri ed petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be led by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation
of the winner.
2. Puzon v. Evangelista Cua, HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, Vol. 1 HRET Reports 9; Aznar v.
Bacaltos, HRET Case No. 05, January 28, 1988, Vol. 1, HRET Reports 5; Ty Deling v .
Villarin, HRET Case No. 53, May 2, 1950.
3. Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mendoza, 156 SCRA 44, 53-54 (1987).
4. La Campaña Foods Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 152, 157 (1993).
5. 219 SCRA 230 (1993).
6. Id., at 239.
7. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy , 23 SCRA 29, 35-36 (1968).
8. 28 C.J.S. § 11.
9. Resolution, SPA No. 95-113, June 2, 1995, p. 4.
10. Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227, 235 (1932).
11. Petition, June 5, 1995, p. 20.

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SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J. July 1, 2015.]

BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL, complainant, vs. CLERK OF COURT

This resolves the complaint 1 of Baguan M. Mamiscal (Mamiscal) against

Section 18. Neglect of duty with reference to the provisions of

Article 82. Duties of District Registrar . — Every District Registrar

I join the ponencia in holding that the complaint against respondent

While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional

I concur in the ponencia. The complaint subject of this administrative

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

(c) Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar);

(d) Acts of imprecation (li'an);

(f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid); or

7. See rollo, p. 15.

9. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provides:

c) Register conversions involving Islam;

10. Rollo, p. 15.

13. Id. at 28.

14. Id. at 20.

16. Id. at 4-5.

19. Id. at 31-60.

21. Id. at 100-102.

23. Preliminary Statement, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

24. Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

26. Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 233 Phil. 279, 282 (1987).

30. Otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status.

32. By virtue of Executive Order No. 121, series of 1987.

34. SEC. 11. The National Statistician. — . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

35. Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation. —

xxx xxx xxx

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1. 63 Phil. 139 (1936). [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

5. 589 Phil. 387 (2008) Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

13. Draft ponencia, p. 7.

15. Draft Ponencia, p. 9.

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[G.R. No. L-68635. May 14, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ABSOLUTE LACK OF

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[G.R. No. L-6749. July 30, 1955.]

JEAN L. ARNAULT , petitioner-appellee, vs . EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; ISSUANCE WHEN

"First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to

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[G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992.]

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (Second District of Bataan) ,

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS TO FIX TARIFF

There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA

c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty

2. Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12; underlining in the original.

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[G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . NAG TANG HO , defendant-

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.