Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Options & Futures II
BUSFIN 4232
Professor Pirim
Spring 2016 session 1
Group # 5
Name Dot
Number
Hajer Tamimi .9
Qinrou Li .3184
Evan Shvach .2
Douglas Taylor .2182
Lingyu Wu .1928
Introduction
On December 1994, Orange County became one of the largest municipalities in the U.S.
that filed for bankruptcy. The highly leveraged investment strategy, the weak risk management
and the demography of Orange County itself helped lead to the bankruptcy. This case introduces
the complete story behind the bankruptcy, explains the causes in details that includes the strategy
of borrowing short and investing long, the misjudgement about the market interest rate, the lack
of oversight for the treasurer and the lack of attentions to internal risk management control.
Robert Citron, the man behind the bankruptcy used a Carry Trade strategy along with reverse
repurchase agreements (reverse repos) to leverage the investment pool and earn higher returns.
The management or the board of supervisors and Citron failed to recognize the risks with such
investment strategies and ended up losing billions of dollars from the county’s fund. Other
factors helped shape this downfall as well, including the economic situation, taxing laws and
Merrill Lynch. The case concludes with the lessons learned from the financial crisis of a
municipality
Industry Analysis/Overview of the Firm
Orange County is located in Southern California, just south of Los Angeles. Today, it has
over 3,000,000 residents, placing it sixth among total county population nationwide. Orange
County marks itself as a destination for not only residents, but tourists from around the world.
Located inside this county are attractions such as Disneyland, Knott’s Berry Farm, and the
pristine beachfront weather environment. The county has a very wealthy population, which
cultivates a very conservative political aura from policies enacted.
The way a county treasurer's office was run before the 1994 county crisis is through the
idea of using a county’s investment pool as an interest bearing checking account. Money
collected from taxes, bond issuance, and other sources was put into the investment pool to earn
high interest. Entities within the pool could withdraw money at any time to pay their expenses,
ex: cities to repair roads. Refer below, Exhibit 1 depicts this process with a flow diagram.
This event in financial history is unique in the climate in which it was cultivated. Orange
County has obligations to stakeholders with much different profiles than those in the financial
services industry. While Orange County received investments from Wall Street, its main priority
was to generate returns for the taxpayers, including schools, local governments, and county
residents.
On June 6th, 1978, Proposition 13 which reduced property tax rate on homes, businesses
and farms by 57% was passed by about two thirds of voters in California, which limited tax
revenue that Orange County can gain to cover its increasing infrastructure expenses. Local
treasuries including Orange County had to find other sources of funds to cover their expenses,
one of which done by Orange County was to be involved in higherrisk investments compensated
by higher return. However, during 1990’s, the political fragmentation caused the county treasurer
not to be adequately overseen. Along with existing problems in internal risk management,
Citron, the treasurer of Orange County took extremely irrational decisions on investments, which
lead to the bankruptcy of Orange County. Before recession in 1980 and 1990, Orange County
and other local treasuries could rely on federal and state funds to cover their infrastructure
expenses, but during the recession federal funds reduced their funds.
Event Summary and Key Persons
This distinct financial debacle was not the result of a firm taking on risky bets
systematically, or a group of rogue investors. The Orange County bankruptcy crisis can be
followed back to one man, and his name was Robert Citron. Citron was born on April 14, 1925
in Los Angeles, California. He was enrolled at the University of Southern California for three
years, but never graduated. Citron met the love of his life, and future wife in 1955 while
bouncing around various, unsuccessful jobs. In 1960, he was able to secure a position in the
Orange County tax collector’s office. It was in 1969 that he ran for the position of Orange
County tax collector and won. However, in 1970, the county made the decision to combine the
tax collector and treasurer positions in an effort to save money. While in theory this choice
seemed favorable on paper, Citron was seemingly under qualified to be in this leadership
position. Citron had no formal training in accounting or investing, but when the two offices of
collector and treasurer were combined, Citron was the man at the top.
During Citron’s career at Orange County as the reigning Treasurer, Proposition 13 was
passed in 1978. This new law would later create havoc for Citron’s nearly untouchable portfolio.
The decrease in revenues needed to be filled by other means and extra risky strategies were
Citron’s solution.
In 1979 that Citron had decided to draft his own law to allow himself to invest larger
sums of money through leverage. The law would allow California county treasurers to borrow
money with reverse repurchase agreements. This allowed Citron to invest in assets with this
borrowed money, and use the underlying asset as collateral. This would set the stage for huge
returns, followed by huge losses for Orange County. At his highest point, Citron was earning a
staggering 17.7 percent return on his investments, and was hailed as a “financial wizard.”
In the span from 1993 to 1994, interest rates rose, something that Citron did not think
would happen. Having his investments tied to rates decreasing, this was bad news for the
investment pool. On November 16, 1994 the county reported a monumental 1.6 billion dollar
loss. Things were no better during the following weeks. On December 4, 1994 Citron was forced
to resign, and on December 6 the county officially declared chapter 9 bankruptcy.
Officials discovered that Citron and his assistant county treasurer, Matthew Raabe, had
funneled approximately 90 million dollars from local governments and school districts into the
county’s general account and covered up through the creation of fake interest rate reports Citron
plead guilty to the fraud charges and was sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $100,000.
Due to health concerns Citron carried out his sentence at the jail’s commissary, allowing him to
return home during nights and weekends. Citron was a shell of his former self during the final
years as county treasurer. During the trial, Citron’s lawyer furnished psychological reports that
confirmed that he had been afflicted with dementia for years. His mental capacity and math skills
had deteriorated severely, forcing him to make some poor decisions . The grand jury for the trial
had found that Citron had used and relied heavily on a psychic and an astrologer for predictions
of future interest rates. However, Citron was well respected by his family, friends, and
neighbors, even after the debacle. He spent the latter years of his life donating his time to the
local Kiwanis Club. Citron maintained until his death on January 16,2013 that the bankruptcy
could have been avoided had the county not fired him. These events are clearly laid out in
Exhibit 2 for demonstration of the chronological snowball effect of each event during Citron’s
term.
Financial Analysis
Robert Citron was the man behind the bankruptcy of Orange County in 1994. Citron
relied on an investment strategy that profits when interest rates are low. He invested in securities
that were interestsensitive, which won huge money during the early 1990’s recession in the U.S.
Citron controlled approximately $8 billion pool and invested the funds in a portfolio of interest
rate linked securities including treasury notes, agency fixed rate notes, agency floating rate notes,
mortgagebacked securities and shortterm papers. The average maturity of these securities is
less than 3 years and most of them are exotic securities whose yields were inversely related to
market interest rate. Then when the recession started subduing and the markets recovering,
Orange County lost $1.5 billion from the fund when the Feds increased the interest rates. The
news came as a shock to many people for Robert Citron was viewed as a money wizard and the
OC fund as a safe investment. When he was appointed as the treasurer of Orange County, the
fund had started gaining returns that the county never experienced before. In 1991, the value of
the fund went up to $20 billion with huge returns on investments of 17.7%. How was Citron able
to accomplish such numbers, is probably a question to ask.
Citron followed a strategy called the Carry Trade. Carry Trade is built on borrowing short
then investing long. He found an arbitrage profit between the difference in the yields of short
term and longterm yields. Put in simple words, Citron borrowed money from the investment
pool, bought bonds, and then traded the bonds as collateral for cash from investors with interest
in the fund; the cycle repeats. Investing with high leverage magnified the profits of the fund.
Specifically, to leverage his portfolio Citron invested on margin by borrowing shortterm
securities and using the borrowed money to invest longterm government bonds, which enlarged
the size of pool from $8 billion to $20 billion, refer to Exhibit 3. According to a report from New
York University Stern School of Business in 1998, the duration of its pool became 6.7 years with
the leverage, which doubled the duration of 3 years before.
To achieve the new duration extension, Citron used reverse repurchase agreements to
short assets: he pledged longterm bonds as collaterals to secure shortterm loans and made
profits from valuable longterm bonds. Holding a strong belief on the low interest rates, Citron
invested on structured notes: inverse floater and spread bonds, both of which offer high coupon
rates when interest rates fall. Citron seemed to forget that with higher returns there always comes
higher risks. Leverage resulted in magnified losses for the County in 1994, refer to Exhibit 4 for
illustration. A lot of different entities were invested in the fund including local governments,
school districts, large investment banks such as Merrill Lynch, and cities as well. Waging on the
difference in yields, Citron left the pool exposed to refinancing risk. He had to refinance the
shortterm obligations with more borrowing since he wasn’t yet receiving returns from the long
term investments to pay back the debt. In order to pay the debt, he had to borrow more debt. The
difference in the borrowing rates is a refinancing risk. In 1994, when Fed Reserve Board began
to keep raising interest rates, the pool went into trouble. The cost of shortterm borrowing
increased while the value of longterm bonds purchased decreased; the coupon rates from
structured notes fell as the interest rates rose. It created liquidity risk in the portfolio: the interests
generated from longterm bonds could not finance the shortterm loans Citron borrowed from
repo market and Wall Street firms. As the interest rate kept rising, the county pool suffered a
more serious loss and finally was not able to repay the firms for shortterm loans.
Looking deeper into the bankruptcy and history of Orange County regulations, it is no
surprise to find that there were multiple issues that pushed OC into bankruptcy. Citron’s actions
didn’t directly cause this failure, but he did incentivize it. As explained above, Proposition 13,
Citron’s madeup law, operational and strategic management inefficiencies, and Merrill Lynch
played a major role in this bankruptcy. The lack of oversight for county treasurer and the weak
internal risk management mechanism made it easy for a powerful individual to hide risks he was
taking. Hence, the disclosure of financial situations and the independence of risk reporting are
prerequisites that keep the risks under control. Although Merrill Lynch was a benefactor in the
fund, it was also the source of financial advice for Citron. Robert Citron relied on the financial
advisors to pick which securities to buy and sell. It offered Citron stepup double inverse floaters
in 1991. These were securities that are inversely related to the interest rates. The securities
gained high profits for the pool with the recession in 1991 and the interest rates going down, but
come 1994 and the tables were turned. The investment pool started losing money quickly with
the rise of the interest rates. Robert didn’t change his position even with the hike in interest rates,
which cost the investors money, $1.5 billion to be precise. As a reaction to the loss, the County’s
Board of Supervisors forced Robert Citron to resign and then filed for bankruptcy. With the news
of the bankruptcy the U.S markets were shaken a little. People started worrying about the
municipal bonds market and other harms to their portfolios that could be caused by the news.
Certain individuals and firms invested in the fund started filing lawsuits against the County and
Citron, taxpayers were hit hard as well.Wall Street started selling their collateral to get their
money, which drove the money problem to a new low.
In the aftermath of the bankruptcy, more regulations were demanded by the people to be
placed on investment strategies related to the derivatives markets. While placing higher
regulations would result in safer environment for individuals and firms, it might counteract the
purpose of the derivative market and the importance of volatility. At the end some regulations
were implemented on the fund. Orange County sued Merrill Lynch for their misleading
brokerage advice, which lead to the fall of their stock. Also, having the OC bankruptcy as the
largest loss in a local government fund in the U.S in 1994, the CFTC (Commodity Futures
Trading Commision) started an investigation on the strategies used. Some issues inspected were
how lawful were the actions of investments? Where they regulated? Was it appropriate? Where
they in the best interest of the investors? and such. To recover from the bankruptcy, the board
issued $800 million worth of bonds to the investors of the fund. This helped save the schools and
cities from going bankrupt themselves. S&P responded to the failure by degrading the bond from
an investment grade bond, AA, to a junk bond rating of CCC. It took Orange County a year and a
half till it recovered from the loss in 1996.
Lessons learned:
This infamous event in financial history certainly brings many lessons to be learned along
with it. The first lesson is when investing, know what strategies the fund is using. Blindly
following profits without identifying the risks is a poor strategy. Make sure to have an
investment strategy that hedges against financial risks including interest rate and refinancing
risks. A responsible analyst does not take events as they happen at face value. It is a disservice to
not only one’s company, or county as is the case with this bankruptcy, but also to oneself to
avoid analyzing the situation and trust one person wholeheartedly because he is revered as a
“financial wizard.” Another important lesson from the Orange County bankruptcy is that it is
important to be aware of all stakeholders within an organization. This organization just so
happened to be an entire county in the state of California. Stakeholders for Orange County do not
only include investors, but schools, local governments, and the livelihoods of families. The
strategies that Citron employed to obtain premium returns were wildly inappropriate given the
needs of his stakeholders, namely financial security. Another key takeaway from this event is
that it is important when in fear of bankruptcy to have a backup plan in mind to save the money
in the fund. If the board of supervisors didn’t file for bankruptcy in 1994, then they wouldn’t
have crystallized a loss of $1.5 billion. As the graph shows in Exhibit 5, the interest rates fell
again in 1995. This could have meant less losses for the County and the investors. In addition,
checks and balances must be in place to ensure that one person is not solely responsible for
billion dollar portfolios, especially for public money. If the situation does arise, more scrutiny of
the elected officials is paramount. Robert Citron was a man with no professional background in
accounting, finance, or economics, yet he was the county treasurer for two full decades
managing billions of dollars of public money. Finally, in terms of local municipal governments,
better statelevel oversight is in order. The Orange County bankruptcy had vast ripple effects not
only in the state of California, but in financial markets nationwide. The state of California could
have been more involved in a situation of enormous risk that could have been lessened, if not
avoided completely with awareness and perhaps intervention.
Exhibit 1
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/citron383795countymoney.html
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/dbtl6.pdf
Exhibit 4
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jamespuplava/thecarrytradeeconomy
Exhibit 5
References:
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Jan. 2013. Web. 11 Feb. 2016.<http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/
01/17/obitcitronorangecountybankruptcy/1842401/>.
Arnold, Laurence. "Robert Citron, Jailed for Orange County Failure, Dies at
87."Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 17 Jan. 2013. Web. 11 Feb. 2016.
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20130117/robertcitronjailedafterorangecounty
bankruptcydiesat87>
Backus, Smith and Walter. "Debt Instruments Set 6 Disasters and Close Calls." New York
University Stern School of Business, 12 Oct. 1998. Web.
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/dbtl6.pdf>
Baldassare, Mark. "The Orange County Bankruptcy: Who's Next?" When Government Fails.
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<http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_498MBRB.pdf>.
(see for lessons learned in aftermath)
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<http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/orangecountybankruptcy.asp>.
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