belonging to Zoila de Talaban of the total value of one
BERNARDO VS. BALAGOT
[G.R. No. 86561. November 10, 1992.]
Facts:
It is stressed at the outset that the petitioner is not among
the disqualified offenders listed in Section 9 of P.D. 968
(Law on Probation). Section 4 of the said decree, which was
promulgated on July 24, 1976, provided for the grant of
probation. On December 1, 1977, that section was
amended by P.D. 1257. This was the prevailing law on
probation at the time the petitioner was convicted in 1984.
On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was again amended, this
time by P.D. 1990. This was the law in force at the time the
petitioner filed his application for probation. P.D. 1990 was
promulgated on October 5, 1985, and published in the
Official Gazette on December 30, 1985. It took effect on
January 15, 1986, after fifteen days from the date of its
publication. The petitioner’s application for probation was
filed on February 3, 1986, after P.D. 1990 had already
become effective. Consequently, the petitioner cannot
invoke the original Section 4 of P.D. 968, as he is not among
"those who have already filed their respective applications
for probation at the time of the effectivity of P.D. 1990.
Issue: Should PD 1990 should apply to the petitioner?
Ruling:
P.D. No. 1990 was issued when it was observed that even if
a person’s conviction was finally affirmed after he had
exhausted the appeal process (usually up to this Court), he
nevertheless could still apply for probation and thus in
effect undo such affirmance. To prevent loss of time,
money, and effort on the part of the State in this wasteful
exercise, the law was amended to make appeal and
probation mutually exclusive remedies. The present case
falls squarely within the objectives of P.D. 1990.
At any rate, even if it be assumed that the respondent
judge did gravely abuse his discretion, the petition was still
correctly dismissed because of the amended Section 4 of
P.D. 1990.
PEOPLE v. BLENVENLDO VENUS
[ GR No. 45141, Sep 15, 1936 ]
Facts:
An information charging the defendant,
Bienvenido Venus, with the crime of robbery in an
inhabited house. The information alleges that the
defendant entered the house then occupied by Zoila de
Talaban by breaking the hasp of the door of said house
which was secured by a padlock and once inside took and
carried away, with the intent of gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, various personal properties
hundred and eighty-eight pesos and fifty centavos. The
information further alleges "that the said accused is a
habitual delinquent, he having previously been convicted
by final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for
the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and
once for theft, the date of his last conviction being
November 14, 1934."
The accused pleaded guilty to the information whereupon
the trial court rendered judgment imposing the prison
sentence upon the defendant-appellant, took into
account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
because the date of the conviction of the accused for the
crime of theft is specified in the information, but it
refused to consider the defendant-appellant a habitual
delinquent under the provisions of article 62 of the Revised
Penal Code for the following reason:
'That the said accused is a habitual delinquent, he having
previously been convicted by final judgments rendered by
a competent court, once for the crime of attempted
robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft”
Issue:
Can the defendant-appellant in this case be considered a
habitual delinquent?
Ruling:
The defendant and appellant in the case at bar can not be
considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist. As
the plea of guilty offsets the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism, the penalty provided for in article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an
inhabited house by means of unlawful entry where the
criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen
does not exceed 250 pesos, should be imposed in the
medium degree in accordance with the provisions of
article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (People vs.
Co Pao [1934], 58 Phil., 545; People vs. Gayrama [1934],
60 Phil., 796), the principal penalty imposed by the court a
quo is modified and instead the penalty of six months
and one day to two years, eleven months and eleven
days of prision correctional, is hereby imposed upon the
defendant-appellant, Bienvenido Venus. With this only
modification, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed,
with costs against the appellant in both instances.
Same case, Pakisulat pa rin ito. This has different
application.
GUMABON vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
FACTS:
After pleading guilty for complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping, Mario
Gumabon and five others were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by
virtue of the above convictions and has served more than
13 years.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court negated the complex

crime stating that rebellion cannot be complexed with
other crimes. Thus, the accused in the Hernandez case was
only sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment.

Petitioners now seek for the retroactive application of the

Hernandez doctrine which was promulgated after their
conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in imposing excessive

penalty.

RULING:

As the Court had ruled since 1956 that only the crime of
simple rebellion exists in our legal system for which the
maximum penalty of prision mayor may be imposed, the
excess of the life sentences imposed upon petitioners over
the imposable maximum of prision mayor cannot stand and
must necessarily be declared void.

Prescinding then from the question of jurisdiction of the

sentencing courts, the case at bar presents a clear case of
an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years
of prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this
Court's settled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannot
be complexed with other common crimes. On this ground,
as well as on the further and more fundamental ground
that to hold them liable to continue serving life sentences
for a crime that the law—at the time of their conviction as
well as now—punishes only with prision mayor which they
have more than fully served, would be to deny them their
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of
the law.