G.R. No.
193643 January 29, 2013 Ruling of the Court:
ANTONIO D. DAYAO
vs.
COMELEC
Facts:
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of
consumers and small industry playersin the LPG
and energy sector. It sought to register as a
party-list organization for theMay 10, 2010
elections and was approved by the
COMELEC.Petitioners filed a complaint and petition
before the COMELEC for the cancellation of
LPGMA’s registration as a party
-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does
notrepresent a marginalized sector of the society
because its incorporators, officers andmembers
are not marginalized or underrepresented
citizens.In response, LPGMA countered that
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitutiondoes not require that party-list
representatives must be members of the
marginalizedand/or underrepresented sector of
the society. It also averred that the ground
citedby the petitioners is not one of
those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941
andthat petitioners are just trying to resurrect
their lost chance to oppose the petition
forregistration.The COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for two reasons. First, the ground
forcancellation cited by the petitioners is not
among the exclusive enumeration inSection 6 of
R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually
a belated opposition to
LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been
approved with finality
.Petitione
rs’ motions for reconsideration were denied.
Issues:
1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a
petition for registration bars the actionof
complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act (RA 7941)
requirethat incorporators, officers and
members of a party-list must be
marginalized orunderrepresented citizens.
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of
the complaint for cancellation.However, in light of
COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012,
the presentpetitions ought to be dismissed.1) An
opposition to a petition for registration is not a
condition precedent to the filingof a complaint for
cancellation.Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down
the grounds and procedure for the cancellation
ofparty-list accreditation, viz:Sec. 6. Refusal
and/or Cancellation of Registration.The COMELEC
may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party,refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any
national,regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:(1)
It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association,organized for religious purposes;(2)
It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek
its goal;(3)
It is a foreign party or organization;(4)
It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign politicalparty, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of
itsofficers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisanelection purposes;(5)
It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating toelections;(6)
It declares untruthful statements in its petition;(7)
It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
or(8)
It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails toobtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency inwhich it has registered.For the
COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to
cancel the registration of aparty-list group, the
law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due
notice and hearing isafforded to the party-list
group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated
groundsfor disqualification in Section 6 exists.2)
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC,
36
the Court explained that the"laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections" referred to in
paragraph 5 includeSection 2 of R.A. No. 7941,
37
 which declares the underlying policy for the law
thatmarginalized and underrepresented Filipino
citizens become members of the Houseof
Representatives. A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply withthis policy
must be disqualified.The party-list system of
representation was crafted for the marginalized
andunderrepresented and their alleviation is the
ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need
to categorically mention that "those who are
not marginalized andunderrepresented are
disqualified."All told, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s party
-list accreditation. In the ordinary courseof
procedure, the herein complaint should be
remanded to the COMELEC. However,on August 2,
2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513
which subjected tosummary evidentiary hearings
all existing and registered party-list groups,
includingLPGMA, to assess their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941and the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The Resolution stated, among others,that the
registration of all non-compliant groups shall be
cancelled. LPGMA submittedto a factual and
evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC and was
deemed to havecomplied with all requirements for
registration.
LICO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list
organization which was registered on 16
November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941, also known as the Party-List System Act
(Party-List Law).
On Nov. 30, 2009, Ating Koop filed its manifestation of intent
to participate in theparty-list system of representation for the
May 10, 2010 elections with petitioner Lico asfirst nominee
and Roberto Mascariña as second nominee. Ating Koop then
earned aseat in the House of Representatives and Atty. Lico
then took his oath of office andassumed office.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as one of the winning party-list
groups.5 Based on the procedure provided
in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC,6 Ating Koop
earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office
on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives,7 and thereafter
assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of
the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June
2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-
sharing agreement signed by its nominees.8 Under
the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as
Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after
petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop
for disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the
Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor
the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to
expel Congressman Lico from the House of
Representatives
HELD:
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition
for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives and for the succession of the
second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of
unseating petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction
to resolve questions on the qualifications of
members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction
over a disqualification case upon proclamation of
the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House
of Representatives.35 In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives.
Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that
has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize
that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue
of his qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not
merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction
correctible by a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC
should not have encroached into the expulsion
issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres vs Commission
on Elections
585 SCRA 557 – Political Law – Leadership Disputes
Within a Party List – Electioneering
Mercantile Law – Corporation Law – Hold-Over Principle
FACTS:
In 1999, Melquiades Robles was elected president and
chairperson of BUHAY, a party-list group duly registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all
its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated
in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to
Participate in the said electoral exercises, including the
Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the
signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. On January
26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections,
BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As
in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate
bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres, on the other hand, filed with
the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to
Certificates. In it, Señeres alleged that he was the acting
president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having
assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles
vacated the position. Señeres also claim that the
nominations made by Robles (nominations pertaining as to
who should represent BUHAY in Congress) were, for lack
of authority, void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term
as party president. Furthermore, Señeres asserted that
Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified from being
an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting
Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority
(LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Robles, so
Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity
which civil service members, like the former, were enjoined
from engaging in.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC
issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning
party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled
to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the
duly authorized representative of BUHAY.
ISSUE: Whether or not Robles should be disqualified as
president of BUHAY.
HELD: No, Robles is not disqualified as the president of
BUHAY. His being the chairman of LRTA and the president
of BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible. There is
no law prohibiting that the LRTA chair cannot be a
president of a party-list group. Further, Robles is not guilty
of electioneering. Robles’ act of nominating BUHAY
representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The
crime electioneering is clearly defined under Section 79 (b)
of the Omnibus Election Code but Robles did not commit
any act defined thereunder.
Anent the issue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY
already expired when he made the nominations hence the
nominations are void, the Supreme Court ruled that the
nominations are valid. This is because of the “Hold-Over”
doctrine under corporation law. As a general rule, officers
and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration
of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected or appointed. The holdover doctrine has, to be
sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It
accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as
dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate
enterprise in its relation to outsiders.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in
their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article
201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner
filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights
to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause
of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners
application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
“[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find
that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code
or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike
and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 190529. April
29, 2010]
03OCT
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS
BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI)
represented by its Secretary General
George “FGBF George”
Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization,
from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s
motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8)
of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. –
The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any
of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the
votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution
citing among others the misapplication in the ruling
of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts
from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became
the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of
PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was
violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent
applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law which provides for two
(2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section
6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional
deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due
process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity
to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity
to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and
hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the
principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et
non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It
requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing
that circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from
the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting
it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the
rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to
be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous
ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it
out from [the] ruling case law.