14. LOZADA VS. COMELEC G.R. No.

L-59068

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on
Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a
special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve
the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders
or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
“Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its
certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist,
would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the
courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP
has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses
thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even
when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a
petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was
intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
15 PEOPLE V JALOSJOS

Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
16 TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL Case Digest

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.

556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained
in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside
orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case

Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator

Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the
cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in
a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
"they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of
the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
17 Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Date: July 13, 2018

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of
the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case
petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it
infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance
to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued
and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than
Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for
“it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

18 Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare
him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President
Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left
in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as
the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.

2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:

1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing
so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in
the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if
the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree
that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious
to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter
held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of
a doubt.
19 Santiago v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a
public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the aliens in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other
for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and
No. 91-94897.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss
or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995
with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of
Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.

Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office.

In view of suspension NOT as a penalty

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine
(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In view of multiple petitions

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted
the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of
"qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the information (Rollo, pp.
25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:

(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.'

In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks.

Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter
alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by
petitioner.
21 Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of
the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter,
a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
22 Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. L-83767 | 1988-10-27

Subject: Art VI, Sec. 17 (Electoral Tribunal composition)

Facts:

Petitioners filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The
SET was composed of 3 SC justices and 6 senators. The issue revolves around the fact that the senators
subject of the election contest before the Trubunal were also the sitting senator-members of the
Tribunal. Petitioners moved for the Disqualification/Inhibition of the Senators-Members on the ground
that all of them are interested parties to said case. Other senators involved voluntarily moved to recuse
themselves. The Tribunal denied the move for mass disqualificatin of effectively all of its senator-
members.

Petitioners argue that the disqualification of the Senator-members was consistent with due process and
fair play and proposed that the Tribunal amend its rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three members (SC Justices) of the Tribunal.

Held:

Electoral Tribunal composition

1. In providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators.

2. The proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
is 2 to 1 ---- an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests.

3. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

4. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
of an objective and impartial judgment. However, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
23 PIMENTEL VS. HRET

Pimentel vs. HRET (2002)

G.R. No. 141489 | 2002-11-29

Subject: Proportional representation in the HRET and CA; Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
prior recourse to the House is necessary before courts may exercise judicial review; Under the doctrine
of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of its functions
unless there is grave abuse of discretion; Requisites for judicial review; Lack of locus standi; Supervening
events have rendered the petition moot

Facts:

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which
included, for the first time, the election of party-list groups whose nominees would become members of
the House of Representatives. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13
organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while
the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each.

Subsequently, the House of Representatives constituted its electoral tribunal (HRET) and Commission on
Appointment (CA) contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. It does
not appear that the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or
the CA. Hence, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Ople, as Chairman
of the CA, and to Associate SC Justice Melo, as Chairman of the HRET, requesting them to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners (Pimentel et al) filed with the Supreme Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction against the HRET and CA, and the respective Chairman and Members. Petitioners
contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should
have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA.

At the time petitioners filed the petitions, the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list
representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the remaining 206 district representatives
affiliated with different political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS
(16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon
Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was an independent

Petitioners assail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that
the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list
representatives.

Senator Pimentel filed the instant petition in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.
The issue is whether or not the present composition of the HRET and CA violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the said
bodies.

Held:

Proportional representation in the HRET and C

1. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those
who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments (CA). Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective electoral tribunal.

2. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in the internal rules promulgated by the House, to wit:
the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments .

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before courts may
exercise judicial review

3. Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.

4. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation
of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the
House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners'
direct recourse to this Court is premature.

5. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the
House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears that the party-list groups in the House at that
time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not
designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result
that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, 'the Court
cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House
of its functions unless there is grave abuse of discretion
6. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, 'the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the CA.

7. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Requisites for judicial review

8. It is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts
unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (i) there must be an actual controversy; (ii)
the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the
resolution of the controversy; (iii) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity;
and (iv) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the
controversy.

Lack of locus standi

9. The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they
are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they
claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As
such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus
standi. The party raising the constitutional issue must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

Supervening events have rendered the petition moot

10. The issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14,
2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot
now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the "present
composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General.
With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the
absence of a proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant
petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be
tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.
24 Aquino vs COMELEC (1995)

G.R. No. 120265 | 1995-09-18

Subject:

Election Laws; Residency Qualification; Transfer of Domicile; Effect of Disqualification (Right of Second
Placer to Proclaimed)

Facts:

When Agapito Aquino ran for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City, he provided in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he has resided in Palm Village, Makati
City for the past 10 months.

A petition to disqualify Aquino was filed on the ground that he lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a
period not less than one year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

Aquino filed another COC this time stating that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to
be elected for one year and thirteen days.

A hearing was conducted by the COMELEC n the disqualification case wherein Aquino presented a lease
contract to prove his residency. On the basis thereof, the Comelec declared Aquino eligible to run.

The opposing parties filed an MR to the Comelec en banc. Meanwhile, elections were held and Aquino
garnered the highest vote for his district.

However, the Comelec En Banc, acting on the MR, declared Aquino disqualified as a candidate for lack of
the residence qualification and enjoined his proclamation as winning candidate.

Aquino filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court questioning (1) the jurisdiction of Comelec to
order the suspension of his proclamation. Aquino contends that after the elections, it was no longer
Comelec but the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case; and (2) the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
congressional candidates in this case since he was running for a newly created political district which
was only existing for barely four months; and (3) the propriety of COMELEC in instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes

Held:

Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal over Disqualification Case

1. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. (Note: Aquino did not automatically become a member of the House of
Representatives upon winning the election, he still has to be proclaimed and sworn into office.)

2. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the electoral tribunal assumes jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or
the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be
a member of the House of Representatives.

Jurisdiction of Comelec over Disqualification Case

3. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction
with Sec 6 of RA 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein.

4. Even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A.
6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Moreover, a
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
disqualification proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. The phrase "when the
evidence of guilt is strong" is applicable not only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but also to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 7
of BP 881.

Residency Qualification in Election Cases

5. In order that Aquino could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

6. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. The term "residence"
has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile."

7. Domicile is the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

8. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in
Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.

9. Records show that Aquino was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52 years immediately
preceding the 1992 election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of
the same district. His connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
condominium unit in the area. While a lease contract maybe indicative of his intention to reside in
Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two years. While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
Aquino claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he
claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring
his physical residence is not to acquire new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Transfer of Domicile

10. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

11. The submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in
a newly created political district lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air.
It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of
Makati.

Effect of Disqualification; Right of Second Placer to Proclaimed

12. The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. (see cases of Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos as reiterated and upheld in Labo, Jr. v.
Comelec, Abella v. Comelec; Benito v. Comelec)

13. The rule is this: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
25 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and ELMER E. PANOTES, respondents.

G.R. No. 201350. January 22, 2013.*

ELMER E. PANOTES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, respondents.

Facts:

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as representative of the
Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer
E. Panotes (Panotes) who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010. Chato filed an electoral protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) assailing the results in all the 160
clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 2011 Rules of the HRET, Chato
designated forty (40) pilot clustered precincts, equivalent to 25% of the total number of protested
clustered precincts, in which revision of ballots shall be conducted. The initial revision of ballots,
conducted on March 21 - 24, 2011, showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties
per physical count vis-a-vis their votes per election returns in certain precincts. Panotes lost no time in
moving for the suspension of the proceedings in the case, and praying that a preliminary hearing be set
in order to determine first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections.

Consequently, in its Resolution, HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to
the protest. After the initial revision of the pilot protested clustered precincts, Chato moved for the
revision of ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts arguing that the results of the revision of
25% of said precincts indicate a reasonable recovery of votes in her favor, but was denied by HRET. HRET
issued the assailed Resolution directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts. Expectedly, Panotes moved for
reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET in ordering the continuation of the revision of
ballots in the remaining 75% of the protested clustered precincts?

Ruling:

None. The Constitution mandates that the HRET "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications" of its members. By employing the word "sole", the Constitution is
emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members
is intended to be its own – full, complete and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its
exclusive control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows:

Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions. – The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction, and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.

Contrary to Panotes' posturing, there existed legal and factual bases for the revision of the remaining
75% of the protested clustered precincts. Rule 37 of the 2011 HRET Rules clearly provides that, after
post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest, the Tribunal may proceed with the
revision of the ballots in the remaining contested precincts. It should be pointed out, however, that the
provision in question is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall."
Therefore, it is merely directory, and the HRET is not without authority to opt to proceed with the
revision of ballots in the remaining contested precincts even if there was no reasonable recovery made
by the protestant in the initial revision.

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the HRET on
the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially
proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a
determination of the true will of the electorate.
26 WALDEN F. BELLO v. COMELEC, GR No. 191998, 2010-12-07

Facts:

On November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of
Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, on March 23, 2010, AGPP filed its
Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of

Acceptance of its nominees.[2]... n March 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807[3]which
prescribed the rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes
of the May 10, 2010 elections.[4]

When the COMELEC published on March 26, 2010 its initial "List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the May 10, 2010 elections with their respective Nominees,"
Arroyo was listed as AGPP's first nominee.

Through a letter dated April 7, 2010, the mandamus petitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law
Department to act, consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification
of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to comply with the... requirements of Section 6 of Resolution
No. 8807.[21] They also wrote the COMELEC on April 20, 2010, reiterating their letter-request dated
April 7, 2010. The COMELEC failed to respond to both letters.[2... n July 28 and 29, 2010, two (2)
separate petitions for quo warranto[39] were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) questioning Arroyo's eligibility as AGPP's representative in the House of Representatives. On
September 7,... 2010, the HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo
to file his Answer to the two petitions.[

In G.R. No. 192832, the petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List also prays that the Court: (a) direct the
COMELEC en banc to review all its decisions in cases for disqualification of nominees and cancellation of
registration of party-list groups filed in the May 10, 2010... elections, as well as those which have not
been resolved, in line with the eight-point guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani;[41] and (b) order
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Elias R.

Yusoph to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for their open defiance of the Court's
Decisions in Ang Bagong Bayani[42] and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. COMELEC.[43

Issues:

The core issues boil down to (1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's
nominees motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined
from giving due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canvassing of AGPP's
votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member
of the House of Representatives.

Ruling:

For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply with
Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in relation
with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested party may file with
the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee
27 Vilando v. electoral tribunal (2011)

EN BANC

[ G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011 ]

RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN

SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged
that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father
was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC,
Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation
announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance
withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a
petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the
proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the
COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

Issues:

WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.

WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines

Held:

1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc
her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present
his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election,
returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and
in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.

3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The
governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied
on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino
absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's
affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in
2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re:Florencio Mallare,
elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We
note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the
1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution.

The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of
the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District, Negros Oriental.