ADDISON V. FELIX (August 03, 1918)
Thus,
FACTS:
Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant
spouses Felix and Tioco located in Lucena City. Respondents
paid 3K for the purchase price and promised to pay the
remaining by installment. The contract provides that the
purchasers may rescind the contract within one year after
the issuance of title on their name.
The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton
and delivery of the land but only 2 parcels were designated
and 2/3 of it was in possession of a Juan Villafuerte.
The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by
Addison.
Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first
installment but the latter contends that there was no
delivery and as such, they are entitled to get back the 3K
purchase price they gave upon the execution of the
contract.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid delivery.
HELD:
The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing
sold. With respect to two of the parcels of land, he was not
even able to show them to the purchaser; and as regards
the other two, more than two-thirds of their area was in
the hostile and adverse possession of a third person.
It is true that the same article declares that the execution
of a public instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that
this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it
is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control
over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to
confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.
When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the
thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the
sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the
execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if there is
an impediment, delivery cannot be deemed effected.
SPOUSES EROSTO SANTIAGO and NELSIE SANTIAGO, v.
MANCER VILLAMOR, CARLOS VILLAMOR, JOHN VILLAMOR
and DOMINGO VILLAMOR, JR.
FACTS:
Spouses Domingo Villamor, Sr. and Trinidad Villamor
(spouses Villamor, Sr.) executed a deed of sale covering a
parcel of land in favor of petitioners Spouses Erosto and
Nelsie Santiago (spouses Santiago). The land in dispute was
occupied by spouses Villamor, Sr.s children, herein
respondents Mancer Villamor, Carlos Villamor, and
Domingo Villamor, Jr. (Villamor children)
Spouses Santiago demanded the Villamor children to vacate
the property but the latter refused to do so. Villamor
children argued that they are the lawful owners of the land
since they acquired the same from San Jacinto Bank.
spouses Santiago filed an action for quieting of title before
the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of spouses Santiago. On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision on the ground
that spouses Santiago failed to prove their legal or
equitable title to the land.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid delivery
HELD: No.
Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the
"ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof."
Related to this article is Article 1497 which provides that
"the thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee."
With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 of the
Civil Code lays down the general rule: the execution of a
public instrument "shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed
the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."
However, the execution of a public instrument gives rise
only to a prima facie presumption of delivery, which is
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold. A person who does not have
actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer
constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a
public instrument.
In this case, no constructive delivery of the land transpired
upon the execution of the deed of sale since it was not the
spousesVillamor, Sr. but the respondents who had actual
possession of the land. The presumption of constructive
delivery is inapplicable and must yield to the reality that the
petitioners were not placed in possession and control of
the land.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of
the adverse claims and interest of another person in the
same property. However, where the land sold is in the
possession of a person other than the vendor, the
purchaser must be wary and must investigate the rights of
the actual possessor; without such inquiry, the buyer
cannot be said to be in good faith and cannot have any
right over the property.