[G.R. No. L-30538. January 31, 1981.
] ISSUING DOCTOR DID NOT FACT OF DEATH IS NOT IN ISSUE; CASE AT BAR. —
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BONIFACIO TIROL and
CIRIACO BALDESCO, Defendants-Appellants.
Arcadio G. de la Cruz, for Defendants-Appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SYNOPSIS
Awakened by the barking of dogs one evening, Kosain Manibpol saw two men come up his
house on the pretext of borrowing a piece of his land. Suddenly, another man came up who, after
flashing his flashlight and boxing Kosain’s face, was followed by a group of more than ten men
who simultaneously hacked and boloed Kosain and the members of his family, resulting in the
death of Kosain’s wife and of his six children. The wounded Kosain and a six-year old daughter,
who survived the massacre were able to recognize the appellants as among their assailants with
the help of a lighted petroleum lamp and the moonlight.
Charged with multiple murder and double frustrated murder, appellants interposed the defense of
alibi. The trial court convicted and sentenced them to death upon finding of conspiracy to
commit the crime charged based principally on the testimonies of Kosain and his six-year old
daughter. The court denied appellant’s motion for new trial for having been filed out of time.
On automatic review, the Supreme Court held that appellants’ defense of alibi cannot prevail
over their having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses whose credibility was
never successfully assailed; that the motion for new trial filed more than fifteen days after
rendition of judgment was filed out of time; and that conspiracy was sufficiently established by
positive evidence showing the assailants’ unison in action and singleness of purpose.
Judgment modified as to civil liability and as to appellant Baldesco whose criminal liability was
extinguished by his death pending appeal but whose civil liability the Court ruled remained
recoverable from his estate.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY OF ACCUSED; EFFECT OF DEATH PENDING APPEAL;
RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS BASIS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY WHICH
SURVIVES. — Where during the pendency of an appeal in a criminal case one of the accused
dies, the appeal will be resolved insofar as he is concerned only for the purpose of determining
his criminal liability which is the basis of civil liability for which his estate may be liable
following the doctrine in People v. Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 124, 134).
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEATH CERTIFICATE NOT HEARSAY EVEN IF
Where the fact of death of the victims is not in issue; where the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the armed men who entered
their residence on the night of December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted; and where the fact that
death came to the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal certainty, the death certificates of
the victims are only corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the accused
may not claim that the court erred in admitting them as part of the testimony of the witnesses on
the ground that they are hearsay evidence, the doctor who issued them having done so on the
strength of the sketch furnished by the police, without personally examining the bodies of the
victims.
3. ID.; ID.; ALIBI, A WEAK DEFENSE; NECESSARY OF SHOWING PHYSICAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENCE AT SCENE OF THE CRIME DUE TO DISTANCE. — It is
well-settled that the defense of alibi, which is easy to concoct, must be received with utmost
caution, for it is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused. To be
acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the accused was alleged to be when the offense
was committed must be located at such a distance that it is well nigh impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime. In the case at bar, although appellant Baldesco testified that the victim’s
house is more than three kilometers from his, it still does not belie the fact that he could easily go
there if he wanted to, considering that both residence s are within the same barrio. So is the house
of appellant Tirol located in the same barrio. According to him, his house is about 1½ kilometers
from that of the victim. The trial court correctly rejected his theory that he was not in his house
when the incident occurred but in another town looking for a job because of the inconsistencies
noted in his evidence.
4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED
BY CREDIBLE WITNESSES. — The alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the prosecution witnesses identifying and pointing to the accused as among the
group of men which massacred the victims. The two survivors, Kosain and his 6-year old
daughter, positively identified both accused as two of the more than ten men who entered their
house on December 4, 1965 and participated in the hacking and boloing of their family Accused
Tirol was even more distinctly and positively recognized as the "bungi" (harelipped) who hacked
some of the victims. The credibility of theses two prosecution witnesses was never successfully
assailed.
5. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES IN TESTIMONY. — The inconsistencies attributed to Kosain Manibpol
refer to minor details (i.e., about the length of time he had known one of the two persons who
first came up to his residence on the pretext of borrowing his lot), which do not affect his
credibility. The apparent inconsistency in his testimony as well as that of 6-year old Undang
Kosain whose credibility was never questioned, as to who among the armed men hacked or
attacked which victim, is likewise insufficient to destroy their credibility, considering that the
presence of a number of armed men simultaneously participating in the lawful aggression could
really be confusing. As noted by the trial court, it would be natural if the witnesses, who were
themselves victims of the horrible deed, were not confused during that terrifying massacre
committed together by more than ten persons.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; MUST BE FILED WITHIN
FIFTEEN DAYS FROM RENDITION OF JUDGMENT WHERE DEATH PENALTY
IMPOSED. — Section 9. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in all cases in which the
death penalty is imposed; the records should be forwarded to the Supreme Court within twenty
(20) days but not less than fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment. This 20-day period is
not rigid nor absolute nor jurisdictional, and may be shortened or extended. However, the
extension of period is for the purpose of enabling the lower court to comply with the mandatory
requirement of elevating the records for review, and not to lengthen the minimum period within
which the trial courts may modify or alter their decision. As enunciated in People v. Bocar (97
Phil. 398), the reason for the 15-day minimum requirement is such that within that period, the
trial court may on its own motion with the consent of the defendant, grant a new trial. Within that
period., the trial court may modify its judgment by reducing the penalty or fine, or even set it
aside altogether and acquit the accused. In the case at bar, the motion for a new trial was filed
twenty-eight days after rendition of the judgment. Although a 15-day extension was granted to
the lower court within which to forward the record of this case, that extension did not affect the
15-day period for filing of a motion for new trial.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS A GROUND THEREFOR;
REQUISITES; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of a newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that: (a) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) it must be to the merits as ought to produce a different
result, if admitted. In the case at bar, therefore, even granting that the motion for a new trial was
filed on time, the same does not merit favorable action. The ground relied on is an alleged newly
discovered evidence, referring to a sworn statement executed by a barrio captain after judgment
had already been rendered, which states that Kosain Manibpol, the prosecution witness, had
admitted to him that the implicated one of the accused only for the purpose of making money out
of the case and that said Manibpol had in fact demanded from a son-in-law of one of the accused
one carabao in exchange for his not testifying against the said accused. The very affidavit of the
barrio captain indicates that the so-called extra-judicial admission of Kosain was already
available during the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded from the accused’s son-in-law
one carabao so that he will not testify against the accused. The son-in-law should have been
presented as a defense witness if such was the fact, together with some other barrio residents who
had knowledge. as was allegedly "public knowledge in our barrio," that the said accused was not
involved in the crime.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; POSITIVE EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO SHOW
CONCERT OF DESIGN. — While it has been held that conspiracy must be established by
positive evidence, direct proof is not essential to show it, since by its very nature it is planned in
utmost secrecy. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of the
execution. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of
some unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, through apparently independent, were
in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may be inferred although no actual meeting between them
to conspire is proved, for the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to
every detail in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at al stages of the
conspiracy. In this case under review, it has been clearly established that the appellants and their
cohorts acted in unison when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and attacked their
victims in a manner showing singleness of purpose — the massacre of the entire family of
Kosain. The fact that two survived is of no moment. The intention to kill all of them was most
patent.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR
TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF. — In addition to the prosecution evidence which has clearly
established the guilt of the accused appellants, there are more incriminating proofs that emanate
from the appellants themselves. The trial court had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused
Baldesco from police custody on December 15, 1965 and his subsequent re-arrest while en route
to Davao. On the other hand, Accused Tirol himself testified that after coming from Salat, he left
his house and never returned, for the reason that the members of his family were afraid of some
vendetta because of the massacre of Kosain Manibpol’s family. The trial court noted that this
fear was entertained even before a warrant of arrest could be issued. These actuations could only
indicate a sense of guilt. As the trial pointed out, fear, of reprisal or retaliation could only haunt
one who is aware of his wrongdoing.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY IN CASE AT BAR
ABSORBS NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
EMPLOYING MEANS TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE, AND BY A BAND. — There were
treachery in the case at bar because the accused and their companions were made a deliberate
surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the killings in such a manner that there was no
risk to themselves. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of nighttime, taking advantage of
superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense, and that the crime was committed by
a band.
11. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; DWELLING. — The aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, the crime having been committed in the dwelling place of the victims who had not
given any provocation, likewise can be appreciated.
12. ID.; MULTIPLE MURDER AND DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER; PENALTY. —
The crimes of murder of seven persons qualified by treachery, and of two frustrated murders,
aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance, are penalized by
the maximum penalty provided for in Article 248 which is death.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch III, in Criminal Case
No. 360, dated March 31, 1969, imposing on Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco the death
penalty for each of the seven (7) murders and an indeterminate sentence for each of the two (2)
frustrated murders.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The following facts appear uncontroverted.
In the evening of December 4, 1965, while Kosain Manibpol was sleeping with his family in
their house at Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, he was awakened by the barking of their dogs.
When he got up to investigate, he saw two persons outside their house who had already come up.
They were Beatingco, Jr. and Julian Casian. He asked them what they came for, and they
answered that they wanted to borrow part of his land, to which he consented. After he gave his
consent, Kulas Bati suddenly arrived, flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he
fell to the floor, the rest of his assailant’s companions, numbering more than ten, who were all
armed with bladed weapons and firearms, also came and hacked or boloed him, his wife and his
seven children, resulting in the death of his wife, Kadidia Kalantongan and his six children,
namely, Daduman, Malaguianon, Locayda, Pinangcong, Baingkong and Abdul Rakman, all
surnamed Kosain. He and one of his daughters, Undang Kosain, who was about six years old,
survived although wounded. They were able to run to the houses of their neighbors, and were
later brought to the municipal building where they reported to the police and were given medical
attention.
For the death of Kosain’s wife and his six children, as well as for the wounding of himself and
his daughter Undang, fourteen (14) persons were charged (p. 3, Vol. II, rec.) with multiple
murder and double frustrated murder by the Matalam Chief of Police, and these were: Nicolas
Bate, Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma, Pablo Diosma, Lorenzo Canio, Durico Sugang, Teofilo
Baldesco, Ciriaco Baldesco, Julian Casiag, Nick Bunque, a certain Miestizo, Sofring Romualdo,
and Bonifacio Bautista [later amended to Bonifacio Tirol; p. 29, Vol. II, rec.]. Of the fourteen,
only Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol were apprehended, while the rest remain at large.
On February 17, 1966, after the second stage of preliminary investigation was waived by accused
Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Cotabato filed the following
information (p. 37, Vol. II, rec.) against the two:
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal accuses Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco of the
crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, committed as follows:
"That on or about December 4, 1965, in Kabalangasan, Barrio Lampayan, Matalam, Province of
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in
company with Nicolas Bate, Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma, Pablo Diosma, Lorenzo Canio,
Durico Sugang, Teofilo Baldisco, Julian Casiag, Nick Bunque, Miestizo, Sopring Romualdo and
Bonifacio Bautista who are still at large, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with bladed weapons and firearms did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill,
taking advantage of the cover of the night, attack, stab and shoot Kadidia Kalangtogan,
Duaduman Kosain, Malaguianon Kosain, Locayda Kosain, Penangcong Kosain, Biacong Kosain
and Abdul Rakman Kosain, who as a result thereof, sustained mortal wounds which directly
caused their death and Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain sustained serious wounds which
ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing all acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of double murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Kosain Manipbol and Undang Kosain which prevented
their death.
"Contrary to law, especially Article 248 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of the two survivors, Kosain Manibpol and his
daughter Undang Kosain, to prove the guilt of the accused. The only other witness presented by
the prosecution was the municipal health officer who issued the death certificates of the deceased
and the medical certificate of Kosain.
Kosain Manibpol, 33 years old, widower and resident of Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato,
declared on direct examination that at about 8:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965, more than ten (10)
persons, all armed, entered his house in Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato. Two persons,
Beatingco Junior and Julian Casian, came ahead, immediately after he got up from his sleep to
check what was causing the barking of their dogs which awakened him. When he asked why they
were there, the two answered that they wanted to borrow his land, to which he consented.
Suddenly, Kulas Bate arrived flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he fell to
the floor, the rest of the armed men came and hacked or boloed not only him but also his wife
and seven children. Among the assailants he recognized aside from the three above-named were
Bonifacio Tirol, Ciriaco Baldesco, Ruperto Diosma, Florencio Caño, Dorico whose family name
he forgot, Teofilo Baldesco, a certain mestizo and Sopring Romualdo. He actually saw Ciriaco
Baldesco hacking his wife with a bolo, and the "bungi" (harelipped) Bonifacio Tirol hacking his
eldest daughter. He had known Bonifacio Tirol for two years before the incident and Ciriaco
Baldesco for a longer period. His wife and six of his children died as a result of the sudden
attack. He himself was wounded at the outer part of his right arm, at the back of his right wrist
and on his forehead, and his chest was badly beaten; but he survived because he was able to run
to the house of a neighbor named Angcogan (t.s.n., pp. 1-10, Vol. III, rec.)
On cross-examination, Kosain testified that when he was investigated by the police, he was not
sure of the surname of the accused Bonifacio, so he stated that it may be Bautista. He learned
later that the surname was Tirol. He admitted that he was confused when he stated earlier that he
had known Bonifacio Bautista for one year and Bonifacio Tirol for two years. Bonifacio Bautista
and Bonifacio Tirol are one and the same person. He further declared that after he had fallen
down as a result of the blow by Kulas Bate, Sopring immediately hacked him. It was after he fell
that he was able to observe the stabbing and slashing of his family, because his assailants must
have thought him dead. He later fled to the house of Angcogan who ran away because of fear,
but returned afterwards with companions and went to their house to verify what happened (pp.
10-24, t.s.n., Vol, III, rec.).
On questioning by the court, Kosain testified that on the night of December 4, 1965 he slept with
a petroleum light burning in their house as in fact they always slept with their house lighted
because their youngest child would cry if there was no light. When he was attacked he was not
able to shout for help because he was caught unaware. His eldest daughter, Danonan (Daduman)
was the one who pleaded with their assailants not to hack them as they had no fault, but she was
also hacked and hit at the abdomen. At this stage he interchanged the assailants of his wife and
children by saying that Bonifacio Tirol hacked his wife and Ciriaco Baldesco hacked his eldest
child (p. 29, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Undang Kosain, about 6 years old, resident of Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, corroborated
the testimony of her father Kosain Manibpol, that she and her father are the only two in the
family now, after her mother, sisters and brother had been killed by more than ten armed men
who entered their house and attacked their family. Among their more than ten assailants, she
knows only three, namely Kulas Bati, Ciriaco Baldesco and another person whom she
remembers only as "bungi" (harelipped). Of the three she knows, only two were in court, namely
Ciriaco Baldesco and the "bungi" Bonifacio Tirol. She identified them by touching the shoulders
of Baldesco and Tirol (p. 65 t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). She remembers Tirol distinctly because of his
appearance as "bungi." She did not see who hacked her mother, but she saw "bungi" hack his
younger brother and sister. Her elder sisters were hacked by Baldesco. She herself was hacked at
her back by Kulas Bati. She showed in court her scar at the back of the left shoulder going
diagonally to the spinal column and measuring about 6 inches long and 3/4 of an inch wide,
which appeared to have scars of stitches. Afterwards, she went to the house of a neighbor named
Antalig.
In answer to the court’s questions, Undang declared that she had three older sisters, two younger
sisters and one younger brother. Her elder sisters were Danonang (Daduman), Maguianon
(Malaguianan) and Lakaida (Locayda). Her younger sisters were Inangkong (Penangkong) and
Bayangkong (Benangkong), and her younger brother was Abdul Rakman. They all died when
more than ten men went inside their house while they were lying down on the mat. She did not
see who hacked their father, but she saw Bonifacio Tirol hacking her three elder sisters, and
Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his younger brother. They used "kalsido" or bolo. The other men were
also armed with boloes, and one of them, Kulas Bati was with a firearm. There was light inside
their house at that time. Besides, it was moonlight night. Before the night of the hacking incident,
she used to see Bonifacio Tirol passing by their house in going to the house of Kulas Bati which
is near their house. She has not seen Ciriaco Baldesco before (t.s.n., pp. 69-75, Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, Undang testified that she used to see Ciriaco Baldesco at their store where
her family buys things. The house of Baldesco is near the schools of her elder sisters. She
sometimes went with them to school. Her oldest sister was hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen.
Her two other elder sisters were likewise hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her younger
brother was hacked by Bonifacio Tirol. Their house was lighted at that time, aside from the fact
that it was bright because of the round moon. The accused Baldesco and Tirol were dressed in
white and dark clothes. The color of the dark clothes was black. She does not know of any
trouble between Ciriaco Baldesco or Bonifacio Tirol and her father (t.s.n., pp. 79-85, Vol. III,
rec.).
The defense of both accused is alibi, and neither of them disputed the facts established by the
prosecution except to deny involvement in the crimes alluded to them.
Accused Bonifacio Tirol, 31 years old, married and residing at Kabalangasan, Matalam,
Cotabato, likewise testified on his own behalf. He declared that he was in Salat, a part of
Kabacan, Cotabato, from December 2 to 7, 1965, seeking employment as a laborer in the logging
firm of Felipe Tan. He left Kabalangasan at 10:00 A.M., took a motorboat and arrived in Salat at
5:00 P.M. He did not see the manager, Felipe Tan, of the logging firm until December 6, 1965,
and so he was able to return to Kabalangasan only on December 7, 1965. While in Salat, he
stayed in the camp where his friend Rufino Duan, was staying. When he returned to
Kabalangasan, his family had already evacuated out of fear for revenge, because of the massacre
of the family of Kosain. He went to Malamaing, another barrio of Matalam, where he found his
family. In Malamaing they stayed in the house of a Cebuano named Kulas. They never went back
to Kabalangasan because they were afraid that Kosain’s family might take revenge on them
(t.s.n., pp. 131-142, Vol. III, rec.).
His wife Nicolasa Tirol, 30 years old and residing at Paco, Kidapawan, Cotabato, confirmed
Tirol’s absence from Matalam from December 2 to 7, 1965 while he was looking for a job in
Salat. She also stated that she evacuated her family because she was warned that the family of
Kosain might take revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 145-151, Vol. III, rec.).
A friend from the logging company, Rufino Duan, 23 years old, single and residing at Paco,
Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise corroborated Tirol’s testimony that he was in Salat from
December 2 to 7, 1965. The said accused stayed with him in the camp he is occupying while he
was at Salat for seven (7) days, looking for work. In order to go to Salat from Kabalangasan, one
has to take a ride on a truck (t.s.n., pp. 118-122, Vol. III, rec.).
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision (pp. 6-28, Vol. I, rec.) dated March 31, 1969, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the herein accused, Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco
Baldesco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder of seven (7) persons, namely:
Daduman Klantongan Kosain [also written in the transcript of steno-type notes as Danonan and
Dananong]; Baingkong Kosain [also written in the transcript as Bai Ingkong]; Abdul Kalatogan
Kosain [also written in the transcript as Abdul Rakman]: Kadidia Kalantongan, Malaguianon
Kosain, Locayda Kosain [also written Lokaida], Pinangkong Kosain [also written Maningdong]
and Binangkong, and of the crime of Frustrated Murder of Kosain Manipbol [also written as
Kusain Manedpol] and Undang Kosain; and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased, and to an imprisonment of
TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS for each of the two
frustrated murders of the two wounded persons, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of each of the seven deceased with the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of
the seven deceased, or FORTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00) in all, and pay the
costs, fifty-fifty.
"It appearing that the accused have been detained, they each should be credited one-half (1/2) of
their preventive imprisonment in the cases of two frustrated murders.
"The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum — death — the
records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme Court.
"Let copy of this Judgment be furnished the Philippine Constabulary and the NBI at Cotabato
City, and the Police Department of Matalam, Cotabato, so that they may exert efforts to
apprehend the other culprits who committed the crimes herein dealt with.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, Accused Baldesco and Tirol, contend in their joint brief:red:chanrobles.com.ph
"FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
"The lower court erred in admitting the death certificates issued by the doctor who did not
personally view and examine the victims, but whose findings therein were based upon the sketch
prepared by the police.
"SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR:
"The lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of both accused despite the convincingly
strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on 4 December 1965, and
therefore their non-participation in the crime charged.
"THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR
"The lower court erred in not granting new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a
voluntary extra-judicial admission by means of a sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely
involved accused Baldesco for a consideration.
"FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR:
"The evidence failed to establish conspiracy among the accused.
"FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The decision is contrary to law" (p. 98, Vol. I, rec.).
During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23, 1977, appellant Baldesco died in the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital (p. 192, Vol. I, rec.), so that on January 28, 1978, We resolved to dismiss
this case insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned. Following the
doctrine in People v. Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 124, 134), this appeal will be resolved insofar as
Baldesco is concerned only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the
basis of the civil liability for which his estate may be liable.
Appellants would like the court to reject the death certificates of the victims on the ground that
they are hearsay evidence, since the doctor who issued them did so on the strength of the sketch
furnished by the police, without personally examining the bodies of the victims.
WE find no error in the admission of said exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses" (p.
9, Vol. I and p. 95, Vol. III, rec.). The fact of death of the victims is not in issue. The testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the armed
men who entered their residence on the night of December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted. That
death came to the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal certainty. Their death certificates
therefore are only corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellants would likewise have the Court give credence to their defense of alibi, alleging that
they have presented convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the
crime on December 4, 1965. This contention is devoid of merit. The rule is well-settled, to the
point of being trite, that the defense of alibi, which is easy to concoct, must be received with
utmost caution, for it is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused.
(People v. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 58, 69; People v. Cortez, 57 SCRA 208.).
Moreover, the alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
prosecution witnesses identifying and pointing to the accused as among the group of armed men
which massacred the victims (People v. Tabion, 93 SCRA 566, 570; People v. Angeles, 92
SCRA 433). The two survivors, Kosain and his 6-year old daughter positively identified both
accused as two of the more than ten persons who entered their house on December 4, 1965 and
participated in the hacking and boloing of their family. Accused Tirol was even more distinctly
and positively recognized as the "bungi" (harelipped) who hacked some of the victims. The
credibility of these two prosecution witnesses was never successfully assailed. The
inconsistencies attributed to Kosain Manibpol refer to minor details (i.e., about the length of time
he had known one of the two persons who first came up to his residence on the pretext of
borrowing his lot - pp. 15-16, Vol. III, rec., in relation to Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 5 and 17, Vol.
II, rec.), which do not affect his credibility. The apparent inconsistency in his testimony as well
as that of 6-year old Undang Kosain whose credibility was never questioned, as to who among
the armed men hacked or attacked which victim is likewise insufficient to destroy their
credibility, considering that the presence of a number of armed men simultaneously participating
in the unlawful aggression could really be confusing. As noted by the trial court, it would be
unnatural if the witnesses who were themselves victims of the horrible deed were not confused
during that terrifying massacre committed together by more than ten persons (p. 27, Vol. I rec.).
What is important is the positive identification of the two accused appellants as having been in
that group and who participated in the concerted attack on the helpless victims. "Alibi is
unavailing once the accused is positively identified by one without motive to charge falsely said
accused, specially with a grave offense that could bring death by execution on the culprit"
(People v. Estante, 92 SCRA 122).
The weakness of appellant Baldesco’s defense lies in the fact that his house where he purportedly
stayed from 6:00 P.M. of December 4, 1965 to the following day - is only about one kilometer
from the house of the victims, the scene of the crime, according to his own daughter and witness,
Teofista Baldesco (p. 116, Vol. III, rec.). And although Baldesco himself testified that the
victims’ house is more than three (3) kilometers from his, it still does not belie the fact that he
could easily go there if he wanted to, considering that both residences are within the same barrio
of Kabalangasan.
So also is the house of Tirol located in the same barrio. According to him, his house is about 1
1/2 kilometers from that of the victim. He wants to impress upon this court, however, that he was
not in his house when the incident occured but in another town looking for a job in a logging
company. The trial court correctly rejected this theory because of the inconsistencies noted in
Tirol’s evidence. Said the trial court:
"The alibi of Bonifacio Tirol is unbelievable. His witness Rufino Duan testified that from
Kabalangasan where Bonifacio Tirol lived to Salat where Bonifacio was supposed to be on
December 4, 1965, people would take a truck ride of the PTC; but Bonifacio Tirol declared that
he went to Salat by speedboat, and went home to Kabalangasan by banca. Duan testified that
Salat is very far from Kabalangasan because it takes one day to reach it from there; but Bonifacio
Tirol declared that he started at Kabalangasan by motorboat at 10:00 A.M., and arrived at Salat at
5:00 P.M. or seven hours only. He modified this afterwards, in the cross-examination, by
testifying that from his house in Kabalangasan to the log pond where he took the speedboat, he
had to walk from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 A.M. or for 3 hours; fixing the time from his home to Salat
at 10 hours. But this testimony about the log pond cannot be believed. He testified he did not
know where the log pond was located; that was the first time he went there. How he located a log
pond at a place he did not know is certainly beyond belief. Of course, he said Rufino told him
where to pass, but that was a long time ago. Bonifacio Tirol further testified that when he went
home to Kabalangasan, he took a banca at Salat at 3:00 dawn and arrived in his house at
Kabalangasan at 9:00 in the morning, or 6 hours. He changed the time of arrival to 10:00 A.M.
when questioned by the Court about it. When asked by the Court why the difference in the period
of time of travel, he reasoned out that the motorboat in going to Salat was going upstream, and
the paddled banca in going to Kabalangasan was going downstream. Even, if that were so, the
difference cannot be three or four hours.
x x x twenty-eight days after rendition of the judgment on March 31, 1969 (p. 90, Vol. II, rec.).
"But even granting that Bonifacio really went to Salat on the 2nd to look for work, there was no
physical impossibility for him to be in Kabalangasan on the evening of the 4th which was a
Saturday. The testimony of Duan that he saw Bonifacio on the 4th in the evening cannot be
believed because of his interest and its improbability. Why should Bonifacio wait for the
manager on a Saturday evening when the next day was a Sunday, therefore not a work day?" (pp.
24-25, Vol. I, rec.).
It is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where
the accused was alleged to be when the offense was committed must be located at such a distance
that it is nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People v. de la Cruz, G.R. No.
L-30912, April 30, 1980; People v. Mercado, Et Al., L-39511-13, April 28, 1980; People v.
Malibay, 63 SCRA 421).
As to appellant Baldesco, the testimonies of his witnesses do not at all bolster his alibi.
Demeterio Riparip stated that he took supper with Baldesco at 6:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965,
after which he slept at 7:00 P.M. and did not wake up until the next morning (p. 109, t.s.n., Vol.
III, rec.). Baldesco’s daughter, Teofista, on the other hand, testified that she took supper at 6:00
P.M. with her father, mother, brother and sister (p. 116, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.), without mentioning
the presence of Riparip in their house; then she listened to the radio with her father, mother,
brother and sister up to 9:00 P.M. and went to sleep afterwards. These testimonies do not rule out
the possibility that he could have left the house that same evening while the rest of his family
were sound asleep and returned late that night or early the following morning.
The third assigned error is likewise bereft of merit. Counsel for appellants contends that the trial
court erred in not granting a new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a voluntary
extrajudicial admission by means of a sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely involved
accused Baldesco for a consideration. The trial court rejected the motion for new trial on the
ground that it was filed out of time (p. 97, Vol. II, rec.).
Section 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in all cases in which the death penalty is
imposed, the records should be forwarded to this Court within twenty (20) days but not less than
fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment. This 20-day period is not rigid or absolute nor
jurisdictional, and may be shortened or extended (People v. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398). However, the
extension of period is for the purpose of enabling the lower court to comply with the mandatory
requirement of elevating the records for review, and not to lengthen the minimum period within
which trial courts may modify or alter their decision. As enunciated in People v. Bocar, supra,
the reason for the 15-day minimum requirement is such that within that period, the trial court
may on its own motion with the consent of the defendant, grant a new trial. Within that period
the trial court may modify its judgment by reducing the penalty or fine, or even set it aside
altogether and acquit the accused.
In the case at bar, the motion for new trial was filed on April 28, 1969 (pp. 92-94, Vol. II, rec.) or
Although a 15-day extension from April 21, 1969 was granted to the lower court within which to
forward the record of this case (p. 30, Vol. I, rec.), that extension did not affect the 15-day period
for filing a motion for new trial.
But even granting that the said motion was filed on time, the same does not merit a favorable
action. The ground relied on is an alleged newly-discovered evidence, referring to a sworn
statement (p. 94, Vol. II, rec.) executed on April 17, 1969 by a certain Romualdo Diosma, barrio
captain of barrio Lampayan, Matalam, Cotabato. In the said affidavit, the affiant declared that he
was shocked to learn that the accused were sentenced to death; that Kosain Manibpol, the
principal witness, had confided to him that he was only interested in commercializing or making
money out of his case, which is why he implicated the accused Baldesco; that Kosain Manibpol
had persuaded him to convince Feliciano Codoy, a son-in-law of Baldesco, to give him (Kosain)
one carabao so that he will drop the case; that Kosain Manibpol also personally demanded from
Codoy one carabao so that he will not testify against Baldesco; that he (affiant) even went with
Kosain to see Codoy in November, 1967 to persuade him to give a carabao to Kosain, but Codoy
refused; and that Kosain, realizing the wrong he had done, was willing to tell the truth regarding
the non-involvement and non-participation of Baldesco in the crime charged, but it was too late
to tell the court because the case was already submitted for decision; and that it was a common
knowledge in their barrio that Baldesco was not among the band that killed Kosain’s family.
This so-called "extra-judicial admission," referring to Diosma’s sworn statement is not the kind
of newly-discovered evidence contemplated in Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. Well-
settled is the rule that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence, it must be shown that: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
(d) it must be to the merits as ought to produce a different result, if admitted [Jose v. CA, 70
SCRA 258].
The very affidavit of Diosma indicates that the so-called extra-judicial admission of Kosain was
already available during the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded from Feliciano Codoy
personally one carabao so that he will not testify against accused Baldesco.
For how could he have offered not to testify against Baldesco if the trial was already concluded?
Codoy should have been presented as a defense witness if such was the fact, together with some
other barrio residents who had knowledge, as was allegedly "public knowledge in our barrio,"
that Baldesco was not involved in the crime. The purported extra-judicial admission is a last-
minute concoction.
Appellants also point out as error that the evidence failed to establish conspiracy. While it has
been held that conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not essential
to show it, since by its very nature it is planned in utmost secrecy (People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA
760).
In the case of People v. Mada-i Santalani (93 SCRA 316, 330), We held: "Conspiracy implies
concert of design and not participation in every detail of the execution. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of some unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may
be inferred although no actual meetings between them to conspire is proved, for the prosecution
need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime
or that they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy" (see also People v. Cabiling, 74
SCRA 285).
In this case under review, it has been clearly established that the appellants and their cohorts
acted in unison when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and attacked their victims in a
manner showing singleness of purpose - the massacre of the entire family of Kosain. The fact
that two survived is of no moment. The intention to kill all of them was most patent.
Thus, the fifth assigned error, i.e., that the decision is contrary to law, need not be considered
separately. The prosecution evidence has clearly established the guilt of the accused appellants.
In addition, there are more incriminating evidence that emanate from the appellants themselves.
The trial court had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused Baldesco from police custody
on December 15, 1965 (p. 27, Vol. II, rec.), and his subsequent re-arrest while en route to Davao
(p. 28, Vol. II. rec.). On the other hand, Accused Tirol himself had testified that after coming
from Salat, he left his house and never returned, for the reason that the members of his family
were afraid of some vendetta because of the massacre of Kosain Manibpol’s family (pp. 141-142,
Vol. II, rec.). The trial court noted that this fear was entertained even before the chief of police
could file a complaint and a warrant of arrest could be issued. These actuations could only
indicate a sense of guilt. As the trial court pointed out, fear of reprisal of retaliation could only
haunt one who is aware of his wrongdoing (p. 26, Vol. I, rec.).
The trial Court did not err in finding the accused guilty of murder of seven (7) persons, qualified
by treachery, and of two frustrated murders. There was treachery because the accused and their
companions made a deliberate surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the killings in
such a manner that there was no risk to themselves. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of
nighttime, taking advantage of superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense, and
that the crime was committed by a band.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not proven, hence it may not be
appreciated.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the crime having been committed in the dwelling
place of the victims who had not given any provocation, likewise can be appreciated.
Considering that there is no mitigating circumstance, the trial court did not err in imposing the
maximum penalty provided for in Article 248.
Since the penal liability of appellant Ciriaco Baldesco had been extinguished by his death on
October 23, 1977, only his civil liability remains to be determined which can be recovered from
his estate.

The civil liability of both appellants for each of the seven victims of the seven murders is hereby
raised to P12,000.00 and their civil liability for each of the two victims of the two frustrated
murders is hereby increased to P8,000.00. The civil liability arising from the crime of two or
more accused is solidary.

WHEREFORE, APPELLANTS BONIFACIO TIROL AND CIRIACO BALDESCO ARE

HEREBY SENTENCED TO (1) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN
MANIBPOL AND UNDANG KOSAIN AS THE ONLY SURVIVING HEIRS OF THE
SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS
FOR EACH OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS; AND (2) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00)
PESOS AND UNDANG KOSAIN ALSO IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00)
PESOS AS THE TWO VICTIMS OF THE TWO FRUSTRATED MURDERS.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs insofar as the accused Bonifacio Tirol is concerned. The death of
accused Ciriaco Baldesco had terminated the criminal case as to him.

Barredo, J., concurs in the judgment against appellant Tirol; dissents as regards Baldesco
because of the belief that his liability, both criminal and civil were extinguished by his death.

93 Phil. 257
G. R. Nos. L-5426-28, May 29, 1953 ]RAMON JOAQUIN, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO C.
NAVARRO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
These three proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the summary
settlement of the estates of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael
Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision, modifying that of the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court
for review.
The main question presented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of
civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of these
persons to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro; and 4th, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela
Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the
petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the right of succession
of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela
Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son
of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
The facts, which are not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of
Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion,
and natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought
refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San
Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with
refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the
Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to
escape. The three daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not
convince Angela Joaquin, who refused to join them; and so Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor,
Francisco Lopes, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was
shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club,
already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air
raid shelter nearby, and stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1945, when they were
forced to leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open. They fled toward the St. Theresa
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese patrols, who fired at the
refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and his daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was
about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr. about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older
than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were
between 23 and 25."The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of
Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals
opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
evidence of survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
applied. The Appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the
death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when
the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is
to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after leaving the German Club in
the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edifice entirely collapsed minutes
after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstancial,
from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable
interval from the instant her son turned his back to her, to dash out of the Club, until he died. All
we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to
escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety
of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams
from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can
decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her side, and that there is no proof when she
died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died later than her son,
and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. Indeed, it could be said
that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence, the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec.
69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question
whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to
the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them: the
battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen
in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not have
overlooked that a variety of causes of death can (and usually do) operate in the course of
combats. During the same battle, some may die from wounds, others from gases, fire, or
drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats of the battle as an overall
cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led to the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin
family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad;
then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there
is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of
whether section 334(37) of Act No. 190, now section 69(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court,
has repealed article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the
contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of
evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should,
under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for consideration when absolute
necessity therefor arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two
provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
"When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is
not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age
of the sexes, according to the following rules:
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 is of the following tenor:
"Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would
inherit one from the other, the person who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and
no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place."Both provisions, as their
language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available
when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which
it represents is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis,
there is no specific evidence as to the time of death * * *". * * * it is assumed that no evidence
can be produced. * * *. Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law
of fairness appropriate to the different legal situations that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence,
1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited and applied with
respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth
Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of
California said:
"When the statute speaks of 'particular circumstances from which it can be inferred' that one died
before the other, it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before
the other may be inferred as a rational conclusion from the facts proven. The Statute does not
mean circumstances which would show, or which would tend to show, probably that one died
before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When, by
circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as
are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said
in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, 'if the matter is left to probability, then the statute settles the
presumption.' "It is manifest from the language of section 69(ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent
and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and
necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and
trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:.
"Q. You said you were also hit at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you fall? A. I fell down.
"Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? A. We were about 15 meters away from
the building but I could see what was going on."
"Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the
shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? A. Yes, sir, I could not
say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
"Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? A. Possible, but
not probable.
"Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes."
"Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? A. Well, a few minutes after
we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
"Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the act that
Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the
same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I
did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and
I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there."
"Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr.
Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and
they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted."
"Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? A. To my knowledge, yes.
"Q. They were wounded? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of
the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I
can remember they were among those killed."
"Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left
the place? A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people
inside especially those trying to escape."
"Q. And none of them was shot except the three girls, is that what you mean? A. There were
many people shot because they were trying to escape."
"Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were in side the building, can you explain
that? A. They were trying to escape probably."It is our opinion that the preceding testimony
contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the
light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted
that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from
proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed,
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he
must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from
the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife
started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro
father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or
fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the
building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to
slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband
and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the
same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and
daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils
of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that
the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot
in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The
Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the
edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant
the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was still alive when her son expired.
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which
Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these causes are speculative, and the probabilities, in
the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as
evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could
not have kept away from protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire to trap the
refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to waste their ammunition except
upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by
falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not,
was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief
space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule
123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be
certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not
mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New
York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y. 622.) As the California
courts have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one
author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from
collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital
question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary
facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain
secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a
jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an
animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same
animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances
in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion, the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based
purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The
opposite theory that the mother outlived her son is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference ought
to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon,
"bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun
with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in
consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

It is said that that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and
which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not,
in our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the
Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the
correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules
of Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is
another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or
contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is
submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court."

The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be
invoked is a question of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least
evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without
costs.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of
the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo
and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained
the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through
her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of
her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again
became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on
Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election
to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the
death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural
y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de
Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict
it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to
have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion
which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather
than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was
purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with
that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both,
instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also
his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio
Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

EN BANC
 G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, Petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O.
FRAGRANTE, deceased, Respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate
of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-�) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original
applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of
San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the
conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced
policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died.
His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen
and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the
evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The
aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which
by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate,
for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in
view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once
granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be
property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law,
belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after
his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the
life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and
not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the
right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there
would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal
representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O.
Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience
- the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant - was under the law conditioned only
upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course,
such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to
secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no
different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says
that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief
Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights
(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive,
may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because
death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the
Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to
prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up
a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management
of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for
the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the
right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of
the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also
property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among
other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation
of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory
or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction
of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of
the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent
to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged
that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any
person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of
a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a
person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a
generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another
work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being.
Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation;
(2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The
latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially
recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for
they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the
defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless
we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be
avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a
result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an
artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to
be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in
the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have
in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the
decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended
to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since
ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, - the estate - and not the
natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission,
not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases
may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said
estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion
and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all
the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure,
article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil.,
13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced
by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead
of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by
legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood - the reason was one in the nature of a
legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of
the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death
have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction
were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason
and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according
to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service
Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of
the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience
and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of
such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is
the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . .
.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the
bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include
artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include
artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others
of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration
thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service
Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final
conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so
that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may
be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent
reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it
as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public
Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the
benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any
prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and
obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon
the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality.
The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs,
solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has
already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding,
from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV),
its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to.
If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such
reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person
herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his
citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino
citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service
of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if
they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship
of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public
Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and
decreed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.chanrobles
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section
8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized
under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of
the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when
the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device
by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural
requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal
fiction has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in
process of solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they
are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If
they are not, it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an
alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21,
1946, be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual
questions and render a new decision accordingly.
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA,
JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.
Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.
Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the
respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No.
107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4,
1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979;
September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10,
1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge
Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-
Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R.
Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg
before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger
jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several
passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge
and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7,
1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular
employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its
answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney
as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following questioned orders, to
wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the
supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds for the Motion to
Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13,
1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that
parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or order
to recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted
as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs,
and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay
jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña
Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B. Baniña
the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late
Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against
said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion
which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979
denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out
of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if defendants
municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979,
such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the
petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner
has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p.
43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the
State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of
the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to
resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment
it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the
municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated
October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives
consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the
State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act
No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged
quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States
of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the
level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself
to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p.
39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,
it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United
States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee,
the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of
Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of
powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts
of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court
of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they
exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining
thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though
elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service,
and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as
legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for
the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if
it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way
to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal
streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule
that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that
the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger ––
tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing
to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby
modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL
and the F.L. CEASE PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct
TIAONG MILLING & PLANTATION CO., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L.
MADDELA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and
FLORENCE CEASE, respondents.

GUERRERO, J:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45474, entitled
"Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, et al." 1 which dismissed the petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
instituted by the petitioners against the respondent judge and the private respondents.
The antecedents of the case, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are not difficult to understand; sometime in June 1908,
one Forrest L. Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties together with five (5) other
American citizens organized the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its
corporate existence the company acquired various properties but at the same time all the other
original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease together with his children namely
Ernest, Cecilia, Teresita, Benjamin, Florence and one Bonifacia Tirante also considered a
member of the family; the charter of the company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were
steps to liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by
extrajudicial partition of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on 19 October
1959; it was here where the trouble among them came to arise because it would appear that
Benjamin and Florence wanted an actual division while the other children wanted
reincorporation; and proceeding on that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and
aforementioned other stockholder Bonifacia Tirante proceeded to incorporate themselves into the
F.L. Cease Plantation Company and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on 9 December, 1959; apparently in view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their part initiated a
Special Proceeding No. 3893 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the settlement of the
estate of Forest L. Cease on 21 April, 1960 and one month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed
Civil Case No. 6326 against Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease together with Bonifacia Tirante
asking that the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared Identical to F.L. Cease
and that its properties be divided among his children as his intestate heirs; this Civil Case was
resisted by aforestated defendants and notwithstanding efforts of the plaintiffs to have the
properties placed under receivership, they were not able to succeed because defendants filed a
bond to remain as they have remained in possession; after that and already, during the pendency
of Civil Case No. 6326 specifically on 21 May, 1961 apparently on the eve of the expiry of the
three (3) year period provided by the law for the liquidation of corporations, the board of
liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an assignment and conveyance of properties and trust
agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as trustee of the Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Co. so Chat upon motion of the plaintiffs trial Judge ordered that this alleged trustee
be also included as party defendant; now this being the situation, it will be remembered that there
were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance of Quezon namely Civil
Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of these were assigned to the
Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L. Maddela p. 43 and the case was finally heard and
submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo; and trial Judge by decision dated 27
December 1969 held for the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, the decision containing the
following dispositive part:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring that:
1) The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company now appearing
under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is the estate also of the deceased
Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and share alike, among his six children the plaintiffs
and the defendants in accordance with Rule 69, Rules of Court;
2) The Resolution to Sell dated October 12, 1959 and the Transfer and Conveyance with Trust
Agreement is hereby set aside as improper and illegal for the purposes and effect that it was
intended and, therefore, null and void;
3) That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee for interest against the estate and
essential to the protection of plaintiffs' rights and is hereby ordered to deliver and convey all the
properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling now under its name, custody and control to
whomsoever be appointed as Receiver - disqualifying and of the parties herein - the latter to act
accordingly upon proper assumption of office; and
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed; the instant case
to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action inherently essential for partition.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, December 27, 1969., pp. 122-a-123, rollo.
upon receipt of that, defendants there filled a notice of appeal p. 129, rollo together with an
appeal bond and a record on appeal but the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the judgment was in fact interlocutory and not appealable p. 168 rollo and this position of
defendants was sustained by trial Judge, His Honor ruling that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by plaintiffs is hereby dismissed as
premature and the Record on Appeal is necessarily disapproved as improper at this stage of the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, April 27, 1970.
and so it was said defendants brought the matter first to the Supreme Court, on mandamus on 20
May, 1970 to compel the appeal and certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of 27 April,
1970 on the ground that the decision was "patently erroneous" p. 16, rollo; but the Supreme
Court remanded the case to this Court of Appeals by resolution of 27 May 1970, p. 173, and this
Court of Appeals on 1 July 1970 p. 175 dismissed the petition so far as the mandamus was
concerned taking the view that the decision sought to be appealed dated 27 December, 1969 was
interlocutory and not appealable but on motion for reconsideration of petitioners and since there
was possible merit so far as its prayer for certiorari and prohibition was concerned, by resolution
of the Court on 19 August, 1970, p. 232, the petition was permitted to go ahead in that capacity;
and it is the position of petitioners that the decision of 27 December, 1969 as well as the order of
27 April, 1970 suffered of certain fatal defects, which respondents deny and on their part raise
the preliminary point that this Court of Appeals has no authority to give relief to petitioners
because not
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
and that the questions presented cannot be raised for the first time before this Court of Appeals;
Respondent Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated December 9, 1970 dismissed the
petition with costs against petitioners, hence the present petition to this Court on the following
assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED -
I. IN SANCTIONING THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BEYOND THE
LIMITS OF AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY LAW UPON THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO HEAR, ADJUDGE AND ADJUDICATE -
(a) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the settlement of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease,
simultaneously and concurrently with -
(b) Civil Case No. 6326, wherein the lower Court ordered Partition under Rule 69, Rules of
Court -
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES COMMONLY INVOLVED IN
BOTH ACTIONS HAVING BEEN RAISED AT THE OUTSET BY THE TIAONG MILLING
AND PLANTATION COMPANY, AS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF SUCH PROPERTIES
UNDER ACT 496.
II. IN AFFIRMING - UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER NOR
CITATION OF ANY LAW TO JUSTIFY - THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION THAT
SUBJECT PROPERTIES, FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS AS ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER
CORPORATION AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE TIAONG MILLING
AND PLANTATION COMPANY, DURING ALL THE 50 YEARS OF ITS CORPORATE
EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
III. IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT ITS
DECISION OF DECEMBER 27,1969 IS AN "INTERLUCUTORY DECISION." IN
DISMISSED NG THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND IN AFFIRMING THE
MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT RENDERED WHICH CONTRADICTS THE
FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.
During the period that ensued after the filing in this Court of the respective briefs and the
subsequent submission of the case for decision, some incidents had transpired, the summary of
which may be stated as follows:
1. Separate from this present appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-35629 (Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, et
al.) which challenged the order of respondent judge dated September 27, 1972 appointing his
Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Eleno M. Joyas, as receiver of the properties subject of the appealed
civil case, which order, petitioners saw as a virtual execution of the lower court's judgment (p.
92, rollo). In Our resolution of November 13, 1972, issued in G.R. No. L-35629, the petition was
denied since respondent judge merely appointed an auxilliary receiver for the preservation of the
properties as well as for the protection of the interests of all parties in Civil Case No. 6326; but at
the same time, We expressed Our displeasure in the appointment of the branch clerk of court or
any other court personnel for that matter as receiver. (p. 102, rollo).
2. Meanwhile, sensing that the appointed receiver was making some attempts to take possession
of the properties, petitioners filed in this present appeal an urgent petition to restrain proceedings
in the lower court. We resolved the petition on January 29, 1975 by issuing a corresponding
temporary restraining order enjoining the court a quo from implementing its decision of
December 27, 1969, more particularly, the taking over by a receiver of the properties subject of
the litigation, and private respondents Benjamin and Florence Cease from proceeding or taking
any action on the matter until further orders from this Court (pp. 99-100, rollo). Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of Our resolution of January 29, 1975. After
weighing the arguments of the parties and taking note of Our resolution in G.R. No. L-35629
which upheld the appointment of a receiver, We issued another resolution dated April 11, 1975
lifting effective immediately Our previous temporary restraining order which enforced the earlier
resolution of January 29, 1975 (pp. 140-141, rollo).
3. On February 6, 1976, private respondents filed an urgent petition to restrain proceedings
below in view of the precipitate replacement of the court appointed receiver Mayor Francisco
Escueta (vice Mr. Eleno M. Joyas) and the appointment of Mr. Guillermo Lagrosa on the eve of
respondent Judge Maddela's retirement (p. 166, rollo). The urgent petition was denied in Our
resolution of February 18, 1976 (p. 176, rollo).
4. Several attempts at a compromise agreement failed to materialize. A Tentative Compromise
Agreement dated July 30, 1975 was presented to the Court on August 6, 1976 for the signature of
the parties, but respondents "unceremoniously" repudiated the same by leaving the courtroom
without the permission of the court (Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11) as a result of
which respondents and their counsel were cited for contempt (p. 195, 197, rollo) that
respondents' reason for the repudiation appears to be petitioners' failure to render an audited
account of their administration covering the period from May 31, 1961 up to January 29, 1974,
plus the inclusion of a provision on waiver and relinquishment by respondents of whatever rights
that may have accrued to their favor by virtue of the lower court's decision and the affirmative
decision of the appellate court.
We go now to the alleged errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
As can be gleaned from petitioners' brief and the petition itself, two contentions underlie the first
assigned error. First, petitioners argue that there was an irregular and arbitrarte termination and
dismissal of the special proceedings for judicial administration simultaneously ordered in the
lower court . s decision in Civil Case No. 6326 adjudicating the partition of the estate, without
categorically, reasoning the opposition to the petition for administration Second, that the issue of
ownership had been raised in the lower court when Tiaong Milling asserted title over the
properties registered in its corporate name adverse to Forrest L. Cease or his estate, and that the
said issue was erroneously disposed of by the trial court in the partition proceedings when it
concluded that the assets or properties of the defunct company is also the estate of the deceased
proprietor.
The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for judicial
administration must be affirmed in spite of its rendition in another related case in view of the
established jurisprudence which favors partition when judicial administration become,
unnecessary. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal at first glance is wrong, for the
reason that what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. The technical consistency,
however, it is far less importance than the reason behind the doctrinal rule against placing an
estate under administration. Judicial rulings consistently hold the view that where partition is
possible, either judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reason. When the estate has no creditors or pending
obligations to be paid, the beneficiaries in interest are not bound to submit the property to
judicial administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court, especially when judicial administration is unnecessary and
superfluous. Thus -
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan
vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil, 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil.,
367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). Syllabus, Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. Pablo G.
Utulo vs. Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302.
Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an administration proceeding only if the
heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of the estate. No creditor
has come up to charge the estate within the two-year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease,
hence, the presumption under Section 1, Rule 74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply.
Neither has the status of the parties as legal heirs, much less that of respondents, been raised as
an issue. Besides, extant in the records is the stipulation of the parties to submit the pleadings and
contents of the administration proceedings for the cognizance of the trial judge in adjudicating
the civil case for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20, rollo). As respondents observe, the parties
in both cases are the same, so are the properties involved; that actual division is the primary
objective in both actions; the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise common;
and that both cases have been assigned to the same respondent judge. We feel that the unifying
effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the wholesome exception to the structures of
procedural rule, thus allowing, instead, room for judicial flexibility. Respondent judge's dismissal
of the administration proceedings then, is a judicious move, appreciable in today's need for
effective and speedy administration of justice. There being ample reason to support the dismissal
of the special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot see in the records any compelling
reason why it may not be dismissed just the same even if considered in a separate action. This is
inevitably certain specially when the subject property has already been found appropriate for
partition, thus reducing the petition for administration to a mere unnecessary solicitation.
The second point raised by petitioners in their first assigned error is equally untenable. In effect,
petitioners argue that the action for partition should not have prospered in view of the repudiation
of the co-ownership by Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company when, as early in the trial court,
it already asserted ownership and corporate title over the properties adverse to the right of
ownership of Forrest L. Cease or his estate. We are not unmindful of the doctrine relied upon by
petitioners in Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 wherein this Court held that in an action for
partition, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all co-owners or co-
proprietors of the property to be divided, and that the question of common ownership is not to be
argued, not the fact as to whether the intended parties are or are not the owners of the property in
question, but only as to how and in what manner and proportion the said property of common
ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of the Court. Consistent with
this dictum, it has been field that if any party to a suit for partition denies the pro-
indivisocharacter of the estate whose partition is sought, and claims instead, exclusive title
thereto the action becomes one for recovery of property cognizable in the courts of ordinary
jurisdiction. 2
Petitioners' argument has only theoretical persuasion, to say the least, rather apparent than real. It
must be remembered that when Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue of
ownership, its corporate existence already terminated through the expiration of its charter. It is
clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation Law) that upon the expiration of the charter
period, the corporation ceases to exist and is dissolved ipso facto except for purposes connected
with the winding up and liquidation. The provision allows a three year, period from expiration of
the charter within which the entity gradually settles and closes its affairs, disposes and convey its
property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for
which it was established. At this terminal stage of its existence, Tiaong Milling may no longer
persist to maintain adverse title and ownership of the corporate assets as against the prospective
distributees when at this time it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is
not only a legal contradiction, but more so, to allow it to maintain adverse interest would
certainly thwart the very purpose of liquidation and the final distribute loll of the assets to the
proper, parties.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its reasoning that substance is more important than form
when it sustained the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, thus -
a) As to the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, of course, at first glance, this was wrong,
for the reason that the case trial had been heard was Civil Case No. 6326; but what should not be
overlooked either is Chat respondent Judge was the same Judge that had before him in his own
sala, said Special Proceedings No. 3893, p. 43 rollo, and the parties to the present Civil Case No.
6326 had themselves asked respondent Judge to take judicial notice of the same and its contents
page 34, rollo; it is not difficult to see that when respondent Judge in par. 4 of the dispositive part
of his decision complained of, ordered that,
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed; the instant case
to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action inherently essential or partition. p.
123, rollo,
in truth and in fact, His Honor was issuing that order also within Civil Case No. 632 but in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 389:3: for substance is more important Chan form, the
contending par ties in both proceedings being exactly the same, but not only this, let it not be
forgotten that when His Honor dismissed Special Proceedings No. 3893, that dismissal precisely
was a dismissal that petitioners herein had themselves sought and solicited from respondent
Judge as petitioners themselves are in their present petition pp. 5-6, rollo; this Court must find
difficulty in reconciling petitioners' attack with the fact that it was they themselves that had
insisted on that dismissal; on the principle that not he who is favored but he who is hurt by a
judicial order is he only who should be heard to complain and especially since extraordinary
legal remedies are remedies in extermies granted to parties ' who have been the victims not
merely of errors but of grave wrongs, and it cannot be seen how one who got what he had asked
could be heard to claim that he had been the victim of a wrong, petitioners should not now
complain of an order they had themselves asked in order to attack such an order afterwards; if at
all, perhaps, third parties, creditors, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, might have been prejudiced,
and could have had the personality to attack that dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, but
not petitioners herein, and it is not now for this Court of Appeals to protect said third persons
who have not come to the Court below or sought to intervene herein;
On the second assigned error, petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the
conclusion that the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of
Forrest L. Cease; that on the contrary, said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the
name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and possessor for the last 50 years of its corporate
existence.
We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the trial court indeed
found strong support, one that is based on a well-entrenched principle of law. In sustaining
respondents' theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as one personality",
or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the deceased Forrest L. Cease
and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and
should be divided equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ", the trial court did
aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the legal fiction of distinct
and separate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the individual member one
and the same. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the undisputed
factual premise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens, friends or third-parties in
relation of one to another, in the course of its existence, it developed into a close family
corporation. The Board of Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which
Forrest L. Cease always retained the majority stocks and hence the control and management of
its affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of its records in 1947 before the Security and
Exchange Commission only 9 nominal shares out of 300 appears in the name of his 3 eldest
children then and another person close to them. It is likewise noteworthy to observe that as his
children increase or perhaps become of age, he continued distributing his shares among them
adding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only 190 were left to his name.
Definitely, only the members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that of the family appears
to be indistinguishable and apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants
(Manifestation of Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never'
had any account with any banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its
behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. In brief, the operation of the Corporation is
merged with those of the majority stockholders, the latter using the former as his instrumentality
and for the exclusive benefits of all his family. From the foregoing indication, therefore, there is
truth in plaintiff's allegation that the corporation is only a business conduit of his father and an
extension of his personality, they are one and the same thing. Thus, the assets of the corporation
are also the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are all legitimate
children of full blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of disregarding or
piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as well as from that of any
other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this attribute, a corporation may not,
generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its stockholders or those of the legal entities
to which it may be connected, and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however,
merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote the ends of justice (Laguna
Transportation Company vs. Social Security System, L-14606, April 28, 1960; La Campana
Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677, May 25, 1953).
For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose
behind its creation (Emiliano Cano Enterprises, Inc. vs. CIR, L-20502, Feb. 26, 1965) or which
could not have been intended by law to which it owes its being McConnel vs. Court of Appeals,
L- 10510, March 17, 1961, 1 SCRA 722). This is particularly true where the fiction is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime (Yutivo Sons Hardware
Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 160), confuse legitimate
legal or judicial issues (R. F. Sugay & Co. vs. Reyes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964), perpetrate
deception or otherwise circumvent the law (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs. reason de Paterno, L-
2886, Aug. 22, 1952, 49 O.G. 721). This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used
as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another
corporate entity (McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Norton Harrison Co., L-7618, Aug. 31, 1964).
In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the
corporation will be treated merely as an association of persons or, where there are two
corporations, they will be merged as one, the one being merely regarded as part or the
instrumentality of the otter (Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, Yutivo Sons Hardware
Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, supra).
So must the case at bar add to this jurisprudence. An indubitable deduction from the findings of
the trial court cannot but lead to the conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if
not wholly, the personal venture of Forrest L. Cease. There is not even a shadow of a showing
that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own. Their participation as
nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitous dole out of his own
shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.
Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case No. 6326 as a case
for partition when the defendant therein, Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. as
registered owner asserted ownership of the assets and properties involved in the litigation, which
theory must necessarily be based on the assumption that said assets and properties of Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. now appearing under the name of F. L. Cease Plantation
Company as Trustee are distinct and separate from the estate of Forrest L. Cease to which
petitioners and respondents as legal heirs of said Forrest L. Cease are equally entitled share and
share alike, then that legal fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to delay
and ultimately deprive and defraud the respondents of their successional rights to the estate of
their deceased father. For Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company shall have been able to extend
its corporate existence beyond the period of its charter which lapsed in June, 1958 under the
guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation Company, Inc. as Trustee which would be against the
law, and as Trustee shall have been able to use the assets and properties for the benefit of the
petitioners, to the great prejudice and defraudation. of private respondents. Hence, it becomes
necessary and imperative to pierce that corporate veil.
Under the third assigned error, petitioners claim that the decision of the lower court in the
partition case is not interlocutory but rather final for it consists of final and determinative
dispositions of the contentions of the parties. We find no merit in petitioners' stand.
Under the 1961 pronouncement and ruling of the Supreme Court in Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs.
Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1188 (and the sequel case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, 2 SCRA
356), the lower court's dismissal of petitioners' proposed appeal from its December 27, 1969
judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of prematurity in that the judgment
was not final but interlocutory was in order. As was said in said case:
It is true that in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held - contrary to the rule
laid down in Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 - that in a partition
case where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action becomes one for
title and the decision or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been
expressly reversed in the Fuentebella case which, in our opinion, expresses the correct view,
considering that a decision or order directing partition is not final because it leaves something
more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, namely, the
appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had before them, the submission of their
report which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after said hearing that
the court may render a final judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of
Court). (1 SCRA at page 1193).
It should be noted, however, that the said ruling in Zaldarriaga as based on Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso, XIV Lawyers Journal 305 (May 27, 1942), has been expressly abandoned by the
Court in Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 295; 331-333 (June 18, 1976) wherein Mr.
Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, laid down the following doctrine:
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is
clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
- that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H. E. Heacock Co. vs. American
Trading Co., to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who
between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed
property, "the judgment . . . rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to those
questions, and [that] the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to
the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment . . . [is] a final judgment ... that in
this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies from the
rendition of the judgment as rendered ... "(as is widely held by a great number of judges and
members of the bar, as shown by the cases so decided and filed and still pending with the Court)
for the fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony with the administration
of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal the judgment of the lower court is
affirmed, it would not in the least work an injustice to any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the
other hand, if for any reason this court should reverse the judgment of the lower court, the
accounting would be a waste of time and money, and might work a material injury to the
[appellant]; and
- that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which expressly reversed
the Heacock case and a line of similar decisions and ruled that such a decision for recovery of
property with accounting "is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and
subsequent cases adhering to the same must be now in turn abandoned and set aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in partition
proceedings and exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil
Procedure) that an order for partition of real property is not final and appealable until after the
actual partition of the property as reported by the court appointed commissioners and approved
by the court in its judgment accepting the report. lt must be especially noted that such rule
governing partitions is now so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, with special reference to Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must first be a
preliminar, order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the parties-co-owners
cannot agree, the court appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which must first
be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it
(sections 6 and 11). In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1
refers to "a person having the right to compel the partition of real estate," so that the general rule
of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are
terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and
denies the adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling in Villanueva vs. Capistrano
and Africa vs .Africa, supra, Fuentebellas express rehearsal of these cases must likewise be
deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's expressed preference for the rationale of the
Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action call for considering such judgments for recovery of
property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore
become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with the accounting
as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal as provided in
Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of
the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair labor practice cases ordering the
reinstatement of the worker with accounting, computation and payment of his backwages less
earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in Fuentebelia for the
contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the door open to
multiplicity of appeals in a single case" of lesser import and consequence. (Emphasis copied).
The miranda ruling has since then been applied as the new rule by a unanimous Court in Valdez
vs. Bagasao, 82 SCRA 22 (March 8, 1978).
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited properties on the part
of petitioners to respondents' action for partition, then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners
would be sustained, for as expressly held therein " the general rule of partition that an appeal will
not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated will not apply where
appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the adverse party's right
to any partition."
But this question has now been rendered moot and academic for the very issue of exclusive
ownership claimed by petitioners to deny and defeat respondents' right to partition - which is the
very core of their rejected appeal - has been squarely resolved herein against them, as if the
appeal had been given due course. The Court has herein expressly sustained the trial court's
findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the assets or properties of the defunct
company constitute the estate of the deceased proprietor (supra at page 7) and the defunct
company's assertion of ownership of the properties is a legal contradiction and would but thwart
the liquidation and final distribution and partition of the properties among the parties hereof as
children of their deceased father Forrest L. Cease. There is therefore no further hindrance to
effect the partition of the properties among the parties in implementation of the appealed
judgment.
One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters, legal heirs of their deceased father,
Forrest L. Cease. By all rights in law and jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike
in the estate, which the trial court correctly ordained and sustained by the appellate court. Almost
20 years have lapsed since the filing of Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the administration of
the Estate of Forrest L. Cease and Civil Case No. 6326 for liquidation and partition of the assets
of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of receivers were appointed
by the court to take, keep in possession, preserve and manage properties of the corporation which
at one time showed an income of P386,152.90 and expenses of P308,405.01 for the period
covering January 1, 1960 to August 31, 1967 as per Summary of Operations of Commissioner
for Finance appointed by the Court (Brief for Respondents, p. 38). In the meantime, ejectment
cases were filed by and against the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating
the already strained relations of the parties. A prudent and practical realization of these
circumstances ought and must constrain the parties to give each one his due in law and with
fairness and dispatch that their basic rights be enjoyed. And by remanding this case to the court a
quo for the actual partition of the properties, the substantial rights of everyone of the heirs have
not been impaired, for in fact, they have been preserved and maintained.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.

Chicote and Miranda for appellant.

W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio
Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to
pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum
of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for payment
of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the
15th of December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Vicente Sixto
Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were
so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants
to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest
thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment should have
been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente
Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was declared to be
insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was appointed his guardian
by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she was authorized by the court, as guardian,
to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband
while in a state of insanity, among them that concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of
The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the guardian, was not aware of the
proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof; (5) that when
Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane,
was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for which reason he neither appeared nor
defended himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the
said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him in
the suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the
said defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in question,
which evidence could not be presented in due season on account of the then existing incapacity of
the defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence, after due
consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th
of December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature and
consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the
purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such
findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered
in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference
to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in
support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error as
follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant
Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine which
supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that
the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the one
here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court. It
would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable
mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the
result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, nor
could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely
an effect of monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond in
question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of
medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility, some of them, as Casper,
going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct
states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the doubt in the minds
of the majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment
and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider as a sufficient cause
for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases or
complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania,
somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which
more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on
the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such
certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is really
insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the
influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract
.The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his
incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years suffered from
such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that a
person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not
necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically, in
reference to this case, the following facts were brought out in the testimony given by the
physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the
first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903, and the latter,
only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his houses and if
you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would understand the contents of the
document?
A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing particularly
remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it might be that he could not do
that; it depends upon what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those concerning greatness?
A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness and wealth.
Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?
A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I have made no trial.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this monomania of
greatness and wealth?
A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared the
instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to Mr. Villanueva
its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied that he
was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness to
be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant
was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving cause fir any suspicion that
there was anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court of
First Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-
Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him some
questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate
surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as many, others had done, and witness did not notice
any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the questions
concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was situated, his
answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore approved the bond; and
that all this took place between July and September, 1908. This witness having been asked, on
cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been
surety in any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should
engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond, replied that it was
in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to
investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any other
previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but
that, as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr.
Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is,
that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the
opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a
consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be expressed
in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is no other, as
in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the
ordinary, a bond may be given for some other consideration, according to the agreement and the
free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and remuneratory contracts, something
remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of the
firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified that he had never had
dealings with Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to
favor the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos,
with monthly interest .But he added that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for
them, to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The witness did not know, however, whether
Arenas gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent might find
sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings with
Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909, that
is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference "for the
purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between 5 and
6 of that same day, in the garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel,
on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not be
affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the
business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be sustained
that there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental disorder that
dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing himself so
oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no proof
that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was
influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting that he
was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under
discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity,
it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a
person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the
performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the
executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance
of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who
as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct, referred, two of them,
to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to the year 1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the
date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony of one of these witnesses
shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908, to have her husband confined in the
Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the director of the institution
who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, as soon as he
shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the insane ward; to
which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly insane enough to be placed
among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this case, stated: that no restrictions
had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do what he liked;
that her husband had property of his own and was not deprived of its management; that he went
out every morning without her knowing where he went; that she did not know whether he had
engaged in the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference to the one now concerned, she
had learned of it only by finding to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a
rendezvous on the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to
deprive him of the management of his own real estate which had been inherited by him, although
he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax, all this being done
by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the family and to all their needs.
Finally, and with direct reference to the point under discussion, she was asked:
Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out of the house and
was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets, and buys
provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being sane when he was
on the street, according to your opinion?
A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that this should
have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people who can testify in regard
to this particular.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the market,
would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and when she was asked
by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew, he had
never squandered any large sum of money; that he had never been engaged in business; that he
supported himself on what she gave him; and that if he had something to count on for his living, it
was the product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is very
evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient
consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
37 Phil. 215
DOMINGO MERCADO AND JOSEFA MERCADO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS,
VS. JOSE ESPIRITU, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS
ESPIRITU, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and
to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, th
e complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Conce
pcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a si
ster of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her parapherna
l property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of
Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which he
reditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father W
enceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, b
y means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and J
osef a Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, which
amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstandi
ng the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the l
and in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of sa
id land, to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that th
e part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, w
hich, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received s
aid products from 1901 until .the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be
rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to th
e plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their decease
d mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their e
quivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each
and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subjec
t-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its
owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization
of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a
portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that su
bsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his ca
pacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis
Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of
seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount bein
g still insufficient he successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggrega
ting a total of P600; but that later, on May 17, 1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of le
gal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria de la Paz, the notarial instrumen
t inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale u
nder pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by t
heir father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolute
ly and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged t
o their deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In his cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs w
as unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been
caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be render
ed by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, be
sides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be
charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and
in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cros
s-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four yea
rs fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that t
hey be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment afore
mentioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and
a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and, the proper bil
l of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this
court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17,
1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the d
ecision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors a
nd therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and
in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstandi
ng, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within the legal period,
ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates
the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain t
he restitution of the land sold.
The record shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by comp
osition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the
pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares and 59 centar
es, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's {Jeath, his said lands passe
d by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the pa
rtition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-s
even and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares.
Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, had by this husband five child
ren, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josef a, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Esp
iritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land
described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for the annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two
-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the com
plaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the
defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customar
ily covered by 21 cavanesof seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conv
eyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of th
e land now in litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and th
at, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was in the possession of the pu
rchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers o
f public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz,
the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested
party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own na
me and in those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Am
alia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by hi
s aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenc
eslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same m
an, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had
belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, Margarita Espiritu, adjoining the parcel previously sold t
o the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question a transaction which M
ercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs."
Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domin
go and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of
legal age and in possession of the required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed befor
e a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the
land, effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission
and authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as
an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said instrument and situated in
Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of
see,d, bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the
east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and o
n the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground tha
t on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the furth
er reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtainin
g their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (the plaintiffs we
re born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-189
1, were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book E
xhibit A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao M
ercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was
born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corrob
orated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Dom
ingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years
old, whereby it would also appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefor
e, on May 17, 1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plain
tiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and sist
ers removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle L
uis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in inte
rest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, perta
ining to the year 1910, wherein it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she
did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of
May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to
her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu
who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her siste
r Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, s
he did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to
his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allo
tted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria
a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior q
uality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the s
aid two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the d
efendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josef a M
ercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said do
cument was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to the
m and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand S
panish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to
court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she ha
d not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898,
for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latte
r, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of only 84 cavanes, and, after its owner's death, w
as under witness' administration during two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portio
n of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894,
utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espi
ritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, cont
aining an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held th
e same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, a son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the
year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his othe
r relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the M
ercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonino Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he me
diated in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu.
When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with it
s contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wences
lao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the lat
ter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he
could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument wh
atever was presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned ei
ther the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mor
tgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado
to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josef
a Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting h
im to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the fir
st time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and wh
ile said document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto w
hose names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for he
r, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied e
ver having been in the house of her brother Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the p
urpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis E
spiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in th
e document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and s
isters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz, and Josefa, surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the c
ertainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said p
urchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother, with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father o
f the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulac
an; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, th
e sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutel
y and in perpetuity said parcel of land, and waive thenceforth any and all rights they may have, in
asmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parc
el or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in fa
vor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of
pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same pu
rchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, dec
omposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' deceased mother; P60
0 collected by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed t
o her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' w
idowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining portion or parcel of 6 cavanes of seed to her b
rother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit
3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the
totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely
and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof
in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of an
y violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who exec
uted it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates,
Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into account the relationship between the contracting parties, and als
o the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to o
btain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, wit
hout proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabo
ve set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the
document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by virtu
e of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, a
ccording to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the to
tal area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate esta
te is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of se
ed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in co
nsequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in la
wful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownersh
ip was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the o
ther portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the pay
ment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his life
time, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the doc
ument Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 c
avanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contra
ct of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, as regards the statements made therein, is of the natur
e of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date
of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs.
(Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margar
ita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she Inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 c
avanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May
25,1894 an instrument that disappeared or was burned and likewise recognizing that the protocols
and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past re
volution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimo
ny recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so
doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuc
h as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said c
onveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interests and prejudiced his
own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of t
he plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document
is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiff
s' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefo
re properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the
date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed and they signed it, they were minors, that is, they ha
d not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the re
cord that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies
were presented of their respective baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supple
mental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age whe
n they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, n
otwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proo
f of the dates of the births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it can
not be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time t
hey executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3
is perfectly valid a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of s
eed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loa
n from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been law
fully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, m
ade by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or
to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and th
e judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rule
s established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27,1860
, J u l y 1 1 , 1 8 6 8 , a n d M a r c h 1 , 1 8 7 5 . )
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Esp
iritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causin
g the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrume
nt of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be suppos
ed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on Februa
ry 14, 1914, wherein it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for b
oth these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the p
laintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they exe
cuted it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Ex
hibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be concl
uded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have been minors when they executed the notarial instrume
nt Exhibit 3. have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not oc
casion the plaintiffs any damage or prejudice whatever, for the reason that the portion of the land
sold to Luis Espiritu was disposed of by its lawful owner, and, with respect to the area of 6 cavan
es that was a part of the same property and was pledged or mortgaged by the plaintiffs' father, nei
ther did this transaction occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their fath
er stated in the document Exhibits that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining porti
on of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was su
bsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the nee
ds of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father h
imself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed in
to the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from
the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document E
xhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, add
ed to that of the P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenc
eslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3
,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed,
and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered a
s equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement in the
prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's representation
s as to his majority, and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to
believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.
The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases cited
in the prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like inst
ances by many of the courts in the United States.
For purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish and Am
erican, recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at th
is time; and in this connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with ra
ther less favor than the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the doctrine, doubtless bec
ause the cases wherein it may properly be applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction
where majority is reached at the age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not ordinarily at
tained until the infant reaches the age of 25.
Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6.a is, in part, as follows:
"If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five
years of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that a
ge, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) aft
erwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the ob
ligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers."
In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following:
"(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem, tune a
dversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo ca
su competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde est ac si nuUus fuis- set in d
olo, et ideo datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, 1. 1. D. de act. empt. secundum Cyn
. Alberic et Salic, in 1. 3. C. si minor se major, dixer. adde Albericum tenentem, quando per aspe
ctum aliter constaret, in authent. sacramenta puberum, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.
"(2) Enganosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major, dixer. Et adverte nam per istam legem
Partitarum, qune non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupilhis taloni assertionem faciat, videtur compro
bari dictum Guillielm. do Cun. de quo per Paul, de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D. de jurejur.
quod si pupillus proximus pubertati juret, cum contrahit, se esse puberem, et postea etiam juret, q
uod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum dispositio authenticse sacramenta puberu
m, sicut si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul, de Cast, multum commedans, dicens, se
alibi non legisse; si tamen teneamus ill am opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax obligatur e
x juramento, non esset ita miranda dicta, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in pri
nc. Item lex ista Partitarum expresse sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superitis dixit, que pare
sciere de tal tiempo: Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. diet. tit. C. si minor, se major. dixer.
et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon
. in summa illius tit. in fin. dicit, quod praesumitur dolus in minore, qui se majorem dixit; et idem
tenet Glossa in dict. 1. 3. et ibi Odofred. in fin. Cynus tamen, et alii, tenent oppositum, quia dolu
s non praesumitur, nisi probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex
Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze enganosamente: et ita tenent Alberic. et Salicet. in diet. 1. 3. ubi e
tiam Bart, in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate asserat se majorem, et ita juret, tune distingue, ut h
abetur diet. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tune non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scri
pturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo restituitur, ut ibi; et per quae inst
rumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis autem,
col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem aliquas notabiles quae
stiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor ex tali juramento in aliis contr
actibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de astate, D. de minor. in fin. gloss, vide ib
i per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia."
In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent illu
stration of the conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the followi
ng resolution therein set forth.
"Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years of a
ge and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, aremarried, or have the administ
ration of their property, or on account of other special circumstances affecting them, the other par
ties to the contract believe them to be of legal age."

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 6
10), supported by numerous citations of authority.

"Estoppel to disaffirm (I) In General. The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general rule applica
ble to infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have created an estoppel
against him to disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the acts or admi
ssions of other persons.

"(II) False representations as to age. According to some authorities the fact that an infant at the ti
me of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he had att
ained the age of majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the infant from disaffi
rming the same or setting up the defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights thereun
der; but there is also authority for the view that such false representations will create an estoppel
against the infant, and under the statutes of some states no contract can be disaffirmed where, on
account of the minor's representations as to his majority, the other party had good reason to belie
ve the minor capable of contracting. Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to
his age, the mere fact that the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age, even though
his belief was warranted by the infant's appearance and the surrounding circumstances, and the i
nfant knew of such belief, will not render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm 51 Phil. 417

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. GERMAN

MARAMBA AND GENOVEVA MUERONG, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is
alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in
question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan
y Calcotura, especially as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be
resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated Ju
ly 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet, he did so b
y intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who thre
atened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisiv
ely support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being voi
d as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor,
which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell th
e land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband V
icente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Mueron
g in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado
, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included
that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of whi
ch the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisit
es prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet, it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of
Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidenc
e of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registr
ation that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhi
bit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold and much less, if it is taken into conside
ration that, according to the evidence in the record, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herei
n plakitiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu
(37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed
by him pretending to be of age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff di
d not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was
the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula to be used in the acknowledgment of the docum G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
ent.
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her so vs.
n in 1922 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears
in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Pra Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.
do and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent per annum, then R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the date of Exhibit 1.
BENGZON, J.:
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paul
a Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the d Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of
efendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in q Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the
uestion. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by th sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
e plaintiff. The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, wi P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay
thout any express finding as to the costs in this instance. So ordered. him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or
as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received
P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties
and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms
above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority
of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors.
However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be
responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A,
Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of
Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet of
legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their incapacity,
and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his money, then he
should be contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants
in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory
note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor,
like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have
it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the
same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be
permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact,
according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as part of
the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other authorities
hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on the theory that such
misrepresentation is not a part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement
of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability
on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not
constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to age does not
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he
is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is
not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed
therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement.
In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in
this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive)
misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the
application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority which
incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally
bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in 1951,
and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it because
more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of majority.
The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a
contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority
age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however, that in
October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in October
1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense
was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of
the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking
for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action
for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because
of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they
received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were
used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold
that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively
established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were
equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now return
P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be enforced,
as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat,
is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of
the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall
pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and
Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6%
interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito

Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in
Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with
whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants
of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering
the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM
OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION
1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT
SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute
that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of
their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of
the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was
firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to
be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here
is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate
and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in
this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless
or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose
of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding
or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from
the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred
to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not
a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this
book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not
punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the
ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless
a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal
law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the
new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special
laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than
that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.
And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant
language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion
of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his
son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged
by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street,
J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil
FIRST DIVISION
Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the
same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay
[G.R. No. 445. March 31, 1902. ]
vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
PEDRO MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, Defendant-
Appellee.

Carlos Ledesma, for Appellant.

Separate Opinions
Felipe Calderon, for Appellee.
AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to
include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600).
See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the
injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by
Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
SYLLABUS
1. GUARDIANSHIP; PRODIGALITY. — In order to render a person legally unfit to administer
his own affairs his acts of prodigality must show a morbid mind and a disposition to spend or waste
the estate so as to expose his family to want or to deprive his forced heirs of their inheritances.
2. ID.; ID. — Courts will not go further to restrain donations than to enforce the express limitations
imposed by law as required by public policy.

DECISION

COOPER, J. :
 to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who
Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father. can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)

The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his
advanced age, is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife,
Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has
given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has
a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take
possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required for the
support of the donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil
Code.)
And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than what he can give by
testament.

In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the complaint be entered in the A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art. 636 of the Civil Code.)
property register of the province, which was done by order of the court.
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the
The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and sets forth a state of facts owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy
quite inconsistent with those alleged in the complaint. may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to
acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of
attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to generosity.
the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate,
to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by the defendant whose
and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power testimony it is unnecessary to recount.
of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was
due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support the allegations of his
revoked, refused to render an account of his administration. complaint. It was vague, indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against The father’s estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels, two of
him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court. which are steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale or mortgage of
these properties. This could have been easily done if such existed. Donations of real property must
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of be made in a public deed (Art. 633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also be
applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of included in a written instrument, and produces no effect with regard to third persons if not recorded
persons. in the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)

The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio contradictorio). (Art. There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal property, the
221 of the Civil Code.) transfer of which could not be easily traced.

The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs. (Art. 222 of the Civil Code.) The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the
revenue from the ships and rents from the city property.
Under our law it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and
a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family The farms have been nonproductive on account of the disturbed conditions of the country, and the
revenue from even these has been in part collected by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her
marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of
the defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from
being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift,
and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with
the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the
mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself
possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits in both courts is adjudged
against the plaintiff.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.