Lebensborn and the Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfiihrer-SS LARRY V. THOMPSON designated as Lebensborn, or the “Well of Life” society, ordering it to perform a twofold task: to administer welfare assistance to SS families having a large number of racially valuable children; and to extend maternity and child-care facilities to expectant mothers, whether they were married or not, if they could prove the biological excellence of their expected children. Even with the emphasis placed on racial value as a criterion for Lebensborn involvement, the agency might appear to have been a curious blend of an SS “fringe benefit” combined with a charitable SS gesture toward unwed mothers. In reality, Lebensborn func- tioned as one unit within a comprehensive eugenics policy begun earlier in 1931 when the Reichsfiihrer issued his famous “marriage decree” to the $8.1 The contribution which Lebensborn made to this eugenics program is examined below with emphasis placed on the socio-biological motives that prompted the Reichsfiihrer’s concern for childbearing and ultimately lay behind the agency’s founding. "The marriage decree emphasized the racial purity echoed later in the stipulations defining the mission of Lebensborn, Not only was unblem- ished Aryan ancestry demanded of an SS couple, but both partners were required to undergo a thorough physical examination and to submit a detailed ancestral history which provided a medical record for evaluating I December 1935, Heinrich Himmler established an SS agency 1. The establishment of Lebensborn and the tasks assigned to it are in an SS directive of Dec. 1940, “Die Pflichten des SS-Mannes und SS-Fithrers,” U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T-175, Records ofthe Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of. the German Police, Roll 15, Frames 251868183. Hereafter cited as T-175 /15 2518681-83. ‘An extensive presentation of Lebenshorn’s creation in 1935 and its subsequent functioning into 1937 is in “Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des SS-Sanititsamtes,” May 31, 1937, SS Docu- ment Number 811, Box 2. This file copy is from a collection of reproduced miscellaneous SS records in the National Archives. The original documents are deposited in the Berlin Document Center where they were shipped following collation for possible utilization at the Military Tribunals Trials. Comprising the bulk of these records are materials from the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt-SS (SS Race and Settlement Central Office or RuSHA). Hereafter cited as Misc. SS Files /SS-811 /Box 2. 54 ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 55 their health and physical vigor. Racial “experts” in the SS-Rassenamt subsequently examined these records, placing great emphasis on the ancestral history as an important guide for determining genetic inheri- tance. When judging the marriage candidates, the racial examiners espe- cially noted trends in family longevity, causes of death, incidence of disease, infant mortality rates, and mental health data? The marriage law and the attendant racially oriented record analysis clearly demon- strate that Himmler desired his SS to be an elite in more than an ideo- logical or organizational sense. He hoped eventually to breed the SS into a biological elite. Racial purity was an obsession with Himmler, consistently empha~ sized in his speeches and writings, even while he was engaged on many fronts in extending the power and influence of himself and the SS.3 He believed that not only physical attributes but character traits, such as loyalty, determination, courage, and a sense of honor, could be biolog- ically transmitted. Since, in his estimation, the “Aryan race” possessed these and other virtues in abundance, Himmler demanded proof of such ancestry from his men and their wives or prospective brides. Marriages consummated on this basis would biologically ensure a future SS elite, and they would also establish the SS as the racial nucleus from which Germany could replenish an Aryan inheritance now dangerously diluted through generations of racc-mixing. The Reichsfiihrer was not, however, absorbed with racial purity and a eugenics policy calculated to achieve it solely for ideological or genetic reasons. Hisaspirations for the SS, as well as Nazi ambitions for Germany, depended upon a large population to conquer territory militarily and then to colonize it. He was, therefore, disturbed on practical grounds 2. A copy of the Heiratsbefehl which summarizes the racial and ancestral examination procedures is in U. S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T-6r1, Non-Biographic Material Filmed at the Berlin Document Center, Roll 10, Ordner 446. Hereafter cited as T-611 /10 |Ordner 446. The later utilization by Lebensborn of these examinations when screening admissions applicants is explained in “Merkblatt iiber die Aufnahme in ein ‘Heim des Lebensborn e.V.,” Mar. 1, 1938, by SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr. Gregor Ebner, the Medical Director of Lebensborn, T-611 /7 JOrdner 433. 3. The most comprehensive statement of Himmler’s views on racial purity isin Heinrich Himmler, Die Schutzstaffel als antibolschewistische Kampforganisation (Miinchen, 1936), passim, Cf. extracts from several Himmler speeches in Hans Buchheim, “Command and Compliance,” in Hans Buchheim et al., Anatomy of the SS State (New York, 1968), pp- 4336-39. See also a Himmler letter to Gefreiter Walter Kiihlin, Apr. 3, 1940, Document Number 62a in Helmut Heiber, ed., Reichsftuhrer! Briefe an und von Himmler (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 75. Cited hereafter as Heiber, Reichsfiihrer. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms56 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsftihrer-SS that German population growth had fallen off since World War I. In- deed, Germany exhibited the sharpest birthrate decline in Europe, reach- ing an unprecedented low in 1933 of fewer than one million live births. Although the population increased by ten million between 1919 and 1933, the birthrate continued to drop even as the total number of mar- riages rose.* Himmler partially accepted expert opinion that a low birth- rate originated both from war fatalities, in which seventy per cent of those killed had been single, and from the economic instability prevalent through much of the Weimar era. While conceding that these factors served to inhibit the birthrate, Himmler believed he detected a deeper cause for the phenomenon. From his vantage point as the state’s chief law-enforcement officer, Himmler viewed Germany asa sexual wasteland. In excellent position to support his observation with authoritative statistics, he claimed that homosexuality was rampant, venereal disease widespread, especially among youth, while both abortions and illegitimate children had in creased in frequency and number.> In short, Himmler surveyed a society he found demonstrably sick, and he was not at a loss to explain why. ‘What the Reichsfiihrer called “bourgeois morality” lay behind the sickness of German society and the reduced birthrate. While Himmler did not clearly define the term, he appears to have equated “bourgeois morality” with the collective German acceptance of certain social and religious norms governing sexual conduct. Ignoring the obvious contri- bution which a Jew, Sigmund Freud, had made to his analysis, Himmler 4. For the concer of Himmler about the birthrate, see “Entwurf fiir die bevélkerungs- politische Schrift an die SS-Fiihrer,” 1937, T-175 /201 /2742407-10. A comprehensive analysis of German population statistics demonstrating the birthrate decline is a paper of Referent Dr. Burgddrfer (Direktor beim Statstschen Reichsamt) entitled “Bevolkerungs~ politische Lage und Ausgleich der Familienlasten,” delivered before the Ausschuss fir Rechtsfragen der Bevélkerumgspolitik of the Akademie fr Deutsches Recht, Nov. 18, 1937. U. S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T-82, Records of Nazi Cul- tural and Research Institutions and Records Pertaining to Axis Relations and Interests in the Far East, Roll 30, After Flash 3. Cited hereafter as T-82 /30 /After Flach 3 ‘Himmler summarized his thoughts on sexual chaos in a speech made to the Sachver- sténdigenbeirat fir Bevétkerungs- und Rassenpoitik, June 15, 1937. U. S. National Archives Microfilm, Microcopy T-s80 (Berlin Document Center Files), Richard Darré Nachlass, Roll 329, Ordner 50, NoFrameNumbers, pp. 1~5.Cited hereafter as T-580 /Darré Nachlass] 329 /Ordner 50. A contemporary pamphlet entitled Tatsachen und Folgerungen, written by a Dr. W. Leonhardt, substantiates the Reichsfihrer’s thesis of a “sick society.” Leonhardt ‘expressed concem for the declining birthrate and sought to link small population growth with abortions, widespread homosexuality, and alarming venereal disease statistics. T-82 / 4x [After Flash 3, ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 57 asserted that sex was natural and that in establishing artificial restrictions ‘on sexual relations society created the unhealthy conditions which cur- rently threatened Germany. Assuming the role of self-appointed social critic, he pointed for example to the gulf that separated religious admoni- tions on chastity and marital fidelity from society’s actual sexual be- havior. He further noted that social custom demanded that young adults postpone marriage until they had acquired material security, which placed too great a strain on their natural curiosity and sexual desire. Predictably, the sad results of bourgeois social and moral repression were venereal disease, abortions, and illegitimate children.® Given the solid biirgerliche Existenz that had characterized his own life, Himmler was undoubtedly presenting a highly personalized conception of bourgeois social and moral values while attempting to make them appear as universally accepted standards. When contrasted with his often caricatured petit bourgeois behavior,’ these fulminations against bour- geois society seem all the more ironic. Himmler regretted the personal misery experienced by those who contracted venereal disease, underwent abortions, or produced illegiti- mate children, He reserved most of his sorrow, however, for their nega- tive impact on population growth. The half-million abortions which he estimated occurred annually cost Germany at least a hundred thousand biologically valuable children. Moreover, abortions frequently resulted in contraction of disease or physical injury, thereby impairing if not climinating the victim’s capacity to produce children under legitimate 6. Himmler speech to Sachverstindigenbeirat fiir Bevélkerungs- und Rassenpolitik, June 15, 1937, T-580 /Darré Nachlass [329 /Ordner 50, passim. See especially pp. 7-8 for Himmler’s utilization of the “bourgeois morality” concept. The sentiments which he expressed in the speech reflected a similar position previously taken in his personal correspondence. Himm- ler to Walter Buch, Chief of the Parteigericht, letter, Apr. 21, 1937, T-580 36 /Ordner 238I1. Not surprisingly, Lebensborn propaganda adopted the same hostile attitude toward “bourgeois morality.”"In an explanatory circular probably compiled in 1938, a Lebensborn publicistasserted, “Sein [Lebensborn's] Kampf geht gegen unterhdhlte liberalistisch biirger- liche und kirchlich dogmatische Anschauungen.” “Lebensborn e.V.,” T-611 /7 |Ordner 433. 7. Two recent contributions to the growing literature on Himmler’s early life empha~ size his youthful petit bourgeois behavior. See Bradley F. Smith, Heinrich Himmler: A ‘Naziin the Making, 1900-1926 (Stanford, 1971), and Peter Loewenberg, “The Unsuccessful Adolescence of Heinrich Himmler,” American Historical Review, 1xxvt, No. 3 (June 1971), 612-41. Cf. Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Himmler (New York, 1965), passim, and George W. F. Hallgarten, “Mein Mitschuler Heinrich Himmler. Eine Jugender- rinnerung,” Germania Judaica, t, No. 2 (1960-61), 4~7, for earlier accounts which examine the same topic. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms58 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfiihrer-SS circumstances. This, in turn, affected the potential for future population growth. Likewise, venereal disease influenced both the quantity and quality of population growth when afflicted persons begot mentally retarded or physically handicapped children. Himmler expressed partic- ular concern over the plight of racially valuable illegitimate children. He argued that the moral stigma placed upon them by society too often resulted in their neglect not only by their parents but by the state. De- prived of the chances for an education and career their abilities might warrant, they usually became a liability rather than an asset to the state.® Sorrow turned to wrath, however, when Himmler contemplated two further causes which adversely influenced population growth. He esti- mated that at least three million homosexuals currently resided in Ger- many, representing a particularly insidious menace because they cor- rupted other men, making them unwilling or unable to father children. When homosexuals did marry in an effort to conceal themselves, the results were equally dismal. According to his evidence, they tended to be terrible fathers if they did have children, and their sexual neglect fre- quently drove their wives to infidelity. Adultery often brought un- wanted pregnancy which, in a vicious spiral, prompted abortion for resolution of the women’s plight. The final bourgeois cause inhibiting population increase involved sexual continence. Himmler observed that married couples who were professionally and economically successful tended to limit the size of their families. This conscious “family planning” constituted a racial crime because it deprived Germany of valuable issue, since the success of the parents implied that their offspring would be endowed with similar attributes of physical vigor and intellectual superiority. Himmler as- sumed these parents thwarted reproduction from selfish, materialistic motives, a typical “bourgeois” attribute.? The population lag clearly frustrated the Reichsfiihrer. A stagnant or declining population indicated weakness and decay when Germany should exhibit strength and vitality. More pragmatically, slight popula- tion growth did not bode well for future economic growth or military potential. Himmler emphatically placed major responsibility for the low birthrate on the catastrophic sexual conditions then prevailing in Ger- 8. T-80 Darré Nachlass/329 |Ordner 50, pp. 8-12. 9. Ibid., pp. 2-3, for Himmler’s opinions on homosexuality, and p. 8 for hie atitude on bourgeois materialism. An even stronger criticism of family planning is in “Entwurf fir die bevélkerungspolitische Schrift an die SS-Fiihrer,” 1997, T-175 /201 [2742407. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 59 many. Since those conditions existed because society accepted certain social and religious standards which artificially inhibited sexual activity, society must be induced to reject the restrictions. Rather than have the state impose change from above, which Himmler believed would pro- voke strong opposition from both individuals and institutions, especially the church, the Reichsfithrer believed society should be educated away from current practices.!° When Germans learned that civic responsibility extended even to sexual behavior, they might be convinced to abandon their opposition to early marriage, to reject the traditional stigmatization of illegitimate children, and to shun the expedient of abortion. Since Gcrman socicty might balk at what amounted to socictal experimenta~ tion through revolutionizing sexual attitudes, Himmler determined to experiment initially with a captive audience—the SS, his sworn brother- hood, bound together by a common ethos and responsive to his will. Should experimentation within the SS prove successful, acquisition of a future biological elite would be assured. Furthermore, the SS would become the teacher through which German society would be educated. to renounce “bourgeois morality.”!1 Freed from sexual restrictions the German birthrate would rise and with it would come a population increase. Lebensborn thus dovetailed nicely with Himmaler’s ideological, practi- cal, and educational aims. Financial support from Lebensborn to large SS families, determined to be racially valuable through ancestral and racial examination, would not only contribute to their personal welfare but would encourage them and other SS families to have more children. Correspondingly, the SS and Germany would benefit from their racially valuable children in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Likewise, maternity and child-care benefits to unwed mothers, including those 10, T-s80 [Darré Nachlass [329 |Ordner 50, pp. 7 nd 17. 11. That the SS should function as the “racial educator” in redefining German sexual attitudes is suggested in “Entwurf fiir die bevilkerungspolitische Schrift an dic SS- Fiihrer,” 1937, T-175 /201 /2742410-15. Ata later date (Mar. 20, 1940) the current Chief of the Race and Settlement Office, SS-Gruppenfilhrer Giinther Pancke, echoed the earlier sentiments of his superior. He wrote Himmler strongly advocating the educational mission of the SS in convincing German society not to ostracize unwed mothers and to appreciate the racial and numerical contribution which illegitimate children could make to Germany's future. T-175/86/2610727-29. An SS-Hauptsturmfidrer attached to the Sippenamt (Ancestral Office) tersely articulated the pathbreaking role of the SS when describing the aims of Lebensbom in 1937. The SS-Fiihrer asserted: “To demonstrate new measures is one of the tasks conferred upon the SS.” “Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des ‘SS-Sanititsamtes,” May 31, 1937, Misc. SS Files /SS-811 /Box 2, p. 5. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms60 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfihrer-SS who had no connection with the $$ but could prove the racial purity of both parents, would add to the population while reducing abortions. Proper prenatal care in Lebensborn homes would minimize infant mor- tality and also reduce the number of sickly babies born as a result of maternal ignorance or neglect during pregnancy. Finally, the solicitude shown these women by Lebensborn would, he hoped, inaugurate a change in the hostile societal attitude toward unwed mothers.!? Lebensborn also performed an additional function: it allowed the Reichsfiihrer to indulge his personality. Over the years Himmler took great delight in the administrative details connected with the organiza- tion, These activities inay have been an attempt to achieve some moral compensation. This appears probable in view of his later admission that presiding over the creation of life was such a “positive” operation in contrast to SS involvement in euthanasia and extermination programs. Although he was absolutely convinced on racial grounds of the necessity of these programs, he found the activities associated with them to be personally depressing. Exhibiting his customary pedantic attention to detail, Himmler busied himself with such Lebensborn minutiae as the die- tary habits of expectant mothers, lavished attention and gifts on children born in the homes on his birthday, often personally examined the records of unwed mothers and decided which ones were racially acceptable for admission to the homes, and frequently corresponded directly with reluctant SS fathers, urging or threatening them to perform their “hon- orable duty” and marry the compromised women in question. Quite literally, Himmler gloried in his role as the “father figure” of the SS. It 12, For the compatibility of Lebensborn with Himmler’s multifarious goals, see “Zwei Jahre Lebensborn-Arbeit,” Jan. 22, 1939, a summary report by Ebner, T-175/17/ 2520715-26. Cf. Ermenhild Neusiiss-Hunkel, Die SS (Hanover, 1956), pp. 69-70. 13. Himmler often expressed satisfaction over his part in aiding childbirth to his masseur and confidant, Felix Kersten. See The Kersten Memoirs, 1940-1945 (London, 1956), pp. 180-81. His depression over extermination operations is noted in Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler,p. 184. See Heiber, Reichsfihrer, Doc. No. 111b, p. 20; Doc. No. 133, pp. 135-16; Doc.No.291,p.249, for Himmler's preoccupation with Lebensborn minutiae. Doc. No. 207, p. 190, is an excellent example of his “direct approach” with SS men who were reluctant to marry. For his gifts to children, see a list of Patenkinder, Nov. 26, 1944, T-175 [R77 /25956osff. T-175 |86/2610413-15 contains the Reichsfiihrer’s brief and cryptic comments on the Fragebogen of applicants to the maternity homes. Preoccupation with trivialities, a solicitous concern for the welfare of others, and a “mother-hen” attitude toward his family are traits of the young Himmler described by Werner T. Angress and Bradley F. Smith, “Diaries of Heinrich Himmler’s Early Years,” Journal of Modern His- tory, x200, No. 3 (Sept. 1939), 206-24. The similarity between his youthful behavior and subsequent adult conduct is rather striking. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 6r was his family; their children were his children. He viewed himselfas the benign, occasionally severe but always fair, patriarch who was a good provider and did not shirk his paternal responsibilities. Paternalistic ego gratification may therefore have reinforced the above-mentioned goals that motivated Himmler to formulate a eugenics policy, the initial phase of which ended late in 1935 with the founding of Lebensborn. The marriage law, effective from the beginning of 1932, already governed the racial criteria for biologically correct marriages. Also anticipating the creation of Lebensborn had been a more rigorous application during 1933-34 of the racial examination required for all SS candidates. Vigorous promotion of an extensive educational program to inculcate the SS with the proper Weltanschauung on racial hygiene and the necessity for producing numerous offspring dated from at least 1934.4 Hopefully, the earlier groundwork would now yield the tangible results of racially acceptable babies born in Lebensborn maternity homes. * oe * The eagerly anticipated results from Lebensborn homes were not im- mediately forthcoming and, when births eventually did occur, they proved disappointing in number. During its first two years of operation, 1936-38, the agency experienced some difficulty in consolidation. Ini- tially attached to the Ancestral Office of the Race and Settlement De- partment, the society was moved in the autumn of 1936 to the Personal Staff of the Reichsfiihrer15 Administrative reshuffling was undertaken in. an effort to improve the society's poor financial condition, which was curtailing operations. The welfare activities of Lebensborn depended in parton dues paid by its membership. Himmler required all hauptamtlichen Fiihrer (officers attached to any one of the then four SS central depart- ments) to join the society and make monthly payments to it. Member- ship for the rest of the SS was encouraged but remained voluntary. In 14. “Die Pflichten des SS-Mannes und S$-Fiihrers,” T-175 /15 /2518681-83, demon- strates the chronological sequence of the racial examination and marriage decree criteria, For the inception of educational training in racial hygiene, see a RuSHA information directive, “Das Arbeitsgebiet des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt-SS,” Nov. 6, 1941, Misc. SS Files /SS-1994 [Box 8. 15, Seea chart specifying the organizational transfer of Lebensborn in Military Tribunal Case Number Bight, The United States of America v. Ulrich Greifelt et al. [File Box 28 / Prosecution Document Book I-C (Eng.) Document Number NO 4153. The trial transcript, prosecution, and defense documentary evidence are deposited in the U. S. National Archives. Hereafter cited as Case 8 [Box 28 /Doc. Bk. II-C (Eng. or Ger.)/ NO 4153. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms62 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfiihrer-SS January 1939 the society reported 13,000 members of whom 8,000 were ‘SS men. SS support was apparently less than enthusiastic, since the SS numbered over 238,000 men at the time.16 Additional financing, how- ever, came from private contributions and from SS funds controlled by the Verwaltungschefder SS, Oswald Pohl. Eventually, Lebensborn received aid from both Party funds and the Reich Finance Minister, who chan- neled financial support through the Reich Health Leader.17 Financial and personnel difficulties combined to retard the opening of maternity homes, with the first home not operative until December 1936, a full year after Lebensborn’s founding." Finance problems also curtailed support extended to large SS families; Lebensborn was advanc~ ing monetary aid to only 110 SS families early in 1939, when the SS contained approximately 1,400 families having between five and twelve children.' This rather meager support evidently did not represent a strong inducement for SS men to increase the size of their families, since SS propaganda emphasizing the biological importance of large families had continued unabated between 1936 and 1939. Also indicative of the leadership's concern that economic necessity was persuading SS men to 16, SS membership regulations and salary deductions for Lebensborn are enumerated in an order appearing in the SS-Befehl:blat: “Beitragsabrechnung des Vereins Lebensborn e. V.." in “Ausschnitt aus dem SS-Befehlsblatt,” June 25, 1937, U. S. National Archives Microfilm Publication, Microcopy T-354, Miscellaneous SS Records: Einwandererzentral- stelle, Waffen-SS and SS-Oberabschnitte, Roll 49t [Frame 4241501. Cited hereafter as T-354/49t /424150r. For the totals on SS membership in Lebensborn, see “Zwei Jahre Lebensbom-Arbeit," Jan. 22, 1939, T-175 /17 /2520715-26. On the numerical size of the SS, see “Zahl der Verheirateten und Gesamtkinderzahl in der SS am 1.1.1939 und 31.12. 1939,” T-175 [25 /2531332. 17. Evidence of financial support received from the Deutscher Reichsverein fir Volks -pflege und Siedlerhife isin a directive from SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Karl Wolff, Himmler’s Chief of Staf, to Oswald Pohl, May 8, 1937, Misc. SS Files /SS-2139 [Box 8. An “Akten- vermerk” dated July 31, 1942, of SS-Standartenfiirer Max Sollmann, since May 1940 the Managing Director of Lebensborn, details financial aid from the Reich Finance Minister, Misc. SS Files /SS-2139 /Box 8. 18, For the difficulties encountered in opening the maternity homes due to financial and construction problems, see Der Geschafigfhrende Vorstand des Lebensborn e.V.to SS- Gruppenfiikrer Oswald Pobi, letter, June 21, 1938, Misc. SS Files /SS-1840 [Box . 19. On the financial aid to $S families, see “Zwei Jahre Lebensborn-Arbeit,” Jan. 22, 1939, T-175 /17 /2520715-26. A concise statement on the amount of monetary support rendered to large SS families is in Lebenshorn to the SS-Oberabschnitt Fulda-Werra, letter, Sept. 17, 1937, T-354/491 /4241511. For the estimate on the total number of families with five or more children, sce “Entwurf fiir die bevélkerungspolitische Schrift an die SS-Fithrer,” 1937, T-175 [201 /2742420-21. The 1937 statistics had listed 1,116 families having five or more children. Given the continued poor SS birthrate after 1937, the author's estimate of 1,400 families may be too generous. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 63 have fewer children was a Himmler order early in 1939 which raised the obligatory monthly contributions paid to Lebensborn by SS officers. The Reichsfiihrer even attempted to encourage more voluntary SS contribu- tions through greater publicity of the Lebensborn welfare function within the SS.20 He obviously expected that a larger welfare fund would allow for wider distribution of Lebensborn financial support and thereby en- courage more of his men to have larger families. The SS as a whole failed to respond to the exhortations of Himmler and other ideologues to produce more children. In fact, 61 per cent of the SS were bachelots in 1939, while the married contingent—some 93,000 men—could muster little more than 100,000 children, or 1.1 children per family. In this respect the officer corps provided no outstanding example for emulation by the rank and file. Of the officers, 23 per cent were single, while the more than 10,000 officers who were married had slightly over 15,000 children, or about 1.5 children per family.2t Although for reasons of age and greater financial security, alder SS officers under= standably had more children than their younger counterparts (approxi- mately 1.7 per family), they were not praised by SS statisticians for their performance. The criticism has some validity when the relative youth of these senior officers is examined. In the youthful SS, older officers were those who had reached the age of forty! Those officers who were forty or older represented about one-third of the approximately 14,000 men in the entire SS officer corps. Senior SS officers were frequently still in their late thirties and physically capable of producing children. Behind the criticism of the statisticians perhaps lay the fear that the senior officers ‘were succumbing to the materialistic malaise associated with “bourgeois morality” and having fewer children the higher up the professional lad~ der they progressed. 20. For propaganda on the desirability of large families, see a Himmler directive, “An alle SS-Fihrer,” Sept. 13, 1936, T-611 /7 |Ordner 433. Two years later the exhortation remained unchanged. See Dr. Ebner’s “Merkblatt iiber die Aufnahme in cin Heim des Lebensborn e.V.,.” Mar. 1, 1938, T-611 [7 [Ordner 433. For the increase in contributions paid by SS officers, see “Reichsfihrer-SS Befehl,” Mar. 20, 1939, T-611 /7 |Orduer 433. On Himmler’s proposal for greater voluntary SS support of Lebensborn see “Zusam- menarbeit zwischen Schutzstaffel und Verein Lebensborn e.V.,” Aug. 8, 1936, T-611 /7/ Ordner 433. 21. “Zahl der Verheirateten und Gesamtkinderzahl in der SS am 1.1.1939 und 31.12. 1939,” T-175 /2s /2531332. Cf. Heinz Héhne, The Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS (New York, 1969), pp. 157-38. 22, The estimate on the number of children per family among older SS officers as well as their percentage within the entire SS officer corps is based on statistics in “Bevilker- ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms64 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfithrer-SS Ofequal concern to the population prognosticators was the relatively late age at which SS men married. The average age was thirty-two com- pared with the Reich average of twenty-seven.” Late marriage in the SS apparently resulted ftom professional demands which inhibited the younger officers’ marital inclinations. They led a transient existence due to the mobility produced by numerous training assignments which, when combined with the personal dedication required for recognition and promotion in the highly competitive SS, usually reduced the time and interest they could devote to courtship, marriage, and a family.24 ‘The marriage delay was crucial, however, since it lessened the likelihood of the men producing large families. Himmler, on the earlier advice of his population experts and seemingly unaware of the added burden he placed on the younger officers, had established four children as the mini- mum number acceptable per SS marriage. Yet SS experts assumed that couples were unlikely to have many children after the age of forty for psychological if not physical reasons. In light of the recent SS birth statistics, they were justifiably skeptical that there would be four chil- dren born during the eight-year reproductive period available in most SS marriages. In their opinion, an SS man who married after the age of thirty-two had not only failed in his “biological duty,” but if his wife were of comparable age, the marriage was relatively worthless, for the most that could be expected from the union was two children. ‘This perhaps explains why after 1936 Himmler repeatedly urged his men to marry at an earlier age.25 Organizational pride as well as eugenics con~ tungspolitik im $S-Fihrerkorps, Stand 1.12.1938,” prepared by the SS-Personalkanzlei, ‘T-175 123 /2640249-72. Cf. “Entwurf fiir die bevolkerungspolitische Schrift an die SS-Filhrer,” 1937, T-175 /201 /2742422-31, which has statistics compiled by year of birth that illustrate the reproductive performance of senior officers and also contains appended critical comment on their record. 23. “Entwurf flir die bevélkerungspolitische Schrift an die SS-Firer,” 1937, T-175 201 /2742417. 24. Heinz Hohne describes the frenetic and competitive existence of young SS officers. See his The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 147-51. Himmler himself alluded to the nu- merous professional obligations required of a young officer when ordering new grad- uuates of the SS-Junkerschulen to postpone marriage until they passed the age of twenty- five, completed certain duty assignments, and were at least two years in grade at the rank of SS-Untersturmfiihrer (and Lieutenant). “Heiratsgenchmigung fiir die aus den ‘SS-Junkerschulen hervorgegangenen SS-Filhrer,” Aug. 30, 1937, T-611 /7/Ordner 433. 25. For the requirement of four children per SS family, see Himmler’s directive to SS officers, Sept. 13, 1936, T-611 |7 /Orduer 433. The gloomy evaluation on the number of children possible from late marriages is in “Bevélkerungspolitik im SS-Fihrerkorps, Stand 1.12.1938,” T-175/123 /2649251€. Cf. “Entwurf flir die bevolkerungspolitische ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 65 siderations no doubt dictated that the Reichsfiihrer demand from his racially motivated SS a marriage age level at least similar to the Reich average. The dilatory approach of SS members to marriage and reproduction ‘was not simply a reflection of professional or psychological demands reducing their willingness to accept the burdens and responsibilities of a family. Himmler did notaid his population cause when he established the intricate and cumbersome regulations surrounding the marriage pro- cedure. He learned to his “horror and astonishment” in 1937 that a back- log of over twenty thousand marriage requests existed in the Race and Settlement Department.?6 Since no S$ man could marry without the racial and ancestral examination, obviously many SS couples were delay- ing both marriage and childbearing due to bureaucratic inefficiency. Himmler had further undercut his desire for biologically valuable children by forbidding SS officer candidates, staff officers attached to the Hauptamter, and members of the SS-Verfiigungstruppe to marry until they were past the age of twenty-five, unless they attained certain ranks prior to that date.?” Strangely enough, the Reichsfiihrer saw no contradiction between refusing to allow his men to marry young and his castigation of “bourgeois morality” for not condoning it, when both opposed it for similar reasons. His insistence that young officers first become established in their careers before contemplating marriage was no different from bourgeois society’s demand that young adults postpone marriage until they achieved professional or occupational security. Himmler also ap- peared oblivious in this instance to observations by his experts that statistics indicated younger marriages produced the most children. Given the mediocre reproductive response of the SS, it is not sur Schrift an die SS-Fithrer,”” 1937, T-175 /201 /2742429-30. An example of Himmler's encouragement of early marriage is “Heiratsgenehmigung fiir die aus den SS-Junker- schulen hervorgegangenen SS-Fiihrer,” Aug. 30, 1937, T-611 /7 /Ordner 433. 26. For the burdensome marriage regulations procedure, see “Befehl zum Einholen der Verlobungs- und Heiratsgenehmigung,” Mar. 11, 1936, T580 /Darté Nachlass/329] Ordner 50, The reaction of Himmler at the length of the marriage request waiting list is in Himmler to Darré, letter, May 18, 1937, T-580/Darré Nachlass 329 /Ordner 47. 27. “Befehl zum Binholen der Verlobungs- und Heiratsgenehmigung,” Mar. 11, 1936, T-80/Darré Nachlass/329 |Ordner so. Cf. “Heiratsgenchmigung fiir die aus den SS- ‘Junkerschulen hervorgegangenen SS-Fiihrer,” Aug. 30, 1937, T-611 /7 [Ordner 433. 28. See the tables and charts in “Bevélkerungspolitik im SS-Fthrerkorps, Stand 1.12. 1938,” T-175 /123 /2649251ff,, and ““Entwurf fiir die bevélkerungspolitische Schrift an. die SS-Fiihrer,” 1937, T-175 /201 /2742422-26. Both of these documents emphasize the greater fertility of young marriages. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms66 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfithrer-SS prising that the performance of Lebensborn was equally dismal. Through 1938 the seven functioning Lebensborn homes received only 653 mothers. According to an agency official, however, Lebensborn established such exacting racial requirements that only forty of every one hundred appli- cants qualified for admission. This assertion evidently was an attempt to minimize a poor record in maternity care rather than an accurate assess ment of past operations. The “official” figures would indicate that about 1,600 women, whether secking entry for legitimate or illegitimate births, had applied to the homes. Inreality, had there beensucha response, itappears unlikely that the same Lebensborn spokesman, in accompanying remarks, would have expressed his great concern over past inadequate maternity demands.” His comments were a rather transparent effort to merchandise the homes through an elitist appeal based on their racial exclusiveness. Neither the total number of unwed mothers who sought admission to the homes nor the subsequent number who qualified racially for ac- ceptance is known. But illegitimate children of SS fathers were scarce, since SS statistics for the period reveal only about two hundred reported illegitimate children fathered by the entire S$!9° Despite the poor response in total numbers of mothers utilizing the homes, Lebensborn officials believed their work, if properly supported and publicized, could save several thousand racially valuable children annually. They insisted that their low patronage reflected inadequate publicity of their operations rather than active resistance from any en- trenched S$ “bourgeois morality.” Yet they faced a dilemma in adver 29. “Zwei Jahre Lebenshorn-Atheit,” Jan. 22, 1930, T-175 /17 /2520715-26, contains the boast about high racial standards and the disappointment expressed over low admis- sions. The files of SS-Oberabschnitt Fulda-Werra exemplify one method unmarried ex- pectant mothers employed when secking entrance to Lebensborn homes. In this instance the mother was the seventeen-year-old daughter of an NSDAP official from the Kreislei~ tung Wittenstein. The father of her impending child was a soldier, already matried with two legitimate children. The gitl’s father used his SS connections to inquire about Lebensborn facilities, the cost involved in using them, where they were located, and whether they currently had room for his daughter. Der Fihrer des SS-Oberabschnitt Fulda Werra to Lebensborn, letter, Sept. 25, 1940, T-354 /49t /4241409. Lebensborn homes were not expensive. The daily cost was RM 2.00 before childbirth and RM 2.50 thereafter. “‘Merkblatt iiber die Aufnahme in ein Heim des Lebensborn e. V.,” Mar. 1, 1938, T-611 [7 |Ordner 433. 30. “Bevélkerungspolitik im SS-Fihrerkorps, Stand 112.1938," T-175 /123 /2649251ff CE Edgar Knoebel, “Racial Illusion and Military Necessity: A Study of SS Political and ‘Manpower Objectives in Occupied Belgium” (unpub. diss., University of Colorado, 1965). p. 69, ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 67 tising their services because the major attraction of the maternity homes was the secrecy which they granted to the unwed mother. Hence, Lebensborn depended upon physician referrals, word-of-mouth promo- tion from women who had been in the homes, and discreet newspaper want ads to attract a clientele.3! The results of these practices had obvi- ously not been impressive. ‘There should have been no advertising problem within the SS, but a Lebensborn report summarizing its operations in 1939 reveals a concerted effort to publicize the attractive qualities of the homes and inadvertently demonstrates the reluctance of SS members to utilize its facilities for bicth, legitimate or illegitimate. The report portrayed the maternity homes as located in pleasant surroundings, tastefully appointed, and operated within an atmosphere of pleasing geniality. The lower incidence of infant mortality compared with the Reich average was also empha- sized when describing the professional competency of the nurses and other staff members. Furthermore, the report proudly described the classes offered in child care and home management, which were always presented within the correct racial Weltanschauung. The classes provided both therapeutic and educational diversion for the women during their usual two to five months residence. Duc to the financial and racial stake Lebensborn and the SS had in the children born in the homes, the agency soon developed foster-child and adoption programs. The society arrogated to itself the decision concern- ing the fitness of an unwed mother to keep her child. While professing to favor the child’s remaining with its mother, Lebensborn nevertheless would not allow an infant out of its custody unless the mother met certain moral and economic criteria. Should she be judged morally un- 31. A strong argument demonstrating the future potential of Lebenshorn and justifying its unspectacular past record is in “Zwei Jahre Lebensborn-Arbeit,” Jan. 22, 1939, ‘T-175 |17 /2520715-26. The publicity dilemma is admitted in “‘Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des SS-Sanititsamtes,” May 31, 1937, Misc. SS Files /SS-811 Box 2. Cf. Lebensborn to ‘SS-Hauptsturmfhrer Hermann Theilen (RuSHA), letter, Dec. 29, 1939, T-611 [7 [Ordner 433. 32. “Zwei Jahre Lebensborn-Arbeit,” Jan. 22, 1939, T-175 /17/2520715-26. The SS membership should have known of Lebensborn’s function, inasmuch as a procedural announcement explaining how, when, and where to apply for admittance to the ma~ temity homes appeared in the SS-Befelilsblatt, Feb. 25, 1938. Repetitive announcement of these instructions at the quarterly muster of all SS personnel was required. “Ausschnitt aus dem SS-Befehlsblatt: Aufhahme von werdenden Miittern in die Heime des Lebensborn e.V.,” T-354/491 4241498. Moreover, Himmler had ordered quarterly muster an-~ nouncements on Lebensborn to take place as early as 1936. “Zusammenarbeit zwischen ‘Schutzstaffel und Verein Lebensbomn e.V.,” Aug. 8, 1936, T-611 [7 [Orduer 433. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms68 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfithrer-SS suitable for motherhood, lack the financial means to provide for the child, or prove unable to secure adequate supervision of the child while she worked to support it, Lebensborn would house the infant for at least a year. This gesture created a need for children’s homes which consid- erably broadened the scope of Lebensborn activities. Ifa child spent a year in the children’s home and the mother still proved unqualified to receive it, the society attempted to place it in an SS foster home. In 1939 Lebens- born resorted to adoption infrequently, preferring to wait for possible resolution of an unwed mother’s personal problems, financial, psycho- logical, or marital, in the hope that the child would eventually reside with one, if not both of its parents. x ok & Lebensborn entered the war years possessing organizational coherence and established family welfare and maternity procedures. Yet the society had enjoyed only marginal success in prosecuting its original aims. Welfare support to kinderreiche SS families remained limited for financial reasons. Few mothers, married or otherwise, entered the maternity homes, keep- ing the society'sinvolvement with childbirth toa minimum. The scarcity of mothers reflects both the preponderance of SS bachelors and the un- successful efforts of Lebensborn to publicize its function, a curtailment ne- cessitated because of the secrecy required to attract unwed mothers. SS bureaucratic inefficiency and Himmler’s orders forbidding some of his mento marry young also reduced the supply of pregnant mothersLebens- born anticipated. The Reichsfiihrer might well have been dissatisfied with these results, since they fell short of achieving his ideological, practical, or educational goals. The war brought Himmler a unique opportunity to improve the situation. True, war losses would reduce the biologically valuable ele- ment within the German population, since they would naturally be in the forefront of the fighting. But war also created the emergency condi- tions under which the Reichsfihrer could more openly propagate a radical cugenics policy, justifying greater deviations from societal and religious norms because the Fatherland desperately needed good blood. “Bour- geois morality,” heretofore so difficult to overcome, might yet be conquered. 33. “Zwei Jahre Lebensborn-Arbeit,” Jan. 22, 1939, T-175 /17 /2520715-26. See also ““Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des SS-Sanitétsamtes,” May 31, 1937, Misc. SS Files /SS-811 / Box 2. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 65 Himmler quickly launched the campaign in an order issued to the entire SS on October 28, 1939, calling upon them to father more chil- dren. Reproduction was held to be nota private matter but a sacred duty to ensure a racially valuable reservoir of good blood to lead Germany in the future. Eschewing all discretion, the Reichsfiihrer suggested that Ger- man women of good racial stock should disregard bourgeois moral con ventions from a sober sense of patriotism and, ifnecessary, have illegiti- mate children. He promised that the $$ would not only provide for the welfare of these children but would also stand prepared to care for the families of married women should their husbands die in the war.>4 Here was a radical proposal openly proclaimed for the first time, although the sentiments merely expressed convictions previously held by Himm- ler. Not surprisingly, the October order produced considerable contro- versy when its contents became more widely known, no doubt demon- strating to Himmler the continued strength of “bourgeois morality” even during a national crisis. From some quarters came the charge that the order invited licentiousness which might seriously corrupt German. morality. The military intimated that it encouraged SS men and the wives of men serving in the Wehrmacht to commit adultery.35 Stung by the criticism, Himmler attempted to clarify the order. In a public dis- claimer, he indignantly repudiated the insinuation about adultery, stress ing that the SS regarded the military as comrades in arms and that SS honor did not condone adulterous conduct. He further claimed that his remarks onillegitimacy had been misunderstood. The SS merely wanted to extend aid to children born out of wedlock whose parents would normally marry but might be prevented from doing so by the vicissi- tudes of war.26 These assurances notwithstanding, Himmler pointedly failed to condemn illegitimacy outright, which allowed great latitude for individual interpretation as to his actual intent. ‘An overtly radical eugenics proposal by the Reichsfiihrer had failed to 34. An English translation of the order is in K. Sosnowski, The Tragedy of Children under Nazi Rule (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 279-80. For the German original, see “SS-Befehl fiir die gesamte SS und Polizei,” Oct. 28, 1939, T-175 /15 /2518680. 35. Himmler elaborated on the various complaints received in a proclamation to “‘Allle Manner der SS und Polizei,” Jan. 30, 1940, T-175 [15 /2518676-77. 36. T-175/15 /2518676~77. The military apparently accepted Himmler’s explanation. of SS honor, since an order by General von Brauchitsch on Feb. 6, 1940, encouraged the army to heed the call for an increased birthrate. Significantly, he cautioned the troops to keep their reproductive efforts within the confines of marriage. T-175 /15 2518674~75. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms70 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfiihrer-SS receive a favorable public response. The rebuff did not deter Himmler from future radical eugenics activities, but it apparently influenced him to pursue them with more circumspection. Secrecy continued through- out the war toward Lebensborn maternity homes, the most obvious bene- ficiaries of the October proposal. On rare occasions when the homes were publicized, their involvement with unwed mothers received slight mention.37 By juxtaposing the general secrecy surrounding Lebensborn with the October order on the propriety of biologically valuable illegitimate children, some postwar accounts of the SS have described Lebensborn as existing for a more sinister purpose. They view the homes as “stud farms” where $$ men and carefully selected young women were mated under pseudoscientific auspices for the purpose of breeding a “master race."38 The basis for this interpretation usually rests on a similar but more moderate intimation made when four former Lebensborn officials 37. In proclamation to SS men and their dependents made shortly after the October 1939 proposal, Himmler emphasized Lebenshor’s role in caring for the pregnant unwed mothers and illegitimate children which he anticipated would result from it. “Aus- fiihrungsbestimmungen zum Befchl des Reichsfihrer-SS vom 28.10.1939,” June 19, 1940, T-611 /7/Ordner 433. When parents of illegitimate children proved unable or unwilling to marry, mandatory secrecy prevailed not only for personal reasons but also due to state interest in birth registration, health insurance payments, and taxation. Himm= ler was therefore adamant that SS physicians be swom to secrecy before their involve- ment with Lebensborn activities. State legal technicalities were discreetly handled by Lebensborn officials who “processed” the vital statistics before passing them on to the relevant state authorities. Legal difficulties surrounding illegitimate children usually vanished when the Reichsfihrer-SS became their legal guardian. “ Ausbildungsbrief Nr. 3 des $S-Sanititsamtes,” May 31, 1937, Misc. SS Files SS-811 /Box 2. See also a letter from Ebner to Sollmann emphasizing secrecy on health insurance matters, Jan. 12, 1942, ‘Misc. SS Files /SS-s371 [Box 26. The secrecy required to encourage unwed mothers to enter the maternity homes limited the society's efforts to publicize its facilites for legiti- mate childbirth. On the rare occasions when the homes received publicity, Lebensborn officials discreetly ignored their unwed mothers. Witness the strategy devised for a propaganda film made in 1939: “In diesem Film sollen, um die Geheimhaltung nicht zu gefirden, nur Mitter gezeigt werden, die verheiratet sind, oder die auf Geheimhaltung keinen Wert legen, und die mit der Aufnahme einverstanden sind. Es wird selbstver- stindlich darauf gesehen werden, dass nur best aussehende Miitter gefilmt werden.” Lebensborn to Himmler, May 17, 1939, T-175 /88 /2611445. Cf.a similar response toward a propaganda film made in 1942, T-175 /48 /2560882. Perhaps Lebensborn succeeded too well in camouflaging its activities. Correspondence during the war reveals numerous queties from several agencies and individuals to prominent SS officals asking if such an institution actually existed. T-175 /R9s /2615405-13 and 2615337-38. +38. Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Horror (New York, 1964), pp. 70-71. A “sexploitation” account in the “stud farm” genre is Peter Neumann's The Black March: The Personal Story of an SS Man (New York, 1959), pp. 74-86. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 7 were among several SS defendants in the “RuSHA Case,” Case 8 of the Nuremberg Trials, The United States of America v. Ulrich Greifelt et al. The prosecution initially alleged that the society provided facilities where illicit conception actually took place.3? That Lebensborn did nothing to discourage illegitimacy is certainly true, but the prosecution subse- quently failed to produce any evidence in support of the assertion about sponsored sexual liaisons. And, while Himmler wanted to reduce the artificial restrictions which society placed upon sexual activities, much evidence indicates that henever pushed this desire to such bizarre lengths. ‘When a proposal made to him late in the war hinted at selective breeding under similar conditions, the Reichsfithrer rejected it, fearing thatit would undermine motherhood and the German family.4° Despite his racially directed desire to cast off the shackles of “bourgeois morality,” Himmler demonstrated his inability to renounce certain societal values which, ironically, made him no different from the petit bourgeois prudes he so frequently castigated.4t Despite the negative public reaction to his October proposal, in- creased maternity demands on Lebensborn developed during the war. Another radicalization of Himmler’s eugenics policy envisioned the capture of biologically valuable children. $S and military occupation in conquered territory produced the inevitable fraternization between the troops and the natives, resulting in a substantial number of foreign pregnancies. Just how substantial is revealed in a 1943 SS estimate that in France alone several thousand French women were pregnant by Ger- 39. Case 8 /Vol. 1 /Trial transcript, p. 42. 40. The disapproval of a proposal for “sclective breeding” in establishments designated as Mitterhafeis in Heiber, Reichsfihrer, Doc. No. 332, p.275. A somewhat similar sugges tion by the Reichsgesundheitsfihrer Dr. Leonardo Conti, prompted by concern for the female surplus confronting Germany, likewise failed to impress Himmler, Conti’s idea is in “Erholung der Kinderzahl durch Eheanbahnung, Eheberatung und Wahlkinder,” June 3, 1942, T-175 /69 /2585959-68. See Himmler to Conti, letter, July 13, 1942, T- 175 /69 /2585949, for the Reichsfdhrer's negative reaction. Cf. Himmler’s unfavorable attitude toward a young woman desiring contact with an SS-Begattungsheim, T-175 /20] 25246198. 41, Acknowledgement of Himmler's own two illegitimate children does not neces- sarily contradict this assertion. The almost furtive manner he adopted toward his second family reflects a petit bourgeois attitude. Precautions were taken to shield their existence from everyone except intimate friends. Moreover, Himmler did not reveal the situation to his legal wife, nor could he bring himself to obtain a divorce, an act which violated ptinciples that he obviously found difficult to discard. Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs, passim. CE. Héhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 421-22. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms7 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfiihrer-SS man military, SS, and civilian occupation personnel.4? Ever on the alert for valuable offspring, especially as SS war casualties mounted, Himmler ordered the women in France and elsewhere seized—when the German paternity could be established—and racially examined by SS doctors, Provided both parents received racial certification, the women were forcibly taken to Lebensborn-operated maternity homes in their own areas or, as in some cases, transported to homes in the Reich to have their children. The bulk of these women were from western Europe, al- though no exact figures are available on the total number who ulti- mately entered the maternity homes. Unless the women planned to marry or had married the German fathers of their children, many strenu~ ously avoided SS attempts to ferret them out, They undoubtedly did so for various reasons, but SS records indicate that once it became common knowledge that Lebensborn placed their illegitimate children in foster homes, the majority of women refused to cooperate.4* Even hefore SS activities directed at seizing the illegitimate offspring of German fathers in occupied territory, the Reichsfiihrer approved simi- lar operations aimed at securing the children of racially valuable parents within both the incorporated and the occupied areas.*5 Lebensborn thus became both a beneficiary of and participant in the SS settlement and population policy administered by the Reichskonissariat fir die Festigung 42. The estimate appears in a letter ftom an Oberstabsarzt to VOMI (Volksdeutsche Mitelstelle, Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans), Oct. 15, 1943, Case 8 /Doc. Bk. VIII-C (Eng,) [NO 1390/p. 39. Sec also Misc. SS Files /SS-1038 [Box 3; SS-1597/Box 5; SS~ 1834/Box § for similar SS attention directed toward women pregnant by German occupation forces in the Channel Islands, the Netherlands, and Norway, respectively. 43. See for example “Erfassung von Franzésinnen, die Kinder von Wehrmachtange- hrigen erwarten,” 1944, Misc. SS Files /SS-1037 /Box 3. In general foreign women were not brought to Lebensborn homes in the Reich. Several occupied areas had their own Entbindungsheime where racially valuable unwed mothers had their babies. Heiber, Reichsfihrer, Doc. No. 261, pp. 228-29. Apparently no standard procedure existed, since pregnant Norwegian women were shipped to maternity homes in Germany. Case 8/ Doc. Bk. VIII-C (Eng.) [NO 4836; NO 4837; NO 2916; NO 3175; and NO 3186/pp. 40-50. The same procedure held also for pregnant women from the Channel Islands, Case 8 Doc. Bk. VII-C (Eng.) | NO 1390; NO 3217; NO 3218; and NO 929. 44. See above, n. 43, Case 8 /Doc. Bk. VIII-C (Eng.) /pp. 40-50. 45. “Denkscrift Himmlers iiber die Behandlung der Fremdvélkischen im Osten (Mai 1940),” Viertejahrshefte fir Zeitgeschichte, v, No. 2 (Apt. 1957), 194-98. Himmler ap- parently based much of the above on a document prepared by the Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP entitled “Die Frage der Behandlung der chemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten,” Nov. 25, 1939, Misc. SS Files /SS-3228 [Box 12. For the later implementation of this policy, see Himmler to Arthur Greiser (Reichsstatt- halter of the Warthegau), letter, June 18, 1941, T-175 (69 /2585852. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson UE deutschen Volkstums (Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Ger- mandom, or RKEDV), an SS agency Himmler founded in October 1939. Lebensborn children’s homes ultimately were to receive an inde- terminate number of children, usually between the ages of two and six, who were judged by SS racial examiners to be of ethnic German back- ground and, therefore, suitable for “re~Germanization” (Wiederein- deutschungsfahige) through eventual placement in German foster homes. These children came primarily from eastern and southeastern Europe and, in many cases, were taken from their parents under threat of physical oreconomicreprisal if they didnot cooperate. A majority of the children, however, appear to have been war orphans whose parents died during military operations or were executed by the occupation authorities.46 These eugenics policies, in their own way equally as radical as the 1939 call for illegitimate births, forced the physical expansion of Lebensborn facilities from prewar levels. By mid-1944 there were fifteen Lebenshorn homes, doubling the number in operation early in 1939. Yet thenumber of nurses staffing these homes totaled only 130.47 Quite obviously this professional staff could not have been sufficient to discharge all the tasks currently assigned to the society. Moreover, Lebensborn officials later claimed that no more than 700 employees were ever connected with it.48 The discrepancy between these figures and the supposedly monumental scale of Lebensborn operations casts some doubt on the actual magnitude of its wartime activity. One explanation for its relatively small staffis that the society utilized 46. An excellent summary of the “te-Germanization” process is a report of SS-Ober- sturmfithrer Harders, “Ubersicht iiber das Arbeitsgebiet der Abteilung C 2 [RuSHA] (Wiedereindeutschung),” Sept. 25, 1942, Misc. SS Files /SS-1597 [Box s. For the seizure of children, orphans or not, ftom various locales, see a directive of Feb. 19, 1942, “Ein- deutschung von Kindern aus polnischen Familien und aus chedem polnischen Waisen- hausetn,” Misc, SS Files /SS-2027 /Box 8; orphans from Russia: SS-5025 [Box 23; or- phans from the Banat: SS-3242 /Box 12; orphans of executed partisans from Oberkrain and Untersteiermark: SS-2416b [Box 10. Lebensbort officials later claimed they only re- ceived 400-500 racially valuable children. Sollman Exhibits, Affidavit of Willi Ziesmer, Case 8/Box 26/Doc. Bk. $4 (Ger.). This figure appears extremely low. The exact number remains problematical, although estimates place the totals somewhere in the thousands. Roman Hrabar, Hitlerowski rabuneke dzieci polskich. Uprowadzanie i germanizo- wanie dzieci polskich w latach 1939-1945 (Katowice, 1960), passim. Cf. Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), P 220. 47. List of Lebensborn homes and nursing staff, Apr. 1944, Misc. SS Files /SS-2138 / Box 8. 48. Sollmann Exhibits, Affidavit of Dr. Hans-Hilmar Staudte, Case 8/Doc. Bk. 1 Ger.) /Doc. No. 5, p. 12. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms74 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsftihrer-SS the facilities and personnel of other SS and Party agencies in fulfilling its tasks. SS doctors attached to other SS units and not Lebensborn staff conducted racial examinations of pregnant foreign mothers and children thought to be suitable for “re-Germanization.” SS agencies connected with the RKFDV supervised the lives of mothers and children until their arrival at Lebensborn homes. The Party Welfare Organization (National- sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, or NSV) also operated children’s homes which reduced the numerical pressure on Lebensborn facilities. Finally, it appears that Lebensborn effected a rapid turnover of the children en- trusted to it by distributing them to foster parents as quickly as pos- sible“? The society would not require an extensive staff or quarters if the children’s homes functioned primarily as transient depots ministering briefly to the children as they passed through. The suspicion remains, however, that Lebenshorn never realized its full potential because SS racial dynamism shifted during the war to rescttle- ment and extermination operations which eventually overwhelmed. the eugenics effort. Lebensborn dependence on other increasingly hard- pressed SS agencies to locate, process, and transport its “products’— racially valuable pregnant women and children—frequently resulted in delays, confused priorities, and quarrels over administrative compe- tency.50 When combined with the organizational disruption produced. by military reverses after 1943, these problems suggest that Lebensborn did not receive the full flood of expectant mothers and young humanity it or Himmler anticipated. When Lebensborn executives personally occu- pied themselves with numerous petty cases of $$ welfare and dutifully traveled to small German towns to speak on racial topics,5! it does not indicate that the crush of work overburdened them or that a large staff 49. A voluminous report (38 pages) of unknown date and origin (probably a RuSHA document produced in 1943) concisely lists the division of labor for SS population policy. Misc, SS Files/SS-3119 /Box 12. See Misc. SS Files /SS-3358/Box 13, and SS-s024, s025/Box 23, for the activities of the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, “Unter bringung von Kinder im Warthepau,” Sept. 16, 1943, Misc. SS Files /SS-3240 /Box 12, is an informative description of Lebensborn foster-child operations. 0. Representative examples of agency “bickering” over organizational competency: ‘Misc. SS Files [SS-s352 /Box 26, which includes a quarrel over maternity-home jurisdic- tion in Cracow, 1942; Misc. SS Files /SS-4876 /Box 21 depicts a squabble between Lebensborn and the NSV over spheres of influence, 1942. For “power struggles” through- out the population program, see Koehl, RKEDV, pp. 163-66. 1, Direct aid given by Dr. Gregor Ebner to a widow secking shelter for herself and four children, June 4, 1942, is in Misc. SS Files /SS-2431 [Box 10. The list of Ebner’s speaking tours, Mar. 31, 1941, is in Misc. SS Files /SS-600$ /Box 28. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 78 was available to relieve them of such menial chores. But, taken in con- junction with other incidents visible on the eugenics front, their pre- occupation with racially propagandizing the populace demonstrates that the sexual radicalization of “bourgeois morality” which Himmler de- sired had not occurred. ek ok Fragmentary Lebensborn records for the war years, while indicating that many illegitimate children fathered by SS men, military personnel, and civilians were born in the maternity homes, further substantiate the suspicion that no sexual “liberation” from “bourgeois morality” took place. The figures advanced by Lebensborn officials on trial in Case 8— 12,000 births during the nine operational years, of which 6,000 were illegitimate—might seem to be low on both counts.®2 S$ marriages alone produced 6,764 births in 1941. While thisillustrates that SS fecundity had not improved greatly over prewar levels, since the SS numbered just under 400,000, it does cast doubt on the trial totals.53 By the end of 1941, SS personnel and other Germans were using Lebensborn maternity homes in greater numbers to escape the danger of Allied bombing in the larger cities and because the homes also were believed to possess better materni- ty facilities.54 Assuming that a majority of SS births in that year occurred in Lebensborn homes, this alone would account for at least one-third of the total number given for its entire nine-year history. However, as noted above, fewer than seven hundred mothers entered the homes in the first two years. The bulk of the patrons obviously came during the war, which makes the 1941 conjectural estimate not unreasonable. Moreover, ifeleven thousand births, excluding an estimated one thousand before the war, are averaged over the five war years, the conclusion follows that the small staff operating the homes could have handled the traffic. The 52. For sketchy indications on the volume of illegitimate children born during the war years, see T-175/R76, R77, and Ros [passim. Lebensborn testimony on the birth totals is in Sollmann Exhibits, Affidavit of Dr. Hans-Hilmar Staudte, Case 8 /Doc. Bk. 1 (Ger.) Doc. No. 5, p. 12a, and Sollmann Exhibits, Affidavit of Willi Zeismer [Case 8/ Box 26 [Doc. No. 54. 33. 8S birth totals in roqr are in a report of Dr. Richard Korherr, Inspekteur fiir Statistik, to Himmler, Sept. 18, 1942, T-175 /24 /2529147-5t. For SS total strength in 1941, see “Gesamtstirke der SS am 31. Dezember 1941,” T-175 [60 ]2576464. 34. Feat of bombing attacks prompted a letter from an SS-Untersturmfiihrer to the 2. SS-Standarte, Frankfurt a.M., Aug. 4, 1940, secking permission for his wife to enter a Lebensborn home, T-354 /49t /4241427. For claims advanced on the safety from bombing and better maternity facilities, see the Trial Brief of Sollmann and Ebner, Case 8 /Box 46, peat. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms6 The Eugenics Policy of the Reichsfithrer-SS limited evidence, therefore, indicates that the childbirth totals introduced in Case 8 may be reasonably accurate. The low SS birthrate in 1941 also suggests a basic reason why the Reichsfiihrer pursued one eugenics expedient after anotherduring the war in an effort to increase it. He encouraged research aimed at reducing female infertility, ordered his men to marry when they passed the age of thirty, and urged them to seek SS medical advice when pregnancy did not occur soon after marriage.5§ In 1943, when SS casualties were in~ creasing, he ordered men eligible for leave to plan their furloughs in advance with their wives, so that they might arrange to conceive chil- dren during the brief holiday. When it was not possible for the men to return home on leave, their wives were ordered to join them at desig- nated rest areas.5° Himmler also attempted to recruit business for Lebens- born in his capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army (Oberbefehls- haber des Ersatzheeres) in 1944. He directed that information regarding the maternity homes be made available to the rank and file.57 Evidently, at that late date an image problem continued to plague Lebensborn be- cause of insufficient and inadequate publicity. The Reichsfiihrer even explored the eugenics possibilities of artificial insemination. He fully approved of the method with regard to married women, but was reluctant to see it employed on women who were un- married.58 The continued unwillingness of Himmler to carry through 55. Indicative of Himmler’s interest in and support of female infertility research were his comments on two leamed papers written in 1944: “Vorschlige zur Behandlung und Heilung der Empfingnisunféhigkeit der Frau und der Zeugungsunfahigkeit des Mannes,” T-175 20 /2524539-40; “Weibliche Unfruchtbarkeit, ihre Ursachen und die Méglichkeit ihrer Verhiitung,” T-175 [145 /2673232~56. Sec the “suggestions” which Himmler made to SS men who remained bachelors too long in Heiber, Reichsfihrer, Doc. No. 277, p- 239, and Doc. No. 365, p. 297. On obtaining medical advice when pregnancy failed to result, see his correspondence with Reichsgesundheitsfiuhrer Dr. Conti, 1942, T-175 /69/ 2585959-68. CF. Heiber, Reichsfilhrer, Doc. No. 210, p. 192. 56. “Planmissiger Urlaub,” Aug. 25, 1943, T-175 /71 /2588499. Propaganda accom- panied the directive on “furloughs,” exhorting SS men not only to concentrate on the present enemy but to remember that a future peace in Germany and the world depended on the next generation. Hence, they should look to their biological duty. “Mahnung und Verpflichtung,” T-175 /71 /2588508-09. 57. “Nachstehender Befehl zur Kenntnisnabme und Bekanntgabe: Betrifft: Lebens- born e.V.,” Nov. 18, 1944, T-175 /15 /2518670-71. 58 Himmler exhibited reluctance concerning artificial insemination of unmarried ‘women in correspondence critical of Dr. Conti’s proposal, “Erholung der Kinderzahl durch Eheanbahnung, Fheberatung und Wahlkinder,” June 3, 1942, 7-175 /69 /2585959- 67. See Heiber, Reichsfihrer, Doc. No. 226, pp. 207-209, for his “scientific” analysis of artificial insemination potentialities. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgitermsLarry V. Thompson 77 radical eugenics proposals that would possibly alter the concept of motherhood or the structure of the family reveals that he proved unable to free himself from the strictures of “bourgeois morality.” Scattered evidence from Lebensborn records indicates that many of his men shared this problem. These files abound with their self-recriminations for adul- terous behavior. Much correspondence reveals, however, that guilt feelings did not always suffice to save their marriages. Divorce was often threatened and occasionally carried out by the wives of some unfaithful SS men. Attempted and successful suicides by frustrated, guilt-ridden unmarried parents were also frequent when marriage wasimpossibleand Lebensborn refused them custody of their child.° Through it all runs a pervasive sense of bewilderment as to how they became entangled in their various sexual predicaments and what had caused their moments of moral weakness. Yet strangely enough, none attempted to place part of the blame on their Reichsftihrer. Himmler could take little comfort, however, from these indirect displays of loyalty. The Lebensborn records, though fragmentary and sometimes falsified, reveal that the Reichsfiihrer’s eugenics policy must be judged an overall failure, suggesting that many SS men placed their private feelings on sexual reproduction “off limits” ftom their institu- tional SS loyalty. SS “bourgeois morality” proved surprisingly strong when limited to the creation of life; unfortunately, this same “bourgeois morality” proved astonishingly weak when applied to the destruction of life, United States Naval Academy 59. An example of personal disgust is a diatribe by Hauptdienstleiter Dr. Gross, “Zur Frage des uneheliche Kindes als Problem der deutschen Bevélkerungspolitik,” Oct. 1944, U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication, Microcopy T-84, Miscellaneous German Records Collection [153 /1520891-914. Dr. Gross concluded that no population crisis existed in Germany and a radical eugenics policy encouraging illegitimate children was unnecessary. For examples of guilt feelings, rationalizations, and romantic deceit among ‘SS men and their women, see Heiber, Reichsfilhrer, Doc. No. 326a, pp. 26970; Doc. No. 380a, pp. 304-305; Doc. No. 387, p. 311. See also T-175 /88 /2611350 for a report of unhappiness among women in a Lebensborn home. For marital conflict prompted by infidelity, see T-175/R77/2595845~47. Illegitimate children also produced suicides, T-175 [R77 /2595496-502. ‘This content downloaded from 128,59.222.107 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 22:36:19 UTC Alluse subject to httpi/iabout,jstor-orgiterms