Joe Wiseman Sentencing Memorandum

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Crim. No. 1:19-cr-17-RJC

)
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
JOSEPH F. WISEMAN, JR., )
)
Defendant )
____________________________________)
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM AND MATERIALS

ON BEHALF OF JOSEPH F. WISEMAN, JR. 1
Now Comes Defendant, Joseph F. Wiseman, Jr., by and through his undersigned counsel,
and respectfully submits this Sentencing Memorandum and attachments, in support of a just and
appropriate sentence in this case. The sentencing hearing is scheduled for August 28, 2019.
I. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JOE WISEMAN
One of the principal factors the Court will consider in determining the appropriate sentence
in this case is the history and characteristics of Joseph F. Wiseman, Jr. Facts presented in the PSR,
the numerous, strong letters of support written on his behalf, 2 and even this memorandum cannot
fully tell the story of a man’s nearly sixty years on this earth. Our hope is that the combination of
those sources will allow the Court to place the crime Joe has admitted to committing in the larger
context of his otherwise law-abiding, hard-working, and honorable life to see the total picture of
the man.
1Joe Wiseman is the man who will be sentenced by the Court and therefore most of the references in this memorandu m
are to Joe personally. It is noted and recognized, however, that all of the contracts at issue with Buncombe County
were entered into in the name of Joe’s legally separate company, Environmental Infrastructure Consultants (“EIC”).
2 Those letters are attached as Exhibits to this Memorandum.
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Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 1 of 41

So, who is Joe Wiseman? For anyone who knows him at all, let alone those who know
him well, he is the last man anyone would expect to be embroiled in a public corruption scandal.
In each of the 19 letters submitted in support for Joe, his family, friends, and former clients have
all expressed complete shock that Joe could have been involved in anything like this. To a person,
they describe Joe as a dedicated, humble, honorable, devoted family man that they have known
well, in many cases for more than 20 or 30 years. To Joe’s strong supporters, nothing could be
more out of character for Joe than for him to find himself in the position he is currently in.
Despite their knowledge of what he has admitted to doing here and that he has pleaded to
a federal felony, each of his supporters nonetheless still believe in the Joe that they have known,
loved and respected all of these years. A recurrent theme in these incredible letters is that Joe’s
life. his family, and his faith are so much bigger and better than this terrible mistake he has made,
and they have all pledged to love, forgive, and support him through and after this case is behind
them. If a man can be measured by the love and support that family, friends, and former colleagues
show you even in the face of humiliating failure and disgrace, then Joe Wiseman is one incredib ly
admired and loved man, even in these circumstances.
1. Regular Joe
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Joe is a Regular Joe. He is a quiet and unassuming civil engineer. He wears oversized
glasses to see and read. He wears orthopedic shoes because of a severe case of Type 2 diabetes,
which has already resulted in the amputation of one of his toes. 3 He speaks softly, is intellectua l
and deliberative, and he is slow to anger. And, at present, he is very afraid. 4
Joe is detail oriented. Throughout his career, Joe has been a meticulous engineer and
thorough record keeper. By his own nature and the nature of his profession, Joe likes getting in
the weeds. His analysis of issues and his answers to questions are thoughtful and thorough, as his
mind focuses on the various ways the question could implicate other issues.
Because of Joe’s meticulousness in keeping records and in analyzing and answering
questions, he has been (and still is being) of enormous assistance to the Government in
investigating this case and other matters, as set forth in greater detail herein.
Joe is intelligent and highly educated. Like his grandfather and father before him, Joe is
a licensed Professional Engineer, having received his civil engineering degree from Drexel
3 As the PSR notes, Joe has been receiving regular treatment since 2013 for his diabetes, high blood pressure, high
cholesterol, poor circulation, and neuropathy which adversely affects his balance. He also receives separate treatment
for frequent infections and ulcers in his feet stemming from the diabetes. He has developed Charcot foot, a deformity
in his foot, which is a direct result of the neuropathy in his feet and which acerbates his balance issues. One of Joe’s
biggest fears in being sentenced to prison is that he will not receive adequate care and will lose additional toes, a foot,
or perhaps even a leg before he is released. Accordingly, we believe it is imperative that Joe serve any prison sentence
imposed in a Bureau of Prisons facility with excellent medical resources, even if that facility is not one closer to his
home and family.
.
4 This last year has taken a huge toll on Joe and his family physically, emotionally, mentally, and financially. Once
the press learned that Joe was the “contractor” identified but not named in the Government’s August 2018 indictment,
they called his home incessantly and camped out on his doorstep in Atlanta, GA, where he resides with his wife and
then-16 year old daughter. They terrified his teenage daughter and harassed his friends and neighbors seeking
information long before the Government was prepared to bring any actual charge against him. His personal reputation
and integrity have been denigrated and his professional reputation has been irreparably tarnished. He received a
threatening phone call. And, most recently, he has had to go through the painful process of contacting friends and
associates to tell them that he has pled guilty to a federal crime, explain how that could have happened, and request a
letter that sheds some light on the man they knew him to be. The stress and strain on Joe’s immediate family has also
been tremendous, as they are repeatedly bombarded with questions about the nature and extent of Joe’s criminal
conduct. In addition to the Government’s criminal investigation, Joe has been sued by Buncombe County and he has
been directed to respond to inquiries from state licensing boards.
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University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1983. And, while working full-time with the
international engineering firm of Camp, Dresser & McKee (now CDM Smith, hereinafter
“CDM”), he earned a master’s degree in environmental engineering in 1987 and a Master of
Business Administration in Finance and Accounting in 1990, both from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Joe is a high achiever. He chose to begin his professional career at CDM in 1985 as an
entry level engineer, even though he could easily have joined his father’s engineering firm instead.
Through hard work and long hours, Joe rose to the level of vice-president in a very short time.
Because of his education and training in environmental engineering, he was assigned as part of the
team to work with Buncombe County on their landfill improvement project. In short order, Joe
became the senior engineer and Project Manager for CDM’s work in Buncombe County.
In 2006, Joe was asked to take over the management of CDM’s Atlanta office, which had
been in a downward spiral for some time. Joe reluctantly moved his family from Raleigh, North
Carolina to Atlanta, Georgia, where he found the CDM office in complete disarray. Many of the
senior engineers had left the firm, and there were few prospects for expanding the company’s
limited business given the crowded field of engineering firms in the Atlanta area. But in just a few
years, Joe was able to completely turn the office around. 5
Joe is humble. Despite his intelligence, education, and achievement, Joe is a very humble
and patient man. He and his family live a modest lifestyle grounded in family values and personal
responsibility, not material possessions. For example, Joe drives a 2006 Honda Pilot with over
5 Soon after Joe successfully saved the Atlanta CDM office, CDM nonetheless laid Joe off. Having served CDM
loyally for almost thirty years, Joe suddenly and unexpectedly found himself an unemployed fifty-year old man in the
worst job market in decades. He tried in vain to find employment with other companies. As the sole provider for his
family, these circumstances caused Joe significant stress and anxiety.
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300,000 miles on it. The vehicles he purchased for his wife and children are also modest makes
and have mileage of over 200,000 or more.
Joe has shown enormous patience throughout his life – as a father, with his clients, and
even with his counsel as we grappled with the facts and worked to understand the nature of Joe’s
profession and the contracts at issue in this case. He showed the same degree of patience and
humility as he educated the Government on the relevant facts and documents.
Joe is a devoted family man. Joe and his wife, Christie, have been married for almost
thirty years. They have three children, two adult sons and a teenage daughter. Both of Joe’s sons
played collegiate baseball at the Georgia Institute of Technology (“Georgia Tech”). His daughter,
who is a senior in high school, is a member of her school’s varsity volleyball team, seeking her
fourth varsity letter this fall. Joe regularly attended his sons’ baseball games and it is a rare
occasion when Joe misses the opportunity to watch his daughter play volleyball.
Every one of the letters submitted herewith to support Joe wax poetically about Joe’s
zealous devotion to his family. Both of his sons, Joseph and Patrick, credit their ability to graduate
with honors from Georgia Tech while playing varsity baseball there (together, no less) to their
father’s seemingly limitless time and devotion spent with them throughout their lives, videotaping
their practices and games, building them a batting cage, even enduring a broken nose from an
errant baseball to the face while he pitched balls to them every night to practice. His daughter,
Caroline, writes of her father’s similar devotion to her in her volleyball career. Caroline, who is a
high school senior, has played varsity volleyball her whole high school career, writes how her
father’s support helped her play her best, with her team winning the State Championship this past
year. Christie Wiseman, Joe’s wife of almost 30 years, beautifully shares how close and loving
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their family has been throughout their incredibly happy marriage, and how, with Joe and her
children, she has really lived a dream come true.
But it is not just Joe’s immediate, nuclear family who have witnessed Joe’s prioritiza tio n
of his family. Joe’s devotion to his family is so predominant in his life that his in-laws, his
neighbors, his co-workers, his former clergy, his Bible Study leader, and even his former
colleagues have all taken the time to mention and point this out in their support letters. AS they all
attest, Joe has been a loving and devoted husband and father from day one.
Joe is an honest and law-abiding man. We understand that this statement may seem
strange in the context of a Sentencing Memo. But, it is true and important -- except for this case,
Joe has no criminal history. 6 Indeed, as the letters submitted in support for Joe show, the most
common reaction of Joe’s friends and family upon learning that Joe has pled guilty to the federal
crime of conspiracy to commit honest services fraud was complete and total shock because Joe
has always been such an honest man of integrity. As his sister, Janet Wiseman notes in her letter,
Joe has always been a “straight arrow.” As you can see, Joe’s involvement in this Buncombe
County scheme is an aberrant outlier and stands in stark contrast to his life-long dedication to high
standards and strong moral principles.
Even before Joe knew whether he would be charged in relation to the Buncombe County
investigation, Joe thoroughly and methodically provided completely honest information to his
attorneys and to the Government. Joe has been questioned thoroughly by an accomplished former
federal criminal investigator, former Special Agent Ron Taylor, and Ron Taylor has determined
that Joe’s statements and explanations about his involvement in this case are credible. And, we
expect that the Government will echo that sentiment in describing their interactions with Joe.
6Joe’s only “brushes with the law” have come in the form of four traffic-related offenses, the most recent of which
occurred almost thirteen years ago.
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Joe is a Godly man. Joe’s faith is not a gallows conversion. As his mother has attested
in her letter of support, Joe was raised in a Catholic family, and he has remained very devoted to
his Christian faith throughout his life. While attending graduate school at UNC, he was very active
in the campus Newman Center. While living in Raleigh in 1999, he began participating in a weekly
Bible study through a group called Bible Study Fellowship (“BSF”). In fact, when his boys were
old enough, he took Joseph and Patrick to BSF with him every Monday. And, he was an active
member of the Bay Leaf Baptist Church in North Raleigh. In his letter of support, Senior Pastor
of Bay Leaf Marty Jacumin describes Joe, whom he knew well, as “the epitome of a man who
loves his family and desires to be the best father he can be.” He also shares that, in all the years
he has known Joe and his family, they have been a “tremendous blessing” to him. 7
When Joe was transferred to Atlanta in 2006, he located another BSF group, in which he
has been an active and regular participant for two hours each week. His BSF group leader is none
other than Billy “White Shoes” Johnson, who also has submitted a letter of support for Joe. In that
letter, Mr. Johnson states that despite the current trying circumstances, he has watched Joe grow
in his faith and that he fully expects Joe to be the leader of the BSF Bible Study one day in the
future.
Also in Atlanta, Joe, Christie, and the children became members and are regular
participants at the First Baptist Church of Woodstock. Joe presently does volunteer work there on
a weekly basis.
Joe’s faith is and has always been a centerpiece of his own life, and he and his wife,
Christie, went to great lengths to ensure that it was a centerpiece of their own family. To a person,
every family member on both Joe’s and Christie’s sides of the family has spoken eloquently in
7Pastor Jacumin also jokes that, because he played football at NC State, it was hard for him to cheer for Joseph and
Patrick Wiseman when they were playing baseball for Georgia Tech, but he tried.
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their support letters about the central and important role Christianity has always held in Joe’s life
and how he and Christie have made sure that it became the guiding force for their children.
And, Joe and his family have leaned on their faith and their trust in God’s plan to get them
through this terrible ordeal.
2. Joe, the Professional Engineer
As noted above, Joe distinguished himself as an engineer both academically and
professionally. There is no serious question as to the quality of Joe’s engineering work anywhere,
including in Buncombe County. Even after the return of the honest services fraud indictment in
August of 2018 that all but named Joe as a coconspirator, the County expressed complete
satisfaction with the quality of Joe’s engineering work. According to Interim County Manager
George Wood, “officials believe the work provided by Wiseman and his companies is valid. I don't
think there's been any issue about the adequacy of the services he provided.” Asheville Citizen
Times, August 14, 2018. And Jon Creighton the Planning Director and Assistant County Manager
of Buncombe County for thirty-four years has now publicly affirmed that Joe’s contract prices
were reasonable, that he did a good job, and that his charges to the County “were not higher than
the reasonable ranges normally charged by vendors and contractors” for the type of work that Joe
performed. See Sentencing Memorandum of Jon Creighton, Case No. 1:18-cr-88, Dock. No. 67, p. 31
(emphasis added) 8
8 Creighton has made these statements validating the pricing and performance of Joe’s contracts with Buncombe
County knowing that he is bound by his plea agreement to tell only the unvarnished truth and with every incentive to
inculpate or otherwise disparage Joe if he could do so honestly. As addressed in more detail herein, the evidence also
conclusively demonstrates that Buncombe County was not charged for and did not pay for the costs and expenses of
the trips that Greene et al. forced Joe to pay. Instead, those costs were absorbed by Joe and not passed on to the
Buncombe County taxpayers. And, without conceding the issue, the Government has acknowledged that it cannot
disprove Joe’s assertion that he did not pad his contracts to recoup the travel expenditures he made on behalf of Greene,
Creighton, and Stone. See Wiseman Factual Basis at 3.
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Indeed, Buncombe County as a whole actually benefitted significantly from having Joe as
its environmental engineer and expert, despite the unfortunate events in the last few years.
Specifically, it is because of Joe’s diligence and work that the County was even able to build its
landfill. In the late 1990s, when Buncombe County was seeking to have the landfill permitted by
the State of North Carolina, the County was originally told that the site it proposed was not suitable
and would not be permitted. Joe put together a team of experts to address the concerns raised by
the State, and ultimately the State agreed to permit the landfill on the site proposed. Without this
landfill, the citizens of Buncombe County would be incurring millions of dollars in additional cost
of transporting their waste to landfills in South Carolina.
Also, in the late 1990s, Joe was successful in getting the EPA to approve a leachate 9 re-
circulation/bioreactor project at the Buncombe County landfill, one of only two such approved
projects in the entire country. In the typical landfill, the leachate has to be collected and hauled
off by truck, incurring significant additional costs. In the leachate re-circulation/bioreactor project
that Joe convinced the EPA to approve, the leachate is instead collected and re-circulated on a
continuous loop over the landfill itself. This process not only saves the taxpayers the cost of
leachate collection and transport, but it also helps to break down the existing garbage in the landfill
to create more space and to increase the life of the landfill, resulting in significant additional cost
savings. Over the long term, this will significantly delay the need for a new landfill in Buncombe
County, saving taxpayers additional millions.
Further, in the Spring/Summer 2009, Joe conceived and executed the successful campaign
to obtain over $4 million in federal stimulus funds 10 for the methane collection and energy
9 Leachate is liquid that settles at the bottom of the landfill when water trickles down through the garbage.
10 These funds consisted of a $3 million grant and a $1 million interest-free loan.
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generation project for the Buncombe County landfill. Thinking outside the box, Joe packaged the
landfill methane collection generator as a “green” project, which allowed Buncombe County to
qualify for stimulus funds dedicated exclusively to green projects. In a nutshell, the generator
extracts the methane gas from the landfill and converts it to energy, which is purchased by Duke
Energy. And, this methane gas generator is the gift to Buncombe County that keeps on giving – it
generates approximately $750,000 in revenue annually (or $15 million over the 20-year life of the
facility) for Buncombe County thanks to Joe.
Most recently, Joe’s ideas for expanding and changing the slope of the landfill, based on
his experience and expertise, saved the County additional significant sums. 11 And, as Investigato r
Ron Taylor has determined as part of his expert analysis, choosing Joe as Buncombe County’s
environmental engineer over the former provider, CDM, resulted in an annual cost savings to
Buncombe County of more than $300,000 in engineering fees alone.
In short, Joe’s actions in paying for these illegal boondoggles indisputably denied
Buncombe County taxpayers of the honest services of their elected officials, and Joe takes full
responsibility for those bad choices. But, at least, his actions did not come at the Buncombe
County taxpayer’s financial expense. Indeed, because Joe was their outside engineer, the citize ns
of Buncombe County have benefitted financially to the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars a
year, millions of dollars over time.
So why is this quiet, unassuming engineering expert standing before the Court to be
sentenced for a federal crime? Challenging circumstances, a difficult job market, bad decisions, a
failure of moral courage, and Wanda Greene.
11 Creighton Sentencing Memorandum, p. 31.
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II. NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE
Despite successfully turning around the failing CDM office in Atlanta, and notwithstand ing
his recognized experience and expertise in environmental engineering, Joe was not good at playing
office politics. For reasons that are still unclear to Joe, and despite his spectacular turn-around of
the CDM Atlanta office, in or around 2010, he was replaced as the manager of the Atlanta office.
He incurred a substantial pay cut and was relegated to performing menial, entry-level engineer ing
tasks in Atlanta.
It was clear that CDM was attempting to force Joe out, but with no immediate employme nt
prospects for a fifty- four-year-old man that would offer him anywhere near the same financ ia l
security, Joe had no choice but to hang on despite the humiliation and decrease in his pay. His one
consolation was that he was allowed to continue to serve in his position as long-standing Project
Manager for Buncombe County, which at least provided him with intellectual stimulation and
professional satisfaction.
But, in 2013, the axe fell, and Joe was laid off without explanation after more than 28 years
with CDM. Despite his best efforts, Joe was unable to find to find employment that was
commensurate with his skill, experience, and expertise and that would compensate him anywhere
near even his reduced earnings at CDM. 12
On the day that he was fired, Joe contacted the clients with whom he was working,
including Creighton, the person primarily responsible for approving and overseeing the Buncombe
County landfill and other construction projects that Joe had been working on for so many years.
Joe told Creighton that he had been fired and that he would be replaced as the project supervisor
12 At the time that he was forced out of CDM in 2013, Joe was earning a salary of approximately $150,000 per year.
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for Buncombe County by another CDM employee. Having worked with Joe for many years and
valuing his experience and expertise, Creighton was not happy to hear this news.
In short order, Creighton used his contacts and influence to get Joe hired as a consulta nt
with a North Carolina engineering firm, then known as PETRA. Creighton began to sever ties
with CDM and started directing the Buncombe County work to Joe through PETRA on the
condition that Joe remained the principle engineer on Buncombe County’s landfill projects.
During the transition period, PETRA only received a small share of the contract work with
Buncombe County. 13 For various reasons, the consulting situation at PETRA turned out not to be
a great fit for Joe, and so in early 2014,with much trepidation, Joe decided to strike out on his own
and formed his own engineering company, EIC. Joe’s primary client between 2014 and 2017 was
Buncombe County, and Creighton directed the contracts associated with the Buncombe County
landfill to EIC. And, as noted above, the change from CDM to Joe’s company resulted in a net
savings to the County of over $300,000 per year, without giving up the expertise and experience
that Joe had brought to the County for almost three decades. 14
1. Industry practices and legitimate business expenses
To understand what has led Joe to be standing before this Court, it is important to
understand the industry practices that Joe learned during his tenure with CDM, which continued
13The Government has estimated that CDM earned approximately $13.3 million from its contracts with Buncombe
County between 2001 and 2017, or more than $830,000 per year. See Case No. 1:19-cr-17, Bill of Information, Dock.
No. 1, para. 4 (Bill of Information). Despite the press reports that read as if all that money went into Joe’s pocket, as
noted, Joe only received a salary of less than 25% of the income received by CDM. And, by contrast, PETRA earned
only about $260,000 between 2014 and 2016 during the two years that Joe served as a consultant on PETRA’s
contracts with Buncombe County. Id. at para. 5. And, Joe only received a fraction of that income as a consultant.
14 The Government estimates that EIC earned approximately $1.9 million from its contracts with Buncombe County
between 2014 and 2018, or about $475,000 per year. Bill of Information, para. 7. That sum is barely half the amount
of revenue received by CDM on an annual basis for doing the same work. And, of course, that sum is gross receipts,
not the net income earned by EIC after the payment of expenses. .
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during his relationship with PETRA, and which he carried over to EIC. Specifically, the payment
of meals and entertainment expenses for clients in connection with business-related trips and client
cultivation was standard practice in Joe’s profession, much as it is in virtually every other service-
oriented business, including the practice of law.
When he first started working at CDM, such expenditures were routinely made by his
mentors and other senior engineers and were reimbursed by CDM. The payment for dinners and
entertainment expenses associated with business-related travel were considered legitimate
business expenses and were encouraged. Golf outings, fishing trips, and other expenditures were
considered appropriate expenses for client cultivation. Joe was actively encouraged by his bosses
to engage in these activities with clients, including state and local government clients, at CDM
expense.
Importantly, CDM drew no distinction between private companies and governme nt
entities, with one notable exception. CDM had a completely separate unit that handled all contracts
with the federal government. The payment of expenses on behalf of federal government agencies
and federal employees was strictly controlled, no doubt because of the myriad of federal laws,
regulations, and policies that govern the conduct of federal agencies, employees, and contractors
with whom CDM did business.
No such limitations were ever mentioned, much less placed on, the payment of expenses
for state and local government agencies or their employees. The payments were simply paid on
behalf of clients by the relevant CDM employee and then transparently submitted for
reimbursement to the company through an expense voucher system. At no time did anyone at
CDM suggest to Joe (or anyone else, to his knowledge) that such payments on behalf of state and
local government employees were improper, even though CDM, as a large international company,
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had its own compliance unit and a staff of in-house attorneys. Joe was always reimbursed for
such expenditures without pushback or complaint. 15 And while ignorance of the law is certainly
no excuse, Joe had no idea prior to this case, and no one at CDM or in any of the state or local
government clients that he served ever suggested that these business-related entertainme nt
expenses were or could be considered improper in any way. 16
Nothing changed when Joe began to work as a consultant for PETRA. In fact, he was once
again encouraged to “wine and dine” current and prospective clients, government and private alike,
and as with his time at CDM, Joe simply submitted a transparent voucher for those expenses and
was always reimbursed.
When Joe started his own company, EIC, in 2014, he incorporated these same practices
that he had learned at CDM and continued at PETRA into his own business, still having no idea
that these practices could be considered improper, much less illegal. But almost from the
beginning of EIC, Wanda Greene wielded her significant power to up the ante and turn the screws
so that she and her select group of fellow Buncombe County employees could enjoy luxury, non-
business related trips at Joe’s expense.
2. Greene extorts Joe
As noted, Joe, or more accurately CDM and PETRA, had paid for legitimate business-
related travel and entertainment expenses as a routine matter for Greene, Creighton, Stone, and
other Buncombe County employees for years. Joe continued to do the same after forming EIC and
taking over these contracts with the County.
15Joe recalls one instance where a government client suggested that he would like a new set of golf clubs. Given the
unusual nature of the request and the cost involved, Joe discussed the issue with his supervisors at CDM and received
permission to make the expenditure. Joe was reimbursed by the company for the cost.
16 As discussed in greater detail herein, not all such expenses are inherently improper or criminal under federal and
state law.
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But in the late summer of 2014, less than six months after forming EIC, things changed
dramatically. Creighton contacted Joe and told him that “Wanda wants to go to Key West.” The
clear implication was that Greene expected Joe to pay for that trip.
Joe did not take these demands lying down. He pushed back and demanded to know the
business nature of the trip. Creighton candidly admitted that there was none. And then he added
that Stone also intended to go on the trip. Taken aback, Joe protested. He told Creighton that he
could not justify paying for a trip that had no business purpose. Creighton’s response was to the
effect of “You know Wanda, she always gets her way. And when she doesn’t, she can be very
vindictive. You don’t want to cross Wanda. Others have learned that lesson the hard way.”
Despite the direct threat, Joe continued to protest that he could not justify paying for a trip
that had no business purpose. Ultimately, Creighton was forced to make clear to Joe that if he did
not agree to pay for this trip, Joe’s almost 30-year contracting relationship with the County would
be terminated by Wanda.
And, based on his own experiences over that 30-year tenure of his relationship with
Buncombe County, Joe knew the threat to his livelihood was real. 17 Greene had never been afraid
to sacrifice the best interests of the County to achieve her personal desires. 18 That Joe could not
be replaced with anyone with his experience and expertise with the Buncombe County landfill
would have been of no moment to Greene. The number of different ways that she successfully
17 Joe knew that this was not an idle threat. He had heard the stories of County employees who had been demoted or
fired for refusing to accede to Greene’s demands. One example has recently come to light through the letter filed with
the Court by former Finance Director Tim Flora. It has been reported that former Budget Director Ken Gobels and
now deceased IT Director Lewis Miles suffered similar fates when they dared to cross Greene.
18 Even Creighton, who worked with Greene on a daily basis, was afraid of her. In his Sentencing Memorandum, he
states that he knew that Greene’s demand that Joe pay for their personal travel was wrong but “he did not want to quit
or get fired. Wanda was mercurial. Wanda was powerful.” See Creighton Memo at 31.
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defrauded Buncombe County shows how little she cared whether quality services were provided,
as long as she got what she wanted.
At the time of Creighton’s demand that Joe pay for this Key West trip, Buncombe County
represented more than 95% of EIC’s gross revenues. Allowing fear instead of moral courage to
drive him, Joe acceded to Greene’s demand and made the required travel arrangements. He
attempted to salve his conscience by convincing himself that this would be a one-time request. He
completely underestimated the depths of Greene’s greed. 19
Almost immediately, Greene insisted on a second trip to Key West in December 2014, and
then, sometime in 2015, she sent Creighton to give Joe a detailed list of trips that she, Creighton,
and Stone expected to take at Joe’s expense over the next 15 months. The list identified the specific
destination and the month and year of the desired trip. 20
When presented with the list, Joe again protested that many of these proposed trips could
not be justified as business related. Creighton reiterated that this is what Greene wanted and that,
bottom line, Joe would agree to pay for the trips or Wanda would terminate his contracts with the
County.
These non-business related trips were a constant source of discomfort for Joe. Although he
did not realize that paying for these trips was a crime, let alone a federal crime, 21 Joe believed they
19For example, Joe did not know about Greene’s misuse of the County’s credit cards or her duping the County
Commissioners into funding her fraudulent insurance scam. And Joe was shocked to learn that his three codefendants
were also billing the County for the trips that he had already paid for in full.
20 See Creighton Sentencing Memorandum, p. 3.
21 Candidly, whether Joe’s status as a victim of extortion by corrupt Buncombe County employees provided a legal
defense to the Government’s position that he was a coconspirator in a bribery scheme was a close and troubling
question for us. The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that extortion can be an affirmative defense to the charge of
bribery. United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986) (“It seems clear that the victim of a crime should
not be held as an accomplice in [or a conspirator to] its perpetration, even though his conduct in a sense may have
assisted in the commission of the crime and the elements of complicity or conspiracy may technically exist.”); United
States v. Miller 340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965), (“the threat of economic harm may under some circumstance result in
Page 16 of 41

were less than ethical, and he took steps to try to extricate himself from the situation. He sought
other employment, but the engineering firms he contacted were not interested in hiring a man in
his mid-fifties. He finally got some interest from his EPA contacts, but he it ultimately did not
pan out.
Not all the originally requested trips on Wanda’s list were taken, but Joe created a list
where he identified nine trips that he said had absolutely no business purpose. Counsel for Joe
provided that list to the Government and those nine trips are the trips that are included in Joe’s Bill
of Information.
3. What is Not Before the Court in Joe’s Case
Although Joe was not named in the August 18, 2018 Indictment of Greene, Creighton, and
Stone, his alleged role was described in that Indictment by reference to the “Contractor.” Before
and after that Indictment, Joe and his counsel have had the opportunity to meet with the
Government and provide evidence that some of the Government’s initial allegations in that
Indictment as they related to Joe’s conduct were incorrect. And because of these meetings and
exchanges of factual information and legal authority, Joe has pleaded to a separate Bill of
Information alleging a separate theory of federal liability than Greene, Creighton, and Stone. It is
important, therefore, that the Court understand the actual facts relating to Joe and where the August
18, 2018 Indictment (understandably) misses the mark with regard to the “Contractor.”.
a. Buncombe County taxpayers did not pay for Greene’s, Creighton’s, and
Stone’s non-business related trips.
In the August 18, 2018 indictment of Greene, Creighton, and Stone, the Governme nt
alleged that “Buncombe County often unwittingly funded the briberies and kickbacks of its own
extortion.”). Considering all of the facts here and the risks of litigation, however, Joe has chosen to forego those
potential avenues and simply take responsibility for his actions.
Page 17 of 41

officials.” Case No. 1:18-cr-88, Dock. No.1, para. 37. In short, the Government believed that Joe
had inflated the price of his lump sum contracts to cover or recoup the costs of the illegal trips,
which would in essence mean that these bribes were paid with the County’s own money.
We have provided evidence to the Government and are providing additional proof to this
Court that this allegation is wrong. What this evidence, including the expert report of former
Special Agent Ron Taylor (attached hereto as Exhibit A), proves is that Joe (through EIC), not
Buncombe County, paid for the non-business trips and other expenses out of his anticipated profit
from his appropriate and reasonable lump sum contracts: those costs were not passed on to
Buncombe County taxpayers.
Specifically, the only way that Buncombe County could have “paid for its own bribes” is
if Joe had improperly inflated his contract price to account for or include extra “padding” to cover
these travel and entertainment expenses. But the evidence is clear that Joe did not, in fact, do that.
As noted above, the County has publicly acknowledged that Joe’s contracts were reasonable and
valid. And Creighton, even against his own interests, has candidly admitted that the lump sum
prices for Joe’s contracts with Buncombe County were all reasonable and within industry
standards.
Additionally, former Special Agent Taylor has assessed, at our request, whether the
contracts with Buncombe County were inflated or padded. Agent Taylor conducted a
comprehensive forensic examination of Joe’s contracts, performed a comparative analysis of more
than two dozen recurring contracts, and reviewed numerous contracts from CDM and the current
Buncombe County contractor. Agent Taylor then reviewed Joe’s business tax returns dating back
to 2011 and compared the net income to the value of the contracts Joe had with Buncombe County
Page 18 of 41

between 2014 and 2017. And, finally, Agent Taylor spent several hours interviewing Joe, testing
Joe’s credibility and truthfulness.
Agent Taylor is prepared to testify, if necessary, as follows: “Based on my experience,
my expertise, my thorough review of the relevant evidence and my discussions with Mr. Wiseman,
I have concluded, to a reasonable certainty that Mr. Wiseman did not, and could not, have padded
or inflated his contracts with Buncombe County.” Exhibit A, p. 5. 22 Indeed, rather than suffering
any financial loss, Agent Taylor has determined that Buncombe County actually recognized an
annual savings in excess of $300,000 by selecting Joe as its environmental engineer on these
contracts as compared to what the County was previously paying CDM for the same work. 23
Because Joe’s lump sum contracts were reasonable and legitimate (i.e., not inflated or
padded), he did not and could not have passed the costs of these illegal trips to Buncombe County.
Instead, Joe absorbed the costs of these trips out of the anticipated profit that he was legally entitled
to earn under the legitimate, reasonable lump sum contracts. Instead of allowing the taxpayers to
be financially injured by Greene’s schemes, Joe instead took a sizeable hit to his company’s bottom
line and his own wallet.
In sum, in stark contrast to the County officials who engaged in behavior that was intended
to and did bilk the Buncombe County taxpayers out of millions of dollars, 24 Joe ensured that his
actions, as regrettable as they are, were never taken at the economic expense of these taxpayers.
22And, as noted above, the Government has acknowledged, without conceding the correctness of the defense position,
that it is not able to prove that Joe’s contracts were inflated or to refute our position that they were not. See Wiseman
Factual Basis.
23 Notably, when all of the current allegations came to light and Joe’s relationship with Buncombe County was
terminated, the County announced that it was going to re-hire CDM to perform the work, which would have meant
significant increased cost to Buncombe County and its citizens.
24No one, including the federal Government, has suggested that Joe was aware of or should have been aware of the
other schemes in which these Buncombe County officials were engaged and that did affect the County fisc.
Page 19 of 41

Indeed, throughout Joe’s more than twenty years in serving Buncombe County, he consistently
provided highly skilled, professional engineering services that inured materially to Buncombe
County’s economic benefit.
b. EIC expenses for legitimate business trips are intentionally not a part of
Joe’s Bill of Information.
The Government initially painted with a broad brush in the August 2018 Indictment and
essentially alleged that any payment by a contractor to or on behalf of Buncombe County’s
employees was a crime. This position significantly overstates, however, what conduct is actually
criminalized by law. That indictment remains part of the public record, however, and it has been
inaccurately seized upon by the press to exaggerate Joe’s actual criminal conduct. 25 But more
importantly, to the extent that the Court has necessarily reviewed that Indictment as part of the
other sentencings occurring on the same day as Joe’s, we believe it is important to distinguish Joe’s
Bill of Information and to offer a brief synopsis of the criminal law applicable the specific conduct
with which he is and is not charged here. 26
Long-standing and typical practices of entertaining clients, even government clients, are
not inherently criminal. As the Fourth Circuit has held, the “traditional business practice of
promoting a favorable business climate by entertaining and doing favors for potential customers
[does not become] bribery merely because the potential customer is the government. Such
expenditures, although inspired by the hope of greater government business, are not intended as
a quid pro quo for that business.” United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976); see
also United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) (same).
25Reading the press, one could easily conclude that Joe personally made over $13 million through his work as the
Project Engineer for Buncombe County when nothing could be further from the truth.
26In the interest of brevity here and to the extent the Court is interested, we are attaching a more fulsome legal
memorandum on the parameters and requirements of the federal bribery statutes, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Page 20 of 41

As applied here with regard to Joe, the Government ultimately agreed to charge Joe with
honest services fraud only with regard to a select number of trips that all parties agreed were
completely unrelated to any legitimate travel or client cultivation. See Wiseman Factual Basis.
Thus, the Bill of Information to which Joe entered his guilty plea intentionally and appropriately
limits the charged trips to those which had no legitimate business purpose. As such, the PSR has
properly not included any other trips or expenses as either part of the nature and circumstances of
this offense or as relevant conduct. 27
III. THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE.
Joe’s Guideline Offense Level, as calculated by the Probation Officer, is Level 21,
Criminal History Category I. Accordingly, his sentencing range, before any departures or
variances, is 37-46 months.
There are five specific bases for a departure or variance that are applicable to this case.
When considered together, we respectfully submit that Joe’s Guidelines range should be reduced
to a sentencing range that would allow the Court, to impose a sentence other than an active prison
sentence, with appropriate conditions, that would achieve the goals of sentencing set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
1. Substantial Assistance
In July of 2017, Greene abruptly announced her retirement. Less than a month later, the
fact that she was under a federal grand jury investigation was inadvertently disclosed. The nature
of that investigation and the specific conduct that was being investigated, however, remained
secret.
27 Nor does the North Carolina misdemeanor anti-gift statute, N.C.G.S § 133-32(a), provide a legitimate basis for a
federal bribery prosecution. The inapplicability of that statute is also addressed in the attached memorandum.
Page 21 of 41

Although Joe had always considered the payments for trips with no business purpose
morally and ethically wrong, he never even considered that the payments could be criminal, let
alone a violation of federal law. And why would he?
For more than twenty-eight years he had practiced his profession in North Carolina as an
employee of CDM and was encouraged to make similar expenditures for government clients
without ever being told even about the North Carolina misdemeanor anti-gift statute, much less of
any potential federal prohibition. And, unlike Greene, Creighton, and Stone, Joe had no reason to
be aware of the County’s policy prohibiting the receipt of anything of value from a person or
company doing business with the County.
The first hint that Joe had that the payments for the non-business-related trips might be
considered illegal came when Joe was approached by Creighton in August of 2017, after the
existence of the grand jury investigation became public, with a request that Joe tally up the
expenses he had paid for on Creighton’s behalf for the last two years. As requested, Joe provided
Creighton with a spreadsheet identifying expenditures he made in that time period for Greene,
Creighton, and Stone. Creighton then provided Joe with five checks to repay the expenses Joe
identified on the spreadsheet.
Importantly, however, Creighton made these payments in lieu of paying outstanding
amounts due on legitimate contracts Joe had with Buncombe County. To accomplish this,
Creighton directed Joe not to submit certain invoices for work already performed, and Creighton
instructed his assistant not to pay some of the invoices already submitted to the County totaling up
to about the amount that Creighton paid Joe. Because Joe and not the County had born all the cost
for the trips in the first place, and because Creighton’s payment was credited against legitimate
work for which Joe was due, Creighton’s attempt to refund some of the money he had taken from
Page 22 of 41

Joe, while perhaps a laudable gesture, was ineffectual. Joe was entitled to be paid by the County
for the legitimate work he had already performed and to be repaid by Creighton for the expenses
attributable to his travel which Joe had previously paid. In essence, Creighton simply paid Joe
with his own funds amounts legitimately due to Joe from the County, but Joe still had to absorb
the expenditures made on Creighton’s behalf so that the County would not.
Even knowing about the ongoing investigation and even after Creighton had insisted upon
this odd “repayment” arrangement, Joe still did not appreciate the jeopardy that the ongoing
investigation posed to him. Creighton specifically told Joe that the federal government was “not
interested in” the travel-related expenses or in Joe’s payments for the same. Nonetheless,
Creighton did warn that ‘Wanda is vindictive and she will not hesitate to throw us under the bus
to save herself.”
Joe was unnerved by the conversation, but he could not see a way that he could get “thrown
under the bus” by Greene. He knew that paying for trips which had no business purpose was
unethical, but he also knew that he had absorbed those costs rather than padding his contracts and
recouping the expenses. At that time, Joe still did not believe or understand that there was any
crime that Wanda Greene could credibly accuse him of committing.
What Joe also did not know is that, in addition to his payments for Greene’s, Creighton’s,
and Stone’s travel, they were each submitting vouchers for reimbursement for those same expenses
to the County. Or that they would seek payment for annual leave for the hours they spent on these
personal junkets. 28
28When undersigned counsel first met with Joe, he was asked whether he knew if Greene, Creighton, and Stone might
be seeking reimbursement for the trips for which he had paid. He said no but then naively asked “why would they do
that?”
Page 23 of 41

Although he was troubled by what Creighton had told him, Joe did not believe or
understand at that point that he had engaged in anything illegal. So, Joe simply continued to do
his job as the Project Manager for the engineering projects with Buncombe County. And to his
great relief, after Greene’s retirement, the demands that he pay for personal travel for Creighton
and Stone stopped. 29
Joe and his family’s whole world changed on June 28, 2018. While Joe was traveling with
his sons, federal agents conducted a search of his home, seized all of his business and many of his
personal records, his computers, and his backup hard drives. Before returning home and with no
understanding of the purpose of the search, Joe contacted counsel.
Counsel met with Joe for the first time on July 10th and a week later met with the AUSA
Edwards and his team of agents. With less than two weeks to prepare for that meeting, counsel
provided significant information in the multi-hour meeting and committed to getting answers to
the questions raised by the agents. With Joe’s permission and encouragement, counsel also offered
for the agents to debrief Joe at the earliest available opportunity.
In return, and based upon some of the information that Joe, through counsel, was able to
provide in that initial meeting, the Government agreed not (and ultimately did not) name Joe in
the anticipated August indictment of Greene, Creighton, and Stone. The debriefing of Joe was
scheduled for July 30th. In the interim, counsel provided additional information to the
Government and offered to image a hard drive and computer that the Government had not seized
during the search of Joe’s home.
29 In what can only be characterized as unmitigated gall, Greene took at least one more trip at Joe’s expense after her
retirement knowing that she was already under federal criminal investigation. Greene used Joe’s credit card without
his knowledge or permission and Joe only learned about the trip when he received his credit card statement.
Page 24 of 41

With barely a month to gather documents, understand the facts, and review the applicable
law, and with no real knowledge of the scope of the Government’s investigation, we traveled to
Asheville with Joe, fully intending that he sit for a no-holds barred interview with the agents to
answer any and all the Government’s questions. Joe was willing to sit for this interview without
any advance knowledge or assurance as to whether he would be charged, what he might be charged
with, or what those consequences might be. But, because of circumstances with the U.S.
Attorney’s office that were entirely outside of Joe’s control, the debriefing was cancelled by the
U.S. Attorney’s office as Joe sat in the outer office of the SBI waiting to be interviewed. Despite
these unfortunate circumstances, Joe’s willingness to be fully debriefed within a month of learning
that he was the target of a grand jury investigation is timely. See Guideline § 5K1.1(a)(5).
Because of scheduling conflicts of counsel and the Government representatives, the
debriefing could not be rescheduled until September, after the grand jury returned the honest
services fraud and bribery indictment against Greene, Creighton, and Stone. In the interim, and
before that September indictment, however, Joe, through his counsel, provided the Governme nt
with a detailed factual and legal proffer to clarify several key issues.
From reviewing that indictment line by line with Joe, it became apparent that the
Government had a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of lump sum contracts, which is a
standard type of contract that professional engineers submit when bidding on work for a project
and which is all that Joe ever had with the County. 30
30 The Court may already be familiar with lump sum contracts which are completely different from time and material
contracts. But, in brief, the risks in lump sum contracts based on, for example cost overruns or the failure to correctly
anticipate subcontractor expenses, are placed solely on the contractor. Whether the contractor makes any profit on
the contract, he will be paid only the agreed upon contract price. How the contractor chooses to or is required to spend
the agreed upon payment under the contract is entirely up to the contractor, with no risk or input from the client. And,
requests for interim payments, or draws, on the negotiated price need not be tied to a particular amount of work
actually performed toward completion of the contract. Rather, such requests for interim payments are generally linked
to expenses that the contractor has incurred at a particular point in the performance of the contract. Thus, what the
Government initially perceived as a proverbial “smoking gun” in terms of Joe’s fraudulent conduct was actually a
Page 25 of 41

It was also apparent that the Government mistakenly believed, based in part on the North
Carolina misdemeanor anti-gift statute, that any payments by a contractor on behalf of a
government employee constituted a crime, and a violation of the federal bribery statutes. But, as
explained briefly herein and in greater detail in the attached legal memorandum (Exhibit B), not
every payment made to or on behalf of a government employee is an illegal bribe as opposed to a
legitimate business practice. See United States v. Arthur, supra, 544 F.2d at 734 (“It does not
follow, however, that the traditional business practice of promoting a favorable business climate
by entertaining and doing favors for potential customers becomes bribery merely because the
potential customer is the government.”). And, as also explained in the attached legal
memorandum, the North Carolina statute, with the absence of a mens rea element applicable to
contractors, cannot support a state or federal indictment.
Accordingly, in addition to providing the Government with significant additional and
corroborating evidence and a factual proffer to answer the agents’ questions during the interim
before Joe’s debriefing, Joe and his counsel worked diligently to provide information to correct
some of the misunderstandings present in the August indictment. And, on September 19, 2018,
Joe submitted himself to a marathon debriefing that lasted almost eight hours. In that debrief, Joe
greatly assisted agents by painstakingly going through various contract and financial documents,
explaining their meaning, explaining how they related to each other, pointing out additional factual
connections and potential theories, and otherwise connecting the dots for many of the trips and
expenses at issue. He also provided significant information about other potential fraudule nt
conduct occurring in Buncombe County, including the alleged activities of now former-
Commissioner Frost, who has since been indicted.
misunderstanding of how lump sum contracts work. But the nature of lump sum contracts is not intuitive, and the
Government’s genuine initial misunderstanding of them is understandable.
Page 26 of 41

Joe was also debrief again by the Government in mid-July, and additional debriefings are
expected to occur over the next several months.
The Government will, of course, offer its evaluation of the significance, usefulness,
truthfulness, and reliability of the information provided by Joe to date, and we all acknowledge
that there is more to do. 31 But the fact that Joe has pled guilty to a Bill of Information that is
materially different in tone and scope from the August Indictment demonstrates that, at a
minimum, the factual and legal information submitted by and on behalf of Joe was useful and
credible to the Government. See Guideline § 5K1.1(a)(1), (2).
Finally, and without going into details, Joe’s cooperation with the Government is ongoing
and extends beyond the corruption by former Buncombe County employees already indicted. 32
Some of that information has already proven useful to the Government, and Joe remains ready,
willing and able to continue to assist the Government as its investigation(s) continue(s). Suffice to
say at this point, Joe’s “in the weeds” nature and his familiarity with the documents associated
with engineering contracts will undoubtedly continue to assist the Government in its ongoing
endeavors.
Accordingly, Joe’s timely, truthful, significant, and useful cooperation with and assistance
to the Government warrants a departure from the applicable sentencing range.
31 As the Court is aware from the filed Motion to Continue Sentencing, Joe’s cooperation is not yet complete. While
the Government has confirmed the value on Joe’s cooperation so far, it may not be in the position yet to move for a
5K departure. Even in the absence of a Government motion, however, this Court is authorized to and should consider
the extent of Joe’s efforts to cooperate to date under 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a). See United States v. Terry, 771 Fed. Appx.
277, 279 (4th Cir. 2019) (And, although the Government claims otherwise, the court was free to consider Terry’s
cooperation in the course of applying the § 3553(a) factors even in the absence of a substantial assistance motion.”).
See also United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 599 (5th Cir. 2014) (joining the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits in “holding that a sentencing court has the power to consider a defendant’s cooperation under § 3553(a),
irrespective of whether the Government files a [substantial assistance] motion.”).
32 Rather than complicate matters further with a new motion to seal and a redacted sentencing memorandum, Joe
simply incorporates the previously filed memorandum in support of his motion to seal the motion to continue the
sentencing hearing and the sealed motion to continue.
Page 27 of 41

2. Departure based on physical impairment.
Guideline § 5H1.4 authorizes a sentencing court to depart from the applicable guidelines
range based on a defendant’s extraordinary physical impairment. Specifically, the Guideline
provides:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, may be relevant in determining

whether a departure is warranted, if the condition or appearance, individually or in
combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and
distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. An
extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward; e.g., in the
case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less
costly than, imprisonment.
Thus, physical impairment is an encouraged basis for a departure. United States v. Crumbliss,
58 Fed Appx. 577, 581 (4th Cir. 2003).
Joe suffers from severe Type II diabetes, which has already resulted in the amputation of
one of his toes. His version of the disease also causes chronic foot infections, poor circulatio n,
neuropathy in both feet, and a Charcot foot. Joe is regularly prescribed antibiotics to combat his
foot infections and ulcers. He wears orthopedic shoes with custom prescription inserts and uses
special creams and lotions to prevent ulcers. And, because of the neuropathy, Joe has no feeling in
his feet and therefore has significant balance issues.
Because of all of these complications from diabetes and the even more dire complicatio ns
that can easily and quickly arise, Joe routinely sees numerous doctors. Since 2013, for example,
Joe has been regularly treated by the following physicians for issues related to his diabetes:
• Dr. Rachel M. DelFavero of Laureate Medical Group in Sandy Springs, GA, for
Diabetes Type 2, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and poor circulation;
• Dr. Titu D. Das of Infectious Disease Services of Georgia, P.C. (IDSGA) in Johns
Creek, GA, for numerous foot infections due to poor circulation as a result of the
diabetes;
• Dr. David Arkin of North Atlanta Endocrinology and Diabetes in Lawrenceville, GA,
Page 28 of 41

for treatment of diabetes.
• Dr. Deborah Kowalchuk of Resurgens Orthopedics in Johns Creek, GA, for Charcot
foot and an amputated second toe (right foot).
Unlike some other Type II diabetes patients, Joe’s diabetes is chronic and progressive. If
he does not receive immediate treatment for the sores and ulcers caused by the disease, he risks
further amputations. And, the costs of his various, regular, medical treatments and prescriptions
are expensive.
In a case involving a strikingly similar defendant, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to depart on the basis of the defendant’s severe case of Type II diabetes. United
States v. Crumbliss, supra, 58 Fed Appx. 577. In that case, the defendant was convicted a violatio n
of 18 U.S.C. § 666 and conspiracy to commit that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. at
578. The defendant’s applicable Guideline range was 37 to 46 months, but the district court granted
a downward departure pursuant to Guideline 5H1.4 and sentenced the defendant to five years’
probation with a special condition of 364 days of home confinement with electronic monitor ing.
Id.
The defendant had been diagnosed with diabetes several years before his appeal. Id. at
579. “He subsequently had two toes amputated and suffered debilitating weakness and pain in his
legs and hips.” Over the Government’s objection, the district court found that the defendant’s
condition was an extraordinary impairment under Guideline 5H1.4 and granted the departure.
In affirming the district court’s decision to depart, the Court of Appeals noted that
“[a]lthough diabetes is a relatively common disease, Crumbliss' experience was apparently not
typical in that he developed complications quickly which required amputation of two toes and use
of a wheelchair because of nerve damage in his lower extremities. His condition was not stabilized
Page 29 of 41

and the best method of treatment had not yet been determined.” Id. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in concluding that the defendant’s condition was extraordinary.
Having affirmed the district court’s determination that the defendant’s condition
constituted an extraordinary physical impairment, the Court of Appeals then considered the district
court’s rationale for imposing a probationary sentence:
Having found that Crumbliss had an extraordinary impairment, the district court was
permitted, even encouraged under § 5H1.4 to depart below the guideline range and
impose a sentence of home detention if it determined that such a sentence would be ‘as
efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.’ The court so found, noting that, “It costs
the taxpayers of this country a lot of money to keep a healthy person in prison. Quite
obviously, the cost is compounded when that person is in such physical constraints that
it's going to cause a lot of hospitalizations, medication, and treatment.”
Id. at 581 (emphasis added). The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the departure. Id. See also United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1990)
(defendant’s physical condition is was a relevant consideration in whether to reduce a defendant’s
Guidelines sentence and whether to impose imprisonment at all).
As the PSR and Joe’s medical records 33 establish, Joe’s diabetes goes well beyond the
normal symptoms and collateral consequences associated with that otherwise relatively common
disease. He has already had to have one toe amputated, and he has to be constantly monitored to
ensure that more such amputations do not become necessary. He is currently receiving wound care
treatment for ulcers on both feet. He requires special shoes because of balance issues and to
prevent the type of injury to his feet that would lead to potential additional amputations. Like the
defendant in Crumbliss, Joe is significantly more compromised than the average diabetes sufferer,
and his condition will necessitate “a lot of hospitalizations, medication, and treatment.” The cost
33 The PSR has documented Joe’s diabetes. We are also in the process of collecting additional letters and medical
records for Joe that will further establish and elaborate on his condition. We will file these records under seal as they
are received.
Page 30 of 41

of Joe’s necessary monitoring and care will be exceedingly difficult for any prison to sustain, and
it will also be very costly. Under these circumstances, a downward departure to the same type of
split sentence imposed in Crumbliss would strike the appropriate balance of competing interests.
3. Overstated loss amount
Reductions from the applicable guidelines range based on overstated loss is an encouraged
basis for a departure. See Guideline § 2B1.1, Application Note 21(C). See also United States v.
Kalili, 100 Fed. Appx. 903, 906 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). Here, the loss amount for Joe’s offense is
determined under the fraud loss table in Guideline § 2B1.1(b), pursuant to Guideline 2C1.1(b)(2).
Joe’s plea agreement stipulates to a loss amount, and it is based on the fact that the value of the
personal trips paid for Greene, Creighton, Stone exceeded $40,000 but was less than $95,000.
Accordingly, Joe’s base offense level has been increased by six levels.
Here, however, we have a somewhat unusual case with unusual facts. As detailed above,
no actual pecuniary loss to the County occurred in Joe’s case (in contrast to the actual loss that
occurred in Greene, Creighton and Stone’s cases). A loss amount of greater than $40,000,
therefore, overstates the financial seriousness of Joe’s conduct. 34 As specifically detailed above,
Joe’s contracts with the County were “lump-sum” contracts, with the County agreeing to pay a
specific lump sum, regardless of any additional expenses that Joe might incur in the performance
of the contract.
As Jon Creighton and Agent Taylor have unequivocally attested, Joe did not inflate or pad
his contracts to cover the cost of these illegal, extorted trips. Instead, Joe absorbed the expenses
34 The County has speculated that it is due $500,000 in restitution. As discussed below, that claim is unsupported and
is based on the alleged value of the personal trips taken by Greene, Creighton, and Stone for which Joe paid with no
actual financial harm to the County. Therefore, the County’s unsupported claim for restitution should be denied.
Page 31 of 41

associated with those trips out of his anticipated, legitimate profit. Accordingly, the County did
not suffer any direct pecuniary harm from Joe’s conduct and there is no actual monetary loss.
We recognize that loss amounts for purposes of calculating the Guidelines offense level is
different from restitution. See e.g. United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 340 (4th Cir. 2003). However, in honest services fraud
cases, which is the charge to which Joe pled guilty, proof of a pecuniary loss to the victim is not
required. United States v. Nayak, 769 F.3d 978, 982-83 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, the loss calculatio n
required by the Guidelines, though correctly determined, can and does in this case, overstate the
seriousness of the offense.
Because there is no actual economic loss to the County in Joe’s case, the required but
artificial method of determining the loss amount attributable to Joe’s conduct overstates both the
loss and the seriousness of the offense. We request the Court to depart to the next lowest “cliff”
under Guideline § 2B1.1(b). See Guideline § 2B1.1, Application Note 21(C). See also Kalili, 100
Fed. Appx. at 906 (same). Such a departure would result in a two-level reduction in Joe’s adjusted
offense level.
4. Minor Role in the Offense 35
Guideline § 3B1.2 authorizes “a range of downward adjustments for a defendant who plays
a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average
participant in the criminal activity.” Guideline § 3B1.2, Application Note 3A. Guideline§ 3B1.2
35 As with the loss calculation discussed above, we are not challenging the Guidelines calculations in the PSR. And
we acknowledge that Joe’s plea agreement does not provide for a role in the offense reduction and we have agreed
that neither party may seek any other enhancements or reductions to the agreed upon offense level. However, the plea
agreement does authorize Joe to “seek a departure or variance from the ‘applicable guideline range’ (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1)
determined by the district court at sentencing, if such departure or variance is permitted by law.”
Page 32 of 41

provides for the most modest such adjustment, a two-level reduction from a Guidelines offense
level for a defendant who was a “minor participant” in the charged criminal conduct.
The Application Notes to this provision clarify that whether a defendant is entitled to a role
in the offense reduction is to be based on the facts and circumstances of the case. “The
determination whether to apply subsection (a) or subsection (b), or an intermediate adjustment, is
based on the totality of the circumstances and involves a determination that is heavily dependent
upon the facts of the particular case.” Guideline § 3B1.2, Application Note 3C.
The following, non-exhaustive list of factors is provided to assist in making this
determination:
(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and
structure of the criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or
organizing the criminal activity;
(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making
authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority;
(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant's participation in the
commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant
performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in
performing those acts;
(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the
criminal activity.
Id. And, “[t]he fact that a defendant performs an essential or indispensable role in the crimina l
activity is not determinative. Such a defendant may receive an adjustment under this guideline if
he or she is substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity. ”
(emphasis added). Applying those factors to the instant case, Joe is substantially less culpable than
at least Greene and Creighton, and arguably Stone as well.
Page 33 of 41

First and foremost, Joe was not the architect of the bribery scheme, did not dictate the non-
business-related trips that would be taken, attempted to resist the demands for the illegitimate trips,
and did not exercise any of the decisions regarding the payments he would be required to make.
Wanda Greene’s Factual Basis makes this point clear:
At some time in 2015, the defendant prepared a written list of the places
she wanted to go, at [Mr. Wiseman’s] expense, and the proposed dates
of travel, and gave that list to Creighton, instructing him to pass it on to the
[Mr. Wiseman]. Creighton did so.
Para. 24 (emphasis added). By Wanda Greene’s own admission, Joe played no role in planning or
organizing the criminal activity.
Rather, Joe participated in the conspiracy under extreme duress, with the threat that his
continued business relationship of more than 25-years with the County would only continue if he
agreed to pay for the illegal trips. Again, Greene’s Factual Basis makes this point clear: “[Greene]
and Creighton had the authority to award or deny the contracts that [Joe’s] companies had with the
County. They and the Contractor understood and agreed that his providing these trips, gifts, and
favors was a necessary condition to his company's continuing to obtain contacts with the County.”
Greene Factual Basis, para. 22 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Joe did not accompany Greene, Creighton, and Stone on all of the trips for
which he was required to pay. Greene Factual Basis, para. 26. Joe’s codefendants simply billed
their expenses to his credit card. Id. Joe’s refusal to go on a number of the trips demonstrates that
he was not exercising decision-making authority in connection with the illegal activity. And, this
fact further demonstrates Joe’s attempt to limit his involvement in the criminal conduct.
Finally, Joe was unaware of, and did not participate in, anywhere close to the full scope of
the criminal activity by Greene, Creighton, and Stone, even as it related just to the personal travel.
For example, Greene took steps to have the County pay for additional trips even after she retired.
Page 34 of 41

To accomplish this, she transferred $45,000 into the Professional Service account within
Creighton’s department. Creighton Factual Basis, para. 11. “On the morning of June 9, 2017,
[Greene] informed [Creighton] by email: ‘Moved $45K to your professional services for [Joe’s
initials].’ Creighton did not use these funds and Joe was completely unaware of the transfer. Id.
Additionally, each of Joe’s codefendants defrauded the County in two separate, additiona l
ways relating to their improper personal travel, completely unassociated with and unbeknownst to
Joe:
[F]irst, by claiming that they had traveled on official County business and therefore
not using their annual leave for these trips. By doing so, they were able to preserve
their hours of annual leave, which they were later able to "sell" to the County,
thereby receiving monetary payments to which they were not legally entitled. The
second way in which the defendants used these trips to defraud the County was by
subnetting per diem and expense claims for their supposed costs of meals and
incidental expenses incurred during these trips. That is, while in fact their meals
and expenses were actually being paid for by [Joe], they nonetheless obtained cash
payments from the County for their supposed dining and incidental costs.
Id. at para. 12-13 (emphasis added).
Joe meets each of the criteria specified in the Guidelines for a role in offense reduction.
And, indeed, the Guidelines specifically recognize that corrupt government employees, like Joe’s
codefendants, who solicit bribes are more culpable than individuals, like Joe, who was coerced
into participating in a bribery scheme under the threat of economic ruin. Guideline § 2C1.1 was
specifically amended to emphasize this point:
Sections 2C1.1 and 2C1.2 each are amended to include alternative base offense levels,
with an increase of two levels for public official defendants who violate their offices or
responsibilities by accepting bribes, gratuities, or anything else of value. The higher
alternative base offense levels for public officials reflect the Commission’s view that
offenders who abuse their positions of public trust are inherently more culpable than
those who seek to corrupt them, and their offenses present a somewhat greater threat to
the integrity of governmental processes.
Guideline Amendment 667, November 1, 2004 (emphasis added).
Page 35 of 41

Here, Greene is charged in two other separate indictments and named as an unindicted
coconspirator in a third that do not implicate Joe in the least. Greene Factual Basis, para. 4-19.
And, although neither Creighton nor Stone are named as defendants in the indictment alleging the
illegal purchase of insurance policies, both stood to benefit from Greene’s illegal actions.
Specifically, Creighton was slated to receive a $522,000 life insurance policy for which
prepayments in the amount of $222,000 had been made; Stone was to receive a $617,000 policy
for which prepayments of $160,000 had been made. Id. at para 83.
Yet despite all of these stark differences between Joe’s position and conduct and that of his
codefendants, neither Greene, Creighton, nor Stone have received an upward adjustment based on
their roles in the offense associated with Joe. Instead, a two-level reduction has been
recommended for Stone as a minor participant.
Under all these facts, and weighing the relative roles and culpability of the defendants who
participated in the improper personal trips, Joe should receive a two-level reduction based on his
role in the offense compared to the roles played by at least Greene and Creighton and, truthfully,
by Stone as well, given her status as a senior government official. Accordingly, a downward
variance to accomplish this just result is warranted. 36
36 We acknowledge that the Guidelines purport to prohibit a departure motion to reduce a defendant’s sentence based
on his role in the offense. Guideline § 5K2.0(d)(3). However, after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005),
the Guidelines are advisory only. Accordingly, district courts are now free to deviate from the applicable Guidelines
range based on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Guidelines. Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85, 116
(2007). And, the Supreme Court has held that a district court may grant a variance based on a factor prohibited by the
Guidelines. Pepper v. United States, 562 476 (2011) (district court’s ability to consider post-offense rehabilitation is
not constrained by the Sentencing Guidelines). See also United States v. Sullivan, 756 Fed. Appx. 272, 279 (4th Cir.
2018) (affirming upward variance based on the defendant’s aggravated role in the offense under the factors of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) even though that adjustment is expressly prohibited as a basis for a departure motion under Guidelin e
5K2.0(d)(3)).
Page 36 of 41

5. Economic Coercion
Guideline § 5K2.0 provides, in pertinent part, that if a “defendant committed the offense
because of serious coercion, blackmail, or duress, under circumstances not amounting to a
complete defense, the court may depart downward.” The facts of this case amply demonstrate that
Joe was coerced, even extorted, into participating in the honest services fraud, for which he stands
convicted, by Greene and Creighton. See infra, Section II.2. and n. 18.
Economic coercion is a recognized affirmative defense to bribery charges. See e.g. United
States v. Miller 340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965), (“the threat of economic harm may under some
circumstance result in extortion.”). And, the Fourth Circuit subsequently ruled that the Hobbs Act
could not be used to prosecute the victim of extortion who merely acquiesced in the demand that
payments be made in order to retain his lawful right to certain business opportunities. United States
v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986). Citing the Model Penal Code, the Court found as
follows:
It seems clear that the victim of a crime should not be held as an accomplice in [or
a conspirator to] its perpetration, even though his conduct in a sense may have
assisted in the commission of the crime and the elements of complicity or
conspiracy may technically exist. The businessman who yields to the extortion
of a racketeer, the parent who pays ransom to the kidnapper, may be unwise or may
even be thought immoral; to view them as involved in the commission of the crime
confounds the policy embodied in the prohibition; it is laid down, wholly or in part,
for their protection.
Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 151 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Our cases thus provide that a payment made in the course of a shakedown where the public
official demands payment as a quid pro quo for proper execution of his duty is not a bribe.”);
United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) (“We think that if a government officer
threatens serious economic loss unless paid for giving a citizen his due, the latter is entitled to have
the jury consider this, not as a complete defense like duress but as bearing on the specific intent
Page 37 of 41

required for the commission of bribery. 37 Cases from the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits also
support the argument that economic coercion may negate the corrupt intent element required to
prove the crime of bribery. United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 354 (3d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Lee, 846 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 514 (7th Cir.
1973).
As noted above, Wanda Greene was the undisputed ring-leader and architect of the bribery
scheme. Joe, for his part, wrongly agreed to participate in the illegal conspiracy with the corrupt
County employees under the direct and credible threat that if he refused to do so, he would lose
his contracts with the County. He is culpable, but he is not nearly as culpable as Greene, Creighton,
or even Stone.
To be clear, Joe is not asking the Court to excuse or exonerate his poor choice to accede to
Greene et al.’s extortionate demands – he has pleaded guilty and fully accepts his responsibility
for his role in this scheme. But under these facts, the law recognizes the legitimate impact of
economic extortion and allows this Court to consider it in reaching a fair and just sentence under
all of the facts. We ask that the Court make a downward departure on this basis.
IV. RESTITUTION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). it is the Government’s burden to establish whether and the
amount of any restitution due. Here, the Government has candidly conceded that it has no evidence
that any restitution is due from Joe. Wiseman Factual Basis, p. 3. 38
37At least one court has suggested that economic coercion may be a complete defense to the charge of bribery, as
opposed to an affirmative defense. See United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2018).
38 As the PSR notes, Buncombe County submitted a Victim Impact Statement in which it speculated that it might be
due up to $500,000. As noted in detail in the filed objection to that statement, the County has offered no basis, much
less proof, for that speculative number. As a result, the PSR appropriately noted that, as of the date of the final PSR,
“no supporting documentation has been submitted by the victim to substantiate the victim’s claim.” Addendum to
PSR.
Page 38 of 41

Even though it is not Joe’s burden to do so, we have taken the extra step of affirmative ly
proving that Buncombe County suffered no pecuniary loss as a result of Joe’s activities. See, infra,
Section II.3.(a).
For all of these reasons, no restitution has been established, is due, or should be ordered in
this case.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we ask the Court to grant a departure or variance for the
reasons stated herein. Under the facts and law of this case and a fair and reasonable application of
the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we believe that the Court can and should reduce Joe’s adjusted
offense level to permit the Court to consider significantly lower sentence than currently called for
in the PSR.
Finally, we ask that the Court consider the words of Joe’s oldest son, Joseph, in determining
the sentence to be imposed:
Judge Conrad, I know you have a job to do, and we understand that my dad must
make amends for the mistakes that he has made. But please understand that
whatever sentence you impose on my dad, every one of us in the Wiseman family
will also have to serve it with him. We will be the ones who do not have him there
to share in our happy life moments, and we are the ones who will have to live
without his support in the tough times.
Letter of Joseph Wiseman, August 19, 2019 (attached hereto) (emphasis added).
Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of August 2019.
DABROWNLAW LLC
/s/david a. brown, sr.
David A. Brown, Sr.
NC Bar No. 48997
360 Rosemore Place
Rock Hill, SC 29732
Dabrownsr79@gmal.com
(704) 654-9418
Page 39 of 41

PIERSON LAW, LLC
/s/ Holly A. Pierson

Holly A. Pierson
GA Bar No. 579655
3127 Maple Drive, NE
Atlanta, GA 30305
hpierson@piersonlawllc.com
(404) 353-2316
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Page 40 of 41

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum, with
attachments, on this, the 21st day of August, with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system,
which will send notification of such filing to counsel for the United States.
/s/ David A. Brown

David A. Brown
N.C. Bar No. 48997
Page 41 of 41

ATTORNEY WORKPRODUCT
RONALD R. TAYLOR
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Attorney: Holly Pierson

David Brown
Report: Memorandum of Activities
Report #: 1
In re: Joe Wiseman
Investigator Taylor was requested to conduct an investigation to determine if the lump sum
contracts negotiated by Joe Wiseman with Buncombe County were “padded” to include illegal
payments for trips and other personal expenses for Buncombe County employees.
The following is an outline of all investigative activities regarding this investigation:
Details of Investigation
Defense counsel briefed Investigator Taylor as to the details of the investigation of Wiseman.
Subsequent to these conversations, Investigator Taylor received numerous files in the possession
of defense counsel relating to the payment of the illegal payments. These documents included
various documents relating to meetings and discussions with the AUSA regarding the Wiseman
investigation, and certain contracts and spreadsheets relating to trips paid for by Wiseman during
the relevant period (2014 – 2017).
Investigator Taylor conducted a thorough examination of the documents provided by defense

counsel. After this document review, Investigator Taylor believed that a detailed analysis of the
contracts themselves would be the best approach to determine if the contracts were padded. In an
effort to validate Investigator Taylor’s investigative approach, Investigator Taylor contacted
Tony Ollmann, CPA. Ollmann is the firm director of Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP a
construction risk management CPA practice headquartered in Wisconsin. Ollmann’s expertise
includes large complex construction audits, process improvement consulting, and construction
fraud prevention and detection. Ollmann also provides litigation support services and is a
frequent speaker at numerous construction, trade and audit associations. Ollmann agreed with
Investigator Taylor’s approach to the issues in the Wiseman matter, primarily that the scope of
work to be performed in the multi-year contracts should be compared with the other multi-year
contracts.
Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28-1 Filed 08/21/19 Page 1 of 5

Investigator Taylor then conducted several detailed interviews of Wiseman regarding this issue
and requested that Wiseman provide Investigator Taylor with all contracts negotiated by
Wiseman with Buncombe County during the period 2014-2018. Investigator Taylor received a
total of 59 contracts. Investigator Taylor determined that 26 of these contracts were multi-year
(recurring) contracts and the remaining 33 contracts were yearly (non-recurring) contracts.
During Investigator Taylor’s investigation, defense counsel requested, via a FOIA request, all
documents relating to contracts negotiated with engineering firms before 2014 and all subsequent
contracts negotiated with other engineering firms after 2017. This request was made in an
attempt to obtain contracts that were negotiated before and after the period in question to
determine the price of any like scope work in these contracts.
Investigator Taylor subsequently received approximately 350 PDF documents relating to the
FOIA request from Buncombe County. These documents were reviewed and only a small
number of these documents could be identified for comparison purposes.
Investigator Taylor first attempted to examine each of the multi-year contracts and identify the
scope of work performed on each contract and compare the costs related to the scope of work
from year to year on these contracts.
Subsequent to an analysis of these contracts, Investigator Taylor contacted Wiseman and asked
for an explanation as to any differences in the price of the contracts, if it fluctuated from year to
year. Wiseman provided Investigator Taylor detailed explanations as to why the contracts
increased or decreased. As a result, Investigator Taylor requested that Wiseman provide
Investigator Taylor any documentation that would support Wiseman’s explanation for the
increase/decrease in the price of the contracts.
Investigator Taylor completed an analysis of the multi-year contracts (26 contracts) which
included Wiseman’s explanation for any increase/decrease in the contracts, and any supporting
documentation of his explanations, and found no evidence of padding in the multi-year contracts.
However, Investigator Taylor had no contracts to compare to the yearly (non-recurring) contracts
(33 contracts).
During this investigation Investigator Taylor discovered that Wiseman learned how to price lump
sum contracts while working at CDM Smith. Wiseman continued to price the lump sum
contracts he negotiated with Buncombe County using the same methodology he learned while
working at CDM Smith. The pricing of a lump sum contract includes Wiseman’s direct labor
charge (which includes a multiplier to cover the cost of overhead and profit). To arrive at the
direct labor charge, Wiseman would estimate the number of hours it would take to complete the
project and multiply this by his hourly rate. While working for CDM Smith, Wiseman’s hourly
rate was approximately $200 an hour. Wiseman’s hourly rate after he left CDM Smith was only
$175 per hour. Added to this amount would be any direct costs related to the project, such as
subcontractor fees and other necessary expenses incurred to fulfill the terms of the contract.
Subcontractor fees made up the bulk of any additional costs added to Wiseman’s estimated direct
labor charge.

Knowing how Wiseman calculated the contract price of his contracts, Investigator Taylor
decided to also conduct a forensics investigation of the contracts, and Wiseman’s books and
records and tax returns to determine if the contracts were padded. Investigator Taylor determined
that a forensics investigation was necessary because Investigator Taylor could not determine the
value of the single year (non-recurring) contracts, and to further corroborate his initial findings.
The results of this forensics investigation are reflected in the following chart:
2014 - 2017
Item Totals Rate
Total Contract Price (Actual)
Multi-Year Contracts (Actual) $824,840

Yearly Contracts (Actual) $1,315,550
Total Contract Price (Actual) $2,140,390

Subcontractors (Actual) -$729,669
Total Funds Available $1,410,721 $176
Total Contract Price (Forensic)
Gross Receipts ($175 Hour - Yearly Rate) $1,400,000 $175

Subcontractors (Actual) $729,669
Total Contract Price (Forensic) $2,129,669
Comparison of Contracts (Actual v Forensic)
Total Contract Price (Actual) $2,140,390

Total Contract Price (Forensic) $2,129,669
Net Income (Tax Returns)
Salary $261,000
Pensions $178,000
Net Profit (Includes Buncombe County Employees) $362,262
Net Income (Tax Returns) $801,262 $100

In addition to the above described investigative techniques, Investigator Taylor analyzed the
Government’s Information filed against Wiseman in an attempt to further corroborate
Investigator Taylor’s findings. The Information filed against Wiseman alleged that from 2001
through 2017, Buncombe County entered into contracts with CDM Smith totaling approximately
$13.3 million. The information further alleged that from May 2014 through February 2018,
Buncombe County paid EIC (Wiseman) approximately $1.9 million pursuant to contracts
negotiated with Wiseman.
An analysis of the Information reflected that the EIC contracts resulted in the following net
savings to Buncombe County:
Item Yearly
CDM Smith Contracts - $13.3 Million (17 Years) $782,353
EIC Contracts - $1.9 Million (4 Years) -$475,000
Yearly Net Savings to Buncombe County $307,353
Results of Investigation
Investigator Taylor conducted a thorough investigation of all available documents relating to the
payment of trips and other personal expenses by Joe Wiseman for Buncombe County employees.
Investigator Taylor also conducted a thorough investigation of the lump sum contracts negotiated
by Wiseman with Buncombe County officials.
Based on this investigation, Investigator Taylor determined the following:
1) Wiseman’s hourly labor rate was $175 per hour.

2) The hourly rate for engineering firms CDM Smith and SCS exceeded $175 per hour.
3) Wiseman included his hourly labor rate plus direct costs related to the project in his
negotiated contract price.
4) The total price of the contracts during the period 2014 - 2017 was $2,140,390.
5) The total amount Wiseman paid subcontractors during this period was $729,669.
6) The funds available to Wiseman during this period to pay all of his overhead expenses
and realize a profit was $1,410,721.
7) The hourly rate of the funds available to Wiseman to pay his overhead expenses and
realize a profit was $176 per hour.
8) In addition to his overhead expenses, Wiseman also paid for all trips and other personal
expenses for Buncombe County employees from his available funds.
9) Wiseman’s tax returns revealed that during the period 2014 - 2017 Wiseman’s business
realized a total net income of $801,264, after paying all overhead expenses and the trips
and other personal expenses paid for Buncombe County employees.

10) The hourly rate of Wiseman’s total net income was $100 per hour. The remaining $75 per
hour was used by Wiseman to pay all of his overhead expenses and for the trips and other
personal expenses paid for Buncombe County employees. This substantially reduced the
potential profit Wiseman could have made, had he not paid for the trips and other
personal expenses for Buncombe County employees.
11) Wiseman’s total net income of $801,264 during the period 2014 - 2017 resulted in an
average annual income of $200,315 per year.
12) Wiseman’s salary from CDM Smith during 2011 was $200,201; therefore, Wiseman’s
average annual income of $200,315 per year is consistent with what he was making while
employed at CDM Smith.
13) An analysis of the government’s Information filed against Wiseman further corroborates
Investigator Taylor’s findings. It is believed these savings were the result of Wiseman’s
lower labor rate, compared to CDM Smith’s rate and CDM Smith’s use of multiple
employees on a contract.
Conclusions
Based on my experience, my expertise, my thorough review of the relevant evidence and my

discussions with Mr. Wiseman, I have concluded, to a reasonable certainty that Mr. Wiseman did
not, and could not, have padded or inflated his contracts with Buncombe County.
Investigation completed.
_____________________________________
Ronald R. Taylor
Private Investigator
NCPPS #3863
SCPDC #2753
1235 East Boulevard
Suite E-183
Charlotte, NC 28203
704-779-3919 Cell/Text
rontaylorpi@gmail.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Crim. No. 1:19-cr-17-RJC

)
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
)
JOSEPH F. WISEMAN, JR., )
)
Defendant )
____________________________________)
LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

Now Comes Joseph F. Wiseman, Jr., by and through his undersigned counsel, and submits
in the instant Legal Memorandum in Support of the Sentencing Memorandum filed
contemporaneously herewith. This memorandum is submitted to support the following legal
assertions set forth in brief in the Sentencing Memorandum: Expenses paid for in connection with
legitimate business travel and in client cultivation do not constitute bribes, even where the
payments are made to or on behalf of a state or local government employee; the North Carolina
anti-gift statute provides no basis for a federal bribery prosecution.
A. Payments Made on Behalf of State and Local Government

Officials in Connection with Legitimate Business Trips and
Legitimate Business Development are Not Illegal.
Section 666(a)(1)(B) proscribes the corrupt solicitation of anything of value by a
government official for the purpose of intending to be influenced in connection with any
business transaction or series of transactions of a government agency. Section 666(a)(2)
prohibits the “corrupt” offer of anything of value to a government official “with intent to
influence or reward” that government official in connection with any business transaction or
Page 1 of 10

transactions of a government agency. (emphasis added).Criminal liability under Section (a)(2)
is wholly dependent on whether the payments were made corruptly and with the intent to
influence the decisions of a government official. And relevant case law, as well as the legislative
history of Section 666, establishes that many payments to or on behalf of a government official
in connection with legitimate trips or for other legitimate business purposes, including but not
limited to general client entertainment/business development, do not fall within the statutes
proscriptions.
In 1986, Section 666 was amended to clarify Congressional intent and “to avoid its
possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.” H.R.Rep. No. 99-797,
at 30, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138. As stated in the House Report, “18 U.S.C. § 666
prohibits bribery of certain public officials but does not seek to constrain lawful commercial
business transactions.” Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 666 prohibits corruptly giving or receiving anything
of value for the purpose of influencing or being influenced in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions. The provision parallels the bank bribery provision 18
U.S.C.
§ 215.” Id. at 30 n. 9.
The elements of Section 666, which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, are as
follows:
(1) The defendant corruptly gave something of value to any person;
(2) with intent to influence a state governmental agency that received more
than $10,000 in federal funds in any year; (3) in connection with any business
or transaction of the agency; (4) that involved anything of value of $5,000 or
more.
Page 2 of 10

See, e.g., United States v. Apple, 927 F.Supp. 1119, 1121 (N.D. IND 1996) (setting forth jury
instruction). Similarly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals approved this recitation of the
elements of Section 666 in a case where a government official was charged with soliciting and
accepting a bribe:
First, that defendant Martínez was an agent of the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico government whose duties included those of an elected Senator of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as charged; Second, that defendant Martínez
solicited, demanded, accepted or agreed to accept anything of value from another
person; Third, that defendant Martínez did so corruptly with the intent to be
influenced or rewarded in connection with some business, transaction or series
of transactions of the Puerto Rico government.
United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013).
The key elements of the charge of bribery under Section 666, then, are that the payments
were made or received corruptly and with the intent to influence the government official in
connection with an official decision. And, as the Fourth Circuit has consistently held, both
Section 666 and the general bribery statute, 18 U.S.S. § 201, require proof of a “quid pro quo,”
that is, that “the defendant must have intended for the official to engage in some specific act (or
omission) or course of action (or inaction) in return for the charged payment.” United States v.
Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1019 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that both Section 666 and Section
201 require proof of a quid pro quo to establish the crime of bribery). “[A] payment is made
with ‘corrupt intent’ only if it was made or promised with the intent to corrupt the particular
official. Not every payment made to influence or reward an official is intended to corrupt him.”
Id. at 1018 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has distinguished between bribery and what it characterized
as “good will favors.”
Not every gift, favor or contribution to a government or political official

constitutes bribery. It is universally recognized that bribery occurs only if the gift
Page 3 of 10

is coupled with a particular criminal intent. That intent is not supplied merely by
the fact that the gift was motivated by some generalized hope or expectation of
ultimate benefit on the part of the donor. ‘Bribery’ imports the notion of some
more or less specific quid pro quo for which the gift or contribution is offered or
accepted. This requirement of criminal intent would, of course, be satisfied if the
jury were to find a ‘course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing’ to a public
official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor even
though no particular gift or favor is directly connected to any particular official
act. Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has held, it is sufficient that the gift is made
on the condition ‘that the offeree act favorably to the offeror when necessary.’
It does not follow, however, that the traditional business practice of promoting
a favorable business climate by entertaining and doing favors for potential
customers becomes bribery merely because the potential customer is the
government. Such expenditures, although inspired by the hope of greater
government business, are not intended as a quid pro quo for that business:
they are in no way conditioned upon the performance of an official act or pattern
of acts or upon the recipient's express or implied agreement to act favorably to
the donor when necessary.
United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976). Accord United States v. Harvey, 532
F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2008) (same).
The Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that bribery under Section 2011
includes “any effort to buy favor or generalized goodwill from an official who either has been,
is, or may at some unknown, unspecified later time, be in a position to act favorably to the
giver's interests.” United States v. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398, 405 (1999). As the Court noted,
under the Government’s broad interpretation of the bribery statute in that case, “a group of
farmers would violate § 201(c)(1)(A) by providing a complimentary lunch for the Secretary of
Agriculture in conjunction with his speech to the farmers concerning various matters of USDA
policy-so long as the Secretary had before him, or had in prospect, matters affecting the
1
Courts have looked to the case law pertaining to 18 U.S.C. § 201 for guidance on the proper interpretation of
Section 666. See e.g. United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Section 666 was born as the
stepchild of another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Jennings, supra, 160 F.3d at
1019 (4th Cir. 1998) (“a court instructing a jury on § 666(a)(2) must define the ‘corrupt intent’ element in the
same way as it would if instructing on § 201(b).”).
Page 4 of 10

farmers.” Id. at 407. Accordingly, the Court refused to read Section 201 as “a prohibition of
gifts given by reason of the donee’s office.” Id. at 408.
Mr. Wiseman’s business related expenses on behalf of Buncombe County officials
attendant to legitimate business trips and/or to general client entertainment/business
development fall squarely into “the traditional business practice of promoting a favorable
business climate by entertaining and doing favors for potential customers” and such payments,
“although inspired by the hope of greater government business, are not intended as a quid pro
quo for that business.” As such, the payments would not be actionable bribes.
Even if the payments could be charged as bribes, these payments would nonetheless not
meet the other statutory elements necessary to make them criminal. As noted, a conviction under
Section 666 requires proof that the payments were made corruptly and with the intent to influence
a government official. The word corruptly “is ordinarily understood as referring to acts done
voluntarily and intentionally and with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end
or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.” United States v. Nelson,
712 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2013). Accord United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204,211 (2nd Cir.
2006) (same). See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616-17 (1995) (“An act is done
corruptly if it's done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a
lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other
benefit to oneself or a benefit of another person.”) (Justice Scalia, dissenting).
But the payment of meals and entertainment expenses for government employees, in
connection with legitimate business travel or business development, does not demonstrate a
corrupt motive or an intent to influence those government employees in connection with
specific governmental action. In other words, such payments do not prove the required quid pro
Page 5 of 10

quo. See United States v. Jennings, 60 F.3d 1006, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1998) (“One has the intent
to corrupt an official only if he makes a payment or promise with the intent to engage in a fairly
specific quid pro quo with that official.”). Accordingly, the payments by Mr. Wiseman for
meals and entertainment expenses in connection with legitimate business travel were not
intended as bribes in the manner required for a charge under Section 666.
B. The North Carolina Misdemeanor Anti-Gift Statute Does Not Support a Federal
Bribery Prosecution.
N.C.G.S § 133-32(a), the NC statute governing gratuities to public officials, provides as
follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any contractor, subcontractor, or supplier who:

(1) Has a contract with a governmental agency; or
(2) Has performed under such a contract within the past year; or
(3) Anticipates bidding on such a contract in the future to make gifts or to
give favors to any officer or employee of a governmental agency who is
charged with the duty of:
(1) Preparing plans, specifications, or estimates for public contract;
or
(2) Awarding or administering public contracts; or
(3) Inspecting or supervising construction.
(emphasis added).2
2
There is a serious question as to whether this statute even applies to Mr. Wiseman, who is a professional engineer.
Several provisions of the North Carolina statutes differentiate between “contractors” and architects, engineers, and
land surveyors. Indeed, Article 3 of the North Carolina General Statutes is captioned as “Regulation of Contractors
for Public Works” and subparagraph 2 of N.C.G.S. § 133-23 defines “persons” as “any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other entity formed for the purpose of doing business as a contractor, subcontractor, or
supplier.” By contrast, the practice of professional engineering is specifically regulated by N.C.G.S. § 89C. An
“engineer” is defined as a “person who, by reason of special knowledge and use of the mathematical, physical and
engineering sciences and the principles and methods of engineering analysis and design, acquired by engineering
education and engineering experience, is qualified to practice engineering.” N.C.G.S. § 89C-3(2).
Page 6 of 10

The provision of that subsection applicable to government employees provides as follows:
It shall also be unlawful for any officer or employee of a governmental

agency who is charged with the duty of:
(1) Preparing plans, specifications, or estimates for public contracts;
or
(2) Awarding or administering public contracts; or
(3) Inspecting or supervising construction
willfully to receive or accept any such gift or favor.
Id. (emphasis added).
The subsection applicable to government employees, who are unquestionably in the best
position to know the prohibition against receiving gifts or favors,3 requires proof of willfulness,4
whereas the statute is silent as to the criminal intent required for “contractors” to violate the
statute.5
The statutory language (or, more appropriately, the absence thereof) with regard to mens
rea is problematic: the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that, absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary, either a mens rea element must be read into a criminal statute or
the statutory provision will be held unconstitutional. And here, recent Supreme Court precedent
3
As the Indictment points out, the County had a policy prohibiting employees from accepting gifts or things of value
from persons having business dealings with the County. Indictment, para. 32. Greene, Creighton, and Stone clearly
should have been aware of that policy. But, the policy by its terms is inapplicable to Mr. Wiseman or others doing
business with the County. And, more importantly, there is no reason why Mr. Wiseman would have known of the
existence of that policy, or should have been aware of it, given the fact that not one of the County’s employees ever
protested about the fact that he was providing them with travel and entertainment during business travel and client
cultivation opportunities.
4
“Willfulness” has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as “a voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty.” United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (emphasis added). Willfulness under North Carolina
cases imposes an even higher burden: “Our courts have defined willfulness as ‘an act done deliberately and
purposefully in violation of law, and without authority, justification, or excuse.’ The term has also been defined as
more than deliberation or conscious choice; it also imports a bad faith disregard for authority and the law.” State v.
Phair, 193 N.C. App. 591, 594 (NC Appeals 2008) (citations omitted). Accord State v. Cook, 814 S.E. 2d (N.C.
Appeals 2018) (same).
.
5
By contrast, the North Carolina bribery statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-218, like the federal bribery statutes, requires proof
that the defendant acted “with the corrupt intent to influence the recipient’s action . . .” State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325,
328 (1953). See also State v. Hair, 114 N.C. App. 464, 467 (N.C. App. 1994).
Page 7 of 10

would suggest that a mens rea requirements must be read into the N.C Statute: “The fact that the
statute does not specify any required mental state, however, does not mean that none exists. We
have repeatedly held that mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal
intent should not be read as dispensing with it.” Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009
(2015) (citations and quotations omitted) (reading mens rea requirement into federal crime of
communicating threats).
The Court emphasized the “basic principle” that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be
criminal.” Id. Affirming this principle, the Court required that a mens rea requirement be read
into the statute at issue because criminal statutes must “include broadly applicable scienter
requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them.” Id. (emphasis added)
(citations and quotations omitted).6
North Carolina cases also hold that statutes that do not contain a mens rea element are the
exception to the general rule that criminal convictions should not be based on an unknowing
violation of the law. State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 80 (1950) (“It is axiomatic at common law that
a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent. . . . [T]he existence
of guilty knowledge on the part of the accused is to be regarded as essential to criminality, even
though it is not required by the statutes in express terms.”); Letchworth v. Gay, 874 F. Supp. 107,
6
Similarly, the Court held in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) that the federal statute prohibiting
possession of a machine gun required the government to prove that the defendant had knowledge that weapon would
fire automatically, despite the absence of any mens rea element in the statute:
As we have observed, the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo–American criminal jurisprudence. . . . Relying on the strength of the traditional
rule, we have stated that offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored, and have
suggested that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense
with mens rea as an element of a crime.
Id. at 605-606 (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted).
Page 8 of 10

109 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (“It offends traditional notions of justice to punish a person for an inadvertent
or negligent act when that person did not intend to commit a crime. Thus, scienter or intent should
be an element of a crime absent clear contrary legislative direction.”) (citing Welch, 232 N.C. at
80) ((emphasis added); accord State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 273 (N.C. App. 1976) (“Our
traditional rule, however, is that when the General Assembly does not specify whether guilty
knowledge, or mens rea, is required the necessity of its existence will nonetheless be implied.”).7
For all of these reasons, proof of willfulness must be shown before imposing criminal
punishment for making a gift to a NC government employee.8 Here, there is no evidence that EIC
or Mr. Wiseman acted with any such willfulness. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary.9
7
The alternative to reading a mens rea element into the statute is to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. See e.g.
United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 2014) (courts will read into a criminal statute “any scienter
necessary” to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional); United States v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D.C.
DC 1963) (“[A] claim that a statute on its face contains no requirement of mens rea or scienter is no ground for holding
the statute unconstitutional, since such requirement may well be read into the statute by the courts.”). Cf. Vanatta v.
Oregon Government Ethics Committee, 347 OR. 449, 468 (2009 (en banc) (statute prohibiting lobbyists from offering
gifts to public officials valued at more than $50.00 or any payment of expenses or entertainment held unconstitutional).
8
A non-exhaustive survey of anti-gift statutes from other states further demonstrates that some mens rea element is
required before a violation of the statute can result in criminal punishment. See e.g. Iowa Code §§ 68B.22(2), 68B.34
(restricted donor prohibited from making gifts to public official but prosecution of violation as a misdemeanor requires
proof that the gift was “knowingly and intentionally given.”); Virginia Code § 2.2-4377 (conviction for violation of
anti-gift statute requires proof of willfulness); Massachusetts General Law 268 § 3 (prohibition against gifts requires
proof that the donor “knowingly . . . for or because of any official act” or with the intent “to influence” such
government employee).
9
For almost 28 years, Mr. Wiseman was employed by the multi-national engineering firm, CDM/Smith, which has
both an in-house legal department and a full-time compliance officer. Yet during the entire period of his employment,
Mr. Wiseman was instructed to pay for and was routinely reimbursed for travel and entertainment for government
clients in North Carolina. Additionally, throughout his career with CDM/Smith, Mr. Wiseman witnessed and heard
anecdotal statements of other government clients being provided with gifts, such as golf outings and fishing trips, as
well as meals, travel, and entertainment on a regular basis. And, when he began working as a subcontractor for
PETRA engineering, the business practices were the same as those he had learned at CDM/Smith. None of the
government employees with whom Mr. Wiseman did business ever suggested that it would be improper for him to
pay for typical client travel and entertainment expenses or that such conduct was illegal under North Carolina law or
violated any County policy. For all of these very reasonable reasons, Mr. Wiseman believed at all times during his
career as a professional engineer, that client cultivation, while on legitimate business trips and during business
development opportunities, permitted him to pay for travel and entertainment expenses of his clients.
Page 9 of 10

For these reasons, Mr. Wiseman did not have the requisite mens rea to violate the North
Carolina anti-gift statute or of any federal crime based on the payment of travel and entertainment
expenses for government employees in connection with legitimate business or business
development trips.
C. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, Mr. Wiseman could not properly be charged
with a federal bribery offense based on the payment of travel and entertainment expenses in
connection with legitimate business travel or client cultivation. Nor, could he be charged with a
federal crime based on the North Carolina anti-gift statute. Therefore, none of the travel an
entertainment expenses except the travel completely unrelated to any legitimate business activities
should be considered as relevant conduct in the sentencing of Mr. Wiseman.
Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of August 2019.
DABROWNLAW LLC
/s/david a. brown, sr.
David A. Brown, Sr.
NC Bar No. 48997
360 Rosemore Place
Rock Hill, SC 29732
Dabrownsr79@gmal.com
(704) 654-9418
Pierson Law, LLC

/s/ Holly A. Pierson
Holly A. Pierson
GA Bar No. 579655
3127 Maple Drive, NE
Atlanta, GA 30305
hpierson@piersonlawllc.com
(404) 353-2316
Page 10 of 10

Joe Wiseman Sentencing Memorandum

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Joe Wiseman Sentencing Memorandum

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Crim. No. 1:19-cr-17-RJC

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM AND MATERIALS

I. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JOE WISEMAN

2 Those letters are attached as Exhibits to this Memorandum.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 1 of 41

admired and loved man, even in these circumstances.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 2 of 41

and deliberative, and he is slow to anger. And, at present, he is very afraid. 4

Because of Joe’s meticulousness in keeping records and in analyzing and answering

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 3 of 41

“CDM”), he earned a master’s degree in environmental engineering in 1987 and a Master of

Carolina at Chapel Hill.

years, Joe was able to completely turn the office around. 5

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 4 of 41

and have mileage of over 200,000 or more.

humility as he educated the Government on the relevant facts and documents.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 5 of 41

children, she has really lived a dream come true.

standards and strong moral principles.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 6 of 41

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 7 of 41

through this terrible ordeal.

2. Joe, the Professional Engineer

As noted above, Joe distinguished himself as an engineer both academically and

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 8 of 41

of transporting their waste to landfills in South Carolina.

County, saving taxpayers additional millions.

10 These funds consisted of a $3 million grant and a $1 million interest-free loan.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 9 of 41

facility) for Buncombe County thanks to Joe.

Buncombe County of more than $300,000 in engineering fees alone.

year, millions of dollars over time.

failure of moral courage, and Wanda Greene.

11 Creighton Sentencing Memorandum, p. 31.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 10 of 41

near even his reduced earnings at CDM. 12

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 11 of 41

1. Industry practices and legitimate business expenses

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 12 of 41

oriented business, including the practice of law.

entertainment expenses associated with business-related travel were considered legitimate

Importantly, CDM drew no distinction between private companies and governme nt

with whom CDM did business.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 13 of 41

expenses were or could be considered improper in any way. 16

was always reimbursed.

business related trips at Joe’s expense.

2. Greene extorts Joe

taking over these contracts with the County.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 14 of 41

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 15 of 41

as long as she got what she wanted.

completely underestimated the depths of Greene’s greed. 19

destination and the month and year of the desired trip. 20

20 See Creighton Sentencing Memorandum, p. 3.

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 16 of 41

3. What is Not Before the Court in Joe’s Case

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 17 of 41

Buncombe County taxpayers.

comprehensive forensic examination of Joe’s contracts, performed a comparative analysis of more

Case 1:19-cr-00017-RJC-WCM Document 28 Filed 08/21/19 Page 18 of 41