EDGAR T. BARROSO v. JUDGE GEORGE E.

OMELIO +
GR No. 194767, Oct 14, 2015

FACTS:
Sometime in 2007, herein petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 16 (RTC-Br. 16) a Complaint for sum of money,
damages and attorney's fees against Dennis Li. The complaint included
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment, and after Dennis Li
filed his Answer, RTC-Br. 16 granted herein petitioner's application for
a Writ of Attachment and approved the corresponding attachment
bond. On the other hand, Dennis Li filed a counter-attachment bond
purportedly issued by herein respondent Travellers Insurance & Surety
Corporation (Travellers).

On January 7, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Approval of

Compromise Agreement which was also approved. However, Dennis Li
failed to pay the sums of money as provided for under said Judgment
on Compromise Agreement. Herein petitioner then filed a Motion for
Execution and RTC-Br. 16 issued a Writ of Execution solely against
Dennis Li. When said Writ of Execution against Dennis Li was returned
by the Sheriff unsatisfied, petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution
of Judgment upon the Counterbond.

An Alias Writ of Execution was then issued against both Dennis Li and
respondent Travellers based on the counterbond it issued in favor of
the former, and pursuant to said writ, Sheriff Anggot served a Demand
Letter on Travellers.

However, instead of appearing before RTC-Br. 16, Travellers filed a

separate case for Declaration of Nullity, Prohibition, Injunction with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), and Damages, which was raffled to RTC-Br. 14. Said
petition prayed for the following reliefs: (a) the issuance of a TRO
enjoining Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner from implementing and
enforcing the Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009, and after
hearing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; (b) judgment
be rendered declaring the counterbond and its supporting documents
to be null and void; ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to
desist from further implementing the Writ of Execution dated April 28,
2009; and (c) ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to pay
Travellers actual and moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

After hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction,

herein respondent judge issued the assailed Order directing the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition for certiorari was proper in this case.
Whether respondent judge.
2. Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and gross
ignorance of the law by acting on respondent Travellers' petition
despite the lack of jurisdiction of RTC-Br. 14 and assuming
jurisdiction over the action for prohibition and injunction against
the executive sheriff of a coequal court.

HELD:
Herein petitioner, while acknowledging that the Court of Appeals (CA)
had concurrent jurisdiction over this petition, justified his immediate
resort to this Court by pointing out that respondent judge's conduct
shows his gross ignorance of the law, and any other remedy under the
ordinary course of law would not be speedy and adequate.

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without
serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to
deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy.

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.

However, it was acknowledged that for exceptionally compelling

reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to act on special civil
actions for certiorari filed directly with it. Examples of cases that
present compelling reasons are: (1) those involving genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) those where the issues are of transcendental importance, and the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights are so great as to outweigh
the necessity for prudence; (3) cases of first impression, where no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on such
issues; (4) where the constitutional issues raised are better decided
after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion;
(5) where time is of the essence; (6) where the act being questioned
was that of a constitutional body; (7) where there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free petitioner from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their constitutional rights; and (8) the issues involve public
welfare, the advancement of public policy, the broader interest of
justice, or where the orders complained of are patent nullities, or
where appeal can be considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.[8]

Verily, the issues in this case could have been competently resolved by
the CA, thus, the Court was initially inclined to reject taking
cognizance of this case. However, we cannot close our eyes to the
unbecoming conduct exhibited by respondent judge in obstinately
issuing an injunction against the orders of a co-equal court despite this
Court's consistent reiteration of the time-honored principle that "no
court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The
various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments."[9] The issue raised in this case, therefore,
falls under one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of
courts, i.e., where the order complained of is a patent nullity.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular

orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in
the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over Its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice,
the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.

To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing
court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have
recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The
remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a
higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court.
This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under
Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court
has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this case, the
issuance of the subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper
and, thus, correctible by certiorari. Herein respondent judge does not
have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an order of a co-equal
court. He must be aware that said co-equal court had the exclusive
jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances if ever there was,
indeed, a mistake. There is no question, therefore, that subject writ of
preliminary injunction is null and void.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA v. HON. FRANK E.

LOBRIGO
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs).

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to

Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guiltyHe argued that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Estipona's motion.

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms
part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118,
the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-
making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found
in any statute.
The accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule
118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of
the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an
Order9 dated July 26, 2016.

ISSUE:
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

HELD:
YES. Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is

now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments.

It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,

practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court
to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust
so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."

As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old

provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
" [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.

It is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure

for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea
bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate"
component of the administration of justice.

For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages

of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For
the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which
there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process

whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There
is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system
- speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on

plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the

defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered
and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to
a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion"
inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself
and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic

rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to
a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in
the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has
full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to

prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how
best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that
simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal
charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been
"properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes
an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is
not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise
for the convenience of the accused.62

We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea

bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the
purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for
being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.


SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA v. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017

FACTS:
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several
inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New
Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in
support of their testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing
of complaints with the Department of Justice.

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing,7 but the petitioner

argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her.

Accordingly, three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima

and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City charging
petitioner for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 for trafficking and
trading illegal drugs inside the New Bilibid Prison.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising that the RTC lacks

jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner

Respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order 22finding

probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima
and her co-accused.

Petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for
the annulment and setting aside of the order and warrant of arrest
issued by the respondent judge and granting a writ of prohibition
enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with
finality.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the

respondents, interposed its Comment to the petition.27 The OSG
argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show
that she has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Further,
the OSG posited that the petitioner did not observe the hierarchy of
courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive
grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over
the offense charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge
observed the constitutional and procedural rules, and so did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the assailed
orders and warrant.28

ISSUES:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first
be filed with the Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the trial court renders the instant petition
premature.

Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the
assailed Information.

HELD:
PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions
to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court
may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1)
when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental
importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional
issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a
constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition
includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in

the present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the
rules on the hierarchy of courts. Petitioner's allegation that her case
has sparked national and international interest is obviously not
covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The
notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for
this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its
rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party
in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent
judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive
and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political
partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a
special treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the
law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's
cause on account of her position and status in the government.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of

court should be disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law
does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which petitioner anchors her
case is that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this
ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure
questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not
probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is from a review of the
allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to
the Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been
brought before the appellate court, which is in the better position to
review and determine factual matters.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the
reliefs sought by petitioner's Prayer.

Her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition "until and unless
the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable
admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the
existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than

to dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity and allow
respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the
desire of petitioner.
The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to seek

relief from public respondents but he failed to avail himself of the
same before coming to this Court. To say the least, the petition is
premature and must be struck down.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-

emphasized considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to
rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The
Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds
of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from
doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case.
This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of
procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the
proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the
incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the

requirements set before this Court can exercise its review powers.
Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
requires the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower courts"
before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,

as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion

perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which

puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no
controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment
or order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm. As per the block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling
on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this

Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can
only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower
tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to negate "uncertain contingent
future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject Motion to
Quash.63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only
of controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues
are involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the
courts through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that
the case does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent
upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire."65

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction

of this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition
nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or
ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower
court, there is no occasion for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this
Court to declare as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be

"[no] other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law."66 Thus,
the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed,
before a premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause
of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February

23 and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently assailing in this Petition.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of
litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and
attention to matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the
overcrowding of its docket. There is no reason to consider the
proceedings at bar as an exception.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still
wont to deny the instant petition on substantive grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information the

Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against
her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of
RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former
Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even
assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of
RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try
the case considering that the acts described in the Information were
intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the acts
described in the Information against the petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created
as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try
drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In fact,
respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and
governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was
streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder,
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the
Information, there can be no other conclusion than that petitioner is
being charged not with Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165.
Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is
whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-
165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction

over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial
Court and no other.

The Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft

court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its
characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a
constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the

Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction
as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is

without jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public

officers
is not determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were
committed "in relation to their office." In determining the forum vested
with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws
governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise
be considered.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating

original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the
Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-
related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA
9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However,
narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them
not readily identifiable.109 In fact, they must first be subjected to
scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition
and nature.110Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are
specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given
scientific instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate
pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric
subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that
the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant
sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided
with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to
prohibited substances.

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to
take is to dismiss the petition and direct the trial court to rule on the
Motion to Quash and undertake all the necessary proceedings to
expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.