SECTION 1

Marcos vs. Manglapus

177 SCRA 668/178 SCRA 760/G.R. No. 88211

October 27, 1989

FACTS: After he and his family spent a three-year exile in Hawaii, former President Ferdinand Marcos, in
his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on
the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose’s to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:

(1) YES. The Supreme Court well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which
justifies her act of banning the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President,
it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect
the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art.
12 (4).]
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." [Art. 13(2).]

On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."

[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived." [Art. 12(4).]

It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

(2) NO. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines.

The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This
is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the
federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as
not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened
by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions
where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the
constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept
suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is
implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited.