vigiliae christianae 71 (2017) 433-448 Vigiliae

Christianae
brill.com/vc

Enhypostaton: Being “in Another” or Being

“with Another”?—How Chalcedonian Theologians
of the Sixth Century defined the Ontological Status
of Christ’s Human Nature

Dirk Krausmüller
University of Vienna, Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
dkrausmuller@hotmail.com

Abstract

This article focuses on the term enhypostaton. It makes the case that this term was
originally coined in order to express three modes of being: “by itself”, “with another”
and “in another”. The first and third of these modes could not explain the status of the
flesh as a nature, which does not have a hypostasis of its own, since they denoted full-
blown hypostases and mere accidents. By contrast, the second mode was tailored to
the specific case of the human being where soul and body as complete natures come
together to form a single hypostasis, which had traditionally served as a paradigm for
the incarnation.

Keywords

Christology – Chalcedonian Formula – Enhypostaton – Hypostasis – John of Damascus

Introduction

In recent years the concept of enhypostaton has attracted the attention of sev-
eral scholars. Michael Uwe Lang and Carlo Dell’Osso have devoted lengthy
articles to the topic.1 Yet the most important contribution to the discussion

1  M. U. Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church fathers, Protestant orthodoxy and Karl

Barth,” JTS n.s. 49 (1998), 630-57; C. Dell’Osso, “Still on the Concept of Enhypostaton,” Aug. 43
(2003), 63-80.

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is undoubtedly Benjamin Gleede’s monograph The Development of the Term

ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus.2 The second half of this study is
devoted to the Christological discourse of the sixth to eighth centuries. Gleede
discusses in chronological sequence the writings of Chalcedonian theologians,
and in each case analyses two different sets of evidence: definitions of the
term enhypostaton and statements about “enhypostasisation”, that is, the no-
tion that Christ’s human nature gains concrete existence in the hypostasis of
his divine nature. This twofold approach is justified by the fact that at the end
of the Patristic era John of Damascus presents the “enhypostasisation” of the
flesh in the Word as one of the definitions of enhypostaton. However, it is not
without problems. It takes the focus away from other explanations of the term
that are not related to the concept of “enhypostasisation” and it does not give
the reader a clear sense of how these explanations changed over time. The
present article takes a different approach. It focuses exclusively on definitions
of the term enhypostaton; and it seeks to answer two questions: what was the
original form of these definitions and why was the concept of “enhypostasisa-
tion” not regarded as a viable option by earlier theologians?

Enhypostaton as “in Another”—a Later Development

The best starting point for the discussion is a passage in the longer version of
John of Damascus’ treatise Dialectica sive Capita philosophica:

Λέγεται πάλιν ἐνυπόστατον ἡ ὑφ’ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως προσληφθεῖσα φύσις

καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐσχηκυῖα τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Ὅθεν καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου μὴ ὑποστᾶσα
καθ’ ἑαυτὴν μηδὲ πρὸς καιροῦ ῥοπὴν οὐχ ὑπόστασις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνυπόστατόν
ἐστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ὑπέστη προσληφθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ
ταύτην καὶ ἔσχε καὶ ἔχει ὑπόστασιν.3

Enhypostaton is again called the nature that has been assumed by anoth-
er hypostasis and has its existence in it. Therefore the flesh of the Lord,
too, which did not subsist by itself not even for a moment, is not a hypos-
tasis but rather an enhypostaton. For it came to subsist in the hypostasis

2  B. Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus (VCS 113;
Leiden: Brill, 2012).
3  John of Damascus, Dialectica. Recensio fusior, 45, ed. P. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von
Damaskos, 5 vols (PTS 7, 12, 17, 22, 29; Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1969, 1973, 1975, 1981,
1988) I, 110.

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Enhypostaton: being “ in another ” or being “ with another ” ? 435

of the divine Word after it had been assumed by it and it has gained it and
has it as its hypostasis.

In this passage John of Damascus defines enhypostaton as that which gains

concrete existence not in its own hypostasis but “in” another hypostasis into
which it has been assumed. This definition, which explains how the human
flesh relates to the divine Word, had a distinguished afterlife. As “enhypostasia”
it features in Lutheran theological treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.4 However, in the Late Antique theological discourse it was an in-
novation. While the notion that the flesh comes to be in the hypostasis of the
Word is already found in earlier texts, the term enhypostaton itself had never
before been defined in this way.5 In order to understand why this is so we need
to consider a passage in the seventh-century compilation Doctrina Patrum,
which is attributed to Maximus the Confessor:

Φύσις μὲν ἀνυπόστατος οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ μὴν τὸ ἐνυπόστατον ὑπόστασις. ὑπόστασις

γάρ ἐστι πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστὸς καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχον ὕπαρξιν. ἐνυπόστατον δέ
ἐστι τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ μὲν ὅλως οὐχ ὑφιστάμενον, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ θεωρούμενον, ὡς εἶδος
ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις ἢ τὸ σὺν ἄλλῳ διαφόρῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ὅλου τινὸς γένεσιν
συντιθέμενον.6

Nature is not anhypostatos, nor indeed is the enhypostaton hypostasis.

For hypostasis is everything that subsists by itself and has its own exis-
tence whereas enhypostaton is that which does not subsist by itself at all,
but is seen in another as the species in the individuals, or it is that which
is composed with another different one as regards substance so as to be-
come a whole.

This passage distinguishes between three modes of existence: being “by itself”,
being “in another” and being “with another”. The first mode is identified with

4  Lang, “Enhypostaton-Anhypostaton,” passim; Gleede, Development, 1-4.

5  On “enhypostasisation” cf. Gleede, Development, 54, with reference to John the Grammarian,
Apologia Concilii Chalcedonensis, IV, 3, ed. M. Richard, Iohannis Caesariensis presbyteri et
grammatici opera quae supersunt (CCSG 1; Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), 55: οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀλλ’
ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἰδικὴ αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη σάρξ; and Maximus, Epistula 15, PG 90, 560BC: ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δι’
αὐτὸν λαβοῦσα τοῦ εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν.
6  Doctrina patrum, ed. F. Diekamp, Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi. Ein griechisches
Florilegium aus der Wende des siebenten und achten Jahrhunderts (Münster: Aschendorff,
1907), 137.

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hypostasis, which denotes concrete and separate existence, whereas the sec-
ond and third modes are signified by enhypostaton, which lacks these two qual-
ities. When we compare this conceptual framework with the passage in John
of Damascus with which we started the discussion we note two differences:
firstly, being “in another” is not equated with the status of the flesh within the
Word, and secondly, being “with another” is introduced as a further option.
The significance of this addition reveals itself when we turn to a passage in
John’s treatise De natura composita sive Contra acephalos:

Τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον ποτὲ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνει ὡς ἐν ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένην

καὶ αὐθύπαρκτον οὖσαν, ποτὲ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰς σύνθεσιν μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως
συνερχομένων, ὡς ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔχει καὶ σώματος. Καὶ ἡ θεότης τοίνυν καὶ ἡ
ἀνθρωπότης τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνυπόστατός ἐστιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἑκατέρα κοινὴν τὴν μίαν
σύνθετον αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν.7

The term enhypostaton denotes sometimes the substance as being seen

in a hypostasis and being self-existent, and sometimes each of the things
that come together for the composition of one hypostasis, as is the case
with a soul and a body. The divinity, too, then and the humanity of Christ
are enhypostatos, for each has as common his one composite hypostasis.

In this passage enhypostaton is used as a general term that denotes existence in

whichever mode, including the hypostasis.8 Moreover, the framework found
in the Doctrina patrum is truncated: only being “with another” is juxtaposed
with being “by itself”. Most importantly, however, we now learn why the former
option is introduced. It denotes the ontological status of body and soul, which
together form the composite hypostasis of the human being. The human being
then serves as an analogy for the incarnation. There it is the divine and the
human nature that are composed with one another in order to form the hy-
postasis of Christ. This model is radically different from the concept of “enhy-
postasisation” that John of Damascus proposes in his treatise Dialectica sive
Capita philosophica. Now not only the human nature but also the divine nature

7  John of Damascus, De natura composita, 6, ed. Kotter, IV, 50.

8  This use of enhypostaton is already attested in the sixth century, cf. Gleede, Development, 54-55.
It is derived from philosophical definitions of substance, cf. D. Krausmüller, “Aristotelianism
and the Disintegration of the Late Antique Theological Discourse,” in J. Lössl and J. Watt
(eds), Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity. The Alexandrian Commentary
Tradition between Rome and Baghdad (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 151-64, esp. 160-64. However,
there is only a terminological discrepancy. The conceptual framework is the same.

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is defined as enhypostaton. There is no mention of the fact that the Word has
a self-sufficient hypostasis, which has existed from eternity and continues to
exist even after the incarnation.9
That the notion of a composite hypostasis appears in this framework is not
surprising. It is already found in Cyril’s writings and gains an even greater sig-
nificance in the theological discourse of the sixth century when it becomes the
official doctrine of the church.10 Indeed, the threefold distinction that we find
in the Doctrina patrum was already known to authors of the sixth century. In
Anastasius of Antioch’s Dialogue with a Tritheite we read:

Φύσις μὲν οὔκ ἐστιν ἀνυπόστατoς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσις. πᾶν γὰρ ὑπάρχον,
εἴτε καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἴτε σὺν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχoν τὴν ὕπαρξιν, ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστι.11

There is no nature that is anhypostatos since then it would not be a na-

ture. For all that exists, be it that it has its existence by itself or that it has
it with another or that it has it in another, is enhypostaton.

In Anastasius’ text this statement is part of a rather convoluted argument,

which seeks to show that the term enhypostaton is not identical with hypos-
tasis. Anastasius insists that Christ’s human nature is not inexistent but en-
hypostatos but he curiously does then not set out in what sense this nature is
enhypostatos. As a consequence the reader has no clue why the options “with
another” and “in another” are introduced. The most likely explanation for this
oddity is that Anastasius borrowed the threefold distinction from an earlier
source, which he did not quite understand. In this source the option “with an-
other” would already have been exemplified with the composition of soul and
body in the human being and applied to the incarnation.
In the following section, where Anastasius explains why enhypostatos
should not be interpreted as “having its own hypostasis”, an important clarifi-
cation is added:

9  Cf. Gleede, Development, 170, and 154: “In explaining enhypostatos he (sc. Maximus the
Confessor) speaks of insubsistence only with respect to the case of natural hypostatic
realisation, whereas the Christological case is specified as co-existence.” This rules out the
concept of inexistence, which Maximus knows in other contexts, see above note 4. On the
problematic nature of this model cf. Gleede, Development, 170.
10  On composite hypostasis, cf. e.g. A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche,
vol. II.2: Die Kirche von Konstantinopel im 6. Jahrhundert (Freiburg: Herder, 1989), 352-55.
11  Anastasius of Antioch, Dialogue with a Tritheite, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, “Des Patriarchen
Anastasius I. von Antiochien Jerusalemer Streitgepräch mit einem Tritheiten,” Traditio 37
(1981), 103.

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Ἐνυπόστατον οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ὑπάρχον, ὑπόστασις δὲ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ

θεωρούμενον καὶ οὐ σὺν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ … ἐνυπόστατός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ
σώματι ποιότης, οἷον λευκότης ἢ μελανία, ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑποστῆναι οὐ δύναται, οὐ λέγεται ὑπόστασις.12

Enhypostaton then is what exists in whichever way, whereas hyposta-

sis is that which is seen by itself and not with another or in another….
Enhypostaton is also the quality in the body, for example, whiteness or
blackness, for it exists in the body, but since it cannot gain hypostasis by
itself it is not called hypostasis.

Here one meaning of enhypostaton, being “in another”, is explained in con-

tradistinction to the alternative option of being “with another”.13 Anastasius
identifies being “in another” straightforwardly with the ontological status of
accidents, which can only exist in the body as a substrate. This clarification
is undoubtedly taken from the same source that also furnished the threefold
distinction. Indeed, it helps us to understand why being “with another” was
introduced in the first place. At this point we need to turn to a passage in the
treatise De Sectis, which dates to the late sixth century:

Ἰστέον οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἐνυπόστατον ἤτοι ἡ ὑπόστασις δύο σημαίνει· σημαίνει γὰρ
τὸ ἁπλῶς ὄν, καθ’ ὃ σημαινόμενον λέγομεν καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἐνυπόστατα εἰ
καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχουσι τὸ εἶναι· σημαίνει καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὂν ὡς τὰ ἄτομα τῶν
οὐσιῶν.14

One must know that the enhypostaton or the hypostasis has two mean-
ings: for it means being tout court, in which sense we also call the acci-
dents enhypostata even though they have their being in others, it means
also that which is by itself as the individuals of the substances.

12  Anastasius of Antioch, Dialogue with a Tritheite, ed. Uthemann, 104.

13  Gleede, Development, 120, declares that “there can be obviously no question … of a real
approximation of the enhypostaton with the accident.” It is difficult to see how this could
be so since the only example for being “in another” as one meaning of enhypostaton is ac-
cidents. Gleede translates the last sentence as “enhypostatos is also the quality in a body,
like whiteness, blackness and so on, as they exist in the body.” By italicising the words also
and exist he seems to insinuate that there is another meaning of being “in another” from
which the accidents are distinguished. One assumes that this is the concept of “enhypos-
tasisation”. However, there is no reference to this concept in Anastasius’ text.
14  De Sectis, 7 (PG 86.1, 1240CD).

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Enhypostaton: being “ in another ” or being “ with another ” ? 439

Here we find only two options, being “by itself” and being “in another”. The
latter option is again exemplified with the accidents. When the author then
applies this conceptual framework to the incarnation he declares that Christ’s
human nature is not a full-blown hypostasis but he does not say what the on-
tological status of this nature is. Logic would demand that it has the status of
accidents because no other option is envisaged. The author of De Sectis does
not seem to be aware of this problem.15 However, it can be argued that the
anonymous author on whom Anastasius of Antioch drew introduced being
“with another” as a third option so as to overcome the stark alternative be-
tween hypostasis and accident, which were both not suitable as explanations
for the ontological status of Christ’s human nature.16

Philosophical (Aristotelian) Influence?

This raises the question: what was this author’s source of inspiration? As is
well known, Aristotelian concepts entered the theological discourse of the
sixth century to an unprecedented degree.17 Therefore one can hypothesise
that the ultimate source of the threefold distinction is a philosophical text.
An exact counterpart does not exist in philosophical literature, which is not
surprising since being “with another” is derived from Christian usage of the
anthropological paradigm. However, we do find formally similar statements.
In John Philoponus’ commentary of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, for example,
we read:

15  Gleede, Development, 117, states: “By no means does the author advance a theological con-
ception of his own about how the reality of Christ’s two natures might be conceived.”
16  In the Dogmatic definitions of Ephraem of Amida, who was patriarch of Antioch in the
first half of the sixth century, enhypostaton is also equated with accidents. At a first glance
the text appears to present the same argument as Anastasius of Antioch. However, the
conceptual framework is radically different. The starting-point is a supposed etymology
of enhypostaton, which is interpreted as “what is found in a hypostasis” and then equated
with the sum total of hypostatic idioms. The text contains other etymologies, which are
equally far-fetched. This is an approach to theology that only becomes dominant in the
seventh century with Anastasius of Sinai. Gleede, Development, 101-103, and 158-62, argues
that Ephraem was a forerunner of Anastasius. However, it cannot be excluded that the
Dogmatic definitions are a pseudepigraphon.
17  Cf. e.g. D. Krausmüller, “Aristotelianism,” 151-64.

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Τρίτον τοῦτο σημαινόμενον τοῦ καθ’ αὑτό, ὃ οὐκέτι ἄλλο τι ὂν κατ’ ἄλλου
κατηγορεῖται, οἷοι ἦσαν οἱ πρότεροι δύο τρόποι, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς ὃ μὴ δι’ ἄλλο ἐστὶ
μηδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, οἷά ἐστι τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ
ὑφέστηκεν, οἷον ἡ οὐσία.18

This third meaning of “by itself”, which is no longer predicated of another

thing as another thing, as were the previous two modes, but (sc. is) simply
that which is not for another nor has its existence in another, as are the
accidents, but subsists by itself, as does the substance.

Here we have three options: “by itself”, “for another” and “in another”.
Significantly, this threefold distinction entered the theological discourse since
it is mentioned in Theodore of Raithou’s treatise Praeparatio from the late
sixth century:

Οὐσία ἐστὶ πρώτως τε καὶ κυρίως πᾶν, ὅτι αὐθυπόστατον ὑπάρχει, τουτέστιν ὃ
καθ’ ἑαυτό ἐστι καὶ οὐ δι’ ἄλλο οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, τουτέστιν ὃ μὴ χρῄζει
ἄλλου τινὸς ἔξωθεν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχειν.19

Substance is first and foremost all that is self-existent, that is, what is by
itself and does not have its existence for another or in another, that is,
what does not need something else outside it in order to exist.

It can be argued that the anonymous author whom Anastasius of Antioch

excerpted knew this threefold distinction either from a philosophical text or
from an earlier adaptation of such a text by a theologian. He would then have
replaced “for another” with “with another” so as to have the anthropological
paradigm as a third option, which provided a way out of the stark opposition
between primary substances and mere accidents.20
At a later stage this model was then further developed. This is evident from
the writings of Maximus the Confessor. For Maximus being “with another” is
still the only meaning of enhypostaton that can be applied to the incarnation

18  John Philoponus, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, ed. M. Wallies, Ioannis Philoponi
in Aristotelis analytica posteriora commentaria (CAG XIII.3; Berlin: Reimer, 1898), 63.
19  Theodore of Raithou, Praeparatio, ed. F. Diekamp, Analecta Patristica. Texte und
Untersuchungen zur griechischen Patristik (Rome: Pont. inst. orient., 1938), 182-222,
esp. 201.
20  Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula, PG 91, 61B9, where the distinction between
καθ’ ἑαυτό, δι’ ἐκεῖνον and ἐν ἐκείνῳ is used in a Christological context.

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although he suppresses the human paradigm as the connecting link.21 However,

he does not exemplify being “in another” with accidents, which exist in pri-
mary substances as their substrates, but with secondary substances, common
natures or species, which gain concrete existence in individuals.22 This was a
model, which did have a bearing on the Christological discourse, because in the
sixth century the concept of enhypostaton had been used in order to explain
that the human nature of Christ as such had some form of existence, which fell
short of the concrete and separate existence of the hypostasis.23 In Maximus’
text there is no sign, however, that this model is relevant for Christology. He
only speaks of normal hypostases in which a common nature realises itself.
The Christological dimension of enhypostaton in the sense of being “in anoth-
er” was only introduced by John of Damascus who at the same time eliminated
the Christological application of being “with another”, declaring it to be valid
for the human compound only.24

Christological Implications

The discussion so far suggests that being “in another” originally had no
Christological application. It denoted accidents and was therefore not suitable
for Christ’s human nature. This problem was not necessarily solved through
the shift from accident to nature in the sense of secondary substance. Indeed,
it can be argued that nature was only introduced because it was regarded as
being somehow “like” accidents.25 In such a framework Christ’s human nature
was in danger of being reduced to a bundle of human qualities.26 This is evi-
dent from the writings of Leontius of Byzantium. Leontius makes no men-
tion of the threefold distinction, which may well not yet have been formalised
in his day. Moreover, he defines enhypostaton in a radically different way. In
his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos he declares that it is the empty
core around which the substantial qualities are layered and from which these

21  Cf. Gleede, Development, 146.

22  Cf. Gleede, Development, 144-45.
23  Cf. Gleede, Development, 147, with discussion of earlier literature.
24  Cf. Gleede, Development, 150, and 167.
25  Cf. Gleede, Development, 89, for the philosophical background of this approximation.
26  Gleede, Development, 151, speaks of “a quasi-accidental relationship of the human nature
to the Logos as a divine super-subject.”

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qualities derive their existence.27 Yet this does not mean that he is not yet
aware of the conceptual problems that the threefold distinction was meant to
solve. Further down in the same treatise he states:

Ὑποστάσεως δὲ ὅρος ἢ τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν μὲν ταὐτά, ἀριθμῷ δὲ διαφέροντα·

ἢ τὰ ἐκ διαφόρων φύσεων συνεστῶτα τὴν δὲ τοῦ εἶναι κοινωνίαν ἅμα τε
καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις κεκτημένα· οὕτω γέ τοί φημι κοινωνοῦντα τοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς
συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς ἀλλήλων οὐσίας ὅπερ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν
οὐσιωδῶς κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορουμένων—ποιότητες δὲ αὗται καλοῦνται—,
ἀλλ’ ὡς τῆς θατέρου φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας μὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν θεωρουμένης ἀλλὰ
μετὰ τῆς συγκειμένης καὶ συμπεφυκυίας· ὅπερ ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐφ’ ἑτέρων μὲν
πραγμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ὧν κοινὴ μὲν ἡ ὑπόστασις
ἰδία δὲ ἡ φύσις καὶ ὁ λόγος διάφορος.28

The definition of hypostasis is either what is the same according to

nature but differing in number, or what is constituted from different na-
tures and has the commonality of being simultaneously and in another.
By having the commonality of being I mean not that they complete the
substances of one another, which one can see in the case of substances
and the things that are substantially predicated of them—they are called
qualities—but that either nature and substance is not seen by itself but
with the one with which it is composed and grown together, as one finds
in other things but not least in the soul and the body whose hypostasis is
common but whose nature is separate and whose definition is different.

In this passage Leontius declares that two beings can be thought of as being
“in one another”, and then describes two ways in which this reciprocal rela-
tion can be understood.29 The two beings complete the substances of one

27  Cf. D. Krausmüller, “Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and
Aristotle in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos,” VigChr 65 (2011),
484-513.
28  Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86, 1280AB, ed. B. E. Daley,
Leontius of Byzantium: A Critical Edition of His Works, with Prolegomena (Diss. Oxford,
1978) 9.
29  Gleede argues that the comparison with substances and their substantial qualities is not
completely ruled out by Leontius but that the reader is expected to distinguish similari-
ties and dissimilarities with the special case of the incarnation. Cf. Gleede, Development,
67: “To conclude, we actually have to choose the first alternative of interpretation, which
states a parallel or rather an analogy between the inexistence of natures and substantial
qualities.” This interpretation is not borne out by the text where the first option is clearly

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Enhypostaton: being “ in another ” or being “ with another ” ? 443

another; or the two beings necessarily exist together with one another. This
is a complex and rather confusing argument. In the case of the second option
we notice a change in terminology. In the concluding part Leontius does not
speak of existence “in one another” but of existence “with one another”. The
first option is even odder. Here Leontius envisages a scenario where two be-
ings complete the substance of one another. However, the example that he
then presents—that a substance is completed by its substantial qualities—is
difficult to reconcile with this scenario. Assuming that the relationship is re-
ciprocal one arrives at a model where either being is equated both with the
substantial qualities, which complete the other being as substance, and with
the substance itself, which is completed by the same other being as substan-
tial qualities. It is evident that such a model is nonsensical. The only way in
which one can make sense of the example is to assume that one being is con-
ceived of as a substance and the other being is conceived of as the substantial
qualities that complete this substance. When applied to the specific case of
the incarnation, this can mean only one thing: the humanity is “in another”,
namely the divinity, which it completes in the same way as substantial quali-
ties complete other substances. It is arguable that Leontius encountered such
an asymmetrical statement in a theological text and that he transformed it
so that it would fit into his own symmetrical conceptual framework. It is not
difficult to see why Leontius rejected this model. According to it the human
nature when assumed into the hypostasis of the Word becomes a set of quali-
ties existing in the one substance of the Word. This, however, is a scenario that
bears a close resemblance with Monophysite Christology where the flesh exists
in the Word not as a separate nature but as distinct natural qualities.30 This
is not to say that all Monophysites would have accepted this model because
it is problematic in another respect as well. It gives the impression that the
union is a natural process that necessarily completes the being of the divine
Word, which is irreconcilable with the Christian belief that the incarnation
is a free act of God. Yet we can be sure that for Leontius as a Chalcedonian
it was even less palatable. This explains why he introduced his own model
where Christ’s humanity and divinity are likened to the human soul and body,
which are full-blown natures but only ever exist together “with one another”.
Significantly, Leontius does not mention the hypostasis of the divine Word at
all but speaks exclusively of the hypostasis of Christ, which originates from the
union of the divine and human natures.

rejected. It originates in Gleede’s wish to see some reference to “enhypostasisation” in

Leontius’ text.
30  Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II.2, 127-32.

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444 Krausmüller

It comes as no surprise that the closest parallel for Leontius’ excluded sce-
nario is found in a Monophysite text, a letter that the grammarian Sergius ad-
dressed to patriarch Severus of Antioch. There we read:

We know that the things which belong to a genus also extend to spe-
cies. And we say that a living creature is a substance endowed with a
soul and sensation. And we know that a man and a horse and a bull are
(sc. instances of) this (sc. substance) along with some different propriety,
which belongs to each of them. Therefore using the same name we call
simples and composites and all these things which are mentioned “living
creatures”, and in this, the generic name of substance is applied by means
of the hypostases which are particular substances, as it seems right to
Father Basil as well. Therefore, if we call the simple Son, even though he
became composite for our sake, one hypostasis, and we are completely
sure that he is endowed with a body, why may we not also take the name
of the highest genus, and call the Son “substance”, while defining that this
was incarnate?31

This passage introduces the ontological framework of genera and species.

Sergius states that a human being, a horse and a bull belong to the genus
“animal” but that each of them has a specific difference, which distinguish-
es it from the others. Here we are clearly meant to think of qualities such as
“rational” in the case of the human being.32 Applied to the incarnation this
model yields the following result: the Word belongs to the genus “God” and
takes “being incarnate” as a specific difference, which turns him into a new
species. The advantage of this model is clear. Conceptualised as a specific dif-
ference, the flesh does not constitute a substance of its own. However, the par-
allelism is not complete: Christ’s divine nature is identified with the highest
genus, substance, which takes “enfleshed” as a specific difference. The reason
for this terminological shift is obvious. Sergius did not wish to introduce com-
position into the divinity, which he would have done had he created a parallel
between the divine Word and the genus “animal” since the latter is made up of
a higher genus and a specific difference. The resemblance of this model with
the first option in Leontius’ argument is striking, and it is even more so when

31  Sergius the Grammarian, Letter 3, tr. I. R. Torrance, Christology after Chalcedon. Severus
of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1988), 208. Cf. Galen,
Definitiones Medicae, ed. K. G. Kuehn, Galeni opera omnia, XIX (Leipzig: Knobloch, 1833),
355: Ζῶόν ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος, αἰσθητικὴ, καθ’ ὁρμὴν καὶ προαίρεσιν κινουμένη.
32  Cf. the discussion of the passage in Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus, II.2, 122-27.

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Enhypostaton: being “ in another ” or being “ with another ” ? 445

we consider that Sergius elsewhere defines “rationality” as that which com-

pletes the substance of a human being, thus effectively conflating specific dif-
ferences with substantial qualities.33 Interestingly, Sergius does not seem to be
bothered by the fact that the incarnation now appears to be a natural process.
Indeed, the phrase “for our sake” suggests that he still regarded it as an act of
divine condescension.
What Sergius’ speculation has in common with the first option in Leontius’
treatise is recourse to philosophical, and more specifically, Aristotelian con-
cepts. Significantly, Sergius begins his argument with praise of Aristotle as the
greatest of all philosophers from which Christians, too, can learn important
things.34 Such an approach found no favour with his addressee Severus, who
insists on the autonomy of the Christian theological discourse, which follows
it own rules. Leontius of Byzantium clearly was of the same opinion when he
dismissed the first option and instead had recourse to the anthropological par-
adigm, where the union of soul and body results in a human being just as the
union of Word and flesh results in Christ. We can conclude that for Leontius
any model that declared one entity to be “in” another entity was unacceptable
and that only “with another” could serve as a viable conceptual framework.
Indeed, we may find here an explanation for Maximus’ decision not to identify
Christ’s human nature with the Aristotelian secondary substance but to repeat
the traditional teaching that the Word and the flesh are “with another”. Since
secondary substances were conceptualised as bundles of qualities inhering in
substrates, they would have been as unsuitable a counterpart for the nature of
the flesh as the accidents, which had featured in earlier definitions of the term
enhypostaton.

Limitations in John of Damascus’ Understanding of the Concept

At this point we need to ask: how did John of Damascus conceive of the “en-
hypostasisation” of the human nature in the hypostasis of the divine Word?
In his book Gleede quotes several passages in which John argues that in the
incarnation the divine Word took the place of the human sperm and fashioned

33  Sergius the Grammarian, Letter 2, tr. Torrance, 168. This is hardly surprising since the two
concepts were more or less identified with each other in the Late Antique philosophical
discourse, cf. e.g. Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. A. Busse, Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis catego-
rias commentarium (CAG IV.1; Berlin: Reimer, 1887), 15.
34  Sergius the Grammarian, Letter 3, tr. Torrance, 207.

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446 Krausmüller

the blood of Mary into a human being.35 Yet these passages are not found
in the same contexts as definitions of the term enhypostaton. One can only ad-
duce them as evidence when one assumes that John of Damascus’ statements
about the incarnation are expressions of a coherent conceptual framework.
This, however, is anything but certain. Thus it seems safer to focus on explana-
tions that are directly related to the term enhypostaton. Such an explanation is
found in John’s treatise Contra Jacobitas:

Ἐνυπόστατον δὲ οὐχ ἡ ὑπόστασις, τὸ ἐν ὑποστάσει δὲ καθορώμενον· οὐσία δέ,

τουτέστιν ὁπωσοῦν ὑπάρχει, εἴτε καθ’ ἑαυτὴν εἴτε σὺν ἑτέρῳ εἴτε ἐν ἑτέρῳ· καθ’
αὑτὴν μὲν ὡς πυρὸς οὐσία, σὺν ἑτέροις δὲ ὡς ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα (σὺν ἀλλήλοις γὰρ
ταῦτα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει), ἐν ἑτέρῳ δὲ ὡς πῦρ ἐν θρυαλλίδι καὶ ὡς ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ
κυρίου ἐν τῇ ἀνάρχῳ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει.36

Enhypostaton is not the hypostasis but what is seen in a hypostasis.

Substance, that is, whatever exists, (sc. is) either by itself or with another
or in another: by itself as the substance of fire, with another as the soul
and the body (for they have the hypostasis in one another), in another as
fire in a wick and as the flesh of the Lord in his eternal hypostasis.

Here John reproduces the threefold distinction that is by now well known to
us. Into this framework are integrated two corresponding statements: fire can
be by itself, and it can be in a wick. The reader concludes that the human na-
ture can exist in its own hypostases, such as Peter or Paul, or it can exist in an-
other hypostasis, that of the divine Word. Analogies such as this had long been
used in the Christological discourse: Cyril of Alexandria was particularly fond
of them.37 However, they do not amount to a philosophical explanation. Such
an explanation is altogether missing from the passage. Indeed, John’s expertise
in employing philosophical concepts should not be overrated. The passage still
shows traces of the discourse from which it was taken. The first type of sub-
stance, that which is “by itself”, evidently corresponds to the Christian hyposta-
sis. However, John continues to employ the term substance in this sense as well

35  Cf. Gleede, Development, 174-81.

36  John of Damascus, Contra Jacobitas, 11, ed. Kotter, IV, 114. Gleede, Development, 172, trans-
lates the first part of this passage as “Enhypostaton is not the hypostasis, but what is
perceived in a hypostasis, i.e. the ousia—yet in whatever way it may exist …” Such identi-
fication of hypostasis with substance is not found in the text. There the statement about
substance is added as a third definition after hypostasis and enhypostaton.
37  Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus II.2, 40-41.

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by which he clearly means the Aristotelian primary substance.38 Accordingly

he mentions a “substance of fire” where he should have spoken of a “hypostasis
of fire”. All this suggests that the introduction of the concept of “enhypostasisa-
tion” is alien to the framework into which it is integrated and that John does
not really address the conceptual problems arising from it.39

Conclusion

To conclude: Some time in the sixth century an anonymous Chalcedonian theo-

logian devised a statement that gave three alternative meanings to the term en-
hypostaton: being “by itself”, being “with another” and being “in another”. The
first and the third of these options had no relevance for the Christological dis-
course: they defined the ontological status of concretely existing individuals,
the hypostases, and of accidents, which exist in individuals as their substrates.
By contrast, the second option had a clear Christological dimension: it was il-
lustrated with the example of soul and body, which exist only in conjunction
with one another, and was then applied to the incarnation where the human
and the divine nature form a composite. This threefold distinction, which may
be derived from a philosophical text, had two advantages: it showed that the
human nature in Christ is not an independent hypostasis and that it cannot
be reduced to the status of accidents, which would inhere in the divine Word
as their substrate. This last option was particularly problematic because it
played into the hands of the Monophysites who had declared all along that
Christ’s humanity was not a nature of its own but a bundle of natural qualities.
In the following centuries this basic model was twice modified. Maximus the
Confessor exemplified being “in another” not with accidents but with second-
ary substances; and John of Damascus linked being “in another” to the con-
cept of “enhypostasisation”. However, there is an important difference between
the two authors. Maximus refrains from identifying the flesh with a secondary

38  On the adaptation of philosophical definitions of substance as that which exists in
whichever way through replacement of substance with hypostasis, cf. Krausmüller,
“Disintegration,” 160-64. The use of substance instead of hypostasis puzzled Gleede,
Development, 173.
39  Cf. John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, ed. Kotter, IV, 173-74. where the
traditional definition of hypostasis as the aggregate of accidents that mark out the indi-
vidual is contrasted with an innovative definition of nature as the aggregate of accidents
that mark out a species. Such conflation suggests that for John there was no longer a
categorical difference between “normal” accidents and substantial qualities.

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substance, most likely because he conceived of secondary substances as bun-

dles of qualities inhering in substrates. By contrast, John has no such qualms.
He explains that the flesh comes to exist “in” the hypostasis of the Word, thus
giving it for the first time a Christological meaning. Yet it remains unclear how
John conceived of the ontological status of the human nature. There is no sign
that he understood the concerns of earlier theologians that the flesh might be
reduced to an accidental appendage of the divine Word.

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