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Magallona v. Ermita (Case Digest)
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MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community
of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased
the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
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Law, Technology and the World
CASE DIGEST: THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL . V . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL .
Published by arce on September 7, 2013 | Leave a response
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al .
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince
the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee
and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks
were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli
Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in
addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the
territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship
was described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the
negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that
it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.
HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a
―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure
under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill
of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of
public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely
open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the
effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot
revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until
there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as
an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin
rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public
consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to
respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation
regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause
of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the
comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three
underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by
the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one
community. Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and
empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s
participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to
effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than
sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one
of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace
partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate
and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the
establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress
(PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned
sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace
process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the
MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the
powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even
go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have
been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying
link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on
RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the
MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the
―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international
law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use
of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent
with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter
into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and
the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right
to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status
of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of
the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically
part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-
mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was
their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD
is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An
associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect.
The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President
dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it
virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be
put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.
Filipino Advisers
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by James Clifford Santos
BASES CONVERSION v. COA, GR No. 178160, 2009-02-26
Facts:
Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and
functions of the BCDA.
Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure
and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the
adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational... structure of the BCDA and
adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.
On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a
P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and
Board member
President Ramos approved the new compensation and... benefit scheme.
In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP
increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which
states that the compensation and benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least... equivalent to that of
the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to
P30,000.
Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members, the full-time
consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end benefit.
COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004[7] stating that the grant of year-end
benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular
COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to... the Board
members and full-time consultants... the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit granted
to the Board members and full-time consultants and held that the presumption of good faith did not
apply to them
The COA stated that:
2.2
Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-
salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly
provided by law.
Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors are not entitled
to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The same goes with full time consultants
wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between... them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole
amount paid to them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.
Issues:
First, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and full-time
consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of the Board include the adoption
of a compensation and benefit scheme.
Second, the BCDA claims that the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted the year-
end benefit because the granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the
Constitution. Sections 5 and 18 state:
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all people of the blessings of
democracy.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
Ruling:
The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not
unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem
Section 9 specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits the
amount of per diem to not more than P5,000; and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to
not more than four meetings.
Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of BCDA, they are not entitled to the year-end
benefit which is a "personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries" and which is "paid only when the
basic salary is also paid."
The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State
Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a
source of enforceable rights.[23]
In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court held that Sections 5
and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions... s.
Principles:
the specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate
that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no other.
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2015 CASE DIGEST: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC
Published by admin on January 17, 2016 | Leave a response
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing
the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence
not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the
case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty.
There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this
case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is
already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may
come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested
in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they
had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted
for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored
messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial
speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden
of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There
is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant
to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech
with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that
take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere
in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
Danger Board Amendment

It has a secular legislative purpose;
It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
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Uberrimae Fidei
The strictest law may become the severest injustice.

Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Oposa v Factoran (Environmental Law)
Oposa v Factoran
GR No. 101083
July 30, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents contesting
the granting of the Timber License Agreement (TLAs), which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a substantive right
(2) WON timber licenses are contracts;
WON the cancellation of which would constitute non- impairment clause which is prohibited under the
Constitution
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Art II, Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Art. II, Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
E.O. No. 192, Section 4. of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country' s environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as w ell as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.”
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
RULING:
(1) Yes, it is a substantive right. Right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"intergenerational justice."
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. (2)
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Victor Morvis
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LAW TECH WORLD
CASE DIGEST: LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET. AL. V. V. O. RAMOS, SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; H. RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND
GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
Published by arce on September 7, 2013 | Leave a response
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR);
R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed
by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the
Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the
FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the
government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain
through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.
Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of
its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from
which they spring must be struck down.
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DIGEST
Monday, June 8, 2015
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that
the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto
are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES
THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
Jeng at 1:35 AM
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by Aleezah Gertrude Regado
PHARMACEUTICAL v. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, GR NO. 173034, 2007-10-09
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president... ffect to
Article 11[2] of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS),... 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issues:
whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating the
RIRR.[3]
Ruling:
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State
Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding,
ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are... provided with services and
nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions
regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
he international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
nder the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation.
ocal legislation
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the... members of the Senate."
ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per s
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point
that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products within the scope... of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and... amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)... embodies the
incorporation method.
Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic
elements of custom: the material... factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective
factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the
United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57,[24] in relation to Article 63[25] of the UN Charter. Under the
1946 WHO Constitution, it... is the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO,[26] and has the
power to adopt regulations concerning "advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and
similar products moving in international commerce,"[27] and to "make... recommendations to members
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization."[28] The legal effect of its
regulations, as opposed to recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind member states
thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be
required for the adoption of such conventions or... agreements, which shall come into force for each
Member when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by the Health
Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such convention or
agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of... the action taken, and if it does not
accept such convention or agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for
non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an annual report to the Director-
General in accordance with Chapter
XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and
quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease;
(b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death... and public health practices; (c) standards
with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety,
purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce;
(e) advertising and... labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after due
notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify
the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the... period stated in the notice. (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,
in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come
into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the recommendation would come
into force for member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA recommendations are generally
not binding, but they "carry moral and political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue
of the collective membership of the highest international body in the... field of health."[29] Even the
ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No. 34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense of Article 23 of the Constitution, the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to the present resolution." (Emphasis
supplied)
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization at its sixty-seventh session,
considered the fourth draft of the code, endorsed it, and unanimously recommended to the Thirty-
fourth World Health Assembly the text of a resolution by which it... would adopt the code in the form of
a recommendation rather than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of the WHO
Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to recommendations made
to it by the Organization, and with respect to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member
states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what
has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the... provisions into law which
is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions,[30] specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding
from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements
and promotions of... breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior.[31]
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of
the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.[32] It is, however, an expression of non-binding
norms, principles, and practices that... influence state behavior.[33] Certain declarations and resolutions
of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.[34] The most notable is the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,... specifically, Government of Hongkong
Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,[35] Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[36] Mijares v. Rañada[37] and
Shangri-la International Hotel Management,... Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..[38]
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency attached to the UN with the
mandate to promote and protect intellectual property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid
means of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing... needs and demands of its
constituents."[39] Other international organizations which have resorted to soft law include the
International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the Codex
Alimentarius).[40]
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO member states, it
provides an excellent example of the power of "soft law" in international relations. International lawyers
typically distinguish binding rules of international... law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles,
and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft
law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the political groundwork for
improved international cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO
member states' normative duty to cooperate fully with other countries and... with WHO in connection
with infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful
politically for two reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and
enhancing, international cooperation on infectious... disease controls is in a country's self-interest x x x if
this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR Resolution could inform the development of
general and consistent state practice on infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps
crystallizing... eventually into customary international law on infectious disease prevention and control.
[41]
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures recommended by WHO to
address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003
and E.O. No. 280 on February 2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad... powers to close down
schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and
agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a state to
implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said resolutions
had great political influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be

established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any... evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member
states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory... in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law... enacted by the legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the
absence of a domestic law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall
define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the
government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and... regulations concerning the
implementation of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of
breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national
health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No.
2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy
guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of... breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2)
appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient
supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of... other feeding options; and (6) feeding
in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized
as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such
health policy, the... advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely
prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be
equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said
advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be... implemented only pursuant to a
law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the
legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance with those of
the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to
"young children" or those from ages two years old and beyond:
MILK CODE
RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to
protect and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the proper use of breastmilk
substitutes and... supplements and related products through adequate, consistent and objective
information and appropriate regulation of the marketing and distribution of the said substitutes,
supplements and related products;
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling within the age bracket of 0-12 months.
Section 2. Purpose These Revised Rules and Regulations are hereby promulgated to ensure the provision
of safe and adequate nutrition for infants and young children by the promotion, protection and support
of breastfeeding and by... ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes, breastmilk supplements and
related products when these are medically indicated and only when necessary, on the basis of adequate
information and through appropriate marketing and distribution.
Section 5(ff). "Young Child&" means a person from the age of more than twelve (12) months up to the
age of three (3) years (36 months).
The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in
certain instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and
declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for... breastmilk":
MILK CODE
RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to
protect and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public about the proper use of breastmilk
substitutes and supplements... and related products through adequate, consistent and objective
information and appropriate regulation of the marketing and distribution of the said substitutes,
supplements and related products;
Section 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from which the revised
rules and regulations are premised upon:... a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to six (6)
months.
b. There is no substitute or replacement for breastmilk.
The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for advertising and
promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and... nutritional claims. Section
13 of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of products within the scope of the
Code, is vague:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers.
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, for
products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and broadcast
unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an... inter-agency committee created herein
pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from which the revised
rules and regulations are premised upon:... x x x x... f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of infant
formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.
Section 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities
for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall
be allowed, because they tend to convey... or give subliminal messages or impressions that undermine
breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as
well as related products covered within the scope of this Code.
Section 13. "Total Effect" -Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be objective and
should not equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in
the advertising concept. It must not in any case undermine... breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total
effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring better
health to the baby or other such... exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The following shall not be included in advertising, promotional and
marketing materials:... a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information which discourage or tend to
undermine the benefits or superiority of breastfeeding or which idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes and milk supplements. In this connection, no pictures of babies and children together with...
their mothers, fathers, siblings, grandparents, other relatives or caregivers (or yayas) shall be used in any
advertisements for infant formula and breastmilk supplements;... b. The term "humanized,"
"maternalized," "close to mother's milk" or similar words in describing breastmilk substitutes or milk
supplements;... c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant and milk formula.
Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Code are absolutely
prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase emotional, intellectual
abilities of the infant and young child and other like... phrases shall not be allowed.
The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 10. Containers/Label.
(a)
Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the appropriate
use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b)
Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and understandable message in
Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a label, which message can not readily become separated from it,
and which shall include the following... points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;

(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for
its use and the proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation.
Section 26. Content Each container/label shall contain such message, in both Filipino and English
languages, and which message cannot be readily separated therefrom, relative the following points:
(a)
The words or phrase "Important Notice" or "Government Warning" or their equivalent;
(b)
A statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(c)
A statement that there is no substitute for breastmilk;
(d)
A statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for its
use and the proper methods of use;
(e)
Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and a warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation; and
(f)
The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other related products
including information that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must
be prepared and used appropriately.
The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health professionals; the RIRR
totally prohibits such activity:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 7. Health Care System.
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the purpose of promoting infant formula or
other products within the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however, preclude the dissemination
of information to health professionals as provided in Section
8(b).
SECTION 8. Health Workers.

(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding products
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottle-feeding is... equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall
also include the information specified in Section 5(b).
Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of products covered by the Code shall be
allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding promotion, education and production
of Information, Education and Communication
(IEC) materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in classes or seminars for women
and children activities and to avoid the use of these venues to market their brands or company names.
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Code are absolutely
prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase emotional, intellectual
abilities of the infant and young child and other like phrases shall... not be allowed.
The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and
continuing education of health professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the same.
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 8. Health Workers
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of this Code may assist in the research,
scholarships and continuing education, of health professionals, in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles

The following are the underlying principles from which the revised rules and regulations are premised
upon:... i. Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part of any policymaking body or
entity in relation to the advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of products covered by the Code shall be
allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding promotion, education and production
of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials... on breastfeeding, holding of or
participating as speakers in classes or seminars for women and children activities and to avoid the use of
these venues to market their brands or company names.
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers - It is the primary responsibility of the health
workers to promote, protect and support breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young child feeding.
Part of this responsibility is to continuously update their... knowledge and skills on breastfeeding. No
assistance, support, logistics or training from milk companies shall be permitted.
The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.
MILK CODE
RIRR
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from manufacturers and distributors of products
within the scope of this Code upon request by or with the approval of the Ministry of Health.
Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code - Donations of products, materials, defined and
covered under the Milk Code and these implementing rules and regulations, shall be strictly prohibited.
Section 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not Covered by this Code. - Donations of products,
equipments, and the like, not otherwise falling within the scope of this Code or these Rules, given by
milk companies and their agents, representatives, whether in kind or in... cash, may only be coursed
through the Inter Agency Committee (IAC), which shall determine whether such donation be accepted or
otherwise.
The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.
MILK CODE
RIRR
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. The following administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any
person, juridical or natural, found to have violated the provisions of the Code and its implementing Rules
and Regulations:... a)
1st violation Warning;... b)
2nd violation Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation, including the recall of the
offending product;... c)
3rd violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation, and in addition
thereto, the recall of the offending... product, and suspension of the Certificate of Product Registration
(CPR);... d)
4th violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five
Hundred (P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation; and in
addition thereto, the recall of the product,... revocation of the CPR, suspension of the License to Operate
(LTO) for one year;... e)
5th and succeeding repeated violations Administrative Fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the
recall of the offending product, cancellation of the CPR, revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the
company concerned,... including the blacklisting of the company to be furnished the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);... f)
An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every
day the violation continues after having received the order from the IAC or other such appropriate body,
notifying and penalizing the company for the... infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there is "repeated" violation, each product violation
belonging or owned by a company, including those of their subsidiaries, are deemed to be violations of
the concerned milk company and shall not be based on the specific violating... product alone.
The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.
The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only to children 0-12 months
old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code The Code applies to the marketing, and practices related thereto, of the
following products: breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula; other milk products, foods and
beverages, including bottle-fed complementary foods, when... marketed or otherwise represented to be
suitable, with or without modification, for use as a partial or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding
bottles and teats. It also applies to their quality and availability, and to information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of
product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food,
and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product... categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal
nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their
physiological characteristics"; while under Section 4(b),... bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any
food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant
formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant." An
infant under Section
4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants
or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as "any food being
marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not
suitable for that purpose." This section conspicuously lacks reference to... any particular age-group of
children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for children aged 0-12
months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be intended for young children more than 12
months of age. Therefore, by regulating... breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect
and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in
Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by
children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 2[42] and 5(ff)[43] of the RIRR.
It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code, does not recognize that
breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be considered and construed
together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,[44] "[t]he particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule
should not be studied as detached and isolated... expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of
breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR
also states that information and educational materials should include... information on the proper use of
infant formula when the use thereof is needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use of breastmilk
substitutes may be proper.
The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 3[45] and 4[46] together as they are interlinked with
each other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR
are valid, it is important to deal first with the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the
DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative
Code,[47] and as delegated in particular under the Milk Code.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative
agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter
precludes the need to further discuss it..[48] However,... health information, particularly advertising
materials on apparently non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively
new area for regulation by the DOH.[49]
As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands,[50] health information was
already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the predecessor of DOH.[51] Section 938 thereof
charged it with the duty to... protect the health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the
dissemination of hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge as
to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing and combating dangerous... communicable
diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy
pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health... consciousness among them."[52] To that end, it was
granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health information and
educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters... which have health
implications."[53]
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that
there is adequate, consistent and objective information on... breastfeeding and use of breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information. These are
expressly provided for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring... x x x x
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
the provisions of this Code. For this purpose, the Ministry of Health shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this
Code and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.
xxxx
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary for or incidental to the attainment
of the purposes and objectives of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding,
for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the
planning, provision, design and dissemination of... information, and the control thereof, on infant
nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-
à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding
of infants and intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include clear information
on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of... breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and
the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of
introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5)
where needed, the proper use of... infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-
prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include
the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding
methods;... and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and
other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use
of breastmilk substitutes.
SECTION 8. Health Workers... x x x x
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent... or superior to breastfeeding. It shall
SECTION 10. Containers/Label
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information
may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code[54] to ensure that the information
that would reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and... health professionals and workers in the
health care system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that
bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass
the power to absolutely prohibit the... advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that the control over
information given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute prohibition is not contemplated by the
Code:... a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate marketing and distribution of
breastmilk substitutes, to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of safe and adequate
nutrition for infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements... when these are necessary, on the basis of adequate
information and through appropriate marketing and distribution.
b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the marketing of and practices related to
breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula, and to information concerning their use;... c) Section
5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is
provided on infant feeding;... d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual informational
and educational materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes and should include information on the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of
said... product;... e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and empowers the IAC to
review and examine advertising, promotion, and other marketing materials;... f) Section 8(b) which
states that milk companies may provide information to health professionals but such information should
be restricted to factual and scientific matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding;... and... g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels
should not contain information that would discourage breastfeeding and idealize the use of infant
formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling
and advertising.
Sections 13[55] on "total effect" and 26[56] of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements,
specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a
statement that... powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be
prepared and used appropriately. Section 16[57] of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased... emotional and intellectual
abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to
wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -... x x x x
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is... equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall
also include the information specified in Section 5.[58] (Emphasis supplied)... and Section 10(d)[59]
which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms "humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that
there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such
information would be inconsistent with the superiority of... breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to health workers
regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof. However, such restrictive
application of Section 8(b) will result in the absurd situation in which milk... companies and distributors
are forbidden to claim to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk,
and yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message.
That askewed interpretation of the Milk
Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by mandating that all information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent, at the same time giving the government control
over planning, provision, design, and dissemination of... information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is
not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and
deterring circumvention of the protection and promotion of... breastfeeding as embodied in Section
2[60] of the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)[61] of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It implements Section 5(b) of
the Milk Code which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x... x x x x
on all the following points: x x x (5) where needed, the proper use of... infant formula, whether
manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of
infant formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of
inappropriate foods or feeding methods;... and, in particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or
improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture
or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers thereof. The
buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair
warning about the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being... present in infant formula and other
related products when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioner's counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that formula milk is prone to
contaminations and there is as yet no technology that allows production of powdered infant formula
that eliminates all forms of contamination.[62]
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to contain the message
regarding health hazards including the possibility of contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in
accordance with Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products cannot be questioned. It is its intervention into the area of
advertising, promotion, and marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, for
products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and broadcast
unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-agency... committee created herein
pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and marketing materials to an
IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency committee composed of the following
members is hereby created:
Minister of Health
Chairman
Minister of Trade and Industry
Member
Minister of Justice
Member
Minister of Social Services and Development
Member
The members may designate their duly authorized representative to every meeting of the Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or other marketing materials, whether written,
audio or visual, on products within the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and prohibit the printing, publication,
distribution, exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising promotion or other marketing materials,
whether written, audio or visual, on products within the scope of this
Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for the exercise of its powers and functions as
well as the performance of its duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of
Section 6(a) of this Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities
for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall
be allowed, because they tend to convey or give... subliminal messages or impressions that undermine
breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as
well as related products covered within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes in line with the RIRR's declaration of principle under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles... x x x x
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related
products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority
given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6
thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional materials prior to
dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly insisted, during
the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational,
viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:... x x x x... x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned
by Petitioner is whether or not there is an absolute prohibition on advertising making AO 2006-12
unconstitutional. We maintained that what AO 2006-12 provides is not an absolute prohibition because
Section 11 while it... states and it is entitled prohibition it states that no advertising, promotion,
sponsorship or marketing materials and activities for breast milk substitutes intended for infants and
young children up to 24 months shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend to convey... or
give subliminal messages or impression undermine that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the other Section, Section 12,
provides for the inter agency committee that is empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising
and promotion materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and manufacture, it simply regulates the
advertisement and the promotions of breastfeeding milk substitutes.
xxxx
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken together with the provision on the Inter-
Agency Committee that processes and evaluates because there may be some information dissemination
that are straight forward information dissemination. What the AO 2006 is... trying to prevent is any
material that will undermine the practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has authority or power to promulgate Rules
and Regulations regarding the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:... x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its
rule making authority when it totally banned advertising and promotion under Section 11 prescribed the
total effect rule as well as the content of materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and...
regulations?
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total absolute ban. Second, the Inter-
Agency Committee is under the Department of Health, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:... x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no absolute
ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes in the Revised Rules?
Yes, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:

But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes
intended for children two (2) years old and younger?
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency Committee that can evaluate
some advertising and promotional materials, subject to the standards that we have stated earlier, which
are- they should not undermine breastfeeding, Your Honor.
x x x x... x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation with the other Sections,
particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your Honor, because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency Committee has
that power to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on advertisement regarding milk substitute
regarding infants two (2) years below?
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition, however, we take exceptions and
standards have been set. One of which is that, the Inter-Agency Committee can allow if the advertising
and promotions will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your
Honor.[63]
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval
or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk
Code, said provision must be related to Section 6 thereof which in turn... provides that the rules and
regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are
set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code, which, at the risk of being repetitious, and for easy
reference, are quoted hereunder:
SECTION 5. Information and Education... x x x x
on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of... breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and
the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative effect on breastfeeding of
introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision not to breastfeed; and (5)
where needed, the proper use of... infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-
prepared. When such materials contain information about the use of infant formula, they shall include
the social and financial implications of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding
methods; and, in... particular, the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and
other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use
of breastmilk substitutes.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Health Workers.
xxxx
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters and such information
shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is... equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall
xxxx
SECTION 10. Containers/Label
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and understandable message in
Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a label, which message can not readily become separated from it,
and which shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to the need for
its use and the proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing agency for the
enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In relation to such responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of
the Milk Code states that:
SECTION 5. Information and Education
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding,
for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the
planning, provision, design and dissemination of... information, and the control thereof, on infant
nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the standards set
forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or
other marketing materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which
reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be objective and
should not equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in
the advertising concept. It must not in any case... undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total
effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring better
health to the baby or other... such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising, promotion, and
marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control over the information content of
advertising, promotional and marketing materials on breastmilk... vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes,
supplements and other related products. It also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen
such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,[64] the Court held:... x x x [T]his Court
had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."[65]
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and
welfare.
With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health professionals, the Court also finds
that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b)[66] of
the Milk Code, in relation to Section
8(b)[67] of the same Code, allows dissemination of information to health professionals but such
information is restricted to scientific and factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of information to
health professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the
manufacturer and distributor of the products covered by the
Code in activities for the promotion, education and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said
provision cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of... information to health
professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.
Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)[68] of the Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and
distributors to extend assistance in research and in the continuing education of health professionals,
while Sections 22 and 32 of the RIRR absolutely forbid... the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i)[69]
of the RIRR prohibiting milk manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any policymaking body in
relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives should not form part of
any policymaking body or entity in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds
nothing in said provisions which contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it is the DOH which shall be principally responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide
which entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking bodies on... breastfeeding. Therefore, the
RIRR's prohibition on milk companies' participation in any policymaking body in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding is in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
reasearch assistance and continuing education to health professionals. Section 22[70] of the RIRR does
not pertain to research... assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it
deals with breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children. Nothing in Section 22 of the
RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance for research or continuing... education to health
professionals; hence, petitioner's argument against this particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 9[71] and 10[72] of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said sections of the RIRR
provide that research assistance for health workers and researchers may be allowed upon approval of an
ethics committee, and... with certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on the
recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research or educational
assistance may be given by milk companies or under what conditions health workers may accept the
assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research... done or
extent of assistance given by milk companies are completely in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 32[73] of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance,
support, logistics or training to health workers. This provision is within the prerogative given to the DOH
under Section 8(e)[74] of... the Milk Code, which provides that manufacturers and distributors of
breastmilk substitutes may assist in researches, scholarships and the continuing education, of health
professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Health, now DOH.
As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent with the Milk Code. Section
6(f) of the Milk Code provides that donations may be made by manufacturers and distributors of
breastmilk substitutes upon the request or with the approval of... the DOH. The law does not proscribe
the refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request
or accept such donations. The DOH then appropriately exercised its discretion through Section 51[75] of
the RIRR... which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations from manufacturers and
distributors of breastmilk substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR that any donation
from milk companies not covered by the Code should be coursed through the IAC which shall determine
whether such donation should be accepted or refused. As reasoned out by... respondents, the DOH is
not mandated by the Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be forced
to accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because
the Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from... refusing donations.
With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the
Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.[76] is misplaced. The glaring
difference in said case and the present case before the Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) was expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to impose fines and civil
penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by the same law the power to review on
appeal the order or decision of the CAA and to determine whether... to impose, remit, mitigate, increase
or compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the Court upheld the CAB's Resolution imposing
administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,[77] the Court upheld the
Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The
circular provided for fines... for the commission of prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the
circular contravened the law because the DOE was expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638
to impose fines or penalties.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the
authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose
such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this... regard, the DOH again exceeded
its authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is,
therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations. Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk
Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution of the violators of this Code and other pertinent
laws on products covered by this Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code... provides for the penalties to be
imposed on violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it,
to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to
this Code shall, upon conviction, be punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one (1) year
imprisonment or a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor... more than Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the offense be committed by a juridical person, the
chairman of the Board of Directors, the president, general manager, or the partners and/or the persons
directly responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to any health worker, distributor,
manufacturer, or marketing firm or personnel for the practice of their profession or occupation, or for
the pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of the Ministry... of Health, be suspended or
revoked in the event of repeated violations of this Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant
to this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is
frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with these revised rules and implementing regulations are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and
regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power
to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of... non-delegability and separability
of powers.[78] Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend,
revise, alter, or repeal the same.[79] This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in... formulating
and adjusting the details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law,[80] in
order to make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules
that prior issuances of administrative... agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or
modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and
in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are
in consonance with the Milk Code.
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:... x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be
implemented by the Respondents is unnecessary and oppressive, and is offensive to the due process
clause of the Constitution, insofar
Principles:
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Philippine Legal Guide
PILA Case Digest: Lim v. Executive Secretary (2002)
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause,
Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of
the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January
2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.
allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur
D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-
intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future
violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of
fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of
constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending
and there is no proof of direct personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for
each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed
on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All
other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains
provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the
cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize
the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the
meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken
into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention,
the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of
interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain
leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history
and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually
petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United
States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true
nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our
considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.
The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that
"[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which
shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme Court
shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a

subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory.
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Philippine Case Digests Databank
Wednesday, September 8, 2010

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Lex at 12:58 AM
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Political Law Case Digests
Wednesday, May 18, 2016
Gudani vs. Senga
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to
shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing,
President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing
Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October
2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service.
After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65,
on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges
against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and
on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of
their having testified before the Senate.
Issue:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank
promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all
the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline
and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the
armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President
to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to
pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court
is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent
from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of
the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy
lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There
is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and
respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence,
it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the
legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to
originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered
by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before
the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his
case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts
complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired
on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
Momlene at 11:04 AM
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Friday, December 21, 2012
GONZALES vs ABAYA Case Digest
EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.
FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including petitioners
herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody
confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the
explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended
the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP
Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and
directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other accused,
pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the
same military personnel.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed
with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all
the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.
Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the
JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before
the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners'
applications for bail.
Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-
Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident,
including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP.
The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead
of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the
Oakwood incident.
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that
the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in
the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of
coup d’état before the regular courts.
2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short,
the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative
of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from
the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of
military discipline.
Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC
in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration,
practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-
connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or
legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely
to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies
to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
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CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR
Published by paul on August 12, 2013 | Leave a response
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.
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Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
- October 01, 2012
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino

people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to certify food products as
halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others,
that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status
by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred status. Without
doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court
found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certificates.
Issue:
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State.
Held:
No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred
status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations
like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the Court
found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certificates.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead
allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find
no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of
their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos
can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the
market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not
encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
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Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017
Facts:
This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been
converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for
religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation
of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and
property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further
averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the
Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees;
and that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the
afternoon.
Issue:
Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution or system of religion.
Ruling:
The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and State.
The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if further
provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with
each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be
tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.
It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the
government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution provides
that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a
temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the
holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of itATTY. ABDUL MAHID M. ATI
Imbong vs Ochoa
Atty. Abdul Mahid M. Ati
2 years ago
Advertisements
JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA

Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court
to resolve some procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to
the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the
scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the
three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be
misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this
case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of
the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression,
as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this
Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed
to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and
it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity
not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –… in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint
or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule
of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any
one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner
Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right
to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH
Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section
7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used
to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken
in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section
11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty
to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as “health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which
the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Filipino activists dance in front of the Supreme Court during a protest on the eve of International
Women’s Day in Manila, Philippines on Friday, March 7, 2014. The group is asking the Supreme Court to
lift it’s order to indefinitely suspend the implementation of the Reproductive Health Law. (AP
Photo/Aaron Favila)
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Categories: CASE DIGESTS
Tags: abortifacient, Bar Review, imbong vs ochoa, judicial review, Jurisprudence, law student, lis mota,
msu college of law, reproductive health, RH Law, theory of implantation
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PINAY JURIST
BAR EXAM REVIEWERS AND CASE DIGESTS
— CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICAL LAW —
Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26, 2016 G.R. No. 212426 EDCA, Treaty, Executive Agreement,
International Agreement
AUGUST 22, 2018
FACTS:
This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in
Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that
EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section
25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally,
they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.
The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the
Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT
because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it
allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
RULING:
Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA
and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations
2. Rotational presence of personnel
3. U.S. contractors
4. Activities of U.S. contractors
We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The
very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive
agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in
painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal
mandate with which they are concluded.
As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and
works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of
existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.
They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international
agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter,
agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.
Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement
or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and
obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international
agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive.
There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and
translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are
products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely
executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being
on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.
Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an
executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the
whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices to state that this Court
remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.
We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
AUGUST 22, 2018
PINAYJURIST
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICAL LAW
EDCA, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, MDT, TREATY, VFA
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Proudly powered by WordPress | TheBUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR)

EMPLOYEES UNION v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169815, Aug. 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 134
Facts: The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Employees Union requested for a Food Basket
Allowance (FBA), with justifying the request on the high cost of living, and also relying on the Employees
Suggestions and Incentive Awards System, which: “includes the granting of incentives that will help
employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and
dedication to public service.” On post-audit, however, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication
Office (COA-LAO) disallowed the grant of the FBA ruling that it had no legal basis and violated the
General Appropriations Act of 1999. The BFAR moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the
disallowance, arguing that the grant would enhance the welfare and productivity of the employees. COA-
LAO denied the motion. The petitioner appealed to the COA-LAO but denied the decision, and likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the approval of the DA Undersecretary can authorize the release of the FBA.
Whether or not the disallowance is unconstitutional as it contravened the fundamental principle of the
State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: The petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit – Legal and
Adjudication Office dated April 8, 2005 and August 5, 2005, respectively, in LAO-N-2005-119, are
AFFIRMED.
Reason: Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16, all agencies are prohibited from granting “[…] any other
form of incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President.” In this case, no Administrative Order has been issued, therefore the claim has no merit.
Further, State principles and policies enumerated in Article II of the 1987 Constitution are the disregard
of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.“me: Anissa by AlienWP.google_plusShare1
Aula Regis Case Digests
Wednesday, February 22, 2017

G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.
Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.
Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
King Monteclaro-Montereal at 15:48
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143 November 16, 2011
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
DAN PADAO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 180849, petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) seeks the reversal of the December 14,
2006 Decision1 and October 2, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76584,
which upheld the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission, Cagayan de Oro City (NLRC) in its
October 30, 2002 Resolution,3 reversing the June 21, 2001 Decision4 of the Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA)
which found the dismissal of respondent Dan Padao (Padao) valid.
In G.R. No. 187143, PNB seeks the reversal of the December 9, 2008 Decision5 and February 24, 2009
Resolution6 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00945, which allowed the execution of the October 30, 2002
NLRC Resolution.
THE FACTS
A. G.R. No. 180849
On August 21, 1981, Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch. He was later
designated as a credit investigator in an acting capacity on November 9, 1993. On March 23, 1995, he
was appointed regular Credit Investigator III, and was ultimately promoted to the position of Loan and
Credit Officer IV.
Sometime in 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans." A certain Sih Wat Kai
complained to the Provincial Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) of Zamboanga del Norte that
anomalous loans were being granted by its officers: Assistant Vice President (AVP) and Branch Manager
Aurelio De Guzman (AVP de Guzman), Assistant Department Manager and Cashier Olson Sala (Sala), and
Loans and Senior Credit Investigator Primitivo Virtudazo (Virtudazo).
The questionable loans were reportedly being extended to select bank clients, among them Joseph
Liong, Danilo Dangcalan, Jacinto Salac, Catherine Opulentisima, and Virgie Pango. The exposé triggered
the conduct of separate investigations by the COA and PNB’s Internal Audit Department (IAD) from
January to August 1995. Both investigations confirmed that the collateral provided in numerous loan
accommodations were grossly over-appraised. The credit standing of the loan applicants was also
fabricated, allowing them to obtain larger loan portfolios from PNB. These borrowers eventually
defaulted on the payment of their loans, causing PNB to suffer millions in losses.
In August 1995, Credit Investigators Rolando Palomares (Palomares) and Cayo Dagpin (Dagpin) were
administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), in connection with an anomalous loan granted to the spouses, Jaime and Allyn Lim (the
Lims). These charges, however, were later ordered dropped by PNB, citing its findings that Dagpin and
Palomares signed the Inspection and Appraisal Report (IAR) and the Credit Inspection Report (CIR) in
support of the Lims’ loan application in good faith, and upon the instruction of their superior officers.
PNB also considered using Dagpin and Palomares as prosecution witnesses against AVP de Guzman, Loan
Division Chief Melindo Bidad (Bidad) and Sala.
The following month, September 1995, administrative charges for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty and Gross Violations of Bank Rules and Regulations and criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 3019
were filed against AVP de Guzman, Sala, Virtudazo, and Bidad. Consequently, they were all dismissed
from the service by PNB in November 1996. Later, Virtudazo was ordered reinstated.
On June 14, 1996, Padao and Division Chief Wilma Velasco (Velasco) were similarly administratively
charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, and violation of R.A. No. 3019.
The case against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a deceptively positive status of
the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of loan applicants Reynaldo and Luzvilla
Baluma and eleven (11) others. It was later found that either said borrowers’ businesses were
inadequate to meet their loan obligations, or that the projects they sought to be financed did not exist.
Padao was also accused of having over-appraised the collateral of the spouses Gardito and Alma Ajero,
the spouses Ibaba, and Rolly Pango.
On January 10, 1997, after due investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of
duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the bank’s Board of Directors. On
January 20, 1997, Velasco was also held guilty of the offenses charged against her, and was similarly
meted the penalty of dismissal. Her motion for reconsideration, however, was later granted by the bank,
and she was reinstated.
On October 11, 1999, after almost three (3) years of inaction on the part of the Board, Padao instituted a
complaint7 against PNB and its then AVP, Napoleon Matienzo (Matienzo), with the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IX in Zamboanga City for 1] Reinstatement; 2]
Backwages; 3] Illegal Dismissal; and 4] Treachery/Bad Faith and Palpable Discrimination in the Treatment
of Employees with administrative cases. The case was docketed as RAB 09-04-00098-01.
In a Decision dated June 21, 2001, the ELA found Padao’s dismissal valid. Despite the finding of legality,
the ELA still awarded separation pay of one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service, citing PLDT v.
NLRC & Abucay.8 The ELA held that in view of the peculiar conditions attendant to Padao’s dismissal,
there being no clear conclusive showing of moral turpitude, Padao should not be left without any
remedy.
Padao appealed to the NLRC, which, in its Resolution9 dated October 30, 2002, reversed and set aside
the ELA Decision and declared Padao’s dismissal to be illegal. He was thereby ordered reinstated to his
previous position without loss of seniority rights and PNB was ordered to pay him full backwages and
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
PNB’s Motion for Reconsideration10 was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution11 dated December 27,
2002.
Aggrieved, PNB filed a petition for certiorari12 with the CA but it was dismissed in a Decision13 dated
December 14, 2006. PNB moved for reconsideration14 but the motion was denied in the CA
Resolution15 dated October 2, 2007.
B. G.R. No. 187143
During the pendency of G.R. No. 180849 before the Court, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment on
September 22, 2003, certifying that on February 28, 2003, its October 30, 2002 Resolution had become
final and executory.16
On December 5, 2003, Padao filed a Motion for Execution of the NLRC Resolution dated October 30,
2002. This was granted by the ELA on April 22, 2004.
On May 4, 2004, PNB and AVP Matienzo sought reconsideration of the ELA’s Order based on the
following grounds: (1) the October 30, 2003 Resolution was inexistent and, thus, could not become final
and executory; and (2) Padao’s motion for execution was granted without hearing.
Acting thereon, the ELA denied PNB’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that motions for
reconsideration of an order are prohibited under Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
Thus, Padao filed his Motion to Admit Computation17 dated July 14, 2004. In its Comment,18 PNB
alleged that the computation was grossly exaggerated and without basis, and prayed for a period of
thirty (30) days within which to submit its counter-computation since the same would come from its
head office in Pasay City.
On September 22, 2004, the ELA issued the Order19 granting Padao’s Motion to Admit Computation.
The order cited PNB’s failure to submit its counter-computation within the two extended periods
(totaling forty days), which the ELA construed as a waiver to submit the same. Thus, the ELA ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution for the payment of backwages due to Padao in the amount of ₱
2,589,236.21.
In a motion20 dated September 29, 2004, PNB sought reconsideration of the order with an attached
counter-computation. The ELA denied the same in its Order21 dated October 20, 2004 on the ground
that the motions for reconsideration of orders and decisions of the Labor Arbiter are prohibited under
Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The ELA further stated that PNB had been given more
than ample opportunity to submit its own computation in this case, and the belatedly submitted
counter-computation of claims could not be considered. Thus, a writ of execution22 was issued on
October 21, 2004.
On November 11, 2004 and January 19, 2005, PNB filed its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and its
Motion to Dissolve Alias Writ of Execution, respectively. Both were denied by the ELA in an Order23
dated February 8, 2005.
On February 18, 2005, PNB filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal24 with the NLRC. On
September 20, 2005, however, the NLRC issued a Resolution25 dismissing the bank’s appeal. PNB’s
Motion for Reconsideration26 was also denied in the December 21, 2005 Resolution.27
Thus, on March 7, 2006, PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari28 with the CA, assailing the findings of ELA
Plagata and the NLRC.
In a Decision29 dated December 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition, and later denied PNB’s motion
for reconsideration on February 24, 2009.
ISSUES
In G.R. No. 180849, PNB presents the following Assignment of Errors:30
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE POSITION OF A CREDIT
INVESTIGATOR IS ONE IMBUED WITH [THE] TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF THE EMPLOYER.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING THE ACT OF FALSIFYING THE CREDIT AND APPRAISAL
REPORTS AND THAT OF MERELY AFFIXING ONE’S SIGNATURE IN A FALSE REPORT PREPARED BY ANOTHER
AS ONE AND THE SAME DEGREE OF MISCONDUCT WHICH WARRANTS THE SAME PENALTY.
In G.R. No. 187143, PNB presents the following Assignment of Errors:31
THE LABOR COURTS AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY INVARIABLY IGNORED PNB’S
COUNTER-COMPUTATION AND MERELY RELIED ON RESPONDENT DAN PADAO’S SELF-SERVING
COMPUTATION OF HIS MONEY AWARD.
THE LABOR COURTS AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE COMPUTATION OF
RESPONDENT PADAO WITHOUT REQUIRING PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
In G.R. No. 180849, PNB argues that the position of a credit investigator is one reposed with trust and
confidence, such that its holder may be validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. In
disciplining employees, the employer has the right to exercise discretion in determining the individual
liability of each erring employee and in imposing a penalty commensurate with the degree of
participation of each. PNB further contends that the findings of the CA are not in accordance with the
evidence on record, thus, necessitating a review of the facts of the present case by this Court.32
On the other hand, Padao counters that local bank policies implemented by the highest-ranking branch
officials such as the assistant vice-president/branch manager, assistant manager/cashier, chief of the
loans division and legal counsel, are presumed to be sanctioned and approved by the bank, and a
subordinate employee should not be faulted for his reliance thereon. He argues that a person who acts
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose cannot be held liable. PNB is
bound by the acts of its senior officers and he, like his fellow credit investigators, having acted in good
faith in affixing his signature on the reports based on the instruction, order and directive of senior local
bank officials, should not be held liable.33
Padao also claims that PNB cruelly betrayed him by charging and dismissing him after using him as a
prosecution witness to secure the conviction of the senior bank officials, that he was never part of the
conspiracy, and that he did not derive any benefit from the scheme.34
The Court’s Ruling
In the 1987 Constitution, provisions on social justice and the protection of labor underscore the
importance and economic significance of labor. Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor as a "primary
social economic force," and as such, the State is bound to "protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare." Moreover, workers are "entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage."35
The Labor Code declares as policy that the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.36
While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of
self-protection against acts inimical to its interest,37 the law sets the valid grounds for termination as
well as the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an employee.38
Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of an
employee except for a just or authorized cause.39 Such just causes for which an employer may terminate
an employee are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Further, due process requires that employers follow the procedure set by the Labor Code:
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.
xxx
b. Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant
to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing
a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving
that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of
the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor
and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor
dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
xxx
In this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of
the Labor Code.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties, while habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances.40
Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.41
In the case at bench, Padao was accused of having presented a fraudulently positive evaluation of the
business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma and eleven
other loan applicants.42 Some businesses were eventually found not to exist at all, while in other
transactions, the financial status of the borrowers simply could not support the grant of loans in the
approved amounts.43 Moreover, Padao over-appraised the collateral of spouses Gardito and Alma Ajero,
and that of spouses Ihaba and Rolly Pango.44
The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a bank’s business cannot be overestimated. The
amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends upon the report of the credit investigator on the
collateral being offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the borrower who may
just opt to have the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a hundredfold, it may lead to the
collapse of the bank. In the case of Sawadjaan v. Court of Appeals,45 the Court stressed the crucial role
that a credit investigator or an appraiser plays. Thus:
Petitioner himself admits that the position of appraiser/inspector is "one of the most serious [and]
sensitive job[s] in the banking operations." He should have been aware that accepting such a
designation, he is obliged to perform the task at hand by the exercise of more than ordinary prudence.
As appraiser/investigator, the petitioner was expected to conduct an ocular inspection of the properties
offered by CAMEC as collaterals and check the copies of the certificates of title against those on file with
the Registry of Deeds. Not only did he fail to conduct these routine checks, but he also deliberately
misrepresented in his appraisal report that after reviewing the documents and conducting a site
inspection, he found the CAMEC loan application to be in order. Despite the number of pleadings he has
filed, he has failed to offer an alternative explanation for his actions. [Emphasis supplied]
In fact, banks are mandated to exercise more care and prudence in dealing with registered lands:
[B]anks are cautioned to exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than
private individuals, "for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money
belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of
negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of
the land registration statute Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as
to mortgagees of the same character and description. It is for this reason that banks before approving a
loan send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and investigate who are the
true owners thereof.46
Padao’s repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted to gross
and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to perform
what he was employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in
damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of dismissal,
which it deemed appropriate given the circumstances.
The CA was correct in stating that when the violation of company policy or breach of company rules and
regulations is tolerated by management, it cannot serve as a basis for termination.47 Such ruling,
however, does not apply here. The principle only applies when the breach or violation is one which
neither amounts to nor involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a case, one cannot evade liability or
culpability based on obedience to the corporate chain of command.
Padao cited Llosa-Tan v. Silahis International Hotel,48 where the "violation" of corporate policy was held
not per se fraudulent or illegal. Moreover, the said "violation" was done in compliance with the apparent
lawful orders of the concerned employee’s superiors. Management-sanctioned deviations in the said
case did not amount to fraud or illegal activities. If anything, it merely represented flawed policy
implementation.
In sharp contrast, Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods
contained therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a credit
investigator.
Further, even Article 11(6) of the Revised Penal Code requires that any person, who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior does so for some lawful purpose in order for such person not to incur
criminal liability. The succeeding article exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force (Article 12, paragraph 6) or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury (Article 12, paragraph 7).
Assuming solely for the sake of argument that these principles apply by analogy, even an extremely
liberal interpretation of these justifying or exempting circumstances will not allow Padao to escape
liability.
Also, had Padao wanted immunity in exchange for his testimony as a prosecution witness, he should
have demanded that there be a written agreement. Without it, his claim is self-serving and unreliable.
That there is no proof that Padao derived any benefit from the scheme is immaterial.49 What is crucial is
that his gross and habitual negligence caused great damage to his employer. Padao was aware that there
was something irregular about the practices being implemented by his superiors, but he went along
with, became part of, and participated in the scheme.
It does not speak well for a person to apparently blindly follow his superiors, particularly when, with the
exercise of ordinary diligence, one would be able to determine that what he or she was being ordered to
do was highly irregular, if not illegal, and would, and did, work to the great disadvantage of his or her
employer.
PNB, as an employer, has the basic right to freely select and discharge employees (subject to the Labor
Code requirements on substantive and procedural due process), if only as a measure of self-protection
against acts inimical to its interests.50 It has the authority to impose what penalty it deems sufficient or
commensurate to an employee’s offense. Having satisfied the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process, it is thus left to the discretion of the employer to impose such sanction as it
sees befitting based on the circumstances.
Finally, Padao claims that he should be accorded the same treatment as his co-employees.51 As the ELA,
however, correctly observed:
[A]s pointed out by the respondents, the case of the complainant was different, and his culpability, much
more than his aforementioned co-employees.1âwphi1 In the case of Palomares and Dagpin, they were
involved in only one case of over-appraisal of collateral in the loan account of the spouses Jaime Lim and
Allyn Tan (Respondents’ Comments, p. 1), but in the case of complainant, his over-appraisals involved
three (3) loan accounts and amounting to ₱ 9,537,759.00 (Ibid.), not to mention that he also submitted
falsified Credit Investigation Reports for the loan accounts of seven (7) other borrowers of PNB (Ibid., pp.
1-2).
xxx
The number of over-appraisals (3) and falsified credit investigation reports (7) or countersigned by the
complainant indicates habituality, or the propensity to do the same. The best that can be said of his acts
is the lack of moral strength to resist the repeated commission of illegal or prohibited acts in loan
transactions. He thus cannot interpose undue pressure or coercion exerted upon [him] by his superiors,
to absolve himself of liability for his signing or countersigning the aforementioned falsified reports. It
may have been allowable or justifiable for him to give in to one anomalous loan transaction report, but
definitely not for ten (10) loan accounts. It is axiomatic that obedience to one’s superiors extends only to
lawful orders, not to unlawful orders calling for unauthorized, prohibited or immoral acts to be done.
In the case of Wilma Velasco, PNB did not pursue legal action and even discontinued the administrative
case filed against her because, according to PNB, she appeared to have been the victim of the
misrepresentations and falsifications of the credit investigation and appraisal reports of the complainant
upon which she had to reply in acting on loan applications filed with the PNB and for which such reports
were made. She was not obliged to conduct a separate or personal appraisal of the properties offered as
collaterals, or separate credit investigations of the borrowers of PNB. These functions pertained to PNB
inspectors/credit investigators, like the complainant. Unfortunately, the latter was derelict in the
performance of those duties, if he did not deliberately misuse or abuse such duties.
As can be seen, therefore, the complainant and Wilma Velasco did not stand on the same footing relative
to their involvement or participation in the anomalous loan transactions earlier mentioned. Therefore,
PNB cannot be faulted for freeing her from liability and punishment, while dismissing the complainant
from service. [Emphases supplied]
Given the above ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 180849, the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00945, an
action stemming from the execution of the decision in said case, must perforce be reversed.
However, Padao is not entitled to financial assistance. In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v.
NLRC,52 the Court reaffirmed the general rule that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of
trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral
character. These five grounds are just causes for dismissal as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
In Central Philippine Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes,53 cited in Quiambao v. Manila Electric
Company,54 we discussed the parameters of awarding separation pay to dismissed employees as a
measure of financial assistance:
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of
separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on serious misconduct or
willful disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willfull breach of trust; or commission
of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family – grounds under Art. 282 of the
Labor Code that sanction dismissal of employees. They must be judicious and circumspect in awarding
separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not
meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause of
labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we
should be more cautions in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are
unworthy of the liberality of the law.55 [Emphasis original. Underscoring supplied]
Clearly, given the Court’s findings, Padao is not entitled to financial assistance.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 180849 and G.R. No. 187143 are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 180849,
the December 14, 2006 Decision and the October 2, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76584 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In G.R. No. 187143, the December 9, 2008 Decision and the February 24, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00945 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The June 21, 2001 Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby ordered REINSTATED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of financial assistance is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special
Order No. 1152 dated November 11, 2011.
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), pp. 7-21. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.,
with Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
2 Id. at 22-23. Former Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with
Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
3 Id. at 54-61. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa, with Commissioner Oscar N. Abella,
concurring.
4 Id. at 102-112.
5 Id. (G.R. No. 187143), pp. 9-27. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with
Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ibañez, concurring.
6 Id. at 22-23. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justice
Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ibañez, concurring.
7 Id. (G.R. No. 180849), p. 100.
8 247 Phil. 641(1988), cited in G.R. No. 180849, rollo, p. 111.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), pp. 54-60. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa, with
Commissioner Oscar N. Abella, concurring.
10 Id. at 122-127.
11 Id. at 128.
12 Id. at 129-143.
13 Id. at 7-21.
14 Id. at 159-183.
15 Id. at 22.-23.
16 Id. (G.R. No. 187143), p. 11. The CA Decision (at footnote 7, p. 11) states that the date of the
Resolution, October 30, 2003, is clearly a typographical error. It should read October 30, 2002.
17 Id. at 87-89.
18 Id. at 91-92.
19 Id. at 94-96.
20 Id. at 97-98.
21 Id. at 106-107.
22 Id. at 108-110.
23 Id. at 111-112.
24 Id. at 113-130.
25 Id. at 131-139.
26 Id. at 140-148.
27 Id. at 149-151.
28 Id. at 152-165.
29 Id. at 9. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justice
Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ibañez, concurring.
30 Id. (G.R. No. 180849), at 35.
31 Id. (G.R. No. 187143), at 45.
32 Id. (G.R. No. 180849), at 35-36.
33 Id. at 362.
34 Id. at 364.
35 Spic N’ Span Services Corporation v. Paje, G.R. No. 174084, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 261, 269-270.
36 Article 3, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the Philippines), as amended.
37 Sawadjaan v. Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 552, 556 (2005), citing Filipro, Incorporated v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 70546, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 123.
38 Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. v. Pasawilan, G.R. No. 182397, September 14, 2011.
39 Article 279, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the Philippines), as amended.
40 AFI International Trading Corporation v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173256, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 347,
353-354, citing Genuino Ice Co., Inc. v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 147740, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 195, 205-
206.
41 Citibank v. Gatchalian, 310 Phil. 211, 217-218 (1995); National Bookstore v. CA, 428 Phil. 235, 245
(2002).
42 Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 11.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 498 Phil. 552, 560 (2005).
46 Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 630, 639-640 (1988), citing Tomas v. Tomas, G.R.
No. L-36897, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 280.
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 7.
48 260 Phil. 166 (1990), where the dismissed company cashier encashed two personal checks drawn by a
Reynaldo M. Vicencio with a combined value of US$1,200.00, on the recommendation of Fernando
Gayondato, the general cashier of Puerto Azul Beach Resort (a sister company of Silahis International
Hotel), and nephew of the Executive Vice President. It was shown in that case that Llosa-Tan initially
refused to encash the checks, citing the company policy prohibiting such transactions, but Gayondato
persisted, assuring her that the presentation of such checks was being done upon instructions of the
Executive Vice President.
49 Sawadjaan v. Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 552, 556 (2005).
50 Id., citing Filipro, Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229 Phil. 150 (1986). In Filipro
case (229 Phil. 150, 156-157[1986]), the Court also stated:
The initial decision of the Labor Arbiter decreeing the dismissal of private respondent herein is fully
justified by the provisions of Article 283 (c) of the Labor Code, already above quoted. Pronouncements
made by this Court in this regard are as follows:
"It is an established principle that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an

employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying loss of confidence in him
(International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967, 971-972
(1982); (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485; Galsim v. PNB, 23 SCRA 293; PECO v. PECO
Employees Union, 107 Phil. 1003; Nevans v. Court of Industrial Relations, 23 SCRA 1321; Gas Corporation
of the Philippines v. Inciong, 93 SCRA 652).
"A company has the right to dismiss its erring employees if only as a measure of self-protection against
acts inimical to its interest," (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil, 485 and International
Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo, G.R. No. 57429, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 967).
"We concede that the right of the employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to
regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. But much as we should
expand beyond the economic doxy, we hold that an employer cannot be legally compelled to continue
with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance towards his employer, and
whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law in protecting
the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." (Manila
Trading Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485, 486-487 (1940).
51 Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 44.
52 G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 171.
53 G.R. No. 163607, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 194.
54 G.R. No. 171023, December 18, 2009.
55 Supra note 53 at 207.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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Lawfool Insights
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec
Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010
Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables
include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general,
and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next
year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the
circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from
disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course
to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have
the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates
violate this constitutional provision?
CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service"
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.
This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most
probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of
the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
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DIVISION
[ GR No. 175210, Feb 01, 2016 ]
MARIO JOSE E. SERENO v. COMMITTEE ON TRADE +
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all information, but is
rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is
tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision rendered on October 16, 2006 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 268, in Pasig City[1] dismissing the petition for mandamus he had filed in his capacity as a citizen
and as a stakeholder in the Philippine petrochemical industry to compel respondent Committee on Tariff
and Related Matters (CTRM) to provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005 meeting; as well as
to provide copies of all official records, documents, papers and government research data used as basis
for the issuance of Executive Order No. 486.[2]
Antecedents
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA),
held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of
the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby
reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July 2005.[3]
On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical
Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector,
wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a
copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005.
Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter of June 20, 2005,[4] to wit:
With reference to your request for a copy of the minutes and resolution of the Committee on Tariff and
Related Matters (CTRM) meeting held on 23 May 2005, our Legal Staff advised that we cannot provide
the minutes of the meeting detailing the position and views of different CTRM member agencies. We
may, however, provide you with the action taken of the CTRM as follows:
"The CTRM agreed to reduce the CEPT rates on petrochemical resins and plastic products covered under
EO 161 from 7% / 10% to 5% starting July 2005, and to revert the CEPT rates on these products to EO 161
levels once the proposed naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation."
The CTRM has yet to confirm the minutes including the action taken during the said meeting since it has
not met after 23 May 2005.
The CTRM, again through Director Mendoza, sent a second letter dated August 31, 2005 as a response to
the series of letter-requests from the APMP, stating:
The CTRM during its meeting on 14 July 2005 noted that Section 3, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees provides that every department, office or agency shall provide official information,
records or documents to any requesting public (sic). However, the section also provides exceptions to the
rules, such as if '...(c) such information, record or document south (sic) falls within the concepts of
established privileged or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
jurisprudence...' The acknowledged limitations to information access under Section 3 (c) include
diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either House of
Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the Supreme Court (Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, 299 SCRA 744)
The CTRM is of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed-door cabinet meetings under Section 3
(c) of the IRR applies to the minutes of the meeting requested by APMP. In view thereof, the CTRM is
constrained [not] to provide the said minutes to the APMP.[5]
The APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM through Director Mendoza
reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of
the petitioner's Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern. However, the
CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by the APMP.[6]
The attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in
the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes. The
case was docketed as SCA No. 2903.
The APMP, through Paras and Concepcion I. Tanglao, respectively its Chairman and President at the time,
sent letters dated December 12, 2005[7] and January 10, 2006[8] to the Office of the President (OP),
stating the reasons why the recommendation of the CTRM should be rejected, but the OP did not
respond to the letters.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction dated January 3, 2006, to which the respondent filed its Opposition dated January 26, 2006
and Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 2006.[9]
Meanwhile, President Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 486,[10] dated January 12, 2006, to lift the
suspension of the tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN
Free Trade Area - Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme. The relevant portions of E.O.
No. 486 read:
WHEREAS, Executive Order 234 dated 27 April 2000, which implemented the 2000-2003 Philippine
schedule of tariff reduction of products transferred from the Temporary Exclusion List and the Sensitive
List to the Inclusion List of the accelerated CEPT Scheme for the AFTA, provided that the CEPT rates on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products will be reduced to 5% on 01 January 2003;
WHEREAS, Executive Order 161 issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the suspension of the application
of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain products in 2003 and 2004 only;
WHEREAS, the government recognizes the need to provide an enabling environment for the naphtha
cracker plant to attain international competitiveness;
WHEREAS, the NEDA Board approved the lifting of the suspension of the aforesaid tariff reduction
schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic products and the reversion of the CEPT rates on these
products to EO 161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines,

pursuant to the powers vested in me under Section 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978
(Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex "A" (Articles Granted Concession under the CEPT
Scheme for the AFT A) hereof, as classified under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978, as
amended shall be subject to the ASEAN CEPT rates in accordance with the schedule indicated in Column
4 of Annex "A". The ASEAN CEPT rates so indicated shall be accorded to imports coming from ASEAN
Member States applying CEPT concession to the same product pursuant to Article 4 of the CEPT
Agreement and its Interpretative Notes.
In its order of May 9, 2006, the RTC denied the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction but directed the parties to file their respective memorandums after noting that
the controversy involved a pure question of law.[11]
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its assailed decision on October 16, 2006[12] dismissing the petition for
mandamus for lack of merit. It relied on the relevant portions of Section 3 of Rule IV of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees), to wit:
Sec 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records and documents to
any requesting public except if:
xxxx
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established privilege or
recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions, orders, rulings, policies,
memoranda, etc.
and relevant portions of Section 7 (c) of the same law, viz.:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxxx
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information - Public officials and employees shall not use or
divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public either:
xxxx
(2) To the prejudice of public interest.[13]
The RTC declared that the "CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads or
secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications;"[14] and that the
record of the communications of such body "falls under the category of privileged information because
of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest."[15]
Hence, this appeal directly to the Court on questions of law.[16]
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues for resolution, namely:
Are meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof exempt from the Constitutional right of access to
information?
Assuming arguendo that the minutes of CTRM meetings are privileged or confidential, is such privilege
or confidentiality absolute?
Can privilege or confidentiality be invoked to evade public accountability, or worse, to cover up

incompetence and malice?[17]
In short, the issue is whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner
with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure. The request for information
was motivated by his desire to understand the basis for the CTRM's recommendation that allegedly
caused tremendous losses to the petrochemical industry through the issuance of E.O. No. 486.
In seeking the nullification of the assailed decision of the RTC, and the consequent release of the
minutes and the disclosure of all official records, documents, papers and government research data used
as the basis for the issuance of E.O. No. 486, the petitioner invokes the following provisions of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6713, thusly:
Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 6713:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials
and employees are under obligation to:
xxxx
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and
readily available for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.
Ruling of the Court
The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of full public disclosure in
all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the
Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a
democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be possible only if
the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But the people's right to
information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[18] the constitutional
guarantee to information "does not open every door to any and all information."[19] It is limited to
matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.[20] Likewise, the
State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.[21]
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus.
Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And,
secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern or public interest.[22] Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want
to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues
"naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[23] As such, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case to case
basis.
In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP, the petitioner has sought to obtain
official information dealing with the policy recommendation of the CTRM with respect to the reduction
of tariffs on petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the recommendation, which
would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought significant losses to the petrochemical
industry that undermined the industry's long-term viability and survival, but also conflicted with official
government pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments designed to support and develop an
integrated petrochemical industry. He has claimed that the implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively
deprived the industry of tariff support and market share, thereby jeopardizing large investments without
due process of law.[24]
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related materials,
and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the country. Thus,
the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth of our
country's economy easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or interest.
The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee
of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.[25] Equally excluded from
coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting
and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.[26] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[27] the Court has ruled that the right to information
does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"
which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings."[28] Likewise exempted from the right to information are "information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by
law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused."[29]
The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as a
closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its mandate
dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the information
withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were
directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State in the
conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 6713.[30]
The authority of the CTRM as the advisory body of the President and the NEDA is set forth in E.O. No.
230, series of 1987 (Reorganization Act of the National Economic and Development Authority), to wit:
SECTION 6. National Economic and Development Authority Inter-agency Committees. - To assist the
NEDA Board in the performance ol its functions, there are hereby created the following committees
which shall nereafter be under the direct control of the NEDA Board and shall submit all their
recommendations to the President for approval on matters involving their respective concerns. The
Chairman of these committees shall be designated by the President. The NEDA Board shall likewise
determine where the technical staff of the said committees shall be based.
xxxx
(e) Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (TRM) - The TRM to be composed of the Director-General of
the National Economic and Development Authority Secretariat, the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries
of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources and of Budget and
Management, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission shall have
the following functions:
(i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related matters, and on the effects on the
country of various international developments;
(ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for international economic
negotiations;
(iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for the country's tariff structure.
(underlining supplied)
The respondents are correct. It is always necessary, given the highly important and complex powers to fix
tariff rates vested in the President,[31] that the recommendations submitted for the President's
consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated. The Court has expressly recognized in Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority[32] that "a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power." In Almonte v.
Vasquez[33] the Court has stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly: "A President
and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."[34]
Without doubt, therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of ideas among the members of
the committee tasked to give tariff recommendations to the President were truly imperative.
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally
construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of
privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted
by specifying the grounds for the exemption.[35] In case of denial of access to the information, it is the
government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be
obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the coverage of the
constitutional guarantee.[36] We reiterate, therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein.
The respondents further assert that the information sought fell within the concept of established
privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No.
6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting being regarded as a closed-door Cabinet meeting.[37] The petitioner,
disagreeing, posits that R.A. No. 6713, by itself, neither provides exceptions to the constitutional right to
information nor specifies limitations on the State policy of full public disclosure; that the Implementing
Rules and Regulations went beyond the scope of R.A. No. 6713 in providing exceptions not covered by
the law; that the alleged closed-door Cabinet meeting exception, so as to fall within the ambit of Section
3(c) of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, was not established under settled policy or jurisprudence;
that the reliance on the rulings in Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari that declared the closed-door
Cabinet meeting as an exception to the right to information was misplaced considering that the
exception was not squarely in issue in those cases; that the pronouncement could only be regarded as
obiter dicta; that the closed-door Cabinet meeting exception, assuming though not admitting the same
to have been established by law or settled jurisprudence, could not be automatically applied to all the
CTRM meetings because the CTRM was different from the Cabinet inasmuch as two of its members,
namely, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission,
were not members of the President's Cabinet; and that the deliberations of the CTRM as a body merely
akin to the Cabinet could not be given the privilege and confidentiality not expressly provided for by law
or jurisprudence, most especially considering that only by legislative enactment could the constitutional
guarantee to the right to information be restricted.
We cannot side with the petitioner.
In Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita,[38] we have said that executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information, not to categories of persons. As such, the fact that some
members of the committee were not part of the President's Cabinet was of no moment. What should
determine whether or not information was within the ambit of the exception from the people's right to
access to information was not the composition of the body, but the nature of the information sought to
be accessed. A different holding would only result to the unwanted situation wherein any concerned
citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter of public concern and the State's
policy of full public disclosure, could demand information from any government agency under all
conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or recommendation of the latter.
In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the people and the interest of
the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the protection of the privilege of non-
disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as well as to
guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive public.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. 2903, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairman), Peralta,* Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
* Vice Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno, per the raffle dated November 7, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 37-39; penned by Judge Amelia C. Manalastas.

[2] Id. at 34.
[3] Id. at 18.
[4] Id. at 95.
[5] Id. at 20-21.
[6] Id. at 21.
[7] Id. at 40-51.
[8] Id. at 52-54.
[9] Id. at 79.
[10] Id. at 55-59.
[11] Id. at 79.
[12] Id. at 37-39.
[13] Id. at 38-39.

[14] Id. at 38.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 9-34.
[17] Id. at 24.
[18] No. L-721 19, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530.
[19] Id. at 540.
[20] Section 7 of Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[21] Section 28 of Article II, 1987 Constitution.
[22] Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 18.
[23] Id. at 541.
[24] Rollo, p. 128.
[25] Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299
SCRA 744, 763.
[26] Id. at 765.

[27] G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
[28] Id. at 188.
[29] Id.
[30] Section 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or
documents to any requesting public, except if:
(a) such information, record or document must be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
security or the conduct of foreign affairs
[31] Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
[32] Supra note 28, at 189.
[33] G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995, 244 SCRA 286.
[34] Id. at 295.
[31] Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
[33] G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995, 244 SCRA 286.
[34] Id. at 295.
[35] Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 51.
[37] Rollo, p. 180.
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2015 CASE DIGEST: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

Published by admin on January 17, 2016 | Leave a response

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.

FIRST ISSUE: No.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

A regulation is constitutional when:

Danger Board Amendment

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

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Posted in Case Digest, Political Law

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