Republic of the Philippines

Office of the Prosecutor

Makati

TERESA DIEZ SOLERO,

Complainant,

NPS No. XV-05-INV-16C-1091

Versus For: Violation of Republic Act 7432

LUKE IVAN MORO,

Respondent.
x------------------------------------x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Respondent hereby respectfully files a Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution

(Annex “A”) of the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor on the above indicated case.

TIMELINESS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

The Resolution dated 25 July 2016 was received by the Respondent on 04 August 2016
and accordingly, this Motion for Reconsideration is seasonably filed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Respondent hereby assigns the following errors in the subject Resolution:

1. The Honourable Office of the Prosecutor erred in ruling that Respondent’s failure to
state his residential address authorizes the Office of the Prosecutor to file the criminal
information without the requisite compliance to the barangay conciliation proceedings.

2. The Honourable Office of the Prosecutor erred in ruling that the Respondent’s defense
of denial was not supported by clear and convincing proof.

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 3. The Honourable Office of the Prosecutor erred in ruling that the Respondent’s failure to
present any affidavit of a witness who could have corroborated his version of the
confrontation between him and complainant highlighted the weakness of respondent’s
denial.

DISCUSSION

I. THE CASE IS WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE REQUIREMENT

OF BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS AS BOTH
RESPONDENT AND COMPLAINANT ARE RESIDENTS OF
BARANGAY PINAGKAISAHAN, MAKATI.

1. For the record, Respondent, like the complainant is a resident of Barangay

Pinagkaisahan, Makati. His complete residential address is House No. 3600, P. Cortez
St., Barangay Pinagkaisahan, Makati. To support this claim, Respondent hereby attaches
the certification issued by the Chairman of the Barangay Pinagkaisahan (Annex “B”) his
proof of billing address from Globe Telecoms (Annex “C”) and his voter registration
(Annex “D”).

2. Respondent’s omission to state his residential address in his counter affidavit is due to
the fact that the original designation of the complaint in the complaint affidavit was for
Violation of Republic Act No. 7432 which is outside the ambit of barangay conciliation
proceedings and which makes the Respondent’s residential address an immaterial and
irrelevant information. For the information of the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor,
Violation of Republic Act No. 7432 is punishable by a fine of NOT LESS THAN fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(PhP100,000.00) while Adm. Circular No. 14-93 exempts from the requirements of the
barangay conciliation proceedings cases for offenses for which the law prescribes a fine
over five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00).

3. Thus, it was on this basis that the Respondent submitted his counter affidavit. He
included therein only information relevant to his defense on the charge of Violation of
Republic Act No. 7432. As his residential address was not relevant to the charge of
Violation of Republic Act No. 7432, the same was not stated in the counter affidavit.

4. And as correctly held by the Office of the Honourable Prosecutor, the Respondent is not
liable for Violation of Republic Act No. 7432. To the disappointment of the Respondent
however, the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor charges the Respondent for an
offense which is different from the crime designated in the complaint affidavit.

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5. While the Respondent recognizes the authority of the Honourable Office of the
Prosecutor to file a criminal information for an offense different from the crime
designated in the complaint, the same however resulted in changing the nature of the
offense from one where barangay conciliation is not required to one where barangay
conciliation is a requisite condition. By ruling that the criminal information should be on
the alleged commission of light oral defamation and not Violation of Republic Act 7432
as indicated in the complaint, the compliance to the barangay conciliation proceedings
and the residential address of the Respondent became relevant information in
determining the propriety of filing a criminal information.

6. However, instead of taking steps in knowing the residential address of the Respondent,
the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor merely stated in the Resolution that:

“Lastly, respondent failed to state his residential address in his affidavit, thus,
this Office could not determine the propriety of the case undergoing barangay
conciliation proceedings.”

-Paragraph 3, page 3 of the Resolution

(Emphasis supplied)

7. The highlighted portion of the above quoted excerpt of the Resolution is erroneous in so
many ways. Firstly, the Respondent is not required to state his residential address in his
counter affidavit. The Honourable Office of the Prosecutor is invited to review Section
3(c), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

“(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall
submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits
shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph
(a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to
dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

8. As can be gleaned from the provision of Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
nowhere was it provided that the Respondent should state his residential address in his
affidavit. As the same is not a required information that should be mandatorily supplied
by the Respondent, the Respondent in his discretion may choose not to include the
same as he is required only to provide relevant information in his defense. As
previously stated, when Respondent filed his counter affidavit, the complaint was for
Violation of Republic Act 7432. And as previously stated, the Respondent’s residential
address was not a relevant information in his defense for Violation of Republic Act 7432.
It was only when the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor ruled to file an offense
different from the offense charged in the complaint did the residential address of the

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 Respondent became a relevant and material information to determine the propriety of
the case undergoing barangay conciliation proceedings. While the Respondent respects
the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor’s authority to base the criminal information on
its interpretation of the allegations in the complaint and not on the crime designated,
the Respondent cannot be expected to know in advance how the Honourable Office of
the Prosecutor will interpret the allegation and accordingly to base his defenses based
on this advance knowledge of such interpretation.

9. Secondly, the above quoted excerpt of the Resolution suggests that the determination
of the propriety of the case undergoing barangay conciliation proceedings is dependent
on the information to be provided by the Respondent. This has no basis in law and
jurisprudence. To the contrary, the obligation to convey to the Honourable Office of the
Prosecutor the information on whether the complaint has complied with the requisite
barangay conciliation proceedings lies not with the Respondent but with the
Complainant and in case of FAILURE BY THE COMPLAINANT to do the same, the
jurisprudential ruling dictates that the proper action is dismissal of the complaint. To
this, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Leticia B. Agbayani vs. Court of Appeals,
Department of Justice and Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, G.R. No. 183623, 25 June 2012 is
controlling, to wit:

“The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the

complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of
excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation
process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been
reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed.

- Agbayani vs. CA
- supra.
- (emphasis supplied)

10. In the case at bar, the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b)
it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a
certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties and yet, in complete
contrast to the established ruling of the Supreme Court as quoted above, curiously the
Honourable Office of the Prosecutor did not dismiss the complaint but rather stated
that “this Office could not determine the propriety of the case undergoing barangay
conciliation proceedings”.

11. It is interesting to note that the ruling in Agbayani vs. CA is very much applicable in the
case at bar as it is also a case of Slander. It is further interesting to note that the
assigned Assistant City Prosecutor is not ignorant of the case Agbayani vs. CA as the
same was cited in the assailed Resolution, particularly in page 3 thereof.

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12. Thirdly, the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor is not deprived of any remedy under the
rules should he really obsessed in finding out the Respondent’s residential address. To
this end, Section 3(e) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is enlightening, to wit:

“(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and
issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be
present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the
counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the
period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.”

- Sec. 3(e), Rule 112,

- Rules of Court
- (emphasis supplied)

13. As provided by the rules, the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor could have conducted a
clarificatory hearing where he could have determined the Respondent’s residential
address to satisfy his desire for such information.

14. Fourthly, is Respondent’s residential address really necessary before the Honourable
Office of the Prosecutor could determine the propriety of the case undergoing barangay
conciliation proceedings? Are the facts contained in the complaint alone not sufficient
for the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor to determine on the propriety of the case
undergoing barangay conciliation proceedings?

15. In the caption of the Complainant’s complaint, it stated the title as “Dr. Teresa Diez
Solero, Graduate Lecturer, College of Education (COE), University of Makati (UMAK),
Fort Bonifacio, City of Makati, Complainant versus Mr. Luke Ivan Moro, UMAK
Employee, Assigned Head Publication (sic), University of Makati (UMAK), Fort Bonifacio,
City of Makati, Respondent”.

16. As clearly indicated in the title, this is a dispute between two employees of the
University of Makati. One, a Graduate Lecturer from the College of Education and the
other, the Head of Publication. A dispute between co-workers. Under Section 409 (d)
of the Local Government Code of 1991, disputes “arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study,
shall be brought in the Barangay where such workplace or institution is located.” (emphasis
supplied).

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17. Thus, the facts that the Complainant and the Respondent are both employed at the
University of Makati and that the dispute arose at the workplace are sufficient to
determine that the Complaint should comply with the requisite barangay conciliation
proceedings and that the proper venue should be the barangay where the University of
Makati is located. The Respondent can’t help but beg the question, under what
authority of the law did the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor based its statement in
the Resolution that since “respondent failed to state his residential address in his
affidavit, thus, this Office could not determine the propriety of the case undergoing
barangay conciliation proceedings?”

18. The fact that both the Complainant and the Respondent are employees of the University
of Makati are not alien to the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor as the 2 nd and 3rd
Paragraph of Page 1 of the Resolution states the following:

“Complainant avers that she is a retired dean of the College of Arts,

Sciences and Education of and presently, a graduate lecturer at the
University of Makati. …..xxxxxx…”

“In August 2015, ………..xxxxxxxx………However, Llorca received a letter

from the respondent who was in charge of Publications in the
university, telling her that respondent was denying the publication of her
work.

- 2nd and 3rd Paragraph

- Page 1 of the Resolution
- (emphasis supplied)

19. Put simply, the Assigned Assistant City Prosecutor was well aware that both the
Complainant and the Respondent are employees of the same workplace, that Section
409 (d) of the Local Government Code dictates that disputes arising from the workplace
where the contending parties are employed shall be brought to the barangay where
such workplace is located and yet made the conclusion that “this Office could not
determine the propriety of the case undergoing barangay conciliation proceedings”.
What a sad day for the law.

20. Thus, even if the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor disregard the Respondent’s
submission of proof of residential address in this Motion for Reconsideration, it has no
other recourse available in law but to acknowledge that considering the facts in the
complaint alone, the case is covered by the requisite barangay conciliation proceedings
if the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor persists in finding the Respondent liable for
an offense subject to the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings. Further,

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 considering the facts in this case, the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor has likewise
no other recourse but to declare that there was no compliance with the requisite
barangay conciliation proceedings.

21. Thus, premises considered, based on the requirement of compliance to the barangay
conciliation proceedings alone, there exists sufficient grounds to justify the immediate
dismissal of this complaint and the reversal of the assailed Resolution of the Honourable
Office of the Prosecutor.

II. THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT

WAS SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF.

22. In the 10th Paragraph, Page 2 of the Resolution, the defense of denial put up by the
Respondent was considered inherently weak and undeserving of greater weight if the
same was not substantiated by clear and convincing proof citing the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Cortez, G.R. 183819, 23 July 2009.

23. It appears however that the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor has not fully appreciated
the substance of the established jurisprudential ruling on the defense of denial. Denial
is not inherently weak. It is bare denial or mere denial which is inherently weak. This is
the reason why the Supreme Court in a long line of cases further qualifies it by stating
that denial is weak WHEN NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF. It
is the qualification highlighted in the preceding sentence that makes a denial a BARE
DENIAL.

24. This blind application of the jurisprudential ruling on the defense of denial, this over
simplification to avoid in depth analysis of the facts, and this inside the box thinking is
strongly discouraged by the Supreme Court. Courts and tribunals are not robotic
entities designed to dispense over the counter solutions with no regard to specific facts.
This conventional thinking on the defense of denial has plagued the judicial system and
the prosecutors to which the Supreme Court has already issued a guideline on its proper
application. To this end, the ruling of the court in Antonio Lejano vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. 176389, 14 December 2010 is illustrative, to wit:

“The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak
Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against
Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela
and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.
Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were
fabricated.

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 But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if
the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial
and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been
made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him
do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an
alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking,
however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is
really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast
tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to
quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a
witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying
witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can.
The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did
it!" without blinking an eye.

- Lejano vs. People of the

Philippines
- supra.
- (emphasis supplied)

25. In the case at bar, the Respondent did not just issue a bare denial but rather he issued a
specific denial that he did not act arrogantly, disrespectfully, abnormally, abusively or in
any manner as the complainant described in her complaint and set forth that he acted
professionally and firmly in his transaction with the Complainant and the Complainant’s
daughter, Juvy Llorca (Llorca). To support this claim, the Respondent has attached his
two letters to Llorca (Annex “1” (24 August 2015 Letter) and Annex “2” (03 November
2015) of the Respondent’s Counter Affidavit). To this day, the Respondent maintains
that he acted in that meeting with the Complainant on that day of 06 November 2015 in
the same spirit and tenor of the aforementioned letters.

26. Had the assigned Assistant City Prosecutor exercised a more prudent, exhaustive,
careful and intellectual analysis of the facts, he could have realize that it is actually the
Complainant who had been more vile and intemperate in her language. Had only the
assigned Assistant City Prosecutor conducted a more thorough analysis of the
Complainant’s Complaint Affidavit, Reply and other letters by the Complainant as
against the Respondent’s letters to Llorca and his Counter Affidavit, it should not be very
difficult to see who between the Respondent and the Complainant has the tendency to
resort to foul language.

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27. The Supreme Court in the same Lejano vs. People of the Philippines case has in fact
issued a guideline as to how a witness’, in this case the complainant, testimony should
be treated in a case where an accused, in this case the Respondent, defense is anchored
on denial, to wit:

“Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two

criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a

credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually
based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its
weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about
something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.”

- Lejano vs. People of the

Philippines
- Supra
- (emphasis supplied)

28. For this purpose, a review of the Complainant’s series of allegations against the
Respondent is in order. A careful reading would reveal that these allegations are best
described as an incoherent ramblings and accusations devoid of any rational order. A
summary of these incoherent ramblings and accusations characterized by Complainant’s
use of intemperate language are compiled as follows:

i. That Respondent allegedly maliciously and capriciously antagonized,

humiliated, embarrassed and sexually harassed her daughter on 05
November 2015 (Page 1, Complaint Affidavit).
ii. That Respondent allegedly acted in a morally upright manner and
abnormally shouted at her (Page 1, Complaint Affidavit).
iii. That Respondent allegedly made disgraceful utterances and even
motioned to physically attack the Complainant (Page 2, Complaint
Affidavit).
iv. That Respondent allegedly scandalously exhibited capricious arrogance,
disgraceful utterances and disrespectful acts and actuations (Page 2,
Complaint Affidavit).
v. That Respondent is allegedly known for his capricious arrogance,
sarcasm, whimsical and scandalous manners in dealing with most
employees. That Respondent makes it appear that it is his major role to

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 stress people with his known irregular characteristics highly prohibited
in public service since he is well – protected by known UMAK
personalities (Page 2, Complaint Affidavit).
vi. That Respondent allegedly scandalously attack (sic) both the
Complainant and her daughter Llorca (16 December 2015 letter of the
Complainant to Engr. Sheila Villanueva, attached as Annex “A” of the
Complaint Affidavit).
vii. That Respondent allegedly is alien to the basic tenets and ethics of
educational research. That Respondent is in constant unreasonable
conflicts with some UMAK employees due to his known arrogance,
sarcastic, whimsical and self-motivated acts and actuations. That the
Respondent allegedly has annoying and stressful characteristics and that
allegedly Respondent’s major role is to stress people. That Respondent
allegedly turbulently attacked Llorca’s credibility. That Respondent
allegedly has ignominious acts and actuations (09 November 2015 letter
of the Complainant to Prof. Ramila Cruzado, attached as Annex “C” of the
Complaint Affidavit).
viii. That Respondent was allegedly designated with controversy and only to
serve the purpose of wrecking havoc to the good order of the University
operation (01 December 2015 letter of the Complaint to Porf. Ramila
Cruzado, attached as Annex “D” of the Complaint-Affidavit).
ix. That Respondent was allegedly moved from one office to another in so
short a time due to his reported unwanted conflicts with people he is
working with. That Respondent is allegedly a roaming monster
terrorizing his opponents (Page 2 of the Complainant’s Reply).

29. Basically, what the assailed Resolution would have us believe is that these incoherent
ramblings devoid of rational order comes from a credible witness. What the assailed
Resolution would have us believe is that a person who alleges that the Respondent
sexually harassed her daughter and thus the Complainant files an action for Violation of
Republic Act 7432 is a credible witness and not someone making bewildering claims.
What the assailed Resolution would have us believe is that a person who described the
Respondent as abnormal with annoying and stressful characteristics has in fact the right
to file an action for oral defamation. What the assailed Resolution would have us
believe is that a person who described the Respondent as a roaming monster has in fact
the right to file an action for oral defamation. What the assailed Resolution would have
us believe is that the Complainant is credible despite her describing the Respondent as a
terrorizing employee wrecking havoc to the good order of the University yet the records

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 show that the Respondent has in fact been regularly designated to key positions in the
University since 2006.

30. What is clear is that the above mentioned incoherent ramblings of the Complainant
perfectly fits the ruling in Lejano vs. People of the Philippines that non-credible witness
makes bewildering claims.

31. To guide the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor in evaluating this case, this case is
simply a product of an over protective mother out to persecute the Respondent to
satisfy her childish daughter who is not mature enough to handle a rejection and
constructive criticism. By allowing this case to go further, the Honourable Office of the
Prosecutor is encouraging the Complainant to bully those who set high standards – to
which her daughter, a doctorate degree holder who remains a casual employee despite
her long years in service, just can’t seem to satisfy.

III. THE NON SUBMISSION OF THE RESPONDENT OF

AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES WHO COULD CORROBORATE HIS VERSION
OF THE CONFRONTATION IS NOT FATAL TO HIS DEFENSE.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF REMAINS WITH THE COMPLAINANT.

32. The assigned Assistant City Prosecutor faults the Respondent for his non-submission of
affidavits of witnesses who could corroborate his version of the confrontation. This
begs the question, has the Complainant submitted affidavits of eye witnesses to
corroborate her version of the confrontation?

33. To answer the question raised in the previous paragraph, a review of the Complainant’s
annexes is in order. In the Complainant’s Complaint-Affidavit, Complainant attached the
following annexes:

a. Annex “A” – 16 December 2015 letter of the Complainant to Engr. Sheila

Villanueva.
b. Annex “A-1” – 19 August 2015 letter of Juvy Llorca to Engr. Sheila Villanueva.
c. Annex “A-2” – 05 August 2015 letter of Engr. Sheila Villanueva to Juvy Llorca.
d. Annex “B” – 05 November 2015 letter of Juvy Llorca to the Respondent and Mr.
John Paul Dagum.
e. Annex “C” – 09 November 2015 letter of the Complainant to Prof. Ramila
Cruzado.
f. Annex “D” – 01 December 2015 letter of the Complainant to Prof. Ramila
Cruzado.

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34. In the Complainant’s Reply, she submitted the following annexes:

a. Annex “A” – copy of the Complaint Affidavit.

b. Annex “B” – 14 January 2016 letter of Atty. Leilanie Bernadette Cabras to the
Honourable Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
c. Annex “C” – 14 January 2016 letter of Atty. Leilanie Bernadette Cabras to the
Honourable University President of the University of Makati.
d. Annex “D” – 24 August 2015 letter of the Respondent to Juvy Llorca.
e. Annex “E” – 03 November 2015 letter of the Respondent to Juvy Llorca.
f. Annexes “F”, “G”, “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”, “L” and “M” - various Board Resolutions of
the University of Makati Board of Regents pertaining designation of University
Officials.
g. Annex “N” – 18 April 2016 letter of Ellen Ruth Punzalan to the Respondent.
h. Annex “O” – 21 April 2016 Affidavit of Ma. Margarita Majella Solis stating her
previous history with the Respondent and that her “friends in the main Library
narrated to her” how the Respondent equally maliciously attacked the
Complainant on 06 November 2015.
i. Annex “P” – 26 April 2016 Affidavit of Juvy Llorca stating her history with the
Respondent and how she learned of the incident on 06 November 2015 “from
those who were able to receive the information”.

35. As can be gleaned from the above enumeration of the Complainant’s annexes, she has
submitted only two affidavits of “witnesses” who stated that they learned of the
incident on 06 November 2015 confrontation between the Complainant and the
Respondent from those who were present. Suffice it to say, Complainant’s “witnesses”
has offered nothing but hearsay version of the 06 November 2015 incident. In
conclusion, the Complainant has likewise not submitted any affidavit of an eye witness
to corroborate her version of the story.

36. As both Complainant and Respondent failed to submit affidavits of witnesses to

corroborate their respective version of the 06 November 2015 incident, the obvious
next question is – whose failure is more significant? The answer lies on who has the
burden of proof between the Complainant and the Respondent.

37. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law (Sec. 1, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court). Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him
who asserts it, not upon him who denies, since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact
cannot produce any proof of it (MOF Company vs. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, G.R.
172822, 18 December 2009).

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38. Following the above quoted jurisprudential ruling, since the Complainant asserts the
commission of an offense by the Respondent and the latter raises the defense of denial, the
burden of proof lies with the Complainant. It is thus devoid of any legal basis to declare
Respondent’s non-submission of affidavits of witnesses to corroborate his version of the story
as fatal to his defense as it would in effect shift the burden of proof upon the Respondent which
is clearly in contrast to the guidelines set forth in the above quoted ruling of the Supreme Court.

39. The value of the fact that it should be the Complainant who should produce affidavits of
witnesses to corroborate her version of the story cannot be more emphasized
considering that the offense to which the Respondent was said to have been found
liable is oral defamation.

40. Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral
defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood (Noel Villanueva vs. People of the Philippines and
Yolanda Castro, G.R. 160351, 10 April 2006). As slander is basically libel, the
requirement of publication in libel is likewise a requirement in slander. This legal fact
was even acknowledged in the assailed Resolution in the following wise:

“xxxxx. As averred by complainant this was heard by the persons who

were at the library at that time, thus, the requirement of publication is
present. “

- Paragraph 2, Page 3
- Assailed Resolution
- (emphasis supplied)

41. However, what bothers the Respondent is not that whether publication is a requirement
in oral defamation. Rather it is the fact that the assailed Resolution declared that the
requirement of publication was sufficiently met by the mere averment by the
Complainant that the 06 November 2015 confrontation between the Complainant and
the Respondent was heard by the persons who were at the library at that time. Again,
what a sad day for the law.

42. The Supreme Court in a long line of cases has repeatedly held that allegations are not
evidence. In slander the requirement of publication is not sufficiently satisfied by the
mere averment of the Complainant that it was so. For as such, this would run in
complete contradiction that allegations are not evidence. Indeed, what a sad day for
the law.

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 43. In conclusion, the Respondent would like to ask the Honourable Office of the Prosecutor
to re-evaluate the assailed Resolution based on the merit or lack thereof of the
Complaint. For, settled is the rule that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall in its own merits, and it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the assailed

Resolution be reversed and the Complaint be immediately dismissed for lack of merit.

Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

10 August 2016, City of Makati.

LUKE IVAN B. MORO

Respondent
0927 999 6135

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ________ day of August 2016 at the City
of Makati.

I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and that I am satisfied that
he has voluntarily executed and fully understood his Motion for Reconsideration.

Copy Furnished:

TERESA DIEZ SOLERO

Unit 302 Rockfort Residences
Kalayaan Avenue, Brgy. Pinagkaisahan
Makati City

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 EXPLANATION OF SERVICE

For lack of available messengerial service to effect personal service to the Complainant,
a copy of this Motion for Reconsideration is served to the Complainant by way of registered
mail with return card.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
IN THE CITY OF ____________________ )S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, LUKE IVAN B. MORO, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with residential address at 3600
P. Cortez St., Pinagkaisahan, Makati City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law do hereby depose and say that:

I have today served by registered mail with return card to:

TERESA DIEZ SOLERO REG. RECEIPT NO. _______________

Unit 302 Rockfort Residences DATE:_________________________
Kalayaan Avenue, Brgy. Pinagkaisahan PLACE:________________________
Makati City

Copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in the case TERESA DIEZ SOLERO versus LUKE
IVAN MORO docketed as NPS-XV-05-INV-16C-1091 for Violation of Republic Act 7432 as
evidenced by the Registry Receipt indicated opposite her name copy of which is attached in the
original copy of said pleading.

I am executing this Affidavit of Service to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and
for any legal purposes it may serve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this _________ day of

August 2016 in the City of __________________.

LUKE IVAN B. MORO

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______day of August 2016, in the City of
____________________, affiant exhibiting to me his ______________________________ with
No. ____________________________ issued on _________________________ at
___________________________ with validity until ___________________________.

Doc. No._____________
Page No. ____________
Book No. ____________
Series of 2016

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