 BAIL AND HABEAS CORPUS to be admitted for bail.

He should have exhausted all

other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The
The right to bail is not impaired by the suspension Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus [Sec. committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
13, Art. III]. absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be
a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that
(244) ENRILE V. SALAZAR the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is
186 SCRA 217
being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab
In Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, where the power.
petitioners were charged with rebellion complexed RATIO: 11 Members of the Court voted against
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, the Court abandoning Hernandez doctrine. The
ruled that based on the doctrine enunciated in People ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical
v. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against bases have withstood all subsequent
the petitioners must be read as charging simple challenges and no new ones are presented here
rebellion only; hence the petitioners are entitled to bail persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal.
before final conviction as a matter of right. The President in effect by legislative fiat
reinstated Hernandez doctrine as binding doctrine with
FACTS: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, the effect of law. The Court can do no less than
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director powerful reason against so doing.
Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC (245) PEOPLE v. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO and
of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 90- RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog,
10941. The warrant had issued on an information G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of People v. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130, it was held
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor that the right to bail cannot be denied one who is
Aurelio C. Trampe, and companions, charging charged with rebellion, a bailable offense.
Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda PanIilio, and FACTS: Private respondent Rodolfo Salas alias
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with "Commander Bilogo raised publicly and took arms
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly throughout the country against the Government of the
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the
from November 29 to December 10, 990. present Government. That from 1970 to the present,
the above named accused in their capacities as
ISSUE: Whether the court must abandon Hernandez leaders of the organizations (NPA and CPP), in
doctrine. conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of the
organizations, engaged themselves in war against the
HELD: No. Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he forces of the government, destroying property or
was denied bail although ordinarily a charge committing serious violence, and other acts in the
of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of pursuit of their unlawful purpose.
rebellion charged against him however is complexed A separate petition for habeas corpus for Salas
with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the was filed with the SC but was dismissed on the basis
intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in of the agreement of the parties under which herein he
its most serious form so as to make the penalty will remain in legal custody and will face trial before
thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no the court having custody over his person and the
such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple warrants for the arrest of his co accused are deemed
frustrated murder. What Enrile et. al. can be charged recalled and they shall be immediately released but
shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes
over their person.
such as murder or all those that may be necessary to In his Order, public respondent Judge Donato,
the commission of rebellion is absorbed, Hence, he taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
should be entitled for bail. The SC however noted that granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the
a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon the
remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that additional condition that he shall report to the court
should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition once every two (2) months within the first ten (10)
days of every period thereof. (This was challenged by made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a
petitioner by alleging that private respondent Salas fine distinction between legal custody and court
waived his right to bail in a separate case). having custody over the person in respect to Salas
and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his
ISSUE: Whether the right to bail may, under certain co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo
with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such Salas will not be released, but should remain in
right may be waived. custody.

HELD: That the Orders of respondent Judge are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
We agree with the respondent court that bail
cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in
Article 134 of the RPC to which is attached the penalty
of PM and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is
therefore, a bailable offense... Therefore, before
conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than RP.
To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other
hand, if the offense charged is punishable by RP bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong.
However, under the present state of the law,
rebellion is no longer punishable by PM and fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. RA No. 6968 amended,
among others, Article 135 of the RPC by increasing
the penalty for rebellion to RP. However, this
amendatory law cannot apply to Salas for acts
allegedly committed prior its effectivity. It is not
favorable to him. No retroactive effect.
We also agree with Petitioner that private
respondent has, however, waived his right to
bail.
CUSTODY. "Custody has been held to mean
nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also
defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a
lawful authority, or the care and possession of a
thing or person."
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 (separate
case for Habeas Corpus which was dismissed)
stipulated that Petitioner Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having custody
over his person, they simply meant that Rodolfo
Salas, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co
[223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
petitioners, who were to be released in view of the
recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they FACTS: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan,
agreed, however, to submit themselves to the court Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to
BAIL - In defining bail as the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law.
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term
"in custody of the law than that as above indicated.
The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.” It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of liberty.
Consequently, having agreed in the separate
case for Habeas Corpus (which was dismissed) to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
VALIDITY - But, is such waiver valid? We hereby rule
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional
rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not
be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
 BAIL ON APPEAL
Basco vs. Rapatalo [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-
1335, March 5, 1997] BAIL, NATURE. A better
understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal
procedure entails appreciating its nature and
purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court
and given by the accused to ensure that the accused
appears before the proper court at the scheduled time
and place to answer the charges brought against him
or her. HEARING IS MANDATORY WHEN AN
APPLICATION FOR BAIL IS MADE. When the grant
of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong.
(246) PEOPLE VS. FORTES
the police station of the said municipality to report a
rape committed against the latter by the accused.
Following this, the accused was apprehended and
charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s
provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An
appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of
bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail
on the ground that the same amounted to an undue
denial of his constitutional right to bail.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail
violated.
RULING: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall
be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined
that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced
to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right the accused.
on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part
of the court.
(247) Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals
GR 139599 (February 23, 2000)
FACTS: Maguddatu, et al were charged with murder
before the RTC of Makati for the killing of Jose S.
Pascual. They filed a motion to be admitted to bail on
the ground that the prosecution's evidence is not
strong. After partial trial on the merits, the trial court
issued an order granting Maguddatu, et. al.'s motion
for bail. On the same day, they posted bail through
AFISCO Insurance Corporation but the latter filed a
motion before the trial court praying for the
cancellation of the bail bond because of the
Maguddatu et al’s failure to renew the same upon its
expiration. There is no showing, however, of any
action by the court on said motion.
Trial court convicted Maguddatu et al of the
crime of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an
indeterminate prison term. The judgment of conviction
was promulgated in absentia. The trial court issued an
order for the immediate arrest of Maguddatu, et. al.
and their commitment to the custody of proper
authorities. While remaining at large, they filed a
Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction for
homicide with a motion to be granted provisional
liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The
trial court does nor appear to have resolved the
motion for bail pending appeal. Instead, it forwarded
the records to the Court of Appeals. CA issued a
Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause
within 10 days from notice why their appeal should not
be deemed abandoned and accordingly dismissed for
their failure to submit themselves to the proper
authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from
which they seek relief in the meantime that no bail has
yet been approved for their temporary liberty and,
further considering that the approval of the same is
discretionary and not to be presumed. A Compliance
and Motion filed by Maguddatu, et. al. explained their
failure to submit to the proper authorities. Despite the
compliance and motion, they remained at large. Court
of Appeals issued the resolution under question
denying Maguddatu, et. al.' application for bail and
ordering their arrest. Aggrieved by the foregoing
resolution, Maguddatu, et. al. brought the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Pending resolution
of the petition, the CA issued a resolution declaring
that the appeal filed is deemed abandoned and
dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124, New Rules
on Criminal Procedure, and thus ordered the RTC
Makati City to issue warrants of arrest for the
immediate apprehension and service of sentence of
ISSUE: Whether Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail
during the whole duration their case is on appeal.
HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of
all the accused except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence
of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of arrest
from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of
Appeals, Maguddatu, et. al. had remained at large. It
is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he
should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise
deprived of liberty.
The purpose of bail is to secure one's release
and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance and Motion
came short of an unconditional submission to the
court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Further, the
trial court correctly denied their motion that they be
allowed provisional liberty after their conviction, under
their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that
they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 12-94, provides that "the Court, in its
discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond capital offense originally charged, to the appellate
during the period to appeal subject to the consent court's sound discretion.
of the bondsman." The bail bond that the accused
previously posted can only be used during the 15-day (248) JOSE T. OBOSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) G.R. No. 114350. January 16, 1997
of Rule 114 which provides that the bail shall be
effective upon approval and remain in force at all In Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281, it was
stages of the case, unless sooner canceled, until the held that the principle denying bail to an accused
promulgation of the judgment of the RTC, irrespective charged with a capital offense where evidence of guilt
of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed is strong, applies with equal force to the appellant
to it. who, though convicted of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was
Moreover, for the accused to continue his nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense.
provisional liberty on the same bail bond during
the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is FACTS: On December 4, 1987, Senior State
necessary. From the record, it appears that the Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged the accused
bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two
motion in the trial court for the cancellation of counts, by separate amended informations filed with
petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ambush-
the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N.
the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, as Secretary
Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew
Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday
admitted to bail upon the court's discretion after mass.
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by Each information alleged that the killing was
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. with the attendance of the following
However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit:
granted shall be canceled if the penalty imposed is treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the
years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in respect due to the victim on account of his rank and
the third paragraph of Section 5 is present. age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The
Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of
guilt was strong.
1. Maguddatu, et. al. violated the conditions of their At the time of the commission of the two
bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance during offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual 'escapee'
the promulgation of the trial court's decision from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, where he
despite due notice and without justifiable reason, was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum
and their continued non-submission to the proper security prisoner.
authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued
constitutes violations of the conditions of their by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya,
bail. Quezon, accused Obosa was escorted out of prison to
2. Maguddatu, et. al. failed to renew their expired appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge
bail bond, as shown by a Motion filed by AFISCO needed his presence so that the judge could inquire
Insurance Corporation for the cancellation of about the whereabouts of the accused therein. While
petitioners' bail bond. accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
3. Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that participate in the commission of the double murder
their application for bail would be granted as a now charged against him as principal for the ambush-
matter of course precisely because it is a matter slaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver.
of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated
appeal effectively deprived the trial court of its decision and on the same occasion, accused
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked
appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional
filing of such notice. It has been held that trial liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted accused
courts would be well advised to leave the matter Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each
of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the case.
 On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a
bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through
Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the
lower court approved. On the same day, June 4, 1990,
the lower court issued an order of release. The prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary released
accused Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding
that, as hereinabove stated, at the time of the
commission of the double murder, accused Obosa
was serving a prison term for robbery."
Respondent People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed with respondent Court
an urgent motion, praying for cancellation of
petitioner's bail bond.
Respondent Court issued its first questioned
Resolution: a) canceling petitioner's bail bond, b)
nullifying the trial court's order of May 31, 1990 which
granted bail to petitioner, and c) issuing a warrant for
his immediate arrest.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a
matter of right and to enjoy the bail granted by the
RTC in Makati.
RULING: In this case, although the accused is
charged with murder on two counts, and evidence of
guilt is strong, the lower court found him guilty of
homicide also on two (2) counts. An appeal by the
accused throws the whole case open for review and
this includes the penalty, the indemnity and the
damages awarded by the trial court which may be
increased. The appellate court may find the accused
guilty of the original crime charged and impose on him
the proper penalty therefor. By virtue of the appeal,
the conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is
stayed in the meantime. Hence, the accused is back
to the original situation as he was before judgment
that is, one charged with capital offenses where
evidence of guilt is strong. Bail must be denied.
To resolve this issue, this court refer to Section
13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."
In sum, this court rules that bail cannot be
granted as a matter of right even after an accused,
who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his
conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for
bail considering that the accused on appeal may still
be convicted of the original capital offense charged
and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still
subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to
leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser
crime than the capital offense originally charged, to
the appellate court's sound discretion.
This court also holds that the trial court had
failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution
required under and mandated by our statutes and
rules, for, aside from being too hasty in granting bail
immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's
previous escape from legal confinement as well as his
prior convictions.
Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should
be commended for its vigilance, discretion and
steadfastness. In ruling against bail, it even scoured
the records and found that treachery attended the
killing thereby justifying its action. The trial court's
literal interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully
debunked by the appellate courts' excellent
disquisition on the rationale of the applicable
rules. Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter
that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life." Law should
not be read and interpreted in isolated academic
abstraction nor even for the sake of logical symmetry
but always in context of pulsating social realities and
specific environmental facts. Truly, "the real essence
of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice."
 STANDARDS FOR FIXING BAIL
Standards for fixing bail. In Sec. 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, among the factors to be
considered by the judge in fixing bail are the
financial ability of the accused, the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the penalty for the
offense charged, the character and reputation of
the accused, his age and health, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of his
appearing at the trial, the forfeiture of other bonds
by him, the fact that he was a fugitive from justice
when arrested, and the pendency of other cases in
which he is under bond. See de la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1; Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA
312. In Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra.,the bail of
P5.5- million recommended by the Solicitor
General for the provisional liberty of the accused
who had already been convicted by the trial court
in an estafa case, was held to be excessive, as
bail is not intended to assume the civil liability of
the accused.
 RULE 114, SEC. 9
Sec. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. – The judge who
issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix
a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but
not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give
bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the
accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the
trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the
accused is on bail. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
(249) Villasenor vs. Abano
FACTS: Petitioner, a mere government employee,
earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and the sole
bread winner of a family of five, was charged with the
murder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to
a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k. The petitioner
on May 29 posted a property bond and was set
at provisional liberty. However, respondent Provincial
Fiscal amended the information, now accusing
the petitioner with “Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority with Murder" before the
arraignment on the murder charge. So on August
7, respondent judge cancelled the petitioner’s bond
and ordered his immediate arrest.
On September 9 upon petitioner’s motion to
reconsider, the respondent judge resolved to admit
petitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond
of P60k. On September 15, on petitioner’s motion that
original bond previously given be reinstated,
respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in
real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be
posted only by residents of the province
of Marinduque actually staying, therein" with
properties which "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."
On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for
preliminary injunction to SC, seeking to set aside
respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9
and 15, and to reinstate the bail bond approved on
May 29(original bond), charging the respondent judge
of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction
and w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation
of the Constitution and the ROC in issuing the
disputed orders. On Oct 3 the Court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC
allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal
case to avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether the condition that the property bond
be posted only by "residents of the province
of Marinduque actually staying therein" is within the
power of the respondent judge.
RULING: YES. Bondsmen in criminal cases, residing
outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach of
the processes of its courts. Bail is given to secure
appearance of the accused. If bondsmen reside in
faraway places, even if within the Philippines, the
purpose of bail may be frustrated.
Weighing as heavily against petitioner's case
is the fact that a reading of his petition fails of an
averment that the requisite exacted that bondsmen be
residents of and staying in Marinduque would cause
him prejudice. The burden of his arguments solely is
that such a condition runs counter to the rules of court
(Section 9, Rule 114,Rules of Court1).
The reason why respondent judge issued such
condition: it is hard to send notices to people outside
of the province through registered mail accompanied
by return cards which in many instances have
not been received in court when trial comes and when
the parties fail to appear, there is no way of knowing
whether the notices have been duly received;
therefore, he cannot order the confiscation of the bond
and the arrest of the accused because he is not sure
whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that
sending telegrams to people outside the province is
costly, and the court cannot afford to incur
much expenses.
(250) DE LA CAMARA VS. ENAGE
41 SCRA 1 (1971)
FACTS: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of
Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested and
detained for his alleged participation in the killing of 14
and the wounding of 12 other laborers. Thereafter,the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and
another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his
co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato
Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then
came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with
the lower court, premised on the assertion that there
was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident.
He likewise maintained his innocence.The
Judge issued an order granting de la Camara's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure
on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la
Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity, but offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color
fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony
amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but
the information charging multiple murder and at the same time being required to post such an
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated exorbitant sum.
murder.
What aggravates the situation is that the lower
The Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad court judge would apparently yield to the command of
Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious
telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution
"is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to
either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la believe that any person in the position of petitioner
Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the would under the circumstances be unable to resist
amount. The Judge however remained adamant. De thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he
la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the must have been to a state of desperation. In the same
Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
escaped from the provincial jail. excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
ISSUE: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in
the determination of the amount of bail, excessive It would have been more forthright if he were
enough to discourage the accused from fleeing. informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of. There would have been no disappointment
HELD: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be
of expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why
excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there
he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What the
were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
from the Supreme Court.
mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the (251) Almeda vs. Villaluz
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition GR No. L-31665, August 6, 1975
against excessive bail.
FACTS: Petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong
As construed in the latest American decision, Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the
"the sole permissible function of money bail is to crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. The amount
assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared of the bond recommended for the provisional release
that 'bail set at a higher figure than an amount of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is respondent judge with a direction that it be posted
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." Nothing entirely in cash. Almeda asked the trial court to allow
can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond
order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of required of him. This request was denied, and so was
an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de
the amended information imputed habitual
la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda.
charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal,
the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a
multiple frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is previous hearing for amendment of the information so
clearly violative of this constitutional provision. as to include allegations of recidivism and habitual
delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The trial
Under the circumstances, there being only two court granted the respondent fiscal's motion in open
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of
murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for the original information and, then and there, entered
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the his amendment by annotating the same on the back of
present case that the Department of Justice did the document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two dismissal of the charge on the ground of double
jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for
reconsideration were denied in open court. in an order dated February 17,1999. After the records
of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals,
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has the petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail
authority to require a strict cash bond and disallow the For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant
petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of
provisional liberty. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor
HELD: As defined in Section 1 of Rule 114 of the General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post
Rules of Court, bail is "the security required and given bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
law, that he will appear before any court in which his the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail area and that he will remain to be so until final
bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. private complainant."
In this case, the accused, as of right, is entitled Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the
to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his
with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is right against excessive bail. A motion for
strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the
and may not be denied even where the accused has amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was
previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999.
absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an Hence, this petition.
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that
"EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED." ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse
This is logical because the imposition of an of discretion in fixing the bail of the provisional liberty
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5
have thus held that "where conditions imposed upon a million?
defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to RULING: Although it cannot be controverted that the
bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our supervisory Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations
powers to provide the required remedy." and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to
The condition that the accused may have grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of
provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor
bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the
transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose lower court and the weight of the evidence against
of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00
required by the court, and there should be no is more reasonable.
suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
revenue on the part of the government. Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the
following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(252) YAP VS COURT OF APPEALS (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
GR NO 141529, June 06, 2001 (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
In Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra.,the bail of P5.5- (d) Character and reputation of the accused;
million recommended by the Solicitor General for the (e) Age and health of the accused;
provisional liberty of the accused who had already (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
been convicted by the trial court in an estafa case, (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the
was held to be excessive, as bail is not intended to trial;
assume the civil liability of the accused. (h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive
FACTS: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to from justice when arrested; and
P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused
.
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City He filed a notice is on bail.
of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty Under the circumstances of this case, we find
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure
order and the requirement that petitioner inform the
court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of
bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious,
we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to
bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the Court. The amount should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when
required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent
to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in
this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot
allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
 STANDARDS FOR FIXING BAIL
RULE 114, SEC. 9
over the case and he allegedly exhibited bias and
partiality by asking leading questions to implicate
complainant as co-accused in the criminal case.
Judge Cañon then issued a warrant of arrest not only
against Jessie Cabañero but also against complainant
Guillerma, the mother. On October 15, 1998,
policemen arrested the complainant and detained.
She was released after posting bail, which could not
be issued and approved in her name because she
was not an accused in Criminal Case No. 4036-H.
Respondent judge pegged the bail at thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00. When her son was
arrested, he also posted bail amounting to
P30,000.00. She alleged that considering the value of
the property allegedly stolen, the bail required was
excessive. Respondent judge explained that
complainant was a principal by inducement and that
the arrest of the complainant was based on his
findings. On April 24, 2000, respondent judge died.
The cessation from office of respondent judge due to
death does not per se warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service. Since the instant administrative
complaint was filed before respondent's death on April
24, 2000, the Court retains authority to pursue the
administrative complaint against him.

Sec. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. – The judge who ISSUE: Whether the judge imposed excessive bail.
issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix
a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but HELD: Yes, We find respondent's interpretation of his
not limited to, the following factors: powers under the Revised Rules of Court far-fetched.
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail; Respondent judge imposed excessive bail.
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense; Under Department Circular No. 4, the 1996
(c) Penalty for the offense charged; Bail Bond Guide for the National Prosecution Service
(d) Character and reputation of the accused; for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the
(e) Age and health of the accused; property stolen is more than P200.00 but does not
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; exceed P6,000.00, the bail recommended is
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; P24,000.00. In the instant case, the monetary value of
(h) Forfeiture of other bail; the falcata trees cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail
of P30,000 is not proportionate to the amount stolen.
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and Death of the respondent in an administrative
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on case is not in itself a ground for the dismissal of the
bail. complaint.
Excessive bail shall not be required. When the law transgressed is elementary, the
failure to know or observe it constitutes gross
(253) Cabañero vs. Cañon, ignorance of the law.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-369, September 20, 2001 WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio K. Cañon is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of
FACTS: On September 16, 1999Judge Antonio K. P5,000.00, to be taken from his retirement benefits in
Cañon of MCTC Hinatuan-Tagbina, at Hinatuan, view of his demise.
Surigao Del Sur was charged of issuance of unjust
interlocutory orders and grave abuse of discretion (254) Victory Liner vs. Bellosillo
relative to the case of People vs. Jessie Cabañero, for G.R. 425 SCRA 79 ; 2004
qualified theft. Jessie D. Cabañero, was accused of
entering Cañal's farmland and harvesting falcata trees FACTS: While a Victory Liner bus was cruising along
valued at P3,191.00.Judge Antonio K. Cañon presided the National Highway of Bataan, it fatally hit Marciana
Morales accidentally. VLI shouldered all the funeral (i) The fact that the accused was a
and burial expenses. VLI and the heirs of the victim fugitive from justice when arrested; and
entered into an Agreement where the heirs executed a (j) Pendency of other cases where the
Release of Claim and an Affidavit of Desistance in accused is on bail.
favor of VLI and the driver Reino De la Cruz.
However, two or Marciana's sons executed a THE AMOUNT OF BAIL should, therefore, be
Pinagsamang Salaysay against De la Cruz. On the REASONABLE at all times.
strength of the document, a criminal complaint was De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged
filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan. with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
On March 13, 2000, Judge Bellosillo ordered homicide. Although permanently employed as drivers
the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest of VLI, it could not be said that each was capable of
against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50, 000 to posting a cash bail bond of P50, 000 and P350, 000,
be posted in cash. He further directed the Chief of respectively. The bail fixed is all the more excessive
Police to immediately impound the bus involved in the because it was in the form of cash. While cash bail is
accident, which could be released only upon the authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash
posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50, 000. in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the
Subsequently, VLI filed a verified complaint accused.
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
against Judge Bellosillo. The complaint claimed that  BAIL AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD
Judge Bellosillo (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law in impounding its bus and requiring it to post a (255) Manotoc vs. C.A.
cash bond for the release of the bus; (b) gravely G.R. No. L-62100 (1986)
abused his authority when it revoked the surety bond
of one of VLI's driver Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case To allow the accused from leaving the
No. 9373; and (c) knowingly rendered an unjust and jurisdiction of the Philippines would render nugatory
oppressive order when he increased the bond to the courts' orders and processes and inasmuch as the
P350, 000 and required it to be posted in cash. jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does
not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is administratively have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
RULING: YES, Judge Bellosillo is administratively placed beyond the reach of the courts.
liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on
accused Reino De la Cruz in Crim. Case No. 10512 FACTS: There was a torrens title submitted to and
and Edwin Serrano in Crim. Case No. 9373. accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was
The Constitution guarantees to every suspected to be fake. Six of its clients filed separate
person under legal custody the right to bail except criminal complaints against the petitioner and
those charged with offenses punishable with Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to
strong. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion
amended, provides that in fixing the amount of bail, for permission to leave the country stating his desire
the judge must primarily consider the following factors: to go to US relative to his business transactions and
(a) Financial liability of the accused to opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution
give bail; and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition
(b) Nature and circumstance of the for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders
offense; and the SEC communication request denying his
(c) Penalty for the offense charged; leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner,
(d) Character and reputation of the having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,
accused; neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC,
(e) Age and health of the accused; which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent
(f) Weight of the evidence against the him from exercising his constitutional right to travel
accused;
(g) Probability of the accused ISSUE: Whether his constitutional right to travel has
appearing at the trial; been violated?
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
RULING: No. The constitutional right to travel being Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to
5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed
to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be court cannot allow the accused to leave the country
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or without the assent of the surety because in accepting
when necessary in the interest of national security, a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly
public safety or public health. agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the
To our mind, the order of the trial court principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or
releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the
order as contemplated by the above-quoted surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
constitutional provision. A court has the power to discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the
prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent.
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the This result has been reached as to a stipulation or
nature and function of a bail bond. agreement to postpone the trial until after the final
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to
defines bail as the security required and given for the leave the state or country."
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial
that he will appear before any court in which his courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of
bond or recognizance.Its object is to relieve the his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's
of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same motion for permission to leave the country.
time, to put the accused as much under the power of
the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, XIII. RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law may  ART III, SEC 14
13
require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
himself available at all times whenever the court criminal offense without due process of law.
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, cause of the accusation against him, to have a
when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
accused from the public officials who have him in their process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
has been regarded merely as a continuation of the after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
original imprisonment. The sureties become invested the absence of the accused provided that he has been
with full authority over the person of the principal and duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state.14  PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
If the sureties have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state, more so then has the (256) People v Sumili
court from which the sureties merely derive such right, GR No 212160, February 4, 2015
and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the FACTS: On June 30, 2006, an Information was filed
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is before the RTC charging Sumili of violating Section 5,
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, Crim. Case No. 12595
for he would not have filed the motion for permission In the City of Iligan, Philippines, he sold one
to leave the country in the first place, if it were (1) sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
otherwise. dangerous drug commonly known as Shabu for the
amount of P200.00.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 5, ART. II, RA
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. City of Iligan, June 30,
2006.
According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006,
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan City
Sub-Office received a report from a confidential
informant that Sumili was selling shabu. Acting on the
same, SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera[7] (SPO2 Englatiera)
dispatched SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2
Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which
confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid
report. Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a
team divided into two (2) groups and briefed them on
the buy-bust operation. He also prepared the marked
money, consisting of one (1) two hundred peso
(P200.00) bill, with serial number L507313.[8]
At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same
day, the buy-bust team headed to the target area.
Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili's
house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer
in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale
has been consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-
bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped by
jumping through the window, throwing the marked
money at the roof beside his house. The poseur-buyer
turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2
Englatiera, who marked the same with "DC-1,"
representing the initials of SPO2 Cabahug.[9] SPO2
Englatiera then prepared a request for laboratory
examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel
CarlitoOng (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together
with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.
However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the
same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already
closed.[10] It was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2)
days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was
able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.[11] Upon examination, it was
confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[12]
In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He
and his daughter claimed that he was a fishball
vendor, and that on the date and time of the incident,
he was at the market buying ingredients. When he
returned to his residence, his wife told him that
policemen were looking for him.[13]
The RTC Ruling
RTC found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and
accordingly, sentenced him to life imprisonment, and
ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00. The RTC found that a buy-bust
operation indeed occurred where Sumili sold the
seized sachet to the poseur-buyer. In this regard, it
gave credence to the straightforward and categorical
testimonies of prosecution witnesses detailing how the
police officers received information that Sumili was
selling shabu, investigated and confirmed that he
indeed was selling shabu, conducted the buy-bust
operation, recovered, marked, and transmitted the
seized item from Sumili to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
and that the laboratory results yielded positive for
shabu. Conversely, it did not give weight to the
defense testimonies which merely denied the
existence of the buy-bust operation and insisted that
Sumili was not selling drugs. The CA Ruling affirmed
Sumili's conviction.
ISSUE: Whether Sumili's conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
RULING: The appeal is meritorious. In order to
convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the
crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must establish the concurrence of the following
elements:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.
Note that what remains material for conviction
is the proof that the transaction actually took place,
coupled with the presentation before the court of the
corpus delicti.[25] It is also important that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items be
preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented
in court as evidence against an accused must be the
same as that seized from him. The chain of custody
requirement removes any unnecessary doubts
regarding the identity of the evidence as held in
People v. Viterbo:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must concur:
(a) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, object, and consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the corresponding payment for it. As the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key
part of the corpus delictiof the crime, it is
therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drugbe established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to
the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial
 chain process, the Court, in the case of People
v. Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])],
held:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally
include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. x x
x.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures
that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the
evidence are minimized if not altogether
removed."[28] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To expand, Section 21[29] of RA 9165
provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow
in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its
integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia,
that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody
over the seized drugs immediately conduct an
inventory and take photographs of the same in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom
such items were seized, or the accused's or the
person's representative or counsel, a representative
from the media, the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall then sign the copies of
the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its
confiscation for examination purposes. While the
"chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance
from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165,[30] as well as jurisprudence nevertheless
provide that non-compliance with the requirements of
this rule will not automatically render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a)
there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance;
AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the
prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.
After a judicious review of the records, the
Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from
Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody,
thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
(257) PEOPLE VS. UMIPANG
G.R. No. 190321
FACTS: On April 1, 2006 at around 6PM, a buy-bust
team from the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City
Police descended along Cagayan de Oro Street,
Maharlika Village, Taguig City after a confidential
informant reported a certain “Sam” was selling drugs
upon aforesaid place. PO2 Ruchyl Gasid acted as
poseur-buyer and was given PHP 500 marked money.
PO2 Gasid and confidential informant, upon finding
“Sam”, asked the latter if they could buy PHP 500
worth of drugs. “Sam” then took out 3 plastic sachets
containing a white crystalline substance with various
price tags – 500, 300, 100. After making the choice
PO2 Gasid paid “Sam” PHP 500.
Upon receipt of money, PO2 Gasid took of his
cap as pre-arranged signal that the sale has been
consummated. Sensing danger “Sam” attempted to
flee the scene but was promptly accosted by the other
members of the buy-bust team. Five more marked
sachets containing the same white crystalline
substance were recovered from “Sam” and promptly
marked “SAU” (Sammy A. Umipang) by PO2 Gasid.
Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where
he was booked, investigated and identified as
accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2
Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime
laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested
positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented
accused-appellant himself and his brother Nash Rudin
Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were
sleeping, accused-appellant and his family were
awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons
outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang
pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-
appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5)
policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at
him. Against his will and amid the screams of his wife,
accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle
and brought to the police headquarters. At the Taguig
Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱
100,000.00 for his release. He denied the charges and
that the alleged evidence were all "planted" by the
police.
For the sale of the sachet of 0.05 gram of
shabu, which violates Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the
RTC of Pasig City sentenced accused-appellant to life
imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000. For possession
of 5 sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.23 gram,
which is a violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, the
same courts sentenced accused-appellant to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and
1dayminimum to 14 years, 21 days as maximum and
fined PHP 300,000. On appeal, CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in finding
that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-appellant
of the alleged sale and possession of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are
violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of
R.A. 9165
HELD: YES. Accused-appellant argues that since
there were two versions presented during trial – one,
that of the prosecution; and the other, that of the
accused – the latter version must be adopted,
because the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties should not take
precedence over the presumption of innocence of the
accused. He also contends that a surveillance of just
30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang
was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly,
accused-appellant claims that the fact of possession
of the confiscated plastic sachets was not clearly
established, and that the evidence allegedly
confiscated from him was merely planted. Alluding to
the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that the
former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the
sachet was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC
Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in
accord with law and evidence. The OSG argues7 that
the necessary elements to convict a person under
Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof
and substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-
appellant’s bare-faced denial should be deemed
merely as a self-serving statement that does not hold
merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no
evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-
appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of
the procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case
stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the
SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in
People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present
case. While this kind of operation has been proven to
be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions
that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy,
a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that
has not escaped the attention of the framers of the
law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In
People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the
very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for
entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters
as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana
or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or
hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the
possibility of abuse is great.
Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.” Accordingly, specific procedures relating to
the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down
in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly
follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that
these procedures have been followed in proving the
elements of the defined offense.
It is evident that Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165
was blatantly disregarded by the buy-bust team when
no proper inventory was done, no photographs taken
and no representatives from the media, the DOJ, and
any publicly elected official were present. Section 86
of RA 9165 was also not followed as the PDEA was
not contacted with regards to the operation. Although
failure to follow Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 ipso facto is
not fatal to the prosecution’s case, it must be shown
why such was not carried out by
(1) justifiable cause and
(2) preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were guaranteed.
Court maintains that presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions cannot overrule
the step- by-step procedure outlined in RA 9165 as it
is a matter of substantive law. The court further
asserts that the conduct itself of the buy-bust team
was defective for the following reasons:
(1) material inconsistencies in the marking of
the evidence. This is shown by the admission of PO2
Gasid, who marked the seized items with the
accused-appellant initials “SAU” (Sammy Abdul
Umipang) allegedly at the scene of the operation.
However, PO2 Gasid admits that prior to the operation
he did not know of the identity or full name of the
accused, the latter being only known as “Sam.” It was
PO2 Saez, in the police station, who got “Sam’s” full
name.
(2) SAID-SOTF did not show genuine and
sufficient third party representatives enumerated in
Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 as evidenced by PO2
Gasid’s admission during cross-examination that no
effort was made to contact the barangay captain or
any barangay official of Brgy. Maharlika.
 (3) SAID-SOTF did not properly accomplish HELD: YES, it must be reiterated that conviction
the Certificate of Inventory. PO2Gasid, who prepared always rests on the strength of the prosecution’s
such document, did not sign it. Court sets aside the evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
decision of the CA affirming the July 24, 2007 RTC Vicente Bongat is hereby ACQUITTED. In the present
decision and acquits Sammy A. Umipang of the case, the credibility of the testimonies of the
crimes charged herein and ordered released prosecution witnesses as well as the inconclusive
immediately. medical findings tends to create if the victim was
indeed raped.
(258) People v Quintal The testimonies were as follows;
G.R. No 190321, April 25 2012 First, V denied of knowing the Quintals when
in fact she was seen playing cards with Jerwin’s group
FACTS: (Catanduanes) An information was filed during the wake.
against Vicente Bongat, Larry Panti, 15-year old Second, V positively identified all the accused
Jerwin Quintal and 16-year-old Felipe Quintal with the when it was very dark inside the hut.
crime of Rape. The victim was a 16-year-old Third, the medical report was lacking in
schoolmate of Jerwin. relation to her testimony that she was ravished. She
The victim’s statement: On August 29, alleged that she was tied in her hand and feet
2001, the victim upon leaving from a wake at around however by a nylon however no injuries were found.
9:45 pm to go to her grandmother’s house was Fourth, V belated reporting showed that she
followed by Jerwin. When she was about to enter the has no intention to report the incident, it was only
house, she was invited by Jerwin and Felipe with a when her mother noticed her unusual manner of
certain Maria for a party. However, she was brought to walking.
a dark nipa house near a rice field. Her mouth was Fifth, the Mother of the V reported the incident
covered with a handkerchief, and tied her hands and to a kagawad and tanod who were her cousins.
feet to the posts with a nylon string. All four of the Sixth, Mother never bothered to ask V about
accused took turns in abusing her. After they finished, the incident. It can be recalled that she dictated what
Larry and Vicente went home, Jerwin and Felipe is to be written for the supposed admission of rape.
accompanied the victim to her grandmother’s house. Seventh, the victim was seen visitng Jerwin in the jail
Two days later, the ordeal of the victim was atleast six times based on the logbook, it was
reported to a barangay kagawad and later to a previously alleged that Jerwin and V were
barangay tanod. The BARANGAY KAGAWAD sweathearts.
summoned the accused and made them sign a
document regarding the incident. The content was (259) People vs. Tumambing
written as instructed by the victim’s mother. G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011
On September 1, 2001, The BARANGAY
TANOD testified that the parent’s of Jerwin came to
FACTS: The city prosecutor charged the accused
him and expressed their intention for their son to
Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal
marry the victim. However, the victim’s party declined.
Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The appellants were also present and the guardian of
Manila.
the victim were present. Their alleged admission of DK, the complainant, testified that at around
the crime was written in a one-half sheet of yellow
2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving
paper. the lights on, at her cousin’s rented room. She was
RTC sentenced Vicente to suffer reclusion
startled when somebody entered the room after she
perpetua, appreciating mitigating circumstance of
had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a
minority, Jerwin and Felipe to suffer reclusion knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any
temporal but pursuant to RA 9344 the Quintals noise. He removed DK’s clothes and undressed
sentence were suspended. Which was later himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When
DISMISSED due to the recommendation of the DSWD the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on
in 2009. Hence leaving appellant Vicente question
and she saw his face. DK recognized him as the same
person who passed by her cousin’s room several
the credibility of the statement of the victim. RTC
and CA merely relied on the statement of the victim
times in the afternoon of the previous day, June 25,
that she was raped. 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny
Tumambing as her rapist.
ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient evidence for The RTC found Tumambing beyond
conviction. reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
 Tumambing appealed the decision to the CA, did not see Paloma take money from PO1 Peñalosa
but it only affirmed the previous ruling of the RTC. nor Peñalosa take delivery of the prohibited substance
from Paloma.
ISSUE: Whether Tumambing was properly identified.
While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
RULING: A successful prosecution of a criminal regularity in the performance of their duties, this
action largely depends on proof of two things: the presumption is disputable by contrary proof and
identification of the author of the crime and his actual cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the
commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime accused to be presumed innocent.
has been committed has no use if the prosecution is
unable to convincingly prove the offender’s identity. The totality of the evidence presented in this
The constitutional presumption of innocence that an case does not support Paloma’s conviction for
accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, since the
that is full of uncertainties. prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence all the elements of the offense.
to DK’s testimony. They maintained that DK
categorically and positively identified her rapist. The (261) People of the Philippines vs. Santiago
CA invoked People v. Reyes where the Court ruled (G.R. No. 191061, February 9, 2011)
that it would be easy for a person who has once
gained familiarity with the appearance of another to FACTS: The public prosecutor of Makati charged the
identify the latter even from a considerable accused Roselle Santiago alias “Tisay” with violation
distance. Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial of Section 5 and Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.)
court and the CA’s findings regarding the credibility of 9165 before the RTC of Makati City in Criminal Case
the witnesses. But the courts mentioned appear to 05-792.
have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical PO1 Voltaire Esguerra testified that on April 4,
evidence in the case. This compels the Court to take a 2005, they received information that Roselle was
look at the same. selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit Extension,
Barangay Rizal, Makati City. Esguerra conducted a
(260) People vs Paloma test buy and received from her one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet that presumably
FACTS: Manuel Paloma (Paloma) was charged with contained shabu. When he returned to his office,
violation of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of Esguerra marked the sachet with "@ Tisay" then sent
2002. In drug cases the prosecution must clearly and it to the laboratory for testing. Before receiving the
adequately show the details of the purported sale, results of the test buy, an asset told the police that
namely, the initial contact between the poseur-buyer Roselle was going to leave her house, prompting
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or Esguerra’s team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
payment of the consideration, and, finally, the Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it
accused’s delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, was he who bought shabu from her earlier that day.
whether the latter be the informant alone or the police She thus let him enter the front yard of her house
officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law- where he told her that he wanted to buy another pack
abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit for ₱300.00. Roselle took his marked money and
the offense. entered the house. While waiting and looking in,
Esguerra spotted two women inside using shabu with
ISSUE: Whether the proof of the sale of illegal drugs the asset by their side, apparently waiting for his turn.
is wanting. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet presumably
RULING: Yes. SPO2 Amigo’s testimony miserably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the sachet,
failed to establish the required details of the Esguerra signaled his team. They arrested Roselle
supposed illegal drug sale. All that PO2 Amigo and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra immediately
could say was that PO1 Peñalosa and the informant marked the sachet with "RPS".
approached Paloma, talked to him, and then PO1 After returning to the station, he turned over
Roselle and the seized sachet to the
Peñalosa made the pre-arranged signal that the sale
investigato. When the contents of the first and second
had been consummated. Since he was standing at a sachets (with "@ Tisay" and "RPS" markings) were
great distance during the purported buy-bust, PO2 examined, these were confirmed to be (shabu). For
Amigo could not provide the details of the offer to buy her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to
the drug and the acceptance of that offer. Indeed, he Esguerra. She claims that the case was a product of a
mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in that amount to appellant, the latter drew from her
the area but Roselle. She narrated how she was pocket a plastic sachet of white crystalline substance
forcibly taken from her house and into custody which she gave to him. At that instant, PO2 Garcia
introduced himself as a police officer, apprised
ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s appellant of her constitutional rights and, together with
finding that the prosecution evidence established her the team members, arrested her. The appellant
guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. countered. Granting arguendo that the accused-
appellant was a drug pusher peddling along Bambang
HELD: YES. Accused is acquitted. Although the St., how come only one (1) sachet containing 0.146
prosecution established through Esguerra the acts grams of shabu was confiscated from her by the five
constituting the crime charged in the drug-pushing (5) police officers who arrested her? If the accused-
case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of appellant was indeed caught in a legitimate
the allegedly prohibited substance that the police entrapment operation, then the policemen had every
seized from Roselle. right and all the opportunity to search her person,
Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed even including the premises. The fact, however, is that
sachet of white substance from Roselle and marked the policemen could only present a single 0.146-gram
the sachet with "RPS" right in her presence. He sachet of shabu, the source of which was not even
claimed that he then immediately submitted the clearly established.8 (emphasis and underscoring
specimen to the police crime laboratory for supplied) Further, appellant questions the chain of
examination. But the request for laboratory exam custody of the shabu as not properly established
reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the
specimen to the crime laboratory. It appears that ISSUE: Whether Andongan is really guilty as charged.
Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn
forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony RULING: No. It bears noting from the testimony of
covers the movement of the specimen among these PO2 Garcia during cross examination that there is no
other persons. Consequently, the prosecution was claim or indication that the shabu allegedly seized
unable to establish the chain of custody of the seized from appellant was the same shabu subjected to
item and its preservation from possible tampering. laboratory examination.
The prosecution also failed to account for the As a method of authenticating evidence, the
whereabouts of the seized specimen after the crime chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
since the chain of custody should be established from finding that the matter in question is what the
the time the seized drugs were confiscated and proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
eventually marked until the same is presented during about every link in the chain, from the moment the
trial. item was picked up to the time it is offered into
Taking into account the above reasons, the evidence, in such a way that every person who
Court finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of touched the exhibit would describe how and from
Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of whom it was received, where it was and what
her innocence of the charge must prevail. happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in
(262) People v Andongan which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
G.R. 184595, June 29 2010 These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
FACTS: On the information of a confidential condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
informant, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Office not in the chain to have possession of the same.
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation Parenthetically, there is also no showing that
against appellant for her alleged illegal drugs trade. the buy-bust team complied with the procedural
With a ₱500.00 bill on which "RR," representing the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of
initials of team leader SPO3 Rolando del Rosario R.A. No. 9165.
(SPO3 del Rosario), was marked. The team, together With the flawed evidence for the prosecution,
with the confidential informant, met appellant at Abad the presumption of regularity in the performance of
Santos Avenue along Bambang Street at around 7:50 official duty by the prosecution witness-police officer
p.m. of June 25, 2004. does not arise.
Informed that PO2 Garcia wanted to buy
shabu, appellant inquired how much, to which PO2 (263) Agustin v. People of the Philippines
Garcia replied ₱500.00 worth. As PO2 Garcia handed G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008

FACTS: In the evening, armed men robbed the house
of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay
Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them
several valuables, including cash amounting
to P600,000.00. The spouses reported the matter to
the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a
search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The MTC issued Search
Warrant No. 5-95, directing a search of the items
stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used
by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was
the residence of petitioner, named as one of the
several suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant,
policemen searched the premises of petitioner's
house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the
recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no
license nor authority to possess such weapon, and,
consequently, the filing of a criminal case for violation
of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms,
against petitioner before the RTC.
The accused, have in his possession one (1)
revolver caliber .38 (Cebu Made) with Serial No.
439575 with five (5) live ammunitions, without the
necessary license or authority to possess and carry
the same being usual instrument in the commission of
crimes or acts of violence.
The prosecution's case centered mainly on
evidence that during the enforcement of the search
warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver
firearm was found in the latter's house. In particular,
SPO1 Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed
rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the
lower shelf. The gun is a .38 caliber revolver with five
live ammunitions, which he immediately turned over to
his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and
frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that
petitioner does not own a gun. Lorna testified that she
saw a "military" man planting the gun.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA
committed reversible error in giving little credence to
his defense that the firearm found in his residence
was planted by the policemen. He also alleges
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which
amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s presumption of
innocence was disregarded by the lower courts on the
basis of inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses.
RULING: YES. The conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the
house and conducted the search, who "discovered"
the gun, and who witnessed the "discovery" are
material matters because they relate directly to a fact
in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been
found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which,
by the process of logic, an inference may be made as
to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. As
held in United States v. Estraña, a material matter is
the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact or
any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to
the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects
the credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely
weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies
of its witnesses.
the inconsistencies are material as they delve
into the very bottom of the question of whether or not
SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the house of
petitioner.
SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have
corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a
different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's
discovery.
He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at
the time the latter discovered the firearm.
While the lone defense of the accused that he
was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this
claim assumes importance when faced with the rather
shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to
remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the
weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its
own proof which must be strong enough to convince
this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be
punished. The constitutional presumption is that
the accused is innocent even if his defense is
weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring
contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was
really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that
petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms
beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be
acquitted of the crime he was with.
 PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
(264) People vs Webb
GR Nos. 176864, January 18, 2011
FACTS: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked
the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
"denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded
Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and
erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that
resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed
grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be
reconsidered.
RULING: No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot
be reconsidered for it places the accused under
double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for
reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court
that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a
mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State
may assail the decision by special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.
Although complainant Vizconde invoked the
exceptions, he has been unable to bring pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not
specify that violations of due process and acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court
supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also alleged
that the Court held a sham review of the decision of
the CA. What the complainant actually questions is
the Court's appreciation of the evidence and
assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility.
That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro
as not a credible witness. The complaint wants the
court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such evaluation which is not
constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of
acquittal can no longer be disturbed.
Basis of the Lack of Proof of Guilt Beyond
Reasonable Doubt
[Suspicious Details]
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI
since November or December 1994 as an “asset.”
She supplied her handlers with information against
drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of
this information led to the capture of notorious drug
pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of
the “Martilyo gang” that killed a police officer. Because
of her talent, the task force gave her “very special
treatment” and she became its “darling,” allowed the
privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the
NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for
sometime, however, they teased her about it and she
was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told
Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real
story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing
showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that
someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not
happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she
told him that she might as well assume the role of her
informant.
[Webb’s U.S. Alibi]
Among the accused, Webb presented the
strongest alibi through
(a) the travel preparations;
(b) the two immigration checks;
€ details of US sojourn;
(d) the second immigration check; and
€ alibi versus positive identification; and
(f) a documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by
positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that
(a) he was present at another place at the time
of the perpetration of the crime, and
(b) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals
expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of
travel documents like the passport as well as the
domestic and foreign records of departures and
arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not
have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to
the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9,
1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26,
1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines,
said the lower courts took only about twelve to
fourteen hours.
[Effect of Webb’s alibi to Others]
Webb’s documented alibi altogether
impeaches Alfaro’s testimony, not only with respect to
him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if
the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony
will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the
anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence
against the others must necessarily fall.

Conclusion
In our criminal justice system, what is
important is, not whether the court entertains doubts
about the innocence of the accused since an open
mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt.
For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent
man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s
inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable
between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the
rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the
role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she
could not produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong
of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention unless they are confined for another
lawful cause.
(265) Lejano vs. People
(Vizconde Massacre)
FACTS: On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and
her daughters Carmela andJennifer were brutally slain
at their home in Parañaque City. The police officers
arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave
detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.
Four years later, the NBI presented star-
witness Jessica M. Alfaro, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She alleged Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael
A.Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada,
Miguel Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits of the
crime. She also pointed police officer, Gerardo Biong,
as an accessory. Thereafter, the public prosecutors
filed information for rape with homicide against all of
the accused. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its
main witness along with the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security
guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former
laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer
Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde,
Estrellita’s husband.
While some of the accused denied being part
of the crime, Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest
since he claimed that he was in the USA when the
crime eventuated. He presented some necessary
documentsand evidence to prove this. In addition, the
defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her
testimony.
The RTC of Paranaque City, found Alfaro a
credible witness. It noted her categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony,
undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. Thus, on
January4, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding all the accused guilty of the crime. This was
also affirmed by the CA when the decision of the trial
court was appealed.
The CA said that they did not agree that the
trial judge was biased on rendering a decision co-
sympathizing with the public. When motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA, this resorted
the accused to appeal this before the SC. On April 20,
2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken
from Carmela’s cadaver.
The Court granted the request pursuant to
section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific
evidence which could lead to a correct decision in the
case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI
informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen. Because of this, Webb filed an urgent
motion to acquit on the ground that the government
failed to preserve such vital evidence which resulted a
denial of his right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether Webb presented sufficient evidence
to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony.
RULING: With regard to Webb’s raising of the DNA
issue, the country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb
nor his co-accused brought up the matter of
preserving the specimen in the meantime. Seemingly,
Webb raised such DNA issue before the CA as a
mere error committed by the trial court in rendering its
decision. None of the accused filed a motion to have
the DNA test done pending adjudication of their
appeal in the CA.
This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having
such test done, the State cannot be deemed required
to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since two individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00
November or December 1994 as an "asset." She o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house
supplied her handlers with information and some of of their co-accused Priolo Billona, Dramayo invited all
these led to the capture of notorious drug pushers.
those present including the other accused Francisco
Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling”. Billons, Modesto Ronquilla. Crescencio and Severo
When Alfaro became unproductive as an Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back
asset, she was teased about it. One day, she of the school house. It was on that occasion that
unexpectedly told Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, a former Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito
high rung employee of the NBI that she knew Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery
someone who witnessed the Vizconde massacre. case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
When Sacaguing showed interest, Alfaro promised to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The
bring that someone to the NBI. When this did not
happen, Alfaro told Sacaguing that she is willing to others were to station themselves nearby.
assume the role of her informant.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was
positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It
(a) he was present at another place at the time was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on
of the perpetration of the crime, and the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's
(b) that it was physically impossible for him to participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short
be at the scene of the crime. Among the accused, pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of
Webb presented the strongest alibi through presenting Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of
the necessary documents of his travel to the United the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had
States when the crime eventuated. just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed
Thus, the Court was impressed and gave for early the next morning, he went to the house of the
credence to his alibi. deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon
Moreover, Webb’s documented alibi altogether that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The
impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly
him, but also the other people who was accused. This notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the
is because Webb’s participation is the anchor of trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The
Alfaro’s story and thus would equate that Alfaro’s answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was
testimony is not true. the cause thereof. The death was due to the wounds
In our criminal justice system, what is inflicted.
important is, not whether the court entertains doubts The lower court found the accused, now
about the innocence of the accused since an open appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty
mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder],
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evident
man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s premeditation aggravated by night time.Reference
inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable was likewise made in such decision as to why the
between teeth. Wherefore, The Supreme Court other co-accused were not convicted, two of them,
ACQUITS accused-appellants of the crimes of which Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to utilized as state witnesses, and the others three,
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Roquilla
acquitted.
(266) People v. Pableo Dramayo, et al.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the lower court
FACTS: Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the should be affirmed.
company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of
RULING: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting
Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao,
point is the Presumption of innocence. Accusation is
Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
the house of the deceased five days before by being demonstrate that culpability lies. Their guilt should be
available as witnesses but they themselves were shown beyond reasonable doubt. There is need,
prime suspects, having been implicated by at least therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should sentence be one of
conviction.
It is thus required that circumstance favoring
his innocence be duly taken into count. The proof
against him must survive the reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway away
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on
the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the
act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required
then is moral certainty.
The judgment of conviction should not have
occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the
fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could
not come to their rescue as it was more than
sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by
the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the
law is that if, on the facts as established, no
reasonable doubt being entertained, the two
appellants would have been acquitted likewise just
because the other five defendants, for the reasons
above stated, were not similarly sentenced.
The principal contention raised is thus clearly
untenable. It must be stated likewise that while
squarely advanced for the first time, there had been
cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of
the defendants being acquitted, the element of
conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold
the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty
of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen
as to their capability.
The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the
allegation as to their guilt not having been sufficiently
demonstrated with the contention that the lower court
overlooked or did not properly consider material and
significant facts of record that ought to have
substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even
the most careful reading of such brief, however, with
due recognition of the vigor in which this particular
point is pressed, would not destroy the credibility of
the facts as testified to concerning the manner in
which the deceased was killed and the motive that
prompted appellants to put an end to his life.
That such a version could not have been
concocted is shown by the undeniable fact that the
two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with
the deceased as the offended party. It was
understandable then why they would want to do away
with the principal witness against them. There was
thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have
committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of
record pointing to no other conclusion except the
perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their
counsel, while to be expected from an advocate
zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly
should not be attended with success. It suffices to
reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has
invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial
judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the
testimony before him except when, as was not shown
in this case, circumstances weight or influence were
ignored or disregarded by him.
 ORDER OF TRIAL
(267) BIANITO ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, vs. HON.
GERARDO M. S. PEPITO
Section 3 of Rule 119 prescribes the order of trial in
criminal cases, provides that
"the plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial
must proceed in the following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the
charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer
evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall
have been concluded, unless the case is submitted to
the court without argument, the fiscal must open the
argument, the attorney for the defense must follow,
and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument
by either attorney may be oral or written, but only the
written arguments, or such portions of the same as
may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of
the case."
FACTS: During Bianito Alejandro's arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty to the crime of Homicide before the
Court of First Instance of Aklan (Branch III, presided
by Judge Gerardo M.S. Pepito). Alejandro, however,
admitted in open court that he killed the deceased but
that he acted in self-defense.
The judge, on 6 July 1979, in an order required
the defense counsel, first to prove evidence in self-
defense and the prosecution to present its evidence to
disprove the same. Alejandro moved for
reconsideration, reiterated in an Amended Motion, of
the Order contending that the Court action was
violative of Section 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,
which establishes the sequence in the presentation of
evidence by the parties in criminal cases, first by the
prosecution and then by the defense, and not vice
versa. Additionally, Alejandro claimed that the
procedure adopted by the Judge is prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused in the sense that the
same would give rise to the presumption that the
prosecution had already established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt when what is only
on record is the accused's admission that he had
killed the victim in self defense. The Judge denied
reconsideration in an Order dated 9 October 1979.
Alejandro filed the petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge’s order requiring the
defense to present first after the accused entered a
plea of guilty was violative of the latter’s right to be
presumed innocent
HELD: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution as a
protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the
requirement that no person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law. That
requirement simply requires that the procedure
established by law shall be followed.
It behooved respondent Judge to have
followed the sequence of trial set forth. That
procedure observes, in the words of Chief Justice
Fernando, the "mandate of reason and the guarantee
of fairness with which due process is Identified". 5 The
procedure outlined safeguards and protects the
fundamental right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is
founded on the principle of justice and is intended not
to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human
agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person. 6
Indeed, the form of a trial is also a matter of public
order and interest; 7 the orderly course of procedure
requires that the prosecution shall go forward and
present all of its proof in the first instance. 8 The
following excerpt from People vs. Balicasan 17 SCRA
1119 (1966) shows fidelity to that procedure:
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the
testimony of the accused, the court should have taken
anew defendant's plea and then proceeded with the
trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In deciding the case
upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court not
only erred in procedure but also deprived the
prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
It is noteworthy also that the Information filed
herein alleges that the heirs of the deceased suffered
damages in the amount of P20,000.00. The
prosecution should prove this first before the defense
presents its evidence.
 PRESUMPTION OF GUILT
(268) Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the
constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52
as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4
provides that any retired elective provincial or
municipal official who has received payments of
retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired.
According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to
class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr.
also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 52, which states that any person who has
committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including
those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of
the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any
partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of
conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory
provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be
declared null and void
HELD: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the
provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional
and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. One class can be treated differently
from another class. In this case, employees 65 years
of age are classified differently from younger
employees.
The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the
“need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to
the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared
null and void for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
“Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article
IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution).
An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him ISSUE: Whether there was violation of the
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the innocent?
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against HELD: No. The fact is that the trial court did not
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both believe defendant’s explanation that the money was
of them would be ineligible to run for public office. lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual
A person disqualified to run for public office on misappropriation. That is why the court said that
the ground that charges have been filed against him is “whether or not the defendant is guilty of malversation
virtually placed in the same category as a person for negligence is of no moment…” the presumption of
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of misappropriation is found on Art. 217 of the RPC
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of which provides that failure of a public officer to have
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).” which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly
And although the filing of charges is considered authorized officer, shall prima facie evidence that he
as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be has put the missing funds or property to personal use.
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" The legislature may enact that when certain
that because of the proximity of the elections, time facts have been proven they shall be prima facie
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational
prima facie evidence against him. connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con facts presumed so that the interference of the one
of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather from the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
than before an administrative body such as the because of lack of connection between the two
COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings in common experience.
between two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment of a person charged, will thereby be  APPLICABILITY TO JURIDICAL PERSONS
avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be (270) Feeder Int’l Line vs. CA
substituted for a judicial determination. CR 942 62, May 31, 1991
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a
FACTS: M/T “ULU WAI” is a foreign vessel of
partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first Honduran registry owned and operated by petitioner
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore. It
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. felt Singapore carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 ofand 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East
Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 The vessel anchored at the vicinity of
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo
and void, for being violative of the constitutional customs authorities. Later on, the Customs team
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused found out that the vessel did not have on board the
required ship and shipping documents, except for a
(269) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO clearance from the port authorities of Singapore.
MINGOA Thereafter, the vessel and its cargo were held and a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was
FACTS: Found short in his accounts as officer-in- issued after due investigation.
charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of
missing fund amounting to P 3, 938 upon demand by property without due process of law in that its right to
the provincial auditor, the defendant Mingoa was be presumed innocent was not recognized.
prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public
funds in the CFI of Romblon. Respondent Mingoa RULING: Petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has
insisted that she left the money on her table and was no personality to invoke the right to be presumed
alleged lost thereon. She created alibis regarding the innocent which right is available only to an individual
missing fund. who is an accused in a criminal case.
  OFFICIAL DUTY
(271) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO
MARTOS
G.R. No. 91847 July 24, 1992
FACTS: In 1989, acting on the tip of a confidential
informer (C.I.) or asset, a team from the First
Narcotics Regional Unit based in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, composed of Sgts.Raguine, Benito and
Padilla, went to Bgy. Carmen East, Rosales,
Pangasinan at about 4:00 p.m., in pursuit of a certain
"Lito" who was engaged in selling marijuana to
students and adults alike.
Carlito "Lito" Martos, was washing his feet at
the water pump near his house when Sgt. Raguine
and the CI approached him. Sgt. Raguine, acting as
poseur-buyer, was introduced by the CI to "Lito". The
former then inquired if "Lito" had "stuff" for sale, and
upon eliciting an affirmative answer, ordered P50.00
worth of stuff. Lito went inside his house and returned
after a while to where Sgt. Raguine and the CI were.
He handed the stuff contained in a small plastic bag,
to Sgt. Raguine while the latter gave Carlito Martos a
P50.00 bill, which serial number was earlier recorded
by him in a log book. After being convinced that the
content of the plastic bag was marijuana, Sgt.
Raguine immediately signalled Sgts. Benito and
Padilla, who were then positioned in separate places
some 10 meters away from the water pump, to close
in and effect arrest.
After identifying themselves as NARCOM
agents, Sgts. Benito and Padilla seized Martos, but
the latter was able to wrench himself free from his
captors and escaped. The three agents pursued him,
but when Martos heard a shot, he stopped running,
raised his hands and surrendered. It turned out that
the shot was fired from the gun of Sgt. Padilla which
accidentally hit the CI on the left arm. Thereupon,
Martos was brought to the NARCOM office in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The stuff was turned over to
the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, for
analysis. The report confirmed the fact that the stuff
was marijuana.
In his defense, Carlito Martos, a jeepney
conductor, testified that in that afternoon, as he was
washing his feet at a pump well, some 3 meters away
from his house, he heard a person shout, "dadiay ni,
dadiay ni, paltogan yon." He then saw three men
coming down from the dike, two of whom drew their
guns. Frightened, he tried to run away, but when he
heard a shot, he stopped and raised his hands. When
the three men overtook him, one of them handcuffed
him while the other two started hitting him with the butt
of their guns, boxing and kicking him. As a tricycle
was being called, one of the men took "a plastic bag
with leaves inside" from his pocket and placed it in his
hands. Carlito refused to hold it and instead dropped
the thing. The above testimony was corroborated by
two other defense witnesses.
At the NARCOM station in Urdaneta, the
agents tried to force appellant to sign a document, but
the latter refused. He claims that he was also forced to
sign his name on a cellophane and cajoled to settle
the case for P25,000.00. He was then jailed and only
released at 1:00 o'clock the following day.
In his appeal, Carlito Martos' argues that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime he was convicted of. The Solicitor General joins
the appellant in the latter's plea for acquittal. They
alleged that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are highly improbable, self-contradictory
and contradictory. Thus, they outlined several
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether the Court could presume that official
duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers
to determine the culpability of the accused person.
RULING: While this Court strongly commends the
efforts of the law enforcement officers who are
engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of
apprehending and prosecuting drug traffickers, the
Court cannot simply disregard the many reports of
false arrest of innocent persons for extortion and
blackmail.l
There is no dispute that the findings of facts of
the trial courts deserve great weight and respect for
they have the privilege of examining the demeanor of
the witnesses while on the witness stand and
determine the veracity of the their testimonies. The
rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as
(1) when the conclusions is a finding based
entirely on speculations;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and
(5) when the court, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee.
The present case calls for a careful scrutiny of
the records due to the irreconcilable differences in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
weakens the case for the People. For instance, the
P50.00 bill which was supposed to have been offered
to the Martos to purchase the marijuana was not
formally offered in evidence. The decision further
states that the confidential informer was wounded on
the right arm, when all the testimonies of both the
prosecution and defense witnesses consistently state
that the informer was hit on the left arm. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are replete
with inconsistencies. Further, there was no evidence
presented to prove that the marijuana shown in
evidence is the same marijuana allegedly sold by
Martos to the buy-bust team.
In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425, prosecution must be
able to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the person charged at a particular time, date and
place committed any of such unlawful acts. As it is,
the Court is not convinced that the evidence of the
prosecution could stand ground sufficient to convict
Martos. The Court cannot even presume that
official duty was regularly performed by the
arresting officers, for it cannot by itself prevail
over the constitutional presumption of innocence
accorded an accused person. "If the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." The accused is not even called upon to
offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited
only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence.
An assiduous and thorough analysis of the
evidence on record disclosed that Martos' conviction
has no basis. The prosecution's evidence in support of
its theory is not convincing. If there was any evidence
presented, it was so slender and shaky, not presented
with care and thoroughness which the gravity of the
offense demanded and, taken in its entirety, is utterly
insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
 EQUIPOISE RULE
(272) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZAFRA
MARAORAO y MACABALANG
G.R. No. 174369
FACTS: On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
against him. PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on
November 29, 2000, they received reliable information
at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District
(WPD) that an undetermined amount of shabu will be
delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the
early morning of the following day. On November 30,
2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2 Mamelito
Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman
Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along
Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking
to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2
Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed
to apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind
dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He was
about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1
Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was later
identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang.
The police examined the contents of the bag and saw
a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the
police station, the investigator marked the plastic
sachet "ZM-1" in the presence of the police officers.
Accused’s defense was that on his way, an
unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a
house number which he did not know. He stopped
walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down
and asked him again. When they turned around, they
saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only
found out that they were police officers when they
chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran
away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred
that he did not run because he was not aware of what
was inside the bag.
Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal
possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this
case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyond
reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the
appellant was in possession of an item or object that
is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (3)
the appellant freely and consciously possessed the
drug. In this case, the fact of possession by appellant
of the bag containing the shabu was not established in
the first place.
ISSUE: Whether the equipoise rule was followed in
this case.
RULING: In every criminal prosecution, the State
must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the crime charged and the complicity or
participation of the accused. While a lone witness’
testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain
instances, the testimony must be clear, consistent,
and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this
case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for
testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both
come from a credible witness and be credible in
itself – tested by human experience, observation,
common knowledge and accepted conduct that
has evolved through the years. Clearly from the
foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in
possession of shabu, and that he freely and
consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused
in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is
guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must
rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must
never sway judgment.1âwphi1 where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted
even though their innocence may not have been
established. The Constitution presumes a person
innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral
certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that
the presumption of innocence must be favored, and
exoneration granted as a matter of right.
(273) GENEROSO P. CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[194 SCRA 73; G.R. NO. 74259; 14 FEB 1991]
FACTS: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, Corpuz
was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said
Office. In this capacity, he received collections,
disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. Upon
termination of his designation and turnover was done,
a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08 was revealed.
He was able to pay only P10,159.50. After a final
demand letter for the total of P50,596.07 which was
not met, a case of malversation was filed against him.
Corpuz insists, however, that he is not guilty of the
charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons. He claims that the
amount represents the unliquidated withdrawal made
by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four
separate checks issued and encashed while Corpiz
was on official leave. He avers he was later made to
post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had
no choice but to comply although he had not actually
received the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether the equipose rule applies in the
present case.
HELD: Records show that the checks issued for the
paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and
there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and
that he was not really on leave on the day the said
checks were disbursed by the paymaster. Corpuz's
denial of responsibility is negated by the following
factors:
(1) when he entered the said amount in his
cash book, he did not make any notation that said
amount, though entered, was not actually received;
(2) At the time he signed the certificate of turn-
over, he did not make any certification that the amount
of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him;
(3) Despite his insistence that Pineda and
Martinez misappropriated the money, he did not file
any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against
either or both.
The suggestion that the supposed injustice on
Corpuz would be abetted by the Supreme Court
unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as
an arrant presumptuousness. The equipoise rule
invoked by Corpuz is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in
which case the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is no such equipoise here. The
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has
not been overcome by Corpuz with his nebulous
claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed
innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to
the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has
breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
(274) NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Equipoise Rule:
The equipoise rule states that where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that
where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence
tilts the scales in favor of the accused.⁠ 11
The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt,
which simply means that the evidence of the
prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden
particular to the prosecution and does not apply to
exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense;
the accused is not required to establish matters in
mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor
is he required to establish the truth of such matters by
a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a
reasonable probability.⁠12
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon
the prosecution’s failure to meet this test, acquittal
becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its
mind be tortured with the thought that it has
imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.⁠ 13
The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.⁠ 14
In the final analysis, the circumstances
narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather
than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.
FACTS: Teodoro Encarnacion testified that he has
just arrived at his residence coming from the Airport
and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving
behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-
up his personal belongings from his case. It was at
this point that five unidentified masked armed persons
appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the
house and poked their guns to his driver and two
helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the
men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face
down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his
wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to
lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the
house and took away jewelries and other personal
properties including cash. After the intruders left the
house he reported the matter immediately to the
police.
Two days later, a group of WPD operatives
came over to his house and he was asked to prepare
a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were
lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was
later told that some of the lost items were in
Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police
had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made
with their participation As such, he is with his wife
posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of
the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended
by Norma Dizon Pamintuan;
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified
that he was with the spouses. After the spouses
Encarnacion recognized the items subject matter of
the robbery at the display window of the stall being
tended by the herein accused, they invited the latter to
the precinct and investigated the same. They likewise
brought the said showcase to the WPD station. He
further testified that he has no prior knowledge of the
stolen jewelries of the private complainant from one
store to another.
Version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito Dizon-
Pamintuan: who testified that he is the brother of
Norma. He, together with the accused went infront of
the Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, waiting
for a vacancy therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three
persons arrived and he overheard that Cpl. Jao told
her sister to get the jewelry from inside the display
window but her sister requested to wait for Fredo, the
owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said
Fredo did not show up, the police officer opened the
display window and got the contents of the same. The
display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and
the same, together with the accused were taken to the
police headquarters. He likewise testified that he
accompanied his sister to the station and after
investigation was sent home.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution proved the existence
of the third element: that the accused knew or should
have known that the items recovered from her were
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
RULING: Yes. Since the court cannot penetrate the
mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge
with care from the overt acts of that person. And given
two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which
sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly
provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner
is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the
items found in her possession were the proceeds of
robbery or theft.
This presumption does not offend the
presumption of innocence enshrined in the
fundamental law.20 In the early case of United States
vs. Luling, 21 this Court held:
It has been frequently decided, in case
of statutory crimes, that no constitutional
provision is violated by a statute providing that
proof by the state of some material fact or facts
shall constitute prima facieevidence of guilt,
and that then the burden is shifted to the
defendant for the purpose of showing that such
act or acts are innocent and are committed
without unlawful intention.
In his book on constitutional law,22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional
presumption of innocence may be overcome
 by contrary presumptions based on the
experience of human conduct. Unexplained
flight, for example, may lead to an inference of
guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man
pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion.
Failure on the part of the accused to explain
his possession of stolen property may give rise
to the reasonable presumption that it was he
himself who had stolen it. Under our Revised
Penal Code, the inability of an accountable
officer to produce funds or property entrusted
to him will be considered prima facie evidence
that he has appropriated them to his personal
use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the
constitutional presumption will not apply as
long as there is "some rational connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, and the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable
as to be purely arbitrary mandate"
The petitioner was unable to rebut the
presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely
on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient
to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary,
even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the
purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo.
 RIGHT TO BE HEARD OR BY COUNSEL
 IMPORTANCE OF COUNSEL
(275) People vs. Holgado
G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950
FACTS: Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention
because according to the information, being a private
person, he kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty. During arraignment the accused
pleaded guilty to the information after the judge ask
him:
"Q Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?—
A. I have no lawyer and I will plead
guilty.
It must also be noticed that in the caption of
the case as it appears in the judgment, the offense
charged is named "SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION"
while in the body of the judgment it is said that the
accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention." Since the accused-
appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to
have been presented by either party, the trial Judge
must have deduced the capital offense from the facts
pleaded in the information.
ISSUE: Whether there is a denial of fair hearing in
violation of the due process clause contained in our
Constitution
RULING: The Judgment appealed from is reversed
and the case is remanded to the court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is
apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counselThe proceedings in the trial court are irregular
from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our
Rules of Court, Rule 112, sec. 3, that:
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney before being arraigned, and must be
asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires
and is unable to employ attorney, the Court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four important
duties to comply with: 1—It must inform the defendant
that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2—After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3—If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the
court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him;
And 4—If the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied
with by the trial court.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important
that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure.
(276) Delgado v. CA
G.R. No. L-46392 November 10, 1986
FACTS: Emma R. Delgado, et.al. were charged with
estafa thru falsification of public and/or official
documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda,
a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the
United States.
Delgado was assisted and represented by her
counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On the date
set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said
Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous
notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for
postponement on the ground allegedly that he was
sick. No medical certificate was however submitted.
The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was
dilatory because there had been numerous
postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The
trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto,
considered Delgado to have waived presentation of
her evidence, and considered the case submitted for
decision. Delgado was found guilty.
Delgado later found out that Atty. Yco was not
a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial and
therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts
should be vacated and set aside, because her
"lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.
RULING: Yes. An accused person is entitled to be
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case
filed against her before the Regional Trial Court.
Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great
danger that any defense presented in her behalf will
be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process.
 IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILT
(277) People vs. Baluyot
75 SCRA 148 (1977)
-NONE-
(278) People vs. Magsi,
124 SCRA 69 (1983)
FACTS: This is a mandatory review of a death
sentence. ELOY MAGSI, JUAN PONCE y BILLON
alias JOHNNY, PERFECTO ARCE alias PEPING,
conspiring and confederating with their fellow accused
GERARDO FLORES alias GERRY, OPRING OLAZO,
DORO DOE and PETER DOE, killed Gallardo. They
were charged with murder. That the following
aggravating circumstances were attendant in the
commission of the offense: (1) abuse of superior
strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense
was committed in the dwelling place of the offended
party; and (4) that the offense was committed by a
band.
Soon after Doro Doe or del Rosario was
apprehended he was already scheduled for
arraignment. Atty. Rivera was appointed as de officio
counsel for the accused. However, she was replaced
by a de parte counsel on the accused’s request. But,
the de parte counsel failed to appear on the hearing
date. Now, The Court appointed Atty. Cariaso as his
de officio counsel, this time (3rd hearing date), neither
the de parte and de officio counsel appeared which
prompted the Court to re-appoint Atty. Rivera as his
de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. Now,
del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with
the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear
of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-
accused. At 4th hearing for arraignment, The Court
motu proprio changed accused's plea of guilty to not
guilty. At the fifth hearing, Atty. Cariaso who appeared
in court only after a warrant for his arrest was issued,
informed the Court that those interested in the
conviction of the accused opposed his appearance, as
de officio counsel (He wants to be relieved as a
counsel de officio of the accused since he has a close
tie with the deceased and his family), and at the same
time, also turned over another note, the contents of
which asked for another resetting. The Court denied
the motion of Atty. Cariaso to withdraw as counsel. but
re-set the case for October 19, 1970. At the outset of
the sixth hearing held on October 19, 1970. Atty.
Cariaso out rightly informed the Court that the
accused was ready to enter an unqualified plea of
guilty.
ISSUE: Whether the Court convicted the accused on
an improvident plea of guilty?
HELD: Yes, WE have consistently enjoined strict and
substantial adherence to Our rulings in cases where
defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere
pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails
to genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception
of evidence when in fact none was conducted,
perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether
he understands the charges and the gravity of the
penalty, are not sufficient compliance with Our
injunctions.
The desire to speed up the disposition of
cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the
basic rights of the accused. Where there is a plea of
guilty, the accused should completely understand the
precise nature of the charge, the gravity of the
offense, the severity of the consequences attached
thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his
plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to
do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the
court that the accused has not misunderstood the
nature and effect of his plea of guilty.
(279) People vs. Besonia
G.R. No. 151284-85, February 5, 2004
-NONE-

(280) PEOPLE v. FREDDIE MURILLO
FACTS: Freddie Murillo was found guilty of murder of
one Paz Abiera, his aunt. Upon arraignment, Murillo,
with the assistance of his counsel pleaded guilty to
the charge. Trial then ensued.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in convicting Murillo
of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death on
the basis of his improvident plea of guilty.
RULING: We find that there was an improvident plea
of guilt that warrants the remand of the case to the
trial court. Appellant argues: His plea of guilt was
improvident since there was no indication that he fully
understood that the qualifying circumstances charged
in the information would result to the penalty of
death. He only admitted the killing but not the
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. There could be no evident
premeditation since he stabbed Paz only after losing
his senses. There could also be no treachery since it
cannot be determined with certainty whether or not the
wounds inflicted on the victim were made before or
after her death. The aggravating circumstance of
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse cannot
be appreciated in this case since it was not alleged in
the Information.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence.--- When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
The reason for this rule is that courts must
necessarily proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form death for
the reason that the execution of such sentence is
irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment, or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. An
accused might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and
consequences of his plea. The judge therefore has the
duty to ensure that the accused does not suffer by
reason of mistaken impressions. Requiring the trial
court to take further evidence would also aid this Court
on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.
Under the said rule, three things are required
from the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital
offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused’s full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability;
and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so
if he desires.
The searching inquiry referred to means more
than just informing cursorily the accused that he faces
jail term. The inquiry must expound on the events that
actually took place during the arraignment, the words
spoken and the warnings given, with special attention
to the age of the accused, his educational attainment
and socio-economic status as well as the manner of
his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his
behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his defense
counsel to confer with him.
The trial court must also explain to the
accused the essential elements of the crime he is
charged with as well as its respective penalties and
civil liabilities. The exact length of imprisonment under
the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the
national penitentiary or a penal colony must be fully
explained to the accused. The court must also explain
to the accused that once convicted, he could be
meted the death penalty and that it is a single and
indivisible penalty that will be imposed regardless of
any mitigating circumstance that may have attended
the commission of the felony. The court must also
direct a series of questions to the defense counsel to
determine whether he has conferred with the accused
and has completely explained to the latter the
meaning of a plea of guilt. This formula is mandatory
and absent any showing that it has been followed, a
searching inquiry cannot be said to have been
undertaken.
In People vs. Pastor, the Court explained that
while there is no definite and concrete rule as to how
a trial judge must conduct a searching inquiry, the
following guidelines should nevertheless be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
 (c) under what conditions he was
detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced
or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of
questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality
profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For
not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does
not labor under these mistaken impressions because
a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with
which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment.Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should
be in a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused
must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the
crime or furnish its missing details.
In the case at bar, records do not show that a
searching inquiry was ever conducted by the judge
when appellant entered his plea of guilty.
Clearly, the proceedings taken by the trial
court was short of being satisfactory. Appellant was
never asked about the circumstances of his arrest and
detention, not even when SPO2 Nieves himself in his
testimony mentioned that he ordered that the two
brothers be brought to Block 6 for questioning without
the presence of counsel. Where or what kind of place
Block 6 is, was not even explained by the witness
neither did the court nor the defense counsel ask the
witness to clarify said point.
The Court also did not ask appellant about the
circumstances of his arraignment as well as his age
and educational attainment. He was also neither
apprised of the consequences of his plea nor was it
explained to him that the penalty imposable for the
crime attended by its qualifying circumstances as
alleged in the Information is death regardless of the
presence of mitigating circumstances.
The failure of the defense counsel to faithfully
protect the rights of appellant also cannot go
unnoticed. Records show that defense counsel Atty.
Dante O. Garin, never cross-examined three of the
four witnesses of the prosecution, namely Sancho
Fereras, Ramon Saraos, and Dr. Ludivino Lagat. The
only prosecution witness he cross-examined was
SPO2 Nieves to whom he asked four questions
pertaining only as to how the police came to the
conclusion that the body parts belong to Paz Abiera.
Apart from these, no other questions were ever
offered.
 RIGHT TO LAWYER OF CHOICE
(281) PEOPLE VS. MALUNSING
63 SCRA 493
FACTS: It was the failure of the lower court to respect
the constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that
is the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for
murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is
a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the
entire proceeding in the case, the appellant while
present did not know what was going on; the trial court
never apprised the appellant of his fundamental right
to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even
bother inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did
not take the witness stand. Attorney Geronimo
Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of the trial
that appellant intimated to him that he had his own
lawyer.
There was an admission that he did appear for
him in the preliminary investigation but only because
there was no other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that while in the original complaint there
were two other accused with the same surname as
the lawyer, Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito,
after such preliminary investigation, no doubt due to
the efforts of Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a
kinsman, they were both discharged for lack of
probable cause, the court ask the appellant if he has a
lawyer; after answering in the negative, the Court then
appointed Atty. Pajarito as counsel de oficio for the
defendant. After marking it of record that he was
appointed as counsel de oficio, the Attorney was ask
whether he wanted to confer with the appellant. This
was answered with: I think I know the case. The Court
then immediately proceeded with the hearing. In the
decision itself, there is this meaningful admission by
the court: No evidence was presented for and in
behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointed counsel de
oficio Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the
exercise of his profession.
RULING: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was
appointed, where the accused has indicated that he
wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision
prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost
confidence in the member of the bar thus designated.
Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel
de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the
accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he
was already fully prepared for his exacting
responsibility. It was unintended but the result could
not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty.
Appellant could then rightfully invoke this
constitutional guarantee of right to counsel.
It is not enough that a counsel de oficio
was appointed, especially so as here, where
the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of
his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact
that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar
thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this
right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of
conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform
the judge that he was already fully prepared for his
exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course,
but the result could not rightly be distinguished from
pure travesty.
Villegas could then rightfully invoke this
constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to
assure a just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the
most to a new trial where he can be duly represented
either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed
de oficio, one who would discharge his task in a much
more diligent and conscientious manner and would
not readily assume that he need not bother himself
unduly with familiarizing himself further with all
aspects of the case. For only in such a way may there
be an intelligent defense. If the matter be viewed thus,
there is no unfairness to the state either. It can still
see to it that a person against whom a probable cause
had been found would have to stand trial, but, to
repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards.
It would not be amiss to refer to the opinion of
Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado, where the
importance of this right was stressed. Thus: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if
it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and
it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure
it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask
him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
There are a number of American Supreme Court
decisions to the same effect. In one of them, William
v. Kaiser, Justice Douglas succinctly summed up the
matter thus: [The accused] needs the aid of counsel
lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of
the law's complexity, or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment."
It is not enough that a counsel de oficio
was appointed, especially so as here, where
the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of
his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact
that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar
thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this
right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of
conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform
the judge that he was already fully prepared for his
exacting responsibility.
It was unintended, of course, but the result
could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty.
Villegas could then rightfully invoke this constitutional
guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a just
and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new
trial where he can be duly represented either by a
counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio,
one who would discharge his task in a much more
diligent and conscientious manner and would not
readily assume that he need not bother himself unduly
with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the
case. For only in such a way may there be an
intelligent defense. If the matter be viewed thus, there
is no unfairness to the state either. It can still see to it
that a person against whom a probable cause had
been found would have to stand trial, but, to repeat,
with all the constitutional safeguards.
(282) JOEL P. LIBUIT vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 154363. September 13, 2005]
FACTS: Del Mundo delivered and brought his car to
the motor shop owned and/or operated by Libuit for
repair of its damaged parts. Libuit, once in possession
of the said car, and far from complying with his
obligation or duty to make the appropriate repairs and
with intent to defraud and with abuse of confidence
misappropriated, converted and/or misapplied the said
car to his own personal use and benefit and despite
repeated demands to return the said car to the owner
thereof, accused refused and failed to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the owner of the said car. It
was also discovered that he had sold the car’s
differential and cylinder head, while the engine could
no longer be found. Libuit was then charged with
estafa.
On arraignment, Libuit testified on direct
examination. However, his defense counsel, withdrew
from the case after his initial cross-examination. On
motion of the petitioner, the continuation of his cross-
examination was reset to give him time to engage the
services of another counsel. The petitioner eventually
secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga
failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order striking
from the records the petitioner’s direct testimony and
declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence already on record.
After further proceedings, the trial court
rendered judgment finding Libuit guilty of the crime of
estafa.
ISSUE: Whether Libuit was deprived of his right to
counsel
RULING: No. The duty of the court to appoint a
counsel de oficio for the accused who has no
counsel of choice and desires to employ the
services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused
has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a
counsel of his own choice. Worth noting, when the
time for the presentation of evidence for the defense
arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone,
the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
In the present case, since Libuit was
represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment
and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-
bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after
his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the
his motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to
engage the services of another counsel. The failure of
Atty. Jose Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to
appear at the subsequent hearings without reason
was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the
striking from the records of his direct testimony, and
thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already
presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of
defendant’s counsel at the trial may even be taken as
a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio
would be discretionary with the trial court, which will
not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse.
This Court is convinced that the trial court had been
liberal in granting postponements asked by the Libuit
himself. We think that such liberality removes any
doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
 DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO BE HEARD
(283) HONOR P. MOSLARES vs. THIRD DIVISION,
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO ROSARIO,
JR.
G.R. No. 129744. June 26, 1998
FACTS: On February 19, 1991, petitioner purchased
three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-
Air, Inc which were thereupon registered under his
name, under the name of Manila Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines, and
under the name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment
thereof, petitioner issued Philippine Bank of
Commissions Check in the amount of P1,425,780.00.
When presented for payment, said check was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. Thus, petitioner was charged for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for Estafa.
The hearings of the case were postponed
several times either at the instance of the petitioner or
the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On
September 13, 1995, the scheduled date of the
presentation of evidence by petitioner, he failed to
appear, but was represented by a newly retained
lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who claimed that he
was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not
yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial court
set the promulgation of the decision on October 30,
1995.
The record shows that accused Honor
Moslares did not attend during the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. The
Court set the presentation of evidence for the defense
nineteen (19) times four (4) of which were cancelled
on the ground that there was a typhoon and the public
prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not
even testify and presented only one witness, a certain
Sixto Avila. Subject cases were submitted for decision
four (4) times for failure of the accused to present
evidence but was lifted in the interest of justice upon
motion of the accused. He changed his lawyer four
times everytime the Court ordered the case submitted
for decision for failure of the accused to present his
evidenced inorder to gain a delay.
On October 30, 1995, the trial court proceeded
to promulgate in absentia the October 26, 1996
decision. On November 14, 1995, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal which was denied due course by the
lower court in its assailed order dated dated February
1, 1996. The lower court, relying on the case of
People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79[1991]), considered
petitioner to have waived his right to appeal.
On February 14, 1996, petitioner filed a
petition for relief from judgment which was likewise
denied by the trial court. On March 14, 1996,
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals which treated the petition as one for
certiorari. Petitioner also filed on October 3, 1996, a
petition to post bail, later supplemented.
On November 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review
and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for
reconsideration subsequently filed by petitioner were
denied.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the decision of the lower court
declaring that the petitioner had waived his right to
present evidence by numerous postponements
thereby depriving petitioner his right to due process.
II. Whether the decision of the lower court in
affirming which was promulgated in absentia deprived
the petitioner an oppurtunity to present evidence in
support of his defense.
III. Whether the petitioner has no valid
defense.
IV. Whether the lower court in dismissing
appeal denied his right to due process.
V. Whether the lower court is correct in
denying petitioner's application for bail.
RULING:
I. & II. While it is true that the right to present
evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it
cannot be said that petitioner had waived said right in
this case. The postponement sought by petitioner and
counsel appear to be justified and were not vexatious
and oppressive as borne by the record of the case.
The intention and the willingness of petitioner to
present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he
had already presented one witness and has other
witnesses ready for presentation, although this was
delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of
the petitioner and his counsel, petitioner's confinement
at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between the
parties, and substitution of counsel.
The rights of an accused during trial are given
paramount importance in our laws and rules on
criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of
the accused is the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the
Constitution itself. This right has been recognized and
established in order to make sure that justice is done
to the accused.
Further, the constitution right of the accused to
be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice
under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right (People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111
SCRA 515 [1982]).
III. It is worthy to note that the alleged criminal
liability of petitioner stems from his being the signatory
of the questioned check and his being an officer of the
corporation, the actual purchaser of the cars. As
mentioned by the Solicitor General in his
Manifestation, and citing the case of Lina Lim Lao vs.
Court of Appeals, an officer of a corporation is not to
be held criminally liable for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 for signing a bum check, upon
which premise, the Solicitor General concludes and
recommends that petitioner be given his opportunity to
present his evidence.
IV. Inasmuch as petitioner's appeal was
perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, the
same must be given due course. To deny petitioner's
appeal is tantamount to denying him due process.
Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, it is an essential part of the judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of this prerogative, but instead,
afford every party-litigant the amplest oppurtunity for
the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from
the constrainsts of technicalities (Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 623 [1996]).
V. Petitioner was not convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment where bail is not matter of right on the
part of petitioner nor of discretion on the part of the
Court. Neither has he been convicted of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of six to twenty years
where bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion and
may be denied if any of the circumstances
aforementioned are present. Rather, petitioner was
convicted erroneously - it is to be hastily added - of
offenses punishable only by imprisonment of one year
each. In this light, petitioner's admission to bail
becomes imperative and indispensable, moreso
because of petitioner's deteriorating health.
The right to bail is a constitutional guaranty
which every person under legal custody may invoke,
except those qualified under the law. Petitioner does
not fall under these exceptions and must, therefore,
be duly accorded such right. Verily, it was patent error
for the respondent Court of Appeals to deny petitioner HELD: The crime charged in the information was
of said right. clearly for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425 or “sale” of prohibited drugs, as amended by
 RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned under such
CAUSE OF ACTION information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But
instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after
(284) People v. Manansala trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8,
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
FACTS: The information filed on October 20, 1994 Act No. 7659.
against the accused alleges: The accused now questions said conviction
“That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of based on the alleged violation of his constitutional
October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines right to be informed of the nature and cause of
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accusation against him.
above-named accused, without being lawfully While no conviction for the unlawful sale of
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and prohibited drugs may be had under the present
knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to circumstances, the established principle is that
another and distributing more or less 750 grams or ¾ possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale
kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small thereof, except where the seller is further
wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
drugs, found in his possession and control. prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale
CONTRARY TO LAW. “ and which are probably intended for some future
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution dealings or use by the seller. In this case, it has been
showed that on October 18, 1994 the Philippine satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana
National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a confiscated from accused-appellant were the same
test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In
dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the this light, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search committed no reversible error in convicting the
warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous
(Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is
Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. necessary to determine whether the conviction of
SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the
the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman information did not allege, instead of for a violation of
Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in
conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded nature and cause of the accusation brought against
the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the him. The rule is that when there is a variance between
information, which the search team recovered from a the offense charged in the complaint or information,
wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was and that proved or established by the evidence, and
the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked the offense as charged necessarily includes the
P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
SNMN426747 used during the test buy. offense proved included in that which is charged.
After trial, accused was convicted of According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court
“possession” of marijuana only under Section 8 of RA (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged
No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as this is alleged in the complaint or information,
ISSUE: Was his constitutional right to be informed of constitute the latter.
the nature and cause of accusation against him Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA No.
violated when he was charged of “sale” of marijuana 9165 entitles the accused to acquittal based on his
under Section 4 of RA No. 6425 but was convicted of constitutional presumption of innocence.
“possession under Section 8 of the same law--- which
entitles him to acquittal?