G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
 practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
 rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a

manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I
am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and

Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
 members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a

lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained

primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which
are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation
is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
 instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a

major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
 Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of

terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua nonfor foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to
 the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA
J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services
Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag ("Petitioner" for brevity) questions the constitutionality of the
appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo ("Benipayo" for
brevity) as Chairman of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity); and (2)
Resurreccion Z. Borra ("Borra" for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. ("Tuason" for brevity) as
COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment of Velma J.
Cinco1 ("Cinco" for brevity) as Director IV of the COMELEC’s Education and Information Department
("EID" for brevity).

The Facts

On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.
On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
"Temporary" capacity.2

On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman,3 and Borra4 and Tuason5 as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of
seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the
position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed
their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the
Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason for confirmation.6 However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments.

On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2,
2008.7 They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on
June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.8

Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments.
Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions.9 The Office of the President submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.10 They took their oaths of office
anew.

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11,
200111 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID,
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a
Memorandum dated April 14, 200112 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically,
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the
EID in the reassignment of petitioner.

On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department.13 Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
"transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until
June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001,14 citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states in part:

"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it
by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to
the foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new
employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the
effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that
the changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before
election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing."

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.15 Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules
and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Simultaneously, petitioner
challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID. Petitioner, moreover, questions
the legality of the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-
Charge Gideon C. De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other
emoluments.

In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad
interimappointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as
Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008.18 They all took
their oaths of office anew.

The Issues

The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows:

1. Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its
power of judicial review in constitutional cases;
2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interimappointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and
subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment
under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;

4. Whether or not Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and
her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without
the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body;

5. Whether or not the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELEC’s Finance Services Department, in

continuing to make disbursements in favor of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in
excess of jurisdiction.

First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review

Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may
exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the
Executive department, which is co-equal with this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from
reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interimappointments issued by the President to Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.19Respondents argue that the second, third and
fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a
personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a
result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office.
Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions
assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the
appointments of these three respondents.

Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001
despite the fact that the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as
early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three
respondents were issued ad interim appointments.

Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the
EID to the Law Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not
the lis mota of this case.

We are not persuaded.

Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law
Department, where she was placed on detail service.20 Respondents claim that the reassignment
was "pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the
Commission’s Chief Executive Officer."21Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of petitioner’s
reassignment on Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on
whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting
Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.

On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in
accordance with the Constitution, then petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to
complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner
has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption
of office. Petitioner’s personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition.

Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad

interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on
August 3, 2001, when the first ad interimappointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001.
However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal."22 Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court,
which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body.
Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a
constitutional issue may be passed upon.23 There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional
issue on time.

Moreover, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad

interimappointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad
interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment
from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the
very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of
the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national
elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In
keeping with this Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have remained
within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may
even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised.24 Here the
petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a temporary appointment that
is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the
President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in
character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

Based on petitioner’s theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to the
other two constitutional commissions, namely the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on
Audit. The last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution is also found in Article IX-B
and Article IX-D providing for the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on
Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that
the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments for only then does his appointment become permanent and no longer temporary in
character.

The rationale behind petitioner’s theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments can guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed
appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the Commission on Appointments
since his appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the
appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can
be terminated at any time for any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword of Damocles hangs over
the head of every appointee whose confirmation is pending with the Commission on Appointments.

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President
can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without
basis.

More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is
permanent in character. In Summers vs. Ozaeta,25 decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:

"x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the ‘President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
 alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued." (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus
an ad interimappointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and
exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,26 this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as
follows:

"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it
is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the
Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with
reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus
qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the
language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’"

Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the meantime"
or "for the time being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly
temporary in character. This argument is not new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 where we explained that:

"x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in
understanding the situation. Private respondent had been extended several ‘ad interim’
appointments which petitioner mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature.
Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word ‘ad interim’ which creates such belief. The term is
defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an officerad interim is one
appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary
incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such
is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban’s
appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is
used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of
the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the
University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President,
means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,
although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under
Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an ad
interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals,28 where the
Court stated:

"We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature
of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in
an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the
instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto,
Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private
respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the
 Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private
respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment which
could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are
permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them." (Emphasis supplied)

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a
government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection
that "[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law."29 Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of anad interim appointment is
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.30 Once an appointee has
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The
second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on
his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution
on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the
Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power.31 A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC. Thus, in Brillantes vs. Yorac,32 this Court struck down as unconstitutional the
designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting
Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:

"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity,
the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may
be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she
sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be
estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

xxx

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is
not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by
designation of the President of the Philippines."

Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,33 a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did
not have a provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, this Court
nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting member of
the COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an acting Commissioner would undermine
the independence of the COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. We declared then: "It would
be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint
a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily." (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies
in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee
Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments
that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision should
be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the nomination of officers subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments - did not provide for ad interim appointments.
The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments
because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-
day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935
Constitution on ad interim appointments. The following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission elucidates this:

"FR. BERNAS: X x x our compulsory recess now is only 30 days. So under such
circumstances, is it necessary to provide for ad interim appointments? Perhaps there should
be a little discussion on that.

xxx

MS. AQUINO: My concern is that unless this problem is addressed, this might present
problems in terms of anticipating interruption of government business, considering that we
are not certain of the length of involuntary recess or adjournment of the Congress. We are
certain, however, of the involuntary adjournment of the Congress which is 30 days, but we
cannot leave to conjecture the matter of involuntary recess.

FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are trying to look for a formula. I wonder if the
Commissioner has a formula x x x.

xxx

MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the matter raised by Commissioner Aquino
and after conferring with the Committee, Commissioner Aquino and I propose the following
amendment as the last paragraph of Section 16, the wordings of which are in the 1935
Constitution: THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS
DURING THE RECESS OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT BE VOLUNTARY OR
COMPULSORY BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL
 DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT
ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.

This is otherwise called the ad interim appointments.

xxx

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the proposed amendment of Commissioners

Aquino and Bengzon, adding a paragraph to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence) The
Chair hears none; the amendment is approved."37 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the
President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise
would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional
commissions. In his concurring opinion inGuevara vs. Inocentes,38 decided under the 1935
Constitution, Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad
interim appointments in this manner:

"Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited? Because, if they expired
before the session of Congress, the evil sought to be avoided – interruption in the discharge
of essential functions – may take place. Because the same evil would result if the
appointments ceased to be effective during the session of Congress and before its
adjournment. Upon the other hand, once Congress has adjourned, the evil aforementioned
may easily be conjured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or reappointments."
(Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution barely
avoided the interruption of essential government services in the May 2001 national elections.
Following the decision of this Court in Gaminde vs. Commission on Appointments,39 promulgated on
December 13, 2000, the terms of office of constitutional officers first appointed under the
Constitution would have to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the date of ratification of the
Constitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this reckoning, the terms of office
of three Commissioners of the COMELEC, including the Chairman, would end on February 2,
2001.40

Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou was appointed only on January 11, 2000 to
serve, pursuant to her appointment papers, until February 15, 2002,41 the original expiry date of the
term of her predecessor, Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, who was elevated to this Court. The original
expiry date of the term of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores was also February 15, 2002,
while that of Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was November 3, 2001.42 The original expiry dates of
the terms of office of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners Flores and Desamito were
therefore supposed to fall after the May 2001 elections. Suddenly and unexpectedly, because of
the Gaminde ruling, there were three vacancies in the seven-person COMELEC, with national
elections looming less than three and one-half months away. To their credit, Chairperson Demetriou
and Commissioner Flores vacated their offices on February 2, 2001 and did not question any more
before this Court the applicability of theGaminde ruling to their own situation.

In a Manifestation43 dated December 28, 2000 filed with this Court in the Gaminde case, Chairperson
Demetriou stated that she was vacating her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed any delay in
choosing her successor might create a "constitutional crisis" in view of the proximity of the May 2001
national elections. Commissioner Desamito chose to file a petition for intervention44 in
the Gaminde case but this Court denied the intervention. Thus, Commissioner Desamito also
vacated his office on February 2, 2001.

During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess between February and June
considering that many of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate run for re-
election. In 2001, the Eleventh Congress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June 3,
2001.45 Concededly, there was no more time for Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, who were originally
extended ad interim appointments only on March 22, 2001, to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments before the May 14, 2001 elections.

If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to fill up the three
vacancies in the COMELEC, there would only have been one division functioning in the COMELEC
instead of two during the May 2001 elections. Considering that the Constitution requires that "all x x
x election cases shall be heard and decided in division",46 the remaining one division would have
been swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution motions for
reconsideration "shall be decided by the Commission en banc", the mere absence of one of the four
remaining members would have prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the
Commissioners are expected to travel around the country before, during and after the elections.
There was a great probability that disruptions in the conduct of the May 2001 elections could occur
because of the three vacancies in the COMELEC. The successful conduct of the May 2001 national
elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III events, was certainly essential in
safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad
interimappointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments
is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two
modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and
pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume
office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment
which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.

Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad

interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution
grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the
President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.

The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC is a long-standing practice.

Former President Corazon Aquino issued an ad interim appointment to Commissioner Alfredo E.
Abueg.47 Former President Fidel V. Ramos extended ad interim appointments to Commissioners
Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Guiani, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F.
Gorospe.48 Former President Joseph Estrada also extended ad interim appointments to
Commissioners Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and Ralph
C. Lantion.49

The President’s power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the
mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, is only for a short
period - from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the Commission on
Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a
trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the check-
and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of granting the President
absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the President’s
appointing power to the checking power of the legislature.

This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the
majority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and not one President will appoint all the
COMELEC members.50 In the instant case, the Commission on Appointments had long confirmed
four51 of the incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a majority, who could now be removed
from office only by impeachment. The special constitutional safeguards that insure the
independence of the COMELEC remain in place.52 The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy, appoints
its own officials and employees, and promulgates its own rules on pleadings and practice. Moreover,
the salaries of COMELEC members cannot be decreased during their tenure.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or
acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments

Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim
appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition
on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last members for three years, without reappointment. X x x." (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on

Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts that
this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, which is the situation of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in character.

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments

can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the
President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding
on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer
renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because
of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its
consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17
of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows:

"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations

or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted
upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless
new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the
Commission." (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be
considered again if the President renews the appointment.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-
passed appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in
Guevara vs. Inocentes53why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new appointments,
thus:

"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the

Commission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive
objection of the Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the Congress",
simply because the President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied
disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for,
under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only
by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval
of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint
those so by-passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint
them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad
interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of
the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the
President is free to make ad interim appointments or reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)

Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the present Constitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim.54 The
jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is
doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the present
Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees.
This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by
the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole
appointing power in the President.

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot
be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interimappointment can be revived by a new ad
interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed
term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied)
There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad
interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves
his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a
member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The
second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then
resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in
the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is
confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee
completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair,
to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
serving more than seven years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years,
and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than
seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because
his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-
C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms
of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation.
Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of
office as COMELEC member – whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or
three years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time – can no longer be reappointed to
the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this manner:

"MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo
Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment
applies only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee
serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put
the qualifying words "without reappointment" in the case of those appointed, then it is
possible that an interpretation could be made later on their case, they can still be
reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.

Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of those
first appointed under the Constitution, no reappointment can be made."55 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Visarra vs. Miraflor,56 Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring opinion, quoted
Nacionalista vs. De Vera57 that a "[r]eappointment is not prohibited when a Commissioner
has held office only for, say, three or six years, provided his term will not exceed nine years
in all." This was the interpretation despite the express provision in the 1935 Constitution that
a COMELEC member "shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed."

To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person
previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any
person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees
under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed
completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to
the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that
the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders
inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.

The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term
of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to
absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.

In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time,
on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no
longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because
most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on
Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad
interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This Court
cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.

The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of
the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second
appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for
less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional
commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. As reported in the Journal of the
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who sponsored58the proposed articles on
the three constitutional commissions, outlined the four important features of the proposed articles, to
wit:

"Mr. Foz stated that the Committee had introduced basic changes in the common provision
affecting the three Constitutional Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal autonomy which
provides (that) appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released to the
Commission in the same manner (as) provided for the Judiciary; 2) fixed term of office
without reappointment on a staggered basis to ensure continuity of functions and to minimize
the opportunity of the President to appoint all the members during his incumbency; 3)
prohibition to decrease salaries of the members of the Commissions during their term of
office; and 4) appointments of members would not require confirmation."59 (Emphasis
supplied)

There were two important amendments subsequently made by the Constitutional Commission to
these four features. First, as discussed earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided to require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of all appointments to the constitutional
commissions. Second, the framers decided to strengthen further the prohibition on serving beyond
the fixed seven-year term, in the light of a former chair of the Commission on Audit remaining in
office for 12 years despite his fixed term of seven years. The following exchange in the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

"MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarificatory questions, Madam President. May I call the
sponsor’s attention, first of all, to Section 2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein it is
stated: "In no case shall any Member be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity." I
detect in the Committee’s proposed resolutions a constitutional hangover, if I may use the
 term, from the past administration. Am I correct in concluding that the reason the Committee
introduced this particular provision is to avoid an incident similar to the case of the Honorable
Francisco Tantuico who was appointed in an acting capacity as Chairman of the Commission
on Audit for about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and then in 1980, was appointed as
Chairman with a tenure of another 7 years. So, if we follow that appointment to (its) logical
conclusion, he occupied that position for about 12 years in violation of the Constitution?

MR. FOZ: It is only one of the considerations. Another is really to make sure that any
member who is appointed to any of the commissions does not serve beyond 7
years."60 (Emphasis supplied)

Commissioner Christian Monsod further clarified the prohibition on reappointment in this manner:

"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is
no reappointment of any kind and, therefore as a whole there is no way that somebody can
serve for more than seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to make sure that this
does not happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting
capacities."61 (Emphasis supplied)

Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of
any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to
prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointee’s total
term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are
very specific - reappointment of any kind and exceeding one’s term in office beyond the maximum
period of seven years.

Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution tightened even
further the screws on those who might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word
"designated" was inserted to plug any loophole that might be exploited by violators of the
Constitution, as shown in the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, between the words "appointed" and "in", I propose to
insert the words OR DESIGNATED so that the whole sentence will read: "In no case shall
any Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): What does the Committee say?

MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning of this sentence. The sentence reads: "In no case
shall any Member be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity."

MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding Officer, the reason for this amendment is that some
lawyers make a distinction between an appointment and a designation. The Gentleman will
recall that in the case of Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think his term exceeded the
constitutional limit but the Minister of Justice opined that it did not because he was only
designated during the time that he acted as Commissioner on Audit. So, in order to erase
that distinction between appointment and designation, we should specifically place the word
so that there will be no more ambiguity. "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR
DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."

MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

 MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the amendment is approved."62

The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment
presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The samead interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February
2, 2008.63 Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of
these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin
prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three
respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the
prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

Fourth Issue: Respondent Benipayo’s Authority to Reassign Petitioner

Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and
reassign her to the Law Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a
collegial body, can authorize such reassignment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment
without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process and therefore illegal.

Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office of
Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC
Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long
as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V
of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following
power:

"Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who shall be
the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission, shall:

xxx

(4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Service Law." (Emphasis supplied)

The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In
the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the
COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner’s appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001,
attached as Annexes "X", "Y" and "Z" to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV
position in the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity.64 Petitioner is not a Career Executive
Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are
necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications
Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission.65 Obviously, petitioner does not
enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G.
Bacal,66 this Court held that:

"As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney,
her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no
security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig:

‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only ‘to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed.’ Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be
withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and ‘at a moment’s notice’, conformably
to established jurisprudence x x x.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which
in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place, or
as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated x x x.’"

Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the
necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming
that her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law. This time, the vigorous argument of
petitioner that a temporary or acting appointment can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the
appointing power happens to apply squarely to her situation.

Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited act
under Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides as follows:

"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service - Any public official who makes or
causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including
public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the
Commission."

Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect
transfers or reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period.67 Moreover, petitioner
insists that the COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel during the election period.

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000,68 exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The resolution states in part:
 "WHEREAS, Sec. 56 and Sec. 261, paragraphs (g) and (h), of the Omnibus Election Code
provides as follows:

xxx

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service – Any public official who
makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the
civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon
approval of the Commission.

WHEREAS, the aforequoted provisions are applicable to the national and local elections on
May 14, 2001;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to appoint, transfer or reassign personnel of the

Commission on Elections during the prohibited period in order that it can carry out its
constitutional duty to conduct free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;

"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it
by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to
the foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new
employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the
effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that
the changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before
election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing." (Emphasis supplied)

The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer
or reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to
COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised
Administrative Code,69 the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power
to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3300.
The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean amending the
Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.

COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting
Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the
COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the
resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to
effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from
the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.

The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The
COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order reassigning petitioner from
the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For
the same reason, Benipayo’s order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally
unassailable.

Fifth Issue: Legality of Disbursements to Respondents

Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent Gideon C. De Guzman, Officer-in-Charge of the

Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, did not act in excess of jurisdiction in
paying the salaries and other emoluments of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,

vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether
or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split
decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission
on Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment upon
the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary
writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of
jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is
inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue
the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly
conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution
grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically
conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down
in Pimentel vs. COMELEC 2— that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the
COMELEC to issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the
Garcia and Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of
the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the
last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

 xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorariprohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the
COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and
Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the
Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-
destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba
were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The
latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won
with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the
petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the
protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11,
1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's
votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1
July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice
of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.

On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which
the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The
corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a
motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the
implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. 4 The dispositive
portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has

exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes
jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order
of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ
of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as

Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the
appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No.
108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent
COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P.
Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984
election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the
most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus in election
cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue
the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984
AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50
provides:

Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any

question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear

and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been
repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The
repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985),
provides:
 Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296
otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is
hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618
and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members
of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis
supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited
Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said,
reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the

grant of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial
body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or

repeal, whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It
is common place Learning thatimplied repeal are not favored in Law
and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort of a court must
always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with
those of another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions
(Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power Corporation vs. ARCA,
25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13
SCRA 377·(1965). Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflict
between the provisions of two (2) statutes,may a court hold that the
provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the earlier
ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine
American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194
(1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs.
Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the
Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title
and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on
the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular
Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of
sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the
particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.)
most if not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is
not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under
B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of
January 18, 1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the
number of Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still
applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision
which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636
which are not inconsistent with the present election laws did not self-destruct, why
should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or
municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in
inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although
this provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with
limited application as the enabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on
May 11, 1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on
Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law,
and avoid an incongruous situation.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in

its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be
construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws."
Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. .
. . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-
28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts

provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating
to the same subject matter and that in the absence of any express
repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed
enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior
statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28,
1975, 68 SCRA 253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to
take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has
appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of
Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the
Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting
opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
election cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the
Commission on Elections, not from lower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388,
September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had
appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals havecertiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because
after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:
 In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari,
prohibition ormandamus against a regional trial court in an election
contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this
Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and
the law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions
to have the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .

...

In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of
Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July
29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question
of whether or not the Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari in election cases.

The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive
authority to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election
cases, and there are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that
the Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the decisions,
there is no law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the
existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP
Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3,
1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions
where it was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue
special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been
repealed.

As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of
Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2),
Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes
the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. 5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution
pending appeal and the writ of execution because
 [a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the
court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it
had already acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the perfection of the
appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to
this Honorable Commission. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist
from enforcing is challenged resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the
very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the
dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.

In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that
it issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private
respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:

it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary
to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that
purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court,
public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was
necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the
parties pending the final outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed
decision. 7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike
in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the
records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is
unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts.
The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case
(SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC
decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then,
the COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the
RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration.
Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be heard to state that it
issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the
of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in
question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in theGarcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no
specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted
it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1
thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in
view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang
Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697
became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or
the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose
lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives.
In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis
supplied).

it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time.
Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs.
Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation
to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the
dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of
the latter reads as follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as
The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No.
1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments
are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or
result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express
recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as
indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause
cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act
to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare
any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that
 a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its
inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an
aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express
limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13

This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or
codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or
code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang
Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code.
It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof
not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding
implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the
proper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly
mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exist in the terms of the new and the old laws. 15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of
the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the
latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in
the Garcia and Uyand Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of
the challenged resolution.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's
motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since
both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an
appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any
motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal.
Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have
supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal
would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July
1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial
court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the
COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the
case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if
the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC
has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it
correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of
execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of
the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos,
et al. " is AFFIRMED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 108399 July 31, 1997

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS composed of Atty. RUBEN M.
RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA, in her capacity as Director of the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO
ACEBEDO, Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN NOEL T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO,
MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS,
MA. ALBERTINA RICAFORT, and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D.
REYES, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 36), 1 nullifying an order of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on
December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990
served the purpose of the first elections for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160).

Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven
(7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that the first elections for the SK
shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992.

The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27,
1992, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding
of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992 The guidelines placed the SK elections
under the direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the
COMELEC. 2 After two postponements, the elections were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.

Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters,
aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing certificates of candidacies. The City
Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.

On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a
letter-resolution "exemption" the City of Manila from holding elections for the SK on the ground that
the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-
enacted Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting
president of the KB City Federation of Manila and a member of City Council of Manila, which called
attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of
the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG
stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to
exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay
chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and
January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials
have been correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be
elected under RA 7160.

On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set
aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local
Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections
for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question denied them the equal protection of the laws.

On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman,
Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners "to desist from implementing the order
of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of the Court." On the
same day, he ordered petitioners "to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to
implement Resolution No. 2499 dated August 27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for
the holding of a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously
in every barangay throughout the country."

The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new
judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no power to
"exempt" the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX,
C, §2(1) of the Constitution the power to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" is vested solely in the
COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect determined that there had been no previous
elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception;
and (3) the "exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897
barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.

Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already
conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on
December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite §532(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides that:

All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different
sangguniang shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan
chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been
selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be
considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the
kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code.
(emphasis added)

They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG has authority to determine whether the City of Manila
came within the exception clause of §532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the elections on
December 4, 1992.

The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996 3 rendered
this case moot and academic. There are two questions raised in this case. The first is whether the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government can "exempt" a local government unit from holding elections
for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that "the
Department of Interior and Local Government shall have direct control and supervision over the election
of sangguniang kabataan with the technical assistance by the Commission on Elections."

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the
parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26,
1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial
court and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within
the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition,
yet evading review." 4 For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control
and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question
may not be decided before the date of such elections.

In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered
by the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC
perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges. The cease and
desist order was for a period of about two years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to
November 15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time
the cease and desist order expired. The case was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than
two years after the order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby become
moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually
continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to
be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading
review, and at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights
determined by the Commission without a chance of redress. 5

In Roe v. Wade, 6 petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes of
Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least
within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no longer pregnant. But the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: "[W]hen, as here, pregnancy
is a significant fact the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the
pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a
case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides
a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review.'" 7

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then
DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under §532(d) of the Local
Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As already
stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents
argue that this is a power which Art. IX, C, §2(1) of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC.
Respondents further argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be held on December 4,
1992 "in every barangay," the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections for
the KB previously held in the City of Manila.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

First. As already stated, by §4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under
the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents' contention, this did not
contravene Art. IX, C, §2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the
power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Elections for SK officers are not subject to the
supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held, contests involving
elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of
Election Supervisors, 8 it was contended that

COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of
rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in
the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which
explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers", and, (b) it constitutes a
total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and
statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in
Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election
Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative
Code. 9

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
contest involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the
pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the
ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay
and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to
exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan
and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts.

xxx xxx xxx

 In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly
KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2,
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of
the Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay officials. His being an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically
provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular
sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to
exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered
voters of the barangay. 10

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative
policy evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang
Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in §6 that the "Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
deemed necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Decree." Again, in 1985
Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the
Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government, the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang
Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a Memorandum Circular dated
March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue
the necessary rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang Barangay,
among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local government units.

The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential.
DILG supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules
embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was the
enforcement of the rules.

Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the
barangays which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections between January 1,
1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4, 1992.
That these barangays were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from
the authority given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections. Since §532(d) provided for
kabataang barangay officials whose term of office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to
supervise the conduct of elections in that year must necessarily be deemed to include the authority
to determine which kabataang barangay would not be included in the 1992 elections.

The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a given kabataang barangay. If
elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since by
virtue of §532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was "extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under [the Local Government
Code of 1991]." In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government was to act merely as
the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will was to take effect. 11 There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as
to the execution of a law. That this is constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases. 12

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void
because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not have
authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.
The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C.
Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:

WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas

Pambansa Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since the advent of the present national
administration;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertaking of the
government to ensure the participation of all sectors of our population in the task of nation
building;

WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November
1985 yet, which is over their three years term of office;

WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for
under the law;

xxx xxx xxx

The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30,
1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.

It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath
of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local Government Code that the
exception clause of §532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee
which drafted the Code show the following: 13

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!

HON. LINA: . . .

Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in
lieu thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The rationale. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?

HON. LINA: It will read as follows: "Provided however, that the Local Government Units
which have conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337, up to the effectivity. . . ."

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word "within," ha, up to. . . .

HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, "within eighteen months prior to December 31,
1990, and insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code."

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?

HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh,
na ginawa, eh.There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of
forty thousand, imaging that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB
 Constitution and By-Laws, and they're sitting already, now if we do not recognize that,
mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.

Section §532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under
existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are
recognized in this jurisdiction. 14

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the
requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 would deny the youth voters in
those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondent claim that only in barangays in the City
of Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 there had already been SK elections held, when,
according to petitioners' own evidence, during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted
in 5,000 barangays.

Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that
there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections between January 1, 1988 and January
1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were permitted to hold elections
on December 4, 1992. For one thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992
(p. 9), 568 barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992
either, because they already had elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For
another, even assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on
December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had
already been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays
ground for complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no
discrimination here.

In People v. Vera 15 this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application of
its benefits by making its applicability depend on the decision of provincial governments to appropriate or
not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers, with the result that those not disposed to
allow the benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the
salaries of probation officers. The difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact that
what youth voters in the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right which was denied to
youth voters in Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on December 4, 1992
but nevertheless were allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila should
similarly have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact was that they
already had their own, just two years before on May 26, 1990. Respondents' equal protection argument
violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the
case filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E.

SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-
ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R.
NEREUS O. ACOSTA,Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership
dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from that party
and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party
(LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party
members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his
party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in
the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent
Drilon immediately filed a petition1 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the
elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National
Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly
convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution,2 party officers were elected
to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO
attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened
to "people power," wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action.
Atienza also said that the amendments3 to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution,
giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of
Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,4 partially granting respondent Drilon’s
petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under
COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was
invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution.
But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term
may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity
until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a
divided Court issued a resolution,5 granting respondent Drilon’s petition and denying that of petitioner
Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-
party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a
consequence, respondent Drilon’s term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon’s
term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote
attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to
clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO.
Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E.
Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi,
and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction6 before the
COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary
general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that
the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a
quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the
party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common
exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not
invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status
of "guests" during the meeting. Atienza’s allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon
arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and
moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienza’s allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’ election as LP president faithfully
complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because supervening events
changed the body’s number and composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned,
or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election
bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP
members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national
stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilon’s nomination, a privilege granted the
LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not
fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez,
and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was
pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile,
certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party
membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were
dropped from the roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.’s
petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO
since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these
positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that
the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed
that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The
COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al.
filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party;
and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal
standing to question Roxas’ election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO
membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue
concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the
expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional
right to due process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

The Court’s Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that,
since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the
controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case.7

But petitioners Atienza, et al.’s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.’s
disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the illegal election of
Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of
"despotic acts" of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et
al.’s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilon’s "railroading"
of election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the
LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.’s prayer for the undoing of respondents
Roxas, et al.’s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.

Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to
question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members, having
been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties.8 As non-members, they
have no stake in the outcome of the action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,9 legal standing in suits is governed by the "real
parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest"
is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.’s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al.
would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.’s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived
them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing
them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the
correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.’s allegations were correct, they would have been
irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to
recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the
correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in
another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s decision in this case.
Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas’ election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that
the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list
of NECO members appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al.
allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before
the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Court’s decision in the earlier
cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect
defied the Court’s ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECO’s
composition.10

But the list of NECO members appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was
drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO membership
had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon
adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO,
which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly
convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO
membership.

Nothing in the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be
pegged to the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such
a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its
Section 2711 provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six
months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the
number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought about by the
elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped.
Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore,
former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be
expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In
addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to
nominate "persons of national stature" to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly
object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP
president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.’s way of ensuring their
election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP
Constitution.
The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents
Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of
electing the party leaders.12 The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently,
the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that
elected Roxas as LP president.

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party
chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that,
therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Court’s resolution. But the Court’s resolution in
the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 2913 and 4614 of
the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it
saw fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when
it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from
the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the
case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.15

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the
expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that
elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELEC’s finding as upheld by this Court
that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of
the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers
that the NECO held. 1avvphi1

While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they
did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly affect the
composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not
bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did
Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words,
the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on
the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was
indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or
invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled within
the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienza’s allies raised objections before the NECO assembly
regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election,
implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to
resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to
conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the
Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections16 that the COMELEC’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in
another case17 that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-
party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC
had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for
certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP
president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to
local elective posts.18 In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer
of the party.

The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the
benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that
have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus
particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.19

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party
membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process
of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing
before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings20 and are, therefore, covered by the due
process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.21

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political
parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the
state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative
agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental
power for the performance of a state function."22 The constitutional limitations that generally apply to
the exercise of the state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the state’s powers are found in Article III of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life,
property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the state’s
powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary
citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or
entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The
right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental
rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.23

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between
the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of
members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning
of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or
to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in
relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among
themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose
rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement
of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v.
Mula,24 the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the
state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the
people.25

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election as
LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party. While the
question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to
Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party
membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its
power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

RODULFO SARMIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC and JOSE
"CITO" ALBERTO II, respondents.

G.R. No. 105725 August 6, 1992

EMMANUEL R. ALFELOR, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF IRIGA CITY and JOSE
C. VILLANUEVA, respondents.

G.R. No. 105727 August 6, 1992

LEANDRO I. VERCELES, SR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CATANDUANES
and ROSALIE ALBERTO-ESTACIO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105730 August 6, 1992

JESUS TYPOCO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CAMARINES
NORTE, and MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF JOSE PANGANIBAN, CAMARINES
NORTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 105771 August 6, 1992

ALBERTO U. GENOVA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CABUSAO,
NEBRIDO F. SANTIAGO, and EUGENIO AGUILAR, respondents.

G.R. No. 105778 August 6, 1992

MARIO S. MANLICLIC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GEN. NATIVIDAD,
NUEVA ECIJA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT NOS. 12-A AND 13,
BARANGAY MATAAS NA KAHOY, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; BOARD OF ELECTION
INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT NOS. 15-A, BARANGAY PICALEON, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA
ECIJA; PRECINCT NO. 25-A OF SAPANG BATO, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; THE
ELECTION REGISTRAR and APOLONIO PASCUAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 105797 August 6, 1992

FRANCISCO G. RABAT, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

G-R. No. 105919 August 6, 1992

DATU MOHAMMAD A. SINSUAT, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DATU MICHAEL SINSUAT and ATTY. RUBEN
PLATON, respondents.

G.R. No. 105977 August 6, 1992

ROSARIO A. VELASCO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF TERNATE, CAVITE,
and CONDRADO LINDO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the
following Special Cases (SPC):

1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion
from the canvass of one (1) election return;
 2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of
Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6)
election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to
include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;

3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the
ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the
inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac,
excluding the returns from 48 precincts;

4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's
opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;

5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's
objection to certain election returns;

6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance
with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;

7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass
of some certificates of canvass;

8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;

9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation
petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in
said amended petition.

Comments had been filed only in G.R. No. 105727 and G.R. No. 105797. This Court dispenses with
the Comments in the other cases.

Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and
decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied).

The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of Article XII provided as
follows:
 Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All
election cases may be heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving
Members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. . . .

It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-
proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the two (2)
Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. 2 Rule
27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from
rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and
not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:

Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party aggrieved by an

oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said
ruling shall, within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the
board of canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a copy
thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.

(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court
concerned.

(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.

(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for
hearing. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five
(5) days from its promulgation. 3 The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours
from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the
case to the Commission en banc. 4 Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall calendar the
motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en bancwithin ten (10) days from the
certification. 5

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be
set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral
to a Division.

A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section
16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The said section provides as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed

terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the
 boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the
filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may
continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission
determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for
the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.

The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon
of 30 June 1992. 7 These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an
exercise in futility.

Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of
regular election protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases
subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests
shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these
petitions before this Court.

The Temporary Restraining Orders issued in G.R. No. 105727, G.R. No. 105730 and G.R. No.
105797 are hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero, Nocon
and Bellosillo, JJ. concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

My brother Feliciano submits powerfully persuasive arguments, as usual, and I am tempted to join
him except for the prescription of the Constitution. Article IX-C, Section 3, says quite clearly:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

The language of the provision suggests that it is jurisdictional and not merely directory and therefore
requires that all election cases be heard first by the division, whose decision may be reconsidered
only by the Commission en banc.

The Supreme Court itself cannot consider in the first instance cases coming under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of a lower court, like a petition for declaratory relief. Even in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice, we can exercise only appellate jurisdiction over such a case under
Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution.

I find the quoted provision ill-considered, to say the least, in view of the practical difficulties it may
spawn. But we are dealing with a mandatory provision of the Constitution which, unless amended
(corrected may be a better word), must be observed.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the captioned cases, i.e., the dismissal of the various
Petitions forCertiorari in the cases disposed of by this Joint Resolution.

I am, however, compelled to dissent from the Joint Resolution to the extent that Resolution holds
that the ComelecEn Banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
dismissed, for instance, the appeal from the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines
Sur, of petitioner Genova, among others, without first referring such appeal to either of its Divisions,
and holding such dismissal as null and void and setting the same aside.

Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

It is important to start with the general proposition that the Comelec may sit En Banc or in two (2)
divisions. It is also helpful to note that the powers and functions of the Commission as specified in
Article IX(C)(2) of the Constitution are lodged in "The Commission on Elections" as a whole; Section
2 did not try to distinguish between powers and functions which are to be exercised En Banc and
those to be exercised by Divisions.

The second important constitutional principle is that the fundamental objective of the above-quoted
Article IX(C)(3) is the expediting of the disposition of both election cases and pre-proclamation
controversies. We have, in many cases, stressed heavily the need for disposing of election protests
as rapidly as possible. 1 We have also many times ruled that pre-proclamation controversies are
administrative and summary in character and are to be resolved with the utmost dispatch subject, of
course, to the requirements of notice to the parties and fairness in procedure. 2

Thirdly, I submit it is clear that the term "election cases" in the last sentence of Article IX(C)(3) is
properly read as referring to election contests or election protests, and not to all proceedings or
controversies arising out of or relating to elections. Article IX(C)(3), in its first sentence, clearly
distinguishes "election cases" from "pre-proclamation controversies," and extends the constitutional
objective of expeditious disposition not only to "election cases" but also to "pre-proclamation
controversies." Thus, while the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) speaks of "all such election
cases," there is no indiscriminate lumping together of election protests or election cases properly so-
called with pre-proclamation controversies.

It is pointed out by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, J., that Rule 3(3) of the Rules of
Procedure of the Comelec (Comelec Rules) provides that:
 Sec. 3. The Commission sitting in divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2)
divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special
actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings
except in accreditation of citizen's arms of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

that "special cases" embrace pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27, Comelec Rules), and
that Rule 27(9) of the Comelec Rules states, among other things, that

(d) the Division to which [the appeal from rulings of a Board of Canvassers] is
assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing.

The majority is here, of course, trying to interpret Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution by
referring to relevant provisions of the Comelec Rules adopted after the 1987 Constitution
went into effect. From the foregoing, my learned brother Davide concludes that

[i]t is clear from [Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution] that election cases include
pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided
by a Division of the Commission. The Commission en banc does not have the
authority to hear and decide it at the first instance. . . .

It seems to me, however, that Rules 3(3) and 27(9)(d) of the Comelec Rules were not intended to
establish a wall of separation between the Divisions and the Commission En Banc. Thus, for
instance, while election cases properly so-called are designated as "ordinary actions" and assigned
to the Divisions, the Comelec Rules authorize the Commission itself to intervene or act in such
ordinary actions. For instance:

Rule 20 — Election Protests

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Revision of ballots. — When the allegations in a protest or counter-protest so

warrant, orwhenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of
justice so demands, it shall immediately order the ballot boxes containing ballots and
their keys, list of voters with voting records, book of voters, and other documents
used in the election to be brought before the Commission, and shall order the
revision of the ballots. For this purpose, the Commission may constitute a committee
on the revision of ballots, to be composed of a chairman, who shall be a lawyer from
the Commission, and two members, one member and his substitute to be proposed
by the protestant, and the other member and his substitute by the protestee.

The revision of the ballots shall be made in the office of the Clerk of Court concerned
at such places as the Commission or the Division shall designate, and shall be
completed within three (3) months from the date of the order, unless otherwise
directed by the Commission.

Sec. 7. Partial determination of the case. — The Commission or the Division

concerned may direct the protestant and, in case there is a counter-protest, the
counter-protestant, to state and designate in writing his or their choice of the
precincts, numbering not more than twenty-five (25%) per centum of the total number
of precincts involved in the protest and counter-protest, if any, whose ballot boxes
shall first be opened, and shall thereafter make a partial determination of the case . .
.
 xxx xxx xxx

Rule 30 — Injunction.

Sec. 1. Preliminary Injunction. — The Commission or any of its Divisions may grant
preliminary injunction in any ordinary action, special action, special case, or special
relief pending before it.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Another difficulty with the position taken by the majority is that under the Comelec Rules, not all pre-
proclamation controversies are necessarily assigned to a Division. There are certain pre-
proclamation controversies which, under the Comelec Rules, are to be filed directly with the
Commission and to be heard and decided by the Commission En Banc:

Rule 27 — Pre-Proclamation Controversies

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Pre-proclamation controversies which may be filled directly with the

Commission.— (a) Thefollowing pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly
with the Commission:

(1) When the issue involves the illegal composition or proceedings of

the board of canvassers as when a majority or all the of the members
do not hold legal appointments or are in fact usurpers; or when the
canvassing has been a mere ceremony that was pre-determined and
manipulated to result in nothing but a sham as where there was
convergence of circumstances of precipitate canvassing, terrorism,
lack of sufficient notice to the members of the board of canvassers
and disregard of manifest irregularities on the facts of the questioned
returns or certificates of canvass in appropriate cases;

(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the
tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1)
a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated
more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one
precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of
the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of
canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were
included in the canvass, but such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due
diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already
been made.

xxx xxx xxx

(d) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the petition for hearing.
 (e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

There is another factor which needs to be considered. The appeals of the various petitioners in
these cases from rulings of the several Boards of Canvassers involved (whether municipal or
provincial) were resolved by the Commission directly. Since all the members of the Commission En
Banc (and therefore, all the members of each of the two [2] Divisions of the Commission) were
present when these cases were disposed of and dismissed, it will be seen that, literally, the several
appeals were heard by all the members of a Division and at the same time by all the members of the
Commission En Banc. It may be seen then that the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above, has been literally and effectively complied with. To say, therefore, that
the cases here involved must first be decided by a Division and then only referred to the
Commission En Banc by a motion for reconsideration, appears to be an exaltation of form over
substance. The present situation must be distinguished from a situation where a constitutional or
statutory provision requires a matter to be resolved by a Commission En Banc but is instead
resolved only by a Division of that Commission or body. In this latter situation, the decision of a
Division of the Commission or other agency is not reasonably to be equated with the decision of the
Commission En Banc; for the latter is necessarily composed of more commissioners than constitute
one division thereof.

Finally, assuming arguendo that the majority have correctly read Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution, it should still be pointed out that most, if not all, of the cases or proceedings at bar, and
the other seven hundred (700) plus cases or proceedings which the Commission En Banc summarily
and similarly disposed of, are not even genuine pre-proclamation controversies. Only certain
statutorily defined grounds or issues may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. In the case(s)
at bar, the grounds or issues sought to be raised by the individual petitioners are so insubstantial in
nature as to fall considerably short of a genuine pre-proclamation controversy. Indeed, in most if not
all of the cases at bar, the grounds raised and the evidence submitted are so slight and tenuous as
to lead to the belief that they were initiated for no more edifying reason than to delay the
proclamation of the winners (per canvassing) in the elections sought to be disputed. Had the
Commission En Banc taken seriously (undeservedly, in my view) the seven hundred (700) plus
proceedings before it and required each to be heard first by Division and then by the Commission En
Banc on a motion for reconsideration, several years would doubtless have been required to dispose
of all those proceedings, had Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 not been enacted.

My ultimate submission is that we must read the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution in such a manner as to avoid handcuffing, as it were, the Comelec and denying it the
essential flexibility it badly needs to be able to carry out the basic constitutional mandate of
"expedit[ing] disposition of election [protests and] pre-proclamation controversies." This teleological
or purpose-oriented reading may be achieved by regarding that second sentence as directory and
not mandatory (or jurisdictional) in character. The legal distinction between directory and mandatory
provisions is as applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws. 3 The characterization of a
constitutional or statutory provision as directory rather than mandatory is not determined simply by the
particular grammatical terms employed; indeed, the problem of distinguishing between directory and
mandatory language would not arise if the use of "will" or "shall" instead of "may" were regarded as
conclusive. That characterization is most rationally made on the basis of the major purpose or objective
which shines through the constitutional language and which must be given effect.
Alternatively, the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution may be read, without
departing from the literal terms used in that provision, as encompassing only election cases properly
so called, i.e., election protests, and not pre-proclamation controversies.

For all the foregoing, I reach the conclusion that the Commission En banc did not act with grave
abuse of discretion nor without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the alleged pre-proclamation
controversies at bar, without first requiring each and everyone of them to be heard in Division.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

My brother Feliciano submits powerfully persuasive arguments, as usual, and I am tempted to join
him except for the prescription of the Constitution. Article IX-C, Section 3, says quite clearly:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

The language of the provision suggests that it is jurisdictional and not merely directory and therefore
requires that all election cases be heard first by the division, whose decision may be reconsidered
only by the Commission en banc.

The Supreme Court itself cannot consider in the first instance cases coming under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of a lower court, like a petition for declaratory relief. Even in the interest of a
speedy administration of justice, we can exercise only appellate jurisdiction over such a case under
Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution.

I find the quoted provision ill-considered, to say the least, in view of the practical difficulties it may
spawn. But we are dealing with a mandatory provision of the Constitution which, unless amended
(corrected may be a better word), must be observed.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the captioned cases, i.e., the dismissal of the various
Petitions forCertiorari in the cases disposed of by this Joint Resolution.

I am, however, compelled to dissent from the Joint Resolution to the extent that Resolution holds
that the ComelecEn Banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
dismissed, for instance, the appeal from the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines
Sur, of petitioner Genova, among others, without first referring such appeal to either of its Divisions,
and holding such dismissal as null and void and setting the same aside.

Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution reads as follows:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
 including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

It is important to start with the general proposition that the Comelec may sit En Banc or in two (2)
divisions. It is also helpful to note that the powers and functions of the Commission as specified in
Article IX(C)(2) of the Constitution are lodged in "The Commission on Elections" as a whole; Section
2 did not try to distinguish between powers and functions which are to be exercised En Banc and
those to be exercised by Divisions.

The second important constitutional principle is that the fundamental objective of the above-quoted
Article IX(C)(3) is the expediting of the disposition of both election cases and pre-proclamation
controversies. We have, in many cases, stressed heavily the need for disposing of election protests
as rapidly as possible. 1 We have also many times ruled that pre-proclamation controversies are
administrative and summary in character and are to be resolved with the utmost dispatch subject, of
course, to the requirements of notice to the parties and fairness in procedure. 2

Thirdly, I submit it is clear that the term "election cases" in the last sentence of Article IX(C)(3) is
properly read as referring to election contests or election protests, and not to all proceedings or
controversies arising out of or relating to elections. Article IX(C)(3), in its first sentence, clearly
distinguishes "election cases" from "pre-proclamation controversies," and extends the constitutional
objective of expeditious disposition not only to "election cases" but also to "pre-proclamation
controversies." Thus, while the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) speaks of "all such election
cases," there is no indiscriminate lumping together of election protests or election cases properly so-
called with pre-proclamation controversies.

It is pointed out by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, J., that Rule 3(3) of the Rules of
Procedure of the Comelec (Comelec Rules) provides that:

Sec. 3. The Commission sitting in divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2)
divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special
actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings
except in accreditation of citizen's arms of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

that "special cases" embrace pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27, Comelec Rules), and
that Rule 27(9) of the Comelec Rules states, among other things, that

(d) the Division to which [the appeal from rulings of a Board of Canvassers] is
assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing.

The majority is here, of course, trying to interpret Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution by
referring to relevant provisions of the Comelec Rules adopted after the 1987 Constitution
went into effect. From the foregoing, my learned brother Davide concludes that

[i]t is clear from [Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution] that election cases include
pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided
by a Division of the Commission. The Commission en banc does not have the
authority to hear and decide it at the first instance. . . .

It seems to me, however, that Rules 3(3) and 27(9)(d) of the Comelec Rules were not intended to
establish a wall of separation between the Divisions and the Commission En Banc. Thus, for
instance, while election cases properly so-called are designated as "ordinary actions" and assigned
to the Divisions, the Comelec Rules authorize the Commission itself to intervene or act in such
ordinary actions. For instance:

Rule 20 — Election Protests

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Revision of ballots. — When the allegations in a protest or counter-protest so

warrant, orwhenever in the opinion of the Commission or Division the interest of
justice so demands, it shall immediately order the ballot boxes containing ballots and
their keys, list of voters with voting records, book of voters, and other documents
used in the election to be brought before the Commission, and shall order the
revision of the ballots. For this purpose, the Commission may constitute a committee
on the revision of ballots, to be composed of a chairman, who shall be a lawyer from
the Commission, and two members, one member and his substitute to be proposed
by the protestant, and the other member and his substitute by the protestee.

The revision of the ballots shall be made in the office of the Clerk of Court concerned
at such places as the Commission or the Division shall designate, and shall be
completed within three (3) months from the date of the order, unless otherwise
directed by the Commission.

Sec. 7. Partial determination of the case. — The Commission or the Division

concerned may direct the protestant and, in case there is a counter-protest, the
counter-protestant, to state and designate in writing his or their choice of the
precincts, numbering not more than twenty-five (25%) per centum of the total number
of precincts involved in the protest and counter-protest, if any, whose ballot boxes
shall first be opened, and shall thereafter make a partial determination of the case . .
.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 30 — Injunction.

Sec. 1. Preliminary Injunction. — The Commission or any of its Divisions may grant
preliminary injunction in any ordinary action, special action, special case, or special
relief pending before it.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Another difficulty with the position taken by the majority is that under the Comelec Rules, not all pre-
proclamation controversies are necessarily assigned to a Division. There are certain pre-
proclamation controversies which, under the Comelec Rules, are to be filed directly with the
Commission and to be heard and decided by the Commission En Banc:

Rule 27 — Pre-Proclamation Controversies

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 4. Pre-proclamation controversies which may be filled directly with the
Commission.— (a) Thefollowing pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly
with the Commission:

(1) When the issue involves the illegal composition or proceedings of

the board of canvassers as when a majority or all the of the members
do not hold legal appointments or are in fact usurpers; or when the
canvassing has been a mere ceremony that was pre-determined and
manipulated to result in nothing but a sham as where there was
convergence of circumstances of precipitate canvassing, terrorism,
lack of sufficient notice to the members of the board of canvassers
and disregard of manifest irregularities on the facts of the questioned
returns or certificates of canvass in appropriate cases;

(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the
tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing as where (1)
a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated
more than once, (2) two or more copies of the election returns of one
precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of
the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of
canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were
included in the canvass, but such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due
diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already
been made.

xxx xxx xxx

(d) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the petition for hearing.

(e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

There is another factor which needs to be considered. The appeals of the various petitioners in
these cases from rulings of the several Boards of Canvassers involved (whether municipal or
provincial) were resolved by the Commission directly. Since all the members of the Commission En
Banc (and therefore, all the members of each of the two [2] Divisions of the Commission) were
present when these cases were disposed of and dismissed, it will be seen that, literally, the several
appeals were heard by all the members of a Division and at the same time by all the members of the
Commission En Banc. It may be seen then that the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above, has been literally and effectively complied with. To say, therefore, that
the cases here involved must first be decided by a Division and then only referred to the
Commission En Banc by a motion for reconsideration, appears to be an exaltation of form over
substance. The present situation must be distinguished from a situation where a constitutional or
statutory provision requires a matter to be resolved by a Commission En Banc but is instead
resolved only by a Division of that Commission or body. In this latter situation, the decision of a
Division of the Commission or other agency is not reasonably to be equated with the decision of the
Commission En Banc; for the latter is necessarily composed of more commissioners than constitute
one division thereof.

Finally, assuming arguendo that the majority have correctly read Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution, it should still be pointed out that most, if not all, of the cases or proceedings at bar, and
the other seven hundred (700) plus cases or proceedings which the Commission En Banc summarily
and similarly disposed of, are not even genuine pre-proclamation controversies. Only certain
statutorily defined grounds or issues may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. In the case(s)
at bar, the grounds or issues sought to be raised by the individual petitioners are so insubstantial in
nature as to fall considerably short of a genuine pre-proclamation controversy. Indeed, in most if not
all of the cases at bar, the grounds raised and the evidence submitted are so slight and tenuous as
to lead to the belief that they were initiated for no more edifying reason than to delay the
proclamation of the winners (per canvassing) in the elections sought to be disputed. Had the
Commission En Banc taken seriously (undeservedly, in my view) the seven hundred (700) plus
proceedings before it and required each to be heard first by Division and then by the Commission En
Banc on a motion for reconsideration, several years would doubtless have been required to dispose
of all those proceedings, had Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 not been enacted.

My ultimate submission is that we must read the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987
Constitution in such a manner as to avoid handcuffing, as it were, the Comelec and denying it the
essential flexibility it badly needs to be able to carry out the basic constitutional mandate of
"expedit[ing] disposition of election [protests and] pre-proclamation controversies." This teleological
or purpose-oriented reading may be achieved by regarding that second sentence as directory and
not mandatory (or jurisdictional) in character. The legal distinction between directory and mandatory
provisions is as applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws. 3 The characterization of a
constitutional or statutory provision as directory rather than mandatory is not determined simply by the
particular grammatical terms employed; indeed, the problem of distinguishing between directory and
mandatory language would not arise if the use of "will" or "shall" instead of "may" were regarded as
conclusive. That characterization is most rationally made on the basis of the major purpose or objective
which shines through the constitutional language and which must be given effect.

Alternatively, the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution may be read, without
departing from the literal terms used in that provision, as encompassing only election cases properly
so called, i.e., election protests, and not pre-proclamation controversies.

For all the foregoing, I reach the conclusion that the Commission En banc did not act with grave
abuse of discretion nor without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the alleged pre-proclamation
controversies at bar, without first requiring each and everyone of them to be heard in Division.

G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its
President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of
Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its
corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers.

On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not
less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence
of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the

Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government.

"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.

Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. — (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be available
to all candidatesduring the periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be
equal and impartial among all candidates for the same office. All candidates
concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of "Comelec Space" for their
information, guidance and compliance.

(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" from newspapers or
publications based in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit an application
therefor, in writing, to the Committee on Mass Media of the Commission. Any
candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" in newspapers or publications
based in the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to the
Provincial Election Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment of "Comelec
Space" maybe filed at any time from the date of effectivity of this Resolution.

(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors
shall allocate available"Comelec Space" among the candidates concerned by
lottery of which said candidates shall be notified in advance, in writing, to be present
personally or by representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place
specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the lottery may appeal to
the Commission.
 (d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or
the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the case maybe, sufficiently in advance and in
writing of the date of issue and the newspaper or publication allocated to him, and
the time within which he must submit the written material for publication in the
"Comelec Space".

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No

newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion,
features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments
which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or
repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However,
unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will
respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)

Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like
the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members
of PPI. These letters read as follows:

This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on
Elections, you aredirected to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page for use as "Comelec Space" or similar to the print support which you have
extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for
each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6,
1995, to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government.

We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to

you their pictures, biographical data, stand on key public issues and platforms of
government either as raw data or in the form of positives or camera-ready materials.

Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in

your publication any day upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the
last day for campaigning.

We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its
agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner
also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. 1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from
enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives
addressed to various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the
respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-
compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution
merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec
space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or
requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time,
however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing
letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of
the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. 2

At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its Chairman,
Hon. Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other Members of the
Court, stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters
dispatched to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to
supply Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo represented to the Court that Resolution and
the related letter-directives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print
space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to
the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very
afternoon, meet and adopt an appropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of
which would forthwith be filed with the Court.

On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation which
attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of this
Resolution follows:

NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the

Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws,
the Commission on Elections RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No.
2772 as follows:

1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed

to mean as requiring publishers of the different mass
media print publications to provide print space under
pain of prosecution, whether administrative, civil or
criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for
violation of said Section provided for either in said
Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
on the grant of "Comelec space."

2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed

to mean as constituting prior restraint on the part of
publishers with respect to the printing or publication of
 materials in the news, opinion, features or other
sections of their respective publications or other
accounts or comments, it being clear from the last
sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall,
"unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate
otherwise . . . respect the determination by the
publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are
significant, newsworthy and of public interest."

This Resolution shall take effect upon approval. (Emphasis in the original)

While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
as having become moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first
constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and prevent its
resurrection.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of Resolution No.
2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 persists in its
original form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and
applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That
Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its
implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the
Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from
publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print
space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the
Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the
company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the
imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the
constitutional difficulties inhearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such
sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal
property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12
May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same
period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not
been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the
unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3Similarly,
it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.

That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only
that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and
programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election
information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by
Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when
their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention
of the general public.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an
assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not,
however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of
factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line with the theory of
democratic representative government. The economic costs of informing the general public about
the qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as
widely as possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by
taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises. The
benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on and the awareness of the electoral
process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the same
basis.

As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if
read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of
Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation — has been
constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. 4 Secondly, while private property may indeed be
validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show
compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing
parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space
confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the State.
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again:

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No

newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion,
features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments
which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or
repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However,
unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will
respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest.

It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution No. 2772. In any case,
Section 8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections. 6 There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for
campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully
distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from
(b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters,
editors, commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are
protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press:

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application.
Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and
sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air
time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any
way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or televisionstations of news or
news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries
and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcaster or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are
not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section
11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other coverage that,
in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. We read
Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.

The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon
the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office —
constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and
that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied)

Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a
guideline for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an
effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful,
does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between
paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given
operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very
specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action
on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or
any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under
Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought
to be raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of
the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the
operation of — media of communication or information — [for the purpose of
ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly honest,
peaceful and credible elections —

is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis
mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

Summarizing our conclusions:

1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22
March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space
to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and
nullified.

2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part
and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22
March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is
hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8
of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 93867 December 18, 1990

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,

vs.

HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt.

The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this case.
What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of
the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific
provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the
Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President
Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections
and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the
respondent is not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by
Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where
the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of
the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There
is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections.

The designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons
of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.

Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the operations
of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of the
Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any
such problem. In any event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that “only the President
(could) act to fill the hiatus,” as the Solicitor General maintains.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
“independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these
Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari
by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.

A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable
at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation
of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the
President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the
respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her
permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced
as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that
temporary position.

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is
still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed
at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of
the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-
meaning.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most
likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any
event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the
best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we
cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked
the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which the security of tenure of its members is. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of
the President of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac
as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without prejudice to the
incumbent Associate Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same
position if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the appointment of a
permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS,

PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO, and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents.

Villarama & Cruz for petitioners.

Marciano LL. Aparte, Jr. for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners would have Us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from
continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer's suit, docketed therein as
Special Civil Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et
al." Petitioners likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
issued by the respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically,
capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order.
It is the petitioners' thesis that the said case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the
private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue
haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in issuing the TRO.

In Our Resolution of 20 April 1992, We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing and enforcing the challenged Order of 10 April 1922, and from continuing with the
proceedings in Special Civil Action No. 465.

At the time of the filing of both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio
Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in
the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Antonio Arevalo, Cresencio Echaves,
Emmanuel Aranas and Palermo Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial
engineer and provincial budget officer of Camiguin, respectively. Their co-petitioners Ronnie
Rambuyon, Primo Navarro and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other
hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional District of
Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional
Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated.

On 10 April 1992, private respondent filed his Petition 1 (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a
quo against petitioners Gallardo, Arevalo, Echaves, Aranas and Sia to prohibit and restrain them from
pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or spending any
public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device for
the future delivery of money, goods and other things of value chargeable against public funds in
connection with the said projects as (1) said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on
public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they
were initiated a few days before 27 March 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by
detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the
commencement of any public works project; hence, they could not have been lawfully and validly
undertaken; (2) the hiring of hundreds of laborers in the different projects continues unabated in flagrant
violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code; (3) the projects
were undertaken in violation of the provisions of the Local Government Code 2 governing the use and
expenditure of the twenty percent (20%) development fund of the Province of Camiguin; (4) these
projects, which are "Locally-Funded", were pursued without the requisite approval of the provincial budget
by the Regional Office of Budget and Management as required by Section 326 of the Local Government
Code; (5) some of the projects which are "Foreign-Assisted" and funded by the Spanish Assistance for
Integrated Livelihood Program (SAIL) lack the required building permits and are without any relevance to
those livelihood projects envisioned by the SAIL; and (6) more importantly, as alleged in paragraph VII of
his Petition: 3

. . . the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring massive outlay of
public funds during this election period has been and is being done maliciously and
intentionally for the purpose of corrupting the voters and inducing them to support the
candidacy of Respondent Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11, 1992
election.

In support of his prayer for a restraining order to be issued upon the filing of the petition and a writ of
preliminary injunction immediately thereafter, herein private respondent alleges in paragraph XV of
his Petition:

That unless the illegal acts of Respondents are enjoined or restrained immediately
first by the issuance of the restraining order upon the filing of this Petition and
immediately after that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, great or irreparable loss and
injury shall be caused not only to Petitioner himself, as a candidate and as a
taxpayer, but also to the entire LDP slate of candidates, whose supporters are being
corrupted and illegally induced to vote for Respondent Antonio A. Gallardo and his
candidates in consideration of their employment in these projects, but (sic) most of all
the greatest and most irreparable loss, damage and injury, in terms of wanton,
irresponsible, excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, is now being
caused and shall continue to be caused, primarily and principally to the sixty-
thousand or more taxpayers of the Province of Camiguin, whom Petitioner
represents as Congressman and whose interests Petitioner is sworn to uphold,
promote and protect.4

The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a ) those that are Locally-Funded,
consisting of twenty-nine (29) different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads,
the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those
designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of
the Human Resource Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and
waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital
and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. 5

On the same day that the private respondent filed his petition, public respondent Judge issued the
questioned TRO, 6 the pertinent portion of which reads:

It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage
and/or injury shall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such
damage and injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton,
excessive, abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be
heard on notice, the respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing
or prosecuting the projects itemized in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of the petition; from
releasing, disbursing and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from
issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds in
connection with said projects. (Emphasis supplied).

In the same order, the public respondent directed the petitioners to file their Answer within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction for 24 April 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, alleging as grounds therefor the following:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

NO. 465, BEING (sic) A SUIT INTENDED TO ENJOIN AN ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.

II

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO CRIMINAL ACTIONS

FOR VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.

III

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE

OF COMPLAINTS/PETITION BASED ON ELECTION OFFENSES PRIOR TO THE
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; FURTHER, PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO FILE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465 SINCE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE
ELECTION OFFENSES BELONGS TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

IV

PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL HIS ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES

THE PETITION DATED 09 APRIL 1992 FILED WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS

COMPLETELY BASELESS SINCE:

A. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY

PETITIONERS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE PUBLIC WORKS BAN
ENFORCED BY THE COMELEC.

B. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE COMMENCED ONLY

AFTER APPROVAL OF THE DETAILED ENGINEERING PLANS
AND SPECIFICATIONS AND PROGRAM OF WORK.

C. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE PROPERLY

SUPPORTED BY A BUDGET DULY PASSED AND APPROVED BY
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT FUND MAY VALIDLY BE USED TO

FINANCE THE MAINTENANCE OF PROVINCIAL ROADS.

VI
 THE TAXPAYER'S SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IMPROPER SINCE
HE IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

VII

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE, MANIFEST

PARTIALITY AND EVIDENT BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
AGAINST PETITIONERS IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 7

As adverted to earlier, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 20 April 1992.

After considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the Petition, the Comment
thereto and the Reply to the Comment, We gave due course 8 to this Petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda which they complied with.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Special Civil Action No. 465. The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably
link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and
(w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular
emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. —

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any

public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases,
disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public
works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. — During the period of
forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election,
any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for
projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails
of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or
other things of value chargeable against public funds.

Private respondent likewise focuses on Resolution No. 2332 (not 2322 as erroneously stated in page
10 of his Petition) of the COMELEC, promulgated on 2 January 1992, implementing the aforesaid
paragraphs (v) and (w) of Section 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-day ban for purposes of the
synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922.

Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws
involving the conduct of elections; corollarily, the issue that is logically provoked is whether or not the
trial court has jurisdiction over the same. If the respondent Judge had only hearkened to this Court's
teaching about a quarter of a century earlier, this case would not have reached Us and taken away
from more deserving cases so much precious time.

Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, 9 decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above
posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this
Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the Constitution with
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is
at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable
scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions." 10

Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known
as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947. The present Constitution and
extant election laws have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no
doubt that the present COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935
Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law" 11 and had the power
to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections, 12 and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power
(a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" 13 (b) "[D]eputize, with the
consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and
honest elections," 14 and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law," 15 it was not
expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That
power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary implication of
the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may
be provided by law."

The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such
rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its
incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the Commission's power under the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said
Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:

xxx xxx xxx

 Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, . . . . 16

Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory
authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its
duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power
is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the
present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, 17 and to serve as the guardian of
the people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change
of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the
following powers:

l) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties
relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen
years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or
rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such
officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation
or failure. 18

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful,
libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. 19

Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a
quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. As a matter of fact, the
specific allegations in the petition therein of violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Code provide a stronger basis and reason for the application of
the Zaldivar doctrine. At most, the facts in the latter case do not illustrate as clearly the announced
doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific provision of the Revised Election Code
then in force was alleged to have been violated. What was sought to be enjoined was the alleged
wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of the power, by virtue of his office, to appoint special
policemen or agents to terrorize voters into supporting the congressional candidate of his choice. In
holding that the then Court of First Instance did not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court
considered the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to exercise all
other functions which may be conferred by law. We likewise relied on the provisions of the Revised
Election Code vesting upon the COMELEC (a) direct and immediate supervision over municipal, city
and provincial officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and
(b) authority to suspend them from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its
instructions, orders, decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal if found
guilty of non-feasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their
duties relative to the conduct of elections. 20
Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new
employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is
banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before
a special election if made without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation
thereof constitutes an election offense. 21 Then too, no less than the present Constitution — and not just
the Election Law as was the case at the time of Zaldivar — expressly provides that the Commission may
"[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision." 22

Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." 23

It may thus be said without fear of contradiction that this vast array of powers and functions now
enjoyed by the Commission under the present Constitution provides a stronger foundation for, and
adds vigor and vitality to, theZaldivar doctrine.

The rationale of the said doctrine needs to be stressed here so that henceforth, no judge will lose his
bearings when confronted with the same issue. Otherwise, he should be held to account for either
the sheer ignorance of the law or the callous disregard of pronouncements by this Court to
accommodate partisan political feelings. We declared in the said case:

The question may be asked: Why should not the judiciary be a

co-participant in this particular instance of enforcing the Election Code as its authority
was invoked? The obvious answer is the literal language of the Constitution which
empowers the Commission on Elections to "have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections."
Moreover, as was so aptly observed by the then Justice Frankfurter, although the
situation confronting the United States Supreme Court was of a different character:
"Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that brings courts into
immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of such
issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such
judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract
phrases of the law." 24 Then, too, reference by analogy may be made to the principle that
sustains Albano v. Arranz. For even without the express constitutional prescription that
only this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on
Elections, it is easy to understand why no inference whatsoever with the performance of
the Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from
this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v.
Arranz, 25while not precisely in point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: "It is easy to
realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every
province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any
order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced
to impotence."

This conclusion finds' support from a consideration of weight and influence. What
happened in this case could be repeated elsewhere. It is not improbable that courts
of first instance would be resorted to by leaders of candidates or political factions
entertaining the belief whether rightly or wrongly that local officials would employ all
the power at their command to assure the victory of their candidates. Even if greater
 care and circumspection, than did exist in this case, would be employed by judges
thus appealed to, it is not unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged
partisanship would fall on their actuations, whichever way the matter before them is
decided. It is imperative that the faith in the impartiality of the judiciary be preserved
unimpaired. Whenever, therefore, the fear may be plausibly entertained that an
assumption of jurisdiction would lead to a lessening of the undiminished trust that
should be reposed in the courts and the absence of authority discernible the from the
wording of applicable statutory provisions and the trend of judicial decisions, even if
no constitutional mandate as that present in this case could be relied upon, there
should be no hesitancy in declining to act. 26

The foregoing disquisitions should have rendered unnecessary the resolution of the remaining
collateral issues raised in this petition. In view, however, of their importance, they will be dealt with in
a general way.

It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under
the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal
officials. 27 Neither can We agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the
court below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or
in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further
commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing.

There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to
initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the
law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a
complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on
Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or
organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the
Commission. 28However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the
Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional
Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." 29 As earlier intimated, the
private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his
candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he
committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

We have, therefore, no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis Our resolution of the
principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be
understood as approving of the acts complained of by the private respondent. If his charges for the
violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code are true, then
no one should be spared from the full force of the law. No government official should flout laws
designed to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or make a
mockery of our electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past have shown that only elections of
that nature or character can guarantee a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect,
preserve and enhance an institution which is vital in any democratic society.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent Judge
of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, without prejudice on the part of the private respondent to file, if he is so minded, the
appropriate complaint for an election offense pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Costs against the private respondent.

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 102925 March 5, 1992

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its Past Chairman
and President, and FRAULIN A. PEÑASALES as its Corporate Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its Chairman;
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.

G.R. No. 102983 March 5, 1992

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI BROADCASTING NETWORK;

MOLAVE BROADCASTING NETWORK; MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.,
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP.; FILIPINAS
BROADCASTING; RADIO PILIPINO CORP.; RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.; EAGLE
BROADCASTING CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for themselves
and in behalf of the mass media owners as a class; ANDRE S. KHAN; ARCADIO M.
CARANDANG, JR.; MALOU ESPINOSA MANALASTAS; MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE
ANTONIO K. VELOSO; DIANA G. DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G. PEDROCHE;
PETER A. LAGUSAY; ROBERT ESTRELLA; ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters
and in behalf of the Philippine electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and
ALEJANDRO de G. RODRIGUEZ; for themselves as prospective candidates and in behalf of
all candidates in the May 1992 election as a class,petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the
constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that
the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out
for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content,
namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners
contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression
of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of
the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of

election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it
shall be unlawful;

xxx xxx xxx

b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space
or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P.
Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as
follows:

Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in
the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of
charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign. (Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of
rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by
huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time
"for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon
the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure
"Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time"
on radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec
space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates
within the area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.

No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by
Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election
Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of
society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty
line." It is supremely important, however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate
one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987
Constitution which provides as follows:

Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor,for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)

The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with
"public information campaigns and forums among candidates." 1

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken
in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special
importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in
particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by
which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that
these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values
even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself
for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's
disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by
Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law." 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of
invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the
Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office,
although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and
free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-
honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3

Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles
relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that
power. The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b)
has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.

In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of
the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact
upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain
important limitations.

Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under
another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from
12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of
Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and
sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes."
Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions
and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11
(b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is
not paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.

The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does not restrict either the
reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs
and activities of any and all candidates for office — constitutes the critical distinction which must be
made between the instant case and that ofSanidad v. Commission on Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the
Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows:

Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
 columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the
freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier,
"for no justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea, J., said:

. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right
to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom
of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis." 6 (Emphasis
partly in the original and partly supplied)

There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b) exempts
from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which
space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of
charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by
the newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive
that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis
among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact
prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial
remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is
entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It
seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that
the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there
is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected
that the Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much the same
considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or
"procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec
will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or
candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.

The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of
media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and
promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their
regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize
any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual
candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec
space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or
ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV
screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed
in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other than modern
mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of
the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem
of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow
or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That
the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be
expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity among
the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of
their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that
while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to
spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True enough
Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election
Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect equalityinter se without regard to their
financial affluence or lack thereof. But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly
comprehensive or which does not completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that
reason alone constitutionally infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in
governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under
challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the
supervision or regulation of communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden
modality is made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).

It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech
of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once
again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and commentary on
pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates themselves. All other fora remain
accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal
opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the candidates themselves.

Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be
totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is
on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly
repeated in the mass mediaad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed
into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It
might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of
television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio
or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly
own or control the stations or channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is
that, in a very real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8

The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-
deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to
condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates'
qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive
audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and
their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves
through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from
the marketing of "packaged" candidates.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article
entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on
Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and
determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957
and the supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying
for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13, 1957, awarding the
contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel
Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the respective answers of the latter two
corporations to said petitions; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and
undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo
Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of
elections."

Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to
quash on the following grounds:

a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged
contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted
a power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the
Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at
hand, said provision would be unconstitutional.

b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be
applied to the instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative
function for purchasing ballot boxes.

c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot
apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a
closed case when the article in question was published.

d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in
question was a fair report because it could be assumed that the news report of the
respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there
was an allegation of fraud, etc.

The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which
assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in
connection with the alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections,
on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation
(NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC),
the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at
P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the
ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13,
1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract
within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the
11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were
signed on May 16, 1957.

Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after
hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was
filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20,
1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its
previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter
ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these
corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24,
1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing,
and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for
reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the
Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.

The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and
jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the
necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times
issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said
Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and
undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections.

The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our
Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and
devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections
(Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General,
85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code
supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these powers are
those embodied in Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote:

SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. — The Commission on Elections or any of the members

thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it,
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take testimony in any
investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any
 controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it
within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said
controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to
punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
constitute contempt of the Commission.

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as
may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this
power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The
Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction.
As to what question may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election
Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the right
to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number
and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials,
while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination. But it is clear that,
to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in
drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a
function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But
this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have
been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government
(Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it
have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon
the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of
the votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns
for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor
does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been
proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this
Court has held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only
when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil.,
136).

On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry
list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election
canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and
to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of
canvassers (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial
duties which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections,
the following resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy which was submitted to it for
determination is very enlightening:

In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first
duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging
from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of
members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling
places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election
day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the
right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is
incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free,
orderly and honest elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations
relative to these processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the
Commission on Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely,
honestly and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized
representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act freely,
honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of election forms and
the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are done freely, honestly and in an
orderly manner. It is further essential that the political parties or their duly authorized
representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors must have the
freedom to choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the
country. It is further essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all
the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely, honestly and
in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words, it is the duty of the
Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an
atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties without any pressure, influence and
interference from any private person or public official. All these preparatory steps are
administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of
the Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any
official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to
correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these
preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this
case, which to our mind is completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the Commission
on Elections, October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case
No. 196)1

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the
multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of
election forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the board of inspectors, appointment of
precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to as to put in
readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the
requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the
same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections
are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us. It stems from the
ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with
the last elections and in so proceeding it provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to
do the job.

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several
dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In
proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated
in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.
S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The
exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts
(Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271).
And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function
has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs.
Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections
has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline
him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the
case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, with pronouncement as to costs.

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

G.R. No. L-61998 February 22, 1983

ROGELIO DE JESUS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.

Jaime G. Fortes for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

The question of law posed for determination in this petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan may be propounded thus: Which of these entities have the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office — the
Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?

After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with
violation of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of Justice which
endorsed the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that petitioner was
being charged in relation to his office, Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog in their
capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal
Genova issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case against petitioner for violation
of section 891 and sub-sections [x] 2 and [mm] 3 of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. After
approval thereof by the Tanodbayan, the following information, dated January 27, 1982, was filed before
the Sandiganbayan:

That on or about January 30, 1980 and sometime thereafter to February 6, 1980, in
the Municipality of Casiguran Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while discharging the
Office of the Election Registrar in the Municipality of Casiguran, Province of
Sorsogon, taking advantage and abusing his official position, did there and there
wilfully unlawfully and feloniously by reason of his being a registrar knowingly
registered persons in order to vote on January 30, 1980 being an election day and at
the same time issuing Identification cards during election day, thereby violating the
provision of the Election Code of 1978 and at the same time tampering with the
election reports by mag it appear that 10,727 persons were the total number of
registered voters for the election of January 30, 1980, when in truth and in fact the
actual total number of voters as - sported on January 27, 1980 by the accused was
only 10,532 but then changed to 10,727, thereby violating the provisions of Section
'89' and Section.'178' under Article XVI specifically sub- section 'X' and sub-section
'MM' which is a violation of the Election Code of 1978 to the erosion of public faith
and confidence.

The case, docketed as SB Criminal Case No. 5054, was raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense

xxx xxx xxx

[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or causes the
issuance of a voter's certificate of registration or cancels or causes the cancellation
thereof the violation of the provisions of this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

[mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs any -
function of a member of the election committee, or the board of canvassers, or
deputy of representative of the Commission.

charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate,
prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its
opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan's exclusive authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and
consequently, the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.

The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as amicus
curiae, and through its law department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr., submitted a memorandum
supporting petitioner's stand. 4

On August 13, 1982, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to
quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
The legal question posed being one of first impression, this, Court resolved to give due course to the
petition, treating the same as an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the proper mode by which relief from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan could be obtained from
this Tribunal. Petitioner and respondents rely on different provisions of the 1973 Constitution as
bases for their respective contentions. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XII[c] of the 1973
Constitution which vests upon the COMELEC the power "to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of elections," and its implementing legislation, Section 182 of the 1978 Election Code,
which provides the following:

Section 182 — Prosecution. The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal
officer, have the power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which invests the court of first instance with
"exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under
the jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts. ... The Solicitor General supports the petitioner's
views. 5

Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, in its resolution of August 13, 1982, 6 asserts its jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 5054 on the authority of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
mandated the creation by the Batasan Pambansa of "a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices, and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned and
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."

To the Sandiganbayan, as set forth in the challenged resolution, ... the key phrase in the
determination as to which of the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts of first instance should take
cognizance of an election offense, is the phrase, 'in relation to their office'." Thus, it would distinguish
between election offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and
those committed not in relation to their office, in this manner:

If the election offense is committed by a public officer or employee NOT in relation to

their office, generally, jurisdiction will be assumed by the regular courts. If, on the
other hand, the offense was committed by a public officer or employee in relation to
their office, then there is no other tribunal vested with jurisdiction to try such offense
but this court, in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, lover ... offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office.

We find the position of the Sandiganbayan devoid of merit.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this
power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of
which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of
the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority
to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would
thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the
authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation
to their office, as contra-distinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ... offenses committed by
public officers ... in relation to their office as may be determined by law" [Sec. 5, Art. XIII]; while the
Office of the Tanodbayan shall "receive and investigate complaints relative to public office." [Sec. 6,
Art. XIII]. The clause, "as may be determined by law" is, to Our mind imbued with grave import. It
called for a legislation that would define and delineate the power and jurisdiction of both the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree
Nos. 1606 and 1607, creating the said entities.

Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

[a] Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

[b] Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and,

[c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including

those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office.

Plainly, the above quoted paragraph [c] is but a re-statement of the constitutional provision relating
to the Sandiganbayan. It is also to be noted that it is phased in terms so broad and general that it
cannot be legitimately construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal
the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the
court of first instance to hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of
the accused.

Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored. it is noted that while Section 184 of
the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c] of P.D. No, 1606 speaks
generally of "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers ... in relation to their office."
Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. 7 And where a reconciliation between
8
the statute is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the latter.

The same principle of statutory construction should be applied with respect to the powers vested
upon the COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in so far as election offenses are concerned.

Moreover, as aptly observed by the COMELEC as well as the Solicitor General, splitting the
jurisdiction over election offenses would serve no beneficial purpose but would rather spawn much
controversy — "complaints about unequal protection, about inconsistent decisions, etc. (which are)
not conducive to a fair and speedy administration of justice." [p. 17, Comment, Solicitor General].
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second Division dated August 13, 1982 is
hereby set aside and Criminal Case No. 5054. entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rogelio de
Jesus" is ordered dismissed. The COMELEC is hereby directed to forthwith conduct an investigation,
and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against petitioner before the proper court
of first instance. No costs.