Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 1123, March 05, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE LOPEZ VITO ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional

resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants,
and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the presidents
of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The
validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the
Constitution.

The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the
case it is unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts
essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to
say that three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having
been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the
first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not
been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the
House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in
the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The
respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the collusiveness on
the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners'
contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law,
with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence
and practice. This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction
there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their
operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are
synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a
co-equal, coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the
"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political

questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C. J. S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated
on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to
require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as
to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the
actions of the political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a
relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme Court reported and
annotated in 122 A. L. R., 695. That case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification
by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the decision
by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an
amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission
to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to

ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory
process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic
in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed
by the "Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge
by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any
intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is leas reason
for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As
the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:

"There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of
the government; because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of
the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an
established form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their
fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of
changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to trammel
the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the
best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to
the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument." (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L. R. A., N. S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts,
Frankfurter and Douglas, in Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no basis for
discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion we
quote the following paragraphs:

"The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of

constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress that ratification by
three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is conclusive upon the courts.' In the
exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution.
However, whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional
determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call
for decisions by a 'political department' of questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated 'political.' And decision of a 'political question' by the
'political department' to which the Constitution has committed it 'conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of * * *
government' Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has
been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification
has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed
amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary
its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in
the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of
the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification
of amendments, we are unable to agree.

"The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it is
apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a
'reasonable time' within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether
duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for
ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed
amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an ultimate control
over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the
course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe
were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
"The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects
as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the
Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss,
that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a 'reasonable time.' Nor docs the Court now disapprove
its prior assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made
clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such
implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the 'political questions' of
whether a State, whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment
may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a
case as this, an amendment is dead because an 'unreasonable' time has elapsed. No
such division between the political and judicial branches of the government is
made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to
Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is 'political' in its
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point."

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three
justices subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the
petitioner's lack of standing in court—a point which not having been raised by the
parties herein we will not decide—his reasoning inevitably extends to a
consideration of the nature of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the
petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as
political, saying:

"The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs.
Garnett, 258 U. S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a voter's right to
protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and the reasons for it were
explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U. S., 536, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S.
Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for
refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing
of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter
of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Holmes thus spoke for the Court: 'Of course
the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private
damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be
recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years,
since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas.,
521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this
Court.' 'Private damage' is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra,
and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the
justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the conception that a
voter's franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the
exact amount 'is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury,' see Wiley
vs. Sinkler, 179 U. S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for which
there is no remedy outside the law courts. 'Although this matter relates to the
parliament,' said Lord Holt, 'yet it is an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as
my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng.
Reprint, 475. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the
plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense.' (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92
Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)

"The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave
intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law
courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies—who are members,
how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different
phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were
counted—surely are matters that not merely concern political action but are of the
very essence of political action, if 'political' has any connotation at all. Marshall
Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U. S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S.
Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U. S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct.,
217. In no sense are they matters of 'private damage.' They pertain to legislators
not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process.
To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on
the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting in legislative
assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a
voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally
significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to
tie put to purposes like the present In seeking redress here these Kansas senators
have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the
Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed."

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles
of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the
working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the fundamental
Jaw. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the
spirit of the United States institutions after which ours are patterned.

But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be
presently shown, they are the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the
questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at the
risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the
Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American
Law Reports, supra, comes to our aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the
controversy.

Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the

Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including twenty
senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment,
and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of
the Senate to erase an indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been
adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They
sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it
and delivering it to the Governor.

The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor
Amendment was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the
legislature of Kansas adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution
was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new
resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed
amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty
against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast
his vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set
forth the prior rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged that in the period
from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by
both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in
five states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within
a reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.

The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but.
dismissed the petition on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States the questions were framed substantially in the following manner:

First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had
standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether
the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the
contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of the
Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as
construed by the Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a
part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could
be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed
amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the
previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.

The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding
the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating:
"Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is
political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court
is equally divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point."
On the third question, the Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely,
(1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to
the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of
Congress in the exercise of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of
amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the
Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the Federal
Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by
the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed
but on the grounds stated in the United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine
justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and
Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that
all the questions raised are political and nonjusticiable. Justices Butler and
McReynolds opined that all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had
jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted
and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the
proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and
Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and nonjusticiable, passed
by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to cast a deciding vote,
on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest
of the questions.

The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds,
on the one. hand, and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on
the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached, these two
groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter
and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed,
on the other, was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares
certain questions political and nonjusticiable.

As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, the foregoing four opinions
"show interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the issues
discussed." It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled
"Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions
rendered, aptly queries "whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court
would not have been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit
for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should
be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion."
Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the
Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered
the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to be an equal
division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a
justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make
up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the
conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious vein,
the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of
irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in
favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment below
regardless of the disposal of the other issues.

From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be
considered as laying down the rule of the case.

The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the
rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the
jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these,
two or three have changed from their original position), two or three adopted a
special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two
have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685,
footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States
Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs.
Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark,
36 Law. ed., 294.)

If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law
making body, we choose' to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be
proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of
Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.

This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries
written with evident vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have been
extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend to add
more, even if we could, to what has already been said. With such vast mass of
cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent
selection and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of
adaptability to a sound public policy.

The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which

opposed it are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are
summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:

"SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness.—It has been declared that the rule
against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a coequal
and independent department of the government, and it would be an inquisition into
the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent
exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law.
The rule is also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published
session laws, hut would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the
legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be found
after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie
evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for
years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that there is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an
act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some
court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the
parties."

From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697,
we extract these passages:

"I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation,
few things would be more mischievous than the introduction of the opposite rule. *
* * The rule contended for is that the Court should look at the journals of the
Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the
Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals.
This proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a
material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be
taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which
is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not
only to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my
mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the
Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us some
evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. * * * Can any one
deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these
journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be
shaken to its very foundations? * * * We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of
evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of
almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to
these journals. * * *" ([1866], Beasley, C. J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N. J. L.,
29, 34.)

"But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then
loss than a quorum of each House may by the aid of corrupt presiding officers
impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It must
be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and
political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human may
violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But
it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for
itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say
that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have
not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or
prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does
not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal." (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans
vs. Browne, 30 Ind., 514, 524.)

Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence—considered a classic, and described

by one who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent
contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth- century
law in form to be used in a new era of growth"—unequivocally identifies himself
with those who believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in
answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i. e., the impossibility of
securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on
legislative action, says:

"(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is
urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the constitutional requirements of three
readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must be declared no
law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is
a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now
the journals may not represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop
with the journals, if it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise
than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act
unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating
an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act
based on improper votes falsified in the enrolment. This supposed duty, in short, is
to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the
journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination
into facts as provable by the testimony of members present is not allowable. If to
support this it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional
duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and
inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty
that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into
the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard
to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of view there can be but
one answer.

"(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated
thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is
based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed only by carrying it
to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the
fallacious notion that every constitutional provision is 'per se' capable of being
enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it
can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large field of constitutional
provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may
remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to
invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint
a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to
act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A
clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to require the
Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the best of his
belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth
he has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by
inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators
to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions
exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution
commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in
a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?

"These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of

applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate. That situation exists
where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and judgment of a
particular independent department of government,—Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department if
the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may provide that no
legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated as void because the
majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in
matters leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must
be left to the conscience of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the
Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a single
legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until
he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly
enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the
proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in
the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the
Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
*******

"The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check
at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary
for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature.
But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of
popular government" (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued
that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the
contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.

It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving
legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions,
or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in
case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.

The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all
probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a
duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the
Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not
have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be
remembered that the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of
whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its
passage.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented,
the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No.
190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of
the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court
did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof."

In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to decide the

question of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote Mere members of Congress within
the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.

The petition is dismissed without costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J.:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote

for them, because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals
are conclusive upon us.
The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question
whether an amendment to the existing constitution has been duly proposed in the
manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the judiciary. That is the
position taken by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16 C. J.
S., 437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have
adopted a different view. (16 C. J. S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)

" 'The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a
constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements
of an existing constitution is a judicial question.' (McConaughy vs. Secretary of
State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N. W., 408.)" (12 C. J., 880.)

" 'An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly
exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially determined
whether a proposed amendment received the constitutional majority of votes.
(Knight vs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W., 396;
Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S. R., 169; In re
Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N. E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22
Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N. W., 779; Bott
vs. Wurts, 63 N. J. L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L. R. A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46
Oh. St., 677; 23 N. E., 491; 6 L. R. A., 422.)' " (12 C. J., 880.)

As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state

systems than to the Federal theory of "grant" of powers, it is proper to assume that
the members of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers, and
even the members of the American Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie
enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in
this portion of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts
may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.

The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution

(Article XV), the proposed amendment was not approved "by a vote of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives."
They complain that certain Senators and some members of the House of
Representatives were not allowed to participate and were not considered in
determining the required three-fourths vote.

The respondents, besides denying our power to revise the counting, assert that the
persons mentioned, for all practical purposes did not belong to the Congress of the
Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and approved.

Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people,
for approval or disapproval, the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines
to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."

Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its

first section provides that "the amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to
be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines
in a Resolution of both Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred
and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a
general election which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-
seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the

Executive, declares in the most solemn manner that the resolution proposing the
amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether
those petitioners who are members of the Congress that approved Republic Act
No. 73 are not precluded from questioning its validity or veracity, unless they
assert and prove that in Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a
contrary showing, is it not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they
endorsed—or at least are bound by—the declarations of Republic Act No. 73?
And if a private party is estopped from challenging the constitutional efficacy of a
law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C. J. S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767)
should not a member of Congress be estopped from impugning a statute lie helped
(presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining
petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C. J. S.,
169.)
But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the
instant litigation may be solved by the application of other well-established
principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one department of the
Government entertains for the actions of the others.

On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the

applicability and binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act
No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I
likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine expounded by the authoritative
Wigmore on a question admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence:
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution upon the judicial authorities.

Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could

plausibly fall back on the time-honored rule that the courts may not go behind the
legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United States vs. Pons, 34 Phil.,
729.)

According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteen (16)
senators approved the resolution against five (5), with no absences; whereas in the
House sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen (18) voted "no", one
abstained from voting and one was absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the
total membership of twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than
three-fourths of the total membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of
Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the measure was
upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.

True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman
to the effect that the votes did not constitute the majority required by the
Constitution. However, in the face of the incontestable arithmetical computation
above shown, those protests must be attributed to their erroneous counting of
votes; none of them having then asserted that "there were absent Senators or
Congressmen who had not been taken into account." For although we might have
judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no
better qualified than the Legislative to determine the number of its actual
membership at any given moment, what with demises or demissions, remotions or
suspensions.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting
the same in so far as they are not inconsistent with the applicable reasons
supporting my concurring: opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I
dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that
if the suspended members of the Senate and House of Representatives had been
counted "the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress."

The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs.

Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions therein raised were political in nature
within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that the judiciary does
not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me evident that the questions
involved in the present proceeding are no less political than those involved in that
former Senate case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the
grounds of my said concurring opinion.

The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority
opinion in the instant proceeding is that the suspension of the said members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives being a political question, the judiciary,
being without jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof by the proper
political department of the government, has perforce to abide by said determination
if it were to go any further in the; consideration of the case. In other words, any
further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the premise that
said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that
we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said suspension, must consider
ourselves bound by the determination of said political branches of the government.
As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto.
[U. S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving the action of the political
departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams
vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs. Chambers,
14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co.,
Ves. Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R. I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)

If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said
members have been thus suspended, there will be to my mind, absolutely no
justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether
or not the required three-fourths vote was attained. Their case was entirely
different from that of members who, not having been suspended nor otherwise
disqualified, had the right to vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they
had, like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in
favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in
favor, of course, their votes had to be counted among those supporting the
resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had to be counted with those
opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there would be sound justification for
counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention
they impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution,
for it is obvious that if they did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the other
hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity
or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly treated.
In their case there would be no way of determining which way their votes would
have gone or whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this
connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not been
suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members
may belong to the political party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution,
still they would have voted independently and following their individual
convictions. In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were
quite a number of minority members of the legislature who voted for the
resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said suspended members, if
they had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution, nor in favor
of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should they
be counted with the members who voted against the resolution or those who,
having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as
though we knew that they would have voted against the resolution, or even that
they would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the
Constitution does not, and could not, include suspended members in the
determination of the required three-fourths vote.

I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution
that "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting (italics
supplied) separately * * *", advisedly used the vital and all-important word
"voting" therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting,
undoubtedly expecting that all members not suspended or otherwise disqualified,
would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even making a
concession in favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to
vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the
measure. But what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision
should have intended to count suspended or disqualified members as opposed to
the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible to know which
way they would have voted or that they would have abstained from voting—that
they would never have voted in favor of the measure. If I should ask why we
should not count such suspended or disqualified members among those in favor of
the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because we do
not know that they would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they
should ask me why we should not count them among those against the measure, I
would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that
they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to the
conclusion—the only one possible—that such suspended or disqualified
members should not and cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of
knowing which way they would have voted or whether they would have abstained
from voting. I stand for a sound and rational construction of the constitutional
precept.
PARAS, J.:

I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.

The last bastion of democracy is in danger.

Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance,
and the banner of the Constitution is silently and meekly hauled down from its pole
to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a new brand of Fascism.
In the words of Cicero, "recedere de statu suae dignitatis."

Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by
those, throwing overboard all ideals as burdensome and dangerous ballast, in
desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could
not stand the impact of initial defeats at the hands of invading fearsome military
hordes.

The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subject to determinate and
indeterminate ideological pressures. Very often man walks in the darkness of a
blind alloy obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or
the arcane predeterminations of the genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless
ship floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be
wrecked at the advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and
learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in our
actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or
completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely on our faith in their
existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting
our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless nights. We are sitting in
judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our fellowmen.
Let us not forget that the day shall come that we will be judged on how we are
judging. Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time solvent has
dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we
have faced our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the
magnitude of our duties and have chosen the most comfortable path of retreat.
Then it will be conclusively known whether we have kept burning the fire of
justice as the vestals did keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of
us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of historical oblivion;
others will have their names as bywords repeatedly pronounced with popular hate
or general contempt; and still others will bo remembered with universal
gratefulness, love and veneration, the guerdon accorded to all those who remained
faithful to the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff
from the grain.

This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal
has the sturdy courage to keep its responsibility in proper high level. It will need
the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict is
rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our fellow citizens and our
decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one
that plunged the United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each future
Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be remembered
with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship
of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock bottom
foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable supreme law of
the land and established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the
Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and unbiased,
exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante
wrote this lapidary line: "lasciati ogni speranza."

Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of
stubborn refusal to see reality or should be impaired by the polaroid visors of
prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the resolution in question,
proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted, the members of the.
Senate were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives were 96, and that
the 16 members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by undisputable
mathematical computation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 24 members
thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted for the
resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do not constitute three-fourths
of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official certifications made by the
presiding officers of the two houses of Congress to the effect that three-fourths of
all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members of the House of
Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts.
Nothing in existence can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public
document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration
of facts that is in conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some
of them are members of the Senate, others are members of the House of
Representatives, and still others are presidents of political parties, duly registered,
with considerable following in all parts of the Philippines.

The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections and the remaining three are respectively the Treasurer of
the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.

Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in

1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and that the House of Representatives is composed
of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2 who resigned to assume other
positions in the Government.

On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the
Philippines a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint

session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of
each House voting separately, To propose, as they do hereby propose, the
following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto:

" 'ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

" 'Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section
eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the
President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization, of all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens
of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines.'

"This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for
the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution."

Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68
Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.

Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on

March 11, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the people the proposed
amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said
purpose.

Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because

Congress may not, by said act, submit to the people for approval or disapproval the
proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B
inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of
the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than
those who actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98
members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72 Representatives, or
4 more than those who actually voted for the resolution.

Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from

them petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero and allege that
the House of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90. They
admit that at the joint session of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in
favor of the resolution 16 votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives had
voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act No. 73 and that necessary
steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act
is unconstitutional, and by way of defense, allege that the resolution Exhibit B was
adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No.
73, ordering its submission to the people for approval or disapproval, fixing a date
for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and
constitutional.

At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:

"The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:

"1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the
majority vote of the Commission on Elections, proclaimed elected senators in the
election of April 23, 1946;

"2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took
part in the election of the President of that body; but that before the senators-elect
were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a resolution was presented, and
subsequently approved, to defer the administration of oath and the seating of
Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing
and decision of the protest lodged against their election;
"3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged
oath of office before notaries public, and not on the floor, and filed said oaths with
the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the said date;

"4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths
of office accomplished by them outside of the floor before a notary public and the
Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946, respectively; and
that their corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31,
1946;

"5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno
filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office dated May 25, 1946, with the
Auditor of the Senate on October 15, 1946, and on said date his salary was paid
corresponding to the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;

"6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;

"7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to
the present time, the said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and Romero have not been
allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate and to vote therein,
nor do their names appear in the roll of the Senate;

"8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers
certified as having been elected in the election held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight
representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan,
Jose Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis
Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for
Negros Occidental;

"9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took
part in the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives held on May 25,
1946;

"10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in
by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno, representative for Manila, submitted a
resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson
for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro
Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F.
Gustilo for Negros Occidental 'pending the hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their election,' copy of the resolution being attached to and made
part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;

"11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and
approved by the House, referred for study to a committee of seven, which up to the
present has not reported, as shown by the Congressional Record for the House of
Representatives;

"12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not sworn
in on the floor and have not been so sworn in or allowed to sit up to the present
time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of the House of
Representatives except during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in
paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names
do not appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown by the
Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the roll inserted in
the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines hereto
attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;

"13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths
of office on the date set opposite their names, as follows:

"Jose Cando

May 25, 1946

"Vicente Gustilo

May 25, 1946

"Constancio Padilla

May 22, 1946

"Alejo Santos
May 23, 1946

"Luis M. Taruc

May 25, 1946

"Amado M. Yuson

May 25, 1946

"Jesus B. Lava

May 25, 1946

"Alejandro Simpauco

May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first
four who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso Pimentel, Secretary of the House;

"14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary
of the House of Representatives;

"15. That the persons mentioned an paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term
beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present, with the exception of Messrs. Luis
Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since August 16;

"16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and were allowed to sit on September 30,
1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;
"17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the
House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso Ramos, had resigned before
the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was discussed and
passed on September 18, 1946;

"18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution
was made by the Secretary calling the roll of each house and the votes cast were as
shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the House of Representatives
hereto attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and

"19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House ct Representatives
and the alleged oaths of office are made a part of this Stipulation by reference
thereto, respondents reserving the right to question their materiality and
admissibility.

"Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

"For the petitioners:

"For the respondents:

"JOSE E. ROMERO

"ROMAN OZAETA

"ANTONIO BARREDO
"Secretary of Justice

"JOSE B. L. REYES

"First Asst. Solicitor General"

PETITIONERS' PERSONALITY

Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case
is the first question we have to consider.

No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's
deliberation, we should not evade deciding it and giving what in law and justice
should be the answer.

To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the
present recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack that personality, such
legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents
themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners
have the necessary legal personality to file the petition, and we do not see any
reason why such personality should be put in doubt.

Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the
second, of representatives; and the third, of presidents of four political parties.

All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of
Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are members of either
of the two houses of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution
Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while the above three excepted senators
were the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said resolution and act
and were not counted for purposes of determining the three- fourths constitutional
rule in the adoption of the resolution.

In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the
necessary steps for the holding of the general election on March 11, 1947, and that
the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the resolution and act
aforementioned in open violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of
respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who
are members of the Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and
disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and
the citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those
represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."

There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or
members of the House of Representatives have direct interest in the legal issues
involved in this case as members of the Congress which adopted the resolution, in
open violation of the Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective
such unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even duty
bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as
representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a
flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people
and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the fundamental law embodying the will
of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent
large groups of our population, perhaps nearly one-half of the latter, and the
numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will personally be
affected by the question whether the Constitution should be lightly taken and can
easily be violated without any relief and whether it can be amended by a process
openly repugnant to the letter of the Constitution itself.

As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and
every one of the citizens and inhabitants of this country. Whether our Constitution
is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of paper, only good
to be thrown into a waste basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the
security, property, personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That
vital question will necessarily affect the way of life of the whole people and of its
most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this land
of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is
finally decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.

Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present
action; and much more, those who are members of Congress have the legal duty to
institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by the electorate.

24 SENATORS

The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the
members of the Senate. According to petitioners there are 24 of them while
according to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because, according to them, "they are not
duly qualified and sworn in members of the Senate."

This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation
of facts submitted by both parties.

No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logodaedaly may change the

meanings and effects of the words placed by respondents themselves in said seven
paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that
Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are not senators notwithstanding their having
been proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the
President of the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving
salaries as senators.

Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the
undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five hundred
millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting to the human mind of the
twentieth century.

Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as
members of the Senate, without taking into consideration whatever legal effects the
Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon which we have already
elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not
suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so
clear and simple as the presence of the sun at day time. Therefore, counting said
three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.

96 REPRESENTATIVES

The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to

the effect that the present House of Representatives is composed of 98 members
and their own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90 members have
qualified, have been fully sworn in, and have taken their seats as such."

Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the

stipulation of facts.

The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives

Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and Simpauco, mentioned in
paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of
Representatives.

The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are
actual members of the House of Representatives. We may even add that the
conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater than in the case of
Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because no resolution of suspension has ever
been adopted by the House of Representatives against said eight members, who are
being deprived of the exercise of some of their official functions and privileges by
the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where
the insolence of totalitarian rulers have replaced all constitutional guarantees and
all concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional question: whether
it is permissible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the
arbitrary power of depriving representatives duly elected by the people of their
constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of
such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of
democracy a mockery.

The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a wanton onslaught against the
sovereignty itself of the people, an onslaught which may cause the people sooner
or later to take justice in their own hands. No system of representative government
may subsist if those elected by the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated
from the exercise of their constitutional functions.

From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last
national election, 98 representatives were elected and at the time the resolution
Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members of
the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and Ramos) had resigned.

Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution
was adopted; three-fourths of them should at least be 18 and not the 16 who only
voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives, three-fourths
of them should certainly be more than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The
necessary consequence is that, since not three-fourths of the senators and
representatives voting separately have voted in favor of the resolution as required
by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that the resolution has
not been validly adopted.

We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement
with the majority opinion, have skipped the questions as to the actual membership
of the Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact that they are
among the first important ones squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If
they had taken them into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of
fairness will bring them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with
respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it appears evident that the remedy sought for in the petition should
be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position
concerning the questions of the actual membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written arguments they
have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity
made by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress as their
last redoubt.

The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not
less than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting separately, * * *."

Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be
certified over the signatures of the President of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents want us to accept
blindly as a fact what is not. They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as
absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official
falsehood.

Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.

An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing

overboard all scruples, in the administration of justice, could accept as true what
we know is not and then perform our official functions upon that voluntary self-
delusion, is too shocking and absurd to be entertained even for a moment. Anyone
who keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the
perversion or miscarriage of justice which necessarily will result from the
suggestion.

But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to
inquire behind the false certification made by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution."

To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of
this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and C,[1] the memoranda presented by both
petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and ably
discussed the question. The perusal of the memoranda will show petitioners'
contentions to be standing on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree
with their arguments.

In what follows "we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary," except "by express constitutional or statutory provision"
to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds the
judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of respect to the political departments."

The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."

This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of

Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat what we have already
said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated on the question.

Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary is "too well-established to
need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what
matters fall under the meaning of political questions."

This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it
even as a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made without a full
comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind
it.

The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question" shows conclusively that the so-called doctrine has
recklessly been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the
confessed difficulty in determining what matters fall within the designation of
political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as
to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the
acts of the political department of the government."

Doctrine is that "which is taught; what is held, put forth as true, and supported by a
teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the body of principles, in any
branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith." It is a synonym of
principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule, and axiom. In its general sense,
doctrine applies to any speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught
to others or recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be
expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the
elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and
paradox.

A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for

developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the solution of many
problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the
basis of a more or less complex legal structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at
least be one of the main columns of an architectonic construction. If that
groundwork, cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose existence still
remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.

We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is

based on the unsettled meaning of political question.

The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary" is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements made as an
excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide
hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.

It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers,

the handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind themselves, as if self-
inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a
danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the
process to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are
matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a
litigation as to whether said article has been complied with or violated is beyond
the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept
as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as
erroneous and false.

Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions
relating to it, therefore, be taken away from the courts? Then, what about the
constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide
"all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or a law?"

COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L.
R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.

No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and
analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court.

The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification
by the State legislature of a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution" and
that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time
from the date of submission to the State legislature," are political questions and not
justiciable.

At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no
similarity or analogy with the constitutional questions herein discussed. The
question as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the Child
Labor amendment proposed by the United States Congress in June, 1924, and upon
the decision of said Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the
amendment has been adopted "within a reasonable time from the date of
submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise a controversy
of violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the
present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated
because in January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected the amendment, a
copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying the amendment was
adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor
casting the deciding vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional
violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after
submission of the amendment to the State legislature.

No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the
Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote or because by the lapse of time from June,
1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its vitality.

It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy
of ratification by a State legislature of a proposed amendment, it was within the
ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the question, in its decision
rendered in the exercise of its constitutional power, to control the action of the
Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not
be controlled by the courts.

Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in
controversy in the present case.

We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs.
Miller, according to the American Law Reports, show "interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject of an amusing article in 48
Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it
happened that the nine-member United States Supreme Court could not reach a
decision on the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast
his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."

How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs.

Miller could be an authority is beyond our comprehension.

GREEN versus WELLER

One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs. Weller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one
paragraph thereof.

Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed
effect.

The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the
submission to the people of a proposal to amend the Constitution which should
cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it dangerous to the
stability of the government, but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the
submission is made "in a established form," adding that the means provided for the
exercise by the people of their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law
should receive such a construction as not to trample upon the exercise of their
right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and
unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to change their Constitution "in the
mode prescribed by the instrument."

So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the
majority position is wrong because the Mississippi Supreme Court, in making the
pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the people is made "in
a established form" and "in the mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in
accordance with the provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be
the opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the proposal of amendment
to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution,
aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of
the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected representatives of the people.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the "confusing" and "amusing"
decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other
authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate
position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution
granted Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional
amendments."

Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power

is granted by our fundamental law to the Congress of the Philippines. Our
Congress may propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal, but
that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical
sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the
people. Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission." That
submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and come into
effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the
President of the Philippines. And if the law happens to violate the fundamental
law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is
enacted, its execution devolves upon the Executive Department. As a matter of
fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people the
proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of
the Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war, rebellion, or
insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.

After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise
not obtainable in the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the majority in any
way.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and

"amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by the
majority, but the opinion does not offer much help. The Justice maintains that the
proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are matters that concern not
merely political actions but are also of the very essence of political action," and
then advances the following argument: "To open the law-courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered
by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."

The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one
of simple distaste for the idea, but fails to give any sensible reason for the attitude.
In a totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in answer to the
promptings of a sense of justice, but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims
of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but
then it would be necessary to elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.

In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded
on reason, but never on passing unreasoned moods, judicial or otherwise.

We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's views, which in their judgment are in accord "with sound principles
of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the
workings of constitutional and popular government." Our regret is not for
ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned and
unexplained mental attitude of a judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it
even with the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it
represents the whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured
reason.

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as
Appendices A, B, and C. Although we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the
discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated in the
majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full approval of the majority, that
a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts.

The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can
we accept the absolute verity of the presiding officers' certification that the
resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact
the certification is false? How can we accept a theory which elevates a falsehood to
the category of truth?

The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the
English have committed the nonsense of accepting the theory, is that reason for
Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals
not think independently? Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in
the art of imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to
reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may happen to
be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to
commit such a blunder.

Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the
majority states that in the United States the jurisdictions are divided almost equally
pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A there
appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the
rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial
in the decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make
reason nor justice.

The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-
making body, invoking to said effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.

Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the
authority of laws which have been repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed
out by the majority does not support their contention. Section 313 alluded to
enumerates the evidence that may prove the procedures of the defunct Philippine
Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines,
with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the
Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof."

This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections
5 and 41 of Rule 123 show conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the
rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as unreasonable and unjust.
Section 5 provides that we may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress
and section 41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but
nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that would make conclusive a
certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress
even if we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our
lawmaking body, upon the very evidence used in support thereof, after a little
analysis, has to banish as a midsummer night's dream.

50 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, SECTION 150

In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50

American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the theory.

We will analyze the reasons adduced:

Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This

must be the strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It is so flimsy to require
much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social
courtesy, the mutual respect that must be shown between different departments of
the government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values become so
perverted that we can make such a blunder in our choice? Since when have the
social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of
overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?

Because without the theory, courts would have to make "an inquisition into the
conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power." This second
reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a Fascistic one. It is
premised on the false belief that the members of the majority are a kind of
emperors of Japan, to be worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology
depicted by the second reason should be relegated to where it belongs: the
archeological museum.

"The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted
evaluation of human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the sake of convenience?

"Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills
authenticated as executed by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained
from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a law." This
last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as
a perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal stupidity may reach.

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority,
Wigmore on Evidence. We will also analyze the arguments relied upon.

That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the
State." This argument, as it appears quoted in the majority decision, is premised on
the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind poisoned by
prejudice, as shown by the following: "We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of
evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of
almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of all persons having access
to these journals. * * *"

The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American

experience, which seems not to be too flattering to our former metropolis.

Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes

convinces us that Wigmore's assumption does not obtain in the Philippines. It is
true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few instances
in which there had been disagreement between what has actually been passed, as
shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so
few to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by Wigmore in America.
Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil in the
Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the following
revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final form furnished
each member at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the
last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon
its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)

This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by

Wigmore's fears.

To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then
less than a quorum of each House may by the aid of presiding officers impose laws
upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore answers:
"This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all
others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have
not been disgraced."

The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering,
disgraceful, or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why arbitrary presiding
officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to have their way
unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and balances established by the
Constitution presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in any department
of government and the system is established to put a check on them.

When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the

legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not shrink from its
duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy.
Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with impunity commit
"culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes"
without being liable to be removed from office on impeachment, and we hope, if
there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do their
duty in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the
uncourageous example which is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES

The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a

guarantee against the adoption of amendments to the fundamental law by mere
majorities.

The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any
change is to be introduced in it, it must be in answer to a pressing public need so
powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives. Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the
Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with the purpose of
avoiding any doubt that it must be complied with mathematical precision, with the
same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical
figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately, it means an exact number, not
susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that no single member
should be excluded in the counting. It means not excluding three Senators and
eight Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to cause any
inconvenience to the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress
who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been complied
with in the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as
false as any falsehood can be.

The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities,
otherwise it would be the death knell of constitutionalism in our country. If a
constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of
the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with the vitality of a
government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a whimsical government of men.

The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate
shall be composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI); that Congress shall by
law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that each House may expel
a member with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members (section 10 [3],
Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine members, three
Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislative members (section 11, Article VI);
that to overrun the veto of the President, the concurrence of two- thirds of all the
members of each House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain
cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is
necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to declare war
(section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of two- thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court
(section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment by a vote of two- thirds of all its members (section 2,
Article IX); and that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments,
but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters
not of momentary but of momentous importance. Each and every one of them
should be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our loyalty to the
sovereign people so requires, but also because by inserting them the Constitutional
Convention had abided by the wise teachings of experience.

By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional
adoption of the resolution in question to have their way is to set up a precedent that
eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be
tantamount to opening Pandora's box of evils and disasters.

The power to declare war can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the members of each House. From now on, by the simple
expediency of certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses
that two-thirds had voted where a bare majority had voted in fact, said majority
may plunge our people into a maelstrom of war.

The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-
thirds of all the members of the House of Representatives. From now on, a mere
plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high officials, including the
President, on the carpet.

To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of

three-fourths of all the members of the Senate. From now on, that three-fourth rule
may be dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three actual Senators, as
has been done in the resolution in question, and thereby oust the President of the
Philippines if he happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.

Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to

submit which to the people high-handed means have been resorted to, there can be
no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect future
generations to unimaginable extent. The Constitutional Convention had thought it
wise that before such a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the
three-fourth rule should be adhered to by Congress.

QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE

Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon
all the forces of liberalism to wage a crusade for human freedom. They should put
on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the vindication of the
principles and guarantees embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of
the Chapter of the United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in
People vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that the future may pass
upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we ventured that
the historian may, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as
follows:

"At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary
and retrogressive. When the victims of a constitutional violation, perpetrated by a
group of the highest officials of the government, came to it for redress, it adopted a
hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the
situation and finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing
those who have pinned their faith and hope in it as the first pillar of the
Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue
of human freedom was disposed of by them most discouragingly by nullifying the
right of an accused to be free on bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a
constitutional guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations."

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian
may record that the highest tribunal of the new Republic of the Philippines has
struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do its
duty in giving redress in a clear case of violation of the fundamental law, to the
great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions of souls all over the world
who are pinning their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.

The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the

deliberations of the several organs of the United Nations is predicated in the
adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our
planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped under the pattern of that single
legal standard. But the whole system is liable to crash if it is not founded on the
rockbed of the elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be held
supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing
social organs, moral attitudes and habits of thinking should undergo reforms and
overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be replaced
with more progressive ones and in consonance with truth and reason. Among these
ideas are the wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in
this case.

The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation
and reform should continuously be undertaken if death by stagnation is to be
avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New formulas
must be devised and invented, and those outworn discarded. Good and useful
traditions must be preserved, but those hampering the progressive evolution of
culture should be stored in the museum of memory. The past and the present are
just stopping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.

Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science has progressed by
leaps and bounds. Polonium and radium were discovered by Madam Curie,
Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma
particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter to become an under-
microscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.

Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants
are grown in plain water, without any soil, but only with anions and cations.
Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood sugar,
weighing one-half of the sawdust processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost
absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria
and other microbes are harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus
niger is made to manufacture the acetic acid to produce vinegar for the asking. The
penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and
tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from formerly lethal
infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an
illness that used to claim more than one million victims a year in the world. The
creation of synthetics has enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature.
Means of transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many
scientific dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on.
There is no reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward,
synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a better
future.

The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any
qualm violated Article XV of the Constitution and the majority of this Court,
instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the
comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers, creates a situation that seems to be
ogling for more violations of the fundamental law. The final results no one is in a
position to foresee.

Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

[1] Omitted.

DISIDENTE

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M.:

Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos llaman a decidir y arbitrar sobre una
violacion de la Constitucion—el codigo fundamental de nuestro pais. A mediados
del año pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta misma Corte Suprema
por tres Senadores[1] que se quejaban de haber sido privados injusta y
arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse en el Senado dc Filipinas y a participar y
votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion
que ampara tal derecho. Ahora esos mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta
Corte para quejarse de otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero esta vez no vienen
solos: les acompañan otros cinco miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de
la Camara de Representantes y tres jefes de agrupaciones o partidos
politicos—Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party. Jose O.
Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del Senado y Presidente del
Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8 Senadores,
17 Representantes y 3 particulares.[2] Tienen un comun denominador, a saber: que
son todos ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.

Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de Elecciones, el

Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor General y el Director del Buro de Imprenta.[3]

El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de prohibicion

dirigido a los recurridos para que estos, sus agentes, empleados, subordinados y
otras personas que aetuen bajo su superintendencia o en su nombre "se abstengan y
desistan de dar los pasos tendentes hacia la celebracion de un plebiscito o eleccion
general el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reforma de los
articulos 13.° y 14.° de la Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles necesarios
en relacion con dicho plebiscito, y de desembolsar o de autorizar el expendio de
fondos publicos para dicho proposito."

Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesario publicar integro a

continuacion el texto de la Resolucion conjunta que contiene la propuesta reforma
a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto de la consulta
popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la misma que en el lexico
corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por resolucion sobre paridad o
igualdad de derechos constitucionales a favor de los americanos, es decir, que
concede a estos iguales derechos que a los filipinos en la propiedad y cultivo de
terrenos publicos, en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como bosques,
minas, pesca y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de utilidades
publicas. He aqui su texto:

"RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE APPENDED AS AN
ORDINANCE THERETO.
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint
session assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the Members of
each House voting separately, To propose, as they do hereby propose, the
following amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
Ordinance thereto;

"ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight,
Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the
President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities,
shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens
of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines.

"This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a

majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is submitted to the people for
their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

"Adopted,

(Sgd.) "JOSE AVELINO

"President of the Senate

(Sgd.) "EUGENIO PEREZ

"Speaker of the House of

Representatives

"We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both Houses in
joint session assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on September
18, 1946.

(Sgd.) "ANTONIO ZACARIAS

"Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) "NARCISO PIMENTEL

"Secretary of the House

of Representatives"

Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional propuesta el

Congreso de Filipinas ha aprobado la Ley No. 73 de la Republica que dispone y
ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de este año, provee a
la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el presupuesto necesario para sufragar los gastos
del mismo. Si una mayoria de los electores votare afirmativamente, la reforma
quedara ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28 años; en caso contrario,
quedara rechazada.

Los recurrentes alegan y sostienen que la resolucion conjunta de que se trata es

ilegal y nula por no haberse aprobado con los votos de las tres cuartas-partes (¾)
del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo XV de la Constitucion, a
saber:

"SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths

of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification."

Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta el Senado

se componia actualmente de 24 miembros, es decir, el numero exacto fijado en la
Constitution, y la Camara de Representantes de 96 miembros, es decir, dos menos
que el numero señalado en la Constitucion, pues dos dimitieron despues de las
elecciones, uno para aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para
aceptar un nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin embargo, segun la
demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21 miembros,
excluyendose de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la Resolucion a tres
miembros, a saber: los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero. De los referidos 21
miembros, votaron a favor de la Resolucion 16 y en contra 5; asi que—arguyen
los recurrentes—la Resolucion no quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el
numero constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (¾) de los miembros, el cual debia
ser 18.

En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio votar a 88

miembros, excluyendose de las deliberaciones y votacion final de la resolucion a 8
miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y Jesus B. Lava, de Bulacan;
Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M.
Yuson y Luis Taruc, de Pampanga; Rep. Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep.
Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros Occidental. De los referidos 88 miembros votaron a
favor de la Resolucion solo 68; asi que—arguyen los recurrentes—la Resolucion
tampoco quedo aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero constitucional de
tres cuartas-partes (¾) partes de sus miembros, el cual debia ser 72, por lo
menos, y no 68, aun dando por descontados los dos miembros que despues de las
elecciones aceptaron cargos en otros ramos del gobierno.

Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica de que se trata,

consiguientemente los recurrentes tachan tambien de inconstitucional e invalida la
referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion general o plebiscito
para el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter al pueblo para su ratificacion o
repudio la enmienda constitucional propuesta, y que consigna la suma de
P1,000,000 para los gastos en que se hubiere de incurrir con motivo de la
celebracion de dicho plebiscito, entre habilitacion de precintos electorales, pago de
dietas de los inspectores y costo de la impresion, publicacion, fijacion y
distribucion gratuita de copias de la propuesta enmienda en ingles, español y
otros dialectos del pais.

Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegaciones esenciales de la demanda y

negar otras, plantean las siguientes defensas especiales:

Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act or
Resolution) de ambas Camaras del Congreso, adverada o autenticada con las
firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba concluyente de que la
misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud del respeto que se debe a un
ramo igual y coordinado del gobierno, no es permisible una investigacion judicial
de si la misma fue o no aprobada debida y propiamente por el Congreso; y que, por
tanto, esta Corte, Suprema carece de jurisdiccion para conocer y enjuiciar los
puntos suscitados por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y
constitucionalidad de la resolucion en cuestion.

Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos alegan,

por via de segunda defensa especial, que la resolucion controvertida fue aprobada
con los votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de todos los miembros cualificados del
Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia
con el Articulo XV, apartado 1, de la Constitucion, y que consiguientemente la ley
de la Republica No. 73 que ordena su planteamiento ante el pueblo para su
ratificacion o desaprobacion, señala una fecha para la celebracion de esta
consulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos publicos para tal fin, es valida y
constitucional.

Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertada entre las partes, pero no se
extracta aqui para no alargar innecesariamente esta disidencia, pero se hara
particular referencia a ella mas adelante a medida que las exigencias de la
argumentacion lo demanden.

Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parses han hecho cumplida
justicia a la tremeiula importancia del asunto haciendo. extensos estudios y
pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia pertinente, en particular la
americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en
nuestras ideas politicas y constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha
convivencia de casi medio siglo.

Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede deeirse, sin exageracion, que excepto en
cuatro momentos culminantes de su historia—el primer grito de rebelion contra
España en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de hostilidades contra America en Febrero
de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de
1935, y la guerra contra el Japon en 1941—en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60
años, ha sido llamado el pueblo filipino a rendir una decision tan importante, de
trascendencia e implicaciones tan graves, tan tremendas, como la que tiene que
hacer en el plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivo de la Resolucion
congresional discutida en el presente asunto.

Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que para bien o para mal sacuden los
cimientos de un pais tal que si fuese un fenomeno cosmico; que determinan el
curso de su existencia y destinos nacionales; que deciden, en una palabra, de la
suerte de generaciones ya existentes y de generaciones que no han nacido toda via.
Es una de esas decisiones que para hacerla los pueblos deben hincarse
humildemcnte de rodillas, de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los pueblos y
naciones la gracia de una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita sabiduria * * *.

II

Para los efectos de una amplia perspectiva historica que permita destacar en toda
su plenitud los contomos de los formidables "issues" o puntos constitucionales
debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente que repasemos, siquiera
brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no cabe en el mismo texto de esta
disidencia),[1] los preceptos basicos de la Constitucion que se trata de reformar
con la Resolucion congresional de que tantas veces se ha hecho merito. Helos aqui:

"ARTICLE XIII.—CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES

"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government estbalished
under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
ARTICLE XIV.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

*******

"SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the

operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so
requires."

Como queda dicho, la reforma propuesta es en el sentido de que, no obstante lo

dispuesto en los preceptos arriba transcritos, "durante la efectividad del Convenio
Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de Filipinas y el Presidente de los
Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al tenor de las disposiciones de la Ley del
Commonwealth No. 733, pero que en ningun caso se extendera mas alla del 3 de
Julio de 1974, la disposicion, explotacion, desarrollo y utilizacion de todos los
terrenos agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales,
carbon, petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzas y fuentes de
energia potential, asi como de otros recursos de Filipinas, y la operacion de
utilidades publicas, si abiertos para cualquier persona, quedan abiertos para los
ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y para todas las formas de negocio y empresa de
la propiedad o controladas, directa o indirectamente, por ciudadanos de los Estados
Unidos, de la misma manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestas a los
ciudadanos de Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o
controladas por ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del Congreso
filipino, supra).

Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial—pues, sobre ser historia contemporanea,

se trata de las labores y procesos deliberativos de la misma Asamblea
Constituyente—de que los preceptos capitales arriba transcritos constituyen la
expresion acabada de toda la madurez de juicio, de toda la prudencia y sabidurfa de
que eran capaces no solo los autores de la Constitucion y los Delegados que la
aprobaron, sino el pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente plebiscito
nacional convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta firmeza y tan
fuerte unanimidad entre nuestros partidos politicos y sus caudillos como en esa
recia y constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nada mejor, creo yo, que las
siguientes palabras para definir el espiritu, la filosofia que informa esas
provisiones:

"This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing the outworn
Regalian doctrine which, it is suggested, may serve to retard the economic
development of the Philippines. The best encomium on this provision is probably
the very criticism launched against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would
liberalize the acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to
the extent of permitting their alienation or of depriving the people of this country
of their heritage. The life of any nation depends upon its patrimony and economic
resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting, must go hand in hand with economic
security, if not economic prosperity. We are at most usufructuaries of our domains
and natural resources and have no power to alienate them even if we should want
to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it would be the height of
folly to even think of opening the door for their untrammelled disposition,
exploitation, development or utilization to the detriment of the Filipino people.
With our natural resources in the hands of foreigners what would be there left
except the idealism of living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is,
after all, an empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that is not
ours! We would be beggars in our own homes, strangers in our own land!

"Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the protection of the
legitimate interests of the Filipino people. There is no antagonism or hostility
towards foreigners but sane nationalism and self-protection which every country of
the world is practising today in the interest of self-preservation." (The Three
Powers of Government, by Laurel, pp. 117, 118.)

Los criticos de la enmienda constitutional propuesta pueden discutir libremente,

eomo cumple a los ciudadanos de un pais democratico, los meritos y demeritos de
la misma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de razones—morales, politicas,
economicas, financieras, internacionales, y hasta de decencia—y naturalmente
defenderla tambien sus partidarios desde todos los angulos. Podrian los opositores
hacer una minuciosa diseccion de su fraseologia y acaso hallar en sus repliegues
peligrosas implicaciones, posibles riesgos, eomo en ese par de adverbios "directa o
indirectamente", a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporaciones o asociaciones
extranjeras controladas solo indirectamente por ciudaoanos americanos para
concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, y en
la operacion de utilidades piiblicas. Todo esto lo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es
obvio, elemental que semejante discusion no compete a esta Corte Suprema, sino
en todo caso a otros poderets constituidos.

Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar la bondad o maldad de la

enmienda propuesta. Lo unico que nos incumbe hacer, ya que la cuestion se halla
propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la enmienda ha sido aprobada
por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato expreso de la Constitucion en materia
de enmiendas; si los requisitos que la Constitucion señala para poder
enmendarla—requisitos que son mandatorios, categoricamente imperativos y
obligatorios—se han cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto
de Gray vs. Childs ([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), "* * * No podemos decir que el
estricto requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede renunciar a favor de una
buena enmienda e invocar en contra de otra mala. * * * No compete a los
tribunales el determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y cuando no lo
es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver con la sabiduria de la politica. Pero es deber
de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan, el determinar si o no el
procedimiento adoptado para la aprobacion de la enmienda es el señalado por los
terminos de la ley organica."

Todo lo que se ha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relieve la filosofia de nuestra
Constitucion en materia de recursos naturales y utilidades publicas, se ha dicho no
como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan solo para subrayar toda la gravedad,
toda la densidad del asunto, y prevenir en todo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y
complaciente liviandad. Como tambien se dijo en el citado asunto de Gray vs.
Childs, "la enmienda de la ley organica del Estado o nacion no es una cosa para ser
tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al azar. Es una cosa seria. Cuando
la enmienda es aprobada, viene a ser parte de la ley fundamental del pafs y puede
significar el bienestar o maldicion de las generaciones de la nacion donde se hace
parte del codigo fundamental."
Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una consigna
en el presente caso en que la reforma propuesta afecta vitalisimamente al
patrimonio nacional del pueblo filipino. ¿No son los recursos naturales y las
utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion, la base que sustenta su existencia, la
espina dorsal de su economia? Por tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el celo, la
vigilancia que el pueblo y sus organos naturales ejercen para que las salvaguardias
impuestas por la misma Constitucion en relacion con el proceso y tramitacion de
toda enmienda constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo rigor.

Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabe escudarse tras la doctrina

de la separacion de poderes que la mayoria de esta Corte invoca para justificar su
inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera", alegando que el presente
asunto es coto vedado para nosotros, algo que cae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso
que en derecho politico y constitucional se llama materia politica no-justiciable.

III

La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice que versa
sobre una cuestion politica, y las cuestiones politicas caen fuera de la competcncia
de los tribunates de justicia. Creo que esto es un error, dicho sea con todos los
respetos debidos a mis ilustres compañeros que sostienen tal opinion. ¿Hay
acaso algun documento mas politico que la Constitucion? Si la opinion de la
mayoria fuese valida y acertada, practicamente ninguna violacion de la
Constitucion podria ser enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual menos,
casi todas las transgresiones constitucionales, sobre todo las que comete el poder
legislativo o el poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter politico. Bajo esa opinion la
Constitucion seria una letra muerta, un simple pedazo de papel: los poderes
constituidos, los individuos que los componen, podrian infringir impunemente la
Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro constitucional pudiera intervenir
ordenadamente para restaurar la suprema majestad de la ley fundamental violada.
Es claro que esto podria conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion,
dependiendo solo el resultado de la mayor o menor docilidad del pueblo, del grado
de elasticidad politica de las masas. Y es claro que ninguno puede querer este triste
destino para nuestro pais.
Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro sistema de
gobierno que esta esencialmente calcado en el americano, es que bajo la teoria
relativa de la separacion de poderes, ningun poder es superior al pueblo cuya
voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los poderes no son mas que agentes,
mandatarios, servidores: el pueblo es el amo, el mandante, el soberano. Y el pueblo
ordena y manda por medio de la Constitucion—esta es su voz el verbo hecho
carne politica y social, el soplo vital que traduce y transmuta su espiritu en
postulados esenciales de regulacion y gobierno.

Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello, dicen los sostenedores
absolutistas de la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Pero se pregunta: ¿quien
señala la voluntad del pueblo tal como esta plasmada en la Constitucion?
¿Quien es el profeta que desciende del Sinai para revelar las tablas de la ley?
¿Quien ha de arbitrar en los conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir los
litigios propiamente planteados en que se ventilan una infraccion de la
Constitucion? ¿Hay un peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o
por el contrario, los resortes estan todos bien situados, capaces de operar y
funcionar adecuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente el busilis, la cuestion
batallona.

No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro sistema de

gobierno e! poder judicial es el llamado a señalar, a interpretar la ley; y en los
conflictos o transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte Suprema tiene la ultima
palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremo y final. Bajo nuestra mecanica
constitucional, igual que bajo la americana, se da la aparente paradoja de que la
superior facultad, el supremo negocio de interpretar la voluntad del pueblo tal
como esta expresada mas o menos permanentemente en la Constitucion, no
corresponde propiamente a ninguno de los poderes electivos, los que se renuevan
periodicamente, sino al poder que si bien es de nombramiento en su origen, tiene,
sin embargo, sentido de perpetuidad, quiero decir, es vitalicio en la complexion y
funcion de los individuos que lo componen—el poder judicial. La sabiduria
peculiar, la originalidad del sistema consiste precisamente en eso: en haber alojado
el supremo arbitraje con relacion a los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales
en un poder del Estado al cual deliberadamente se le ha dotado de un clima
psicologico y moral el mas propicio posiblc a la objetividad y desasimiento de las
disputas politicas y discordias civiles, situandosele por encima de los vaivenes de
la politica al uso y las veleidades de la suerte electoral. "Esto es lo que va implicito
en la expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la facultad de revision
judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).

"The very essence of the American conception of the separation of powers is its
insistence upon the inherent distinction between law-making and law-interpreting,
and its assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when brought to
bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the
Supreme Court, p. 146.)

En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo de los

Estados Unidos, por boca de su gran Chief Justice John Marshall, en terminos
inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura para poner en vigor la
Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y declaro que es terminantemente de la
competencia y deber del departamento judicial el decidir cual es la ley que rige.

"The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same. Webster says: 'The
Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of course, that every act of the
Legislature contrary to the law must be void. Hut who shall decide this question?
Shall the legislature itself decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal
and becomes only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to
judge whether their acts be conformable to the Constitution, then the Constitution
is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding; because, if the construction of
it rest wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of
very erroneous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case
arises, must decide upon the validity of particular acts.' Webster, Works, Vol. III,
30." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 1, 2d edtion, pp. 4,
5.)

En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien lo

siguiente:

"* * * Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final, frena
con efectividad a los demas departamentos en el ejercicio de su facultad de
determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los actos ejecutivos y
legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion."
Esta doctrina se reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62), a saber:

"* * * As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds 'neither the sword nor the
purse' it is by constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate
constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation. (Section 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense
and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government
and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the 'system of checks and
balances' of the government established."

No es que con esto el poder judicial asume un complejo de superioridad sobre los
otros poderes del Estado, no. Se trata simplemente de que, dentro de las
limitaciones de toda creation humana, alguien tiene que arbitrar y dirimir los
conflictos y las transgresiones a que puede dar lugar la Constitucion, y se estima
que el poder judicial, por la razon de su ser y de sus funciones, es el mas llamado a
ser ese arbitro. Se trata de una propia y graciosa inhibicion de los otros poderes en
virtud de una necesidad impuesta por unas teorias y practicas de gobierno que han
resistido la prueba del tiempo y el choque con la realidad y la experiencia. En mi
disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192), hablando sobre este
particular dije lo siguiente y lo reitero ahora, a saber:

"En parte, el argumento expucsto es corrccto y acertado. No se pucde discutir que

los trcs poderes del Estado son iguales e indepen dientes entre si; que ninguno de
ellos cs superior al otro, mucho menos el poder judicial que entre los tres es el
menos fuerte y el mas precario en medios e iniplementos tnateriales. Tampoco se
puede discutir que bujo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esfera de
accion propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera un cumulo de facultades que le
pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de esa esfera y en el uso de esas facultades
cada poder tiene absoluta discre cion y ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar
sus actos so pretexto de quo alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios, injustos,
imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion llega solo hasta aqui.
Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasla nuestios dias, el
principio de la separacion de poderes ha sufrido tremendas modificaciones y
limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la
separacion de poderes queda condicionada por una mecanica constitucional—la
mecanica de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the
United States, tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.a edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada
poder es absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de
sus facultades y funciones no se puede coartar. Pero cuando se sale y extravasa de
esa esfera invadiendo otras esfeias constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades que no le
pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le atnpara, la Constitucion que es
superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica dentro de sus fronteras,
impidiendo sus incursiones anti-constitucionales. La cuestion ahora a determinar es
si bajo nuestro sislenia de gobierno hay un niecanismo que permite restablecer el
juego normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos
que podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a
determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus
derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion
y las leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la
cuestion basica, cardinal en este asunto.

"Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen—son los tribunales
de justicia."

La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-justiciable ni

las materias o casos que caen dentro de su significado. "The difficulty lies"—dice
la ponencia—"in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political
question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente, una autoridad—el
caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido no hace muchos años por la Corte Suprema
Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria cree que este es el caso mas semejante
al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria padece error: el caso de Coleman contra
Miller es precisamente un buen argumento en favor del recurso.

Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los Estados

Unidos propuso una reforma a la Constitucion, conocida por "Child Labor
Amendment" (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero, 1925, la Legislatura
del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion rechazando la enmienda y una copia
certificada de la resolucion se envio al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos.
En Enero, 1937, o sea 12 años despues, una resolucion conocida como
"Resolucion Concurrente del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del Estado de
Kansas para ratificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Al considerarse
la resolucion 20 Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra. El Teniente
Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente del Senado en virtud de la Constitucion
estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la resolucion, rompiendo asi el empate. La
resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por la Camara de Representantes de
Kansas mediante una mayoria de los votos de sus miembros.

Fue entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un recurso de

mandamus por los 20 Senadores adversos a la resolucion y por otros 3 miembros
de la Camara de Representantes. El objeto del recurso era (a) compeler al
Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso favorable de la resolucion y poner en su
lugar las palabras "no ha sido aprobada"; (b) recabar la expedicion de un interdicto
contra los oficiales del Senado y Camara de Representantes prohibiendoles que
firmaran la resolucion y contra el Secretario de Estado de Kansas prohibiendole
que autenticara dicha resolucion y la entregara al Gobernarlor. La solicitud
cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernador a emitir su voto decisivo en el
Senado. Tambien se planteaba en la solicitud el hecho de que la resolucion habia
sido rechazada originariamente y se alegaba, ademas, que durante el periodo de
tiempo comprendido entre Junio, 1924, y Mayo, 1927, la enmienda habia sido
rechazada por ambas Camaras de las Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solo se habia
ratificado en 5 Estados, y que por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse
ratificado dentro de un tiempo razonable la enmienda habia perdido su validez y
vitalidad.

La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre los hechos,
asumio competencia sobre el caso y sostuvo que el Teniente Gobernador tenia
derecho a emitir su voto decisivo, que la proyectada enmienda conservaba su
vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido, y que la resolucion, "habiendo
sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes y por el Senado, el acto de
ratificacion de la propuesta enmienda por la Legislatura de Kansas era final y
completo." Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.
Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta asumio
jurisdiccion sobre el caso, con la concurrencia y disidencia de algunos Magistrados
que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de plano, sin mas ceremonias, por la
razon, segun los disidentes, de que los recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni
derecho de accion para pedir la revision de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de
Kansas, y porque ademas se trataba de una cuestion puramente politica, por tanto
no-justiciable. Bajo la ponencia de su Presidente el Sr. Hughes, la Corte Suprema
Federal conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones
planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: "Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is
challenged upon" the ground that the petitioners have no standing to seek to have
the judgment of the state court reviewed and hence it is urged that the writ of
certiorari should be dismissed. We are unable to accept that view." Esto viene a ser
como una replica a las siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr.
Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice
Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no standing in this Court." De lo dicho resulta
evidente que la Corte Federal no adopto la actitud de "manos fuera" (hands off),
sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso, encarandolo.

La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante extensa, esta
consagrada enteramente a discutir la cuestion de la jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya
hemos visto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto enteramente en favor de la
jurisdiccion, en virtud de las razones luminosas que alli se explanan y que no
reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no alargai indebidamente esta disidencia.
La segunda parte es bien breve, apenas consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la
cuestion de si el voto del Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no
valido. La Corte no lo resuelve, porque dice que sus miembros se dividieron por
igual sobre si era una cuestion politica y, por tanto, no- justiciable. La tercera parte,
tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y discutir las siguientes
proposiciones: (a) Si habiendo sido rechazada originariamente la enmienda, una
ratificacion posterior podia validamente dejar sin efecto dicho rechazamiento y
tomarse como una ratificacion legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si el largo
tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la ratificacion—unos 13
años—no habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la
enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo.
El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es muy
interesante y desde luego acabado. Se estudian y comentan luminosamente los
precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento de una enmienda propuesta
impide que la niisma sea ratificada posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente: que
el articulo V de la Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseado en terminos
positivos, es decir, habla de ratificacion y no de rechazamiento, y que por tanto "el
poder para ratificar lo confiere al Estado la Constitucion, y que, como poder
ratificante, continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento." Luego la
Corte dice, examinando Jos precedentes, que el Congreso, en el ejercicio de su
control sobre la promulgation de las enmiendas a la Constitucion, ha resuelto esta
cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido indicado, esto es, considerando inefectivo el
previo rechazamiento frente a una positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que
esta accion del Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consigniente, los tribunales
no estan autorizados para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la Corte dice
que se trata de una cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir una cuestion que cae
dentro de la zona constitucional exclusiva del Congreso; por tanto, se trata de una
accion valida, constitucional. Pero no hay nada en esa decision que diga, o permita
inferir, que cuando el Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la Constitucion,
como en el caso que nos ocupa, los tribunales no pueden intervenir, bajo el
principio de la supremacia judicial en tratandose de interpretar la Constitucion,
para resolver el conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio
propiamente pedido. En otras palabras, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller la
Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el Congreso, al declarar valida la ratificacion de
la enmienda constitucional sobre trabajo infantil (Child labor), no habia infringido
el articulo V de la Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, y la Corte lo razona diciendo,
con la vista de los precedentes, que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y no
de rechazamiento, y que, por tanto, "el poder para ratificar continua y persiste a
pesar de un previo rechazamiento." De suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no es
eierto que la Corte Suprema Federal declaro injusticiable la materia, pues ique
mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum categorico, positivo y terminante?

Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el rechazamiento y la

ratificacion—unos 13 años—no habia tenido el efecto de dar caracter final a la
repudiacion de la enmienda, causando estado juridico definitivo, la Corte Suprema
Federal fallo que no, es decir, declaro valida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso
de tiempo, aduciendo razones muy atinadas, entre ellas lu de que las condiciones
de caracter moral, medico, social y economico que aconsejaban la prohibicion del
trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y existentes, si no mas, cuando se
sometio la enmienda por primera vez para su ratificacion como 13 años despues.
Y luego la Corte cita autoridades y precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre
ellos el caso tipico y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U. S., 368; 65 Law. ed.,
994; 41 Sup. Ct., 510). En este caso la Corte declaro que el Congreso, al proponer
una enmienda a la Constitucion, puede fijar un tiempo razonable para su
ratificacion, y sostuvo la action del Congreso al disponer en la proyectada 18.a
Enmienda que la misma seria ineficaz a menos que se ratificase dentro de siete
años.

Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario: el

Congreso no habia fijado ningun plazo para la ratificacion. En vista de esto, los
recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del Congreso declarando lo
que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuenta los precedentes judiciales y el
precedente congresional de 7 años ya sostenido en el caso citado de Dillon contra
Glass; y que desde luego el periodo de 13 años era demasiado largo para ser
razonable. La Corte Suprema dijo que no, que no eran los tribunales los que debian
fijar ese tiempo razonable; que en esta cuestion entraban muchos factores de
naturaleza varia y compleja—politicos, economicos y sociales—que solo el
Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar ya mediante la correspondiente
legislacion como en el caso de la 18.a Enmienda, ya en cada caso concreto de
ratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora
bien, pregunto: ¿no es esto un dictum judicial? ¿no es esto justiciar? ¿no esta
aqui la Corte Suprema Federal sentandose en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su
opinion sobre una materia juridica y constitutional sometida a su consideracion?
En realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado de resolver
es la validez o nulidad del voto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador, por la razon de
que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la misma decision, la opinion del Tribunal
estaba igualmente dividida. Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas,
resueltas, y esta accion de la mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y
las materias en el discutidas, es lo que ha motivado la disidencia de 4 Magistrados
los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y Douglas. En efecto, estos disidentes no
disimulan su desagrado al ver que la Corte asume en el caso, siquier
implicitamente, el poder de interpretacion judicial, y aun van mas alla—expresan
un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte "trata el proceso enmendatorio provisto
por la Constitucion, como sujeto a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y
en otros sujeto a la autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien que en la
decision "no hay desaprobacion de la conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon
contra Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere tacitamente que una enmienda
propiamente sometida debe darse por muerta, a menos que se ratifique dentro de
un tiempo razonable." Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes esperaban que la Corte
revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella en el citado asunto de Dillon contra Glass en
donde la Corte, en vez de abstenerse de conocer del caso por tratarse en el, segun
los disidentes, de materia politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el
mismo asumiendo su poder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y declarando
valida la ley del Congreso que fijaba un plazo de 7 años para la ratificacion de la
18.a Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de reproducir las mismas palabras
de la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo que yo pueda decir, demuestran de modo
inconcuso las irreconciliables diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria, representada
por el ilustre ponente Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes, pues mientras por un lado el
ponente justicia decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo
todas las cuestiones planteadas, menos la cuestton del voto del Teniente
Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y precedentes, los disidentes, en su
opinion, preconizan una actitud de absoluta abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands
off), por tratarse, segun ellos, de una materia politica no-justiciable que cae
exclusivamente bajo el control del Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los
disidentes:

"* * * To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly
assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional
authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are
unable to agree.

"The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption. However, it is
apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a
'reasonable time' within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether
duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for
ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed
amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an ultimate control
over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the
course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe
were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.

"The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects
as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject to the final authority of the
Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass,
that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must
die unless ratified within a 'reasonable time'. Nor does the Court now disapprove
its prior assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made
clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such
implication in article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the political questions of
whether a State whose legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may
subsequently reverse its position, and whether in the circumstances of such a case
as this, an amendment is dead because an 'unreasonable' time has elapsed. No such
division between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by
article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress
alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the article exclusively
and completely to Congress. The process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is not subject
to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.

"Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending process, subject
to no judicial review, the views of any court upon this process cannot be binding
upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs. Glass attempts judicially to impose a
limitation upon the right of Congress to determine final adoption of an amendment,
it should be disapproved. * * *" (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R., 695, 708, 709.)

La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en el referido

asunto de Coleman vs. Miller es algun tanto confusa, como han podido notar los
mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita de alguna explicacion. Es cierto que no
suscriben la ponencia mas que 3 Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr. Hughes y los
Sres. Stone y Reed, pero en cuanto a la jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio
sobre el caso y la materia hay que añadir los votos de los Sres. McReynolds y
Butler. Estos dos ultimos no solo concurrian implicitamente en la accion de la
Corte al enjuiciar el caso, sino que inclusive opinaban que debia concederse el
recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la ratificacion cardia de la Enmienda sobre
Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor) hecha por la Legislatura de Kansas. De modo que en
cuanto al "issue" de la jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5
contra 4—por la jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes, y los
Magistrados Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de absoluta
abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), los Magistrados Sres. Black, Frankfurter,
Roberts y Douglas.

Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser una
autoridad a favor de los recurridos, juntamente con el caso de Dillon vs. Glass
constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal americana a favor de
los recurrentes.

Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de la tesis de que tenemos

jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidir el presente caso, en el ejercicio de nuestras
supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el principio
firmemente establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos propiamente
planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, la jurisprudencia de
los Estados es todavia mas indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y decisiva. La
importancia de esto sube de punto si se tiene en cuenta que, mas que con el
gobierno federal, nuestra analogia, nuestros puntos de contacto en lo politico,
constitucional y juridico es mas bien con los diferentes Estados de la Union
americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierno es unitario. Aqui nuestras provincias no
son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes como lo son los Estados
americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas semejante a la nuestra no es
la federal, sino la estatal. Por eso si bien es cierto que las constituciones de los
Estados, como la nuestra, todas estan fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de la
Constitucion federal, se vera que en ciertos rasgos caracteristicos del sistema
unitario nuestra Constitucion se aproxima evidentemente mas a las de los Estados
que a la federal. Esa semejanza es sobre todo notabilisima en la parte que se refiere
al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en realidad, los Estados de la
Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida interior, domestica, son
practicamente naciones independientes; asi que nuestra evolucion, nuestro transito
de la condicion de Commonwealth a la de Republica soberana e independiente si
bien nos distingue de ellos en el derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin
embargo, ha operado en el campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la
Constitucion, ora en la parte organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la
independencia no hemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de Constitucion: la misma
que nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir, cuando estabamos
sujetos a la soberania americana, es la misma que nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos
Republica; y no cabe duda de que nos serviria perfectamente bien si no la
tuvieramos asendereada y malparada en nuestras pecadoras manos con repetidas
violaciones, con frecuentes asaltos contra su integridad * * *.

Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquiera a que señale un caso, un
solo caso en la jurisprudencia de los Estados de la Union americana en que los
tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y enjuiciar una violacion
constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupa por la razon de que se trataba de una
cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay absolutamente ninguno; por eso que los
recurridos, a pesar de las pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota su habil
y concienzudo alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.

En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de varios Estados dan cuenta de casos

identicos al que nos ocupa y en todos el los se ha declarado invariablemente que la
violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al precepto que regula el proceso
de las enmiendas a la Ley organica es una cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte
Suprema de Estado se ha lavado jamas las manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de
poderes. Es mas: creo que ni siquiera se ha planteado seriamente la objecion
fundada en el argumento de la injusticiabilidad.

Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citar mas que algunos casos los
mas conocidos y representativos, tomados de la jurisprudencia de algunos Estados,
a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la Corte Suprema de Florida
tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs. Gilchrist y el de Gray vs. Childs.

En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963; Ann. Cas., 1914B,
916), se trataba de una accion de prohibicion interpuesta por el Gobernador del
Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado, H. Clay Crawford, para
impedir que cierta propuesta enmicnda a la Constitucion se publicara y se
sometiera al electorado en un plebiscito para su ratificacion o rechazamiento. Es
decir, lo mismo de que se trata en el caso que tenemos ante nosotros. La enmienda
habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes de Florida con el voto
necesario y constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su
concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo con el voto de tres quintos, pero esta
votacion fue reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba el asunto, pendiente de
reconsideracion cuando se clausuro la Legislatura. Despues, sin embargo, diose por
aprobada la propuesta enmienda y el Secretario de Estado trato de dar los pasos
para su publicacion y ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi la accion de interdicto
prohibitorio, fundada en la alegacion de que la enmienda no habia sido aprobada
debidamente por la Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos prescritos en la
Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente caso tambien hubo alli una batalla
forense colosal, con un tremendo despliegue de habilidad y talento por cada lado.
El ponente no se recata en alabar el esfuerzo de las partes y dice: "* * * we think
the parties to this litigation are to be commended, both for taking the proceedings
that have brought these unusual questions before the court for determination and
for the great ability with which their counsel have presented them to this court."

¿Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose incompetente para
conocer del asunto por la razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica y, por
tanto, no justiciable? De ninguna manera. La Corte asumio resueltamente su
responsabilidad y poder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y fallo el asunto
en su fondo, declarando que la cuestion era propiamente judicial y que la enmienda
constitucional propuesta no se habia aprobada de conformidad con los requisites
establecidos por la Constitucion para el proceso y tramitacion de las enmiendas.
Por tanto, se denego la peticion de supersedeas interpuesta por el recurrido para
enervar el recurso; es decir, el recurrente gano su inusitado e historico pleito. Y las
esferas politicas de Florida no se desorbitaron por esta decisiva derrota de la teoria
de la separacion de poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunas de las doctrinas
sentadas en el asunto, a saber:

"Constitutional Law—Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action by

Legislature in Proposing Constitutional Amendment.
"A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has been validly
proposed and agreed to by the Legislature is to be had in a judicial forum where
the constitution provides no other means for such determination.

"Injunction—Subject of Relief—Act of Secretary of State in Certifying Proposed

Amendments.

"The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the county
commissioners proposed amendments to the constitution is in its nature ministerial,
involving the exercise of no discretion, and if the act is illegal it may be enjoined in
appropriate proceedings by proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy
afforded by law.

"Injunction—Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as Defendant.

"The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen, taxpayer, and
elector, is a proper complainant in proceedings brought to enjoin the secretary of
state from publishing at public expense and certifying proposed amendments to the
constitution upon the ground that such proposed amendments are invalid because
they have not been duly 'agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to
each house' of the legislature.

"Amendment to Constitution—Eflect of Ignoring Mandatory Provisions of

Constitution.

"If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amending the
constitution, it violates the right of all the people of the state to government
regulated by law.

"Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.

"It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to the existing
constitution.

"Mandatory Provisions of Constitution as to Manner of Amending Constitution.

"The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of the

constitution to 'be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to each
house' of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly contemplates that such
amendments shall be agreed to by the deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the
requisite number of the members of each house at a regular" session.

"Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect—Mandatory Character of

Provisions.

"Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended meaning and
effect, and essential provisions of a constitution are to be regarded as being
mandatory." (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas., 1914B, pp. 916, 917.)

El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. En 1934 otro asunto

constitucional importante, el de Gray contra Childs, se decidio en virtud de la
autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.

En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien se
trataba de una demanda de prohibicion para impedir la publicacion de una
propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al electorado de Florida
para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una eleccion general o plebiscito fijado
para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda habia sido aprobada por la Camara de
Representantes con el voto de tres quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta
confusion acerca del texto finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura, antes de
clausurarse aprobo una resolucion conjunta autorizando a ciertos oficiales de las
Camaras para que despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones en las actas y
en el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la verdadera historia de los procedimientos
y compulsar el texto de la enmienda tal como habia sido aprobada. Se alegaba en la
demanda que esto era ilegal y anticonstitucional. El tribunal de circuito estimo el
recurso de prohibicion. Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema
del Estado, la misma confirmo la sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto
prohibitorio. He aqui los pronuncia mientos de la Corte que parecen estereotipados
para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:

"(4, 5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method by which the
Constitution may be amended. It requites that a proposed amendment shall be
entered upon the respective Journals of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate with the yeas and nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such
amendment by each House. The proposed amendment here under consideration
nowhere appears upon the Journals of the Senate, and therefore it is unnecessary
for us to consider any other questions presented or any authorities cited.

"The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a thing to be lightly
undertaken nor to be accomplished in a haphazard manner. It is a serious thing.
When an amendment is adopted, it becomes a part of the fundamental law of the
land, and it may mean the weal or woe of the future generations of the state
wherein it becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict
requirements pertaining to amendments may be waived in favor of a good
amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the Constitution may be
amended in one respect without the amendment being spread upon the Journals of
one of the respective Houses of the Legislature, then it may be amended in any
other respect in the same manner. It is not for the courts to determine what is a
wise proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of the
policy the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the courts, when called
upon so to do, to determine whether or not the procedure attempted to be adopted
is that which is required by the terms of the organic law.

"Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above pointed out, the
decree appealed from should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed on authority of
the opinion and judgment in the case of Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So.,
953; Ann. Cas., 1914B, 916." (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern Reporter, pp. 274,
279.)

Notese que la clausula sobre enmiendaa en la Constitucion de Florida es semejante

a la nuestra, a saber: (1) la propuesta enmienda tiene que ser aprobada por la
Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres-quintos (3/5) de los miembroa, en
Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los sies y los nos tienen que hacerse
constar en el diario de sesiones (Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20,
inciso 1, Constitucion de Filipinas); (3) despues de aprobada la enmienda por la
Legislatura se somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para su
ratificacion o rechazamiento.

El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal americana

es diferente, a saber: el Congreso puede proponer la enmienda bien (1) mediante la
aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros; bien (2) mediante una
convencion que se convocara al efecto a peticion de las Legislaturas de dos tercios
(2/3) de los diferentes Estados. En cualquiera de ambos casos la enmienda sera
valida para todos los efectos y fines como parte de la Constitucion siempre que
fuera ratificada por las Legislaturas de tres cuartos (¾) de los Estados, o por
convenciones de tres cuartas-partes de los mismos, segun que uno u otro modo de
ratificacion hubiera sido propuesto por el Congreso.

Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digo mas arriba, me inclina a

sostener que la jurisprudencia constitucional propiamente aplicable a Filipinas es la
jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es con estos con los cuales tenemos
analogia o paridad constitucional en lo quo toca a la forma y manera como se
puede reformar la Constitucion.

Seguire ahora citando mas casos.

Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el asunto

de In re McConaughy (106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408), tambien se suscito la
cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia sido aprobada de
acuerdo con los requisitos señalados en la Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como
aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si esto era una cuestion judicial o una cuestion
politica no justiciable. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro sin ambajes que
era una cuestion judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen desperdicio:

"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a

constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements
of an existing constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt that the
consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the constitution has been amended in the manner
required by the constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine
the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be
permitted to illegally amend the organic law. There is some authority for the view
that when the constitution itself creates a special tribunal, and confides to it the
exclusive power to canvass votes and declare the results, and makes the
amendment a part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by
proclamation or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is final and conclusive. It
may be conceded that this is true when it clearly appears that such was the
intention of the people when they adopted the constitution. The right to provide a
special tribunal is not open to question; but it is very certain that the people of
Minnesota have not done so, and this fact alone eliminates such cases as Worman
vs. Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A., 716, and Miles vs. Badford, 22
Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the jurisdiction of the courts."
(In re McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N. W., 408.)

Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs. Clark (136

Ga., 313; 71 S. E., 479; 38 L. R. A. [N. S.], 77), se suscito igualmente una disputa
sobre si una enmienda habia sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos de la
Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o no. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado
declaro afirmativamente. He aqui su inequivoca pronunciamiento:

"Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the governor
declaring that the amendment was adopted was conclusive, and that the courts
could not inquire into the question. To this contention we cannot assent. The
constitution is the supreme state law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes
no provision for exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an
amendment has been made in the constitutional method, and for the issuance by
him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation may be both
useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether or not a change has been
made in the fundamental law; but the constitution did not make it conclusive on
that subject. When the constitution was submitted for ratification as a whole, a
provision was made for a proclamation of the result by the governor. Const. art. 13,
section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference to amendment
there is no such provision. Const. article 13, section 1, par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910,
section 6610). In the absence of some other exclusive method of determination
provided by the constitution, the weight of authority is to the effect that whether an
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of the
existing constitution is a judicial question." (Hammond vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313; 71
S. E., 479; 38 L. R. A. [N. S.], 77.)

Tambien tenemos el siguiente caso de Indiana:

"(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part of appellees
that this court has no jurisdiction to determine the questions in issue here. In the
case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind., 336, 391; 99 N. E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C,
200), this court, after reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to
determine similar questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:

" 'Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or because the
constitutional forms or conditions have not been followed or have been violated
(italics supplied) may become a judicial question, and upon the courts the
inevasible duty to determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and
they have, with practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine the
validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of change in the organic law.
Such is the rule in this state'—citing more than 40 decisions of this and other
states.

"(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case entitling him
to equitable relief. The trial court found that the officers of the state, who were
instructed with the execution of the law, were about to expend more than $500,000
under the law, in carrying out its provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the course
of the oral argument, that the necessary expenditures would amount to more than
$2,000,000. This court, in the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, involving the
submission to the people of the Constitution prepared by the Legislature, answered
this same question contrary to the contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414
of that opinion." (186 Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol.
116, pp. 921, 922.)

Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia amcricana tanto federal como de Estado

sobre este punto, esto es, cuando es judicial la cuestion y cuando no lo es, se halla
bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en la parte que lleva el
encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption
of Constitution and Amendments" (12 Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es un compendio
cuidadosamente elaborado en que se da un extracto de la doctrina con las citas
sobre autoridades al pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo las citas para
no alargar demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tiene mas que
consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que parece un resumen
del extenso analisis que llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto federal como estatal. Su
meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una nueva constitucion se ha adoptado la
tienen que decidir los departamentos politicos del gobierno; pero la cuestion de si
una enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido debidamente propuesta,
adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo con los requisitos provistos por la Constitucion,
para que venga a ser parte de la misma, es una cuestion que los tribunales de
justicia tienen que determinar y resolver, excepto cuando la materia ha sido
referida por la Constitucion a un tribunal especial con poder para llegar a una
conclusion final. He aqui el sinopsis:

"SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments.—Whether or not a new

constitution has been adopted is a question to be decided by the political
departments of the government. But whether an amendment to the existing
constitution has been duly proposed, adopted, and ratified in the manner required
by the constitution, so as to become part thereof, is a question for the courts to
determine, except where the matter has been committed by the constitution to a
special tribunal with power to make a conclusive determination, as where the
governor is vested with the sole right and duty of ascertaining and declaring the
result, in which case the courts have no jurisdiction to revise his decision. Rut it
must be made clearly to appear that the constitution has been violated before the
court is warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire constitution is
involved, or merely an amendment, the federal courts will not attempt to pass on
the legality of such constitution or amendment where its validity has been
recognized by the political departments of the state government, and acquiesced in
by the state judiciary." (12 C. J., pp. 880, 881.)

VI

Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recurso es que la copia impresa
de la resolucion en cuestion aparece certificada por los presidentes de ambas
Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion consta que dicha resolucion fue
debidamente aprobada por el Congreso con los votos de las tres quintas-partes
(3/5) de sus miembros; que, por tanto, la debida aprobacion de dicha resolucion no
se puede cuestionar, es una prueba concluyente para todo el mundo y para los
tribunales de justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda en la doctrina
inglesa llamada "enrolled act doctrine," cuya traduccion mas aproximada al
español es "doctrina de la ley impresa." Esto, por un lado.
Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige y
prevalece en esta jurisdiccion no es la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act doctrine,"
sino la doctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de "journal entry
doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de si una ley o una resolucion ha sido
debidamente aprobada por el Congreso debe buscarse en el diario de sesiones
mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de sesiones es concluyente y final.

Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se resolvio por esta
Corte en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (34 Jur. Fil., 772), que ambas
partes discuten en sus respectivos informes. Una de las defensas del acusado era
que la Ley No. 2381 de la Legislatura Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido
condenado era nula e ilegal porque se aprobo despues ya del cierre de las sesiones
especiales que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de la noche; es decir,
que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo el 1.° de Marzo, pues la
sesion sine die del dia anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion haciendose parar
las manecillas del reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche. Esta Corte, sin necesidad de
ninguna otra prueba, examino el diario de sesiones correspondiente a la referida
fecha 28 de Febrero, y habiendo hallado que alli constaba inequivocamente
haberse aprobado la mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo que esta prueba era final y
concluyente para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mtmdo. La Corte
desatendio por completo el "enrolled act," la copia impresa de la ley, pues dijo, a
saber: "Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa a si la Ley Impresa (Ley No. 2381),
que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye prueba concluyente sobre la
fecha de su aprobacion, investigaremos si los Tribunales pueden consultar otras
fuentes de informacion, ademas de los diarios de las sesiones legislativas, para
determinar la fecha en que se cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando tales
diarios son claros y explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que no habia necesidad de consultar
otras fuentes, que el diario de sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la
causa en contra del apelante.

Y no era extraño que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria americana,
familiarizada y compenetrada naturalmente con la jurisprudencia pertinente de su
pais ¿Que de extraño habia, por tanto, que aplicasen la doctrina americana, la
doctrina del "journal entry," que es mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la
doctrina inglesa, el "enrolled act doctrine," que despues de todo tiene cierto tinte
monarquico, producto del caracter peculiar e influencia tradicionalista de las
instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.) Firman,
como se sabe, la decision el ponente Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados Sres. Torres,
Johnson, Moreland y Araullo, sin ningun disidente. Y notese que cuando se
promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en vigor el articulo 313 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba reformado por la Ley No. 2210, que entre
otras cosas proveia lo siguiente: "* * * Entendiendose, que en el caso de las Leyes
de la Comision de Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existe una copia
firmada por los Presidentes y los secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera prueba
concluyente de las disposiciones de la ley en cuestion y de la debida aprobacion de
las mismas." ¿Que mejor prueba de la voluntad expresa, categorica, de hacer
prevalecer la doctrina americana sobre la doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para
esta Corte hubiera sido aplicar el citado articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil. No lo hizo, paso por alto sobre el mismo, yendo directamente al diario de
sesiones de la Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay
algun respeto a la regla del stare decisis, esta es una magnifica ocasion para
demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi como asi; sobre
todo cuando de por medio anda la Constitucion como en el presente caso en que se
ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la ley fundamental ha sido violada en
un respecto muy importante como es el capitulo sobre enmiendas, y la queja no
solo no es temeraria sino que se halla apoyada en buenas y solidas razones.

Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en la citada causa de los Estados

Unidos contra Pons (1916, Agosto 12) adoptando en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina
americana del "journal entry" en lugar de la inglesa del "enrolled act," en nuestra
Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de
1902, no habia ninguna disposicion que proveyera mandatoriamente que en el
diario de sesiones de la Legislatura se hiciesen constar los sies y los nos en la
votacion de cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especificamente
los nombres de los miembros que hayan votado en pro y en contra, ni tampoco
habia ninguna disposicion estatutoria a dicho efecto. De modo que en aquella
epoca el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura carecia aun de las fuertes garantias de
veracidad que ahora posee en virtud de esa disposicion que hace obligatoria la
constancia o consignacion de los sies y nos, disposicion incorporada en la
Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion de
Filipinas, Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1; seccion 21, inciso
2.)

Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no puede
haber duda. Ese articulo, que equivale a una regla de prueba, no se ha incorporado
en el Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una regla fundada en un
principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino de algo peculiar aislado, acerca
del cual las autoridades estan divididas, con una mayoria de los Estados de la
Union americana decididamente en contra, su no inclusion en el Reglamento de los
Tribunales tiene que considerate necesariamente como una derogacion.
Indudablemente esta Corte, al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los
Tribunales, ha querido derogarlo en vista de lo resuelto en la citada causa de
Estados Unidos contra Pons y de la novisima disposicion insertada en la
Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica, que exige la consignacion
en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada votacion final de proyecto de ley
o resolucion conjunta, con especificacion de los nombres de los que han votado.

Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen mas razones para reanrmar en
esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o "constancia en el
diario de sesiones" (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa
disposicion de nuestra Constitucion que hace obligatoria la consignacion de los
sies y nos en la votacion de cada bill o resolucion, con especificacion de los
nombres de los que hayan votado en favor y en contra, hace del diario de sesiones
la mejor prueba sobre autenticidad de los actos legislativos y es, por consiguiente,
la ley sobre la materia en este pais, con entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa o
"enrolled act doctrine." Las autoridades americanas son contestes en que siempre
que en un Estado de la Union Federal la Constitucion contiene una disposicion
semejante a la nuestra sobre sies y nos la regla de prueba no es la copia impresa de
la ley o "enrolled act," sino el "journal entry" o constancia en el diario de sesiones.
(Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)

Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no fuera
porque los abogados de los recurridos arguyen fuertemente en favor de la doctrina
de la copia impresa o "enrolled act doctrine," y la mayoria de esta Corte acepta sus
argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el asunto federal de Field vs. Clark en apoyo de la
doctrina.

He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda la

diligencia de que he sido capaz y he llegado a la conclusion de que nuestros
predecesores en esta Corte merecen todo encomio por su indubitable acierto al
adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons, supra,
la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o constancia en el diario de sesiones
legislativas. No cabe duda de que esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas liberal, y
tambien mas humana y mas Concorde con la realidad. La doctrina inglesa del
"enrolled act" o copia impresa de la ley esta basada en el derecho comun y se
adopto en Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y la forma de
gobierno es monarquica, y se adopto en un tiempo en que el poder del Parlamento
que era tambien el mas alto tribunal de justieia, era absoluto y transcendente y las
restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy ligeras. Por eso un tribunal americano ha
dicho: "Because such a rule obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a
monarchial form of government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason
for its application in this state, where the will of the sovereign power has been
declared in the organic act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito con
frecuencia este asunto famoso de Delaware porque es en el mismo donde he
hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre ambas doctrinas: la
americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled act.")

Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a favor de

la doctrina del "journal entry." Lo resuelto en el asunto federal de Field contra
Clark, en que tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha hecho mas que fortalecer
ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va envuelta la inferencia de que cuando la
Constitucion establece ciertos requisitos para la aprobacion de una ley o
resolucion, con la consignacion de los sies y nos y los nombres de los que han
votado afirmativa y negativamente, el diario de sesiones es el que rige y prevalece
como modo e instrumento de autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y
representativo de Union Bank vs. Commissioners of Oxford (199 N. C., 214; 25 S.
E., 966; 34 L. R. A., 487), la Corte Suprema de North Carolina ha declarado lo
siguiente:
"According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated cases in the
courts of last resort in 30 states, and also by the Supreme Court of the United
States, that when a state Constitution prescribes such formalities in the enactment
of laws as require a record of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals, these
journals are conclusive as against not only a printed statute, published by authority
of law, but also against a duly enrolled act. The following is a list of the
authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either directly or by very close
analogy. * * * It is believed that no federal or state authority can be found in
conflict with them.

"Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr vs. Coke (116 N. C., 223; 22 S. E.
16; 28 L. R. A., 737; 47 Am. St. Rep., 801, supra, to the effect that, where the
Constitution contains no provision requiring entries on the journal of particular
matters—such, for example, as calls of the yeas and nays on a measure in
question—the enrolled act cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals.
That, however, is very different proposition from the one involved here, and the
distinction is adverted to in Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S., 671 (12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36
Law. ed., 294." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)

Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos ha

dicho lo siguiente:

"But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South Ottawa vs.
Perkins, 94 U. S., 260; 24 Law., ed., 154, on appeal from the United States court
for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice Bradley delivering the opinion);
said: 'When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois
that no act can be deemed a valid law, unless by the journals of the Legislature it
appears to have been regularly passed by both houses, it became the duty of the
courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The courts of
Illinois may decline to take that, trouble, unless parties bring the matter to their
attention, but on general principles the question as to the existence of a law is a
judicial one and must be so regarded by the courts of the United States." (Rash vs.
Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 387.)

Se dice que el interes publico exige que el "enrolled act" o copia impresa de la ley
firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso se declare
concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos, confusion: cualquiera se
creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley o resolucion, impugnando la
autenticidad de su aprobacion o de su texto. Pero esto pone en orden las siguientes
preguntas que se contestan por si mismas: ¿no es el diario de sesiones un
documento constitucional, exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve por las dos
camaras del Congreso, controlado y supervisado por dichas camaras y por los
oficiales de las mismas? ¿que mejor garantia de autenticidad, contra la
falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar obligatoriamente
en el diario, en la votacion de todo bill o resolucion, los sies y los nos, y haciendo
constar los nombres tanto afirmativos como negativos? ¿se ha producido por
ventura caos y confusion en los Estados americanos que han adoptado esta regla y
que, sogiin admiten los mismos recurridos, forman una decisiva mayoria? ¿es
acaso posible concebir que el sentido americano, tan practico, tan utilitario, tan
realista, optase por una regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion? Prescindiendo
ya de la jurisprudencia que, ya hemos visto, esta decididamente inclinada a favor
de la doctrina americana del "journal entry" ¿que dicen los tratadistas mas
autorizados, los de nombradia bien establecida, y sobre todo los especialistas en
derecho constitucional?

El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., 193,
dice lo siguiente a favor del "journal entry rule":

"Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193), says: 'Each
house keeps a journal of its proceedings which is a public record, and of which the
courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If it would appear from these journals
that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the
Legislature did not follow any requirement of the Constitution or that in any other
respect the act was not constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this
evidence, and adjudge the statute void. Rut whenever it is acting in apparent
performance of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in
favor of the action of a legislative body. It will not be presumed in any case, from
the mere silence of the journals, that either house has exceeded its authority, or
disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts, unless
when the Constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken,
as, for instance, where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered."
Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction, seccion 46
y siguientes, tambien se declara a favor del "journal entry rule" con el siguiente
pronunciamiento:

"The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly passed, unless
there is evidence of which the courts take judicial notice showing the contrary. The
journals are records, and, in all respects touching proceedings under the mandatory
provisions of the Constitution, will be effected to impeach and avoid the acts
recorded as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals affirmatively show that
these provisions have been disregarded. * * * The journals by being required by
the Constitution or laws, are record * * *.

"When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a paramount law, for
the obvious purpose of showing how the mandatory provisions of that law have
been followed in the methods and forms of legislation, they are thus made records
in dignity, and are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly authenticated
are also records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such journals are parallel
records; but the latter arc superior, when explicit and conflicting with the other, for
the acts authenticated speak decisively only when the journals are silent, and not
even then as to particulars required to be entered therein." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl.
Rep., p. 378.)

Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece toda

clase de respetos. Pero creo no se me tachara de parcial ni ligero si digo que sobre
el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me inclino mas y doy mayor peso
a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de Sutherland, por razones obvias. Wigmore nunca
pretendio ser especialista en derecho constitucional. Con mucho tino el ponente en
el tantas veces citado asunto de Rash contra Allen dice lo siguiente de la opinion
del celebrado constitucionalista:

"We have quoted Judge Cooley's language because of the great respect that his
opinions always command, and also because of the fact that it is upon the authority
of his opinion that many of the decisions in support of the American rule have been
based." (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)

Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados sobre el

particular lleva a uno al convencimiento de que la tendencia actual en America es a
tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas en vez de la simple forma, el
caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la ficcion legal, para ir a la realidad misma.
Y no cabe duda de que el "enrolled act" se presta a veces a tener mas apoyo en el
artificio y ficcion legal, mientras que el diario de sesiones, con las fuertes garantias
de autenticidad como las que se proveen en nuestra Constitucion y en
Constituciones similares americanas, reproduce y refleja la realidad de los liechos
relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad. Tomemos como ejemplo el presente
caso. La copia impresa de la resolucion cuestionada, firmada por los Presidentes de
ambas Camaras del Congreso, reza que la misma fue aprobada debidamente con
los votos de las tres cuartas- partes (¾) del Congreso, pero esto no es mas que
una. opinion, una conclusion legal de los presidentes, pues no consta en dicha
copia impresa el numero concreto de votos emitidos, ni el numero concreto de la
totalidad de miembros actuales de cada camara. Tampoco constan en dicha copia
impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion, los sies y nos de la votacion, con los
nombres de los que votaron afirmativa y negativamente. Asi que, con solo esa
copia impresa a la vista, no podemos resolver la importantisima cuestion
constitucional que plantean los recurrentes, a saber: que la votacion fue
anticonstitucional; que arbitrariamente fueron excluidos de la votacion 11
miembros debidamente cualificados del Congreso—3 Senadores y 8
Representantes; que, por virtud de la exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11
miembros, el numero de votos emitidos en cada camara a favor de la resolucion no
llega ni constituye las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion; y que,
por tanto, la resolucion es ilegal, anticonstitucional y nula. Para resolver estas
cuestiones, todas tremendas, todas transcedentales, no hay mas remedio que ir al
fondo, a las entrañas de la realidad, y todo ello no se puede hallar en el "enrolled
act," en la copia impresa de la ley, que es incolora, muda sobre el particular, sino
en el diario de sesiones donde con profusion se dan tales detalles. ¿No es verdad
que todo esto demuestra graficamente la evidente, abrumadora superioridad del
"journal entry" sobre el "enrolled act," como medio de prueba?

Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro de la legislacion y

jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de la Union es decididamente. en favor de
la doctrina americana del "journal entry"; que en Filipinas desde 1916 en que se
promulgo la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Pons la regla es el
"journal entry rule"; que esta regla se adopto por este Supremo Tribunal en un
tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil y
cuando el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura no gozaba de los prestigios de que
goza hoy, en virtud de las rigidas y fuertes garantias sobre autenticidad de las
votaciones legislativas provistas en nuestra Constitucion; que ahora que el referido
articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya ha sido derogado por el
Reglamento de los Tribunales y se hallan vigentes esas garantias constitucionales
que son mandatorias, la regla indiscutible y exclusiva sobre la materia es el
"journal entry rule"; que la regla americana es mas liberal y mas democratica que
la regla inglcsa, la cual tiene un evidente sabor monarquico; que el pueblo filipino
jamas tolerara un sistema monarquico o algo semejante; que el cambiar de regla
ahora es un paso muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la
reaccion y puede dar lugar a la impresion de que las instituciones de la Republica
filipina tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del "enrolled act" es un
instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver conflictos constitucionales
que se iran planteando ante los tribunales, e inclusive puede fomentar groseros
asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por el contrario, la doctrina americana del
"journal entry" es amplia, eficaz, y permite que con toda libertad y desembarazo so
puedan resolver los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, sin evasivas ni
debilidades; y, por ultimo, que nuestro deber, el deber de esta Corte, es optar por la
doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los procesos ordenados do la ley y de la
Constitucion y evite situaciones en que el ciudadano se sienta como desamparado
de la ley y de la Constitucion y busque la justicia por sus propias manos.

VII

La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria, estima

innecesario discutir la cuestion de si los 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes que fueron
excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros del Congreso. Es decir, lo que debiera
ser cuestion fundamental—el leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio decidendi en este
caso—se relega a termino secundario, se deja sin discutir y sin resolver. No puedo
seguir a la mayoria en esta evasion: tengo que (liscutir este punto tan plenamente
como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es precisamente lo principal—el meollo
del caso.

Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluidos eran miembros actuales

del Senado cuando se voto la resolucion cuestionada, por las siguientes razones:
(a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares del diario de
sesiones que obran en autos como anexos, dichos Senadores fueron proclamados
por la Comision de Elecciones como electos juntamente con sus 21 compañeros.
Despues de la proclamacion participaron en la organizacion del Senado, votando
en la eleccion del Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el Senador Vera recibio 8
votos para Presidente contra el Senador Avelino que recibio 10. Tambien
participaron en algunos debates relativos a la organizacion.

(b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y en el diario de sesiones que

prestaron su juramento de cargo ante Notarios particulares debidamente
autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose depositado dicho
juramento en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin embargo, que ese juramento no
era valido porque no se presto colectivamente, en union con los otros Senadores.
Esto es un error. La Ley sobre la materia es el articulo 26 del Codigo
Administrativo Revisado, a saber:

"By whom oath of office may be administered.—The oath of office may be

administered by any officer generally qualified to administer oath; but the oath of
office of the members and officers of either house of the legislature may also be
administered by persons designated for such purpose by the respective houses."

Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es evidente que
el Senador y Representante puede calificarse prestando el juramento de su cargo
ante cualquier funcionario autorizado para administrarlo; y la disposicion de que
tambien pueden administrar ese juramento personas designadas por cada camara es
solo de caracter permisivo, opcional. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que antes del
advenimiento de la Republica el Senado habia reconocido la validez del juramento
de cargo prestado ante un Notario Publico por otros Senadores de la minoria los
Sres. Mabanag, Garcia, Confesor y Cabili. A menos que estas cosas se tomen a
broma, o la arbitrariedad se erija en ley—la ley de la selva, del mas fuerte—no es
concebible que el juramento ante Notario so declare valido en un caso y en otro se
declare invalido, concurriendo las mismas circunstancias;

(c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del

diario de sesiones que obran en autos como anexos, que los Senadores Vera,
Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus sueldos y emolumentos como
tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del Senado hasta ahora, incluso
naturalmente el tiempo en que se aprobo la resolucion cuestionada. Es violentar
demasiado la argucia el sostener que un miembro de una camara legislativa puede
cobrar todos sus haberes y emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser legalmente
miembro de la misma. El vulgo, maestro en la ironia y en el sarcasmo, tiene una
manera cruda para pintar esta situacion absurda: "Tiene, pero no hay". ¿Como es
posible que las camaras autoricen el desembolso de sus fondos a favor de unos
hombres que, segun se sostiene seriamente, no estan legalmente cualificados para
merecer y recibir tales fondos?

(d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no son
miembros del Senado porque, en virtud de la Resolucion Pendatun, se les
suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del juramento, ya
hemos visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto de la suspension del derecho al
asiento, he discutido extensamente este punto en mi disidencia en el asunto de
Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de anticonstitucional y nula la suspension.
Pero aun suponiendo que la misma fuera valida, los recurrentes alegan y arguyen
que no por eso han dejado de ser miembros los suspendidos. La alegacion es
acertada. La suspension no abate ni anula la calidad de miembro; solo la muerte,
dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto (vease Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur.
Fil., 100, 101; vease tambien United States vs. Dietrich, 126 Fed. Rep., 676). En el
asunto de Alejandrino contra Quezon hemos declarado lo siguiente:

"Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en toda su larga
historia no ha suspendido a ninguno de sus miembros. Y la razon es obvia. El
castigo mediante reprension o multa vindica la dignidad ofendida de la Camara sin
privar a los representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es peimisible
vindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo dando asi oportunidad a
los representados de elegir a otro nuevo; pero la suspension priva al distrito
electoral de una representacion sin que se le de a ese distrito un medio para llenar
la vacante. Mediante la suspension el cargo continua ocupado, pero al que lo ocupa
se le ha impuesto silencio." (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101.)

La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de la

votacion es todavia mas firme. Consta igualmente, en virtud de la estipulacion de
hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones obrantes en autos, que dichos 8
Representantes tambien se calificaron, al inaugurarse el Congreso, prestando el
juramento de su cargo ante Notarios Publicos debidamente autorizados; que su
juramento se deposito en la Secretaria de la Camara; que han estado cobrando
desde la inauguracion hasta ahora todos sus sueldos y emolumentos, excepto dos
los Representantes Taruc y Lava que han dejado de cobrar desde hace algun
tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas deliberaciones, las relativas al
proyecto de resolucion para suspenderlos.

Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe esta diferencia fundamental:

mientras con respecto a estos ultimos la Resolucion Pendatun sobre suspension
llego a aprobarse adquiriendo estado parlamentario, en la Camara de
Representantes no ha habido tal cosa, pues la resolucion de suspension se endoso a
un comite especial para su estudio e investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no ha
tomado sobre ella ninguna accion, ni favorable ni adversa. De modo que en el caso
de los Representantes hasta ahora no hay suspension, porque de tal no puede
calificarse la accion del Speaker y del macero privandoles del derecho de tomar
parte en las deliberaciones y votaciones. Para quo una suspension produzca efectos
legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales, tiene que decretarla la Camara misma, por
medio de una resolucion debidamente aprobada, de acuerdo con los requisitos
provistos en la Constitucion. Nada de esto se ha hecho en la Camara.

El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que "El Congreso,

en sesion conjunta, por el voto de tres cuartas partes de todos los miembros del
Senado y de la Camara de Representantes votando separadamente, puede proponer
enmiendas a esta Constitucion o convocar una convencion para dicho efecto."
Donde la ley no distingue no debemos distinguir. La frase todos los miembros debe
interpretarse como que incluye todos los miembros elegidos, no importa que esten
ausentes o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente cuando no estan suspendidos
como en el caso de los ya citados 8 Representantes. El Juez Cooley, en su ya citada
obra Constitutional Limitations, hace sobre este particular los siguientes
comentarios que son terminantes para la resolucion de este punto constitucional, a
saber:

"For the vote required in the passage of any particular law the reader is referred to
the Constitution of his State. A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless
the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by the Constitution, a two-
thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class
of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the
terms employed clearly indicate that this proportion of alt the members, or of all
those elected, is intended. (A constitutional requirement that the assent of two-
thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to
every bill appropriating the public money or property for local or private purposes,
is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by calling a bill a 'joint resolution'.)

(Footnote: "Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus frittered
away." Allen vs. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich., 324; 47 L. R. A., 117.)

(Footnote: "By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some
particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority vote, or some other
proportion of 'all the members elected,' or of 'the whole representation.' These and
similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account whether present or
not. Where a majority of all the members elected is required in the passage of a
law, an ineligible person in not on that account to be excluded in the count.
(Satterlee vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal., 314.)" (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. 1, p. 291.)

VIII

Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los

recurrentes para plantear el presente litigio. Sin embargo, en nuestras
deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sobre si los recurrentes
tienen interes legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y, por tanto, para invocar
nuestra jurisdiccion en el presente caso. La duda es si el interes que alegan los
recurrentes no es mas bien el general y abstracto que tiene cualquier otro
ciudadano para defender la integridad de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso seria
insuficiente para demandar ante los tribunales, los cuales, segun el consenso de las
autoridades, no estan establecidos para considerar y resolver controversias
academicas y doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales, en que hay algun daño
y perjuicio o amago de daño y perjuicio.

Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de los recurrentes es incuestionable.

En primer lugar, 11 de ellos son miembros del Congreso, y alegan que se les privo
del derecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion cuestionada y que si se les
hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no hubiese obtenido la sancion de las tres
cuartas-partes (¾) que requiere la Constitucion. ¿Que mayor interes legal que
este? Ellos dicen que sus votos hubieran sido decisivos, que con su intervencion
parlamentaria hubiesen salvado al pais de lo que consideran amago de una
tremenda calamidad publica—la concesion de iguales derechos a los americanos
para explotar nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades publicas. ¿No es este
amago de daño, para ellos individualmente y para el pais colectivamente,
adecuado y suficiente para crear un interes legal? En el asunto de Coleman vs.
Miller, supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se resolvio a favor de los
recurrentes. Como ya hemos visto, estos eran 20 Senadores del Estado de Kansas
que alegaban que en la propuesta ratificacion de la 18.a Enmienda a la
Constitucion Federal sus votos quedaron abatidos por el voto decisivo del Teniente
Gobernador. La Corte Federal declaro que esto constituia interes legal suficiente y
adecuado.

En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y contribuyentes

de Filipinas. Naturalmente, como tales tienen derecho a participar en la explotacion
de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion de utilidades publicas, con exclusion de
los americanos y otros extranjeros. De ello se sigue logicamente que cualquier acto
legislativo que anule y abrogue esa exclusividad afectara personalmente a sus
derechos, amagandolos de un probable perjuicio. Esto, a mi juicio, crea un interes
legal adecuado y suficiente para litigar. Esto no es un interes meramente
academico, abstracto. (Vease Hawke vs. Smith, 253 U. S., 221, 227; 64 Law. ed.,
871, 875; 40 Sup. Ct., 495; 10 A. L. R., 1504; veanse tambien Leser vs. Garnett,
258 U. S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 571 ; 42 Sup. Ct., 217; Coleman vs. Miller,
122 A. L. R., 698.)

En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba ser "ciudadano y

elector del Estado de Ohio, y como elector y contribuyente del Condado de
Hamilton, en su nombre y en el de otros similarmente situados, presento una
solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado para que se prohibiera al
Secretario de Estado a que gastara fondos publicos en la preparacion e impresion
de balotas para la sumision al electorado de la 18.a Enmienda a la Constitucion
Federal para su ratificacion. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante
tenia interes legal y, por tanto, personalidad y derecho de accion para demandar.
En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes alegaban ser electores
cualificados de Maryland y solicitaban la exclusion de ciertas mujeres del censo
electoral por el fundamento de que la Constitucion de Maryland limitaba el
sufragio a los varones y la 19.a Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal no habia sido
validamente ratificada. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo tambien que los
demandantes tenian interes legal suficiente y adecuado.

IX

Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto se le pregunto a uno do los

abogados de los recurridos, creo que el mismo Secretario de Justicia, cual seria el
remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se sostiene que en el presente caso se
trata de una materia no judicial, injusticiable, y que, por tanto, los tribunales nada
tienen que hacer. El Secretario de Justicia contesto: ninguno. Lo unico que los
recurrentes pueden hacer es esperar las elecciones y plantear el caso directamente
ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de caracter politico. Esto mismo se
dijo en el caso de Vera contra Avelino, supra, y reitero lo que alli he dicho sobre
este argumento, a saber:

"Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente, desalentador de que el

caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo la Coustitucion ni bajo las leyes
ordinarias. A los recurrentes se les dice que no tienen mas que un recurso: esperar
las elecciones y plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eligiendoles o elevando a su
partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los recurridos o a su partido. Algunas
cosas se podrian decir acerca de este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que
el remedio no es expedito ni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir ninguna
responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir tambien que en una eleccion
politica entran muchos factores, y es posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy,
con ser tan fervida y tan palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por
otros 'issues' mas presionantes y decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que,
independientemente de la justicia de su causa, un partido minoritario siempre lucha
con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.
"Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento es que no cabe concebir
que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan dejado en medio de nuestro
sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio en donde quedan paralizados los resortes
de la Constitucion y de la ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente frente a lo
que el considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactores de la
Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de gobierno—sistema
presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la flexibilidad del tipo ingles—el
parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los paises que siguen su sistema hay una
magnifica valvula de seguridad politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que
sacuden los cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se disuelve y se convocan
elecciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes 'issues' del dia. Asi se
consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin violencia. El sistema
presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es
inflexible. Entre nosotros, por ejemplo, el periodo es de seis años para el Senado,
y de cuatro años para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para cubrir vacantes que
ocurran entre unas elecciones generales y otras. Se comprendera facilmente que
bajo un sistema asi es harto peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones
donde el individuo y el pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y de
las leyes, bajo procesos ordenados y expeditos, para proteger sus derechos." (Vera
contra Avelino, pags. 363, 364.)

Fue Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politica era conveniente que
el pueblo americano tuviera una revolucion cada veinte años. Parece que el gran
democrata dijo esto no por el simple prurito de jugar con la paradoja, con la frase,
sino convencido de que la revolucion es el mejor antidoto para la tirania o los
amagos de tirania.

Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones del inmortal autor de la
Declaracion de Independencia, creo que la revolucion es siempre revolucion, la
violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion, desquiciamiento de los resortes
politicos y sociales, derramamiento de sangre, perdida de vidas y haciendas,
etcetera, etcetera. Asi que normalmente ninguno puede desear para su pais la
violencia, aun en nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud publica.
Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucion sin sangre, esa que
no pocas veces se ha consumado v. gr. en la historia contemporanea de Inglaterra,
y aun de America misma. Y ese ideal es perfectamente realizable permitiendo el
amplio juego de la Constitucion y de las leyes, evitando pretextos a la violencia, y
no posibilitando situaciones de desamparo y desesperacion.

Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica, la mejor doctrina judicial es la que
en todo tiempo encauza y fomenta los procesos ordenados de la Constitucion y de
la ley.

[1] Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.

[2] Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P. Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez, Tomas

Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, y Jose E. Romero.

Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario Cabigon, Floro

Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan, Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin Y. Kintanar, Vicente
Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P. Primicias, Nicolas Rafols, Jose V.
Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez, Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson,
George K. Tait, y Leandro A. Tojong.

Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y Sofronio

Quimson, Nacionalista Party, Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine
Youth Party, respectivamente.

[3] Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez Vito, Francisco Enage y Vicente de Vera,
respectivamente. Marciano Guevara, Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero,
Auditor y Director de Imprenta, respectivamente.

[1] La politica de nacionalizacion de los recursos naturales y utilidades publicas

incorporada en nuestra Constitucion no es una politica nueva, sino que trae bu
origen de nuestro pasado remoto, de la historia colonial misma de España en
Filipinas. Los primeros conflictos de los filipinos con los conquistadores tenfan por
causa la propiedad de la tierra; los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicar el
dominio del suelo que creian dctentado por los colonizadores. Estos conflictos
fueron agravandose con el tiempo condensandose en la formidable cuestion agraria
que en las postrimerias del siglo diecinueve fue en gran parte la causa de la
revolucion contra España. Las campañas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el
Katipunan de Bonifacio tomaron gran parte de su fuerza, de su valor combativo, de
los agravioa provocados por la cuestion agraria. La Liga Filipina de Rizal estaba
fundamentalmente basada en un ideario economico nacionalista, de control y
dominio sobre la riqueza y recursos del pais.

"Cuando America establecid aqui su soberanta su mayor acierto consistio en echar

los cimientos de su politica fundamental de 'Filipinas para los filipinos.' Primero el
Presidents McKinley, y despues los Presidentes Taft y Wilson, consulidaron esta
politica. El congreso aprobo leyes tendentcs a la conservacion de terrenos publicos
y recursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de 1.° de Julio de 1902 conocida por Ley
Cooper. En estas leyes se limitaba y restringia la adquisicion y uso de bienes de
dominio publico por particulares.

"Una prueba palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener rigidamente
la politica de conservacion del patrimonio de los filipinos fue la investigacion
congresional provocada por el Congresista Martin, de Colorado, en relacion con la
venta de terrenos de los frailes en Mindoro, a una compañia americana en exceso
de las 1,024 hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto dio lugar a uno
de los episodios mas famosos en la carrera del Comisionado Residente Quezon.
Este relata su campaña en su autobiografia 'The Good Fight,' a saber:

" 'My next address to Congress took place when a congressional investigation was
being urged by Congressman Martin of Colorado to determine how the
Government of the Philippines was carrying out the policy laid down by Congress,
that limited to 1024 acres the maximum area of government land that could be sold
to corporations or individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the United
States had taken the Philippines to prevent the exploitation of the Filipino people
by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives. American capital interested in the
sugar industry had acquired two very large tracts of land which the Philippine
Government had bought from the friars with the funds from bonds issued under the
security of the Philippine Government. The avowed purpose in buying these
extensive properties from the Spanish religious orders was to resell them in small
lots to Filipino farmers, and thus to do away with absentee landlordism which had
been the most serious cause of the Philippine rebellion against Spain. The reasons
given for the sale of these lands to American capital by the American official in
charge of the execution of the congressional policy were twofold: First, that the act
of Congress referred only to lands of the public domain but not to lands acquired
by the Government in some other way. And second, that the sale of these lands was
made in order to establish the sugar industry in the Philippines on a truly grand
scale under modern methods, as had been done in Cuba. It was further alleged that
such a method would bring great prosperity to the Philippines.

" 'I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the
establishment of the sugar industry under those conditions would mean the
debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. 'Moreover,' I argued, 'large
investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the
permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States.' At the climax of my
speech I roared: 'If the preordained fate of my country is either to be a subject
people but rich, or free but poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter.'

" 'The investgation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and although the
sales already made were not annulled, no further sales were made in defiance of
the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by President Quezon, pp. 117-119.)'

"Para implementar la politico de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino bajo la Ley

Jones y la Ley del Commonwealth fundo con una gruesa capitalizacion las
corporaciones economicas del Estado como el Philippine National Bank, National
Development Company, National Cement Company, National Power Corporation,
y otras.

"Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se creo la

Comision de Servicios Publicos."