Sovereignty vs sovereign rights: What do we have in West PH Sea?

Under international law, the Philippines has sovereign rights – not sovereignty – over the West Philippine Sea

MANILA, Philippines – Filipinos fumed when President Rodrigo Duterte stressed that the Philippines has "no sovereignty" over its exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea.

"No country in the world has sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone," Duterte said in a speech on June 26.

Duterte had also said on June 21 that the sinking of a Filipino fishing boat by a Chinese ship in Recto Bank (Reed Bank) in the West Philippine Sea "was
not an attack on our sovereignty."

Is Duterte correct?

Or as Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo, a lawyer, asked a reporter in a press conference on June 27, "Ano ba ang difference ng sovereign rights
at saka sovereignty. Meron ba (What's the difference between sovereign rights and sovereignty. Is there a difference)?"
Rappler consulted two of the Philippines' leading experts on the West Philippine Sea – Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Jay
Batongbacal, director of the University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and the Law of the Sea.

The short answer is: Yes, under international law, the Philippines has no sovereignty – and only has sovereign rights – over its EEZ in the West Philippine
Sea.

The Philippine government is duty-bound to defend its sovereign rights over the West Philippine Sea, experts said.
What is the difference between sovereignty and sovereign rights?

Batongbacal explained that sovereignty "is like full ownership of property, with all the rights it implies, including the right to destroy it." Sovereignty
applies to the Philippines' landmass and its 12-nautical mile territorial sea.

Exclusive sovereign rights function "like usufruct, a right to use and enjoy property," said Batongbacal.

Sovereign rights allow the Philippines to exclusively fish and enjoy marine resources, such as oil and natural gas, in its 200-nautical mile EEZ in the West
Philippine Sea.

"You don't need to be an owner of property to be able to use and enjoy it. For example, if you rent property, you don't own it but are using and enjoying
it, and are entitled to even defend it against trespassers, because you have the sole right to possess it," Batongbacal said.
Does the Philippines have sovereignty or sovereign rights over its EEZ?

Carpio explained: "Under international law, the Philippines has sovereignty over its territorial sea (12 nautical miles), and jurisdiction over its EEZ (beyond
12 nautical miles up to 200 nautical miles). International law does not recognize sovereignty beyond the 12-nautical mile territorial sea."

Batongbacal also said "we don't have sovereignty" over our EEZ.
What does the Philippine Constitution state?

Article I of the 1987 Constitution states:

"The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas."

Carpio told Rappler: "The Constitution does not expressly say we only have sovereign rights in our EEZ. But under UNCLOS, which we have ratified and
forms part of our domestic statutory law, we only have sovereign rights in our EEZ."

The Constitution is however clear about its duty to protect its EEZ "exclusively" for Filipinos.

Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution mandates: "The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens."
How does one harmonize the Philippine Constitution and international law?

Carpio explained that the law operates in two areas – domestic and international.

"Our domestic law is anchored on our Constitution which defines our national territory to include 'other submarine areas' over which the Philippines has
'sovereignty OR jurisdiction,'" said Carpio.

International law states that the Philippines has "sovereignty" over its territorial sea and "jurisdiction" over its EEZ.

"The rule is, as repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, in case of conflict between our Constitution and international law, our Constitution will prevail, and
this is what our government officials must follow," the justice said.

"However, we can avoid a conflict by classifying our national territory into two: those over which the Philippines has sovereignty, and those over which
the Philippines has jurisdiction," he added.
Where do we go from here?

Carpio said the Philippines "must defend both types of national territory because that is the mandate of the Constitution."

"Just because we do not have sovereignty, but only sovereign rights, in our EEZ does not mean we should not protect our EEZ. Sovereign rights are
priceless too, that is why the Constitution directs the State to protect its marine wealth in its EEZ," said Carpio.
Batongbacal said: "Going back to the EEZ, yes, we don't have sovereignty over it, but that doesn't mean we cannot defend our exclusive sovereign rights
over it. Even though we don't own or have sovereignty over the entire EEZ, we have every right to assert or defend our rights to the natural resources in
it."

Duterte however, downplayed the constitutional provision on the country's marine resources.

"That provision is for the thoughtless and the senseless. The protection about economic rights, about the economic zone, resources? I am protecting the
country and 110 million Filipinos," the Philippine leader said on June 27.

He said the Constitution is meaningless if war with China erupts.

"I would say, 'If you don't have anything to wipe your butt with, use that Constitution of yours.' Because that means war and that piece of paper, the
Constitution, will become meaningless with no spirit except desperation, agony, and suffering," Duterte said.
DND insists China 'squatting' in West PH Sea

'Possession' or 'position?' The Defense department clears up post-SONA mess by reiterating the Philippines’ claim of sovereign rights in the West
Philippine Sea
JC Gotinga
Published 2:44 PM, August 01, 2019
Updated 2:44 PM, August 01, 2019

MANILA, Philippines – The Philippines has “possession and position” in the West Philippine Sea, the Department of National Defense (DND) said on
Thursday, August 1, in a statement on President Rodrigo Duterte’s much-criticized remark in his 4th State of the Nation Address (SONA) on July 22.

DND spokesperson Director Arsenio Andolong said "the Philippines has two documents to support its claims versus none for the Chinese,” citing the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 UNCLOS arbitral award as bases of the Philippines’ sovereign rights in
the West Philippine Sea.

"Thus, the Chinese presence in the West Philippine Sea is akin to somebody squatting on a piece of land owned by someone else,” Andolong said.

In his SONA, Duterte said the Chinese could not be driven away from the West Philippine Sea because they were “in possession” of it.

The remark drew strong criticism from Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, who pointed out that China’s reclaimed outposts in the
West Philippine Sea only comprised 7% of its total area, which falls within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon Jr afterwards claimed that the word Duterte used was "position” and not “possession,” meaning China
had a “positional advantage” in the West Philippine Sea.

Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana then backed Hermogenes’ claim.

However, the official transcript of the SONA from the Office of the President does use the word “possession” – twice.

“China also claims the property and he is in possession. ‘Yan ang problema. Sila ‘yung(That's the problem. They are the ones) in possession and claiming
all the resources there as an owner,” the official transcript of Duterte's speech states.
Possession, position

This latest statement from the DND said China "is in position, and to a certain degree, has possession of only a very small part of the South China Sea”
because of its militarized artificial islands in the area.

“South China Sea” is the international name of the sea that connects the Philippines, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

“West Philippine Sea” is the term used by Filipinos to refer to their EEZ within the South China Sea, which includes the 7 reefs that China reclaimed.

The Philippines has control over 9 islets in the same area, including Pag-asa Island, which hosts a civilian community of about 250 Filipinos.

"In the same vein, the Philippines also has possession and position in the West Philippine Sea,” Andolong said.

"We have to clarify, however, that possession, position, and control are different realities that do not necessarily exist together. Although several claimant
countries are occupying features in the South China Sea, not one of them has complete and sole control over that entire body of water,” he added.

Andolong defended the Duterte administration amid criticism that the country lost ground to China after it shelved the UNCLOS arbitral award to
broaden ties with Beijing.

"It must also be pointed out that the Philippines never gave up any of its positions in the WPS during the Duterte Administration and, in fact, it is
improving the existing facilities of its biggest island, Pag-asa, to accommodate more residents and personnel,” Andolong said.

A source from Pag-asa told Rappler that Chinese vessels continue to ply the waters around the island, especially when Philippine ships deliver
construction supplies.

The government is building a beaching ramp and paving the airstrip on Pag-asa Island.

On Wednesday, July 31, Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin said he had “fired off” a diplomatic protest against China for its vessels' “swarming” of
Pag-asa from July 24 to 25.

The possession/position affair from Duterte’s last SONA drew controversy and highlighted criticism that his administration is too favorable to Beijing.

Duterte was, in fact, asserting a supposed “fishing deal” he made with Chinese President Xi Jinping that allows the Chinese to fish in the West Philippine
Sea, which he said was the reason he could not drive them away.
On June 9, a Chinese trawler ran into an anchored Philippine fishing boat at Recto Bank off Palawan and left its 22 Filipino crew marooned.

Duterte downplayed the incident as concerns were raised that Chinese trawlers may be maritime militias in disguise.

The DND statement from Andolong states a tougher line.

"We are ready to defend our sovereignty and sovereign rights using whatever means available to us,” Andolong said.
"Likewise, every able-bodied Filipino should be ready to fulfill his or her duty when the time comes.” – Rappler.com
Self Determination and the Territorial Integrity
The principles of territorial integrity and self determination are two important principles which apply to international law and politics. These principles
define the relationships which a country should have with others especially regarding global politics. The principle of self determination explains that
countries have the right to freely determine their international politics status and sovereignty without outside or external interference (Gudeleviciute 1-5).
The principle of territorial integrity on the other hand explains that countries should avoid promoting border changes or secessionist movements in other
countries. Such movements or changes are viewed as acts of aggression. Although these two principles play an important role in international politics,
they sometimes come into conflict due when being applied.
It is important to assess these principles in more detail in order to understand the areas in which conflict may be experienced when implementing these
two principles of international law. This paper aims at analyzing the principles of territorial integrity and self determination in more detail as well as
establishing circumstances under which the two principles may come into conflict. The paper will also assess which of the principles is more important
when applying international politics as well as the benefits and weaknesses of both principles. The discussed issues will be summarized at the end.
Principle of territorial integrity
The principle of territorial integrity as discussed states that countries should avoid promoting border changes or secessionist movements in other
countries. This principle was developed many centuries ago due to the belief that intruding into another territory is an act of aggression which justifies
war. Many wars including the First and Second World War have been fought as a result of applying the territorial integrity principle. The adoption of the
UN charter by countries supported territorial integrity.
Benefits of principle
One benefit of the territorial integrity principle is that it seeks to protect states from acts of aggression by other states. The territorial integrity protects
the borders of states from external aggression acts by other states, and in doing so; the people within such territories are protected (Annalisa 44-48). This
principle also upholds the sovereign nature of states and prevents interference from external parties or states.
Weaknesses of principle
There are various weaknesses of the principle of territorial integrity. One weakness of this principle is that it is seen to prevent the evolution of states.
States are dynamic and they have a lifecycle which begins and ends over time. The principle of territorial integrity is seen to ignore this view and it
pushes for a fixed position on the territories of states. As a result, many states go into war when their territories are invaded instead of seeking mutual
solutions to problems which face them. The principle of territorial integrity has been seen to cause many past and present wars which may have been
avoided if the principle was implemented in a peaceful and dynamic manner (Spielvogel 17-22).
Principle of national self-determination
As earlier discussed, this principle is seeks to empower countries to freely determine their international politics status and sovereignty without outside
interference. This principle can be traced to the mid-19th Century although past historical events such as the American Revolution are seen as roots of
self determination principle. There are three important theories which are linked to national determination. The realist theory of liberal internationalism
promotes liberty within states and supports abolition of war (Betty 23-28). The realist theory which was applied during the Cold War supports the view
that territorial integrity is more important than self determination. Cosmopolitan liberalism on the other hand supports the shift of political power to a
global government, which would facilitate easy changing of boundaries.
Benefits of principle
One benefit of the self determination principle is that it seeks to promote democracy. This principle advocates for the implementation of the will of the
people without interference from external actors, and this is consistent with modern democracy. This principle is beneficial for modern states which aim
at implementing democracy and implementing the will of people (Elizabeth 192-193).
Weaknesses of principle
One major weakness of the principle of self determination arises from the definitions associated with the principle. The principle uses words such as
“peoples” which have not been defined in international law. In UN resolutions, “peoples” is seen as a territorial unit’s entire population regardless of
differences in characteristics of the population. However, in international law, minorities and other ethnic groups are not recognized as separate peoples.
Conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and self determination
There is a conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and self determination. The self determination principle which advocates for countries to
freely determine their international politics status and sovereignty without outside interference challenges the territorial integrity principle. This is
because states are made legitimate by people, which means that people should be given freedom to choose territorial boundaries and states as they
wish. Self determination therefore conflicts which territorial integrity which advocates for fixed territories among states which should be respected by the
rest of the world to avoid acts of aggression (Danspeckgruber 66-73).
When both principles come into conflict, it is my opinion that the self determination principle should be upheld since it possesses superior qualities to
the territorial integrity principle. The self determination principle empowers states to determine their future through internal decision making as opposed
to external interference. This is a principle which is consistent with democracy which supports decision making by the majority in order to determine the
future of a country. The territorial integrity principle is weaker since it defines territories as a means of determining sovereignty as opposed to the will of
the people. Democracy advocates for the will of the people hence if they decide to change their territory or borders, the will should be respected. The
self determination principle can be seen to be one of the roots of democracy in the modern world.
Summary and conclusion
The self determination and territorial integrity principles have been evaluated in detail. Both principles are important when defining international politics
and law. The principle of self determination explains that countries have the right to freely determine their international politics status and sovereignty
without outside or external interference, while the principle of territorial integrity on the other hand explains that countries should avoid promoting
border changes or secessionist movements in other countries. There are various weaknesses and benefits of both laws and these have been discussed in
detail.
However, there is clear conflict in the application of the two principles since the self determination principle may override the territorial integrity principle
as long as it is the will of the people. In the case of conflict between the two principles, it is my opinion that the self determination principle should
prevail since it promotes democracy among states. In conclusion, the UN and international community should address these two principles in order to
prevent the conflict of interest and ambiguity especially when it comes to definitions of terms relating to them.

Back in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a public pledge not to “militarize” disputed land features in the South China Sea. Three years on, what

we are witnessing is nothing short of “militarization on steroids” across the whole area.

By all indications, China is already on the verge of establishing a full-fledged exclusion zone across the South China Sea. It’s not a matter of if but when.

The strategic implications couldn’t be any more self-evident.

President Rodrigo Duterte’s rapprochement with the Asian powerhouse hasn’t tamed China’s maritime and territorial appetite in the West Philippine Sea.

If anything, the past two years have only seen acceleration in Chinese reclamation and militarization activities.

China’s unilateral challenge to the maritime status quo in Asia is expected to feature prominently in the upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in

Singapore from June 1 to 3, an annual gathering of world leaders and defense ministers from across the region. The event aims to promote a “rules-

based” order in the Asia-Pacific region in light of China’s revanchism.

The Philippines can, at the very least, try to resist such deleterious development through diplomatic protests, re-assertion of its rights based on

international law, and mobilization of allies and partners across the region.

Anyone familiar with Beijing’s foreign policy knows that, contrary to Duterte’s claims, China is the last country that would resort to war in the South China

Sea.

After all, any armed conflict would provide a perfect excuse for America and other global powers to step in; enrage and alienate other smaller claimant

states and push them into the West’s strategic embrace; and, crucially, endanger China’s trade linkages, much of which passes through the South China

Sea and the Strait of Malacca.

Above all, China would torpedo its bid for regional leadership if it launches a brutal war against a far weaker neighbor such as the Philippines. China

understands that leadership is based on authority, which is determined by legitimacy rather than brute force alone.

This is precisely why all key Southeast Asian states, ranging from Vietnam to Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have expressed, in varying degrees, their

dismay over the militarization of the disputes.

All these countries have made it clear that they will take necessary actions to defend their interests in the area. It’s time for the Philippines to abandon its

self-imposed strategic silence on the South China Sea.

WEAPONIZING ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

Earlier this month, China made the unprecedented move of deploying nuclear-capable H-6k bombers to disputed land features in the South China Sea.

According to the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the giant aircraft undertook exercises “to conduct takeoff and landing training on islands and

reefs in the South China Sea in order to improve our ability to ‘reach all [Chinese] territory, conduct strikes at any time and strike in all directions.’”

The exact location of the drills is yet to be confirmed, but the Woody Island in the Paracels, a group of islets also claimed by Vietnam, seems the likeliest

candidate. Though the Philippines has no direct claim in the Paracels, which doesn’t fall within the West Philippine Sea (our Exclusive Economic Zone and

continental shelf), it has no reason for complacency.

To put things into perspective, the Chinese bombers are capable of conducting nuclear strikes against adversaries and, even more worryingly, have an

operational range of more than 10,000 nautical miles. That places the entire Philippines within the range of Chinese bombers, which will likely be also

deployed to the Spratlys (Kalayaan islands) in near future.

In the past few months, China has reportedly installed radar and electronic jamming equipment on Philippine-claimed land features; deployed YJ-12B

anti-cruise ballistic missiles (ACBMs) as well as HQ-9B surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) to the Spratlys; and conducted its largest-ever military drills in the

South China Sea.

Steadily but surely, China has laid down all the foundational elements of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ): namely, large-scale airstrips, missile

defense systems, deployment of combat aircrafts, regular war games, and artificially augmented islands capable of hosting large numbers of military

personnel in the middle of the high seas.

Filipino troops and citizens spread across Spratlys, particularly in Thitu (Pag-Asa) Island, largely rely on food and water provision from mainland

Philippines. Soon, China will be in a position to fully restrict, if not cut off, the supply lines of other claimant states, including the Philippines.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

Even the simple threat of a complete supply-line choke-off could intimate and discourage our continued presence in the area. On the ground, what

matters the most is continuous and effective exercise of sovereignty. China’s weaponization of its artificial islands makes that increasingly impossible for

us.

Overtime, China would determine the extent of freedom of navigation and overflight, both civilian and military, for other nations’ assets passing through

the South China Sea.

This is precisely why the Philippine government should, at the very least, consistently express its discontent over such overt challenge to our maritime

sovereign rights as well as international law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Instead of downplaying developments in the area, Duterte should make it clear to Beijing that any challenge to our territorial and maritime integrity

wouldn’t be costless.

After all, the Philippines can revamp security cooperation with like-minded friends and allies, including America, Japan, Australia, India, Britain, France,

and key members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The government should also leverage our unequivocal legal victory at The Hague against China based on principles of international law.

Gladly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has made it clear that they “will not renege on our beholden constitutional duties to protect our

sovereignty and maintain our territorial areas [in South China Sea].” Hopefully, our civilian leadership will build on the courage and patriotism of our

brave soldiers.

Dissecting Duterte’s
amped-up West Philippine Sea rhetoric
President Rodrigo Duterte's stronger words on the sea dispute so far revolve around one specific part of the West Philippine Sea – Pag-asa Island. Here's
why it's special to him.PRIL 26, 2019
Published 4:00 PM, April 26, 2019
Updated 5:52 PM, April 26, 2019

MANILA, Philippines – Observers are abuzz with what some describe as a change in tune in Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s rhetoric towards
China’s actions in the West Philippine Sea.

From his usual placating tone, he has threatened to send Filipino soldiers on a “suicide mission” to protect an island that had been swarmed by Chinese
ships over several months.

“The Pag-asa Island belongs to us…Hindi ako papayag kung pati Pag-asa i-occupy nila(I won’t allow it if they occupy even Pag-asa),” said Duterte on
April 4, from Puerto Princesa City in Palawan.

What could be behind the strong words? And what’s prompting Duterte to speak in such a tone now?

There are key things to note about Duterte’s recent West Philippine Sea remarks. First, they revolve around one specific part of the West Philippine Sea –
Pag-asa Island (known as Thitu internationally).

When Duterte brought up the maritime dispute with Xi during their meeting on Thursday, April 25, it was Pag-asa Island he mentioned specifically.

The last time Duterte seriously ruffled Chinese feathers was in April 2017, and it also had to do with Pag-asa.
Back then, he had ordered the military to fortify Pag-asa Island, and all Philippine-held islands in the West Philippine Sea.

In the same speech (notably also delivered in Puerto Princesa, a boat ride away from Pag-asa), Duterte said he would even visit Pag-asa Island on
Philippine Independence Day. The Chinese were not happy, prompting Duterte to renege on the promise a few days later.

But he didn't stop there. He allowed Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana to make the visit, which China tried to stop too. Feet planted firmly on land
China claims is theirs, Lorenzana and Filipino soldiers sang the Philippine national anthem proudly.

Clearly, when it comes to Pag-asa, Duterte takes a tougher stance.

Pag-asa vs Panatag

One just needs to compare his vow to protect Pag-asa with his defeatism when it comes to that other famous West Philippine Sea feature, Panatag
(Scarborough) Shoal.

“We cannot stop China from doing [these] things,” said Duterte when asked what he would do about a Chinese mayor’s plan to put up a environmental
monitoring station on the shoal.

He had also once said: "Huwag na muna natin pakialaman 'yang Scarborough [Shoal] kasi hindi natin kaya eh. Magalit man tayo, hangin lang.”

(Let's not dwell on Scarborough Shoal because we don't have the capabilities. Even if we express anger, it will just amount to nothing.)

Compare this to how he reacted when China blasted as "illegal" the repairs he ordered on Pag-asa Island facilities.

"That's part of our duty as a nation," Duterte parried in 2017, even advising China to just "look away." In the same breath, he reminded China that
Filipinos have occupied Pag-asa since 1974.

So while Duterte's recent declarations on the sea dispute are stronger than usual, they are actually consistent with his previous remarks specifically about
Pag-asa.

Why is Pag-asa worth making uncompromising statements for? Pag-asa has something that Panatag Shoal, Mischief Reef, Ayungin Shoal, and other
talked-about features don’t – a commnunity of Filipino civilians actually living on it.

Pag-asa is home to around a hundred civilian Filipinos. It has a municipal hall and health center. While China believes the island belongs to them, so far
the Philippines has managed to hold on to it, and Duterte wants to keep it that way.

Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra, who was a high-ranking official in Malacañang at the time Duterte ordered Pag-asa Island repairs, said the President
differentiates the island from other parts of the West Philippine Sea.

Duterte appears to adopt a “more flexible approach” when it comes to features where the Philippines’ exclusive rights to use resources is the main issue,
the Cabinet member told Rappler.

“But when we speak of Pag-asa Island, which is actually occupied by a Filipino community, we are treading on issues of territory and security,” said
Guevarra.

“The President’s tough stance in this regard indicates that his clear priority is on human lives and territorial integrity, which, unlike fishing rights and
other economic privileges, are non-negotiable,” he added.

This way of thinking may not sit well with maritime law experts. All islands and features within the West Philippine Sea deserve to be protected with the
same tough rhetoric, whether occupied or not, because any encroachment violates the country’s sovereign rights.

But Duterte may not think this way. Occupation of Pag-asa by the Chinese crosses one of his red lines: physical harm to Filipinos.

“I assure you, if they kill or arrest people there who are Filipino then that would be the time when we would decide on what to do,” he had said on April
4.

So why deliver such strong remarks against China over Pag-asa now?

Days earlier, the military’s Western Command (Wescom) reported the presence of 275 Chinese ships near Pag-asa Island from January to March this year.

They recorded over 600 incidents of trespassing during these months. The Department of Foreign Affairs slammed them as part of China’s “swarming”
tactics.

The presence of Chinese ships around the island began escalating as the Philippines started repairs of Pag-asa facilities, specifically a beaching ramp that
is supposed to enable the delivery of construction materials and equipment needed to upgrade, among others, a dilapidated runway.

The beaching ramp was supposed to be finished in early 2019, Lorenzana had said.

But Philippine Ambassador to China Chito Sta Romana doesn’t think the Chinese ships mean to invade Pag-asa Island. So far, they have not intercepted
any supply lines to the island, a crucial area of agreement between Beijing and the Duterte administration.

“The areas of agreement are the access lines, the supply lines. You know, that’s why we’re able to continue our construction in Pag-asa, and there has
been no effort [to intercept]. If there is any interdiction, that would be a major issue,” he told reporters on Wednesday, April 24, in Beijing.

So why are the Chinese ships there?

“They’re watching Sandy Cay,” said Sta Romana.

The Sandy Cay element

Sandy Cay is a string of sandbars only 3 nautical miles from Pag-asa Island. It’s in the middle of the island and Subi (Zamora) Reef, which China has
turned into an artificial island with military capability.
Why is Sandy Cay special to China? Sandy Cay is a naturally-formed feature that only recently became permanently visible above the water surface.
Previously, it could only be seen during low tide but deposits from China’s illegal dredging in Subi Reef elevated it in 2017.

China covets Sandy Cay because it could generate a new 12-nautical-mile swathe of territorial waters, said Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice
Antonio Carpio.

Because Subi Reef lies within that 12-nm area, China, by controlling Sandy Cay, would legitimize its claim over their man-made island.

But do you hear Duterte threatening suicide missions to protect Sandy Cay? Quite the opposite.

When Chinese ships were spotted near it back in August 2017, Duterte retorted, “Why should I defend a sandbar and kill the Filipinos because of a
sandbar?”

That month, when the military tried to construct a nipa hut on Sandy Cay as “shelter” for Filipino fishermen, Duterte called it off, citing an agreement with
China that neither side build anything on the sandbars.

If Duterte feels he can afford to be softer on China when it comes to their island-building, he draws the line when it comes to physical harm to Filipinos.

This could explain his other strong remarks against China in the past – his appeal to them to “temper” their radio warnings to Filipino Air Force pilots and
his serious concern over the safety of Navy soldiers harassed by a Chinese chopper on the way to Ayungin Shoal.
Elections, U.S. promise

Other factors that make Duterte’s strong remarks on Pag-asa Island significant is that they were made weeks before the May 13 elections and after US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo affirmed that America would act on China aggression in the West Philippine Sea.

Surveys show most Filipinos don’t agree with Duterte’s soft stance on the West Philippine Sea and don’t trust China as much as the US and Japan.

Though Duterte remains popular despite his accomodation of China, he knows the opposition capitalize on the unpopularity of his foreign policy.

He’s labelled ex-foreign secretary Albert del Rosario as among the “yellows,” his term for the Liberal Party which is fielding its own senatorial candidates.

Undoubtedly, Duterte’s amped-up rhetoric looks good on his senatorial bets who can use it to fend off questions about the administration’s pandering
to China.

Could Duterte and the government be gaining confidence to stand up to China from the US’ affirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty last March?

South China Sea expert Gregory Poling said Pompeo's words are a "clear deterrent"for the Chinese as it sends a message that "violence against Pag-asa
(Island) or the (BRP) Sierra Madre (stationed in Ayungin Shoal), for instance, would result in a US response."

Lorenzana gave a rather underwhelming reaction to Pompeo’s remarks.

“He just reiterated what is in the treaty. Nothing of new import,” he had told Rappler back then.

But there’s another question underlying all of Duterte’s surprising public declarations. Does he mean it or is he bluffing?

“From my past experience with him, his position, his public position, you know, that’s what he states also in his discussion,” said Sta Romana.
Duterte government’s red lines

Will Duterte step up his rhetoric against China when it comes to other West Philippine Sea features, like Panatag Shoal?

He might, given that his administration's other red lines specifically involve such features. Bilateral talks between Filipino and Chinese diplomats have led
to key agreements that, if violated, could draw a response from the Chief Executive.

According to Sta Romana, who participates in these talks, these crucial agreements are:

 No building on Scarborough Shoal

 Allow Filipino and Chinese fishermen to fish in Scarborough Shoal
 No obstruction of supply and access lines to Pag-asa Island
 No construction or occupation of “new” features like Sandy Cay

The Philippines and China have agreed to these 4, which is why China has not begun reclamation in Scarborough Shoal, why the Philippines continues
construction on Pag-asa Island, and why the Philippines stopped building a nipa hut on Sandy Cay.

But the situation in Pag-asa and Sandy Cay is tense because of their proximity to Subi Reef, where China paramilitary ships have congregated and
Chinese military planes have landed.

Once a lowly reef, Subi is now an island outfitted with runways, lighthouses, radomes, hangars, and communication facilities. Residents of Pag-asa Island
can see the structures on Subi Reef with a naked eye.

“We are occupying one area (Pag-asa Island) and they’re occupying the other feature (Subi Reef) and they are very close to each other and in between is
the Sandy Cay. This is really the root of this issue right now,” said Sta Romana.

Duterte and Xi have agreed for their country's diplomats to talk it out. Rappler got no response from Presidential Spokesman Salvador Panelo and
Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana when we asked if Duterte asked Xi to order Chinese ships to increase their distance from the island.

The vague Palace statement about the meeting also did not mention if Duterte brought up the 2016 Hague ruling, which struck down China’s claim to
the West Philippine Sea, including Pag-asa Island.
Some say the ruling could be a powerful galvanizing force for other countries against China – only if the Philippines would use it. Rather than involve the
international community though, the Duterte government prefers to dialogue directly with China.
Senators signal support for joint sea exploration

Senators on Wednesday signaled their support for a possible joint exploration with China in disputed areas bordering the West Philippine Sea as the
government continues to search for alternatives to the Malampaya gas field in Palawan.

In separate interviews, the senators also kept the door open to such joint explorations in resource-rich areas well within the Philippine exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).

Senators issued their pronouncements even as concern was raised anew over reports that Chinese military transport planes were spotted landing on a
China-built facility in the Philippines’s Panganiban Reef.

Asked if senators would back joint exploration with China in the disputed areas, or even within the Philippines EEZ, Senate President Pro Tempore Ralph
G. Recto said he would, provided that such arrangement complies with the Philippine Constitution.

“If they could figure out a way to make it constitutional,” Recto replied, citing, for instance, that “Malampaya is joint exploration or joint venture of some
sort.”

The Malampaya joint venture is led by global oil giant Shell and has accounted for a sizeable share of the country’s energy requirements.

Sen. Gregorio B. Honasan, who chairs the Senate’s Defense and Security Committee, also affirmed support for similar economic arrangement “to avert
war tensions or low-intensity conflict.”

“Yes,” Honasan said in reply to the BusinessMirror’s query. “As long as our foreign economic security policies are clear, we are able to use our bilateral
multilateral engagements—Asean, MDT, VFA, Edca—as leverage, it does not violate core principles of our Constitution,” he added referring to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Mutual Defense Treaty, Visiting Forces Agreement and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Honasan added: “Also to trade space for time, to buy time for us to put our house in order fix our backyard, reduce the partisan political noise, unite and
rally behind the Flag and attend to the real, more serious problems the nation is confronting.”

Sen. Francis N. Pangilinan pointed out, however, this “can only be done via service contracts of the government with foreign private corporations, as
allowed/limited by the Constitution, which must still comply with procurement laws.

At the same time, Pangilinan stressed that “proponents must be qualified, undergo transparent process, and decision must be based on clear criteria.”

Sen. Juan Edgardo M. Angara affirmed inclination to support the option “so long as any such agreements for joint exploration will abide by
constitutional guidelines and so long as these are mutually beneficial and not one-sided.”

Angara also acknowledged that “cooperation can be a favorable alternative to having these resources lie idle.”

Diplomatic protest

Rep. Gary Alejano of Magdalo and Rep. Carlos Isagani Zarate of Bayan Muna on Wednesday urged to file a diplomatic protest against China following its
“continued militarization” of the West Philippine Sea.

Alejano and Zarate made separate statements after two Chinese military transport planes have been photographed on Panganiban Reef, marking the
first reported presence of this type of aircraft in Philippine territory in the South China Sea (SCS) and raising the prospect that China will base warplanes
there.

“The Chinese did not reclaim Mischief Reef for nothing. The construction of a military grade airstrip there is not for display only,” Alejano said. “It is a
matter of time before the Chinese deploy their fighter aircrafts in their reclaimed islands as part of their strategic objective of controlling SCS.”

The lawmaker added the Philippines must “continuously and persistently” call out such move that destabilizes the region.

“We should not be deceived by China’s pronouncements that it will not militarize SCS. I am hoping that President Duterte will file a diplomatic protest
this time around,” Alejano said.

Zarate said the presence of Chinese military aircrafts in Panganiban Reef is a “clear violation” of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.
“This move of China is a clear violation of the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague and is a way of asserting its contempt of the
court as well as its dominance in the area,” he added.

“The Duterte administration should be taken to task for not doing anything on this blatant violation of our sovereignty. The Philippine government
should not take this sitting down,” he said.

Panganiban Reef—internationally known as Mischief Reef —is located within the Philippines’s 370-kilometer EEZ in the South China Sea. The waters
within this zone are known locally as West Philippine Sea.

“Based on media reports, surveillance images taken on January 6, showed two Xian Y-7 military transport planes 20 meters to 50 meters apart on the
ramp near Runway 21 on Panganiban, one of seven reefs in the Spratlys that China has transformed into artificial islands with military capabilities,” he
said.

“China is obviously flexing its military muscle and endangering the fragile peace in the West Philippine Sea. This is highly condemnable and the
Philippines should protest this provocative Chinese action,” Zarate added.
Commentary: Time for a new Philippine strategy toward China
Mark Manantan (Philstar.com) - April 22, 2019 - 2:32pm
Not even a powerful president like Duterte can prevent China from altering the status quo. So, what’s the plan?
In his most provocative statement yet, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte urged China to stay away from a Philippine-controlled island in the South
China Sea: “I am asking you, I will not plead or beg, but I’m just telling you, lay off the Pag-asa because I have soldiers there. And if you lay a finger on
them, it’s another story. I will tell my soldiers, prepare for a suicide mission.”
Known for his pro-China overtures, Duterte’s warning came as a shock. Since assuming power in 2016, Duterte launched a radical shift on the Philippines’
South China Sea policy — downplaying a favorable 2016 arbitration ruling, threatening to scrap joint maritime patrols with the United States,
and pursuing joint oil and gas exploration. Manila cozied up to Beijing amid overlapping territorial claims. Acting out of sheer pragmatism, Duterte
aimed to strike a compromise with Xi Jinping’s government rather than embroil the Philippines in war against the growing military power.
Yet China recently crossed the line in Duterte’s view. Following the report from the Philippine Western Command on the sustained presence of 275
Chinese maritime militia vessels since January, Duterte warned: “Let us be friends, but do not touch Pag-asa Island, otherwise, things would be different,”
he said.
The ongoing saga of Chinese behavior in the South China Sea now puts into question the legitimacy of Duterte’s conciliatory approach toward China.
Amid the Duterte administration’s “pivot,” China’s hardline resolve to gradually control the contested seas persisted.
In fact, Duterte’s “pivot” legitimized exaggerated Chinese claims over the South China Sea. It signified a green light for China to fast track its reclamation
activities and installation of anti-cruise ship missiles, surface-to-air missile systems and electronic jamming equipment in the Spratly Islands, just to name
a few developments.
Thus, with the increasing deployment of China’s grey zone tactics and doubts over the actual economic benefits of a closer Sino-Philippine relations, the
question looms: Is it time for the Philippines to re-engineer its approach toward China?
The pressure is palpable for the Philippine government to retrofit its Duterte-centric approach in the South China Sea. The urgency of the matter is
critical based on two developments in domestic politics, which the Duterte government has always considered peripheral in dealing with the South China
Sea issue.
1. The voice of the Filipino people
In a recent survey conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS), 44 percent of Filipinos, a sizable plurality, doubt the good intentions of China toward
the Philippines. Based on a previous poll published in November 2018, 87 percent of Filipinos stressed that the government must regain control over the
shoals and islands it rightfully claims in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.
In the same poll, 86 percent of respondents urged the government to strengthen the Philippine Navy’s capability to deter Chinese intrusion over the
West Philippine Sea, while 71 percent urged the Duterte government to bring the issue to multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The figures are consistent yet the Duterte government continues to adopt a zero-sum game attitude, branding the Philippines ill-equipped to wage war
against China, despite having feasible policy options to assert its right in the contested waters.
2. The ICC Complaint
Meanwhile, an International Criminal Court communication filed by former Philippine top diplomat Albert Del Rosario and former anti-graft chief
Conchita Carpio Morales against Chinese President Xi Jinping seeks to hold Xi accountable for crimes against humanity, described as the “most massive,
near permanent and devastating destruction of the environment in humanity’s history” that affected present and future generations of people across
nations.
The ICC complaint gained support from a few senators and Vice President Leni Robredo lauded the effort as “patriotic.”
Upon lodging the complaint, critics have been quick to point that no progress is likely, given China’s non-membership to the Rome statute. But beyond
the viability of the case, it underpins a “shame diplomacy” tactic. It tacitly rallies international support for the Philippines and underscores that members
of the domestic political sphere, represented by former bureaucrats, are devising ways to highlight the problematic aspects of the Duterte government’s
appeasement of China.
Following the reported swarming incident at Pag-asa Island, the Department of Foreign Affairs released an official statement calling the presence of
Chinese militias illegal.
Although a diplomatic protest is yet to be seen, the statement reverberated with a loud message: China must respect Philippine sovereignty and abide by
the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Conclusion
It still remains to be proven if Duterte’s latest warning against China will have any serious ramifications on the country’s current stance on the South
China Sea. As midterm elections draw near, China is a controversial topic in electoral debates, with a staggering 89 percent of Filipinos aware of the issue.
Thus, the timing of Duterte’s statement as well as recent developments regarding China in the domestic political sphere could either be serendipitous or
strategic to win votes in the coming election.
Known for flip-flopping, Duterte might be spotted in a campaign sortie in the coming days recalling his provocative statement and using his “it was just a
joke” excuse yet again to explain controversial remarks.
One thing is certain, though. Duterte is now seeing the drawback of his appeasement toward China. The cracks are appearing, making the obvious clear:
Not even a powerful president like Duterte can prevent China from altering the status quo.
Duterte stresses Philippines not equipped to wage war with China
Alexis Romero (Philstar.com) - March 10, 2019 - 7:26pm
MANILA, Philippines — President Rodrigo Duterte stressed that the Philippines could not afford to go to war with China, days after a US official assured
him Washington would protect Manila if its forces are attacked in the disputed West Philippine (South China) Sea.
Duterte said an armed conflict with China would result in a "massacre" of Filipino troops because Beijing has "plenty of good quality weapons."
"If we go to war against China, I would lose all my soldiers just as they are leaving for the war. It will be a massacre. We don’t have the capacity to fight
them," the president said during the distribution of land ownership certificates in Negros Occidental last Friday.
"Now that they are rich country, they have plenty of good quality weapons, and China has improved a lot because many jobs have been generated by
the construction and the planning behind making China more beautiful. But for many years, they were ordered by their president to keep on creating
guns," he added.
Duterte said unlike China, which has the financial capability to invest in weapons, the Philippines' budget is being spent for education and teachers'
wages.
"They have money. They have weapons that we can’t compare ours with if we ever go to war. I would lose all of my police and soldiers in just one day.
I’m not saying that I am scared. But what about my two wives and four girlfriends? They won’t have anything," he added.
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan are embroiled in a dispute over the South China Sea, where an estimated $5 trillion worth of
goods passes through every year.
In 2013, the Philippines, whose military capability is one of the weakest in the region, challenged what it described as China's "exaggerated" maritime
claims before an international court. A Hague-based arbitral tribunal voided China's claims in 2016 but the Chinese government refused to recognize the
ruling, calling it "illegal since day one."
Late last month, US State Secretary Mike Pompeo assured Duterte Washington is ready to fulfill its treaty obligations and to defend the Philippines if its
troops are attacked in the South China Sea.
Duterte has welcomed the assurance but has expressed reservations on the processes that require the nod of America's Congress. He noted that the US
government has to secure the approval of its Congress before it can declare war.
Does the Philippines have limited options on the South China Sea issue?
Patricia Lourdes Viray (Philstar.com) - May 23, 2018 - 4:40pm
MANILA, Philippines — President Rodrigo Duterte keeps on insisting that taking a stronger stance on against China's militarization in the South China
Sea would mean going to war.
Justifying his administration's soft stance on the maritime dispute, Duterte said that he would have taken a stronger and more "violent" position on the
matter but that would "probably be a great loss to the nation and probably end up losing a war."
As opposed to the president's pronouncements, the Philippines' options are not limited to waging a war to resolve the dispute.
The Philippines actually has legal, diplomatic and security policy options following the July 2016 ruling of a United Nations-backed tribunal on the Sout
China Sea, according to an April 2017 report titled "South China Sea Lawfare: Post-Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects."
Legal policy options
Jay Batongbacal, director of the University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, said that the use of armed force in settling
the disputes is out of the question.
Following the issuance of the arbitral ruling, the Philippines has legal policy options related to the entrenchment of legal positions on entitlements, rights
and delimitation, re-engagement with China on legal positions and engagement with other claimants and the ASEAN on the same basis.
"Therefore, its only policy framework for addressing and eventually resolving the South China Sea disputes must be based on the peaceful modes of
dispute settlement enumerated in the Charter of the United Nations and Part XV of UNCLOS," Batongbacal said in his article in the report.
Batongbacal also opened the possibility of China changing its position on the arbitral ruling under the circumstances of "a transactional exchange of
legal rights for economic benefits or an accommodation coerced through unilateral actions."
Re-engaging with China on the basis of legal positions would give the Philippines two tracks — re-engaging and improving bilateral ties and the
possibility of another round of unilateral actions and escalating the sea row.
"These options present the best suitable means for the Philippines to protect and preserve its exclusive rights and interests in its EEZ and continental
shelf, while at the same time, leaving the doors open to possible joint cooperation related to shared interests in the remaining disputed areas comprised
of 12-nautical mile territorial sea enclaves around all the high-tide elevations in the Spratly Islands area," Batongbacal said.
Engaging with other claimant states such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei would result to a clear and common position derived from the arbitral
decision, despite China's refusal to acknowledge the landmark ruling.
As such, the award could be a basis for a unified regional position on maritime rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian
countries, Batongbacal said.
"In summary, the Award has provided the Philippines with very strong legal leverage that can be used in its bilateral relations and discussions with China
and in multilateral relations with other parties both within and beyond the region," the maritime law expert said.
So far, the Philippines has started a bilateral consultation mechanism with China on the South China Sea while negotiations on a legally binding code of
conduct are ongoing with the ASEAN.
Diplomatic policy options
The Duterte administration departed from the Aquino administration's confrontational strategy when it opted to set aside the arbitral ruling and chose to
directly engage with China instead.
Policy analyst Richard Heydarian suggested that the primary diplomatic option would be to engage with China rather than confront it.
"Instead of leading to further confrontation between the (Philippines) and (China), the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings has actually enhanced their
resolve to bridge their differences through diplomacy, leading to a decline in tensions in the South China Sea," Heydarian said in the "South China Sea
Lawfare" report.
He suggested that a joint fisheries agreement in the Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing continues to control, would be a "game-changing" compromise.
Given that the Duterte administration prefers avoiding conflict, a mutually satisfactory agreement would move closer to the renormalization of ties
between the two countries, according to Heydarian.
"Much of this has to do with the Duterte administration’s pragmatic foreign policy outlook and the realization that translating de jure victory into de
facto gains requires careful and deliberate diplomacy," he said.
US-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), meanwhile, suggests that a mediation from ASEAN or a neutral party such as Singapore, would
be possible in case of conflict in the area.
"Parties could also call for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to negotiate a cease-fire, although China’s permanent seat on the Council
could limit the effectiveness of this option," the think tank said.
Security policy options
Rommel Banlaoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, said that the South China Sea dispute is not only a legal
issue but also a security issue which requires security responses.
"Aware of the aforementioned security implications and the current security situation in the post-arbitration South China Sea, the Philippine government
is now pursuing several key policy options, including rethinking its security alliance with the US, strengthening its strategic partnerships with Japan and
Australia, promoting strategic cooperation with ASEAN members, and engaging China constructively in functional areas and on non-traditional security
issues," Banlaoi said.
While the arbitral award gave the Philippines legal victory, the ruling also had security implications such as the protection of Filipino fishermen in
Scarborough Shoal, securing the country's gas and oil exploration projects in Reed Bank and ensuring the safety of Filipino troops in the Kalayaan Island
Group.
Think tank CFR also suggested that military-to-military communication would reduce the escalation of conflict over the South China Sea.
"Communication mechanisms like military hotlines to manage maritime emergencies, similar to the ones set up by China and Japan, China and Vietnam,
and China and ASEAN, could be established among all claimants," the CFR said.
In case conflict involving the Philippines would arise, the United States would be obligated to consider military action under the Mutual Defense Treaty.
The think tank, however, noted that Washington's defense commitment to Tokyo is stronger than its commitment to Manila.
"Under its treaty obligations, the United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the US-Philippine treaty holds both nations
accountable for mutual support in the event of an 'armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties,'" the CFR said.
The US has been openly calling out China's expansive reclamation activities and has conducted freedom of navigation operations in the contested
waterway to display its military might.
The Philippines’ shifting stance towards the South China Sea dispute

Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte has been known for its conciliatory approach towards China in relation to the South China Sea dispute, preferring

to engage with Beijing as close trade and investment partner rather than a threat to its sovereignty. However, recent Chinese activities in the Spratly

Islands are putting this stance into question.

Duterte’s “pivot to China”

In 2016, The Philippines won an international arbitration case against China over the South China Sea, which holds important untapped oil and gas

reserves. However, China did not recognise the ruling and continued transforming reefs into artificial islands and expanding its military installations in the

maritime zone.

After he came to power, president Duterte put aside the arbitration ruling in order to improve relations with China. Seeking a commercial alliance with

Beijing, he opened up the country to Chinese workers and infrastructure investments. In his first trip to Beijing in October 2016, Duterte reaped US$24

billion in deals. Both countries also agreed on advancing their cooperation for a joint exploration of the South China Sea energetic resources.

The president also began to question the adequacy of the US-Philippines alliance. In 2016, he expressed his wish of having a “separation” from the US

and declared his intention of having US troops out of the country. This marked a shift in the foreign policy stand of Manila.

Troubled waters are raising domestic tides

Despite the warming of ties with China, Beijing hasn’t ceased its expansion efforts at the South China Sea. Moreover, recent developments have been

restoring the tension between both countries. Since the beginning of the year, Philippines patrols have reported the sighting of over 200 Chinese vessels

near Thitu Island, in the Spratly archipelago. The island holds Filipino soldiers and civilians, and China has strongly opposed Manila activity in this area.
Duterte’s administration has faced domestic criticism denouncing his soft stance in the maritime issue and his inclination to strengthen economic ties

with Beijing. On April 9, protesters marched towards the Chinese embassy in Manila to demonstrate against Chinese presence in the South China Sea and

its increasing economic influence in the country. In a poll from September last year, 87 percent of respondents said that the Philippines should regain

control of islands and shoals it claims in the disputed waters.

In response to the vessels sightings, the Department of Foreign Affairs said that their presence was “a clear violation of Philippine sovereignty”. Duterte

also asked China to “lay off” the island and threatened to deploy soldiers otherwise. On April 2, Philippines presidential spokesman Salvador

Panelo said that the government could raise the 2016 arbitration ruling if bilateral negotiations fail to bring a solution. In essence, these declarations

seem to be signalling new adjustments in the Philippines policy towards China.

These moves come ahead of critical midterm elections in May and Duterte’s visit to Beijing later this month. As Duterte’s opponents have

been denouncing the risks of Chinese loans, the issues with illegal Chinese workers, or the president’s ties with a Chinese businessman accused of being

involved in illegal drug trade; his administration is on the lookout of a more stringent approach towards China.

Time for a Philippines-US rapprochement?

Amid these circumstances, the Philippines and the US are engaging in more efforts to improve their ties and increasing their joint military drills. In a

recent visit to Manila, the US secretary of state Mike Pompeo appealed to the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) between both countries to assert the US

commitment to assist the Philippines in case of armed attack on its vessels or aircraft. Pompeo also declared that the Chinese military and island

development activity threatens the “sovereignty, security and therefore economic livelihood” of the Philippines and the US.

His visit came two months after Delfin Lorenzana, Philippines defence secretary, recognized the need to review the treaty to address the lack of concrete

commitment from the US in the South China Sea scenario. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the treaty has long been unsatisfactory for

Manila, because of its vagueness in covering disputed territories. Whereas it is not clear if the US would intervene in case of being attacked in the South

China Sea, the Philippines would be involved automatically if US vessels were to trigger a crisis situation.

Adjusting to a foreign policy challenge

Despite having been one of the most belligerent ASEAN countries towards China in the past, the Philippines are unlikely to take steps that could damage

stability. Even if the recent events have made Duterte to slightly deviated from his non-confrontational stance towards China, the president’s priority

remains to maintain a pragmatic approach in order to pursue beneficial trade, investment, and infrastructure deals with China.

Therefore, his administration will try to address the dispute through bilateral ways, in opposition to international arbitration. As jointly agreed by both

countries last November, Manila will adhere to the consensus of exercising self-restraint to prevent an escalation of the territorial dispute. The recent

statements from the government seem to serve more as a tactic to gain public trust from citizens ahead of the midterm elections rather than as an actual

statement of intent.

However, this won’t be enough to slow down China’s action or to revert public distrust towards Manila’s inaction at sea. These factors are revealing

weaknesses in Duterte´s approach, and they might result in tougher challenges for his administration in the medium term.

Overall, the multiple shifts in the Philippines foreign policy approach have resulted in a very inconsistent track, and we can expect similar changes of

course in the future. This has proven innocuous for regional stability but could prevent Manila from reaping gains from more coherent stances. For

example, if it doesn´t consolidate its ties with the US, Manila might fail to achieve a revision of the MDT on its own terms. As the country faces pressure

from the two global superpowers, appeasing both of them could prove an impossible juggling game.