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Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority
to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police
power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because
it cannot be delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower
the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that
grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
Limbona v. Mangelin
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987,
the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared
null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending
further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot
and academic" because its resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of
Region XII?
Held:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey
the clear mandate on local autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook".
But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a
settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided
a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could
not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side.
For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees;
and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local
Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling
thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic
and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the
exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political
branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case,
the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it
is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
HELD:
NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, aprovisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of
whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce orincrease it further; or 3) to deny
the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section
8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to
the final outcome of the proceeding.
HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which
is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets
and highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of
a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private
respondent’s vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic.
The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The
act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD
1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle
among the imposable penalties
Held :
The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail
nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It
contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a
municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not
preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once
said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units
should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment
of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new
local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called
for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed
and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the
new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their
functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the
power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence
of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems
essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new
Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the
1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan
case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the
plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining
areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite
should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area
for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in
the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste"
attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the
Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in
the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in
that law.