Indiana University Press

The Structure of the Argument in Peirce's "Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed
for Man"
Author(s): Thomas L. Prendergast
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall, 1977), pp. 288-305
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Thomas L. Prendergast
The Structure in
of the Argument
Peirce's"Questionsconcerning
Faculties
Certain ClaimedforMan"
One of the earliestof Peirce'spublications, "Questionsconcerning
CertainFacultiesClaimedforMan" is a sustainedattackon thedoctrine
of immediate knowledgewhichPeirceidentifies as centralto the "spirit
of Cartesianism" in modernphilosophy.1 The revolutionary characterof
Peirce'sattackis apparentwhen one recognizesthatthis doctrine had
been imbeddedin philosophical thinking forovertwo hundredyears.
Althougha numberof authorshave analyzedthis article,none has
givena fullquestion-by-question commentary in whichthestructure of the
arguments in each questionand the overallstructure of the articleis
exhibited.2That this typeof commentary is called for is supportedby
Peirce'sconceptionof philosophicalreasoning.He holds thatit should
form"a cable whose fibersmay be ever so slenderprovidedtheyare
numerousand intimately
sufficiently connected"(5.265, my emphasis).
this
Accordingly strength of Peirce'spositionin thisarticledependson
thecumulative effect of thenumerous arguments in eachof thequestions.
There are two pointsconcerning the structureof the articlethatare
essentialin orderto followPeirce'sargument: The articlehas a scholastic
formin whicheach discussionis introduced by a question,and the dis-
cussionitselfis dividedinto threeparts,arguments for an affirmative
answerto thequestion,Peirce'sown positionforthenegativeand finally,
his repliesto the affirmative arguments.The questionsare posed in a
logical order such that each negativeanswerprogressively removesa
buttressof theintuitionist position.
In viewof thesepointsmypurposeis two-fold.(1) I shall separate,
explain,and if necessary, amplifythearguments foundin thethreeparts
of each question. (2) I shall elucidatethe orderof the questionsindi-
catinghow the negativeanswerto each questionor groupof questions
progressivelyundermines theintuitionistposition.
Beforebeginningthequestionby questionanalysis,I mustattempt to
makeclearwhat are the characteristics of immediate(intuitive)know-

Peirce's "Questions concerningCertainVacuitiesClaimed for Mail' 289
ledge. Peirce definesan intuitionas "a cognition not determinedby a

previous cognitionof the same object, and thereforeso determinedby
something out of consciousness" (5.213). Again an intuition is "a
cognition... determineddirectlyby the transcendentalobject" (5.213).
Furtheran intuitionis a cognitionthat "refersimmediatelyto its object"
(in statementof Question 1). From the above texts an intuitionis a
cognition directlydeterminedby the object out of consciousness and
immediatelyreferringto that object. If this is the case then the first
characteristicof immediate (intuitive) knowledge is that it is non-
inferential. It does not depend in any way on previous knowledge. A
second characteristicis that immediate (intuitive) knowledge is self-
guaranteeing. "By simple contemplationof the cognition" one could
tell that it is an intuition,i.e., refersimmediatelyto its object. Simply
having the intuition is enough to guarantee its intuitive character.
Immediateknowledge,is therefore,non-inferential and self-guaranteeing.
Now the analysisof the firstof the seven questions:
Whether by the simple contemplationof a cognition, inde-

pendentlyof any previous knowledge and without reasoning
fromsigns,we are enabled rightlyto judge whetherthat cogni-
tion has been determinedby a previous cognition or whether
it refersimmediatelyto its object.
A reformulation of the question makes it clearer: Can those cognitions

that are intuitivebe immediatelydistinguishedfrom those that are not?
The point of this firstquestion is not to argue that there are no intui-
tions, but to show that even if there were, they could not be imme-
diately distinguishedfrom other cognitions. The argumentis directed,
against the claim that we have an intuitive facultyof distinguishing
intuitive from mediate cognitions. This is the firstof the faculties«
claimed for man rejectedby Peirce. •
Peirce acknowledgesthat everycognition,as somethingpresent,is ani
intuitionof itself (5.214). Peirce seems to mean that the contentof a
cognition is immediatelypresented. However, whetherthat contenthas
been determinedby anothercognitionor by the transcendentalobject is
not immediatelypresentedin that content. Of course if this determina-
tion were part of the immediate content, then we could distinguish
intuitivelybetween intuitionsand cognitions determinedby other cog-
nitions. But Peirce does not abandon the affirmativeargument. In

290 Thomas L. Prendergast
conformity withthe scholasticpresentation,

he offersan argumentfor
the intuitive of
power distinguishing between and othercog-
intuitions
nitions,eventhoughthedetermination of thecognitionin questionis not
partof its immediatecontent.
The determination of a cognitionby anothercognitionor by a

transcendentalobject . . . wouldappearto be an elementof the
actionor passionof the transcendental ego, whichis not,per-
haps in consciousness immediately; yetthistranscendental
and
actionor passionmayinvariably determine a cognition
of itself,
so that,in fact,the determination or non-determination of the
cognitionby another may be a part of the In
cognition. this
I
case, shouldsaywe had an powerof distinguishing
intuitive
an intuitionfromanothercognition.(5.214)
Althoughneitherthe determination of a cognitionby anothercog-

nitionnor by thetranscendental objectis partof the immediate content
of the cognition, it maystillbe partof the cognitionin the following
way. If a cognitionis determined by anothercognition, thisinvolvesan
actionon the partof the transcendental ego. The transcendental action
producesa cognitionof itselfwhich,althoughnotpartof theimmediate
contentof the cognitionin question,is a partof the cognitionin that
one knowsimmediately fromthe cognitionitselfthatit has been deter-
minedby anothercognitionthrough the transcendentalaction. If a cog-
nitionis determined by the transcendentalobjectthisinvolvesa passion
on the partof the transcendental ego whichby the same argumentas
abovemaybe partof thecognitionin question,and thusone can know
immediately thatthe cognitionis an intuition.Briefly, in beingable to
immediately distinguish between the element of actionor passionin the
in
cognition question one can immediately between
distinguish a cogni-
tiondetermined by another and an intuition.
Peirceanswersthis argument againsthis own position.There is no
evidencethatwe have any such powerexceptthatwe feel we have it.
But thiscannotsettlethematterforthequestionof whetherthe feeling
is intuitiveor not mustbe raised. To claimthatit is intuitive begs the
that
question, is, it assumes thatwe can immediately distinguishintuitions
fromothercognitionswhichis the veryproblemunder investigation.
Further, if it is claimedthatthe feelingis infallibleand the judgment
concerning the feelingis infallibleand so on, thenthe personis "evi-

CertainFacultiesClaimedforMan" 291
denceproof." In otherwordsno evidencewill be admittedas showing

thatthefeelingis notinfallible.(5.214)
This completes Peirce'sgeneralargument againstourhavingthepower
to intuitively distinguish intuitions fromnon-intuitions. The upshotis
that if it is to be establishedthatwe have intuitions, it mustbe on
othergrounds,suchas theinability of explainingcertainitemsof know-
ledge in anyotherway. In the nextthreequestionsconcerning specific
itemsof knowledgeclaimedto be intuitive, Peirceuses theconclusionof
thefirstquestionas a premisein his argument to showthateach of the
itemsneednotbe intuitive butcan be explainedas inferences.
ButPeircedoes notleavethefirstquestionafterthegeneralargument.
He offers a seriesof ninearguments drawnfromconcrete casesin eachof
whichthefactscan be bestexplainedby denyinganyintuitive powerof
distinguishing intuitions from other cognitions. Since each of the nine
arguments makes the same point in a more or less complicated way,I
shallonlytreatthreeof them.
The secondof the nine concernsthe difficulty of distinguishing be-
tweenwhatis seen and whatis inferred whenwatchinga magicianper-
forming a trick(5.217). The generalpointof the argument is thatwe
a
have no infalliblepowerof distinguishingpremise from a conclusion,
and thatin difficult cases our onlyalternative is to reasonfromcertain
signsto thefactthatsomething was seenor inferred.In thetrickof the
Chineseringsthe magiciantakestwo solid ringslinkedtogetherand
deceivestheaudienceintothinking thattheyare separate.He thenpre-
tendsto put themtogether.The audienceis certainthattheysaw the
ringsput together.Of coursetheysaw no such thing,but inferredit
fromthe factthattheythoughtthe ringswere separateto beginwith.
The onlyway in whichone could determine thatthe linkingwas not
seen but inferredis the knowledgethat some sort of deceptionhad
occurredand thatsolid ringscould not have been linkedin the way in
whichone apparently saw themlinked.
The sixthof theninearguments concernstheblindspoton theretina
of theeye (5.220). If youcloseone eyeit appearsthatthespaceseenis
a continuousoval, but an experiment will show it is a ring with a
particularspot in the middle in which a small objectcannotbe seen.
Peirce'spointis thatby simplylookingwithone eye closed you could
not determine thatthe fillingup of thatspot is an intellectual result,
and thus no distinction could be made in this example between intel-
lectualresultsand intuition by mere contemplation of the object. That

the fillingup of the blind spot is an intellectualresult is an inference

from the experiment. Peirce seems quite taken by this example for he
exclaims "What more strikingexample could be desired of the impos-
sibility of distinguishingintellectual results from intuitional data, by
mere contemplation"(5.220).
Finally the eighth of the nine argumentsconcerns the sensation of
pitch (5.222). The pitch of a tone depends on the rapidity of the
succession of the vibrationsthat reach the ear. Each of the vibrations
produce an impulse on the ear, and it is experimentallyknown that a
single impulse can be heard, thus each of the impulses makingup a tone
can be heard. Now since each of these impulses must exist prior to any
tone, and the pitch of the tone depends on the rapidityof the succes-
sion with which these impressionsare sent to the mind, the sensation
of pitch is determinedby previous cognitions. This could not have been
known by simply contemplatingthe tone, in other words, by simply
listening to the tone. It is only by reasoning about the pitch that we
know this.
Notice thatthis example of a sensationis not intuitive,but determined
by previous cognitions. Recall Peirce's claim that as far as the definition
is concerned intuitionmay be any kind of cognition, not simply judg-
ments. Here we have sensationas a possible example of an intuitionthat
is not a judgment. But Peirce denies that even these are intuitions. His
explicit argumentfor this conclusion is delayed until the article "Some
Consequences of Four Incapacities" (5.291).
The cumulativeeffectof the nine argumentssupportsthe thesisthatwe
have no intuitivefacultyof distinguishingintuitionsfrom mediate cog-
nitions. Further,no facts require us to suppose that there exists such a
faculty. In the firstquestion Peirce has done three things: (1) He has
given an argumentfor the intuitivefacultyin question; (2) He has
refuted the argumentas begging the question; (3) He has adduced
various factsthe only unifiedexplanationof which is thatwe do not have
the intuitivepower of distinguishingintuitionsfromothercognitions.
The next three questions concernthe claim for certainspecial intuitive
faculties. In each of the questions Peirce assumes the conclusion of the
firstquestion that it is not self-evidentthat we have an intuitivepower
of distinguishing intuitions from mediate cognitions. Consequently,
whetherthe special intuitivepowers exist or not must be determinedon
grounds other than intuition. If the knowledge claimed to be intuitive
cannot be explained by known facultiesoperating under known condi-

tions,thenwe mustsupposesomeunknownfaculty to explainit. In turn,

theunknownfaculty mustbe shownto be the intuitive facultyin ques-
tionbyarguingthatit is themostprobableexplanation of theknowledge
we have. As will becomeclear,Peircethinksthatno intuitivefaculties
need be supposed,becausein each case theknowledgecan be explained
bythefaculty of inference.
In the secondquestion"Whetherwe have an intuitive self-conscious-
ness"Peirceaskswhether thereis an of
intuition theprivateself,thatis,
a directand immediate recognitionthat/ exist. Sincewe have no intui-
tive powerof distinguishing intuitionsfromcognitionsdetermined by
others,whetheror not we have an intuitiveself-consciousness mustbe
determined can be explainedbyknown
byevidence.If self-consciousness
faculties,thereis no reasonto suppose an intuitiveself-consciousness
(5.226).
This questionis divided into two parts. In the firstpart Peirce
accountsfor the genesisof self-consciousness throughthe operationof
knownfaculties.In the secondpart he takes up "the only argument
worthnoticingfortheexistence of intuitiveself-consciousness" (5.237).
In accounting for the genesisof self-consciousness Peirce offersa psy-
chologicalhypothesis.
At a certainage we knowthatchildrenare self-conscious. We also
knowthattheyare awareof ignoranceand error.Furthertheyhave the
powerof inferring theirown existence fromignoranceand error.It may
thenbe concludedthatthegenesisof self-consciousness can be explained
by the operation of known facultiesunder conditions knownto exist.
The awareness of ignorancedemandsthehypothesis of a selfin whichthe
ignorance can inhere.The awarenessof errordemandsthehypothesis of
self thatis fallible. There is, therefore,no reason to a
suppose faculty
of intuitiveselfconsciousness (5.236).
Followingthe loose Scholasticformof the articlePeirce offersan
argument forthe existenceof intuitiveself-consciousness in the second
partof thisquestion.
We are morecertainof our own existencethanof any other
fact;a premisscannotdetermine to be morecertain
a conclusion
than it is itself;hence,our own existencecannothave been
inferred fromanyotherfact.(5.237)
Peirce'sreplyis decisive. He admitsthe firstpremiss,but rejects
thesecond.

294 Thomas I. Prendergast
A conclusioncannotbe morecertainthanthatsomeone of the

factswhichsupportit is true,butit mayeasilybe morecertain
thananyone of thosefacts.(5.237)
His exampleis a dozenwitnessestestifying to a certainoccurrence.My

belief in that occurrence restson my belief that each of the twelve
witnesses is generally to be believedunderoath. The conclusion, namely,
theoccurrence testifiedto, is morecertainthanthatanyone of themen
is generally to be believed,whichis a premiss(5.237).
The same pointis made withrespectto my existence.It is testified
to by everyotherfact. My existenceis, therefore, morecertainthanany
one of the facts.The conclusion,namely,myexistence, is morecertain
thananyone of thefactsthatsupportit (5.237).
In this questionPeirce has producedhis own hypothesisfor the
genesisof self-consciousness throughinference, given an argumentfor
intuitive self-consciousness and refuted it byshowingone of itspremisses
is false. He concludesthereis no reasonto supposean intuitive faculty
of self-consciousness.
The nextcandidatefor an intuitivefacultyis takenup in the third
question"Whetherwe have an intuitivepower of distinguishing be-
tweenthesubjectiveelementsof different kindsof cognitions."What is
represented in a cognitionis theobjectiveelement;the actionor passion
of theselfby whichit is represented is the subjectiveelement(5.238).
This seemsto correspond to themorefamiliar object-act The
distinction.
cognition is an intuition of the objective element. It is possiblethat an
of
intuition thesubjective element (the act) accompanies everycognition.
We mayhave an intuition of theact of believing,conceiving, imagining,
etc. Whetheror notwe do is thequestionto be answered.
In thisquestionPeirceofferstwo arguments foran affirmative answer
to the question:(1) Thereis a greatdifference betweenseeinga color
and imaginingit. The difference betweenthe mostvivid dreamand
realityis immense;(2) If we could not intuitively distinguishthe act
of believingfromthe act of conceiving, we could not distinguish them
at all. The onlyway we could distinguish themis throughreasoning,
butthesamequestionwouldarisewithrespectto thereasoning, namely,
is it itselfbelievedor merelyconceived,and this opens an infinitive
regress(5.239).
As in the second questionPeirce returnsto the conclusionof the
firstquestionto beginhis answerto the arguments above. We do not

Pence's"Questionsconcerning
knowintuitively thatany cognitionis intuitive.Is it thennecessary to

an
posit intuitivepoweror can the factsbe explainedwithoutit? In
answerto the firstargumentabove concerning the greatdifference be-
tweenseeinga color and imaginingit9Peirceacknowledges thatthere
is a greatdifference.However,farfromthinking it an argument in favor
of the intuitivepower, he sees it as an argument against such a power.
The factthatthereis a greatdifference betweenthe immediateobjects
of sense and imaginationis enoughto foundthe distinction between
senseand imagination. Thereis no needto appeal to a peculiarintuitive
powerof distinguishing the act of sensingfromthe act of imagining
(5.241).
In answerto the secondargument thatno distinction could be made
betweenbeliefand conceptionunlessit is intuitive, Peircerepliesthat
we can verballydistinguish betweenactiveand sensational belief,and in
bothcases,we can distinguish it fromconceptionwithoutinvokingan
intuitive power. If we take belief in the sensationalsense,a judgment
a
accompaniedby feeling of conviction, it may be distinguished from
conception by thatfeeling of conviction. If we take beliefin the active
sense,a judgmentfromwhicha man will act, it maybe distinguished
fromconceivingby the observationof externalfacts. Peirce,unfor-
tunately, does not elaborateon whattheseexternalfactsare. There are
twolikelycandidates.If theactivesenseof beliefpresagesPeirce'sview
of beliefas a habitof action,eitherthe readinessto act or the actions
expressing thereadinessto act maybe the externalfacts. In eithercase
thereare difficulties.The readinessto act is an externalfactin thesense
thatit is notsimplya stateof consciousness dependenton mywill,but I
cannotsee how it could be observedas Peirceclaimsthe externalfacts
are. If the externalfactsare interpreted as the actionsexpressingthe
readinessto act,theobservational character can be saved,butonlyat the
of
expense makingmyknowledge that I believe dependon observation
of myactions.Of coursePeirceclaimsthatevenin activebeliefit maybe
discovered byinference fromthesensationof conviction thataccompanies
it,butthisdoes notresolvethedifficulties above.
That conceptioninvolvesneithera readinessto act nor a feelingof
convictionis assumedin the reply. The resultis that belief may be
distinguished from conceptionwithoutsupposinga special intuitive
faculty.

The conclusionof thisquestionis thatno intuitivepowerof recog-

nizingdifferent acts of cognitionneed be assumedin orderto explain
thefactthatwe can distinguish them.
The fourthquestionis of a moregeneralnature."Whetherwe have
any power of introspection, or whetherour whole knowledgeof the
internalworldis derivedfromtheobservation of externalfacts." In the
twopreviousquestionsPeircehas arguedagainstthe necessity of assum-
ing certainspecific intuitivepowers. In this question arguesthat
he
thereis no reasonto assumethatwe have any knowledge,intuitiveor
not,of theinternalworldthatis not derivedfromexternalobservation.
He wishesto show thatwe have no directperceptionof the internal
world. This perception mayalso be a perception of it as internal,but
this is not a necessary part of the notionof introspection thatPeirce
attacks(5.244).
Althoughhe deniesthatthereis any reasonto assumeintrospection,
he does not denythatwe mayinvestigate and gain information on psy-
chologicalquestions.Peircesuggestsa numberof candidatesthe know-
ledgeof whichis claimedto be obtainedthroughdirectperception, such
as sensations,emotions,and volitions. He then shows that in each
exampleourknowledge can be explainedbyinference fromexternalfacts.
Peirceadmitsthatsensations are partlydetermined by theconstitution
of the mind and, in this sense, are sensationsof somethinginternal
(5.245). I do not thinkthatthis meanstheyrepresent something in-
ternal, but that the peculiarquality of the sensationis determined by
internalconditions.Thoughknowledgeof mindmaybe obtainedfrom
a consideration of these sensations,we do not directlyperceivethe
sensation.For example,theknowledgeof mindgainedby a considera-
tionof the sensationof rednessis not gainedby a directperception of
thatsensation of redness but by inference from red as a predicate of
somethingexternal.Peirce does not elaborate,but the followingcon-
siderationsare relevant.We do not learnto use 'red' as a predicateof
something internalsuch as a sensation,and thenapplyit to something
externalby inference.As Peircesays in "Some Consequencesof Four
Incapacities,"
We can admitno statement concerningwhatpasseswithinus

exceptas a necessary
hypothesis to explain what takes place
in whatwe commonly world.(5.266).
call theexternal

Peirce's "Questions concerningCertainFacultiesClaimed forMan'1 297
Althougha completediscussionof the point would require a discussion

of hypothesisand how perceptualjudgmentsfitthis description,we can
indicate brieflywhat Peirce is driving at.5 The sensation of redness
*
always arises as a predicatein that 'Somethingis red." Now according
to Peirce the sensationdepends on impressionson the eye following one
anotherin a certainway and with a certainrapidity. Now the sensation
is simple and thus is a simple predicatetaken in place of a more complex
one. It thereforereduces a manifold of impressions to a unity and
therebyfulfiillsthe functionof a hypothesis(5.291).
But Peirce is aware that there are certaininternalevents that seem to
be directlyperceived. Emotions seem to provide examples of feelings
thatare not inferredfroma characterof somethingexternal. When I am
angryI directlyperceivemy state. No inferenceis needed. The force of
this counter-exampledepends on taking anger as a purelymental quality
or as Hume puts it an "original existence"4with no cognitive or repre-
sentationalcharacterat all. The result is that a cognition of anger is a
cognitionof somethingpurelyinternal.
Peirce replies that although introspectionis not necessarilyintuitive,
it is not self-evidentthat we have any such power. It has already been
established in question three that we have no intuitivepower of dis-
tinguishingdifferentsubjective modes of consciousness (acts of con-
sciousness). We cannot intuitivelydistinguishan act of introspection
fromotheracts of consciousness. The resultis that the existenceor non-
existenceof the power of introspectionmust be determinedon the basis
of whetheror not thispower mustbe supposed to explain the facts.
Peirce admits that a man's anger does not imply a constantcharacter
in its object. (This is in contrastto the sensation of red above.) How-
ever,the anger does implysome relativecharacterin the object thatmakes
him angry (5.247). The character is relative to the person who is
angry. For example, one may say "he cheated me" which would be an
expression of the anger and, of course, the relative character in the
object would be that the other person is a cheat. Only when this judg-
ment is made and the emotion has subsided to some extent can one say
"I am angry." The point seems to be that an emotion does involve a
cognitive element in which some characteris predicated of an external
object but always relative to a particular person in particular circum-
stances. Perhaps it can be put this way. I certainlyfeel angry when I
say "You cheated me," but the anger is not directlyintrospected. It is
expressed as "You cheated me," and that I am angry is inferredfrom

this. After commentingon the sense of willing Peirce concludes that

there is no reason for supposing any power of introspection. Any
informationgained about psychologicalquestions is by inferencefrom
externalfacts.
Up to this point Peirce has established that there is no intuitive
facultyof distinguishingintuitionsfrom other cognitionswith the result
that any furtherintuitivefacultymay be supposed only on the grounds
thatsome particularkind of knowledge cannot be explained withoutthat
supposition. Peirce then establishes that no special faculties need be
supposed to explain knowledge of self, knowledge of differentacts of
consciousness,and introspective knowledge. All of thesecan be accounted
for by inference.
Questions five and six "Whether we can think without signs" and
"Whether a sign can have any meaning, if by definitionit is the sign
of somethingincognizable" may not seem to advance the overall argu-
ment but I thinkthat in these questions Peirce is attemptingto show in
general,that therecan be no intuitions.
Immediatelyafter proposing question five, "Whether we can think
withoutsigns," Peirce gives a one sentence argumentfor an affirmative
answer, "... there is, to this day, no betterargumentin the affirmative
than that thought must precede every sign" (5.250). Unfortunately,
this leaves one with verylittle to work with. I think,however,that the
argumentmay be filled out in the following way. Suppose we take a
gestureas a sign. Accordingto the argument,it is a sign only because it
is preceded by a thoughtin which the connectionbetween the gesture
and what is signifiedby the gesture is known. Now if this thoughtis
itselfa sign, that it is a sign is determinedby some thoughtthatprecedes
it in which there is knowledge of the relations necessaryto make it a
sign. Further,if all thought is in signs an infiniteregress is opened
making thoughtimpossible. Therefore,there must be some thoughtnot
in signs, i.e. intuitionsthat are self-authenticating.These would not
derivetheirsignificancefrompriorthoughts(knowledge) with the result
thatthe infiniteregresswould be closed, therebymakingthoughtpossible.
Peirce replies by an analog to the Achilles Paradox.
This assumesthe impossibilityof an infiniteseries. But Achilles,

as a fact, will overtake the tortoise. How this happens is a
question not necessaryto be answered at present,as long as it
certainlydoes happen. (5.250)

Peine' s "Questions concerningCertainVacuitiesClaimed forMan" 299
Just as Achilles does overtake the tortoisedespite the argumentthat

he would have to pass an infinitenumber of finitedistances to do so,
so thoughtcan take place despite the argumentthatit has to pass through
an infinitenumberof signs.5 How eitherof these happens need not be
explained at this point. Peirce means that the logical difficultiesin
eithercase need not be overcome,since they do not affectthe fact that
Achilles does overtakethe tortoise;theydo not affectthe thesis that all
thoughtis in signs. Justas the infiniteseries argumentdoes not disprove
that Achilles overtakesthe tortoise,so the infiniteseries argumentdoes
not disprovethe thesis that all thoughtis in signs.6
Having refutedthe counter-thesis, Peirce argues for his view that all
thought is in signs.
If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of

thought that we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly,
no other thoughtcan be evidenced by external facts. But we
have seen that only by external facts can thought be known
at all. The only thought,then,which can possiblybe cognized
is thought in signs. But thought which cannot be cognized
does not exist. All thought,therefore,must necessarilybe in
signs. ((5.251)
From question four we have learned that thoughtis known only by

inference from external facts. Further these external facts can only
evidence thoughtin signs. Peirce means that only throughpredications
concerningexternal objects can thoughtbe known, that is, these judg-
mentsdeterminethe knowledge of our thoughtswith the resultthat these
thoughtscan only be signs (not intuitions) since our knowledge of them
depends on prior knowledge (predications concerningexternalobjects).
Since the only thoughtthat can be known is in signs, and thoughtthat
cannot be known does not exist,all thoughtmust necessarilybe in signs.
Peirce continuesthat from the propositionthat all thoughtis in signs
it follows that every thought determines some other thought which
interpretsit. During this period Peirce thoughtthat this was the essence
of a sign.7 In other words thinkingis essentiallythe translationof one
sign by another. For Peirce this means that in the immediatepresent (in
intuition) there is no thought. Thinking, which is sign translation,has
temporalduration.

Although Peirce does not say so this seems to be a general refutation

of any view that holds we have immediate access to our own thoughts.
In the previous question Peirce concluded that there is no reason to
assume the power of introspectionafterhaving examined several particu-
lar examples of alleged introspectiveknowledge. In this question Peirce
concludesthattherecannotbe any immediateaccess to our own thoughts,
not simplythat thereis no reason to suppose a special intuitiveor intro-
spectivefaculty.
After having shown that all thoughtis in signs Peirce asks the sixth
question, "Whether a sign can have any meaning,if by its definitionit is
the sign of somethingabsolutelyincogni2able." I must admit that the
functionof this question in the progressionof the overall argumentis
not clear, neverthelessI think it can quite plausibly be interpretedas
an attemptto show that the definitionof intuitiongiven at the beginning
of the articleis self-contradictory.
In keeping with the form of each question Peirce offers several
counter-examplesto his view that a sign can have no meaning if it is a
sign of somethingincognizable. The universal proposition "All rumi-
nants are cloven-hoofed" includes a possible infinityof animals. It is
clear that it is not possible to know that all ruminantshave been exam-
ined. There always remains the possibility that some have not been
examined (5.254). Presumably,the argumentwould continue that the
universalpropositionis a sign of somethingabsolutelyincognizable,but,
neverthelesshas meaning. The same sort of argumentholds for hypo-
theticalpropositionsin that such a propositiondoes not concern simply
the actual state of things,but everypossible state of things. However,
not all of theseare knowable since only one can exist (5.254).
Before replyingto the arguments,Peirce sketcheshis own position.
That no sign can be a sign of something absolutely incognizable is
derived from the fact that all our conceptionsare derived from abstrac-
tions and combinationsof cognitions firstappearing in judgments of
experience (5.255). Since the absolutelyincognizable cannot appear in
experience,therecannot be any conceptionof the incognizable. Further,
if the meaning of a term (sign) is the conception it conveys,and, as
just shown, there cannot be a conception of the incognizable, such a
sign can have no meaning.
But it may be objected that "not-cognizable" itself is a concept pro-
duced fromthe concept "not" and the concept "cognizable." In answer
Peirce poses the following dilemma. If "not" is taken as a syncate-

Peirce's "Questions concerningCertainFacultiesClaimed forMan" 301
goremic term, the only concept involved is "cognizable." If "not" is

taken as a concept,"not-cognizable"is self-contradictory.In explanation
of the latterpart of the dilemma,Peirce claims that the highest concept
that can be reached is the concept of somethingof the nature of a cog-
nition. If "not" is a concept, it is a concept of the cognizable. There-
fore "not-cognizable",if a concept, is self-contradictory(5.257). He
continues
Over against any cognition,thereis an unknown but knowable

reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only
the self-contradictory.In short, cognizability (in its widest
sense) and being are not merelymetaphysicallythe same, but
are synonymousterms. (5.257)
I think that the conclusion of this question shows that the definition
of intuitiongiven earlyin the articleis self-contradictory.The definition
reads intuitionis "a cognitionnot determinedby a prevous cognition of
the same object, and thereforeso determinedby somethingout of con-
sciousness" (5.213). If intuitionis taken as a cognition (sign) whose
meaning is the object out of consciousness,the cognition can only be
meaningless,because the object as out of consciousnessis incognizable.
The resultis that "intuition" although definedas a cognition cannot be
so by the definitionitself.
To the argumentfrom universal and hypotheticalpropositionsPeirce
replies in one sentence.
... the reply is, that though their truth cannot be cognized
with absolute certainty,it may be probablyknown by induction.
(5.258)
Commentingin detail on this reply would lead us into Peirce's early

the scope of
attemptsto show the validityof inductionwhich is beyond
this paper. However, it may be helpful to indicate the sort of argument
involved in induction. ProfessorMurphy has shown that in this article
inductiondoes not mean the confirmation of a hypothesis,but one of the
processes of reasoning by which we create postulates.8 The proposition
"All ruminants are cloven-hoofed"is reached by the followingreasoning.
Animal!, Animal2, Animal3 and Animal4 are taken as samples of the
collection of ruminants; Animali, animal2, animal3 and animal4 are

cloven-hoofed (1.559) .9 The formof thisargument is clearlynotdeduc-

tive, and at best the conclusionis only probable. Apparently, Peirce
thinksthisis enoughto counterthe chargethatuniversalpropositions
are instancesof signsthathave meaningwhile at the same timebeing
signsof something absolutelyincognizable.
It seems to me that accordingto the progressionof the overall
argument, positionis completely
the intuitionist refutedexceptfor a
last resortargumentin questionseven. Peirce has shownwe have no
facultyby whichwe can intuitively distinguish intuitionsfromother
No
cognitions. special of
faculties intuitionneed be supposedto account
for our knowledgeof self or for our knowledgeof the difference be-
tweenactsof consciousness. No specialfaculty of introspection need be
supposed to account for our knowledge of certain internal states.There
can be no immediate accessto our own thoughts and, finally, intuitions
are impossible.
It appearsthatthe overallargument againstthe intuitionist position
is complete,butthereis one intuitionistargument to whicha replymust
be given. Questionseven,"Whetherthereis any cognitionnot deter-
minedby a previouscognition,"is given over to that reply. Peirce's
statement of thelastremaining intuitionist
argument is as follows:
It would seem thereis or has been [a cognitionnot deter-

minedbya previouscognition};forsincewe are in possession
of cognitions,whichare all determined by previousones,and
theseby cognitionsearlierstill,there must have been a first
in this series,or else our stateof cognitionat any time is
completely determined, accordingto logicallaws,by our state
at any previoustime. But thereare manyfactsagainstthe
and therefore
last supposition, in favorof intuitive
cognitions.
(5.259)
Withsomefillingin, theargument as sayingunless

can be interpreted
thereis a firstcognitionin the seriesof cognitions,an object could
neverbecomeknown,sincetherewould be no pointin timewhenthe
knowingof thatobjectcouldhavebegun. Consequently, therewouldbe
wouldresult.But thefactthat
no knowledgeat all and utterskepticism
objectsdo becomeknownis againstthis conclusionand supportsthe
position.The argument
intuitionist has a transcendentalform:Objects

do become known; that this occurs demands intuitions,and therefore,it

is false that everycognitionis determinedby a previous cognition.
Before replyingto the argumenthe attemptsto show thatthe only way
one can explain the determinationof a particularcognition is througha
previous cognition. It has been established that one cannot know by
intuitionthat a given cognition is not determinedby a previous cogni-
tion. Simply by contemplatingthe given cognition it cannot be known
whetherit is or is not determinedby a previous cognition. The only
way it can be known is by a hypotheticalinferencefrom observed facts
(5.260). Peirce does not explain in this article what this inference
involves,but taking as an example "red" as a cognition,our knowledge
of it as a cognition arises by inferencefrom "red" as a predicate of
some externalobject. Now the judgment "X is red" is also a cognition
which explains the determinationof the given cognition. Peirce's point
is that the only way in which a given cognition's determinationcan be
explained is by previous cognitions. Somethingentirelyoutside of con-
sciousnesswhich you may want to say determinesit can only be known
in the given cognition. Thus to claim that somethingabsolutelyexternal
determinesthe given cognition is to make the determinationof that
cognition unexplainable. Now this hypothesiscannot be justified for
the only justificationof a hypothesisis that it explains the facts. In
this case, on the one hand, the hypothesisis offeredas an explanation
of the cognition,while on the other hand, it makes the fact of the
cognitionunexplainable,which is self-contradictory (5.260).
Peirce does offertwo furtherargumentsin support of his position.
The firstclaims that an intuitionmust be instantaneous,and therefore
its apprehensionmust take no time, but we have no power by which it
could be known (5.262). The second is that our cognitions are cog-
nitions of relations,but a cognition of a relation is determinedby a
previouscognitionif it can be known (5.262). These argumentsare not
developed in any way except for a shortparagraphearlierwhere Peirce in
developing his view that all thoughtis in signs says that it is another
form of the axiom "that in intuition,i.e. in the immediate present,
thereis no thought,or, that all that is reflectedupon has past" (5.253).
The point seems to be that if thought is a process of sign translation,
then thoughtis always relationaland involves some temporalduration.
Peirce's replyto the objection that theremust be a firstcognitionis to
suggest that thought is analogous to a mathematicalcontinuum. For
example, take an invertedtriangle which is slowly dipped into water.

304 Thomas I. Prendergast
Let the horizontal lines made by the surface of the water across the
trianglerepresentdifferent cognitions. Further,let a horizontalline below
anotherhorizontalline representone cognitionthat determinesanother.
The apex of the trianglewill representthe object externalto conscious-
ness that determinesboth these cognitions. Those who argue that there
must be an absolutely firstcognition not determinedby any previous
cognitionwould have to claim that theremust be an absolutelyfirstline
made by the surface of the water on the triangle, i.e., a line below
which no otherline could be made. This is clearlyfalse in the example.
For any line drawn across the triangle there are as many lines as you
like that can be assigned below the given line (5.263). If the analogy
holds between thought and this continuum of lines, then there is no
absolutelyfirstcognitionnot determinedby a previous cognition.
of this paradox are the
Peirce points out that the logical difficulties
same as Zeno's Achilles paradox. He is not insisting here on any
particularway of resolvingthose difficulties,but simplythat any solution
that is reached be equally applied to the case of cognitionsdetermining
other cognitions. If motion is denied, then deny the process of one
cognition determininganother (5.263). If lines and points are called
fictionsthencognitionsare fictions.The point seems to be somethinglike
this. The transcendentalargumentabove no more proves that cognition
is impossible than Zeno's Achilles paradox proves that no motion is
possible.
It is apparentthat this importantargumentrestson the validityof the
analog of thoughtwith a mathematicalcontinuum. Further,the notion
of a continuumis one of the most vexed problemsin Peirce's philosophy.
and obscurities,Peirce has produced
Nevertheless,despite the difficulties
a most devastatingcritiqueof Cartesianismin epistemology.
MarquetteUniversity
NOTES
1. This article was originallypublishedin the Journalof Speculative

1868. It is reprinted
Philosophy, and Paul Weiss (editors),
in CharlesHartshorne
CollectedPapers of Charles SandersPeirce. 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press,
1931-1958),5.213-5.263.VolumesVII and VIII were editedby ArthurBurks.
in whichthe firstnumberrefersto
In citingPeirceI shall followtheconvention
thevolumein the CollectedPapersand thenumbers afterthe periodreferto the
paragraph.

2. Manley Thompson, The PragmaticPhilosophy of C. S. Peirce (Chicago:

U. of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 37-44; W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism
(New York: Dover, 1966), pp. 59-83, MurrayG. Murphey,The Development of
Peirce's Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1963), pp. 106-122; C. F.
Delaney, "Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism,"The Monist, 57 (April, 1973),
pp. 240-251; Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce's Empiricism (New York: Octagon
Books, 1966), pp. 3-18. Each of these gives a treatmentof the article, but
because of the particular perspective adopted none gives a full question-by-
question commentary.In many cases the more obscure argumentsare neglected.
ProfessorDelaney's informativearticle comes closest to a full account, but he
does not discuss questions five and six, presumablybecause he thinks they are
not germaneto his thesis.
3. An account of Peirce's view of perceptual judgments can be found in
Richard Bernstein's"Peirce's Theory of Perception"Studies in the Philosophy of
Charles SandersPeirce (second series; Amherst,U. of MassachusettsPress, 1964),
pp. 165-189. Edward C. Moore and RichardS. Robin edited this work.
4. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge(Oxford: Oxford U.
Press, 1888), p. 415.
5. Peirce offers one solution to the Achilles paradox in "Grounds of
Validity of the Laws of Logic," (5-333).
because
6. I must admit a feeling of discomfortin giving this interpretation,
it comes dangerouslyclose to making Peirce beg the question. But I have not
been able to providea betteraccountconsistentwith what Peirce says.
7. In his later writingsPeirce modifieshis view to make habit the ultimate
logical interprétantof a sign (5.491).
8. MurrayG. Murphey,The Developmentof Peirce's Philosophy (Cambridge:
Harvard U. Press, 1963), p. 113.
9. Ibid., pp. 145-146. ProfessorMurphey explores one of Peirce's attempts
to establishthe validityof induction.


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The Structure of the Argument in Peirce's "Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.34 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 10:20:58 AM

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ledge. Peirce definesan intuitionas "a cognition not determinedby a

Whether by the simple contemplationof a cognition, inde-

A reformulation of the question makes it clearer: Can those cognitions

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conformity withthe scholasticpresentation,

The determination of a cognitionby anothercognitionor by a

Althoughneitherthe determination of a cognitionby anothercog-

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denceproof." In otherwordsno evidencewill be admittedas showing

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the fillingup of the blind spot is an intellectualresult is an inference

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tions,thenwe mustsupposesomeunknownfaculty to explainit. In turn,

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A conclusioncannotbe morecertainthanthatsomeone of the

His exampleis a dozenwitnessestestifying to a certainoccurrence.My

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knowintuitively thatany cognitionis intuitive.Is it thennecessary to

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The conclusionof thisquestionis thatno intuitivepowerof recog-

We can admitno statement concerningwhatpasseswithinus

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Althougha completediscussionof the point would require a discussion

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this. After commentingon the sense of willing Peirce concludes that

This assumesthe impossibilityof an infiniteseries. But Achilles,

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Just as Achilles does overtake the tortoisedespite the argumentthat

If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of

From question four we have learned that thoughtis known only by

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Although Peirce does not say so this seems to be a general refutation

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goremic term, the only concept involved is "cognizable." If "not" is

Over against any cognition,thereis an unknown but knowable

Commentingin detail on this reply would lead us into Peirce's early

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cloven-hoofed (1.559) .9 The formof thisargument is clearlynotdeduc-

It would seem thereis or has been [a cognitionnot deter-

Withsomefillingin, theargument as sayingunless

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.34 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 10:20:58 AM

do become known; that this occurs demands intuitions,and therefore,it

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.34 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 10:20:58 AM

1. This article was originallypublishedin the Journalof Speculative

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.34 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 10:20:58 AM

2. Manley Thompson, The PragmaticPhilosophy of C. S. Peirce (Chicago:

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.34 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 10:20:58 AM

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