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YU VS REYES-CARPIO
GR NO. 189207
FACTS: Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued
an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence
dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for
resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked.
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of
the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On
September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the
case for resolution, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations (incidental
issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on
declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. Eric added
that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration
of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so
that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was
being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the
said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on
nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of
the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric
opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion,
saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was
denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for
certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the main issue of nullity of
marriage must be submitted for resolution first
before the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations.
RULING:
NO.
It appears in the records that the Orders in
question, or what are alleged to have been exercised
with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory
orders. An interlocutory order is one which “does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that
the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion and that those were patently erroneous.
Considering that the requisites that would justify
certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an
appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial
court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not
disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents
on custody, support, and property relations. It is
clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge
merely deferred the reception of evidence relating
to custody, support, and property relations. And the
trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations
after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family
Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, including custody, support
of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based on
the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time
when a decision granting the petition is already at
hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely,
the trial court, or more particularly the family court,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common children,
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon
entry of judgment granting the petition. And
following the pertinent provisions of the Court En
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is
undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code
state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.
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Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the
deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial
court may receive evidence on the subject incidents
after a judgment granting the petition but before
the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought
to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion
that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence
on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous
and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative
and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a
trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence
submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-
Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner,
much less in a way that is patently gross and
erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders
deferring the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. To reiterate, this
decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-
Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave
abuse of discretion on her part.
Dino v Dino
GR 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
The Parties were once childhoon sweethearts who
lived together and later got separated. On January
1998 petitioner and respondent got married.
On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriage against
respondent citing psychological incapacity under
article 36.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family
assets.

Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt
him.
RTC declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code”
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code
HELD:
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch
102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless
of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there
is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner
and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
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Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40
and 45 are governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs
the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao
675 SCRA 642
FACTS :
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is the
offending spouse.Neither party filed a motion for

reconsideration and appeal within the period 20
days7 later or after more than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed
before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the
RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.
ISSUE :Whether the offending spouse acquired
vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:N0,In the present case, the petitioner was
accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint
that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the
trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties.
Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the
trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of
the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
UGALDE VS YSASI
GR NO 130623
FACTS: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde
(petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got
married before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951, Rev.
Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church
wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod
City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any
ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de
Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in
April 1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly
contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor
Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay
City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and
Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and
personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful
wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded
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of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal
properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial
court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her
conjugal share in respondents inheritance as per the
settlement of the estate of respondents parents,
Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on
17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979,
respectively.Petitioner also prayed for a monthly
support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in
the conjugal partnership; the appointment of a
receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and
documents signed and ratified by respondent with
third persons without her consent; and payment of
appearance and attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for dissolution of
the CPG should be dismissed.
RULING:
YES.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15
February 1951. The applicable law at the time of
their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code),
which took effect on 30 August 1950. Pursuant to
Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership
of gains.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial
separation of property results in the termination of
the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case
No. 4791 approving the parties separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175
of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court
decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was
already dissolved.
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to
approve the Compromise Agreement because the case
was for custody, and the creditors were not given
notice by the parties, as also required under Article
191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the
Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment
upon a compromise agreement has all the force and
effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only
upon parties thereto and their privies, and not
binding on third persons that are not parties to it.
HEIRS OF GO vs. SERVACIO
G.R. No. 157537
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of
sale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver
affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio
Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said
property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his
son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein
respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the
petitioners demanded the return of the property, but
Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence this
case for the annulment of sale of the property. The
contention of the petitioner was that following
Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property
to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta
was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the
Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article
130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the
want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not
render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to
the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to
the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not
also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within
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the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio
was void for being made without prior liquidation? –
RULING:
NO, Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the
termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or
extra-judicially within one year from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership
property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Matthews vs. Taylor
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, Benjamin Taylor (Benjamin), a
British subject, married Joselyn Taylor , a 17-year
old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage
was subsisting, Joselyn bought a 1,294 square-meter
lot in Boracay, for and in consideration of
P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin. They constructed improvements thereon
and eventually converted the property to a vacation
and tourist resort, also using Benjamin’s funds.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of
the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and
Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen.

Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise
enter into contract with third parties with respect to
their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as
lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was
signed by the parties and executed before a Notary
Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the
property and renamed the resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it
was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s)
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property,
and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s
husband, any transaction involving said property
required his consent.
ISSUE:
Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered
into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage?
RULING:
No.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely
not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens
attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another.
In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that
directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional
provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a
particular property be declared as part of their
father’s estate; that they be reimbursed the funds
used in purchasing a property titled in the name of
another; that an implied trust be declared in their
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(aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified
for their lack of consent.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin,
being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This
is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and
no declaration can be made that the subject property
was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the
Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If
the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and
right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right
that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Dar vs. Legasto
G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case
for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners
where they were sued as “Mr.and Mrs.” in the said
case. Petitioners were found guilty of failure to
comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy
Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their
respective spouses did not sign the same. Petitioner’s
contention: since what is involved in the instant case
is their common rights and interest to abode under
the system of absolute community of property, either
of the spouses can sign the petition. Revised Circular

No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and
governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent
the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving
the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a
form of forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signing of one of the spouses in
the certification substantially complies with the rule
on certification of non-forum shopping.
Held:
YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and
Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common
interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of
them in the certification substantially complies with
the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former
Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 145222
April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Civil case for damages that arose from
slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol.
RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to
pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA and SC.
Court issued a writ of execution, directing
the sheriff to collect indemnification from Erlinda.
Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient,
sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real
property on execution, and thereafter a notice of
sheriff’s sale was issued.
Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party
Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one
Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up a
sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale proceeded with the
spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder.
One year after the sale, Romulo Nicol,
husband of Erlinda filed a complaint for annulment of
Certificate of Sale and Damages with Preliminary
injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff
and alleged that the property was directly levied upon
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without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda.
ISSUE: WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to
the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
NO. Article 122 of FC explicitly provides that
payment of personal debt contracted by the husband
or wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except in so far
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The
CPG has no duty to make payments for the liability of
debtor-spouse.
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 124642
February 23, 2004
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.
(PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President
Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with
the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed
a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI.
Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to
attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T.
Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set
Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that
the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff
were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses
aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of
the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling
factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal
nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is
registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in
this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the
petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not

contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s
profession or business.
ISSUE: WON the 100,000 shares of stocks may be
levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the
marriage subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the
petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were
issued to and registered in its corporate books in the
name of the petitioner-husband when the said
corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This
was done during the subsistence of the marriage of
the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are,
thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership
property of the petitioners. The private respondent
failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money.The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks
were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp
Investment Philippines solely in the name of the
petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that
the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership,
owned the same.
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now
Article 121[2 and 3]of the Family Code of the
Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to
prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s
act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in
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behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred
from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a
contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded
to the conjugal partnership.
SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY
vs.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C.
MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO
A. LOPA
G.R. No. 143382
November 29, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through
its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner
approved the application and entered into a credit
line agreement with respondent corporation. It was
secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves
jointly and severally with respondent corporation for
the payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all
its debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent corporation and
individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real
and personal properties of respondent corporation
and individual respondent Martinez including the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found
that it did not redound to the benefit of his family,
hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on
the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC's
decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held
liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the
husband to accommodate a third party

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of
Appeals. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the
conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de
Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly
intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the
husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and
services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” In other words, where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such
obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services
are given to another person or entity and the husband
acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the
credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of
the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for
respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s
benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez
benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden.
Munoz, Jr. vs Ramirez (spouses)
FACTS: On April 6, 1989, Eliseo(husband), a Bureau
of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged a property
owned by Erlinda(with consent) to the GSIS. This was
Page |9
done to secure a loan of 136,500.00 housing loan
payable within 20 years. The money was then used to
construct a 2 story residential home.
It is alleged that Petitioner(Munoz) granted the
respondents a loan of P600,000.00 which is secured
by the disputed property. The deal was that
Petitioner would give Erlinda 200k advance to cancel
the GSIS mortage and the balance of 402k after the
title is surrendered to petitioner.
When Erlinda gave the title to the petitioner the
husband did not sign the title which prompted the
petitioner to not give the balance of 402k and want
to cancel the mortage. Since Erlinda already used the
200k to pay for the GSIS Loan and could not return
the 200k, Petitioner kept the title.
Sometime in 1993, the respondents discovered that
their previous title named after them has been
cancelled in favor of the petitioner.
RTC RULING
The RTC dismissed the complaint,
CA RULING
The CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and
set aside the RTC decision.
THE ISSUE
whether the subject property is paraphernal or
conjugal
RULING: Paraphernal
As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to be conjugalunless the
contrary is proved. In this case, clearevidence that
the wife inherited the lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the
wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to
Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the
CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True,
respondents were married during the effectivity of
the CC and thus its provisions should govern their
property relations. With the enactment of the FC

however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal
partnership of gains superseded those of the CC.
Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and
not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which
supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of
the improvement and any resulting increase in the
value are more than the value of the property at the
time of the improvement, the entire property shall
belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement for the cost of
improvement.
In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of
the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it isfairly reasonable to
assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the contribution paid by the
husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife at the time she
contracted with MUNOZ; the written consent of the
husband was not necessary.
Abrenica vs Abrenica G.R. No. 180572
FACTS:
Petitioner and Respondent were law firm partners.
The respondent filed a case against the Petitioner to
return partnership funds representing profits from
the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover
from petitioner retainer fees that he received from
two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging
that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to
his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an
Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her
step-children owned a number of the personal
properties sought to be levied and that it was under
their Absolute Community Property.
A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3
January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the
Petitioner’s properties, he has been previously
married to another woman but their marriage has
already been dissolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joena had the right to the claim.
P a g e | 10
Held:
No, the two of these step children were already of
legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of
the children, parental authority over him belongs to
his parents. Absent any special power of attorney
authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children,
her claim cannotbe sustained. Under Art. 92, par. (3)
of the Family Code excludes from the community
property the property acquired before the marriage
of a spouse whohas legitimate descendants by a
former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if
any, of that property. Thus, neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second
marriage.
WILLEM BEUMER VS. AVELINA AMORES
GR 195670, December 3, 2012
FACTS: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married
Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage
was declared null by the RTC on November 10, 2000
by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem
filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
and distribution of properties which he claimed were
acquired during their marriage.
BY PURCHASE: (a.)Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated
survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, including a residential house constructed
thereon (b.)Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house constructed thereon
(c.)Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre (d.)Lot 4,
Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 &
2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
BY INHERITANCE:(a.) 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the
Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m. (b.) 1/15 of Lot
2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that
appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
The respondent averred that she and petitioner did
not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-
I by way of inheritance. During trial, petitioner
testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received
from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient

income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed
that the joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to
Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. During
trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted
before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to assail the
decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD: The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners
may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or
structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned
by the parties. While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise
claimed that his personal disability funds were used
to acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on the
grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the
subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. A contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates
no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Pacific Ace v Yanagisawa
G.R. No. 175303, [April 11, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending
litigation, made in open court and embodied in a court
order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person
relying thereon. The latter may seek the annulment
of actions that are done in violation of such
undertaking.
FACTS:
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanesenational,
and Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn), a Filipina,
P a g e | 11
contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall
of Manila.
On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-
meter townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Niño,
Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque townhouse unit).
The Registry of Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P.
Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa,
Japanese citizen[,] both of legal age.”
In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of
bigamy (nullity of marriage case). During the
pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He
asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her
name. At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and
her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of
the properties registered in her name during the
pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application
and motion moot. Said undertaking was annotated on
the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit or TCT No.
99791.
Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of
P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real
estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the
Parañaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.
The instrument was submitted to the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same
date.
At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the
nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA.
The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s
marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of their
registered properties, including the Parañaque
townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC
did not lift or dissolve its Order on Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the
properties registered in her name.
Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT
No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage as a violation of

the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the
annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case)
against Evelyn and PAFIN.
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of
the October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn. It
admitted, however, that it did not conduct any
verification of the title with the Registry of Deeds
of Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good,
friendly and trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained
that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of
the REM because a foreign national cannot own real
properties located within the Philippines.
Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October
2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the
property with her own funds and that she has
exclusive ownership thereof.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which
allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a
co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists
that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution
with its declaration that an alien can have an interest
in real property located in the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be
part of the community property of a Filipina and her
foreigner spouse;
2. Whether a real property registered solely in the
name of the Filipina wife is paraphernal or conjugal;
3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned
above when the marriage is declared void?
4. Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue
of ownership, even as the same issue was already
ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in
the CA.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
RATIO:
P a g e | 12
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did notmake
any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn
owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled
that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over
the said question and should not have been interfered
with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified
that it was improper for the Parañaque RTC to have
reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the
Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because
it was essential for the determination of the validity
of the REM.
The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows
that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as
his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji
invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not
to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed
in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC),
and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT
No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity
to own real property as their defense to the suit.
They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to
own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to
the REM contract for its validity. But this argument
is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the
right asserted by Eiji. This defense does not negate
Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of
the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal
with the registered property, to the annotations
entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in
dismissing the complaint based on this defense.
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate
court’s ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN
executed the REM in complete disregard and violation
of the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and
the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did not dispute
the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on
Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the Parañaque
townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is
a mortgagee in bad faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s
commitment not to dispose of or encumber the

property, is akin to an injunction order against the
disposition or encumbrance of the property.
Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of
a standing injunction order are voidable as to the
party enjoined and third parties who are not in good
faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is
issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of
the offending actions.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need
to discuss the other issues raised by the petitioner.
ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller got married and lived in Germany
owned by the respondent parents but then they
decided to reside in the Philippines permanently. The
respondent had inherit the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used to proceeds for
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and he
registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of
respondent to the petitioner, the spouses eventually
separated.
The respondent filed a petition for separation of
properties before RTC Quezon City. The court
granted said petition and ordered equal partition of
personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during
the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property
the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled
to reimbursement.
P a g e | 13
Held:
No, Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
There is an express prohibition against foreigners
owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that
constitutional prohibition, he put the property under
the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly
what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity.
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.
MARIA B. CHING v. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR.,
et al.
506 SCRA 735 (2006)
In line with the policy of the State, the law
emphatically prohibits the sale of properties between
spouses.
Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for
recovery of property and damages against Maria
Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of
sale and of transfer certificate and the issuance of a
new one. Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real
owners of the property involved. They further
contend that it was after their father‘s death that
they found out that a contract of sale involving the
same property has been executed by their father and
common-law wife Ching. However, Ching claimed that
she is the actual owner of the property as it was she
who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed
the complaint against Ching, declaring that there is
no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as
null and void, fictitious and simulated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared null and void
the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No.
138405, in favor of the Maria Ching, was null and void
for being contrary to morals and public policy
HELD:
The subject property having been acquired during the
existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and
Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the court
find no evidence on record to conclude otherwise.
The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife
Epifania have been estranged for years and that he
and defendant-appellant Maria Ching, have in fact
been living together as common-law husband and wife,
there has never been a judicial decree declaring the
dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor their
conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that
the property located at Cebu City belongs to the
conjugal partnership. Assuming that the subject
property was not conjugal, still the court cannot
sustain the validity of the sale of the property by
Joseph, Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching,
there being overwhelming evidence on records that
they have been living together as common-law
husband and wife.
The court therefore finds the contract of sale in
favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching null and
void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
The purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr.
in favor of his concubine, undermines the stability of
the family, a basic social institution which public
policy vigilantly protects.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura
G.R. No. 146683. Nov. 22, 2001
FACTS:
P a g e | 14
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana
became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima
died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share
consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco.
Since Francisco do not have any children to take care
of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his
niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers
since they slept in the same room. On the other
hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his
mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she
was a mere helper who could enter the master’s
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that
Francisco was too old for her. She denied having
sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces
got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow
started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as
househelper though her family was provided with
food and lodging.Francisco’s health deteriorated
andbecame bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals
from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died,
he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where
he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq
m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the
same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under
his name. This was made in consideration of the 10
year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered
by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot
received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews
and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter
vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was
valid.
HELD:The court in this case considered a sufficient
proof of common law relationship wherein donation is
not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony
of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila
did not demand her wages is an indication that she
was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
SSS v Davac
G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966
Facts:
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of
Lianga Bay, became a member of the SSS. He
designated Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and
indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He
died then each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac
and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death
benefit with the SSS. The deceased contracted two
marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano
and the second with Candelaria Davac. The processing
was withheld. The SSS filed this petition praying
that the two parties be required to litigate their
claims.
The SSS issued the resolution naming Davac as the
valid beneficiary. Not satisfied with the resolution,
Lourdes Tuplano brought the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Social Security
Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive
the death benefits in question.
Held: Yes. SSS resolution affirmed.
P a g e | 15
Ratio:
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or
total and permanent disability under such conditions
as the Commission may define, …his beneficiaries,
shall be entitled to the following benefit…
The beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's
employer is the one entitled to the death benefits.
The appellant contends that the designation made in
the person of the second and bigamous wife is null
and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of
the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife of
her share in the conjugal property as well as of her
own and her child's legitime in the inheritance.
As to the first point, appellant argues that a
beneficiary under the Social Security System
partakes of the nature of a beneficiary in life
insurance policy and, therefore, the same
qualifications and disqualifications should be applied.
Article 739 and 2012 of the civil code prohibits
persons whoi cannot receive donations from being
beneficiaries of a policy.
The provisions mentioned in Article 739 are not
applicable to Candelaria Davac because she was not
guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she
had knowledge of the previous marriage of her
husband Petronilo.
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the
benefits accruing from membership in the Social
Security System do not form part of the properties
of the conjugal partnership of the covered member.
They are disbursed from a public special fund
created by Congress in pursuance to the declared
policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually
and perfect a social security system which ... shall
provide protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death."
The sources of this special fund are from salary
contributions.
Under other provisions, if there is a named
beneficiary and the designation is not invalid, it is not
the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive
the benefits (unless they are the designated

beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there are
no designated beneficiaries or when the designation
is void, that the laws of succession are applicable.
The Social Security Act is not a law of succession.
SUMBAD v. CA
308 SCRA 75
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of decision
of CA
Facts: Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata’s
husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law
marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a
certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at,
Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983,
Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at
property in favor of the private respondents who
purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax
Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the
seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in
question.
In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait
brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of
deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with
damages against private respondents, alleging that
they are the children and compulsory heirs of George
and Agata. They claim that after the death of their
mother, their father sold the Otucan property and
used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential
lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983,
Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at property
to private respondents without their knowledge and
consent. They further alleged that although the
private respondents were warned that the Sum-at
property did not belong to Maria they still purchased
the lots from Maria and that Maria had no right to
sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale are null
and void and did not transfer title to private
respondents. During the trial, petitioners and
defense presented several witnesses.
Issues:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with
respect to the forgery of the deed of donation
should be given credence.
P a g e | 16
No. The court agreed with the trial and appellate
court’s decision that Eillenger’s testimony is “vague
and incredible” and incapable of impugning the validity
of the public document. Forgery should be proven by
clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it
has the burden of proving the same. Not only is
Shirley Eillenger’s testimony difficult to believe, it
shows is had been rehearsed as she anticipated the
questions of petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner’s should
have presented handwriting experts to support their
claim that George’s signature on the deed of donation
was indeed a forgery.
2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under
Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a public
instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations
of immovable property.
No. Petitioners contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to do so.
However, the acknowledgment clause states that the
person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court
who acted “for and in the absence of the clerk of
court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos.
270 and 641, to administer oaths. In accordance with
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed, it is to be presumed that the deputy
clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in
this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court.
3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133,
CC
No. Art 133 provides that “every donation between
spouses during the marriage shall be void. This
prohibition does not apply when the donation takes
effect after the death of the donor. Neither does
this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing.” This prohibition extends to
common-law relations (Matabuena v. Cervantes). In
fact, Art 87, FC provides that “every donation or
grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons

living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.” However, this point is being raised for the
first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded,
petitioners were unable to present evidence in
support of such a claim. The evidence on record does
not show whether George was married to Maria and,
if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not
married to George, evidence should have been
presented to show that at the time the deed of
donation was executed, George and Maria were still
maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice tait’s (one
of the witnesses presented) testimone is only to the
effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother.
There is no evidence on record that George and Maria
continuously maintained common-law relations until
the date when the donation was made (April 2, 1974)
4. WON the petitioners’ claim that they only
learned of the sales to the private respondents in
1988 when they visited Maria because she was
seriously ill is admissible
No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before
claiming their inheritance and are thus guilty of
laches which precludes them from assailing the
donation made by their father in favor of Maria.
Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exerting due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
5. WON Lanoy Takayeng’s testimony that
Georde gave Fani-is money to purchase the Sum-at
property means that the money came from the
proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property.
No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the
alleged meeting took place, the amount of money
given by George to Fani-is and when the purchase
took place or if the sale was consummated in
accordance with George’s instructions.
Held: Petitioners have not sufficiently shown the
nullity of private respondents’ title to the lots
purchased by them. Decision of CA affirmed.
P a g e | 17
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
FACTS:
On October 3, 1942, Aurelio Camacho married
Consejo Velasco. Twenty years after, without his
marriage being dissolved, he contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita Camacho. In 1967,
Aurelio met petitioner Nenita Bienvenido, who he
lived with from 1968 until at the time of his death in
1989. Sometime in 1982, Aurelio bought a house and
lot which was registered in his name. 2 years after,
he executed a deed of sale of the property in favor
of petitioner Nenita, the TCT was issued in her name.
After the death of Aurelio, respondent brought a
petition before the RTC seeking the annulment of the
sale of the property of petitioner. Petitioner
answered and claimed that she and Aurelio purchased
the property in question using their joint funds and
that she was a purchaser in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and
Luisita is void.
HELD:
That exception involved by respondent in accordance
with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the
remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven
year period has lapsed; That this exception cannot be
invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first
wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to
Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent
Luisita was void for being bigamous. There is no basis
for holding that the property in question was
property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and
Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
first place. Until otherwise shown in an appropriate
action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent.
During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were
married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his
sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every
donation between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered
by the prohibition because the donation was made at
the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet
married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between
live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law
is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since
the reason for the ban on donations between
spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure
being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.The court, however, said
that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean
that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between
Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.
G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969
Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a
public instrument, donated the two parcels of land to
their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the
latter’s marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took
possession of the properties, but the Certificates of
Title remained in the donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua
later executed a deed of sale of the same two
parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio.
P a g e | 18
A TCT were issued to Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo and
her daughter, Anatalia, sought the annulment of the
deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for
recovery of possession of the properties which was
granted by the court. The decision became final, and
Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua,
were installed in possession of the land.
Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint
for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar
as one-half portion thereof was concerned claiming
that in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only
neglected leaving something for his own support but
also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir,
plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
While the cases were pending, plaintiff Cipriano
Lagua died. The Court of Appeals held that the
donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced
the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervasio Lagua.
The donation was thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to
plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of 494.15 square
meters to be taken from any convenient part of the
lots.
ISSUE:
Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness
of the donation proper?
Ruling:
No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to
determine the legitime, the value of the property
left at the death of the testator shall be considered,
deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will. To the net value of
the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to
collation, at the time he made them. In other words,
before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting a
payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to collation would
be added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitimes of the compulsory

heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter
can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a
donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there
must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the
donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the
donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said that,
with the evidence then before the court, it was in any
position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation
involved here, and to order its reduction and
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.
SOLIS V. BARROSO (53 PHIL 912)
TOPIC: Article 1773
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso made
a donation of propter nuptias of the lands described
in the complaint in favor of their son AlejoLambino
and Fortunata Solis in a private document in
consideration of the marriage which the latter were
about to enter into. One of the conditions of this
donation is that in case of the death of one of the
donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would
revert to the donors while the surviving donee would
retain the other half. AlejoLambino and Fortunata
Solis were married and immediately thereafter the
donors delivered the possession of the donated lands
to them. However, doneeAlejoLambino died and in the
same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the
latter's death, Juan’s wife recovered possession of
the donated lands.
The surviving doneeFortunata Solis filed the action,
which is the subject matter of this appeal, against
the surviving donors and heirs of the deceased donor
Juan Lambino, with their respective husbands,
demanding of the defendants the execution of the
proper deed of donation according to law. The court
rendered judgment based upon Article 1279 of the
Civil Code in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 1279 of the Civil
Code is applicable
RULING:
P a g e | 19
NO, Article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to
contracts, is not applicable to the present case. The
case at bar is a donation propter nuptias which is not
valid and did not create any right, since it was not
made in a public instrument. Article 633 provides
that in order that a donation of real property may be
valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is
the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in
so far as its formal validity is concerned. Hence,
Article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court
applied is not applicable thereto. The last named
article provides that, should the law require the
execution of an instrument or any other special form
in order to make the obligations of a contract
effective, the contracting parties may compel each
other to comply with such formality from the moment
that consent has been given, and the other
requirements for the validity of the contract exist.
Suffice it to state that this article refers to
contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in
question which must be governed by the rules on
donations. It may further be noted, at first sight,
that this article presupposes the existence of a valid
contract and cannot possibly refer to the form
required in order to make it valid, which it already
has, but rather to that required simply to make it
effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events,
be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein
the form is required precisely to make it valid.
Moreover, in donations propter nuptias, the marriage
is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being
necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be
clearly inferred from Article 1333, which makes the
fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for
the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for
granted that there may be a valid donation propter
nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has
not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid
donation would be forever valid, even if the marriage
never took place, if the proper action for revocation
were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the
lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is,
so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias
is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the obligation which
may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition
necessary for the birth of the obligation.
 P a g e | 20

Valencia v Loquiao
GR 122134, October 3, 2003

FACTS:

On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda

Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias
which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated
as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son,
respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent
Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa
Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms
of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4)
parcels of land, including the land in question, as well
as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the
conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration
of the impending marriage of the donees.

The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944

and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the
back of O.C.T. No. 18383.

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15,

1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively, leaving as
heirs their six (6) children, namely: respondent
Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and
petitioner Romana, all surnamed Locquiao. With the
permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa,
petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana)
took possession and cultivated the subject land.
When respondent Romanas husband got sick
sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia
Valencia (hereafter, petitioner Constancia) took over,
and since then, has been in possession of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not acceptance of the donation by the

donees is required in donations propter nuptias.

HELD:

NO. Acceptance is not necessary for the validity of

such gifts. As provided in Article 129, implied
acceptance is sufficient.