Define: a.
Political Law—is that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and
defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.
(PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO, 43 Phil. 887)
b. Constitutional Law
c. Constitution
d. Administrative Law
e. Law of Public Officers
f. Law on Public Corporations
g. Election Law
h. Distinction between Political Law and Constitutional Law
2. Read: MACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77
The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges, justices,
etc., (public officers) from engaging in business within the territorial
jurisdiction of their courts is political in nature and therefore, said provision
was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty from Spain
to the United States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed
abrogated if there is a change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted under the
new sovereign, the same is without force and effect.
3. The Supremacy of the Constitution
Read: 1. MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228
2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry
out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision, which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action.
4. Kinds of Constitution
a) written or unwritten
b) rigid and flexible
c) cumulative or conventional
5. AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Art.
XVII)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
[1] The Congress upon a vote of ¾ of all its Members; or
[2] A constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein. No
amendment under this Section shall be authorized within five (5) years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
Section 3. The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of all its members, cal a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit
to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
ninety days after the certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of
the petition.
NOTE: Amendments to, or revision of the Constitution is VALID only
when approved by a majority of the votes cast during the plebiscite, not by
the votes of the Members of Congress.
2. Read: R.A. 6735
Requisites for a valid people’s initiative to amend the Constitution;
distinctions between amendment and revision.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO , together with
6,327,952 registered voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160
Carpio, J.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the
COMELEC to amend the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles
VI and VII to replace the present Presidential-Bicameral system of
government to Parliamentary-Unicameral system using Section 2, Art. XVII
of the Constitution. Petitioners claim that their petition was signed by
6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes over
12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3%
of the registered voters in every legislative district signed the same in
accordance with Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to
change the Constitution involves sections 1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of
Article VII and an Article XVII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. The
petitioners prayed with the COMELEC that after due publication of their
Petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters’ ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
The COMELEC dismissed the petition citing SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC,
270 SCRA 106 where it was held that:
RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the
Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system under
Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. x x x .
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry the purposes of this act.
Considering the said dismissal, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court on Certiorari and Mandamus alleging rave abuse of
discretion and to set aside the COMELEC’ Decision and to compel the
latter to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Issues:
1. WHETHER THE LAMBINO GROUP’S PETITION COMPLIES
WITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE;
2. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS RULING IN
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, DECLARING THAT RA NO.
6735 “INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL
TERMS AND CONDITIONS” TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVE
CLAUSE ON PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION; and
3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE LAMBINO
GROUP’S PETITION.
H E L D:
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements
of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even
no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. As such, there is likewise no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Section provides:
“Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.”
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the
meaning of the amendment “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition”. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want
to propose a constitutional amendment. IS THE DRAFT OF THE
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT READY TO BE
SHOWN TO THE PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE ASKED TO SIGN?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and
shown to them before they sign? Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President…As it is
envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the
people “before they sign such proposal”. The framers plainly stated that
“before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare the proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” IS THAT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL ON ITS
FACE IS A PETITION BY THE PEOPLE. This means two (2) essential
elements must be present:
1. The people must author and must sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign for and on their behalf;
2. As an initiative upon a petition, THE PROPOSAL MUST BE
EMBODIED IN A PETITION.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who will express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETIITON “ ONLY IF THE PEOPLE SIGN ON A PETITION
THAT OCNTAINS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS.
The petitioners bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of
the document containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people
signed initiative petition without knowing the actual amendments
proposed in the said initiative. Instead , the alleged 6.3 million people who
signed the petition had to rely the representations of Atty. Lambino.
Clearly, Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories,
and even the entire nation.
2. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress
and a Constitutional Convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. This is clear under Section 1 of Art. XVII of
the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art.
XVIII clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to
the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments. The two are distinguished as follows:
“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document
[Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But
whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as
an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried
out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or
suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.
“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or
only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to
consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts
of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on
account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997 & June 10, 1997
RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the
Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system. Section
2 Art. XVII is not self-executory and unless Congress provides for its
implementation , it would remain in the cold niche of the Constitution. RA
6735 in all its 23 sections mentions the word “Constitution” only in section
2 and Section 3 as compared to the initiative on “statutes” and local
legislation. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on
this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry the purposes of this act.
Enumerate the steps to be followed and the requisites to be met in order that
the people may proposed the amendments, repeal, amend or enact a law or
provision of the Cnstitution.
3. What are the different modes of amending the constitution? Distinguish
“Revision” from “amendment” of the Constitution.
“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document
[Constitution]. It may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions. But
whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as
an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried
out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or
suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.
“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or
only a few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to
consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts
of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on
account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect. (SINCO, Vicente,
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW)
4. Read: a) MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
b) GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
There is no prohibition for Congress to propose amendments to
the Constitution and at the same time call for the convening of a
Constitutional Convention to amend the Constitution. The word “or” in the
provision “…Congress, upon a vote of ¾ of all its members; OR [2] A
constitutional Convention” under Section 1, Art. XVII also means “AND”.
c) TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
“Doctrine of Proper Submission” means all the proposed
amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the
ratification or rejection at the same time, not piecemeal.
d) SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
e) ALMARIO vs. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69
If the question regarding the proposed amendment to the Constitution
deals with its “necessity, expediency or wisdom”, the same is political in
nature and beyond the power of the courts to decide.
f) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 ACRA
106
Purpose and Effect of a Preamble.
WE, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that
shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
2. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201
It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and
civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the
lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should
be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not
mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of 4. Read: The Law of the Sea: Its major implications to the Philippines, by
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human Justice Jorge R. Coquia, p. 31, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 8, No.1.
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the 5. R.A. 3046
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
R.A. 5446
Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to 6. Definitions:
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime
of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested reliance upon a. Territorial sea
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain b. Internal or inland waters
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. c. high seas or international seas

ARTICLE I – THE NATIONAL TERRITORY d. sea-bed

Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine Archipelago, with e. sub-soil
all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
f. Insular shelves
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, g. other submarine areas
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines. 7. Reason and effect of having an Article on the National Territory.

1. What is the most significant change in this Article, compared with those 8. Read:
of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions?
1) Presidential Decree No. 1596 – June 11, 1978 (Making the Kalayaan
2. What is the archipelago theory or archipelagic doctrine? Island Group [Freedomland] as part of the Philippine Territory)

3. Methods used in fixing the baseline from which the territorial belt is 2) Presidential Decree No. 1599 – June 11, 1978 (Declaring the Exclusive
measured: Economic Zone of the Philippines which is 200 nautical miles from its
baseline)
a. The normal baseline method

b. The straight baseline method

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
b.Manifestations of a republican state.
The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is
“essentially presidential with parliamentary features.”
2. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418
The form of government is “essentially parliamentary with presidential
features.”

c. Define “state” g. Two-fold function of the government

COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23 Read:

d. Elements of a state. Define each: 1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely
directory] and Constituent [Mandatory] Functions)
1. people
2) ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649
2. territory
Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of the
3. sovereignty government as classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant.

4. government h. Parents Patriae

e. Different meanings of the word “people” as used in the constitution: Read:

1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2); 1) GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738

2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7); 2) CABANAS VS. PILAPIO, 58 SCRA 94

3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4) i. De jure govt.? De facto govt.?

f. Presidential & parliamentary forms of government Read:

Read: 1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect)

1. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160
757
A government formed as a result of a people’s revolution, is considered de
jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or other countries like
the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.
3. Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra.
j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?
Read: CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113
There are several kinds of de facto governments.
a. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that
government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself
against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.
b. The second is that which is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war,
and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of
Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of
1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the
troops of the United States.
c. And the third is that established as an independent government by
the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state
of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not
concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second
and third kinds of de facto governments.
“But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated
a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations,
such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the
freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied,
are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation.
Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a
matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual
for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue
administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their
posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required
to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil
authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These
principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have
considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and
applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to
occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor
for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and
limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws
war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the
writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of
nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which
regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts
so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his
pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being
de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-
known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in
international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an
enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of
acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are
not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that
they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts
done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of
municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a
community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state
and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for
example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it
would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon
criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive
government .” (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the
occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same
war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has
acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the
Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the
Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
(Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
l. Sovereignty:
1. legal
2. political
m. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation?
Read:
1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 30 SCRA
968
“By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely
consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency.
The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases
as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United
States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The
first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty.” “Nothing is
better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme,
its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it
applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty.” Then came this
paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: “It is to be admitted
any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of
its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.” The
opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most
diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.
2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476
3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397
2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
police, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations.
a. difference between aggressive & defensive war
b. Read:
1) MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70
The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it
is a generally accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be
applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner so that it would be a violation of
the said international law to detain him for an unreasonable length of time
since no vessel from his country is willing to take him.
“The meaning of “reasonable time” depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of
transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government
desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people’s
expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of
exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption
assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is
really trying to expedite the expulsion of this petitioner. On the other hand,
the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since the
last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected
opportunities to send him abroad. And unless it is shown that the deportee is
being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for
deportation 3 or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or
unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not
interfere.
2) KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second
only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who
were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and
thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan
to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of
full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce
the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes
against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember
what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
3) SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121
4) AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195
The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part
of the law of the Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle
of international law in accordance with the Incorporation clause of the
Constitution.
5) REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds
support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance
between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it
could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that
respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his
denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that
a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of
the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no
proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue
was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of
Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside.
The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly
demands nothing less.
Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it
cannot be validly invoked whenever its application would collide with a
constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or
expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any
foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or
demonstration.
3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the
military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.
See also:
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2)
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)
4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal and military service.
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13
“The appellant’s argument that he does not want to join the armed forces
because “he does not want to kill or be killed” and that “he has no military
inclination” is not acceptable because it is his obligation to join the armed
forces in connection with the “defense of the State” provision of the
Constitution.
2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721
3. PD1706, August 8, 1980
4. Exec. Order No. 264
5. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
6. Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable.
Read:
1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413
2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514
(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases)
3) Other provisions:
Other provisions on church & state:
1. ART. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE
REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.
2. ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques,
non-profit cemeteries…actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
3. ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or religion, except
when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
4. ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered…as political parties. (NOTE: Religious organizations are also
prohibited ion connection with sectoral representatives under Art. VI)
5. ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents, religion
shall be allowed to be taught to their children in elementary and high
schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved
by religious authorities to which said children belong, without additional
cost to the government.
7. Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right
to self-determination,
8. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.
1. meaning of “nuclear-free” Philippines;
2. Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25
9. Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all..
10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
11. The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.
a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII
12. 9. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support the support of the government.
NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on
divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or may not
be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing abortion , other than
therapeutic, is unconstitutional.
1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.
2. Read:
a) GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)
A law prohibiting the sale of “girlie magazines” [bold?) is constitutional
and does not violate the above provision. This is so because parents could
buy said magazines for their children if they believe the same is already
suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in accordance with this
provision which states that the parents have the “natural and primary right
in rearing their child for civic efficiency…”
b) MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922)
c) PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925)
A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is
unconstitutional since it interferes with the right of parents in rearing their
children. They have the right to choose which school is best suited for the
development of their children without interference from the State.
d) PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806
e) CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94
10. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
Read:
1) PD 684
2) PD 935
3) PD 1102
4) PD 603; see the objectives of the law
11. Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of men
and women.
12. Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
13. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
14. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote human liberation and development.
1) Read together with Article XIV
Read :
VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993;
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate
with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-
generational justice.” Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment” of Philippine rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country’s vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth.”
The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with
the timber licensing agreements entered into by the government which if not
stopped would be prejudicial to their future. This is so because the DENR
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations
the natural resources of the country. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said
civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be
too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a
legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court
is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even
to be hinted at here.
13. Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
1) Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
3) Read:
a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59 SCRA 54
The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an
Iglesia Ni Kristo member may refuse to join a Union and despite the fact
that there is a closed shop agreement in the establishment where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority union therein.
13. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
See Art. XII a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution

14. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the b. Read PD 27 – as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives
to needed investments. c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended – THE CODE OF AGRARIAN
REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this
a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the matter)
welfare state concept? Distinguish the two.
d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7, 1988.
opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only)
e. Read:
The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-
state concept which is being followed as shown by the constitutional Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to labor… (NOTE, July 14, 1989
however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which provide
for “free enterprise)
16. Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE unity and development.
COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109
To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 15- 21.
Mendoza, J.
Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:
The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE
REPUDIATED laissez faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an 1. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)
economic principle, and although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government the power
to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. 2. Art. X, Secs. 15 – 21

As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective 3. Art. XII, Sec. 5
regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under
Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the 4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6
power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and
when the public interest so requires. 5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17

15. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural 6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12
development and agrarian reform.
17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.
18. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
a. Define “autonomy”
b. See Art. X
Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions
evidencing “autonomy” to local government units.
19. Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.
20. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
To be discussed under Article XI.
a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195..
b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers
of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery other than graft
cases against public officers.
c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have
been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee.
21. Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public
disclosure of government transactions
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), [1][4] “directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.” The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and
entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared
to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC
subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds
are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly
advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and
PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that
the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265
million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive
committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting
the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of
directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of
Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG,
one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons
in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455.[2][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment.[3][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum,[4][8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring
Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio
Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the
matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. All were disregarded by the
petitioners.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia
arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA,
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was
detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas
corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen,
Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the
PCGG’s nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate
Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable
reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees
are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the
absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not
vested with the power of contempt.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered:
first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which
this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the
Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt
power; fourth, Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated
any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy;
and (b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not
constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.
I S S U E:
Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its
implementation wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in
investigations involving their transactions violates Section 28, Art. II of
the Constitution?
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions
long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[5][15] cited
in Arnault v. Nazareno.[6][16] In those earlier days, American courts
considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain,
it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not
itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true
– recourse must be had to others who possess it.”
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1
of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is
invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to
sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the
people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all
citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office.
In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and
not their rulers.[7][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the
principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff
beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative
bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same
provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña,[8][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the
portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b)
of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its
Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly
obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were
given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof
from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in
my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or
staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution
which mandates that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.”
ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
a. Define legislative power
– Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:
1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws
2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers
– reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws
– Separation of Powers
Read:
a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b. Nature of legislative power
c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the
legislature?
d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.
e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.
1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case
of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the
government.
– Other exceptions: traditional
3. Delegation to local governments
The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is
deemed to know better the needs of the people therein.
a. See Section 5 of Article X
b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660
bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56
A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary
of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation officer
because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries,
convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set
aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.
a. Reason for the delegation
4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies
5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and
Section 32, Article VI—The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress
of local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof
signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters thereof.
f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.
1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?
Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of
the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of
the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated.
The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the
said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its
population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed” except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.” Petitioner argues,
accordingly: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the
disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive
order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision,
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division
other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of
such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or
subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive
control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities
under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative
power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is
untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality,
but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the
time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov’t of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality
of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the
common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative
nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out
or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of
Section 68, the President:
… may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase “as the public welfare may
require,” in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that
in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
328), this Court had upheld “public welfare” and “public interest,”
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents
and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case
conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules
and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets.
Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or
permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)
1. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
2868, entitled “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose,” the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council
of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
or corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order
No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August,
1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order
No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August,
1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months’
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this
court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53
of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval;
that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his
proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first
published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was
first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in
so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules
and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the
question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Governor-
General. The Act also says: “For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does
not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.” That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-
General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue
and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out
the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall
take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner
specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is
not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is
valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum
price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice,
sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence
of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price,
the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the
United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive
to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each
branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only
to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming,
without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at
which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was
that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act
delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law,
all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-
General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in
conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance,
it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA
208
5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757
(Affecting National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to
respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which necessarily include the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d)
thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation
and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it
is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire
network or components of the communications systems contemplated
therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates
procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice
to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that
said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral
evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side
before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have
been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the
function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence
quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary
and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-
legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is
legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies
to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is
adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the
order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was
issued pursuant to respondent NTC’s legislative function but because the
assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner’s application for a certificate of public
convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or
information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of
the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner’s contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made
a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates-
when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such
is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies
exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the
finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing
Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested
capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to
cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as
well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other
words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank
of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the
administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due
process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185,
204, supra, where it is said: ‘If the nature of the administrative agency is
essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not
necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if
vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application
of a policy to a specific individual) … It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: ‘Aside
from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general
rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative
action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or
property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the
fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.
Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial,
that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an
initial evaluation of petitioner’s financial statements-without affording
petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or
aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction.
No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any,
discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner
could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of
its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and
detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner’s ratiocination that an
immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and
the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent
NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent
NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary
since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative
bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to be considered
as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what conditions must
concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION – a reviewer – Primer by FR. JOAQUIN
BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA
270
h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.
i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their
qualifications, elections/selections and as to the participation of the
Commission on Appointments in order to validate their membership.
j. Manner of election and selection
1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108
2. Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four
Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided for by law.
3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
4. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years
and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
30th day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of
Representatives.
2. Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, ½
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other
sectors, as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
standards provided in this section
Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Read:
1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
Rep. Act No. 2630
“Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United states,
acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR
LAST RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.”
2. Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution
“Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with par.
3* , Section 1 shall be deemed natural born citizens.”
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO
CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004
Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the House of
Representatives who was disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?
Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman of the
6th District of manila for the May 14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez won
over the petitioner with 32,097 votes as against petitioner’s 31,329 votes.
3. Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based on the
following grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2] falsification of election
returns; 3]substitution of election returns; 4] use of marked, spurious fake
and stray ballots; and 5] presence of ballots written by one or two persons.
4. On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of
ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et
al., declaring Mark Jimenez “ ineligible for the Office of Representative of
Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the District. Mark Jimenez
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all
the votes cast for the former should not be counted and since he garnered
the second highest number of votes, he should be declared winner in the
May 14, 2001 elections and be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of
the 6th District of manila.
Issues:
Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since
the winner was disqualified?
Held:
1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order
that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be considered “stray”. This
final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION. This was the
ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence, when a
candidate has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To
do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. The reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide
and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes does not entitle the second placer to be declared the
winner. The said principle was laid down as early as 1912 and reiterated in
the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and
DOMINO VS. COMELEC.
Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their
election.
No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a
period of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be
held on the second Monday of May.
a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral
representatives to the Hose of Representatives.
Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987
2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, September 4,
1989
b. On gerrymandering
Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term.
Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts
whose Congressmen resigned or died while in office) without a law passed
by Congress appropriating funds for the said purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28,
1987
5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving
such increase.
a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress?
P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution. The President’s salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the
VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum.
The Chairman of the Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and
the members, P180,000.00 per annum.
b. Read:
1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President;
P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00
for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for members
of the Constitutional Commissions)
2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823
6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
a. Privilege from arrest
Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22
b. Freedom of Speech and debate
Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure
of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Read:
1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) ,
he is deemed to have resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental
because as a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other office in the
government.
2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa as “appointed member” for being a member of the Cabinet is
allowed to return to his former position as Governor if he resigns from the
Batasan. This is so because he was just an “appointed” member as
distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed
member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than the elected
members)
3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office.
Read:
1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39
2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a
member of Congress who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a
case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is appearing as such,
not as counsel for the corporation.
10. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
4th Monday of July for its regular season, unless a different date is fixed
by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it
may determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence
of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.
NOTE: In the cases of:
1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN;
and
2. REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended
by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This
preventive suspension applies to all public officials, including members of
Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation if
Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the
preventive suspension imposed therein.
Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the
Congress itself.
[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than
that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting.
Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for
reconsideration dated March 14, 1949
2) Disciplinary measures on erring members
Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the
other?
Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729
The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper
journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1
CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347
The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that
it is urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and
formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was really approved, the
former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE
THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131
e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to
be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or
on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present. )
5) Differentiate a “regular” from a “special” session.
11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election
contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9
members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief justice, and the remaining six shall
be members of the Senate or House of Representatives as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in
the Electoral tribunal shall be its Chairman.
See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII
Read:
1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988
2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988
3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC &
RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11. Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the Senate President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators
and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the
commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission shall
act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority of all the members.
Read:
1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989
If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress
is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party
while reducing the other, the number of representatives of the different
parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed in
proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the
membership of the Senators was only “temporary” so as not to result in the
change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)
2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992
Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in
addition to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators
are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties, however,
are not allowed to “round off” their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled
to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is
only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there
must be 24 members of the Commission. If the different parties do not
coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of Senators in the CA is
less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas—13 Senators; LDP—11
Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5)
while LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)
To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.
12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, to discharge such
powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each member.
14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29
“A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be
detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the
detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due
process of law.”
Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question
hour
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations
in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them
to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing
on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing
and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP:
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga;
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q.
Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps
of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as
resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on
the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr.,
delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled “Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or
has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the
Presidential Election of May 2005”; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled “The Philippines as
the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World”; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator
Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled “Clear and Present
Danger”; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana
Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in
the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator
Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and
Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping
of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was
the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated
September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement “due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal attention” while
“some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent
operational matters.”
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1] dated September 27,
2005 “respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing
[regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive
Department have been invited” in order to “afford said officials ample time
and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may
better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.”
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary Ermita that
the Senators “are unable to accede to [his request]” as it “was sent
belatedly” and “[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all
resource persons were completed [the previous] week.”
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter
from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes,
Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or
cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract
agreements relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464,
“Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as
follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to
implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
(a) Nature and Scope. – The rule of confidentiality based on executive
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides
that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between
the President and the public officers covered by this executive order,
including:
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the
public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002);
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in
the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
5. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege;
3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
5. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. –
All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress
to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence
to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican
state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been
recognized that the head of government may keep certain information
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to
the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”
Considering that no member of the executive department would want to
appear in the above Senate investigations in aid of legislation by virtue of
Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the same
unconstitutional because the President abused her powers in issuing
Executive Order No. 464.
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when
they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
H E L D:
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464,
ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s
power of judicial review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[3]
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism
Association v. Ongpin[4] and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office,[5] respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6]
The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest
of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential
decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In
Franciso v. House of Representatives,[7] this Court held that when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
I
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring
supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in
Arnault v. Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the
Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power
to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress
Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the
controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he
was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the
Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to
be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce
it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be
had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which
is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[9] . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of
inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and
those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows
that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed
on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,”
is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[11] the
inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond
the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a
result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public
officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in
its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the
inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe
the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be
done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry
conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to
the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to
each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information
is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.[12]
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-
equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power —
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach
of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour is therefore CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of E.O.
464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of
executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior
national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are “covered by
the executive privilege.”
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by
the President. Given the title of Section 2 — “Nature, Scope and Coverage
of Executive Privilege” —, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem
generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended
to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of
whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered
from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the
executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against
Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of
the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant
case.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section
2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead
of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes
E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given
her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether
the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each
case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
2
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to
information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force
as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual
citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly
limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives
the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby
denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials
through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of
expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion
be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate
its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware
of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear
fruit.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence
of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its
violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
3
The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the
Official Gazette as illegal. Due process thus requires that the people
should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. This
is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA VS.
TUVERA.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b)
and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), “Ensuring Observance
of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” are declared VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
“Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
corporations.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1)
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has no valid legislative
purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of
hte Romualdez corporations is a “purely private transaction” which is
beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and
(3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one’s self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically
provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or
the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all
matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as
to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any
committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator
which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation.
In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort
must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is
proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile)
made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2
September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo “Baby” Lopa of “having taken over
the FMMC Group of Companies.” As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa
wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying
that he had “taken over ” the FMMC Group of Companies; that former
PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast
interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there
has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of
a “takeover” on his (Lopa’s) part of FMMC are baseless as they are
malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate
on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could
repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a
Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa
that his (Enrile’s) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group
of Companies are “baseless” and “malicious.” Thus, in his speech, 18
Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or
Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of
the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John
T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held :
… The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the
legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to
remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this
power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose
the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted
solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to “punish”
those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since
congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of
the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it
cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive. …
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6
SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against
self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other
types of suit
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners
may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and
produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned
inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
 INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
THE FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various
Resolutions were introduced in the Senat
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the
consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved
in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October
25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming
he was “out of town” during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It
appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it
into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees
for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, [15][6] (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,[16][7] and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve.[17][8]
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum
to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary
Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the
Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already
testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his
conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri
asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of
executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project
after being told about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under
conversations and correspondence between the President and public
officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez,
G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and
has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent
Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause
Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade
and Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show
cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of
the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees,
manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and
that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have
cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as
shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September
2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of
me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and
which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November
2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary
claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be
dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty.
Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-
appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation
with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving
high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration
of petitioner’s request that he “be furnished in advance” as to what else he
needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the
matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committee’s hearing on Tuesday,
September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25,
2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and
Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby
delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and
obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for
failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt
(Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is
hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested
and detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such
time that he will appear and give his testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this
Order and make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its
enforcement.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above
Order.[18][9] He insisted that he has not shown “any contemptible conduct
worthy of contempt and arrest.” He emphasized his willingness to testify
on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his
request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for
certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should
restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter
“through the issuance of declaration of contempt” and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt
Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction),
seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a)
enjoining respondent Committees from implementing their contempt
Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing
prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring
respondent Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees’ show cause Letter and
contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his
conversations with President Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions.” According to him, these
discussions “dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials on the country’s diplomatic relations and
economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.” He also emphasizes
that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and
within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita[19][10] and United States
v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing
communications made to him in official confidence under Section
7[21][12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section
24[22][13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1)
petitioner’s testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation
conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their
authority to order petitioner’s arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to
court with clean hands.
I S S U E S:
1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri
are covered by the principle of ‘executive privilege’?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of
executive privilege, by order of the President, to cover (i)
conversations of the President in the exercise of her executive and policy
decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid
testifying on his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on
his assertions that the said conversations “dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines”
x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1
[2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the
following provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive
privilege?
3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in
ordering the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
H E L D:
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the contempt Order?
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[23][18]
becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between
the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under
Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with
the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall
be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the
public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and
complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to
the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.[24][19] Simply stated, while both
powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their
objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of
compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Court’s
pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[25][20] is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information
is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by
Executive Privilege
We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change.[26][21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to
enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to
be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. [27][22] This
directs us to the consideration of the question — is there a recognized
claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
A- There is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not
in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which
has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the
Freedom of Information Act[28][23] and the Federal Advisory Committee
Act,[29][24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination,
occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most
recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared
unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy
to note that Executive Ermita’s Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its
bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v.
Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26] There was never a mention of
E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[32][27] have comprehensively
discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to
explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define
the communications covered by executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the
presidential communications privilege.[33][28] In United States
v. Nixon,[34][29] the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in
preserving “the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President’s performance of his official duties.” It thus considered
presidential communications as “presumptively privileged.” Apparently,
the presumption is founded on the “President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality.” The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
candor of presidential advisors and to provide “the President
and those who assist him… with freedom to explore alternatives in
the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”
In In Re: Sealed Case,[35][30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It
ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is
the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to “communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making
and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential.” The latter includes ‘advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.”
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President
while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making
of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional
role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the delibera
tive process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies
to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional
materials as well as pre-deliberative ones[36][31] As a consequence,
congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications
privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential
communications privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only
to White House Staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential
decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those
functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the
court characterized as “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential
power,” such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal
power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to
receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate
treaties, etc.[37][32]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our
jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is a
“governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.” In
Chavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential
communications privilege is fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as
the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,[40][40]
appointing,[41][41] pardoning,[42][42] and diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch,
somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege,
to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that
the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.[44][44]
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.[45][45] Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to
balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in
executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution. The
U.S. Court held:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
process under all circumstances.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46][46]
where it was held that presidential communications are presumptively
privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing
of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are
enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government “in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each
Branch.”[47][47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation
from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical
need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a
law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of
the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the “the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an
inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight
function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the
questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not
guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no
dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.
Nixon[48][48] that “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending
criminal trial” outweighs the President’s “generalized interest in
confidentiality.” However, the present case’s distinction with the Nixon
case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding
where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of
law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be
disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to “limit the
scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the
balance between the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for
information.” Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a
criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v.
Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the
context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President
did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or
sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary
Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of
presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and
policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim
of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern.[49][50] We might
have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at
all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be
provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50][51] Article 229[51][52] of
the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[52][53] of R.A. No.
3019, and Section 24(e)[53][54] of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of
jurisprudence classifies as confidential[54][55] and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly,
there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain
information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such
kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its
Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated
with the people’s right to public information. The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.
The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress
to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people
to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued
by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power
to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their
right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification
in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in
general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as
public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to
information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate
cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject
of careful review by numerous decided cases.
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked
We now proceed to the issue — whether the claim is properly invoked by
the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly
invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control over the matter.”[55][56] A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain reason”
for preserving their confidentiality.[56][57]
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There,
he expressly states that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v.
Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of “precise and certain reason,” we find the
grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as
not “to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged.” The case of Senate v. Ermita
only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.”[57][58] The
following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [58][59] the Congress must
not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal
department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing
the Contempt Order
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show
cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied
immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3)
questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition
thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautista’s letter, stating that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his
conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege.
Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify
again, provided he “be furnished in advance” copies of the questions.
Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent
Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at
the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed the
present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order in view of five (5) reasons:
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of
the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid
down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with “the
usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and
in furtherance thereof.” Compliance with this requirement is imperative,
both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must
be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue
of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner’s
repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list
of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees’ January 30,
2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. [59][61] Section
18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provides that:
“The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for
contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or
refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the
Committee or any of its members.”
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the
Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud
of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules
of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the
end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order is
arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent
Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and
inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his
explanation as “unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued the Order citing
him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He
manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent
Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was
ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves
respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and
inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily
dismissing his explanation as “unsatisfactory.” Undoubtedly,
respondent Committees’ actions constitute grave abuse of discretion fo
r being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The
same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the
present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner’s repeated
request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three
(3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt
judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court,
not for retaliation or vindication.[60][63] Respondent Committees should
have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary
witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial
review could have been avoided if powers are discharged with
circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation
of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the
government.
In this present crusade to “search for truth,” we should turn to the
fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system
of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered
separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective
spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Court’s mandate is to preserve
these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political
branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise
of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for
truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic
institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the
petitioner and ask the three(3) questions mentioned above in connection
with his conversations with the President being covered by the “executive
privilege” rule.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to
Privacy; Public disclosure of government transactions; right to information
on matters of public concern; right against self-incrimination;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), [61][4] “directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of
Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG,
one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons
in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455.[62][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment.[63][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on
Public Services issued an Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose
Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order
bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the
Committees’ members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia
arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA,
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was
detained.
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of
whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before
respondent Senate Committees is justified.
Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It
reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such
power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from
testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions
long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[65][15] cited
in Arnault v. Nazareno.[66][16] In those earlier days, American courts
considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain,
it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not
itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true
– recourse must be had to others who possess it.”
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress’ power of inquiry,
provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII,
Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[67][18] Then came the 1987 Constitution
incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore
implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American
jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[68][19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not
just of Congress, but also of “any of its committee.” This is significant
because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to
the committees.[69][20]
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power
is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically
ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in
Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly
repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG
members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.[71][22] It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.”[72][23] PCGG belongs
to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1
of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is
invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to
sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the
people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all
citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office.
In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and
not their rulers.[73][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the
principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff
beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative
bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same
provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña,[74][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the
portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b)
of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its
Commissioners.
He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly
obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were
given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof
from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in
my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x x x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or
staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section
4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the
present petitions.
2) NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS.
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No.
72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony
of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey
its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot
be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and
conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions
performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish
for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It
is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not
expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents
assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines
and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete
residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
its committees.
1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the
repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that
may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law,
possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not
expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for
legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault
v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]),
in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to “enforce their
authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice.” (Commissioner v. Cloribel,
127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other
cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for
the first time in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29
[1950]) where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed the
contempt power.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either
House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House
has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must
be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power.
How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme
within the real of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of the other’s
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370
[1955]).
The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke
ground in what was then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and
succeeded in supplying the raison d’ etre of this power of Congress even in
the absence of express constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for
upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis
mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the
respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present
controversy.
3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of
self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority
and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to
possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate
branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative
bodies which are creations of law.
4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973
Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the
power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal
provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for
the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in
the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power
and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be
implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere
incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local
legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be
considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal
rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the
contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government
body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e.
compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law
cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local
legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the sovereign people,
the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in
all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through
their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome
powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in
pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting
local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is
devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim
that it can exercise these powers.
11. Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the Rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the HR at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may not cover matter matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
12. Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.
b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.
c. What is referred to by the phrase “next adjournment?”
d. Read:
1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369
– the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
– the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants emergency
powers to President Aquino.
13. Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that
the E-VAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which
came from the Senate, not from the House of Representatives. This is so
because the Senate is allowed to “propose amendments” to bills which must
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives.
14. Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President for the operation of the government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
[2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress
shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available
as certified by the national treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.
[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the house of Representatives, the Chief justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the constitutional commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall
be disbursed only for the purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
17. Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its members 3 days before its passage, except when the
President certifies as to its necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
Read:
1) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
4) LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
The case questions the law entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”, but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted
upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill”?
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the
President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by
correcting legislation.”
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute “should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision
contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the
single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
“expressed in the title” of the bill. This constitutional requirement “breathes
the spirit of command.” Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill
1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the
bill, being of local application, originated.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss
the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its
form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional
requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in
mind by the court.
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed
statute. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur” 8 projects the impression that solely the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the
slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in
the Province of Lanao del Sur,” read without subtlety or contortion, makes
the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has
a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns
of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it
also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to
the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.
5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172
6) CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418
7) TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281
SCRA 333
18. Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections , to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
2/3 of all the members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and
the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its
journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it.
[2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item
or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
1) Read:
a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912
b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY ’89]
hereinafter), which was vetoed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by
Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the
Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the
Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be
restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose
recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been
disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If
allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and
statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A
careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted
shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended
by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been
reduced. An unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of
the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need
to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and
infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5)
of Article VI of the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of
P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the
President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the
Executive Branch of the Government.
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY’89), and
subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY’90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the
item veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto “provisions” of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY’90) are
provisions and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the
item veto power of the President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of
the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as follows:
Sec. 27.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item veto power or the line-
veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the
President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations
Bill. In other words, the power given the Executive to disapprove any
item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item.
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution
(Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the
public official concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any
reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this
exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a
provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are
concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth
v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S.
410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared “that an ‘item’ of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens
to be put into an appropriation bill.”
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in
Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to
the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power as
previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926);
2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some
particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire
bill.
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, we are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the
term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should
relate specifically to some “particular appropriation” therein. The
challenged “provisions” fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed
“provisions” do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation.
They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will
have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and
to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the “Legislative
Budget Research and Monitoring Office” (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition).
Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional
policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90)
although labelled as “provisions,” are actually inappropriate provisions that
should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
(Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158).
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional
powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the
Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive
officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor’s constitutional
power to veto bills of general legislation … cannot be abridged by the
careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby
forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable
substantive legislation or vetoing “items” of expenditure essential to the
operation of government. The legislature cannot by location ot a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governor’s veto
power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures
so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of
government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine … We are
no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to
infringe on the Governor’s constitutional right to veto matters of substantive
legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the
constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we
hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for purposes of
the Governor’s item veto power over general appropriation bills.
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose
conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached,
the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out,
citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao
Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11
SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY’89) and
Section 16 (FY’90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the
veto power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct
“items” of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a
condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in
Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations
Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related
was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY’89) and Section 16 (FY’90)
because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25
(5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. (Emphasis ours).
If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the Executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down
by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be
overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made no
attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners’ argument that
the veto is ineffectual so that there is “nothing to override” (citing
Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been
herein upheld.
b. BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the
funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of
any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other
items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate,
the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to
it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the
fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]),
the Court upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to
augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact,
been granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the
Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria
v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way
endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of
government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings
for augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among
others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of
the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other
items in the Judiciary’s appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional
provision on “fiscal autonomy.”
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to
the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with
pensions have been enacted by practically all the states in the United States
(State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in
most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges
or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state.
Where a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement
with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not,
thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the
purpose of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the
government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative
security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those
who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the
Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of
their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of
Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment
of the pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and
jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA
910 providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be
computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date
of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4,
1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of
retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree
was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly
Pension of Judges and Justices, supra).
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional
officers are unduly favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted
men number in the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they
can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men
retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age
50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply
equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or
civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on
indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of
retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional
reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the
package of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve
the independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court.
Any institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both
the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of
independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be
reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and
concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except
through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not
appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the
Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court’s
supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in
office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or
quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The
Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with
the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30,
Article VI, Constitution).
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to
former Justices of this Court and the ground that there should be no “grant
of distinct privileges” or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores
these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these
Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a
large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are
intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement
benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that
public funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select
individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased
performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Miller: “To lay with one hand the power of the
government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow
upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done
under the forms of law . . .” (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655)
(Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they
certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to
be, under their charter, learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices
J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos,
and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General
and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two
courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees,
should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these
Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To
characterize them as engaging in “robbery” is intemperate, abrasive, and
disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry
to state that the then quality of research in that institution has severely
deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW
Association v. Topeka but Citizen’s Savings and Loan Association of
Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed.
455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing
cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges,
waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their
services. The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a
municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000
times since that ancient period. Public use is now equated with public
interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost
housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only
private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was “robbery” in
1874 is now called “social justice.” There is nothing about retirement
benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old
textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell “loan” correctly. Good
lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant
citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues
in the Judiciary requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would
be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high
cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in
Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree
because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he
deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely
expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value
and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness
in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he
should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was
rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue
to be effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to
the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is
SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the
1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents
are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of
fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as
the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to
be implemented as promulgated.
2) What is a “pocket veto?”
3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?
3. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506
What is the so-called “executive impoundment”?
It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the
President, he however refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made
possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority
of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3)
principal sources of authority of the President. [1] authority to impound
given to him by Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive
power drawn from his power as Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful
execution clause of the Constitution.
Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund
(CDF) of Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the
same is “set aside for ‘infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and
Congressmen.
19. Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the government.
[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or
employed…directly or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect,
denomination, or system of religion…except when such preacher, priest…
is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
or leprosarium.
All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219
1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789
2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil.
547
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
4) AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201
5) MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987
Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker
for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an
awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary
increase in accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in
Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health
requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying
Dr. Perez’ salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the
merit increase in its current budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of
Local Government opposed the proposed merit increase because the
provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to officials/employees in the national
government, and consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto,
since he is an employee of the local government as provided for in the
charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request the Ministry
of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary
adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query
made by the Ministry of Health, in his Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981,
dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the merit increase program
applies only to the officials/employees of the national government but
declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the
Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such
opinion, the Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December
1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment which release of the amount was
denied by the Office of the Budget and Management which insisted that the
awardee is an employee of the local or city government who is not covered
by the merit increase program. Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the
Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable action
thereon to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The latter referred
the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who affirmed his earlier decision of
disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the same reasons. A petition
for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and Management to pay
the merit increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which
granted the aforementioned favorable decision, subject matter of the present
petition for review on certiorari before Us by petitioners arguing that:
1. The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San
Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which
states among other things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the
same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose
salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local government
employee whose position does not appear in the list of national government
employees defined under another law (P.D. 985).
2. The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there
is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to
release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because
such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the
Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.
3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the
national government would have far reaching effects such that all other city
health officers and local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled
to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez’s exemplary
accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step increase
must yield to the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds
which the government must set aside for the purpose.
We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private
respondent invites Our attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA
#5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which
provides that the position of a City Health Officer is not included among the
heads of the regular departments of the city but included among the national
officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the
Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the
same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of
1967 which shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister and
not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the
testimony of its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief of the Compensation
and Position Classification and a specialist thereon that the City Health
Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the Ministry
of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that, Section 7
of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of the
City Health Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of
the same Sec. 7, excludes the city health officer from the classification of
local government official as can be gathered from the phrase “… except
those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in the
constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and
employees who are under the direct supervision and control of the National
Government or its agencies and who are paid wholly or partially from
national funds.”
Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government
officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the
preservation of health is a national service. Also their positions are partially
funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their
salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds.
We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by
private respondent to wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which
categorically rules that “Officials and employees of provincial and city
health offices render service as officials and employees of the Bureau of
Health (Ministry of Health) and they are for that reason not local but
national officials under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of
Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, which is specific and definitive
that the private respondent is a national government employee and the
Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase awarded to him. In this
1981 opinion, it was explained in detail how the said funds corresponding to
his merit increase could be legally disbursed contrary to the unfounded
speculations expressed by the petitioners.
Lastly, there is no basis in petitioner’s allegations that they cannot be
compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it
is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to
allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government
official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more
particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone
beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial
duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having
failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.
20. Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R.
No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
Regalado, J.
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
“In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court”
Issue:
Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?
Held:
Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent as
provided under Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. As
explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 519,
the aforesaid constitutional provision “was intended to give the Supreme
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.”
Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by
Section 27 of RA 6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Read: MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987
21. Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law
or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: x x x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. –
Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[22][13] SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases. (e) A public officer cannot be
examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by disclosure.
( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. – Public
officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to
anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[51][52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. – Any public
officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official
capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he
may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the
revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused
serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and
a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
[52][53] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by
his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized
persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release
date.
[53][54] Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communications. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following case: x x x
(a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when
the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
[54][55] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the Supreme Court
recognized matters which the Court has long considered as confidential
such as “information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by
law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.” It also
stated that “presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during close-door cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court or other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. Such information
cannot be pried-open by a co-equal branch of government.
ARTICLE VII – THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
1. a. Define executive power
b. May the President refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his
opinion it is unconstitutional?
No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers
because by doing so, he will be arrogating unto himself the power to
interpret the law, not merely to implement it.
Read:
1) L.S. MOON & CO. VS. HARRISON, 43 Phil.38
2) GOV’T. VS. SPRINGER, 50 Phil. 529, read also the separate
opinion.
3) What is the extent of the executive or administrative orders that
may be issued by the President as the Chief Executive, under the
Administrative Code of 1987?
BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
Puno, J.
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a
Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics
Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY .
The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds:
1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the
Philippines;
2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the
said AO is unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to
appropriate funds for such expenditure; and
3. The AO violates the citizen’s right to privacy protected by the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution.
Held:
1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens
and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by
Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the
President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the
President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts,
AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the
President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.
2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main
purpose is to provide a “common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical
methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It
is the confirmation of an individual’s identity through a fingerprint, retinal
scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government
offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data,
however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but
the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist.
Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how
these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO
CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS.
WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE
PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER,
WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF
THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE
THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal
information gathered about our people will be used only for specified
purposes thereby violating the citizen’s right to privacy.
Sections 2. No person shall be elected President unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years o f age on the day of the election, and a
resident o f the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
the election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He may be removed from Office in the same
manner as the President.
The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation.
Note: Section 13, Art. VII. The President, Vice President, the members of
the cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure…
Section 8, Article VIII. The Judicial and Bar Council—–Secretary of
Justice..
Section 2, Article XI. The President, VP, …may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.
Section 4. The President and the Vice President shall be elected by direct
vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
30th day of June next following their election and shall end at noon of the
same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than 4 years shall be qualified for election to the same office
at any time.
No Vive President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he
was elected.
The returns of every election for President and Vice President duly certified
by the Board of canvassers of each province or city shall be transmitted to
the congress….
The candidate having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal number of votes, one
of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.
Section 5…Oath
Section 6. Residence…Salary may not be decreased…not increased until
after the expiration of his terms…shall not received any other emolument
from the government of from any source during their tenure.
Section 7. ..shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
…P & VP not qualified, the Senate President shall act as President or the
Speaker, if SP is not yet qualified..
Congress shall pass a law if the SP & Speaker are not qualified to act as
President…
Section 9. VP is vacant, the President shall nominate from the Senate of HR
and who shall become VP upon confirmation of majority vote of the
members of the Senate & H of R voting separately.
Section 10. …In case of vacancy in the office of the President and VP,
Congress shall convene on the 3rd day after the vacancy to enact a law
calling for special election to be held not later than 60 days…the law is
deemed certified under Section 26, par. 2 of Art. VI and shall become a law
upon 3rd reading.. Special elections cannot be postponed but no special
election if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the next presidential
election.
Section 11. When President transmits to Congress his written
declaration of inability to perform his duties, the VP shall be acting
President until the President transmits another declaration to the
contrary.
When majority of the members of the cabinet transmit to the
Senate President a written declaration that the President is unable to
perform his duties, the VP shall act as the President.
If the President transmits to the SP his declaration that there is no disability,
he shall reassume his post but if the majority of all the members of the
Cabinet still insists that the President is unable to discharge his powers,
CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. IT MUST CONVENE
WITHIN 48 HOURS if not in session without need of a call.
If 2/3 of both Houses, voting separately, determines that the President is
unable to discharge his powers, the VP shall act as President. Otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising his powers and duties of his office.
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be
informed of the state of his health. The members of the cabinet in charge of
national security and foreign relations and the Chief of the AFP shall not be
denied access to the President.
a. Qualifications, disqualifications, term of office, etc., of the President
and Vice-President.
b. See: Sec. 17 of Art. XVIII.
c. Read: PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC, 140 SCRA
453 (The snap presidential election case)
3. Sections 7-12
a. Note the order of succession to the office of the President and Vice
President
b. Query: Is President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a de jure or a de facto
President? If de jure, how did she succeed? Resignation or permanent
disability of former President Estrada?
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-
15 and 146738, March 2, 2001
Puno, J [En Banc]
F A C T S:
1. On 13 November 2000, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives transmitted to the Senate the Articles of Impeachment
charging petitioner Joseph Estrada with bribery, graft and corruption,
betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The
impeachment of petitioner resulted from disclosures made by Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis Chavit Singson in October, 2000 that petitioner had
received payments from illegal jueteng operations and excise taxes;
The impeachment trial began on 07 December 2000. A highlight of the
December 2000 hearings was the testimony of CLARISSA OCAMPO of
the Equitable – PCI Bank that she witnessed petitioner affixing the
signature of “JOSE VELARDE” on bank documents involving a P500 M
investment agreement;
2. On 16 January 2001, the issue of whether or not to open what has
been dubbed as the “Second Envelope” arose before the impeachment court.
The envelope allegedly contained proof that petitioner held P3.3 B in a
secret bank account under the name “JOSE VELARDE”. The motion to
open the said envelope was struck down by the senator-judges by a vote of
11-10. The public and private prosecutors walked out of the trial to protect
the ruling. Hours after the controversial ruling, the public began to rally at
the EDSA SHRINE; the rally continued in the following days;
3. On January 17, 2001, the public prosecutors tendered their
collective resignation to the Speaker. They also filed a Manifestation of
WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE with the Impeachment Court.
Thereafter, Senator Roco moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings. Chief Justice Davide granted the same;
4. In the afternoon of 19 January, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the AFP
withdrew his support to President Estrada. The same is true with the PNP
Chief and majority of the members of the Estrada Cabinet;
5. In early hours of 20 January 2001, negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power began between petitioner’s representatives
and that of respondent GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then Vice
President. Later in the morning, Arroyo reportedly requested the Chief
Justice to administer her oath. The letter, sent through fax was quoted thus
by Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion, as follows:
“The undersigned respectfully informs this Honorable Court that Joseph
Ejercito Estrada is permanently incapable of performing the duties of his
office resulting in his permanent disability to govern and serve his
unexpired term. Almost all of his cabinet members have resigned and the
Philippine National Police have withdrawn their support for Joseph Ejercito
Estrada. Civil society has likewise refused to recognize him as President.
“In view of this, I am assuming the position of the President of the
Philippines. Accordingly, I would like to take my oath as President of the
Republic before the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. today, 20
January 2001, 12:00 noon at EDSA SHRINE, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
“May I have the honor to invite the members of the Honorable Court to
attend the oath-taking”.
6. At 12 noon, Arroyo was sworn in by Chief Justice Davide as the
14th President of the Republic of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family left Malacanang Palace. Petitioner issued the following
statement:
“At 12 o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her Proclamation as President, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order
in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacanang Palace, the seat of the
Presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
Mabuhay”
“(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
7. Petitioner also sent copies of the following letter to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House of Representatives on 20 January 2001.
The copy for the House Speaker was sent at 8:30 a.m.. Another copy was
transmitted to the Senate President and received only at 9:00 p.m.
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Art. VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
8. Prior to the events of January, 2001, 6 cases had been filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. A special panel was created
to investigate these cases. On January 22, 2001, petitioner was directed to
file his counter-affidavit and affidavit of his witnesses;
9. On February 5, 2001, petitioner filed these cases to prohibit the
respondent from investigating the charges of plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption on the ground that he is immune from suit;
10. On February 6, 2001, the petitioner filed the petition docketed as
GR No. 146738 for quo warranto against Arroyo praying that he be
declared the lawful President of the Philippines and respondent GMA
merely as acting President on account of his temporary disability.
I S S U E S:
1. DO THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION AND ARE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE?
2. DID PETITIONER ESTRADA RESIGN AS PRESIDENT?
3. IS THE PETITIONER TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS
PRESIDENT?
4. DOES THE PETITIONER ENJOY IMMUNITY FROM SUIT? IF
SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?
5. SHOULD THE PROSECUTION OF ESTRADA BE ENJOINED
DUE TO PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY?
H E L D:
I
No, the cases do not involve political question. In Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051 [1957], it was held that political questions refer to “those
questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative and executive branches of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular measure.”
The 1987 Constitution narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of the court, not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.
IN support of the contention that the cases involve political questions, the
respondents cited the cases of LAWYER’’ LEAGE FOR A BETTER
PHILIPPINES VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO, May 22, 1986 and
related cases. The court pointed out that in those cases, it held that the
government of President Aquino was the result of a successful but peaceful
revolution by the Filipino people. The Freedom Constitution itself declared
that the Aquino government was installed through the direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people “in defiance of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended.” IN contrast, the Arroyo government is not revolutionary in
character. The oath of President Arroyo took at the EDSA Shrine is an oath
under the 1987 Constitution where she swore to preserve and defend the
1987 Constitution.
The EDSA 1 that installed President Aquino and EDSA II which installed
Arroyo are different because the first involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the
Office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial
review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question, EDSA II involves legal questions.
Therefore, the present cases involve legal questions requiring the proper
interpretation of provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit and the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
II
Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner Estrada resigned as
President.
Resignation is not a high level abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be written. It can
be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
Since Estrada did not write a letter of resignation before evacuating the
Malacanang Palace on January 20, 2001, the determination of whether he
resigned should be based on his acts and omission before, during and after
20 January 2001. THIS IS THE TOTALITY TEST, THE TOTALITY OF
PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEARING MATERIAL RELEVANCE
TO THE ISSUE.
The diary of former Executive Secretary Angara as serialized in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001 gives an “authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner.” These are:
a. On January 19, 2001 at the height of the EDSA protest,
Estrada called for a snap presidential election in May 2001 and made it on
record that he will not be a candidate. It is an indication that he had given
up the presidency even at that time since his term is supposed to be up to
2004;
b. Estrada did not object to the suggestion that he consider a
“dignified exit” and that he be allowed to go abroad with enough funds;
c. Estrada’s statement that he was guaranteed by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes that he would be given a 5-day grace period in the palace
which shows that he had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign;
d. During the negotiations between the Estrada and Arroyo groups in
the early morning of January 20, 2001, the resignation of the petitioner was
treated as a fact;
e. During the 1st round of negotiations, Estrada said “Pagod na pagod
na ako. Ayoko masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, intriga”.
The court held that this was a “high grade evidence” that he had resigned.
The SC held that “ayoko na” are words of resignation.
f. The President’s act of leaving the palace on January 20, 2001
confirmed his resignation. Petitioner’s press release, “his final act and
farewell”, acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President, his
reservation about its legality. He said he was leaving the palace for the sake
of peace and order. He did not say that he was leaving as a result of a
disability and was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability appears
III
NO.
The court held that the petitioner has in fact resigned and his claim of
inability was laid to rest by Congress. The decision that respondent Arroyo
is the de jure President, made by a co-equal branch of the government,
cannot be reviewed by the Court.
Both Houses of Congress had recognized that Arroyo is the President when
they passed Resolution “expressing their support to the administration of
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, President of the Philippines”
which was passed on January 24, 2001; another resolution dated January
24, 2001 “expressing full support to the assumption into office by VP
Arroyo as President of the Philippines”; and the Resolution dated February
7, 2001 “confirming President Arroyo’s nomination of Senator Teopisto
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Philippines.”
Both Houses also sent bills for the New President (GMA) to sign into law.
Therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
disability and could not revise the decision of Congress recognizing Arroyo
as President without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
IV
NO.
As a non-sitting President, Estrada enjoys no immunity from the criminal
charges of plunder, bribery and graft and corruption filed against him.
Likewise, the argument that he should first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings before he could be charged criminally is without
merit since the impeachment court has adjourned indefinitely insofar as the
case against him is concerned. To follow his line of argument would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. In fact, the Constitutional
Commission in its deliberations show that even if the case against an
impeachable officer has become moot as a result of his resignation, the
proper criminal and civil cases may be filed against him.
Also, as held in RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160, an
incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court
BUT NOT BEYOND. In NIXON VS. FITSGERALD, 457 US 731, the US
Supreme Court held that the immunity of the President from civil damages
covers only official acts. In the 1997 case of CLINTON VS. JONES, 520
US 681, the US Supreme Court held that the president’s immunity from
suits for money damages arising out of official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.
Finally, the constitutional provision that a public office is a public trust
would be “devalued if we sustain petitioner’s claim that a non-sitting
President enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.”
V
NO.
The SC held that the evidence presented by the petitioner is insufficient for
the Court to rule that the preliminary investigation by respondent Desierto
be enjoined. The claim of the petitioner, based on news reports, that the
Ombudsman had prejudged his case is not sufficient ground to stop the
investigation. As held in MARTELINO VS. ALEJANDRO, 32 SCRA 106,
“to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be an actual
prejudice—there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced. The accuracy of the reports cited by the petitioner could
not be the subject of judicial notice since the Ombudsman is entitled to the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty.
(NOTE: On April 7, 2001, the Motion for Reconsideration of Estrada of the
above decision was denied for lack of merit.)
4. Section 13. The President, VP, Members of the Cabinet or their
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure.. They shall not during their
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in any
business or be financially interested in any contract with…the government
or any government owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Read: 1. PUNZALAN VS. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153
2. ADAZA VS. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431
3. Opinion No. 155, Series of 1988 by the Secretary of Justice
4. Executive Order No. 284
5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec., February 22, 1991
Sections 14 Appointments extended by an Acting President shall
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days
from his assumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
election and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
(NOTE: Section 9, Article VIII. The President shall issue the appointments
within 90 days from the submission of the list)
Read:
1) AYTONA VS. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1
2) PAMANTASAN VS. IAC, 140 SCRA 22
6. Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint…
The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
a. Read:
Temporary Appointments for members of the Cabinet; Ad interim
appointments.
SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., 472 SCRA 587
Carpio, J.
Facts:
1. On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced its Regular Session. On
August 25, 2004, the Commission on appointments was constituted;
2. While Congress was in session, the President issued appointments
as Acting Secretaries to the following:
a. Arthur Yap to the Department of Agriculture;
b. Alberto Romulo to the Department of Foreign affairs;
c. Raul Gonzales to the Department of Justice;
d. Florencio Abad to the Department of Education;
e. Avelino Cruz, Jr. to the Department of National Defense;
f. Rene Villa to the Department of Agrarian Reform;
g. Joseph Durano to the Department of Tourism; and
h. Michael Defensor to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
3. On September 8, 2004, the petitioners questioned said
appointments as “Acting Secretary” as UNCONSTITUTIONAL since
Congress was in session and it was an act of circumventing the power of the
Commission on Appointments confirm the said appointments. They claimed
that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether
regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.”
4. On September 22, 2004, Congress adjourned its session;
5. On September 23, 2004, the president issued “ad-interim
appointments” to the above-named appointees to the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity;
6. Thereafter, the respondents moved for the dismissal of this case on
the ground that it is now moot and academic considering the issuance of ad-
interim appointments and subsequent submission of the appointments of the
above-named members of the cabinet to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation.
I s s u e s:
1. Shall the case be dismissed since it is already moot and academic?
2. Do all the petitioners have the personality to sue?
3. Were the temporary appointments made while Congress was in
session to positions subject of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments unconstitutional?
H e l d:
1. While it is a rule that courts should not decide moot cases, the
courts, as an exception, will rule on it if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review (TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438; ACOP
VS. SECRETARY GUINGONA, 383 SCRA 577; VIOLA VS. HON.
ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409; ALUNAN III VS. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA
501).
2. Only those members of the Commission on Appointments have the
personality to sue and not the other petitioners who are not. While it was
held in SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656 that
members of Congress have the personality to sue if the President’s act has
the effect of impairing the powers of Congress, the same is not applicable in
this case. This is so because the Commission on Appointments is
independent from Congress itself. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting
appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress.
3. The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment
in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law cannot impose on the President the obligation of
automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter ego. He must be of
the President’s confidence and provided that the temporary appointment
does not exceed one (1) year.
There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and appointments in
an acting capacity. While both are effective upon acceptance, ad interim
appointments are extended only during the recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time that there is a vacancy.
Moreover, ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily circumventing the need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
1. CALDERON VS. CARALE, April 23, 11992
1-a) ULPIANO SARMIENTO III VS. SALVADOR MISON, G.R. No.
79774, Dec. 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549
2. MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS. THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, April, 13,1989
 2-A TERESITA DELES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, September 4, 1989
3 RAFAEL VS. EMBROIDERY AND APPAREL CONTROL
BOARD, 21 SCRA 336
4 OLIVEROS-TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272;
5 . TARROSA VS. SINGSON, May 25, 1994;
6 NIERE VS. CFI, 54 SCRA 165
b. Distinguish adjournment from recess.
c. Differentiate the status of an appointment made by the President while
Congress is in session compared to that when it is in recess.
7. Section 17, The President shall have control of all the executive
departments , bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
President’s Control over the executive department; usurpation of legislative
powers and infringement on the citizen’s right to privacy
KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No.
420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified, Multi-purpose Identification
System by all Government Agencies in the Executive Department. This is
so despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in
1998 OPLE VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES
Administrative Order No. 308[National computerized Identification
Reference System] issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos that the same is
unconstitutional because “a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system,
where none existed before”. The Supreme Court likewise held that EO 308
as unconstitutional for it violates the citizen’s right to privacy.
Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that Proclamation No. 420
is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:
a. usurpation of legislative powers; and
b. it infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy
Held:
1. The issuance by the President of Proclamation No. 420 is not a
usurpation of legislative powers. This is so because EO 420 applies only to
government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions…and does not grant such government
entities any power that they do not already posses under existing laws. It is
not similar to AO 308 because it does not create a notional ID system since
it the same applies only to the executive branch of the government,
including government owned and controlled corporations but not the
judiciary nor the independent constitutional commissions. This only shows
that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is
needed to establish a single ID system which is compulsory to all branches
of the government. EO 420 makes existing sectoral card systems of the
government entities like the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and Land Transportation
Office less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Finally, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the President’ constitutional power of control over
government entities in the executive department as well as under the
President’s constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
2. The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the citizen’s
right to privacy since it does not require all the citizens to be issued a
national ID as what happened in AO 308. Only those dealing or employed
with the said government entities who are required to provide the required
information for the issuance of the said ID.
a. Distinguish the power of control over the power of supervision
b. Read:
1. Santos vs. Exec. Sec., April 10, 1992
1-a. Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771
1-b. Echeche vs. CA, 198 SCRA 577
The act of the Executive Secretary in reversing the decision of the
Secretary of the DENR allowing the payment of the backwages of petitioner
is considered an act of the President and therefore valid in accordance with
the doctrine of qualified political agency.
1-c. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative
complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials
sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city
health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza,
Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando
Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a
barangay tanod.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without
the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued,
Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders
of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby
causing injuries He was released only the following day.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive
suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a
period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the
petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On
September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together
with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement
which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner
testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. He was again ordered
suspended.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local
Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local
officials.
It is the petitioners’ argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows
the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power
of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both
petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local
government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided
by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments.
It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution,
which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of “as may be provided by law”) is
significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is
“provided by law” and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the
Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal
provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is
filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the
case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer
within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the
hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days
immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be
imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed
prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did
the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase “as may be provided by law”
intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend,
discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed
Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the
significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in
the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by
law”) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments’
autonomy from congress and to break Congress’ “control” over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake
of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power
of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court
has held
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p.
2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power
of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast
to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following
digression: “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in
his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in
Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. …
xxx xxx xxx
“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter.” 36 “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, “investigating” is not inconsistent with
“overseeing”, although it is a lesser power than “altering”. The impression
is apparently exacerbated by the Court’s pronouncements in at least three
cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,
41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this
Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only
supervision “as may be provided by law,” 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron,
and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President “may not . . . suspend
an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action
against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.” 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano
categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension
of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and
its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.
In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is
specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which
does not et with respect to municipal officers …
In Mondano, the Court held:
… The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form
of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.”
Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power
of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of … municipalities … . If it be construed that it does and
such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department
Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l),
Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the
debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President’s powers.
The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive,
because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of
removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has
repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said,
“supervision” and “removal” are not incompatible terms and one may stand
with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of
the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means “a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization.”
NOTE: The successive suspensions of the Mayor, however, was declared
invalid by the Supreme Court.
1-d) MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de
Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in
a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant
Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10
April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to
his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the
provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from
office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges
preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
The Constitution provides: “The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.” Under this constitutional provision the
President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over
which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law.
The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided
for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not
have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order
the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which,
as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be
provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1,
section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution.
If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the
same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or
difference between the power of control and that of supervision.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly
and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials
in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” 2
And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity
of the officer in question.” 3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be
construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as
that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the
President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of
the Revised Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and
only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he “may at any time
remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the
Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.” Again, this power of
removal must be exercised conformably to law.
In the endorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive
Secretary requested immediate investigation, appropriate action and report
on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the institution of
judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial
governor.
If the endorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a
designation of the provincial governor to investigate the petitioner, then he
would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation to be
conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188,
2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred
against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or
specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because rape
and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as
mayor nor do they constitute or involve” neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or any other form of maladministration of office.”
True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor
and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment
must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by
the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information
for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of
age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn
complaint of the offended spouse. 4 The charges preferred against the
petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those
or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of
law.
1-e. Carpio vs. Exec. Sec., 206 SCRA 290
1-f. Malayan vs. CA, 213 SCRA 640
1) LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO, 21 SCRA 895
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of the ministries. (1973
Constitution, Art. VII)
Control means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify, or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.” (Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175) The President can, by virtue of
his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision
of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus or offices under
him. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, 58 SCRA 272; Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, et
al., 118 Phil. 1468). He can exercise this power motu proprio without need
of any appeal from any party. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, supra).
The President is not expected to perform in person an the multifarious
executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxillary unit which assists the President. Under our
constitutional set-up, the Executive Secretary acts for and in behalf of
the President: and by authority of the President, he has undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order of the
Secretary of Natural Resources and other Cabinet Secretaries. Where
the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the President” his decision is
that of the President. (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA
895).
3) LACSON VS. ROQUE, 92 Phil. 456
4) VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710
5) VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, 67 Phil. 451
6) ALAJAR VS. ALBA, 100 Phil. 683
7) FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA
757
8) OLIVEROS TORRE VS. BAYOT, 58 SCRA 272
c. What is the doctrine of Qualified Political agency? (see the separate
opinion of Former Chief Justice FERNANDO in the LACSON-
MAGALLANES VS. PANO CASE)
d. Powers which must be exercised personally by the President and could
and could not be delegated to any cabinet member?
Doctrine of qualified political agency; personality to sue; when the said
doctrine does not apply
CONSTANTINO and the FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS.
CUISIA, et al., 472 SCRA 505
Tinga, J.
F a c t s:
The petition seeks to stop the respondents from executing additional debt-
relief contracts or foreign borrowings in connection with the Philippine
Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 and to compel the Secretary of
Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents.
The respondents negotiated with the foreign commercial bank creditors a
multi-option financing package in connection with the country’s foreign
debt. This includes a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign
debt at a discount. The second option allows creditors to convert existing
Philippine debt instruments into bonds or securities. Petitioners characterize
the Financing Program as beyond the powers of the President under Section
20, Article VII of the Constitution.
I s s u e s:
1. Do the petitioners have the personality to sue?
2. May the respondents contract and guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines? Stated otherwise, may the
President delegate such power to her subordinates?
H e l d:
1. The petitioners as tax payers have the personality to sue. They are
suing as citizens of the Philippines and a s taxpayers. The recent trend on
locus standi has veered towards a liberal treatment in taxpayer’s suits. In
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. [243 SCRA 436] the supreme Court held that
taxpayers are allowed to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government owned and controlled corporations
ALLEGEDLY IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW.
2. The petitioners claim that the President “alone and personally” can
validly bind the country in contracting foreign debt under Section 20,
Article VII of the Constitution. The contention is without merit. The
Secretary of Finance, as alter ego of the President regarding the “sound and
efficient management of the financial resources of the government, has the
power to implement the policy which was publicly expressed by the
president herself. This is in connection with the doctrine of qualified
political agency. While there are instances where the President must act
personally and not through his secretaries like the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, proclamation of martial law or pardoning power
[Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451], negotiation with foreign
creditors may be done by the Secretary of Finance or the Governor of
Central Bank.
The petition was therefore dismissed.
7. Section 18. The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all
the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress voting
jointly, , by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise, he shall be
released.
a. Take special notice of the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of Habeas Corpus declaration of Martial Law.
b. Compare it with the provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitution on
this subject.
What are the restrictions imposed on the President in the exercise of such
emergency powers? What are the effects of exercises of emergency powers
to the judicial system?
Commander-in-chief provision; Legal standing to question a
presidential proclamation; moot and academic cases when courts still
has to decide it; state of rebellion and state of national emergency
distinguished
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID*, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO
BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO.,
INC.,
G.R. No. 171396
May 3, 2006
– versus –
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The cases:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege
that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of
the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are
void for being unconstitutional.
The Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition
have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists
– the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in
a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected
in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the
President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified
by certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by
obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the
future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down
the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense
and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary
duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to
the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017,
thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition
have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists
– the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and who are
now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted
Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our
republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified
by certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by
obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the
future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme
Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring
down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of
Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences,
ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to
the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued
declaring a State of National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of
the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24,
2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as
well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President
lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII
of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was
issued declaring a state of national emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24,
2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and
to undertake such action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and
quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of
the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor
announced that “warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including
media, can already be implemented.”[1]
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would
not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno
[KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
[NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the
intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near
the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot
police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass
shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was
used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to
the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of
riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala
Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.[2]
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the
ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the
basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from
Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police
District were stationed outside the building.[3]
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya,
and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is
“meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or
do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government.” The PNP warned that it would take over any media
organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during
the state of national emergency.” Director General Lomibao stated that “if
they do not follow the standards – and the standards are – if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to
what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a
‘takeover.’” National Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to “cooperate” with the government
for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for
“balanced reporting” from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that
his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast
outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national
security is threatened.[4]
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin
Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed
a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the
Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in
any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran,
they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed
by the police.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine
Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo,
Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro
Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna
Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in
Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the “Batasan 5” decided to stay indefinitely.
Hence, these Petitions.
I s s u e s:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and
academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400
(ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda)
have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
1. PROCEDURAL
I- Moot and Academic Principle
Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following
requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy;
second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality; third, the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,
the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence,
we shall limit our discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;” a real
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor
General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending
that the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President
Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events,[5] so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case[6] or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render
the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed
illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional
or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital
issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that
“an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no
duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution (Province of Batangas
vs. Romulo, .R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736).
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved (Lacson vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357
SCRA 756);
Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public (Province of Batangas
vs. Romulo); and
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Albaña v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98,
Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577,
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004,
421 SCRA 656. )
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is
no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest,
involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given
by constitutional guarantees.[7] And lastly, respondents’ contested actions
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the
Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal
standing or locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.”[8] In private suits, standing is governed by
the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.”[9] Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on
his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here,
the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be
a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be
suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In
either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer”
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in
Beauchamp v. Silk,[10] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s
suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in
the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by
the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[11] “In
matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is
at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v.
Jordan[12] held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied.”
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and
thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
“direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt,[13] later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.[14] The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke
the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera,[15] it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,[16]
Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,[17] Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works[18] and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines
v. Felix.[19]
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was
done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,[20]
where the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the Court to
act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino
v. Comelec,[21] this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to
the “far-reaching implications” of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the
suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity
of laws, regulations and rulings.[22]
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have
failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of “transcendental importance.” Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[23] where the Court ruled that the
enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable
diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance
which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[24] wherein the Court held
that “given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court
may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite
the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review” of the
Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[25] while the Court noted that the
petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing
that “Balikatan 02-01” involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or
spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora,[26] that in cases of transcendental importance, the
cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements
may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s
attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,[27] the Court ruled that the status of
Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the requisite
personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot
sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused.
Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury
it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Comelec,[28] the Court reiterated the “direct injury” test with respect to
concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that “there
must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.”
In Lacson v. Perez,[29] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[30] the Court ruled that only the
petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they
claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation
of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative
powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social
Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating
them with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is
the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality doctrine” on legal standing. It
cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now
waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter.
The petitions thus call for the application of the “transcendental
importance” doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases.”
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency,[31] may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. However,
this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any
other official, he remains accountable to the people[32] but he may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.[33]
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the
President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its
distilled point – from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker and
Montenegro v. Castaneda to the volatile era of Lansang
v. Garcia, Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile. The
tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining “political questions,”
particularly those questions “in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.” Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that
the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang
took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in
the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence
of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From
the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of
checks and balances, “under which the President is supreme, x x x only if
and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme.” In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was
divided in Aquino v. Enrile. There, the Court was almost evenly divided on
the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a
political or justiciable question. Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which
greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the
latter case, ratiocinating that “in times of war or national emergency, the
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and
the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable
only to his conscience, the People, and God.”
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora — a recent case most
pertinent to these cases at bar — echoed a principle similar to
Lansang. While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that “this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This ruling is mainly a
result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution
which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The latter part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of
judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power,
Lansang adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the
President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this
Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by
way of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings.”
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress
what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important
provisions, thus:
First provision:
“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision:
“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision:
“as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”
First Provision: Calling-Out Power
The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421
SCRA 656) this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular
or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,[34] the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President
may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated
earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo
found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces
to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the
President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the
authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President
Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” emanates from her
powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was
Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides:
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall
be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of
Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section
17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without
legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Second Provision: “Take Care” Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII
which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,[35] the primary
function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before
assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its
laws.”[36] In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all
the armed forces of the country,[37] including the Philippine National
Police[38] under the Department of Interior and Local Government.[39]
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador
argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo
the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of
the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They
assail the clause “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.”
Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative
clause shows that it was lifted[40] from Former President Marcos’
Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines
as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and,
in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos
legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce obedience to all
the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP
1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.”
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?
PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to executive orders,
proclamations, administrative orders, etc. She cannot issue decrees similar
to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.[41]
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through
the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can
only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty
to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of
national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant
to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
 During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports
to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of
the “martial law” thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.[42] In
effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction
No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National
Defense to take over “the management, control and operation of the
Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and)
Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the
Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national
emergency.”
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim
that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.
A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a
state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To
the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision
refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like
the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national
emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to
be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be
construed together and considered in the light of each
other.[43] Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of
Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be
read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency
powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident
in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
declared by Congress.[44] materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by 1) Read:

President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily 2) The Habeas Corpus Cases
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. a. BARCELON VS. BAKER, 5 Phil. 87 (1905)

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
b. MONTENEGRO VS. CASTANEDA, 91 Phil. 882 (1952)
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances c. LANSANG VS. GARCIA, 42 SCRA 448
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such d. GARCIA-PADILLA VS. PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the April 20, 1983
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no e. MORALES VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, 121 SCRA 472 April
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, 26, 1983
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
f. OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, G.R. No. 54558,
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP May 22, 1987
1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless g. ROLANDO ABADILLA VS. GEN. RAMOS, 156 SCRA 97
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
h. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such i. People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 120
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without prior 2) The Martial Law cases
legislation.
a. AQUINO VS. ENRILE, 59 SCRA 183
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members b. AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION, 63 SCRA 546
during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and c. GUMAUA VS. ESPINO, 96 SCRA 402
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune
 d. LEGASPI VS. MINISTER 115 SCRA 418 (on the possible
options available to the president in case of lawful violence)
8. Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction
by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress.
a. Define: reprieve, commutation, pardon, amnesty
b. See Article IX-C, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution and Article 5 of the
Revised Penal (Act 386)
Section 5, Art. IX-C. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
c. Read:
1) BARRIOQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ, 82 Phil. 642
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
[1] Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
[2] Pardon is granted to one after conviction (of ordinary crimes) ; while
amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
[3] Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences
of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “”nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence” article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine
Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C.,
118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel
AnheuserBusch Brewing Ass’n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61;
Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law.
ed., 476.)
[4] Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is valid
only with the concurrence of the majority of the members of all the
members of Congress.
2) VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152
Before one may validly apply for executive clemency (pardon or amnesty)
he MUST ADMIT HAVING COMMITTED THE ACTS WHICH
RESULTED IN HIS IMPRISONMENT.
3) CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR, 71 Phil. 34
4) PEOPLE VS. JOSE, 75 Phil. 612
5) PELOBELO VS. PALATINO, 72 Phil. 441
6) PEOPLE VS. PASILAN, 14 SCRA 694
7) LEGASPI VS. MINISTER, 115 SCRA 418
8) MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN,February, 1989
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need
of a New appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog
City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17,
1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on
December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for
resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code
transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city
governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1,
1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date
she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to
see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had
required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of
the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the
Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her
has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government
has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August
1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4,892.50. 2
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner’s letter to the Office
of the President for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said
Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because,
as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which
she was accused. In line with the government’s crusade to restore absolute
honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda
v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd
Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground
for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
n fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. …
Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly
provides that “a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.” (Sec. 36, par. 2).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A.
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the
absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the
civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
filed the present petition in her behalf We gave due course on October 13,
1987.
Petitioner’s basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to
her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency
while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having
been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant
city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other
words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment
remained “suspended.” More importantly, when pardon was issued before
the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to
speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime
charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to
imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional
as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The
penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal
penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public
office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the
sentence. Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the
accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by
the pardon. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its
accessory penalties, suspension from public office.
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate
understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal consequences. This is
not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have
not been wholly consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the
gravity of the King’s wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has
been largely influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as “an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. … A pardon is a deed, to the validity
of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance.”
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning
power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given
even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon was granted
even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning
that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction
was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it
is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the
pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects
of a full and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether
or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino, We find a reiteration of the stand consistently
adopted by the courts on the various consequences of pardon: “… we adopt
the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941,
December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. …
(W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional
grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power
of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts,
should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party … concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction.
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or
approved. The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad
language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme
statement which has been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind,
this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it
does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offender’s innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive
consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing
more. “To say, however, that the offender is a “new man”, and “as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense;” is to ignore the difference
between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense
is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more
dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places
no restraints upon him following his conviction.”
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It
does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force
is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her.
Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s
civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in
the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation
.
9. Lllamas vs. Exec. Sec. Orbos, Oct. 15, 1991
The case before Us calls for a determination of whether or not the President
of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. In connection therewith, two important questions are
also put in issue, namely, whether or not the grant of executive clemency
and the reason therefore, are political questions beyond judicial review, and
whether or not the questioned act was characterized by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the
Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a
decision of the Office of the President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition).
Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of
the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90
days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the
time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that
official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the
assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed
the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to
the petitioner.
Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991
Resolution was “whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction,” (p. 6, petition) basically
on the ground th executive clemency could be granted by the President only
in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the
Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused to recognize
his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the
suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights
to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was
so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding
by public respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by
respondent governor, the former failed to justify the reduction of the penalty
of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the executive
clemency granted by public respondent was “the product of a hocus-pocus
strategy” (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because there was
allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by
respondent governor.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, …
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense s warrants, or when the continuance
in office of the respondent coul influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of
said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation the proceedings
against him until its termination. (Emphasis supplied)
Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction. Respondent govemor avers
that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is granted to the
President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a
political question which is beyond judicial review.
Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts
cannot inquire into the manner in which the President’s discretionary
powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled
rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary
powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review.
And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act
of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the
President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs.
Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is
considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment
upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore,
discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the
manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial
review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as
to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of government
because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public
or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate
constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted
him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do
permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set
of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in
the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p.
1326).
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely
political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution
the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We
must not overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of
executive clemency is subject to constitutional limitations. We will merely
check whether the particular measure in question has been in accordance
with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or
motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of
judicial review.
Petitioner’s main argument is that the President may grant executive
clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final
judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the
grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted
in an administrative case,” allegedly because the word “conviction” refers
only to criminal cases (par. 22-b, c, d, Petition). Petitioner, however,
describes in his very own words, respondent governor as one who has been
“convicted in an administrative case” (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner
concedes that the word “conviction” may be used either in a criminal case
or in an administrative case. In Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA
536, We ruled:
For misfeasance or malfeasance … any [elective official] could … be
proceeded against administratively or … criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established …
Moreover, applying the doctrine “Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire
debemos,” We cannot sustain petitioner’s view. In other words, if the law
does not distinguish, so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner’s proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise
of the executive clemency in administrative cases.
d. Is breach of the condition of pardon subject to judicial review?
Read: TORRES VS. GONZALES, 152 SCRA 272
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the
President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would “not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law.” Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the “Board”) resolved
to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President, the
Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of
Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol
(108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22
March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty
counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases
were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26
June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926;
this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. The Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986
from the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”), addressed to the Board,
on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long
list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty
years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering
with police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI
report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a
status report on each of the charges there listed and Identified.
On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued “by authority
of the President” an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner.
The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts
of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926. 3 Petitioner also contends
that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and
recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime
by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in
the past. This Court was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of
Prison. Tesoro, who had been convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents, was granted a parole by the then Governor-General. One
of the conditions of the parole required the parolee “not [to] commit any
other crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner.” Two years
after the grant of parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice of the Peace
Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been
committed with the wife of Tesoro’s brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with
the Court of First Instance the corresponding information which, however,
was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. The complainant
then went before the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro
with violation of the conditions of his parole. After investigation by the
parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the
President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the petitioner.
Tesoro contended, among other things, that a “judicial pronouncement to
the effect that he has committed a crime” is necessary before he could
properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran,
held that the determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro’s parole had
been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-
General and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts.
As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of
the power that had granted it, we held that “he [could not] invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.” Thus, this Court held that by accepting the
terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed
that the Governor-General’s determination (rather than that of the regular
courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and
conclusive upon him.
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons, the petitioner had been convicted of the
crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two years of his
sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the President of the
Philippines, “the condition being that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he
shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.” 8 Eight years
after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and
sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto mayor. He was
thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his
original sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions.
Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He contended,
secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution). This Court,
through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both
contentions of Sales.
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, the petitioner had been
convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he
was granted by the President a conditional pardon “on condition that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Espuelas
accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to
the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court
of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution
witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months
later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period
of his original sentence.
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be
summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions
of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of
guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
The petitioner challenges his recommitment, claiming he has not violated
the condition of his pardon “that he shall not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines.” The government bases its stand on the case of
Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol, 108 Phil. 353, where it was held,
in connection with a similar condition, that mere commission of a crime, as
determined by the President, was sufficient to justify recommitment.
Conviction was considered not necessary.
I would grant the petition.
There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal
charges, but that certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as many as such
charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction,
without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon.
Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42
SCRA 59). A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding
information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for
conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a
crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a
person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted
thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge.
That this conviction must be pronounced by the judge and no other is too
obvious a proposition to be disputed. The executive can only allege the
commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable Read: Distinctions between Treaty and executive agreements.
evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the
allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction. 1) GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 280

e. Amnesty to rebels 2) TAN SIN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD, 104 Phil. 868

Read: 3) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN, 3 SCRA 351

Proclamation No. 80, February 28, 1987 4. Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

10. Sections 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on 11. Under the present Constitution, is the president immune from suit in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the relation to acts performed by him or by his subordinates by virtue of his
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided for by specific orders during his tenure considering that the immunity from suit
law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every provision under the 1973 Constitution was already deleted?
quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
ARTICLE VIII – THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
government or government owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided for by law. 1. Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such other courts as may be established by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
(NOTE: Please see Section 25, Art. 18. After the expiration in 1991 of the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the USA
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the a. What is judicial power?
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.) Read: Badua vs. CBA, February 14, 1991

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within 30 days from b. Restrictions to the exercise of judicial power
the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, Political question doctrine
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Read:
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its
regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time. 1) JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30
 2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294 5) LINA VS. PURISIMA, 82 SCRA 244

3) ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 (When the question deals
with the necessity, expediency and wisdom of a particuar act, the same is
political and not justiciable)
4. Read again ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990
6) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG,39 SCRA 106
4. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

b-1. Definition of political question No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its members.
Read:
3. Section 3. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 Political questions are neatly the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested automatically and regularly released.
act, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political)
4. Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
2. Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 and 14 associate justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
divisions of 3, 5 or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof.
3. Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. (Political questions are questions to
be answered by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which
full discretionary authority is vested to the executive or legislative branch of (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
the government). executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (When the crux of the problem
deals with the validity of an act, it is justifiable. ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.
c. Cases on judicial power in general
(3) Cases or matters heard by a divisions hall be decided or resolved with
1) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756 the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
2) SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 SCRA 188 without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
3) RADIOWEALTH VS. AGRACADA, 86 Phil. 429 doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
4) NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE, 23 SCRA 405
Read:
1) VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA, 80 Phil. 297
2) VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577
3. JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376
To be decided by the Supreme Court en banc
1. Involving the constitutionality of any law, treaty, etc.;
2. When there is conflict of the decisions of 2 or more divisions of the
Supreme Court;
3. When a case is referred to by the division to the banc and the same
was accepted by the latter;
4. In death penalty cases;
1. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher;
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading , practice , and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance
with the civil service law.
(READ: Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA on the limitation of the Rules…not
to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
a. What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites?
DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, 444 SCRA
203
Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.
The following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power:
a. There must be before the court a case calling for the exercise of
judicial review;
b. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial Read:
adjudication;
aa. SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438
c. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing
to challenge; bb. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

d. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the b. On personality to sue
earliest opportunity; and
Is there a difference as to the “personality” requirement if the law being
e. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. questioned involves disbursement of public funds and on the other hand, if
it does not .
– Distinguish judicial power from judicial review.
Standing to question the validity of an Executive Order which does not
Read: involve disbursement of public funds; Requisites before the President may
issue executive Orders in furtherance of police power.
1. Fernandez vs. Torres, 209 SCRA 677
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY
1-a. Santos III vs. Northwest Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673

1-c) ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139 Ynares-Santiago, J

2) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled
“PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
3. NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 657 DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.”
4. Allied Broadcasting Center vs. Rep., Oct. 18, 1991
Under Section 3.1 of the said EO, THE IMPORTATION INTO THE
COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED
5. Lagamy vs. CA, 199 SCRA 501 MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED.

a-1. Functions of Judicial Review The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used
motor vehicles questioned the constitutionality of said EO.
1) legitimizing function
I s s u e s:
2) checking function
1. Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to
3) symbolic or educational function question the constitutionality of EO 156?
2. Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote
police power like in this case?
3. Is EO 156 constitutional?
Held:
1. The private respondent has the personality to sue to question the
constitutionality of an administrative issuance because it will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Respondents would suffer a
direct injury if said EO will be implemented because in its Certificate of
Registration , it is allowed import/trade used motor vehicles and spare parts.
Clearly, it would suffer prejudice if importation of all motor vehicles, not
only used cars will be prohibited.
2. The President is authorized to issue an executive order provided it
complies with the following requisites:
a. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
b. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
c. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature; and
d. It must be reasonable.
There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section 28 [2] of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to in turn authorize the President by law,
within specified limits, and subject to such restrictions and limitations, to
fix tariff rates, import and export quotas…”. Likewise, the Tariff and
Customs Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers.
3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used
cars constitutional? In this case, while the first two requisites are present,
the 3rd is not. This is so because it is not within the powers of the President
to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars, even in the
Freeport Zones like Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore
is ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the President
because it tries to supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute
and other existing laws.
The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable since
it likewise prohibit the entry of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which
is owed by law, RA 7227.
Read:
1) PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
2) SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
3) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
3-a. Read again NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 57
4. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5, 1994
Read this very carefully because it changes the original concept of
personality to sue when public funds are involved or not.
2. TATAD VS. GARCIA, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 436 (Even
though no public funds are involved and that petitioner is not directly
injured by the contract, he has the personality to question the same if it
involves national interest)
3. BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS. LARON, 170 SCRA 240 (If the
contract is for local consumption only, and that the petitioner is not directly
injured by the said contract which does not involve the disbursement of
public funds, the petitioner has no personality to sue)
c. May inferior courts also exercise the power of judicial review in
the light of the requirement of Section 4(2) of Article VIII?
Read: YNOT VS. IAC, March 20, 1987
d. Three views on the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law 2. ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite
suspension imposed on RAUL GONZALES)
Read:
g-1. May law students practice law before the courts? Requisites?
1) NORTON VS. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 US 425
Read:
2) SHEPPARD VS. BARREN, 194 US 553
Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court on December 19, 1986
3) DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB, 38 SCRA 429
h. On the integration of the bar
4) REPUBLIC VS. HEREDA, 119 SCRA 411
Read: IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554
5) REPUBLIC VS. CFI, 120 SCRA 151
6. Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over
e. Transfer of venue in criminal cases all courts and the personnel thereof.

Read: Read: DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337

1) PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172 4. Sections 7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least
2) PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393
40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
3) PEOPLE VS. PILOTIN, 65 SCRA 635
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
f. Rule making power; note the limitations courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen
of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
Read:
(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
1) BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, 81 Phil. 648 integrity, probity and independence.

2) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433 Section 8. A judicial and bar Council—composition—Chief Justice,
Secretary of Justice, Representative of Congress, Integrated Bar, Professor
g. On admission to the bar of Law, retired justice and representative of the private sector..

Read: 1. IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534 The regular members—term of 4 years—Commission on Appointments—

Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90
days from the submission of the list.
a. Read:
1. UY vs. Judge Capulong, April 7, 1993
2. Court Administrator vs. Judge Gines
b. Read:
Exec. Order No.216, July 10, 1987, creating the Judicial and Bar council
8. Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and the associate justices of
the Supreme Court, and the judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
a. See Sec. 17, Art. XVIII
b. Read: 1) NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER, 152 SCRA 284
2) PERFECTO VS. MEER, 85 Phil. 552
3) ENDENCIA VS. DAVID, 93 Phil. 696
9. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70
years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
Read: 1) OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O.G. 147
2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294
10. Section 12. The members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
Read:
1) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
2) MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION, 57 Phil. 60
3) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756
4) IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988
11. Sections 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing o f the
opinion o f the court. A certification to this effect signed by the CJ—-Any
member who took no part or dissented…must state the reason therefor. The
same procedure in all lower collegiate courts.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
Read:
1) AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
2) VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI, 47 SCRA 354
 3) BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE, 102 SCRA 7
4) MANGCA VS. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273
5) VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG, 121 SCRA 205
6) NAPOLCOM VS. LOOD, 127 SCRA 757
7) NUNAL VS. CA, 169 SCRA 356
8) Mangelen vs. CA, 215 SCRA 230
Requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law
and the facts on which it is based.
BEDRUZ VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 484 SCRA 452
Carpio-Morales, J.
A trial court’s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific
provision of the law violated, is not in derogation of the constitutional
requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the law
and the facts on which it was based or the factual and legal bases for the
conclusions reached by the trial court as long as the legal basis can be
inferred from the discussion in the decision.
Further, the requirement that the “decision shall state clearly and distinctly
state the law and the facts on which it is based” applies only to a decision of
a court of justice covered by Art. VIII of the Constitution], not the Office of
the Ombudsman.
GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION VS. ENDAYA, 444
SCRA 329
When Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution shall be complied
with by the courts.
Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that “no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
This constitutional provision applies only to cases submitted for decision,
i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or
other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A RESOLUTION IS ISSUED
DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AND STATING THE
LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR like “the petition raised are factual or there is
no reversible error in the respondent’s court decision”, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
by the petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been
passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement
with that of the Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon
the Court of Appeals. This complies with the constitutional requirement
under Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution
12. Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other
lower courts.
(2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.
(4) Even after the lapse—-the court shall still decide without further delay.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of
each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.
ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT
1. Sections 1 & 2. ..shall enjoy local/fiscal autonomy
 PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET
AL., May 27, 2004
Local Autonomy; automatic release of funds of Local Government
Units, particularly the IRA.
The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General
Appropriations Act of 1999, 2000 and 2001 insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48
entitled “Establishing a Program fro Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization “ with the purpose of facilitating the process of enhancing the
capacities of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions and services devolved
tot hem by the national government agencies concerned pursuant to the
Local Government Code.
Issue:
May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA
by the different local government units?
Held:
The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are
unconstitutional as they encroach on the fiscal autonomy of the local
government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is
already moot and academic because said provisions have been
implemented, there is a possibility that the same be incorporated in the
future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided
before another GAA is enacted. It behooves this Court to make a categorical
ruling on the substantive issue now to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public.
Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is
unconstitutional because it amounts to control to local government units
when the President’s power over local government units is confined to
general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two
powers were enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have any
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner of doing the act. He has no judgment
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides
that the share of each local government unit shall be released without need
of any further action, DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCIAL, CITY,
MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case may be on a
quarterly basis…and which may not be the subject to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the
local government units shall enjoy local autonomy as well as Section 25,
Art. II of the Constitution.
2. Section 3.. there shall be a LGC which shall provide a more responsive
and accountable local government with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative and referendum….
Read:
1) 1991 Local Government Code on Recall, requisites, grounds and
procedures) and other important aspects.
2. Exec. Order 249
Residence requirement for local government positions.
 TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO, ET AL., 475 SCRA 290
Carpio, J.
Facts:
The petitioner who is the daughter of Rep. Tomas Dumpit, 2 nd District of La
Union, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La
Union for the May, 2004 elections. The respondents filed a case for her
disqualification on the ground that she is a registered voter of Naguilian , La
Union and only transferred her registration as a voter to San Julian West,
Agoo, La Union, on October 24, 2003. Her presence in San Julian West,
Agoo, La Union was noticed only after her certificate of candidacy.
Barangay officials claimed in an affidavit that she is not a resident of the
said Barangay.
The petitioner countered that she acquired a new domicile in San Juan West
when she purchased from her father a residential lot on April 19, 2003 and
she even designated a person as caretaker of her residential house.
Held:
While residence and domicile are synonymous, domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, the following
requisites must be present:
1. an actual removal or actual change of domicile;
2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the case of petitioner while she bought a parcel of land in San Julian
West, Agoo, La Union on April 19, 2003, property ownership is not an
indicia of the right to vote or voted for an office.
To effect a change of residence, there must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time, change of domicile or
residence must be voluntary and the residence a the place chose for the new
domicile must be actual.
In the case at bar, what was constructed by the petitioner on said lot was a
beach house which is at most a temporary place of relaxation. It can hardly
be considered a place of residence. Finally, in the Special Power of attorney
designating a caretaker with a monthly salary of P2,500.00, it was shown
that she is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6
butterfly St., Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Memtro Manila. This shows that she has
a number of residences and the acquisition of another one does not
automatically make the recently acquired residence her new domicile.
Tess Dumpit-Michelena’s cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union, is therefore valid.
Section 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local
governments…
Read: MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143
1. Sections 5.. Shall have the power to create their own revenues…
2. Section 6..shall have a just share in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them..
Read:
1. Basco vs. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52
1-a. Philippine Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality of Pililla, 198 SCRA 82
1-b) WILLIAM LINES VS. CITY OF OZAMIS, 56 SCRA 590
1-c. Estanislao vs. Hon. Costales, May 8, 1991
 2) VELASCO VS. BLAS, 115 SCRA 540
3) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
4) MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE VS. ABELLERA, December 12,
1986, 146 SCRA
5) PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS. LAC, December 17,
1986, 146 SCRA
6. MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS VS. LIBANGAN SA
MALOLOS, 159 SCRA 525
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials shall be not more
than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
BENJAMIN BORJA VS. COMELEC, and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., G.R.
No. 133495, September 3, 1998
Mendoza, J.
Issue:
Whether a Vice Mayor who succeeds to the Office of the Mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have
served a term for the purpose of the three-term limit on local officials as
provided under the Local Government Code.
Held:
No.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
Section. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, shall be determined by law, which shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
The above provision of the Constitution is restated in Section 43 [b] of RA
No. 7160, the Local Government Code.
The term limit for local elective officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS
SERVED THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN AN ELECTIVE LOCAL
OFFICE, HE MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN ELECTED TO THE SAME
POSITION FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF TIMES BEFORE THE
DISQUALIFICATION CAN APPLY.
Clearly, therefore, before the disqualification could apply, the following
requisites must be present:
1. the local official must have been elected for the same position
[Example: Mayor] three times; and
2. the local official must have served three consecutive terms as
Mayor.
In the present case, only the 2nd requisite is present since in 1988, the
private respondent was not a candidate for Mayor in 1988 but as Vice
Mayor though he succeeded the elected mayor in 1989. It was only in 1992
and 1995 that he was a candidate for Mayor. As such, he could still be a
candidate for Mayor in the May, 1998 elections.
(NOTE: Applying the above doctrine, MAYOR MAURICIO DOMOGAN
of Baguio City is not prohibited from running for City Mayor of Baguio in
the 2001 elections because he was not elected as City Mayor in 1992 though
he served as City Mayor since 1992 as a result of the disqualification of
RAMON LABO, JR.. His 1992-1995 term was not by election but by
operation of law. It was only in 1995 and 1998 that he was a candidate for
City Mayor (2 times) though he served 3 times as Mayor. The first requisite
before the disqualification applies to him is not present).
ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602
The petitioner was elected Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. During
his 3rd term (1995 elections), he was proclaimed the winner but his
opponent filed an election protest and two (2) months before the next
election and 4 months before the end of his 3 rd term , the COMELEC
declared his opponent to be the winner and was able to occupy the position
of Mayor for 2 months.
Is he entitled to run for the position of mayor in the election after he was
declared a loser during his 3rd term but he almost completed 3 terms?
Held:
Yes because in order that the prohibition shall apply to him, the following
requisites must be present:
1. the local official must have been elected for the same position
[Example: Mayor] three times; and
2. the local official must have fully served three consecutive terms as
Mayor.
In this case, he was not elected to the position 3 times because he lost
during the 3rd time though he served the office for 2 years and 10 months.
Likewise even assuming that he won the 3rd election, he did not fully serve
the term of 3 years. It is not enough that an individual has served 3
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must have also been elected
to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
Prohibition to run for more than 3 consecutive terms
FEDERICO T. MONTEBONVs. COMELEC & ELEONOR ONDOY,
G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008
Petitioners Montebon, Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu
for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April
30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates[1][4] for municipal councilor
filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC
alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007
elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the
service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12,
2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified
from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.
In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their
respective memoranda.
In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s assumption
of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an
interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that,
according to the law, voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the official concerned was elected.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not
disqualified from running for the fourth consecutive time to the same office
if there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for
disqualification ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor
should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His
second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus
not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.[2][5]
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division,
as follows:
Respondent’s assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in
January 2004 during his second term as councilor is not a voluntary
renunciation of the latter office. The same therefore operated as an
effective disruption in the full service of his second term as
councilor. Thus, in running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007
Elections, respondent is deemed to be running only for a second
consecutive term as councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully
served being his 2004-2007 term.
Petitioner Montebon’s and Ondoy’s June 9, 2007 manifestation and
omnibus motion are hereby declared moot and academic with the instant
disposition of their motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3][6
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal
councilor.
The petition lacks merit.
The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from
serving more than three consecutive terms in the same post. Section 8,
Article X thereof states:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,[4][7] the Court held that the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.[5][8] In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[6][9] the Court
emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the
official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served
three consecutive terms in the same position.[7][10]
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for
three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully
served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of
Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of
law.[8][11] Section 44[9][12] of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs
in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member
shall become vice mayor. Thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor,
the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by
the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
xxx
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor
due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with
law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in
no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal
councilor.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept
of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.[10][13] (Emphasis added)
Thus, respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was
an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in
an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation
of law. We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code
makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently
unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate
succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official
concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of
law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office
that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if
for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post
vacated.
xxxx
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically
not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a
government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and
neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.[11][14]
1. Section 10. No province, city, municipality or barangay may be
created, divided, merged or abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor,
the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by
the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
x x x.
 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1. Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), [1][4] “directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of
Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG,
one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons
in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455.[2][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment.[3][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of
whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
Constitution. Assuming that it has not been repealed, is it not inconsistent
with Section 1, Art. XI which states that public office is a public trust?
The petition has no merit.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is
invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to
sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the
people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all
citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office.
In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and
not their rulers.[4][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the
principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff
beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative
bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same
provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña,[5][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the
portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b)
of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its
Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly
obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were
given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof
from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in
my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any
other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or
staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[6][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section
4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the
present petitions.
2. Sections 12–18
a. Impeachment, officers of the government who are impeachable,
grounds, limitations for its exercise, procedure, etc. . .
Read: ROMULO, et al vs. YNIGUEZ, et al, 141 SCRA 263
“Culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust”
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic
of the Philippines but shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.
Read:
FRANCISCO VS. SPEAKER JOSE DE VENECIA, ET AL, 415 SCRA
44, November 10, 2003
When is an impeachment complaint deemed to be a bar to the filing of
another complaint within a 1-year period?
A verified impeachment complaint bars the filing of another complaint
against an impeachable official within a period of 1 year after the same
was received by the House of Representatives and referred by the Speaker
to the appropriate committee for its study and recommendation. It is
deemed initiated under Art. XI, Section 3 [5] after the referral to the
Committee by the Speaker. To “initiate” refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint COUPLED WITH CONGRESS TAKING
INITIAL ACTION OF SAID COMPLAINT.”
ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE, ETC.
1. Secs. 1-19
a. Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act of 1988
Section 5 [2] Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.
b. What is academic freedom?
Very Important: (2007 Bar Question)
Under the 1973 Constitution, “Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY
ALL institutions of higher learning” while under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL institutions
of higher learning.” In short, before, ON LY INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER LEARNING ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHILE
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS
ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS AS
WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL.
Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving
students
I S S U E S:
Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its
decision to expel the private respondents?
H E L D:
Since De La Salle University is an institution of higher learning, it
enjoys academic freedom which includes the right to determine whom
to admit as its students.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.[28][74] According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and
(4) who may be admitted to study.[29][75]
While La Salle is entitled to invoke academic freedom in its actions
against its students, the penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on
private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as
subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.” [30][94] This
power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a
penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would
give rise to a due process question.[31][95]
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty
of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed
by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the
two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not
suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they
involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future
of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his
future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and
universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that,
appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an
educational tool rather than a punitive measure.[32][96]
Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said
private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer
credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL.
GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION, 68 SCRA 277
“What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally
qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see
it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority
except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or
conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines.”
“The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university
teacher recognized and effectively guaranteed by society to seek and
express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in
his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university
teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the
status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they
disseminate their learning.”‘
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that
expulsion is “an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of
his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the
Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. The
penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct,
dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or
possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency,
drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses Read: MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311
such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or
leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the c. Implied
stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school
personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or
1. When the government institutes a suit;
discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school records or school
forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.”
State immunity from suit; when government officers initiate a suit against a
private party, it descends to the level of a private individual susceptible to
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(b) provides that
counterclaims
exclusion is “a penalty in which the school is allowed to exclude or drop
the name of the erring pupil or student from the school rolls for being
undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.” 2. When the government engages in business or enters into a contract; and

3. Read:

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS aa. MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA bb. U.S. VS. RUIZ,
136 SCRA
1. Sections 1-12
cc. TORIO VS. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599
Exec. Order No. 264
dd. COMMISSIONER VS. SAN DIEGO, 31 SCRA 616
a. Consent is either Express or Implied
ee. USA vs. JUDGE QUINTO, et al., February 26, 1990 and the
cases cited therein
b. Express
ff. Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Sandoval, March 19, 1993
1. general law
gg. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357
aa. C.A. 327
hh. Veteans vs. CA, 214 SCRA 286
bb. Act 3083, Sec. 1
Immunity from suit; effect of a void contract with the government; unjust
cc. Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386) enrichment

dd. PD 1807, January 16, 1981 4. Tests of Suability for incorporated government

2. Special law Read:

aa. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456 g. Executive Order No. 275

bb. ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM VS. CIR, 102 Phil. 789

5. Tests of Suability for an unincorporated govt. agency government

agency

ARTICLE XVIII – TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

1. Sections 1-27

2. PCGG Cases

Read:

a. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 530

a.-1 BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY VS.

PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, May 27, 1987,
150 SCRA 181

b. RICARDO SILVERIO VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 77645, Oct. 26, 1987,155
SCRA 60

c. KWONG, et al vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 79484, December 7, 1987,156

SCRA 222

d. PALM AVENUE REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION VS. PCGG, G.R. No. 76296, August 31,
1987,153 SCRA 579

e. LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. VS. PCGG, April 15, 1988,160

SCRA

f. PCGG VS. PENA, 159 SCRA 556