2015 Bar
such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
I.
The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi Sha
established diplomatic relations and immediately
their respective Presidents signed the following:
1. Executive Agreement allowing the
Republic of Kroi Sha to establish its embassy
and consular offices within Metro Manila;
and
2. Executive Agreement allowing the
Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the
Philippines its military complement,
warships and armaments, from time to time
not exceeding one month,
1. For the purpose of training exercises
with Philippine military forces and exempting from
Philippine criminal jurisdiction acts committed in
line of duty by foreign military personnel, and
2. From paying custom duties on all
the goods brought by said foreign forces into
Philippine territory in connection with the holding
of the activities authorized under the said
Executive Agreement.
Senator Maagap questioned the constitutionality of
the said Executive Agreements and demanded that
the Executive Agreements be submitted to the
Senate for ratification pursuant to the Philippine
Constitution.
Is Senator Maagap correct? Explain. (4%)
RELEVANT PRINCIPLES: G.R. No. L-14279
The concurrence of said House of Congress is
required by our fundamental law in the making of
"treaties" which are, however, distinct and different
from "executive agreements," which may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we
have entered into executive agreements covering
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of
claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.
International agreements involving political issues
or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent
character usually take the form of treaties. But
international agreements embodying adjustments
of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
usually take the form of executive agreements.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall
short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in
our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions.
They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated "agreements" time or
"protocols". The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements — whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges
of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under
the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade
agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties,
and that they have abundant precedent in our
history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without
the approval of the Senate. They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission
of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies
declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect of the
settlement of claims against foreign governments,
were concluded independently of any legislation.
II.
1.
A bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives in order to implement faithfully
the provisions of the UNCLOS to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
Congressman Pat Rio Tek questioned the
constitutionality of the bill on the ground that the
provisions of UNCLOS are violative of the provisions
of the Constitution defining the Philippine internal
waters and territorial sea. Do you agree or not with
the said objection? Explain. (3%)
RELEVANT PRINCIPLE: G.R No. 187167
As their final argument against the validity of RA
9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters
to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably
expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters"
under Article I of the Constitution or as
"archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49
[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine
areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of
archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their
bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic
State extends to the waters
enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with
article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air
space over the archipelagic waters,
as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained
therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea
lanes passage established in this
Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic
waters, including the sea lanes, or
the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained
therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude
the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the
international law principle of freedom of
navigation. Thus, domestically, the political
branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent
and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation,
international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS
III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to
the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage
is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised
in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their
archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not
place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental
coastal States which are subject, in their territorial
sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right
of transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for
their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to
their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and
the waters enclosed by their baselines as one
cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.
Separate islands generate their own maritime
zones, placing the waters between islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond
the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these
waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III.
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory
constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our
present state of jurisprudence considers the
provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."
Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating
and interpreting implementing legislation, as well
as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated
the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present
petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the
protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen (Article
XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables
the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic
zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources
within such zone. Such a maritime delineation
binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III,
the international community will of course reject it
and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like
the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in
waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively
exploit the resources found within this zone up to
200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves
the traditional freedom of navigation of other
States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
2.
Describe the following maritime regimes:
1. Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles from
the baseline
2. Contiguous Zone 24 nautical miles
from the baseline
3. Exclusive Economic Zone Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) "shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines
4. Continental Shelf (4%) The continental
shelf of a coastal State comprises the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to
that distance.
III.
Professor Masipag who holds a plantilla or regular
item in the University of the Philippines (UP) is
appointed as an Executive Assistant in the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The professor is considered only on leave of
absence in UP while he reports for work at the CA
which shall pay him the salary of the Executive
Assistant.
The appointment to the CA position was
questioned but Prof. Masipag countered that he
will not collect the salary for both positions; hence,
he cannot be accused of receiving double
compensation.
Is the argument of the professor valid? (4%)
RELEVANT PRINCIPLE: G. R. No. 156982
In Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court
elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions
against holding multiple positions in the
government and receiving double compensation:
(1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section
7, Article IX-B on all government employees against
holding multiple government offices, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions
of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII on the President and
his official family from holding any other office,
profession, business or financial interest, whether
government or private, unless allowed by the
Constitution.
Sections 54 and 56 of the Administrative Code of
1987 reiterate the constitutional prohibition
against multiple positions in the government and
receiving additional or double compensation:
SEC. 54. Limitation on Appointment. - (1) No
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
(3) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
SEC. 56. Additional or Double Compensation. -- No
elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional or double compensation
unless specifically authorized by law nor accept
without the consent of the President, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind form any
foreign state.
IV.
When is a facial challenge to the constitutionality
of a law on the ground of violation of the Bill of
Rights traditionally allowed? Explain your answer.
(3%)
RELEVANT PRINCIPLE: G.R. NO. 167011
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
Section 45(j) "as applied" to them in a live case
under which they face prosecution. This is the
traditional "as applied" approach in challenging the
constitutionality of any statute. In an "as applied"
challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of
his constitutional right can raise any constitutional
ground - whether absence of due process, lack of
fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness.
The U.S. Supreme Court has created a notable
exception to the prohibition against third-party
standing. Under the exception, a petitioner may
mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute even if he claims no violation of his
own rights under the assailed statute. To mount a
"facial" challenge, a petitioner has only to show
violation under the assailed statute of the rights of
third parties not before the court. This exception
allowing "facial" challenges, however, applies only
to statutes involving free speech. The ground
allowed for a "facial" challenge is overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared: x x x the Court has altered its
traditional rules of standing to permit - in the First
Amendment area - ‘attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with the requisite narrow specificity.’ x x x Litigants,
therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not
because their own rights of free expression are
violated, but because of a judicial prediction or
assumption that the statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.
The rationale for this exception allowing a "facial"
challenge is to counter the "chilling effect" on
protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply refuse to speak
to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad
or vague law chills him into silence.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's
thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to
determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions
on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when
the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to
the detriment of the Filipino people.
V.
BD Telecom, a Filipino-owned corporation, sold its
1,000 common shares of stock in the Philippine
Telecom Company, a public utility, to Australian
Communication, another stockholder of the PTC,
which also owns 1,000 common shares of stock.
A Filipino stockholder of PTC questions the sale on
the ground that it will increase the common shares
of AT, a foreign company, to more than 40% of the
capital stock of PTC in violation of the 40%
limitation of foreign ownership of public utility.
AT argues that the sale does not violate the 60-40
ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens
decreed in Section II, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution because Filipinos still own 70% of the
capital of the PTC.
AT points to the fact that it owns only 2,000
common voting shares and 1,000 non -voting
preferred shares while Filipino stockholders own
1,000 common shares and 6,000 preferred shares,
therefore, Filipino stockholders still own a majority
of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation,
and both classes of shares have a par value of Php
20.00 per share. Decide. (5%)
VI.
1.
Distinguish the President's authority to declare a
state of rebellion from the authority to declare a
state of national emergency.
2.
What are the limitations, if any, to the pardoning
powers of the President?
VII.
Senator Fleur De Lis is charged with plunder before
the Sandiganbayan. After finding the existence of
probable cause, the court issues a warrant for the
Senator's arrest.
The prosecution files a motion to suspend the
Senator relying on Section 5 of the Plunder Law.
According to the prosecution, the suspension
should last until the termination of the case.
VIII.
A law provides that the Secretaries of the
Departments of Finance and Trade and Industry,
the Governor of the Central Bank, the Director
General of the National Economic Development
Authority, and the Chairperson of the Philippine
Overseas Construction Board shall sit as ex -officio
members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of a
government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC). The other four (4) members shall come
from the private sector.
The BOD issues a resolution to implement a new
organizational structure, staffing pattern, a position
classification system, and a new set of classification
standards.
After the implementation of the Resolution, Atty.
Dipasupil questioned the legality of the Resolution
alleging that the BOD has no authority to do so.
The BOD claims otherwise arguing that the
doctrine of qualified political agency applies to the
case. It contends that since its agency is attached
to the Department of Finance, whose head, the
Secretary of Finance, is an alter ego of the
President, the BOD's acts were also the acts of the
President.
Is the invocation of the doctrine by the BOD
proper? Explain. (4%)
IX.
Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines received invitations from the
Chairperson of the Senate Committees on National
Defense and Security for them to appear as
resource persons in scheduled public hearings
regarding a wide range of subjects.
The invitations state that these public hearings
were triggered by the privilege speeches of the
Senators that there was massive electoral fraud
during the last national elections.
The invitees Brigadier General Matapang and
Lieutenant Coronet Makatuwiran, who were
among those tasked to maintain peace and order
during the last election, refused to attend because
of an Executive Order banning all public officials
enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof from appearing
before either house of Congress without prior
approval of the President to ensure adherence to
the rule of executive privilege.
Among those included in the enumeration are
"senior officials of executive departments who, in
the judgment of the department heads, are
covered by executive privilege." Several individuals
and groups challenge the constitutionality of the
subject executive order because it frustrates the
power of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Decide the case. (5%)
X.
The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 123-15 prescribing the
administrative requirements for the conversion of a
timber license agreement (TLA) into an Integrated
Forestry Management Agreement (IFMA). ABC
Corporation, a holder of a TLA which is about to
expire, claims that the conditions for conversion
imposed by the said circular are unreasonable and
arbitrary and a patent nullity because it violates the
non -impairment clause under the Bill of Rights of
the 1987 Constitution.
In the same proclamation, the governor called
upon the members of the Philippine National
Police, with the assistance of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general searches and
seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety. Was the action
of the provincial governor proper? Explain. (4%)
XI.
1) What is the concept of expanded judicial review
under the 1987 Constitution? (3%)
2) Differentiate the rule -making power or the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and judicial legislation. (2%)
XII.
Discuss the evolution of the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. (3%)
XIII.
On August I5, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Tatalo
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432, entitled
"An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
Lone District of the City of Pangarap." The bill
eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It
mandated that the lone legislative district of the
City of Pangarap would now consist of two (2)
districts.
Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution as
unconstitutional. According to him, R.A. No. 1234
cannot be implemented without conducting a
plebiscite because the apportionment under the
law falls within the meaning of creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain.
(4%)
XIX.
Pursuant to its mandate to manage the orderly
sale, disposition and privatization of the National
Power Corporation's (NPC) generation assets, real
estate and other disposable assets, the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM)
started the bidding process for the privatization of
Angat Hydro Electric Power Plant (AHEPP). After
evaluation of the bids, K -Pop Energy Corporation, a
South Korean Company, was the highest bidder
Consequently, a notice of award was issued to K
-Pop.
XV.
On June 2, 2015, Chairperson Ty retired optionally
after having served the government for thirty (30)
years. The President then appointed Commissioner
Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson. The Commission
on Appointments confirmed her appointment. The
appointment papers expressly indicate that Marikit
will serve as COMELEC Chairperson "until the
expiration of the original term of her office as
COMELEC Commissioner or on June 2, 2021."
Matalino, a tax payer, files a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court asserting that the
appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson is
unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) The appointment of Marikit as COMELEC
Chairperson constituted a re -appointment which is
proscribed by Section 1(2),Article IX of the 1987
Constitution; and
(2) the term of office expressly stated in the
appointment papers of Marikit likewise
contravenes the aforementioned constitutional
provision.
Will the constitutional challenge succeed? Explain.
(4%)
XVI.
(SOMETHING'S MISSING HERE.)
Hence, she is disqualified perpetually from holding
any public office or from being elected to any
public office. Before the election, the COMELEC
cancelled Bars COC but her motion for
reconsideration (MR) remained pending even after
the election. Bai garnered the highest number of
votes followed by Pasyo Maagap, who took his
oath as Acting Mayor.
Thereafter, the COMELEC denied Bars MR and
declared her disqualified for running for Mayor. P.
Maagap asked the Department of Interior and
Local Government Secretary to be allowed to take
his oath as permanent municipal mayor. This
request was opposed by Vice Mayor Umaasa,
invoking the rule on succession to the permanent
vacancy in the Mayor's office. Who between Pasyo
Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to
occupy the position of Mayor? Explain your answer.
(5%)
(2) How do you differentiate the petition filed
under Section 68 from the petition filed under
Section 78, both of the Omnibus Election Code?
(3%)

XVII.
The Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth
Association (GBTYA), an organization of gay,
bisexual, and transgender persons, filed for
accreditation with the COMELEC to join the
forthcoming party -list elections. The COMELEC
denied the application for accreditation on the
ground that GBTYA espouses immorality which
offends religious dogmas. GBTYA challenges the
denial of its application based on moral grounds
because it violates its right to equal protection of
the law.
1. What are the three (3) levels of test that are
applied in equal protection cases? Explain. (3%)
2. Which of the three (3) levels of test should be
applied to the present case? Explain. (3%)
XVIII.
Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police officers
was on routine patrol in Barangay Makatarungan
when it noticed an open delivery van neatly
covered with banana leaves. Believing that the van
was loaded with contraband, the team leader
flagged down the vehicle which was driven by
Hades. He inquired from Hades what was loaded
on the van. Hades just gave the police officer a
blank stare and started to perspire profusely.
The police officers then told Hades that they will
look inside the vehicle. Hades did not make any
reply. The police officers then lifted the banana
leaves and saw several boxes. They opened the
boxes and discovered several kilos of shabu inside.
Hades was charged with illegal possession of illegal
drugs. After due proceedings, he was convicted by
the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction.
In his final bid for exoneration, Hades went to the
Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated when the police officers searched his
vehicle without a warrant; or that the shabu
confiscated from him is thus inadmissible in
evidence; or and that there being no evidence
against him, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the People of the Philippines maintains
that the case of Hades involved a consented
warrantless search which is legally recognized. The
People adverts to the fact that Hades did not offer
any protest when the police officers asked him if
they could look inside the vehicle. Thus, any
evidence obtained in the course thereof is
admissible in evidence. Whose claim is correct?
Explain. (5%)
XIX.
The Citizens' Party questioned the sale arguing that
it violates the constitutional provisions on the
appropriation and utilization of a natural resource
which should be limited to Filipino citizens and
corporations which are at least 60% Filipino
-owned. The PSALM countered that only the
hydroelectric facility is being sold and not the
Angat Dam; and that the utilization of water by a
hydroelectric power plant does not constitute
appropriation of water from its natural source of
water that enters the intake gate of the power
plant which is an artificial structure. Whose claim is
correct? Explain. (4%)
XX.
Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of
Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed which
impeded the entry of vehicles into the area. This
caused food shortage resulting in massive looting
of grocery stores and malls. , There is power outage
also in the area.
For these reasons, the governor of the province
declares a state of emergency in their province
through Proclamation No. I. He also invoked
Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the provincial
governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters
and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence.
XXI.
The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang Pilipino (PMP)
is a major political party which has participated in
every election since the enactment of the 1987
Constitution. It has fielded candidates mostly for
legislative district elections. In fact, a number of its
members were elected, and are actually serving, in
the House of Representatives. In the coming 2016
elections, the PMP leadership intends to join the
party -list system. Can PMP join the party -list
system without violating the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 7941? (4%)

XXII.

The President appoints Emilio Melchor Chairperson

of the Civil Service Commission. 0 Upon
confirmation of Melchor,s appointment, the:
President issues an executive order including him
as Ex -Officio member of the Board of Trustees of
the =Lc Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), and the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH).

A taxpayer questions the designation of Melchor as

ex -officio member of the said corporations before
the Supreme Court based on two (2) grounds, to
wit: (I) it violates the constitutional prohibition on
members of the Constitutional Commissions to
hold any other office or employment during his
tenure; and (2) it impairs the independence of the
CSC. Will the petition prosper? Explain. (4%)

Allegedly, this is based on the Administrative Code-

ofri_ 1997 (E.O. No. 292), particularly Section 14,
Chaptee±: - 3,Title I -A, Book V.

This provision reads: "The chairman of the CSC

shall be a member of the Board of Directors of
other governing bodies of government entities
whose functions affect the career development,
employment, status, rights, privileges, and welfare
of government officials and employees..."