1. CARIŃO VS.
INSULAR GOVT 212 US designated,-a purpose that has been
449;
This was an application to the Philippine court
of land registration for the registration of
certain land. The application was granted by
the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the court of first instance of the
province of Benguet, on behalf of the
government of the Philippines, and also
on behalf of the United States, those
governments having taken possession of
the property for public and military
purposes. The court of first instance found the
facts and dismissed the application upon
grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by
the supreme court (7 Philippine, 132 ), and the
case then was brought here by writ of error.
The applicant and plaintiff in error is an
Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the
land lies. For more than fifty years before the
treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899 as far back as the
findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had
held the land as owners. His grandfather had
lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to
the custom of the country, some of the fences, it
seems, having been of much earlier date. His
father had cultivated parts and had used parts
for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for
pasture in his turn. They all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father,
in accordance with Igorot custom. No
document of title, however, had issued
from the Spanish Crown, and although, in
1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made
application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing seems to
have come of it, unless, perhaps,
information that lands in Benguet could
not be conceded until those to be occupied
for a sanatorium, etc., had been
except so far as it saw fit to permit private
carried out by the Philippine government
and the United States. In 1901 the plaintiff
filed a petition, alleging ownership, under
the mortgage law, and the lands were
registered to him, that process, however,
establishing only a possessory title, it is
said.
Whether applicant has a valid claim over
he land in dispute?
Yes. Petition Granted.
 Land was not registered, and therefore
became, if it was not always, public
land.
 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title deeds,
it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title
by prescription." For cultivated land,
20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30.
 Applicant's possession was not
unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father
ever was made.
 Every native who had not a paper title
is not a trespasser.
 There must be a presumption against
the government when a private
individual claims property as his or
her own. It went so far as to say that
the lands will be deemed private
absent contrary proof.
The position of the government, shortly stated,
is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had
title to all the land in the Philippines
titles to be acquired; that there was no
prescription against the Crown, and that,
if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited
time to make the title good; that the
plaintiff's land was not registered, and
therefore became, if it was not always,
public land; that the United States
succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that
the plaintiff has no rights that the
Philippine government is bound to
respect.
The United States government contented that
Spain had title to all the lands in the
Philippines, except so far as it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired. It maintained that
no prescription can be claimed against Spanish
empire and even if that was possible, a decree
in 1880 had set a deadline for the registration
of these titles. No title would be recognized as
valid beyond that date. Since the land in
question was not registered, the government
contended that it had become public (if it was
already public). When the United States
succeeded to the title of Spain, Cariño had no
right which it was bound to respect. The Court
disagreed with the United States in a decision
that has remained as obscure as it is
significant.
The Court admitted that Spain had embraced
the universal feudal theory that all lands were
held by the Crown. However, Justice Holmes,
who spoke for the Court, said that in practice
sovereignty may vary in degree. “How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical
relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are
matters for it to decide.
The Igorots were never brought under the
control of the Spaniards. The Court quipped
that it would be almost certain that Spain
would not have granted registration of the
property that would not have made title valid.
Regardless of Spain’s position about technical
subtleties, this did not mean that under the
dominion of the United States, Cariño had lost
all his rights. He was not a mere trespasser
when the government succeeded as the
new sovereign. A contrary position, would
“amount to denial of native titles throughout an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least
for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the
power to enforce.”
2. SECRETARY OF THE DENRY VS. YAP
G.R. NO. 167707 & G.R. NO. 173775
(CONSOLIDATED), 2008
G.R. No. 167707
This petition is for a review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al,
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine
reserve. Yap, et al., alleged that said
proclamation raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945,
or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them. Claiming that Proc. No.
1801 precluded them from filing an application
for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as
“public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No.
167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 and classifying Boracay Island into 400
hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centreline of
roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for
forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and
other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with
the Supreme Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay. They have been
in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have
also invested billions of pesos in developing
their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.
1. Whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically
deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands
alienable. NO.
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive
order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as
alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of state ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have
not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.
2. Whether Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and
all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island. YES.
The Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No.
926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an
agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property. The Regalian Doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. All
lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our
present Public Land Act presupposes that the
land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. Where the land is not
alienable and disposable, possession of the land,
no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue
that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession
by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Except for lands already covered by
existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705.
The private claimants cannot apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect
to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
3. Republic vs. Naguiat, GR # 134209, Jan.
24, 2006
Celestina Naguiat, an Filipino citizen,
resident of Angeles City Pampanga, applied for
registration before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales, four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan Zambales. She claims to be the
owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from an entity who
have been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years that had not suffered from any
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor
is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an
opposition to the application assailing the
ownership of the respondent on the grounds of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in
question by the predecessors-in-interest that is
an ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant that is no longer
applicable; the subject properties are part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
The trial court adjudicated the land to
the respondent and affirmed by the appellate
court, hence the petition for review.
Whether the areas in question still form
part of public domain – YES.
The Court ruled that the areas are still
part of the public domain. The respondent
failed to present the required certification from
the proper government agency or proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable
and disposable.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
Anent thereto, under the Section 6 of
the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying and reclassifying lands of the public
domain belongs to the Executive Branch and
not with the court. The lower court and the
appellate court erred in deciding in favor of the
respondent with subsisting matters that rest in
the powers of the Executive Branch of
government.
Unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession unless until
determined by the proper government agency
or proclamation reclassifying the land
agricultural thus alienable and disposable. The
Court properly REVERSED and SET ASIDE
the decisions of the lower court and appellate
court and the application of the respondent
DENIED.
4. Cruz vs. Sec of DENR 135385, Dec 6,
2000;
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions
of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene
the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not
contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CRISANTO S. RANESES, G.R. No. 189970,
June 9, 2014
Respondent Crisanto S. Raneses (respondent)
filed an Application5 for Original Registration
of Land Title over two parcels of land both
located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig City,
Metro Manila with a total area of twenty-two
thousand six hundred (22,600) square meters
(subject properties). During the initial hearing,
respondent marked several documents to
establish compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.Respondent testified that despite
the fact that the earliest tax declaration on
record over the subject properties was issued
only in 1980, his parents had been in
continuous possession and occupation of the
same as early as June 1945. The RTC issued its
first assailed Order granting respondent’s
application for land registration. The LLDA
filed its Opposition to the application alleging
that the subject properties are below the 12.50-
meter elevation, hence, forming part of the bed
of Laguna Lake and are, therefore, inalienable,
indisposable and incapable of registration. The
CA upheld the RTC which gave more credence
to the findings contained in the Inter-Office
Memorandum than that of the ECD
Memorandum and in granting respondent’s
application
Whether the subject properties in this
case are alienable or disposable land of
the public domain
No. under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, a
petition may be granted upon compliance with
the following requisites: (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (b) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Regalian doctrine,
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Unless public land is shown
to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain for land
classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It must be proved. And the applicant
bears the burden to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that
the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to hurdle this burden.
6. Rural Bank of Anda Inc. vs. Roman
Catholic Arch of Lingayen-Dagupan gr
155051, May 29, 2007;
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736),
is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about
1,300 square meters and is part of “Lot 3”.
Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of
Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for
commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the
national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building
of Mary Help of Christians Seminary
(seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on
the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen
(respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT
6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the
construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent
the caretelas from parking because the smell of
horse manure was already bothering the priests
living in the seminary. The concrete fence
enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east,
west, and center and has no gate. People can
pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of
the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence
was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot
736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor
Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss
the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr.
Arenos agreed that the construction of the
building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be
stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested
Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence
and restore the concrete fence. On20 May
1998, Mayor Domalanta informed
respondent that the construction of the
building of the Rural Bank of Anda would
resume but that he was willing to discuss with
respondent to resolve the problem
concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint
for Abatement of Illegal Constructions,
Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August
1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are
valid
The petition has no merit. Both respondent and
the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they
do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant
Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the
Land Management Services in Region I
testified that no document of ownership for Lot
736 was ever presented to their office. Both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley
failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since
Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone
through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public
domain and is owned by the state
This is in accordance with the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the state owns all
lands and waters of the public domain. Thus,
under Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution: “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to
themselves public or government lands without
prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736
is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution
Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently,
the contract of lease between the Municipality
of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a
portion of Lot 736 is also void.
7. Buenaventura vs. Republic GR 166865,
March 2, 2007
Petitioners then filed an Application for
Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the
RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property,
located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Petitioners alleged that they and their
predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the
said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer,
and possession as owners of the same since
time immemorial and/or within the period
provided for by law.
The court a quo issued an Order
granting the application for registration of title
of the subject property. However, the Republic
appealed to the CA alleging that petitioners
failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-
interest and by themselves. The Republic
further argues that petitioners own evidence
tends to show that the subject property is not
alienable and disposable because it was a salt
bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.
On 23 August 2004, the CA rendered a
Decision in favor of the Republic, thus,
overturning the Order of the court a quo, and
the parcel of land subject matter of the
application is declared public land. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Decision, but it was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari
Whether the CA erred in nullifying the
Decision of the trial court confirming
petitioners title over the subject property
for not being allegedly supported by
substantial evidence as required by law
YES. The DENR of NCR dated October 29,
2001, prove that the subject property was
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Said certification is sufficient to
establish the true nature or character of the
subject property. The certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.

Whether the CA gravely erred in declaring
the subject property as pubic land and
ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50
year possession in the concept of an
owner and completely unmolested by any
adverse claim.
YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands
of the public domain commenced only after 12
June 1945, application for registration of the
said property is still possible by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the PRD which speaks of
prescription. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, those who are in possession of
alienable and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as open,
continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more,
may have the right to register their title to such
land despite the fact that their possession of the
land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
In the present case, while petitioners
possession over the subject property can be
reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date
when according to evidence, the subject
property became alienable and disposable, they
can still have the subject property registered in
their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
PRD. Thus, the court granted petitioners
application for registration of the subject
property and directing the issuance of a decree
of registration in petitioners favor.
8. Alcantara vs. DENR gr 161881 July 31,
2008; DAMILES
Petitioner Nicasio Alcantara, under the Forest
Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No.
542by the DENR, was allowed to lease 923
hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton,
Barrio Apopong, General Santos City. However,
such land is being claimed as the ancestral land
of the Indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao
people, who claim that they and their ancestors
have been cultivating, possessing, and
occupying it since time immemorial. According
to them, Christian settlers started occupying
the area only after WWII. Due to this, there
was a constant friction(violent at times)
between them. The IPs eventually lost physical
control of much of the and Alcantara, a son of
one of the settlers, claims that FLGLA No. 542
has been subsisting since1983. The
respondents, as representatives of said tribes,
filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and
the reversion of land to the indigenous
communities. Respondent-intervenors, the
Heirs of Datu Abdul Pendatun and the Heirs
of Sabal Mula Gawan, claim that among those
who took the land by force was petitioner's
predecessor, ConradoAlcantara. They narrate
that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried
to retake the land but failed because the well-
armed settlers repelled them, which led to the
killing of 2 of their leaders. Petitioner filed an
answer to the complaint questioning the
authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it
was the DENR secretary who should have
jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public
lands. Also, the COSLAP should suspend the
hearing of the case, because the DENR was
then hearing a similar controversy. He was able
to renew FLGLA No. 542 for another 25 years,
to expire on Dec 31, 2018, despite the
pendedncy f the COSLAP case and the
opposition from private respondents. On Oct.
29, 1997, RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's
Rigths Act (IPRA), which was intended to
recognize and promote all the rights of
country's Indigenus Cultural
Communities(ICCs)/IPs within the framework
of the Constitution.
W/N the petitioner may continue his
enjoyment of the land up to the expiration
of FLGLA No.542 (Dec. 31, 2018) based on
his alleged residual rights.
No. The Court made the final finding that
FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and it was
made in violation of prevailing laws and it was
proper for it to be cancelled. The CA also stated
that based on the records, that subject land
belongs to the Blaan ICC since they have been
in possession of, and have been occupying and
cultivating the same since time immemorial, a
fact which has not been disputed by the
petitioner. It was also declared that FLGLA No.
542 violated Sec 1 of PD 410 which states that
"all unappropriated agricultural lands forming
the part of the public domain are declared part
of the ancestral land of the ICCs/IPs occupying
the same, and these lands are further declared
alienable and disposable, to be distributed
exclusively among the members of ICC
concerned.
9. Gordoland Devt. Corp. vs Republic
Petitioner is engaged in the business of real
property development. On November 18, 1996,
it filed with the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue
City, an application for original registration of
title over eight parcels of land totaling 86,298
square meters located in different barangays
within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu.
Petitioner avers it obtained title over said
parcels in 1995 by virtue of several deeds of
sale and assignments of appurtenant rights
from the alleged owner-possessors whom
petitioner claims had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation as would entitle them to acquire
title by acquisitive prescription, under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land
Act, in relation to Republic Act No. 496 and
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
After submitting its formal offer of exhibits, the
petitioner filed a Manifestation with an
attached photocopy of a Certification. However,
the list of lot numbers referred to in the
certification was not included in the
certification, nor was it attached to the
Manifestation. The list was never submitted to
the trial court. The petitioners Manifestation
merely informed the court that it had failed to
include the said certification in its formal offer
of exhibits, and that it was submitting the same
in compliance with the requirements of the
application. Petitioner did not move to re-open
the proceedings to present the certification in
evidence, have it authenticated and subjected
to cross-examination, or have it marked as an
exhibit and formally offered in evidence. The
original was never submitted.
The State, through the Director of Lands,
entered its formal opposition to the application,
asserting that registration should be denied.
On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered
its decision granting the application, and
directed the issuance of the respective decrees
of registration for each of the eight parcels of
land. Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the
trial court received a Report from the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Office of the
Director, Department on Registration, which
declared that LRA was not in a position to
verify whether or not the subject lands were
covered by land patents, or within the area
classified as alienable and disposable. It
recommended that the Land Management
Bureau (LMB) in Manila, the CENRO and the
Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in Cebu be
ordered to determine and make a finding if the
lots were alienable and disposable. Thereafter,
the trial court, acting upon the LRA report,
directed the LMB, Cebu CENRO and FMB to
report on the true status of the lands. It did
not, however, recall or suspend its judgment in
the main.
Whether or not the court of appeals erred
in finding that petitioner failed to prove
that the subject properties were alienable
and disposable public land.
In view of the lack of sufficient evidence
showing that the subject lots were already
classified as alienable and disposable lands of
the government, and when they were so
classified, there is no reference point for
counting adverse possession for purposes of an
imperfect title. The Government must first
declare the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry,
cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that: The
facts and circumstances in the record render
untenable that Gordoland had performed all
the conditions essential to reinforce its
application for registration under the Property
Registration Decree.
The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that
subject Lot No. 4221, Lot No. 4222, Lot No.
4242, Lot No. 7250, Lot No. 7252, Lot No. 7260,
Lot No. 7264, and Lot No. 7269 form part of the
public domain not registrable in the name of
Gordoland. To reiterate, under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands belong to the State. Unless
alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus.
10. Republic vs. Dela Paz | G.R. No. 171631
| 15 November 2010
The RTC granted respondents’ application for
registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Such decision
was affirmed by the CA. Thus, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the
subject property, which is an agricultural land,
by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
June 18, 1987, executed by their parents, who
earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz by virtue of
a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili
ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay dated March 10,
1979.
In their application, respondents claimed that
they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land
and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the same, in the concept of an
owner since they acquired it in 1987.
Respondents further averred that by way of
taking possession, they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the same, in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period
of more than 50 years since the filing of the
application of registration with the trial court.
They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Petitioner opposed the application for
registration on several grounds, one of which is
that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question for a
period of not less than 30 years.
Whether the respondents, by them or
through their predecessors-in-interest,
have proven that they possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier
No. Respondents’ earliest evidence can be
traced back to a tax declaration issued in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest only in
the year 1949. At best, respondents can only
prove possession since said date. What is
required is open, exclusive, continuous, and
notorious possession by respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Respondents failed to explain why,
despite their claim that their predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the subject properties
in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945; it was only in 1949 that their
predecessors-in-interest started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is
the rule that tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of the applicants for
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
11. Republic vs. Santos, GR No. 180027, July
18, 2012
In October 1997, respondents purchased three
parcels of unregistered land formerly owned
by Generosa Asuncion, Teresita Sernal, and
spouses Antona. The three parcels of land
were consolidated into a single lot (Lot 3).
Respondents filed with the RTC an application
for original registration over Lot 3. The RTC
directed the DENR to report on the status of Lot
3. DENR submitted a report saying that Lot 3
is an alienable and disposable land since
March 15, 1982. Respondents submitted a
Certification by the DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) that Lot 3 is classified as alienable
and disposable since March 15, 1982. During
the trial, respondents presented the
testimonies of Generosa, Teresita, and spouses
Antona all saying that they have been in
possession of the lots for more than 30
years before the sale. The Government
maintains that the land in question still forms
part of the public domain.
Whether the respondents’ application for
registration should be granted
No. Jura Regalia means that the State is the
original proprietor of all lands and the source
of all private titles. Being an unregistered
land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the state.
In this connection, original registration of title
to land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, or otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The said section
provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the
proper CFI an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired
ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
It appears that they seek the registration of
Lot 3 under either the first or the second
paragraph of the quoted section. However, we
find that neither justifies registration in favor
of the respondents.
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 refers to the
original registration of "imperfect" titles to
public land acquired. Its requisites are: (1)
That the subject land forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain; (2) That the applicants, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership, and; (3) That such possession and
occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The respondents were not able to satisfy the
third requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed
to establish that they or their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in possession and
occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or
earlier." First, the testimonies of respondents’
predecessors-in-interest and/or their
representatives were patently deficient on this
point. None of them testified about possession
and occupation of the subject parcels of land
dating back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. Rather,
the said witnesses merely related that they
have been in possession of their lands "for over
thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by
respondents in 1997.
Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the
Joint Affidavit be considered as sufficient to
prove compliance with the third requisite. The
said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general
claim that Valentin had "continuously, openly
and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute
owner" the parcels of Generosa and Teresita
even "before the outbreak of World War 2" —
which lacks specificity and is unsupported by
any other evidence.
Second. The supporting tax declarations
presented by the respondents also fall short of
proving possession since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by
the respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No.
9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely
covers the portion of Lot 3 previously
pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much
worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows no
declared improvements on such portion of Lot
3 as of 1948—posing an apparent
contradiction to the claims of Generosa and
Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.
Moreover, they also anchored their claim on
prescription provided under Section 14(2) of
PD 1529; for prescription to run against the
state, the land must be proven to be
patrimonial in character. To be patrimonial,
there must be an express declaration by the
state that the land is no longer needed for
public service or the development of
national wealth, or that the property has
been converted to patrimonial. Until then,
the period of prescription against the state
will not commence to run. The express
declaration contemplated is separate and
distinct from mere classification that the
land is alienable and disposable. Respondents
were not able to prove that prescription has
begun to run against the state
12. Republic of the Philippines, petitioner
vs Ludolfo V. Munoz, respondent
On June 14, 1996, Munoz filed an application
for registration of title of a parcel of residential
land before the RTC of Albay. Munoz allegedly
acquired the property through donation from
her parents, and his parents and predecessors
in interest have been in possession of the
property since time immemorial for more than
70 years. The residential lot originally owned
and possessed by Paulino Pulvinar and
Geronimo Lozada, who subsequently both sold
their share of unregistered land to the parents
of Munoz.
The Republic of the Philippines through the
OSG opposed the application, among his
contentions were that muniments of title, tax
payments and receipts of applications do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
bonafide acquisition and that the parcel applied
for is part of the public domain and not subject
to private appropriation.The Regional Trial
Court rendered decision in favour of Munoz,
noting that the a reportsubmitted by the
Director of Lands, that as per records of the
Land Management Bureau in Manila the
subject property is covered by Free Patent
Application No. 10-2-664 of AnastaciaVitero,
mother of Munoz. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
1. Whether or not the failure to present
the original tracing cloth plan is fatal
omission whichnecessarily affected the
trial court’s jurisdiction.
As to the first issue, it bears stressing that the
constructive seizure of land accomplished by
posting of notices and processes upon all
persons mentioned in notices by means of
publication and sending copies to said persons
by registered mail in effect gives the court
jurisdiction over the lands sought to be
registered. It is true that the best evidence to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes
is the original tracing cloth plan from the
Bureau of Lands, in this case however, the
presentation of the original tracing cloth plan
may be dispensed with since the blue print copy
of the survey plan approved by the Bureau of
Lands and the technical descriptions duly
verified and approved by the Director of lands
were presented and provide sufficient
identification.
2. Whether or not in proving the alienable
and disposable nature of the property
there has to be acertification from the
DENR and Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office.
As to the second issue, the CA ruled that
Munoz need not adduce documentary proofs for
the property to be declared alienable and
disposable because of the fact that it had once
been covered by Free Patent application in the
name of the mother of Munoz, which was
unfortunately not acted upon by the proper
authorities. This court however cannot sustain
this argument. As well settled in jurisprudence,
it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show a positive act of the
government such as presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigations, legislative act or a statue or
certification from the government that the land
applied for is alienable and disposable which
the respondent failed to secure. The court
cannot approve the application for registration
due to failure to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
13. Saad Agro- Industires v Republic
Orcullo applied for a free patent over lot 1434
which was subsequently approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
causing an Original Certificate of Title to be
issued over the said lot. This lot was
subsequently sold to SAAD Agro Industries by
one of Orcullo's heirs.
Several years later, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint for annulment of title and reversion
of the lot granted to orcullo stating that the
issuance of the free patent was irregular and
erroneous as the land in question is part of the
timberland and forest reserve of sibonga, Cebu.
The RTC denied the petition for annulment and
reversion but was overruled by the CA granting
the reversion
W/N the CA is correct? NO.
On reversion: reversion involves a serious
controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the
government. The state, as the party alleging
fraud and representation bears the burden of
proof. The state failed to do so in this case
because the delineation of forest areas of the
public domain was only made 9 years after
orcullo was awarded the free patent over the
subject lot through PD 705 which was
promulgated in 1980.
While the Government has the right to classify
portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated
the land in good faith much prior to such
classification must be recognized and should
not be prejudiced by after-events which could
not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held
that the Government, in the first instance may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land,
unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made.
14. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL
ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O.
RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; H.
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing
the President to enter into FTAA is a exception
to the rule that participation in the nation’s
natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. RA
7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on
April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942,
or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996. Petitioners
prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules,
and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground
that they allow fully foreign owned corporations
like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention
of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of
the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly
listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
DENR approved the transfer and registration
of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case
is still pending before the Court of Appeals. EO
279, issued by former President Aquino on July
25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign
owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of
minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the
(DENR) Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulmentof the FTAA
would violate a treaty between the Philippines
and Australia which provides for the protection
of Australian investments.
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining
Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources. YES
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional. RA
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that ―All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by
the State. The same section also states
that, ―the exploration and development
and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision
of the State. Conspicuously absent in Section
2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of
the public domain through
license, concession or lease is no longer allowed
under the 1987 Constitution
Under the concession system,
the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area.
The concession amounts to complete control by
the concessionaire over the country‘s natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary
rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has
deleted the phrase ―management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The
present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of the service contracts was precisely
the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to avoid. The constitutional provision
allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is
an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation‘s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA
7942 is invalid insofar as the said act
authorizes service contracts. Although the
statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the
1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service
contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
law.
The underlying assumption in the
provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources
just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942
has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the
State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations
engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements
or compensations for each other as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional,
all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987
Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited
only to merely technical or financial assistance
to the State for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between
the government and WMCP is a ―service
contract that permits fully foreign owned
companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP
FTAA is a Service Contract. The FTAA
between he WMCP and the
Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract. Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants
WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that
may be produced from the contract area.
Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides
that EMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel
necessary for the Mining Operations. These
contractual stipulations and related provisions
in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural
resources that properly belong to the State and
are intended for the benefit of its citizens.
These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987
Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils
that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck
down.
15. BARROGA VS. ALBANO, G.R. NO. L-
43445, JANUARY 20, 2016
The CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a
parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino. One
of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was
declared in default. For unrecorded reasons, the
decree of registration did not issue except until
after the lapse of 14 years or so (October 14,
1955). It was only after 24 years (November 17,
1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquino’s
name.
In 1970, after the decree of registration
had been handed down but before title was
sued in Delfina Aquino’s favour, the children
and heirs of Ruperta Pascual, appellants
Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca,
brought suit against the children and heirs of
Delfina Aquino and appellees Angel Albano, et
al.
 Barroga, et al., contended that they had
been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and
were the real owners thereof, and they prayed
that Delfina Aquino’s title be voided and
cancelled and that a new title be made out in
their names.
Delfina Aquino’s title encroached upon
a 4-square meter portion of an adjoining lot
belonging to Cesar Castro. Castro filed a
complaint in intervention for the recovery
thereof. (Note: The CFI dismissed Barroga’s
and Padaca’s complaint, and declared
intervenor Castro the owner of the 4-square
meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino’s
title.)
The familiar doctrine of res judicata
operated to blot out any hope of success of
Barroga’s and Padaca’s suit for recovery of Lot
No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by
the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding
affirming Delfina Aquino’s ownership over the
property, and in which proceeding the former’s
predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had
taken part as oppositor but had been declared
in default. The judgment of the cadastral court
was one against a “specific thing” and therefore
conclusive upon the title to the thing.
On August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court
promulgated an order granting the motion of
Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as
regards Lot No. 9821. The said writ was dated
August 28, 1975. Again, Barroga and Padaca
sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by
Angel Albano, et al. Their argument was, as
possessors of the lot in question, they could not
be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ
of possession.
Whether they can be ejected. YES.
The writ of possession could properly issue
despite the not inconsiderable period of time
that had elapsed from the date of registration
decree, since the right to the same does not
prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar and Lucero vs.
Loot. It also declared that the segregation of
the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and
its restoration as integral part of Lot 9821, had
no effect whatever on Albano’s right to the writ
of possession, which was the appropriate
process for the enforcement of the judgment in
the cadastral case.
Conformably with the established
axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of
this opinion, the appellees Angel Albano, et al.
must be declared to be entitled to a writ of
possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of
the decree of registration and vindication of the
title issued in favour of their predecessor-in-
interets, Delfina Aquino; the writ may be
correctly enforced against Barroga and Padaca
as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual,
who was a party in the registration proceedings
which resulted in the declaration of Delfina
Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof.
The appellees are entitled to said writ
of possession, despite the lapse of many, many
years, their right thereto being imprescriptible
at least as against the persons who were
parties to the cadastral case or their successors-
in-interest. The appellants, it must be said,
have succeeded in prolonging the controversy
long enough. They should no longer be allowed
to continue doing so.
16. Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs. Registry of
Deeds of Parañaque City GR 133240, Nov.
15,2000
Petitioner Corporation amended its
Articles of Incorporation to change its name
from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz
Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC.
As a consequence of its change of name,
petitioner sought the amendment of the
transfer certificates of title over real properties
owned by them, all of which were under the old
name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a
petition for amendment of titles with the RTC
Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent
the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently
because the titles sought to be amended, all
state that they were issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise
inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition
that the lands covered by the subject titles are
located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner
learned that the subject titles are in the
custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque
City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading
instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are
located in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a
quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on
the ground of improper venue, it appearing
therein that the respondent is the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are
located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the
lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. On the other hand, in view of the
dismissal of the petition, the lower court also
denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his
Comment contending that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it
appeared from the original petition that the
lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside
the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since
it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not
have acted on the motion to admit amended
petition.
Whether the trial court motu
proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground
of improper venue
Venue of real actions - This question has
already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court
held that it may not. The motu
proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by
respondent trial court on the ground of
improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish
between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of
actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action is
conferred only by law.[16] It may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action. On the
other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by
statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties, and an objection on improper venue
may be waived by the failure of the defendant
to raise it at the proper time. In such an event,
the court may still render a valid
judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be
left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional,
and hence may be waived. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than
restrict their access to the courts as it relates to
the place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground
of improper venue is certainly not the
appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings. Where the defendant fails to
challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held
and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on
appeal or in a special action be permitted to
belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly
erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the
procedure outlined in the rules of court to take
its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right- A party
may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time
within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that
every case may so far as possible be determined
on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial
of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and
unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the amendment proposed
by petitioner for in so doing, it would have
allowed the actual merits of the case to be
speedily determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing
amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity
of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment to
the complaint was made before the trial of the
case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for
trial.
17. Lozada vs. Bracewell, GR 179155, Apr.
2, 2014;
On 1976, petitioner filed an application
for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514,
which was granted on 1989 by the RTC of
Makati City, acting as a land registration court.
Consequently, on 1997, the LRA issued Decree
in the name of petitioner, who later obtained
OCT covering the said parcel of land.
On 1998, within a year from the
issuance of the aforementioned decree,
Bracewell filed a petition for review of a decree
of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the "Property Registration
Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas City,
claiming that a portion of Plan, consisting of
3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan
PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which he is the
absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently
included in Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly
filed in 1963 an application for registration and
confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated
in Las Piñas City, which was granted by the
RTC of Makati City, on 1989. He further
averred that petitioner deliberately concealed
the fact that Bracewell is one of the adjoining
owners, and left him totally ignorant of the
registration proceedings involving the lots
covered by Plan PSU-129514. Instead of
impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s
grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining
owner, although she had already died by that
time.
Petitioner called Bracewell a mere
interloper with respect to the subject lot, which
the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be
part and parcel his Plan that was approved way
back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan was
surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the
latter plan, in fact, contained a footnote that a
portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a
portion of the parcel of land covered by
petitioner’s Plan.
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA
Director Cortez in a report dated on 1996,
which was submitted to the RTC of Makati
City. The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner
for deliberately preventing respondents from
participating and objecting to his application
for registration when the documentary evidence
showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had
been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that
he Bracewell was recognized as the owner
thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands
way back in 1965, as well as in the City
Assessor's Office.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case
on appeal before the CA, arguing mainly that
the Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction
over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which
should be filed in the same branch of the court
that rendered the decision and ordered the
issuance of the decree.
The appellate court affirmed the
assailed judgment of the RTC.
Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC
has jurisdiction over the petition for
review of Decree No. N-217036, which was
issued as a result of the judgment
rendered by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134.
No. Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the
"Land Registration Act," as amended, – which
was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their
respective registration proceedings – foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall
jurisdiction over all applications for registration
of title was conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective
provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.
The land registration laws were
updated and codified under PD 1529, which
took effect on January 23, 1979, and under
Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an
application for land registration is still vested
on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city
where the land is situated.
Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of
registration only proceeds from the land
registration court’s directive, a petition taken
under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a
review of the land registration court’s ruling.
As such, case law instructs that for "as long as
a final decree has not been entered by the
[LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not
elapsed from the date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it."
While it is indeed undisputed that it
was the RTC of Makati City, which rendered
the decision directing the LRA to issue the
Decree, and should, applying the general rule
as above-stated, be the same court before which
a petition for the review of the Decree is filed,
the Court must consider the circumstantial
milieu in this case that, in the interest of
orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the
said petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First
Instance.— (a) Real actions. — Actions
affecting title to, or for recovery of possession,
or for partition or condemnation of, or
be commenced and tried in the province where
the property or any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is
undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the
application for its original registration should
have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC
were it not for the fact that the said court had
yet to be created at the time the application
was filed.
18. SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag. G.R.
No. 164687. February 12, 2009
Madayag filed with the RTC of Pangasinan an
application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM) filed an opposition to
the application alleging that Madayag’s survey
plan encroached from their properties.
Meanwhile, SM filed with the DENR a petition
for the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan.
SM filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
alleging that the RTC should await the DENR
resolution of the petition for the cancellation of
the survey plan. The RTC issued an Order
granting the Motion. Madayag filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA assailing the RTC
Order. CA granted the petition ordering the
RTC to continue proceedings. Thus, SM filed
this Petition for Review.
Whether the RTC should suspend the proc
eedings in the land registration case
pending the resolution of the petition for
the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan
filed with the DENR.
There is no need to suspend the proceedings. W
hen the law confers jurisdiction upon a court,
the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective. It may, therefore, hear and determine
all questions that arise from a petition for
registration. The RTC need not wait for the
decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel
the survey plan in order to determine whether
the subject property is already titled or forms
part of already titled property. Petition is
denied. The RTC is directed to continue with
the proceedings
19. Brgy. Piapi vs. Talip , GR No. 138248
On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein
petitioners, filed with RTC Branch 18, Digos,
Davao del Sur, a complaint for Reconveyance
and Damages for a parcel of land consisting of
3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Davaol del Sur,
and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of
Deeds issued in the name of Juan Jayag and
has a market value of P15,000. They alleged
that they have openly possessed such land for
30 years in the concept of owner, and that
respondent, Talip, fraudulently obtained from
the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case as considering
that the assessed value of the land is P6,030.
Under Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa (BP)
Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction.
Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in
the RTC as the total assessed value of the
property is P41,890, as shown by Real Property
Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated
August 20, 1996 issued by the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur, Atty. Marcos D.
Risonar, Jr.
On January 12, 1999, RTC Davao dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction hence this
certiorari petition alleging that Section 19 (1) of
BP Bilang 129, as amended, gives the RTC
jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance
since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Whether the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the complaint for
reconveyance
NO, MCTC has the jurisdiction. This case is
analogous to Huguete vs Embudo; where
petitioners argued that a complaint for
annulment of a deed of sale and partition is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. Supreme Court ruled that the nature of
an action is not determined by the caption of
the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
When the ultimate objective of the petitioners,
is to obtain title to real property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof. However, they failed to alleged therein
the assessed value of the subject property.
Instead, what they stated was the market value
of the land which was at P15,000.00.
The Rule requires that the assessed value
of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof, shall be alleged
by the claimant. It bears reiterating that
what determines jurisdiction is the allegations
in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land. Considering that their action
involves the title to or interest in real property,
they should have alleged therein its assessed
value. However, they only specified the
market value or estimated value, which is
P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 33 (3), it is the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court and not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.
RULES: Section 19 (2) of BP Bilang 129.
Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction: (2) In
all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest
thereon, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise: (3) Exclusive jurisdiction in all
civil actions involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, that in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots.
20. Santiago vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), GR No. 156888
This case stemmed from a Complaint
for Recovery of Possession of Property, filed by
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and
herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against
SBMA on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of
Olongapo City, Zambales. In their Complaint
petitioners, alleged that: Victoria M. Rodriguez
is the sole heir and administrator of the estate
of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order
"In the Matter of the Settlement of the Estate
of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc."; In his
lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y
Reyes was the owner of parcels of land
registered in his name under that certificate of
title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-
Protocol.
On January 31, 2002, Victoria M.
Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir and
administrator of the estate of Hermogenes
Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and
Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, 2
parcels of land covered by his aforesaid title. By
virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff
Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid
parcel of land consisting of 2.5 hectares.
Despite the fact that respondent SBMA is not
the owner of the 2 aforesaid parcels of land
leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo,
defendant is claiming possessory, if not
proprietary, rights over them. More
particularly, defendant is using these parcels of
land for its own commercial and other
purposes. Plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez seeks to
recover possession of the property from the
defendant so that she could comply with her
contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
SBMA contends that sometime in 1998,
Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner
Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment
with respondent SBMA, availed herself of the
housing privilege accorded to the latter’s
employees; that due to said privilege, she was
allowed to lease a housing unit inside the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement,
however, "shall be terminated if the lessees are
no longer employed with SBMA;" that on 31
January 2002, Liwanag Santiago’s employment
contract concluded; that since said contract was
not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an
employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a
consequence thereof, as mandated by the
SBMA Housing Policy, she and her family were
asked to vacate and return possession of the
subject housing unit.
On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a
TRO against SBMA from ousting petitioner
Santiago and his family from the premises of
the subject housing unit within 72 hours from
receipt. Further, it was likewise restrained and
enjoined from committing any other acts that
would prevent the latter and his family from
occupying the premises they have allegedly
leased from Victoria Rodriguez.
The RTC stated that since the alleged
right of complainant Rodriguez stemmed from a
Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de
Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be
considered a right in esse. The RTC took
judicial notice of P.D. No. 892, which required
all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply
for registration of their lands under R.A. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six months from effectivity of the decree,
or until 16 August 1976. After such time,
Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used
as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens
System.
Whether the Spanish Titles are still
admissible as evidence of ownership of
lands
No. The present petition is
substantially infirm as this Court had already
expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18
that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any
evidentiary value to establish ownership over
real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16
February 1976. The successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14
August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their
name covering the Subject Property. In the
absence of an allegation in petitioners’
Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it
could be assumed that they failed to do so.
Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892,
then the successors of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez were already enjoined from
presenting the Spanish title as proof of their
ownership of the Subject Property in
registration proceedings.
Spanish titles are subject to
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may
still lose his ownership of the real property to
the occupant who actually possesses the same
for the required prescriptive period. Because of
this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the
applicant for registration of his Spanish title
under the Torrens system must also submit
proof that he is in actual possession of the real
property, so as to discount the possibility that
someone else has acquired a better title to the
same property by virtue of prescription.
Registration proceedings under the
Torrens system do not create or vest title, but
only confirm and record title already created
and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the
courts, in registration proceedings under the
Torrens system, are precluded from accepting,
confirming and recording a Spanish title.
Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise,
are prevented from accepting and indirectly
confirming such Spanish title in some other
form of action brought before them (i.e.,
removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only
short of ordering its recording or registration.
To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to
the existence of land titles, recognized and
affirmed by the courts, but would never be
recorded under the Torrens system of
registration. This would definitely undermine
the Torrens system and cause confusion and
instability in property ownership that P.D. No.
892 intended to eliminate.
21. Mactan-Cebu Int’l Airport Authority
vs. Tirol, gr 171535, June 5, 2009;
DAMILES
A complaint for quieting of title was
filed by respondents, Spouses Edito and Merian
Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda Ngo,
against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA). Plaintiffs-appellees
and business partners claim to have purchased
a 2,000 square meter parcel of land, Lot No.
4763-D, from a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a
Filipino citizen married to a certain Mr. Scott
Edward Jenkins, an American citizen.
Plaintiffs-appellees bought the said property on
the strength of the apparent clean title of
vendor Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax
Declaration and Transfer Certificate. After the
sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were
purportedly purchasers for value and in good
faith, they succeeded in titling the said lot
under their. It was only in January 1996 that
plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on their
title when their request for a Height Clearance
with the Department of Transportation and
Communications was referred to the defendant-
appellant Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of
the latter’s ownership of the said lot by way of
purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
According to plaintiffs-appellees:
Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763 was decreed
in the names of spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act on June 1, 1934. Julian Cuison
and Marcosa Cosef sold the to Spouses Moises
Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug, who
thereafter succeeded to secure the
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title.
Thereafter, the latter sold a portion,
denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs. Elma
Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier
discussed, sold the same lot to herein plaintiffs-
appellees.
According to the defendant-appellant:
The original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the
government, through the [then] Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA, for brevity).
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
MCIAA.
Who is the True Owner of the subject
Property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but
on grounds different than those relied upon by
the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the
New Civil Code is misplaced. We enumerated
the requisites that must concur for Article
1544 to apply, viz.: (a) The two (or more) sales
transactions must constitute valid sales; (b)
The two (or more) sales transactions must
pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c)
The two (or more) buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each represent conflicting interests; and (d) The
two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each have
bought from the very same seller. Obviously,
said provision has no application in cases where
the sales involved were initiated not by just one
vendor but by several successive vendors.
In the instant case, respondents and
petitioner had acquired the subject property
from different transferors. Petitioner, through
its predecessor-in-interest (CAA), acquired the
entire Lot No. 4763 from its original owners,
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, on
March 23, 1958. On the other hand,
respondents acquired the subject parcel of land,
a portion of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma
Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five
years later. The immediate transferors of Elma
Jenkins were the spouses Moises Cuizon and
Beatriz Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained the
subject property from spouses Julian Cuison
and Marcosa Cosef. Therefore, the instant
controversy cannot be governed by Article 1544
since petitioner and respondents do not have
the same immediate seller.
In this regard, well-settled is the rule
that registration of instruments must be done
in the proper registry in order to effect and bind
the land.[19] Prior to the Property Registration
Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land
Registration Act) governed the recording of
transactions involving registered land, i.e., land
with a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No.
3344, as amended, provided for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real
estate without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.[20] Accordingly, if a parcel of land
covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is
registered under Act No. 3344 and not under
the Land Registration Act, the sale is not
considered registered and the registration of
the deed does not operate as constructive notice
to the whole world.
22. Melencio vs CA, GR 148846, Sept 25,
2007
The subject property is a 30,351 square meter
parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot
No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas, Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of
30,777 square meters covered by TCT No.
20626 in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim
Chuan. The entire property was originally
owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one
child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia, mother of the
late Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Amodias.
The entire property was brought under the
operation of the Torrens System. However, the
title thereto was lost during the Second World
War. On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly
executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale whereby
they extra-judicially settled the estate of
Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject
property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty
Company for a consideration of P10,200.00. On
August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale was registered under Act 3344 as there
was no title on file at the Register of Deeds of
Lapiu-Lapu City. Thereafter, AZNAR made
some improvements and constructed a beach
house theron. On February 18, 1989,
petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale, conveying the
subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan for
and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar then
filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go
Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and
Cancellation of TCT No. 20626 alleging that the
sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second
sale.
WON there is a valid certification and
verification by only one of the plaintiffs
Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case
of Iglesia ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that
Commonality of interest is material and crucial
to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be
reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a
patent denial of substantial justice, because it
cannot be denied, that the ends of justice are
better served when cases are determined on the
merits- after all parties are given full
opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses
– rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. The same liberality
should likewise be applied to the certification
against forum shopping. The general rule is
that the certification must be signed by all
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only
one of them is insufficient. However, the Court
has also stressed in a number of cases that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and thus should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective. The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the contents
of the certification. This is because the
requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions merely underscored its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
23. Casimiro Development Corp. vs. Mateo
| G.R. No. 175485 | 24 July 2011
In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank
the land in question which was previously sold
by the mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in
turn constituted a mortgage on the property in
favor of China Bank as security for a loan.
China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and
consolidated its ownership of the property after
Rodolfo failed to redeem. A Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) was issued in the name of China
Bank. In 1991, the petitioner brought an action
for unlawful detainer against the respondent’s
siblings. Respondent counters that the
petitioner acquired the property from China
Bank in bad faith because it had actual
knowledge of the possession of the property by
the respondent and his siblings.
Whether the petitioner was an innocent
purchaser for value
One who deals with property registered under
the Torrens System need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title. He is charged with notice
only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT was a
clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or
encumbrance, the petitioner had the right to
rely, when it purchased the property, solely
upon the face of the certificate of title in the
name of China Bank. The respondent’s sibling’s
possession did not translate to an adverse claim
of ownership. They even characterized their
possession only as that of mere agricultural
tenants. Under no law was possession grounded
on tenancy a status that might create a defector
inflict a law in the title of the owner. The
petitioner having paid the full and fair price of
the land, was an innocent purchaser for value.
The TCT in the name of the petitioner was
declared valid and subsisting.
NB: If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid,
he should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all,
which will not only be unfair to him as the
purchaser, but will also erode public confidence
in the system and will force land transactions
to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof
of ownership.
The Torrens Certificate of Title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title in the particular
property described therein. The issuance of the
certificate of title to a particular person does
not preclude the possibility that persons not
named in the certificate may be co-owners of
the real property therein described with the
person named therein, or that the registered
owner may be holding the property in trust for
another person.
Registration of land under the Torrens System,
aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period
allowed by law, also renders the title immune
from collateral attack.
24. Vicente vs. Avera, G.R. No. 169970,
January 20, 2009
On May 29, 1991, Avera filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the
RTC and docketed as JDRC Case. Avera
asserted exclusive ownership over the property
in dispute. A notice of lis pendens was inscribed
on TCT No. 34351.
Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property
in dispute. On July 22, 1998, TCT No. 34351
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the Registry
of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for
the property in dispute, on the basis of the deed
of sale executed on October 1, 1987. The notice
of lis pendens was carried over to TCT No.
14216.
The RTC of Pasig City, rendered a Decision in
the JDRC case, declaring the marriage of Avera
and Domingo void and ordering the property
acquired during their cohabitation to be put in
the custody of Avera, including the property in
dispute. Petitioners filed a Complaint for
Injunction with Prayer for a TRO before the
RTC of Mandaluyong City enjoining
respondents from enforcing the notice to vacate.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, Mandaluyong City. The CA
held that petitioners are bound by the outcome
of the JDRC case, because the annotation of the
notice of lis pendens (January 23, 1992) was
ahead of petitioners’ registration of the deed of
sale executed on October 1, 1987 (July 22,
1998).
Whether the CA erred in ordering the
dismissal of the complaint for injunction
despite the fact that petitioners are the
registered owners of the property
Yes. As the registered owners and actual
possessors of the property in question,
petitioners have a clear legal right to the
property in dispute. Section 51 of PD 1529
provides that registration is the operative act
that conveys or affects registered land as
against third persons. Thus, a TCT is the best
proof of ownership of land. In the case at bar, it
is undisputed that petitioners are the
registered owners and actual possessors of the
subject property. Moreover, as the registered
owners, petitioners have the right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of ownership.
A petition which, in effect, questioned the
validity of a deed of sale for registered land
constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of
title. It was erroneous for respondents to assail
the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in
favor of petitioners, because this constitutes a
collateral attack on petitioners’ TCT. Section 48
of P.D. No. 1529 prohibits a collateral attack on
a Torrens title.
The notice of lis pendens neither affects the
merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It
serves to protect the real rights of the
registrant while the case involving such rights
is pending resolution. While the notice of lis
pendens remains on a certificate of title, the
registrant could rest secure that he would not
lose the property or any part of it during the
litigation. For this reason, the Court has
pronounced that a “purchaser who buys
registered land with full notice of the fact that
it is in litigation between the vendor and a
third party stands in the shoes of his vendor
and his title is subject to the incidents and
result of the pending litigation.”
25. OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF
PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a
406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City
covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio which was an accretion of Cut-
cut creek. They assert that the original
occupant and possessor land was their great
grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to
his son, Pedro Valdez. Meanwhile, in 1961,
respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida. Pedro transferred his rights
over the land in favor of Ebio. Office of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08 seeking for the construction
of an access road along Cut-cut Creek
traversing the lot occupied by the respondents
and they proceeded to cut eight coconut trees
planted on the said lot City Administrator sent
a letter to the respondents ordering them to
vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days,
or be physically evicted from the said property.
Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent
for a further dialogue. The request remained
unheeded.
However, records of the case shows that
Rsidential Lot 8 is owned by Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. covered by TCT which appears to
have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to
the City Government of Parañaque.
Whether the respondent acquired the
property by acquisitive prescription.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their
predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had
occupied and possessed the subject lot as early
as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio
secured a permit from the local government of
Parañaque for the construction of their family
dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
executed an affidavit of possession and
occupancy allowing him to declare the property
in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it
was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes,
Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL
8) which adjoins the land occupied by the
respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than
thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in
its corporate or private capacity sought to
register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired
ownership over the subject property through
prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register
their title over the said lot. It must be
remembered that the purpose of land
registration is not the acquisition of lands, but
only the registration of title which the applicant
already possessed over the land. Registration
was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership. A decree of registration merely
confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
26. Duque – Rosario vs Banco Filipino
savings and Mortgage Bank
This case involves a lot that was foreclosed by
banco filipino. Lot No. 356 – A was a piece of
land under the possession of Dr. Rosario who
mortgaged it several times, including
respondent Banco Filipino in this case. For
their failure to pay their loan it was foreclosed.
Apparently, the said lot actually belonged to
the Torbela siblings who lent it to Dr. Rosario
as an accomodation for them to make loans
from banks with a mortgage on the properties.
While the property was under Dr. Rosario's
name, he registered them and acquired
registration titles in his name.
Whether or not the mortgage was valid?
No.
Under the civil code, one of the requisites of the
contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor
should be the absolute owner of the property to
be mortgaged, otherwise the mortgage is
considered null and void. Dr. Rosario was held
not to be the owner of the mortgaged property
but merely constituted an implied trust with
the Torbela siblings as they agreed the
properties would only be transferred to secure
loans.
Even if certificates of title were issued in favor
of Rosario, registration does not vest title to
him, but merely evidence of such title. Land
Registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has.
A trustee who obtains a torrens title over a
property held in trust for him by another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration.
27. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF
FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO G.R. No.
171571, March 24, 2008
2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in
four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono
¼ share in the two lots;
b) Tito Dignos ¼ share in the two lots;
c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
¼ share in the two lots; and
d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
¼ share in the two lots
It appears that the two lots were not
partitioned by the adjudicatees. It appears
further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was
awarded ¼ share in the two lots, sold the entire
two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) via a public instrument
entitled ”Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale”
without the knowledge of respondents whose
predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees
of the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA), erected a security fence one of the lot
and relocated a number of families, who had
built their dwellings within the airport
perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance
airport security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of
a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA
to cease giving third persons permission to
occupy the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu
City. Respondents further alleged that neither
they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold,
alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots
of which they have been in continuous peaceful
possession. Respondents furthermore alleged
that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-
interest had given them any written notice of
its acquisition of the ¼ share of Tito Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its
Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that
from the time the lots were sold to its
predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession thereof; through acquisitive
prescription, it had acquired valid title to the
lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and
for value; and assuming arguendo that it did
not have just title, it had, by possession for over
30 years, acquired ownership thereof by
extraordinary prescription. At all events,
petitioner contended that respondents action
was barred by estoppel and laches.
The trial court found for respondents. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the
heirs of Tito binding to the respondents
NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of
this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even
if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to thesale.This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that
since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is NOT null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus
acquired only the rights pertaining to the
sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼
undivided share of the two lots.
2. WON estoppel and laches should work
against respondents
NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of
acquisitive prescription. Petitioners’ insistence
that it acquired the property through
acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then
extraordinary, does not lie. It bears emphasis at
this juncture that in the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito
Dignos heirs the following material portions
thereof validate the claim of respondents that
the two lots were registered: x x x x
That since the OCT of Title of the above-
mentioned property/ies has/have been lost
and/or destroyed… and the VENDEE hereby
binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own
expense and that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their
heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves
to help in the reconstitution of title so that the
said lot/s may be registered in the name of the
VENDEE in accordance with law x x x x
NOTES: As for petitioners argument that the
redemption price should be ¼ of the prevailing
market value, not of the actual purchase price,
since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received
just compensation for the property at the time
it was purchased by the Government; and, (2)
the property, due to improvements introduced
by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth
several hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is
not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of
the increase in value of the lots.
As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito
Dignos did not notify respondents about the
sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs,
assigns and successors, undertake and agree to
warrant and defend the possession and
ownership of the property/ies herein sold
against any and all just claims of all persons
whomsoever and should the VENDEE be
disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and
defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This
decision is, therefore, without prejudice to
petitioners right to seek redress against the
vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their
successors-in-interest.
28. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. VS.
PALILEO G.R. NO. 83432, MAY 20, 1991
In April 1970, defendant spouses
Enrique Castro and Herminio R. Castro (spouse
Castro) sold to herein respondent Manuelito
Palileo a parcel of unregistered coconut land in
Surigao del Norte. The sale is evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, but the deed
was not registered in the Registry of Property
for unregistered lands in the province of
Surigao del Norte. Since the execution of the
deed of sale, Palileo who was then employed in
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, exercised acts of
ownership over the land through his mother
Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer.
Manuelito Palileo has continuously paid the
real estate taxes on said land from 1971 until
the present.
In November 1976, the CFI of Manila
rendered a judgment was rendered against
defendant Enrique T. Castro to pay herein
petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company
(Radiowealth), the sum of P22,350.35 with
interest rate of 16% per annum from November
2, 1975 until fully paid, and upon the finality of
the judgment, a writ of execution was issued.
The Provincial Sheriff Marietta E. Eviota,
through defendant Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Leopoldo Risma, levied upon and finally sold at
public auction the subject land that defendant
Enrique Castro had sold to Palileo in 1970. The
said Provincial Sheriff executed a certificate of
sale was by the in favor of Radiowealth as the
only bidder, and upon expiration of the
redemption period, she also executed a deed of
final sale. Both documents were registered with
the Registry of Deeds.
Learning of what happened to the land,
Palileo filed an action for recovery of the subject
property. The court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of Palileo, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Who is the rightful owner of the subject
property?
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed
the appellate court’s decision on this case.
There is no doubt that had the subject property
been a registered land, this case would have
been decided in favor of Radiowealth since it
was the company that had its claim first
recorded in the Registry of Deeds for it is the
act of registration that operates to convey and
affect registered land. Therefore, a bonafide
purchaser of a registered land at an execution
sale acquires a good title as against a prior
transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.
However, a different set of rules applies
in the case at bar which deals with a parcel of
unregistered land. Under Act No. 3344,
registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a
third party with a better right." The
aforequoted phrase has been held by the
Supreme Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one's favor does not give
him any right over the land if the vendor was
not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even
if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Applying
this principle, the Court of Appeals correctly
held that the execution sale of the unregistered
land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because
the land no longer belonged to the judgment
debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
29. Talusan v. Tayag, g.r. 133698, Apr. 4,
2001
The case involves auction sale of a
condominium unit, covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in
Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas,
Baguio City.
Elias imperial, the former owner, sold
his condominium unit to Antonio Talusan and
Celia Talusan, as evidenced by an Absolute
Deed of Sale. Juan Hernandez, the City
Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to
Imperial informing him that the property
would be sold at public auction if Imperial
failed to satisfy the delinquent real estate
taxes, penalties and cost of sale, amounting to
Php4,039.80. Unbeknownst to Hernandez,
Imperial and his family had already migrated
to Australia.
The property was sold through auction
sale to Hermenegildo Tayag for Php4,400.00
and a final bill of sale was issued in his favor.
The Talusans, who were still in possession of
the property, offered to pay the same to Tayag
were rejected. They filed for writ of preliminary
injunction.
RTC of Baguio, Branch 6, ruled in favor
of Tayag, finding that Tayag is not bound to the
Deed of Sale between Imperial and the
Talusans because such was never registered
with the Register of Deeds.
The Talusans sought for the annulment
of the auction sale, but the legality of the sale
was upheld. The CA affirmed.
Whether the auction sale was not valid
because of non-publication of delinquent
real estate taxes – SC ruled in favor of the
respondents.
Cases involving an auction sale of land
for the collection of delinquent taxes are in
personam, unlike land registration proceedings.
Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in
proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy
the requirement of proceedings in personam.
Mere publication of the notice of delinquency
would not suffice, considering that the
procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was,
therefore, still incumbent upon the city
treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency
directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the
interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of
delinquency was sent by registered mail to the
permanent address of the registered owner in
Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of
Baguio City directed him to settle the charges
immediately and to protect his interest in the
property. Under the circumstances, we hold
that the notice sent by registered mail
adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer,
who was the registered owner of the
condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax,
the registered owner of the property is
deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the
registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax
delinquency and other proceedings relative to
the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the
property, petitioners cannot claim to have been
deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not
entitled to it.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out
the fact that petitioners brought this
misfortune upon themselves. They neither
registered the Deed of Sale after its execution
nor moved for the consolidation of ownership of
title to the property in their name. Worse, they
failed to pay the real property taxes due.
Although they had been in possession of the
property since 1981, they did not take the
necessary steps to protect and legitimize their
interest.
Indeed, petitioners’ suit is now barred by
laches. The law helps the vigilant, but not those
who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of
obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against
the slothful and the condemners of their own
rights.
30. Yu v. Pacleb, g.r. 172172, Feb. 24, 2009;
FERRER
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife
Angelita Chan are registered owners of an
18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio
Langcaan, Dasmariñas,Cavite, covered by TCT
No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property).
On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar
Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the property to
Rebecca del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter
sold to Ruperto Javier.
On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell
was entered into between Javier and Spouses
Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed to pay
Javier P200,000 as partial payment and
P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the
contract, and Javier undertook to deliver
possession of the Langcaan Property and to
sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from
execution of contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not
registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint
with the RTC for specific performance and
damages against Javier, contending that Javier
represented to them that the Langcaan
Property was not tenanted, but after they
already paid P200,000 as initial payment and
entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11,
1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by
Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb.
Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the
cancellation of the agreement and for the
return of their initial payment.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu,
Ramon, and the latter’s wife executed a
“Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang
Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa
Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid Ramon
P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his
tenancy rights over the subject property. But on
Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint
for annulment of the deed of sale to Javier,
alleging that the deed of sale executed between
him and his late first wife Angelita was
spurious as their signatures were forgeries.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed
an action for forcible entry against respondent
with the MTC alleging that they had prior
physical possession of the Langcaan Property
through their trustee Ramon until the latter
was ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC
ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the
RTC, but set aside by CA.
His first action for annulment of deed of
sale having been dismissed, respondent filed
action for removal of cloud from title on May
29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale
between him and his late first wife and Rebecca
del Rosario could not have been executed on
Feb. 27, 1992, because on said date, he was
residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died
20 years ago. During pendency of the case,
respondent died, succeeded by his surviving
spouse and representatives of children with his
first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are
purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA
reversed and set aside lower court’s decision
and ordered for the cancellation of the
annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of
Langcaan Property.
Whether or not petitioner spouses are
innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith.
Petitioner spouses are not innocent
purchasers for value, and they are not in good
faith. Several facts should have put petitioner
spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of
their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan
property.
First, the property remains to be
registered in the name of respondent despite
the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to
Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and
both deeds were not even annotated in the title
of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale
were executed only 2 months apart containing
identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan
Property is in the possession of Ramon, son of
the registered owners, this should have made
petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity
of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier.
Petitioner spouses could have easily verified
the true status of the subject property from
Ramon’s wife, since the latter is their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a
purchaser who buys from the registered owner
himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher
degree of prudence from one who buys
from a person who is not the registered
owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who
buys from the registered owner does not need to
look behind the certificate of title, one who
buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the
title of the transferor, or in his capacity to
transfer the land.
Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be
considered as innocent purchasers in good
faith, and respondent has a better right over
the Langcaan Property as the true owner
thereof.
31. FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN
LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No. 158407 January
17, 2005
Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint
for forcible entry against respondent Vivian
Jensen before the MTC. The summons and the
complaint were not served on the respondent
because the latter was apparently out of the
country. The Sheriff left the summons and
complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's
brother), who received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the
respondent. The respondent failed to appeal the
decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was
issued.
The respondent then filed a complaint against
the petitioner before the RTC for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC on the
ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she
was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. Respondent
claimed she was a resident of Oslo, Norway and
although she owned the house where Oscar
Layno received the summons and the
complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo
Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno
was never authorized to receive the summons
and the complaint for and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the respondent. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the CA
which affirmed the appealed decision with
modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint
was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi
in rem.
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.
Whether or not there was a valid service
of the summons and complaint on the
respondent.
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s
complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner
against the respondent is an action quasi in
rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner
for forcible entry is a real action and one in
personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce
a personal obligation or liability on the
defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil
Code, for the latter to vacate the property
subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay
actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the
property.
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership
of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam is to impose, through
the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. It has been held that an action in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive
relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is
an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v.
Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments
are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all
possible claimants. The judgments therein are
binding only upon the parties who joined in the
action.
On the issue of whether the respondent
was validly served with the summons and
complaint by the Sheriff:
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the
Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the person of a resident
defendant who does not voluntarily appear in
court can be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance
with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily
out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (a) substituted
service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal
service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.
In the present case, the records show that the
respondent, before and after his marriage to
Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent
was in Oslo, Norway, having left the
Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons
and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only
be validly served on her through substituted
service The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officer’s
Return; otherwise, any substituted service
made in lieu of personal service cannot be
upheld.
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the
term "dwelling house" or "residence" are
generally held to refer to the time of service;
hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons
at the former’s dwelling house, residence or
place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling
house or residence refers to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service is made, even though he
may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. It is, thus, the service of the summons
intended for the defendant that must be left
with the person of suitable age and discretion
residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much important as
the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
As gleaned from the service return, there is no
showing that the house where the Sheriff found
Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that
of the respondent herein. Neither is there any
showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain
where the residence of the respondent was on
the said date. It turned out that the occupant of
the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and
that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to
collect the rentals from him. The service of the
summons on a person at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have been left at the
residence or place or abode, where he has
another place at which he ordinarily stays and
to which he intends to return.
Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent; as such, the
decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is
null and void.
32. DBP vs. COA, G.R. 144516, Feb. 11, 2004
*nothing in the full text of the case relates even
remotely to LTD
The DBP is a government financial institution
with an original charter. The COA is a
constitutional body with the mandate to
examine and audit all government
instrumentalities and investment of public
funds. On February 26, 1980, a Trust Indenture
was entered into by and between the DBP
and the Board of Trustees of the Gratuity Plan
Fund, vesting in the latter the control and
administration of the Fund. The trustee,
subsequently, appointed the DBP Trust
Services Department (DBP-TSD) as the
investment manager thru an Investment
Management Agreement, with the end in view
of making the income and principal of the
Fund sufficient to meet the liabilities of DBP
under the Gratuity Plan.
In 1983, the Bank established a Special Loan
Program availed thru the facilities of the DBP
Provident Fund and funded by placements from
the Gratuity Plan Fund. This Special Loan
Program was adopted as part of the benefit
program of the Bank to provide financial
assistance to qualified members to enhance and
protect the value of their gratuity benefits
because Philippine retirement laws and the
Gratuity Plan do not allow partial payment of
retirement benefits. The program was
suspended in 1986 but was revived in 1991 thru
DBP Board Resolution No. 066 dated January
5, 1991.
Under the Special Loan Program, a prospective
retiree is allowed the option to utilize in the
form of a loan a portion of his "outstanding
equity" in the gratuity fund and to invest it in a
profitable investment or undertaking. The
earnings of the investment shall be applied to
pay for the interest due on the gratuity loan
which was initially set at 9% per annum subject
to the minimum investment rate resulting from
the updated actuarial study. The excess or
balance of the interest earnings shall then be
distributed to the investor-members.
Pursuant to the investment scheme, DBP-TSD
paid to the investor-members a total of
₱11,626,414.25 representing the net earnings of
the investments for the years 1991 and 1992.
The payments were disallowed by the Auditor
under Audit Observation Memorandum No. 93-
2 dated March 1, 1993, on the ground that the
distribution of income of the Gratuity Plan
Fund (GPF) to future retirees of DBP is
irregular and constituted the use of public
funds for private purposes which is specifically
proscribed under Section 4 of P.D. 1445.
AOM No. 93-2 did "not question the authority
of the Bank to set-up the [Gratuity Plan] Fund
and have it invested in the Trust Services
Department of the Bank."9 Apart from
requiring the recipients of the ₱11,626,414.25
to refund their dividends, the Auditor
recommended that the DBP record in its books
as miscellaneous income the income of the
Gratuity Plan Fund ("Fund"). The Auditor
reasoned that "the Fund is still owned by the
Bank, the Board of Trustees is a mere
administrator of the Fund in the same way that
the Trust Services Department where the fund
was invested was a mere investor and neither
can the employees, who have still an inchoate
interest [i]n the Fund be considered as rightful
owner of the Fund."
Former DBP Chairman Antonio requested COA
Chairman Gangan to reconsider AOM No. 93-2.
Chairman Antonio alleged that the express
trust created for the benefit of qualified DBP
employees under the Trust Agreement
("Agreement") gave the Fund a separate legal
personality. The Agreement transferred legal
title over the Fund to the Board of Trustees and
all earnings of the Fund accrue only to the
Fund. Thus, Chairman Antonio contended that
the income of the Fund is not the income of
DBP.
Chairman Antonio also asked COA to lift the
disallowance of the ₱11,626,414.25 distributed
as dividends under the SLP on the ground that
the latter was simply a normal loan
transaction. He compared the SLP to loans
granted by other gratuity and retirement funds,
like the GSIS, SSS and DBP Provident Fund.
Whether DBP has the requisite standing
to file the instant petition for certiorari
YES. Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution
does not bar government instrumentalities
from questioning decisions of the COA.
Government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations have long resorted
to petitions for certiorari to question rulings of
the COA. These government entities filed their
petitions with this Court pursuant to Section 7,
Article IX of the Constitution, which mandates
that aggrieved parties may bring decisions of
the COA to the Court on certiorari. As a party
to the Agreement and a trustor of the Fund,
DBP has a material interest in the
implementation of the Agreement, and in the
operation of the Gratuity Plan and the Fund as
prescribed in the Agreement. The DBP also
possesses a real interest in upholding the
legitimacy of the policies and programs
approved by its Board of Directors for the
benefit of DBP employees. This includes the
SLP and its implementing rules, which the
DBP Board of Directors confirmed.
Whether the income of the Fund is income
of DBP
NO. The Agreement indisputably transferred
legal title over the income and properties of the
Fund to the Fund’s trustees. Thus, COA’s
directive to record the income of the Fund in
DBP’s books of account as the miscellaneous
income of DBP constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The income of the Fund does not
form part of the revenues or profits of DBP, and
DBP may not use such income for its own
benefit. The principal and income of the Fund
together constitute the res or subject matter of
the trust. The Agreement established the Fund
precisely so that it would eventually be
sufficient to pay for the retirement benefits of
DBP employees under RA 1616 without
additional outlay from DBP. COA itself
acknowledged the authority of DBP to set up
the Fund. However, COA’s subsequent directive
would divest the Fund of income, and defeat the
purpose for the Fund’s creation.
Whether the distribution of dividends
under the SLP is valid
NO. As Chairman Zalamea himself noted,
neither the Gratuity Plan nor our laws on
retirement allow the partial payment of
retirement benefits ahead of actual retirement.
It appears that DBP sought to circumvent these
restrictions through the SLP, which released a
portion of an employee’s retirement benefits to
him in the form of a loan. Certainly, the DBP
did this for laudable reasons, to address the
concerns of DBP employees on the devaluation
of their retirement benefits. The remaining
question is whether RA 1616 and the Gratuity
Plan allow this scheme.
We rule that it is not allowed. Severance of
employment is a condition sine qua non for the
release of retirement benefits. Retirement
benefits are not meant to recompense
employees who are still in the employ of the
government. That is the function of salaries
and other emoluments.
In the present case, the Fund allowed the
debtor-employee to "borrow" a portion of his
gratuity fund credit solely for the purpose of
investing it in certain instruments specified by
DBP. The debtor-employee could not dispose of
or utilize the loan in any other way. These
instruments were, incidentally, some of the
same securities where the Fund placed its
investments. At the same time the Fund
obligated the debtor-employee to assign
immediately his loan to DBP-TSD so that the
amount could be commingled with the loans of
other employees. The DBP-TSD – the same
department which handled and had custody of
the Fund’s accounts – then purchased or re-
allocated existing securities in the portfolio
of the Fund to correspond to the employees’
loans.
In sum, the SLP enabled certain DBP
employees to utilize and even earn from their
retirement gratuities even before they retired.
This constitutes a partial release of their
retirement benefits, which is contrary to RA
1616 and the Gratuity Plan. As we have
discussed, the latter authorizes the release of
gratuities from the earnings and principal of
the Fund only upon retirement.
33. Republic vs. Naguit and CA, G.R.
144057, Jan. 17, 2005
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration
of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her
imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas,
Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision
confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon
failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial
after filing his formal opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the
property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
claim of ownership since the subject land was
declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Whether it is necessary under Section 14
(1) of the PRD that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
NO. Section 14 (1) merely requires that
the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is file. To
follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the
construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative
for it would mean that all lands of public
domain which were not declared as alienable
and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not
be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession
by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the
government from enforcing the said provision
as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and
disposable.
There are three requirements for
registration of title, (1) that the subject
property is alienable and disposable; (2) that
the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession and occupation, and; (3) that the
possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the
government through a statute or proclamation
stating the intention of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property, thus,
declaring the land as alienable and disposable.
However, if there has been none, it is presumed
that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property and the possession of the
land no matter how long would not ripen into
ownership through acquisitive prescription.
The land in question was found to be
cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old. The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14 (1) of the PRD. Naguit
had the right to apply for registration owing to
the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
34. Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., g.r.
162243, Dec. 3, 2009; DAMILES
PICOP filed with the DENR an application
to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 43convertedinto an IFMA.PICOP filed
before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully
refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute
the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter
has complied with all the legal requirements for
the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as
amended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of
PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP)in its Petition
for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the
government is bound by contract, a
1969Document signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with
PICOP.
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract
recognized under the non-impairment
clause by which the government may be
bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran
that a timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the non-impairment clause is
edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses
are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot
be invoked. The Presidential Warranty
cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP
of exclusive possession and enjoyment of
its concession areas. Such an interpretation
would result in the complete abdication by the
State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power
to control and supervise the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural
resources in the area.
35. MINDA S. GAERLAN, petitioner vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent
Petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan filed an
application for srcinal registration of title over
a parcel of land situated in Cagayan De Oro
City, alleging that she acquired said property
from a certain Mamerta Tan by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land
and accordingly had the property declared for
taxation under her name. The trial court,
finding saidapplication sufficient in form, set
the case for initial hearing. Subsequently, the
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed an Opposition to said
application for registration on the ground,
among others, that neither petitioner nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject Land since June
12, 1945or earlier and that the tax declarations
do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject
land.
The trial court granted petitioner’s application
for registration of title. The OSG appealed from
said decision asserting that the trial court erred
in ruling that the subject parcel of land is
available for private appropriation. The CA
reversed the trial court’s Decision and
dismissed the application for registration of
title, finding that petitioner failed to present
any proof to establish that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. The CA enunciated,
among others that the petitioner must prove
that the DENR Secretary has approved the
land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable and
that the land subject of the application falls
within the approved area per verification
through the survey of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources (PENRO)
or Community Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO).
Hence, this petition.
Whether the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner’s application for registration of
title.
No, the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s
application based on the insufficiency of the
evidence presented and the incomplete
requirements.
PD No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No.141, as amended by
Section 4 of PD No. 1073 specifies those who
are qualified to apply for registration of land
i.e., those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in an open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Moreover, under the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership is on the
person applying for registration who must
prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable. To prove that the
land is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Land
Investigators, and a legislative act or statute.