- Generality

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review

Facts: A complaint was filed against Sweet, an employee of the US Military, for
having committed an offense against a prisoner of war. In his defense, he
contended that being a soldier or a military employee, that he was “acting in the
line of duty” at the time the offense was committed, it exempts him from the
jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Issue: Does the civil court have jurisdiction to try the case of the accused?

Ruling: The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. In this case, the general principle applies—that the
jurisdiction of civil courts is unaffected by the military or other special character
of the person brought before it. The contention also that the act was performed
under the order of his military superior cannot affect the right of the court to
take jurisdiction of the case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions; the military tribunal not
asserting any claim.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28,

2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released
him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot
blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to
protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable
by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule
on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

- Territoriality

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which
arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon,
brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The
8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's
engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying
the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which
has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of
the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, vs. COMMANDING GENERAL,

PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States
Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of
Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the
94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason
and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty
and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. On March 11, 1947, the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered
into an agreement concerning military bases,

ISSUE:
whether or not the general court martial has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed outside the military base

Held:
No. Paragraph 3, of Article XXI of Temporary Installation provides "that
offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located
within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as
offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article
XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as
committed within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of
Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to
the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the present
limits of the City of Manila. And so hold, that the General Court-Martial
appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense
allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said
court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.

- Prospectivity

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to

reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was
rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the
petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated
such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for
rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after
their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the
maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued
detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a
retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable
to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied

retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not
a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection,
given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of
benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE

CARMELO C. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.

520 SCRA 332 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Carmelo Bernardo (Bernardo) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22), for issuing six postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500 to F.T.
YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.(Ylang Ylang Mktg). The MeTc
rendered judgment finding Bernardo guilty of the offense charged. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC judgment.Bernardo elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). He filed a motion for extension of time
to file petition for review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from
his counsel‘s receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion Partial
Reconsideration.
The CA granted the motion for extension of time but only for 15 days.
Apparently unaware of the CA order, he used up the 30-day extension sought
and filed his petition. Hence, the appellate court denied his petition having been
filed 15 days later and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other
pertinent and material documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in granting only 15 days extension

HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an “additional
period of 15 days only” within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under
the same section, a “further extension” not to exceed 15 days may be granted
“for the most compelling reason,” petitioner had no basis to assume that his
request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for
extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the
length of time they pray for.
The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in
restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides that “[n]o further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.”
People v. Pimentel

Facts:
As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-
Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest
was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live
ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of
Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to
quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he
claims that alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was
granted by RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied
retroactively to Tujan.
Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA
1700, as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which
was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the
previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a
total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET

AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA.

The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at

the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest
was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas
and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were
valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as

respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the

alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence
of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the
part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing
acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880;
the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional
because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the

doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may
temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best
assurance that due process of law would be observed.

PENAL LAWS ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners Case Digest

Facts:
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case
against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel
announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual
to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered
that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and
to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision was
rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself." Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case
can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice
medicine while administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness
stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony,
to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness
by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self incrimination, along
with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality. (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May
26, 1969)
FELONIES
DOLO

PEOPLE VS VICENTE TEMBLOR

The accused-appellant, Vicente R. Miñano, was charged with the crime of rape
in Criminal Case No. 1673 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Fourth
Judicial Region, Romblon, Romblon.
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On January 21, 1991, the trial court
render its decided that the accused VICENTE R. MIÑANO GUILTY is beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

In this appeal, the accused-appellant assails his conviction by the trial court. It
allegedly failed to take into account the following: 1) several inconsistencies in
the testimony of the victim; 2) delay in filing the complaint; 3) admission of the
victim that she was menstruating when the rape incident happened; and 4)
affidavit of waiver and desistance which was executed by the victim.

ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT

HELD:
Although this Court ordinarily relies on the factual findings of the trial court,
recognizing its superior competence to assess the credibility of the witnesses
through direct observation of their deportment on the stand, We decline to apply
this policy in the case before Us. 14 It is not enough that the victim expressed
her emotions to the fullest while testifying, the totality of the evidence should be
considered before reaching the conclusion that, indeed, her testimony is credible
and positive. A meticulous examination of the records and analysis of the
arguments of the parties enabled Us to unearth the truth behind the victim's
serious charge of rape against the accused-appellant. The prosecution has not
sufficiently established his guilt to the point of overcoming the constitutional
presumption of innocence that he enjoys.
The accused-appellant sets up the main defenses that at the time of the rape
incident, their entire family was at home and the victim left their house on
March 11, 1988. Although these were adequately corroborated by his wife, not
much credence should be given to her testimony. It is undeniably tainted with
bias since it springs from the natural desire of a wife to bail out her husband
from criminal liability even to the extent of lying . 42 We thus find his defenses
weak. However, it is an enduring rule that the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of that of the defense. 43
This Court has no option but to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet
the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of the accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. It is imperative that We reverse the trial court's guilty
verdict.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of rape.
SO ORDERED.
018. PEOPLE v. HASSAN

Short Version: Hassan was convicted of murder on the bases of the testimony of
a lone witness for the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation
conducted by the police investigator of the Zamboanga City Police Station. The
Supreme Court found that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. As a
general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because,
after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of
complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a
pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as
to the identity of the culprit as when 'the identification is extremely tenuous

Facts: Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death one Ramon
Pichel, Jr. Jose Samson, lone witness for the prosecution testified that he was
with the victiom at about 7:00 pm of July 23, 1981 when they went to buy
mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City and
that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw assailant stab the victim, who was
seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters
from the fruit stand; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon from behind "only
once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building.
RTC of Zamboanga convicted Hassan based on this testimony and testimony of
Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio regarding the investigation conducted by the
police.

Issue: WON accused should be found guilty for the crime of murder- NO!

Ruling: Evidence for the Prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum
of proof- beyond reasonable doubt- required to convict an accused person.
Ratio: (Relevant part:MOTIVE) In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused,
value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence. In this case, testimony of the lone eye witness and
evidence introduced by the police are weak and unconvincing
~The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, that he saw the assailant
stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" only once contradicted the expert
testimony of the medico-legal officer of the NBI officer who identified two stab
wounds, one at the front portion of the chest and third rib, and another located at
the left arm posterior aspect. The medical expert also concluded from the nature
and location of the chest wound that it was inflicted on the victim while the
alleged accused was in front of him."

~The procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation

between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman. Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was
alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor.
However, on cross-examination he stated that the accused was identified by
Samson in a "police line-up”. Court considered the confrontation arranged by
the police investigator between eyewitness and the accused as violation to the
right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the identification
of the accused.

~Also, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the
evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly. Statement of Hassan was
taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr.
and sworn only two days after it had been taken. The fruit vendor—from whom
Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes was not investigated. Nor was
the arresting officer, companion of Corporal Carpio presented. The knife and its
scabbard, which were confiscated by Carpio from Hassan at the time of his
arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of
human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the
deceased. Court also emphasized the fact that accused was found sitting on his
pushcart with a companion after the incident. If he were the assailant, he would
have fled.

~ A day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at
Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that
frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly
police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. There was
no attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to
investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr
which could have produced the link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or
innocence.

Court found that there was total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for
stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is
not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a
state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the
requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards
his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the
culprit as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," as in this case.

Accused AQUITTED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

People of the Philippines vs. De los Santos

FACTS:Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf
truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3
bottles of beer. On their way to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenn’s
truck, hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several members
of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a highway wearing black
shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the
spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained
minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very
dark as there was no moon. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the
highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple
murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple attempted murders, with the
use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.

HELD:
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through
reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light
felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should
be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should
have, therefore, been filed

US v. Ah Chong GR No. L-5272, March 19, 1910

Facts:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the
Officers’ quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with
him in the said quarters was the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, who was
employed as a houseboy. There had been several robberies in Fort
McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant and his
roommate to reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room
by placing a chair against it. The defendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock on the
door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who
was alone in his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open
the door of the room. The defendant called out twice, asking the identity
of the person but heard no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill the intruder if
he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the
defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the chair.
Because of the darkness of the room, the defendant thought he was
being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at
the intruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept under his
pillow. It turned out that the said intruder was actually the defendant’s
roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the
military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the
following day.

Issue:
WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:
Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated.
In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid defense, there has to be
several requisites. One, that the act done would have been lawful had
the facts been as the accused believed them to be. Two, that the
intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, and
lastly, that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part
of the accused.

In the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant
believed him to be, then Ah Chong acted in good faith, without malice or
criminal intent, and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability
and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Oanis 1943

People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

FACTS:
Ø Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.

Ø The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.

Ø Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing
a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously
or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked
by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

Ø According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at

the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the
place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she
said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance

YES.
Ø ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness

Ø appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to

immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
Ø "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention."

Ø a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses

unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest

Ø The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the

killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.

Ø 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:

offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-
present injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not
present

Ø According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or

2 degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

CULPA

022. PEOPLE v. BUAN

G.R. No. L-25366 | March 29, 1968 | En Banc | Direct appeal by accused
from an Order of the CFI |
People – plaintiff-appellee
Jose Buan – accused appellant
Decision by: Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.
Digest by: KY Bautista
Short version: Buan (bus driver) hit a jeepney, injuring the jeep passengers and
damaging the jeep. He was charged with “slight phys inj through reckless
imprudence” but was acquitted by the Justice of the Peace. An Info for “serious
phys inj and damage to property through reckless imprudence” was filed with
the CFI. Accused moved to quash as he was already acquitted in the Justice of
the Peace. SC agrees with accused saying that once convicted/acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, he may not be prosecuted again for that
same act. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.

Facts:
• Accused Buan was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company
along MacArthur Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his
negligence, he struck a passenger jeep.

• The jeep turned turtle. Jeep passengers were injured.

o 6 – slight phys inj (med attendance 5-9 days)
o 3 – serious phys inj (med attention 30-45 days)
o Damaged jeep – P1,395

• In the Guiguinto Justice of the Peace Court, charge against accused:

“slight phys inj through reckless imprudence.” He was tried and acquitted.

• Prior to this acquittal, Prov Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI the info in
the present case: “serious phys inj and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.”
• Accused was arraigned but moved to quash the info: that he had already
been acquitted of the same offense.

• CFI denied. MR denied.

• Accused appealed to the SC.

Issue: W/N the second case placed the appellant (accused) twice in jeopardy --
Yes

Ruling: CFI Bulacan directed to quash and dismiss the charge.

Ratio:
• Once convicted/acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, he
may not be prosecuted again for that same act.

• The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony.

• The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result. The gravity
of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty.

• As the careless act is single, the offense (criminal negligence) remains

one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

• Ppl v. Silva (1962): where the result of the same vehicular accident one
man died, two seriously injured, three suffered slight physical injuries, the
acquittal for “slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence” was a bar to
“homicide through reckless imprudence”

• Ppl v. Diaz (1954): dismissal of “reckless driving” barred “damage to

property through reckless imprudence” (which was based on the same negligent
act)

• Ppl v. Belga (nd): dismissal of info “physical inj through reckless

imprudence” bars “damage to property through reckless imprudence” and
“multiple physical injuries” arising from the same collision

But SolGen argues: the charge for “slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence” could not be joined with the accusation for “serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence” because RPC 48 allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies.

Ppl v. Diaz (1954) already answered this: This may be true. But the prosecution
was not obliged to first prosecute for slight phys inj through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the lesser offense (but accused was
acquitted), the prosecuting attorney is not in a position to press the more serious
charge which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence.
Voting:
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a
prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years
(prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for
Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town
fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk),
and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the
Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion
(principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on
fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and
barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not
what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the
that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and
the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against
miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act
that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in

confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions
who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record

establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the
mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong.
- GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE
JUDGEMENTS.

MALA IN SE Vs MALA PROHIBITA

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No.
26558, finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the
President of the Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the
grounds that

1.) it was vague;

2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal

prosecutions; and
3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the accused. The
said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination’ ,‘series’ , and unwarranted ’. Based on this, the petitioner used
the facial challenge to question the validity of RA 7080.

ISSUES:
1.WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2.WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to
due process.
3.WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law. The over-breadth doctrine states that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.A
facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

ANALYSIS:

1.NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The
validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law liable to its
penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since
this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2.NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal
prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled
to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the
accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA
7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime is a
misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is
enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.

3.NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The

legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as
constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se.

CONCLUSION:
Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ACTS DIFFERENT THAN INTENDED
PRAETER INTENTIONEM

Criminal Law: People v Sabalones

294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO,
accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.

Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a

shooting incident in Cebu in 1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and
Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio
Presores. The victims were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who
also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with Rogelio
Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo
and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to the party after parking the car at Lim’s
house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Sabalones and Beronga appealed.

Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores testified about the shooting and identified the faces of the accused.
Presores was riding in the car that is behind the jeep. He positively identified
Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen fired at the car, driver
Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan Tiempo’s
house from which they have escaped death.

Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied

their presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented
numerous witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took
place [since he got tired watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga
testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7
pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from place to
place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims.
The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses
arguing that the place where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.

RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.

Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible?

Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two
witnesses. There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when
they peered during lulls in gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of
car’s headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because the
conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to the co-
accused because it is used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by one
witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen
credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow],
mistake does not diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use
error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.

Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?

No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive
identification. Using the case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the
accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene of the crime.
Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.

Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?

No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate
court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under
Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Because there are no
mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not
matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who
actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-
conspirators since the act of a conspirator becomes the act of another regardless
of the precise degree of participation in the act.

Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the
crime was done at night time and that the accused hid themselves among the
bamboo. Evident premeditation is also an aggravating circumstance [the
accused had planned to kill the victim some days before].
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

Urbano v. IAC

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued,
and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with
the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable
settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on
the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was
denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death

Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of
the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
SULPICIO INTOD v. CA, GR No. 103119, 1992-10-21

Facts:
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house... and asked him
to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.

Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,... Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house

At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location... of

Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig
fired at said room. It turned out; however, that Palangpangan was in another
City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one
was in the room when the accused fired the... shots. No one was hit by the gun
fire.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.

Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible... crime

Issues:
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible.

Ruling:
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability,[7] and... now penalizes an act which were it not
aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property.[8] The
rationale of Article 4(2) is to... punish such criminal tendencies.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either
(a) inadequate or (b)... ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by
its nature one impossible of... accomplishment.[11] There must be either (1)
legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act[12] in order to qualify the act as an impossible... crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would
not amount to a crime.[13] Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the... consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead[15] falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime.[16] One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat...
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided
for impossible crimes and made them punishable.

WE hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime

Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner,
this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties... provided by the law, and to pay
the costs.

Principles:
The rationale of Article 4(2) is to... punish such criminal tendencies

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Quinto V. Andres 2005

Quinto v. Andres

G.R. No. 155791 March 16, 2005

Lessons Applicable: Proximate cause, EX to Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
November 13, 1995 7:30 am: Edison Garcia, 11 year-old and Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto saw Dante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert. Wilson agreed while Garcia seeing that it was dark inside, opted to
remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the
drainage system.

Only Pacheco had a flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of
the drainage system and left without saying a word. Then, Andres came out,
went back inside, and emerged again carrying Wilson who was already dead.
He laid his body down in the grassy area.

Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene. Andres went to the house of Melba
Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and informed her that her son had died. They rushed
to the drainage culvert. Wilson was buried without any complaints filed.

November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took the sworn
statements of Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto

Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish
with Andres and Wilson

Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI’s autopsy showed that the cause death is
drowning with traumatic head injuries as contributory

NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with
the RTC

Dr. Dominic Aguda testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the
occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object, That the 14x7-
centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could have rendered the him
unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of
Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or
pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea
region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.
RTC: granted demurer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Acquittal in criminal case bars a civil action where the judgment
of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to
them

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
o The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages

GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action

EX: the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate
him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.

The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or

indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused
o While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of
action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.

o Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the
private complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or
superior weight of evidence. – failed

§ That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even
Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so
afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside

§ failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill
the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing
GR: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action.

EX: civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a

finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended

o Natural - an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events

o Logical - a rational connection between the act of the accused and the
resulting injury or damage
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury

o Proximate cause

§ cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient

intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred
§ acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor

o There must be a relation of “cause and effect,”

§ cause = felonious act of the offender

§ effect = resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.

The “cause and effect” relationship is not altered or changed because of the

o pre-existing conditions

§ pathological condition of the victim

§ predisposition of the offended party

§ physical condition of the offended party

o concomitant or concurrent conditions

§ negligence or fault of the doctors

§ conditions supervening the felonious act

Ø tetanus

Ø pulmonary infection

Ø gangrene

not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:

1. there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and
the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely
foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or

2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim

The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.
the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two
things:

1. first, the criminal act - objective

2. second, defendant’s agency in the commission of the act - subjective

element of crimes

· In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to

prove:

1. the death of the party alleged to be dead

2. that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide

3. that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death

Criminal Law- People vs. Valledor

"An insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a
lucid interval"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Valledor

G.R.No. 129291 03July2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case is about Enrico Valledor’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of
consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the
appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez
(stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on
different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they
were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded,
while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accused-appellant was
intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was
arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was
declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accused-appellant admitted
commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of
insanity.

The appellant’s plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances:

1.) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving
abnormally. The mother then brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman, a medical
practitioner. She then disclosed to the doctor that insanity runs in the family

2.) Dr. de Guzman then diagnosed the appellant as suffering from “psychosis w/
schizophrenia” and prescribed the appellant w/ an anti-depressant known as
thoracin which kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months

3.) On 04 March 1991, the appellant’s mother noticed that he is acting

strangely, so she left to buy Thoracin, but when she returned the appellant is
nowhere to be found.
4.) On 06 March 1991 (date of commission of crime) he was seen swimming
across the river Barangay Captain and Councilman took the appellant out of the
water inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the
effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that appellant was mentally ill,
the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to accompany accused-appellant
to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with
appellant, while on the jeepney the appellant then jumped off the jeepney and
boarded a tricycle.

5.) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer I and was
recommended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL

6.) While under the care of the hospital the medical findings for the appellant
was that he was suffering from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under
Schizophrenia
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused?
No, since in considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons to be
of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and
it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously
- The acts made by the appellant shows that he does not have complete absence
of the power to discern as shown by his stabbing of the two victims (roger and
elza) while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed, also his action
of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware of the
wrong he committed.
- The actions performed by the appellant does not sufficiently prove his insanity
at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."
- Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness
what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the
offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane
when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.

HELD:
THE COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY WITH MODIFICATIONS:
HE IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR THE KILLING OF
ELZA RODRIGUEZ, AND ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR BOTH ROGER
CABIGUEN AND ROGELIO MAGLALANG (FROM FRUSTRATED
MURDER FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO MAGLALANG IT WAS REDUCED
TO ATTEMPTED MURDER)
SPECIAL LAWS AND THE RPC

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused,
Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law.
He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00
under Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport
while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec.
6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD
NO. 1883.

Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of
the Philippines without an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-
resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange
in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their
foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries
upon arrival in the Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading
or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules
and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine
of no less than P50,000.00.

At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from
Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in
business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his business
associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were
handed to and kept by him.

Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai
was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out
of the Philippines.

Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against

Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or
gross ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held:
Yes.

Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was
apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not
correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other
people.

In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank
Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said
amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
A Case of Warrantless Arrest: ROBIN PADILLA VS. Court of Appeals
ROBIN PADILLA VS. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner was involved in a hit and run accident and was later
apprehended by the police after he was chased by them. During the arrest,
petitioner was found to have in his possession two different firearms and 2 other
firearms were found inside his vehicle after the policemen saw the first two
firearms he was carrying.
Petitioner was then convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Hence the
present petition.

Issue: WON the warrantless search and arrest conducted on petitioner was valid

Held:
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense,
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit
and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that
"presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but
also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to
the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle
using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already
positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
property is valid, 44 are as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

4. consented warrantless search, and

5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the
authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying
into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within
"plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to
the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which wasimmediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that:

(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,

the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties
as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the,
corpus delicti.

53 Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain

view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter
gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search
and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected,
the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment
and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an
incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible
evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search
of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have
been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.