CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA

CABILIN, v. FELIX ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970

Facts: Carmen through her parents sued Icao for support for having succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her without her consent and as such she became pregnant. Icao refused on the
ground that no child was born.

Issue: Whether or not Carmen is entitled to support.

Held: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly
of the defendantappellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective.
ANTONIO GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO
G.R. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961

Facts: Nita Villanueva married to Oscar Lazo became pregnant for 3 times all of which were
aborted at the instance of Nita without consent or knowledge of Oscar. Oscar filed this case for
damages against Geluz as the doctor who performed the abortion.

Issue: Does an unborn child acquire civil personality that an action for damages may be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child?

Held: No. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child
was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee
was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears
to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
LIMJOCO v. ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE
G.R. No. L-770

Facts: X, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
(CPC) to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal while he was still alive. The Public
Service Commission (PSC) granted the CPC even after the death of X since X's estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service and authorized X's intestate estate
through its judicial administrator appointed by the court to maintain and operate the said plant. Y
however opposed the issuance of the CPC as he claims that the intestate estate of X is neither
a person nor a citizen.

Issues:
1. Whether the estate of X may be considered a person for purposes of settlement and
distribution; and
2. Whether the estate of X may be considered a citizen.

Held:
1. Yes. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,such as under the bill of
rights (Article III), it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of
cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) thereof
must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be
without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. Among these artificial
or juridical persons are estates of deceased persons.
Thus, it has been the constant Ruling that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets
left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which
survive after his demise. The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance
of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the
fiction is indulged.
MO YA LIM v. CID
G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971

Facts: X, a Chinese citizen who wanted to visit a relative in the Philippines, applied for and was
granted a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant valid for one month. To
guarantee that X would depart the Philippines on or before the expiration of the passport visa
and so that the requests for extensions would be granted, Y filed a bond in the amount of Php
1,000.00. However, after being granted several extensions, X contracted marriage with Z, a
Filipino citizen, prompting the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate the bond filed by Y
and order the immediate deportation of X. Petitioners opposed the contemplated action on the
ground that X ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage with Z.

Issue: Whether X ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage with Z, a Filipino
citizen.

Held: Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceeding in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently.

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of
the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso
that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to
the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary
to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in
evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her
marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a
citizen herself under the laws then in force. That she establishes such power long after her
marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.