SHERMAN SHAFER, petitioner, vs. HON.

JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

OLONGAPO CITY
FACTS:

On 2 January 1985, petitioner Sherman Shafer obtained a private car policy, GA

No. 0889, over his Ford Laser car with Plate No. CFN-361 from Makati Insurance
Company, Inc., for third party liability (TPL). During the effectivity of the policy, an
information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and serious
physical injuries was filed against petitioner.
The owner of the damaged Volkswagen car filed a separate civil action against
petitioner for damages, while Jovencio Poblete, Sr., who was a passenger in the
Volkswagen car when allegedly hit and bumped by the car driven by petitioner, did not
reserve his right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, in the course of the
trial in the criminal case, Poblete, Sr. testified on his claim for damages for the serious
physical injuries which he claimed to have sustained as a result of the accident.
Upon motion, petitioner was granted leave by the former presiding judge of the
trail court to file a third party complaint against the herein private respondent, Makati
Insurance Company, Inc. Said insurance company, however, moved to vacate the order
granting leave to petitioner to file a third party complaint against it and/or to dismiss
the same.
The court further stated that the better procedure is for the accused (petitioner)
to wait for the outcome of the criminal aspect of the case to determine whether or not
the accused, also the third party plaintiff, has a cause of action against the third party
defendant for the enforcement of its third party liability (TPL) under the insurance
contract.6 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said order, but the motion was
denied;7 hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the accused in a criminal action for reckless imprudence, where the civil
action is jointly prosecuted, can legally implead the insurance company as third party
defendant under its private car insurance policy, as one of his modes of defense in the
civil aspect of said proceedings

HELD:
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance (third party liability, or TPL) is
primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by
innocent third parties or passengers as a result of a negligent operation and use of motor
vehicles.9 The victims and/or their defendants are assured of immediate financial
assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners.
The liability of the insurance company under the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability
Insurance is for loss or damage. Where an insurance policy insures directly against
liability, the insurer's liability accrues immediately upon the occurrence of the injury or
event upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on the recovery of
judgment by the injured party against the insured.
The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer.
The general purpose of statutes enabling an injured person to proceed directly against
the insurer is to protect injured persons against the insolvency of the insured who
causes such injury, and to give such injured person a certain beneficial interest in the
proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be liberally construed so that their intended
purpose may be accomplished. It has even been held that such a provision creates a
contractual relation which inures to the benefit of any and every person who may be
negligently injured by the named insured as if such injured person were specifically
named in the policy.
In the event that the injured fails or refuses to include the insurer as party defendant
in his claim for indemnity against the insured, the latter is not prevented by law to avail
of the procedural rules intended to avoid multiplicity of suits. Not even a "no action"
clause under the policy which requires that a final judgment be first obtained against
the insured and that only thereafter can the person insured recover on the policy can
prevail over the Rules of Court provisions aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits.
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PENARANDA
FACTS:
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in
Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner
for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment of damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October
1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City,
a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986
as Criminal Case No. 15437-111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional
remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation,
was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent
judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered the payment of support
pendente lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, the application for support pendente lite, should
be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by the
private respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the application for support is suspended in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against petitioner
HELD:

NO. The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Gandionco vs.
Penaranda
Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal
action, is one which is “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense”. In other
words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil
action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such
as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support,
and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon

proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.3 No criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:
Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC, for short) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in “Timog
Park,” located in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin (Lazatin, for short) as its
President.

On 7 February 1983, petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four

(4) lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park
On the same date above-mentioned, 7 February 1983, petitioner made a down payment
of P7,200.00, representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4)
lots. A corresponding receipt for the downpayment was issued by TSDC to the
petitioner.Then on 10 August 1983, he paid the sum of P12,529.30 as his alleged full
payment for Lot. No. 16, after which, TSDC caused to be issued in the name of the
petitioner the title to said lot.2
On 7 November 1983, petitioner paid TSDC the amount of P36,067.97, which was
allegedly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14 and
15. A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to the petitioner.3

Thereafter, from December 1983 up to June 1984, petitioner demanded from TSDC the
issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the
private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused on the ground that the petitioner had
not fully paid for said three (3) lots.
According to private respondents, sometime in January, 1983, TSDC’s Board of
Directors approved the petitioner’s contemplated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To
confirm the agreement, respondent Lazatin wrote petitioner a letter reiterating standard
conditions of the sale, which the petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity
to said letter. The conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, “(i) 10% down
payment with a commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one
month’s time; (ii) said construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; and,
(iii) the effective price was P70 per square meter with a rebate of P10.00 per square
meter upon completion of the house in six (6) months.”4

But, as alleged by the private respondents, petitioner commenced the construction of a

house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months.
And as to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct houses on
them.5
Thereafter, on 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX, docketed as Civil
Case No. 4224. In his complaint, petitioner prayed, among others, that judgment be
rendered ordering private respondents to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title
covering the three (3) lots which he had allegedly fully paid for, and which private
respondents had refused to do so.

Before the civil action was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal
of Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from the private
respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates of title to said lots
HELD:
As a ground for the consolidation of the criminal civil cases, petitioner invokes
Rule 111, Sec. 3(a), Rules of Court, which provides:”Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising
from offenses.—Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in the first paragaph
of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) After a criminal action has
been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the
trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted,
the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional
evidence that any party may wish to present. x x x x. “Under the aforequoted provision,
the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the
civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main
relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots which
petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell between the
petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was
for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu, and not
one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by
the petitioner is inapplicable.

Calalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:

Erlinda Gruta, 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as
househelper in the household of petitioners spouses Dr. Fidel Calalang and Dra. Maria
Gener Calalang and their son Ferdinand Calalang, in Bulacan (Rollo, pp. 357; 393).
On October 31, 1981, Erlinda Gruta died of malathion poisoning. Ferdinand Calalang,
son of the spouses Calalang, who brought Erlinda first to the Calalang’s Clinic and then
to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where she died, was charged with murder for allegedly
poisoning her (Rollo, pp. 164; 393).
The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Then the case
was referred to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, Bulacan, for preliminary
investigation
On June 8, 1983, nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year
after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dated May 27, 1982, dismissing the murder
charge, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand
Calalang impleading the spouses Calalang docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18019 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on the claim that they are jointly and severally liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang
HELD:
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable” (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code). In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only
if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. (Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325)
In the case at bar, counsel for private respondents admitted that his complaint for
damages is based on the commission of the crime. Stress must be made, however, that
under circumstances, it is a fundamental rule that the facts upon which the civil liability
might arise must exist to warrant the filing of a civil action.
Thus, “the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily
extinguish the civil liability unless the Court declares in the judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.” (Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et
al., 97 Phil. 672). Similarly, “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Verily, the dismissal of this criminal case as found by IAC is only by resolution of the
provincial fiscal and does not proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist, so that said case may be refiled
anytime without the effect of double jeopardy. Therefore, the insufficiency of evidence to
support a murder charge does not imply that there is no sufficient evidence to support
the civil case based on the same alleged act.
Marcia vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger
bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee,
private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia
and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective
parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was
due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger
bus.
While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case
No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated and the
conclusion that “CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant
was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was
a case of PURE ACCIDENT.”
As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the
decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje. On August 10, 1966, the Court
of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint against the
defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the acquittal of Paje
in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence “is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action;
that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have
been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action.

In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the
collision, instituted a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil
Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver
Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly
and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente
Marcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this
Court (Laura Corpus et al. vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062) which, however,
affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that “(1) The acquittal of the defendant
Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that
the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for
the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.”
ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents can be held civilly liable after it had ruled
in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of
pure accident.
HELD:
No. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The
injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal
negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for
damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court states that “(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.” Otherwise stated,
unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the
final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded
self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not
incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due
to the fact that he was not sufficiently identified to be the assailant, a civil action for
damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from
which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court,
sufficiently identified as the perpetrator of the crime.
Bonite vs. Zosa
FACTS:

At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio Bonite was working as
“caminero” of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta
City, he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite
died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners)
against the respondent Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 9328. Petitioners through their counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as
private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against
the accused.3
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case,
acquitting the accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.4

On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the
same accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order, but the same was denied:6 hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the
Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners’ failure in the criminal action to make a
reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the
prosecution of such criminal action
HELD:

In the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless
imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private
respondent) was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have
the right to file an independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in
the criminal case notwithstanding.
In addition to anchoring their right to bring a separate civil action for damages under
the express provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such separate
civil action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.7 Acquittal of the accused from
a charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a
subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence,
but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, in referring to “fault or negligence” covers acts “not punishable by law” as well as
acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores (delict and quasi-
delict).8

In regard to private respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in the case
at bar is Article 33 of the Civil Code9 (and not Article 29), because the latter is not
applicable to criminal offenses proceeding from a tortious act, we find the same to be
devoid of merit. It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state
that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be
availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth
therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused
must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. It is a well
known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish.
Moreover, Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical
injuries11 intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was
alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
Thus, the law penalizes the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity
of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty.12 As reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil
action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be
instituted under said article.13 It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at bar.

Coming now to private respondent’s contention that the enforcement of the right to file
an action for damages under Article 29, should be subject to the procedure outlined in
Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, i.e., that a reservation be made in
the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, we find such
contention to be without merit. Article 29 of the Civil Code does not include any such
reservation requirement. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the
latter’s acquittal in the criminal case based upon reasonable doubt.
Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal
Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an
independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded
as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does
not require such a reservation.14 In fact, the reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such
requirement of a reservation as ineffective.
Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does
not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under
Article 29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action
under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions.
People vs. Umbrero
FACTS:
Angelina Urbi Ragsac, daughter of the victim Alfonso Urbi testified: She was at
home in Sta. Teresa at about 2:00 in the afternoon of November 29, 1980 when several
armed men came, two (2) of whom shot her father under the house, accused Alfredo
Costales and Danny Costales. She was not able to recognize the other armed men. She
was two (2) meters from her father when he was shot. Of the two accused mentioned,
she only identified in Court accused Alfredo Costales, Danny Costales was not present.
He was the one who shot her father. He followed her father when he ran outside the
house but the companions of Alfredo Costales followed and killed him. Alfredo Costales
and Danny Costales shot her father with short firearms. Their companions had long
firearms. All the accused ran after killing her father.

The accused Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria
pleaded not guilty on arraignment. The other accused, Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome
Tangonan, and Danny Costales were not arraigned as they were still at large. In the first
assigned, error, Mariano Umbrero alleges that he was denied his right to due process.
He states that there was no preliminary investigation conducted as his name not
included in the criminal complaint filed with the municipal court which conducted the
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of preliminary investigation the petitioner was denied
his right to due process
HELD:

Although appellant Umbrero was not named in the complaint filed by the police
with the municipal trial court for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation,
the municipal judge upon being informed that Mariano Umbrero was one of the
perpetrators of the killing of Alfonso Urbi, issued a warrant of arrest and later ordered
suspect Umbrero to file his counter-affidavit. The record shows that appellant Umbrero
was given the opportunity to answer the charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.”

“The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction
over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective. If there was no preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering
his plea, calls the attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary investigation,
the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation,
order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.”
 The appellant never asked for or called the attention of the court before entering
his plea, as to the absence of a preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary
investigation, then is deemed waived as he failed to invoke such right prior to or, at
least, at the time of the entry of his plea in the court of first instance. (People v. Casiano,
p. 483, supra) The entry of their plea constituted a waiver of their right to preliminary
investigation and any irregularity that attended it. Jurisdiction was acquired by the
Court over the person of Mariano Umbrero as the accused appeared at the arraignment
and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Velasquez vs. Undersecretary of Justice

FACTS:
Respondent Edgardo Avila was a Cash and Business Development Consultant of
the Techtrade Management International Corporation, authorized to follow-up business
transactions, including loan applications submitted to the company.
On September 29, 1986, Avila informed the company that he had a borrower (whom he
did not identify) for P200,000 with interest of 3%/month for a 30-day term from
September 29 to October 29, 1988. This was approved by the company which issued to
him a pay-to-cash check for P194,000 after deducting the 3% interest of 6,000. Instead
of returning the borrowed amount on due date or giving a satisfactory explanation for
the supposed borrower’s failure to pay the loan despite written demands, Avila resigned
from the company on December 17, 1986 promising that: “x x x I shall set aside the
P200,000 upon its subsequent collection (subject of Atty. Caacbay’s letter of 12/ 10/86)
to answer for the P100,000 portion of Tony’s P700,000 loan to you; please treat the
P100,000—balance, less my unpaid professional fee and gas expenses from November
16 to Decem-ber 15, 1986, as my separation and compulsory benefit” (p. 6, Rollo).

On December 23, 1986, petitioner Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive Vice-

President/Managing Director of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against Avila in
the Manila City Fiscal’s Office, where it was docketed as I.S. No. 86-28751. Assistant
Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief,
Investigation Division of the City Fiscal’s Office, the latter set aside Fiscal Lopez’
resolution and ordered the filing of an information for estafa against Avila in the Regional
Trial Court.

Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both motions were denied
by the City Fiscal. The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex C) of that
resolution but it was denied on May 15, 1989 (Annex B, Petition). Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Undersecretary of Justice has the jurisdiction to interfere the

Judge disposition over the case
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo vs.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the
court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvesti-gation should, after
the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to
him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may
interfere with the judge’s disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their
opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge
of that. “The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraign-ment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation. “In order therefor[e] to avoid such a
situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.” (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA
462, 471 & 472.)

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, applied for a free patent for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67, with an area of
1,391 square meters, located beside the Washington Highway in San Francisco, Agusan
del Sur. His application was favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando
Luison. On May 11, 1976, OCT No. P-8379 was issued to him Eight (8) years later, on
June 27, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Francisco passed
Resolution No. 40, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur to assist
it in recovering Lot No. 3097 from Attorney Paredes because the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site. The Sangguniang Bayan requested the
provincial fiscal to file a perjury charge against Attorney Paredes, Jr. (p. 15, Rollo). The
resolution was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (p. 16, Rollo). On March 28,
1985, Civil Case No. 512, for annulment of Attorney Paredes’ title, was filed by the
Republic in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Agusan del Sur (p. 17, Rollo).
During the pendency of Civil Case, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, filed with the Tanodbayan on October 28, 1986, a criminal complaint
charging Attorney Paredes with having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to
influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land
Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.
On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case to Fiscal
Ernesto Brocoy of Butuan City) for preliminary investigation.

Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the preliminary
investigation of the case on August 29, 1987. However, the summons were served on
November 19, 1987 upon the INP Station Commander of San Francisco, instead of Atty.
Paredes. The summons did not reach Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting
for proof of service of the summons on the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct
the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses. On August 29, 1988,
the fiscal issued a resolution finding a prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A.
3019 committed by the accused. The Fiscal’s resolution was approved by Tanodbayan
Prosecutor Josephine Fernandez on June 26, 1989 (p. 22, Rollo).
Attorney Paredes filed a motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan’s resolution. He
assailed the validity of the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Fiscal
Brocoy without notice to him (pp. 23-25, Rollo). His motion for reconsideration was
denied.
In the local elections on January 18, 1988, Attorney Paredes was elected governor of
Agusan del Sur.
On May 20, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 512, annulling Governor Paredes’ Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253 and his OCT
No. P-8379 and restoring the land “to the mass of public domain”.On August 28, 1988,
an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan (Crim. Case
No. 13800) and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional liberty,
was issued on August 30, 1989 and served upon him (p. 12, Rollo). He refused to post
bail in “protest against the injustice to him as Governor,” . Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.

On September 20, 1989, this petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden
Paredes, against the Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband’s
arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime
charged in the information against him had already prescribed.
ISSUE:

Whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner after a preliminary

investigation that was conducted by the Tanodbayan without notice to him, are valid,
and (2) whether the crime charged against him has already prescribed.
HELD:

YES. The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is
invalid because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has
already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the
attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter
of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should
merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded
in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a proper ground for a
motion to quash which should be filed before the arraignment of the accused (Secs. 1 &
2, Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; People vs. Castro, L-6407, July 29,
1954) for whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined
in the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.
ZACARIAS VS CRUZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Zacarias seeks, by the present petition for habeas corpus, to
nullify respondent judge's order of arrest issued against her in Criminal Case C-1320 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan Branch. Her ground is that respondent
judge issued the same without personally examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses in said case in alleged violation of Section 1(3), Article
III of the Constitution.
Concededly, the order of arrest issued on January 24, 1966 by respondent judge was
upon a criminal information for estafa filed in court against petitioner following a
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent fiscal.
If only for the reasons that follow, the petition should be dismissed. She is at liberty
upon a P10,000-bail bond. She has heretofore pleaded to the information. Posting of a
bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person,1 estops
him from discussing the validity of his arrest.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused has already entered a plea of not guilty to the
information, he is deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation and to
have abandoned his right to question any irregularity that surrounds it
HELD:

YES. In the recent case of Luna vs. Plaza (1968), 26 SCRA 310, 321-322, our
ruling is that where petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, "he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any,
in the preliminary examination conducted x x x prior to the issuance of the warrant of
arrest."3 It makes eminent sense to say that an accused in a criminal case who is at
liberty on bail and who had thus secured by judicial decree release which the high
prerogative writ of habeas corpus is intended to afford, may no longer avail of that
remedy.

And then, nothing in the record suggests that petitioner herein ever moved to quash the
information upon the ground that by the defective arrest the court acquired no
jurisdiction over her person And again, she is deemed to have waived lack of jurisdiction
over her person.
There is the other fact that petitioner has already entered a plea of not guilty to the
information charging her with estafa. She is deemed to have foregone her right to
preliminary investigation and to have abandoned her right to question any irregularity
that surrounds it. By now, this is settled law.5
To be underscored here is that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of a criminal information, does not otherwise render it defective, does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
FACTS: