OUTLINE IN PERSONS

AND FAMILY RELATIONS

SY 2019-2020
-------------------
Note: All articles references are to the Family Code unless a Civil
Code article reference (NCC) is indicated.

Required Text: Family Law in the Philippines, Legarda, Mawis, Vargas

(2017 ed)
Tolentino, Persons and Family Law, Vol. 1

We will use a variety of teaching/learning methods to achieve the goals of

this course, to keep things interesting, and to accommodate various learning
styles. I ask for your forbearance when I am using a style that works for
others, but not for you.

PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOL

As you may know, you are creating your professional reputation in the law.
Accordingly, please behave as the best attorneys do. This includes paying
attention and responding to what others say as well as working with others
to collectively learn the material.

Please be prepared for class and to be ready to work. Please listen to others,
avoid dominating discussion, take the initiative to improve your skills, take
risks and be resourceful. Please seek help when you realize you need it or
when recommended. Please show up every day on time and stay in class the
whole time.

If you are unable to attend a class due to illness or other good reason, please
notify me before class, if possible. You may receive an excused absence if
you notify me in writing why you need to miss class and provide me with
sufficient information for me to excuse you. If you accumulate 5 or more
unexcused absences, you will fail the course and you will be given a FAIL in
the class.

You are responsible for learning information and getting the handouts
provided in class or made available online. If you missed class, talk to
classmates to learn what happened and get notes.

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AND FINALLY – I DO NOT GIVE A .99 to allow you to pass (if you are
from DLSU); nor a “4” if you are from UP. Your grade is either a “1” or a
“0”; “3” or “5.”

DO NOT TALK TO ME ABOUT YOUR GRADE AFTER THE FINAL

EXAMS HAVE BEEN GRADED.

Note: SC Rules required:

1. 02-6-02, Adoption
2. 02-11-10, Nullity
3, 02-11-11, Legal Separation
4. 02-11-12, Provisional Orders
5. 03-04-04, Custody of Minors
6. 04-10-11, VAWC

I. INTRODUCTION

1 Tolentino, Civil Code, pp. 1-10 [1990 Edition]

II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Arts. 1 to 13, pp. 1-52 of Tolentino

NCC 1 - 18

A. When law takes effect

NCC 2
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24
Exec. Order 200, Sec. 2

Tañada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Commissioner v Hypermix, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012
Acaac v Azcuna, Jr., G.R. No. 187378, SEP 30, 2013

B. Ignorance of the law

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 NCC 3
KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ, 69 PHIL 217
Elegado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 285

C. Retroactivity of laws

NCC 4, cf. NCC 2252 - 2269

Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22
Family Code (FC) 256

Simon v Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

Francisco vs. CA , G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998
CF: Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001
David v Agbay, G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

NCC Art. 5 with NCC Art. 17 (3)

I. Waiver of rights

NCC Art. 6
NCC Art. 2035

DM Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

Aujero V PhilComSat, G.R. No. 193484, January 18, 2012
Dona Adela v Tidcorp, G.R. No. 201931, February 11, 2015

F. Repeal of laws

NCC 7
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3
FC 254

Thornton vs. Thornton, Aug. 16, 2004

Kida v Senate, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012
Yinlu Bicol v Trans-Asia, G.R. No. 207942, Jan. 12, 2015

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 G. Stare Decisis

NCC 8

Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001

De Castro v JBC, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
Virtucio v Alegarbes, G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012
Republic v Rehman Enterprises, GR 199310, Feb.19, 2014
UCPB v Uy, GR 204039, Jan. 10, 2018

H. Duty to render judgment

NCC 9, 10
RPC 5
People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690
People v Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019
Alonzo v Padua, 150 SCRA 379
Barcellano v Barza, GR 165287, September 14, 2011

I. Presumption and Applicability of Custom

NCC 11 - 12
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2), (3)

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

J. Legal periods

NCC 13

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

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 cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded
and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls
on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall
not run until the next working day. (a)

Section 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done which effectively

interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start
to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the
period.

RAC Sec. 31
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months;
"month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall
be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day
of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.

Comr. v Aichi Forging, G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010

Issue:
Did Aichi Forging file their judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit within the 2
year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997?

Relevant Facts:
Aichi Forging on September 30, 2004, filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. On the same day, Aichi Forging filed a Petition
for Review with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT.

Aichi argument: within the 2 years: September 30 ,2002 - September 30, 2004

Commr Argument: 2004 is a leap year which is more than 365 days, so last day to file should
be September 29, 2004.

Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. The court states that section 229 is not applicable which leaves the question of section 112.
The court clarified in its ruling that the Administrative Code, which states that a year is 12
calendar months, repeals and amends the provision in the Civil Code that states that a year is 365
days. Because of this, Aichi’s claim under 112 which prescribes a 2 year time frame to claim for
refund/credit is valid. But it also states in section 112 that the Commissioner has 120 days in
which to review and decide on the case, and if the petitioner does not like the decision or if the

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Commissioner does not act on the case after the 120 days then petitioner may filed a case with the
CTA. Because Aichi Forging did not wait the 120 days, the petition to Court of Tax Appeals is
premature. The premature filing gives no jurisdiction to CTA, which results in the reversal of the
CTA decision.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the
October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No.
7065 for having been prematurely filed.

II. Applicability of Penal Laws

NCC 14, 17(3), RPC Art. 2

Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.

Article 17(3). Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

RPC Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws
of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within
the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime
zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

L. Binding effect

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 NCC 15
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

cf. FC 26
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36 37 and 38.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

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(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.

Del Socorro v Van Wilsen, GR 193707, Dec. 10, 2014

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child

RULING
1. Insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.

But in international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree).

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

ALSO, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.

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 2. YES. Since yes yung unang argument. Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case.

Tenchavez v. Escaño 15 SCRA 355

That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 886), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country

Board of Commissioners vs. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853

FACTS:
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural
mother.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila
from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian,
and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6,
1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens

The new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in
the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion
of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.

ISSUE:
Is William T. Gatchalian a Filipino Citizen?

YES. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old
minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of China. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino,
as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen
whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted
abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in

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the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country ..."

Yao Kee v Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)

FACTS
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.

Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo

Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
alleging that:
(a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
(b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate;
(c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children
to him; and,
(d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratix of the intestate
estate of the deceased.

- The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that:
(a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
(b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and,
(c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to
become the administartix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

- Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kia in FooKien, China; that she does not
have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; thain China,
the custom is that there is a go between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both
parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-
be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as
an engagement day; that on the engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring
some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a
date would be set for the wedding; that during the wedding, the parents of the bride
would give the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed by the
parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the
wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as the
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that she and Sy
Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China, which she
does not know the whereabouts of that document.

ISSUE: Is the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat, in accordance with

Chinese law or custom, valid?

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RULING:
NO. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the
law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-
serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction

Custom defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed

(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.” The law requires that “a
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.” On the score the
Court had occasion to state that “a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered
by a court of justice unless such customs is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact.”

NCC 16
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Aznar v Garcia, 7 SCRA 95 (1963)

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in Davao approving, among other
things, the final accounts of the executor; directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of Php3600, which she had paid to Helen Christensen Garcia as
her legacy; and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property
of Edward E. Christensen in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator.

Edward E. Christensen, at the time of his death, was a citizen of the US in the
State of California, domiciled in the Philippines. In his will, executed in Manila on March
5, 1951, he declared that he has only one child, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, born in
the Philippines and residing in Los Angeles, California, and that he has no other
ascendants or descendants except for Lucy. He further declared that MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN (married to Eduardo Garcia) , although she was baptized Christensen, is
in no way related to him. Nevertheless, he bequeathed unto Maria Helen Php3600 from
his estate, and unto Maria Lucy he bequeathed “all the income from the rest, remainder,
and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which

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may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime.”

Maria Helen opposed the approval of the partition in that it deprives her of her
legitimate share as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE
What laws should govern the distribution of Edward E. Christensen’s estate?

RULING
The law that governs the validity of Edward E. Christensen’s testamentary is
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that intestate and
testamentary successions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration. What is the law of California governing the disposition
of personal property of its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions? The answer can be
found in Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which states that if there is no law to
the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the
person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The Philippine courts cannot and should not refer the case back to California as
this will render the issue incapable of determination, getting tossed back and forth. The
Philippine court must apply its own law.

Therefore, as the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, Maria Helen, should be
governed by Philippine Law.

Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358 (1967)

- Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States.
- He had two wives, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and had five legitimate
children namely Edward, George, Henry, Alexander, and Anna
- Violet Kennedy, his second wife, who survived him and had three legitimate
children namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy.
- Finally he had three illegitimate children: Amos Jr., Maria and Miriam.
- On August 5, 1952, Amos executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate (which are located in the Philippines and in Texas) should be divided,
in trust, in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each
c. After the foregoing two items have been satisfied the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares.
- On July 8, 1958, Amos died. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as the executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein released from time to time according as the lower court

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approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
- On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
- On April 30, 1964, the lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition
relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which
in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUES
Which law will apply in executing the deceased’s will? Philippine Law or Texas Law?

RATIO DECIDENDI
Texas Law. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

- On the other hand, the appellants have pointed out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
- Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters.

Tayag v Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

- Idonah Slade Perkins died on March 27, 1960 and left 2 stock certificates worth
33,002 shares of Benguet Consolidation Inc. (Benguet), the certificates are in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York (Domiciliary Administrator/In the
place of the deceased).
- August 12, 1960 Renato D. Tayag (Tayag) was appointed ancillary administrator
(Subordinate/Auxiliary of Domiciliary).
- A disputed arose between Benguet Consolidation Inc. and Renato Tayag about
who is entitled to the stock certificates.
- January 27, 1964 Court of First Instance of Manila ordered Benguet to produce
and deposit the certificates to Tayag or Clerk of Court, which Benguet did not comply.
- Tayag then petitioned to the court to declare or consider the certificates lost.
Benguet then admitted that “it is immaterial” concerning “who is entitled to the
possession of the stock certificates in question”.

ISSUES
1. Are the Stock Certificates and Benguet Consolidation under the Jurisdiction of the

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Philippines?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Are the stock certificates under the Jurisdiction of the Philippines?

Yes, as explained by the court stating that “an administrator appointed in one state or
country, the administrator has no power over property in another state or country.

The corporation Benguet Consolidation Inc., being domiciled in the Philippines and as
the court stated “owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local
courts”

Even if the corporation is considered as an artificial being created by the will of the law
the court states that “it owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its
will”

NCC 17
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

Raytheon v Rouzie, GR 162894, February 26, 2008

Facts:

1) Brand Mining Service Inc (BMSI) entered into a contract with American citizen,
Stockton Rouzie, Jr.

2) It was stipulated in said contract that Rouzie would be BMSI’s representative to

negotiate sale of services in the Philippines with a renumeration of 10% of gross receipts

3) Rouzie was able to secure a service contract with Republic of PH for dredging of
rivers in Mt. Pinatubo

4) Rouzie then filed a suit against BMSI, Rust International, Gilbert, and Browning for

14
alleged non-payment of commission before the Artbitration Branch of NLRC

5) Rouzie initiated civil case for damage to the RTC of Bauang, La Union in which RTC
ruled in favor of Rouzie

6) Petitioners allege that the contract was governed by the laws of State of Connecticut as
stipulated in the choice-of-law clause and that RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case

- petitioners also used the principle of Forum Non Conviens – meaning that the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum

7) RTC ruled that it does have jurisdiction. Court of Appeals sustained this ruling.

Issue:

W/N the PH Court has jurisdiction to hear the civil case despite the defense of petitioners
that the contract was governed by US laws – YES

Ruling:

1) The jurisdiction of the court is different from the choice of law stipulated
between
parties in the contract.

- being a civil case, RTC automatically acquired jurisdiction to hear the case

- the fact that US laws shall govern the contract between parties does not prevent the
court from hearing the case

- the choice of law will only be dealt with once the court proceeds with the hearing on the
merits of the case

2) Forum Non Conveniens is a discretionary power upon the courts. It may opt to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction ONLY after vital facts are established to determine if
this principle shall apply. However, the Court did not find sufficient finding of foreign
elements to abstain from hearing said case

NCC 18
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

Tamano v Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

Senator Marmintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married

15
 Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano (Zorayda) until his death in
1994. A year before his death, he married Estrellita Tamano
(Estrellita) of which both marriages if of civil rites.

- Zorayda and her son filed a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground
that it was bigamous. It was contended that there was
misrepresentation on both parties as both have declared
divorced and single from each one's marriage, thus making
the marriage contract false and fraudulent.

- Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of the civil

code having no jurisdiction over the case since both are
Muslims and should be under PD No. 1083 which was
denied along with the motion to reconsider.

ISSUES
1. Does the Regional Trial Court have the proper
jurisdiction in the case at hand?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Yes. In the case at hand, all marriages occurred from both
sides were marriages under Civil rites. Also, even if the PD
No. 1083 is considered, it does not provide provisions on
marriages having marriages with Civil and Muslim rites.
Therefore, this deficiency in the law provided is supplied by
Article 18 of the Civil Code. PD No. 1083 (The Code of
Muslim Personal laws) has jurisdiction with Marriages to
Muslims under Muslim rites. However, the said special law
does not provide for a situation where the parties are both in
civil and Muslim Marriages. This deficiency in the law, as
declared by the court, is enough grounds to declare the
Sharia Court to have no jurisdiction in the case of Tamano.

Llave vs Republic, GR 169766, March 30, 2011

RELEVANT FACTS
• Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Mamintal Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
married Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) twice on 1993 – initially under Islamic laws
and tradition then under a civil ceremony officiated by a RTC Judge. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced.”Since then, Estrellia has
been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death,
his widow.
• On November 23, 1994, Zorayda Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Tamano
(Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children
with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. In their

16
complaint they alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zoraydo on 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
• The complaint further averred that the marriage between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano was celebrated under the New Civil Code, and is therefore governed by the law.
Based on Article 35(4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by Sen.
Tamano with Estrellita is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior
marriage to Zorayda was still subsisting, and that Sen. Tamano never divorced in his
lifetime, nor could he have even if he wanted to because divorce is not allowed under the
Civil Code. Moreover, Sen. Tamano could not have divorced Zorayda by invoking the
Muslim Code (PD No. 1083) either, for the simple reason that the couple did not register
their mutual desire to be covered by the law.
• Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss with the similar argument that since the
previous marriage was under Muslim rites, the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because under the Muslim Code, issues involving Muslim
marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari’a Courts. The RTC
denied Estrellita’s motion. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Thus she filed a petition with the
Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUE

• Is the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano bigamous?

RATIO DECIDENDI

• Yes. The marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano was never invalidated by the
Muslim Code. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio for being
bigamous. The marriage between Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike during that time was the Civil
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given
time. Under that provision divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of RA
394 (An Act which took effect on June 18, 1949, authorizing for a period of 20 years
divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces in accordance with Muslim
customs and practices) which was NOT availed of during its effectivity.

• Estrellita thinks that Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under the Muslim Code. However, the Muslim Code cannot benefit
Estrellita. First, Article 13(1) of the Muslim Code provides that the law applies to
“marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Msulim law or this Code
in any part of the Philippines.” But the SC already ruled in a previous case that Article 13
of the Muslim Code does NOT provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. (*my thoughts, So this deficiency shall be supplied by the
provisions of the Civil Code).

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• Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and thus
cannot override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The Muslim Code explicitly provides for the prospective
application of its provisions. There is one instance where Muslim Code can have
retroactive effect, Article 186(2) provides that “A marriage contracted by a Muslim male
prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be
considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their
mutual desire to this effect.” BUT EVEN GRANTING there was registration of mutual
consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective,
as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws,
again a case that is not provided for by the Muslim Code and thus shall be supplied by the
Civil Code.

Zamoranos v People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011

April 28, 1982: Zamoranos converts from Catholic to Islam

May 3, 1982: Zamoranos ad Jesus de Guzman (also a Muslim convert) get married in
Islamic rites.

July 30, 1982: Zamoranos and de Guzman wed again in civil rites before judge Laguio of
QC RTC.

Dec 18, 1983: Zamoranos and de Guzman divorce by Talaq (The right given to a Muslim
man to divorce his wife by mere unequivocal statement.)

December 20 1989: Zamoranos marries Samson Pacasum, Sr.

June 18 1992: Zamoranos and de Guzman divorce is confirmed by Shari’a circuit which
issued a Decree of Divorce -- mentioned de Guzman gave her authority to exercise Talaq,
that there was no objection from de Guzman, both were converted to Islam, confirm
marriage is dissolved.

December 28 1992: Zamoranos and Pacasum renew vows in civil ceremony before Iligan
City RTC judge

Had four kids

1998: De facto separated (Not living together anymore) which led to a “bitter battle for
custody”

October 18 1999: reached a compromise agreement where Zamoranos gets primary

custody and Pacasum gets visitorial rights.
- Pacasum filed a flurry of cases afterwards:
- annulment which he amended to a declaration of void marriage citing the prior
marriage of Z to dG during their marriage, bigamous marriage so should be void ab initio,

18
Z should forfeit custody, share, and inheritance.
- criminal complaint for Bigamy
- Dismissal & disbarment from Civil Service Commission, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Bureau of Finance
- July 18, 2004: Pacasum marries Catherine Ang

ISSUES
1. Should the civil code or family code apply to the case at hand because of the Civil
marriage done by Zamoranos? No because the civil marriage was merely ceremonial and
supplementary. The
2. Did the RTC have jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for Bigamy?
3. Was the marriage of Zamoranos and Pacasum bigamous?
4. Did Zamoranos have the right to remarry?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Should the civil code or family code apply to the case at hand because of the Civil
marriage done by Zamoranos? NO. because the civil marriage was merely surplusage and
the Islamic rites will govern, which means it did not have any effect on the validity of
both Islamic marriage and divorce. NCC 18 states “In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions
of this Code.” in this case the Special Law (Muslim Code) does not have a deficiency, so
the Civil Code should NOT be applied. Article 3 of PD 1083 states: (1) In case of conflict
between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall
prevail.
2. Did the RTC have jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for Bigamy? NO. Although the
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over bigamy as a criminal case, it did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense in this specific case. “In this case, the
charge of bigamy hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her
marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. The RTC should have at least
suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had evidence that Zamoranos’ previous
marriage was not resolved.
3. Was the marriage of Zamoranos and Pacasum bigamous? NO. “Bigamy dwells on
the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has
yet to be dissolved.” Zamoranos presented:
a. Affidavit of Confirmation (executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who
solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman) -- stated the two are Muslims,
solemnizing marriage
b. Certification by a judge confirming divorce
c. Affidavit by Judge Usman of Zamoranos and de Guzman jointly asking for
confirmation of their Talaq
4. Did Zamoranos have the right to remarry? YES. Under Article 54a of PD 1083:
“the marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with this Code.”

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.

19
194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-
MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information
in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

RELEVANT LAWS
- PD 1083: A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE
RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING
MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
o Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
▪ (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.
▪ (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or
laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the
former.
▪ (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing
herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
o Article 13. Application.
▪ (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
▪ (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
▪ (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites
and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and
custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr),
betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and
divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife parental authority, and the
properly relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.

Villagracia v Sharía, GR 188832, April 23, 2014

The dispute between Roldan E. Mala and Vivencio V. Villagracia started when the former
had the 300-square-meter parcel of land that he claims he owns surveyed on October 30,
2006. The Geodetic Engieer Dennis P. Dacup found out that Vivencio occupied the part
of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.

To settle the conflicting claims, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation but failed to settle
with Vivencio. This led him to file an action to recover the possession of the parcel of
land to the Fifth Shari’a District Court. Despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to
file his answer to the court. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence
ex parte which was granted. On June 11, 2008, respondent ruled for Roldan. It ordered
Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay P10,000.00 as moderate
damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. After 6 months, the same court issued the

20
notice of Writ of Execution to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision.

Vivencio then filed for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction citing Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines and argued that Shari'a District Courts may only hear civil
actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian,
Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Roldan's action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed
that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on
the ground of mistake. This petition was denied for lack of merit.

Vivencio then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on August 6, 2006
wherein he argued that Fifth Shari'a District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering
the decision dated June 11, 2008. Under Article 143, paragraph (2) (b) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, Shari'a District Courts may only take
cognizance of real actions where the parties involved are Muslims.

The court ruled for Vivencio.

ISSUES
1. Does Shariah District Court have jurisdiction over an action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim?

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. None. Shariah District Courts have no jurisdiction over an action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim. According to Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, Shari'a District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims.

NCC 19 – 21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648

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 - Wassmer and Velez were to be married on September 4, 1954. Two
days before the wedding, Velez left Wassmer a letter stating that the
wedding needed to be postponed because of the disapproval of his
mother. The next day Velez sent a telegram stating the wedding was to
continue and nothing changed. Valez was never seen or heard from
again. Beatriz sued Valez for damages.

ISSUES
1. Is Velez liable for damages for breaching promise to marry Wassmer?

RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. Because pursuant to Article 21 of the NCC Velez is liable for damages because 2 days
before the wedding Velez walked out on Wassmer, in spite of all the preparations and publicity
done. Velez failed to provide an adequate explanation and left Wassmer to face the shame and
humiliation alone and was never seen or heard from again.

Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994

- Sometime in December 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. He
professed his undying love and affection, which Santos in turn reciprocated. With
Tanjaco’s promise of marriage, Santos allowed him to have carnal knowledge (sex) which
lasted from July 1958 to July 1959 when Santos conceived a child. She resigned to avoid
social humiliation thereby making her unable to financially support herself. Tanjanco,
breaking his promise to marry allegedly cause her mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and moral shock. The Court of first instance dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. Santos appealed to the CA ruled that there was no cause of action
for the child yet unborn however, there is for damages of Santos, premised under Article
21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed stating that a breach of promise is not
permissible.

- ISSUES

1. Is Tanjanco liable under Article 21?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. No. In the example that the CA used, they overlooked the term “seduction”, which
is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It connotes the idea
of deceit, enticement, and superior abuse of power. In this case, both are of legal age, and
maintained intimate sexual relations and repeated acts of intercourse. This is contrary to
the term “seduction” since it is voluntary and consensual. If she has yielded due to the
promise of marriage, she would not have had regular sexual intercourse with him for a
year, without early fulfillment of the promised marriage. No case is made under Article
21 of the Civil Code.

Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115

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FACTS
• On October 27, 1987, Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Baksh for
the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
o She alleges that she is: 22 years old, single, Filipino, a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community.
o On the other hand, Baksh is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges, Dagupan.
o Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they agreed to get married
at the end of the semester, October 1987. Baksh then visited Gonzales’ family in Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.
o Sometime August 20, 1987, Baksh forced Gonzales to live with him in Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him.
o A week before filing the complaint, Baksh’s attitude towards Gonzales. He
maltreated and threatened to kill her; she sustained injuries as a result.
o During a confrontation with the Brgy. Capain of Guilig a day before filing the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with
him anymore; petitioner already married someone living in Bacolod City.
• In his Answer, Baksh admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties and
denied the rest of the allegations.
o He claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be marred with
private respondent; neither did he seek consent or approval from Gonzales’ parents nor
forced her to live with him.
o He only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place
with the representative of the barangay captain.
• After trial, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a
decision favoring the private respondent.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the trail court’s ruling.

ISSUES
• Can damages be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21of the Civil Code of the Philippines?

RATIO DECIDENDI
• The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. (This has been decided in De Jesus v. Syquia.)
• Although so, the court contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in the jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
o Article 21 fills the vacuum. It is even postulated together with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code. Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs.

23
• Where a man’s promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, when in reality
he had no intention of marrying her and the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him or to obtain her consent to the sexual act -
damages may be collected pursuant to Article 21 not because of the promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. Such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, public policy.
• Gonzales surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipino, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.

Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11-2922, April 4, 2011

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Immoral conduct was defined as: “conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless,
and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community.”
● To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.
● A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree

FACTS
● The complainant alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying
love for her. She agreed to live with him due to his promise to marry her. Complainant
became pregnant but the respondent forced her to abort the baby. When complainant did
not agree, respondent abandoned her. She lost her baby and stopped going to school
because of the humiliation.
● The respondent denied the allegations and claimed that the charges were baseless,
false and fabricated. He also averred that Norma Tordesillas, complainant’s co-employee,
was using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas hated him because the respondent
chastised her for her arrogant behavior in work.
● Respondent believes that the complainant’s letter was prepared by Tordesilllas
who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog
● Complainant insisted that she wrote the letter herself in her reply.
● The SC referred the complaint to the acting executive judge of the RTC for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
● The respondent sought the inhibition of Judge Cuares from the case, alleging that
the judge was partial and had bias in favor of the complainant.
● The SC designated Judge dela Pena to continue with the investigation. Judge
Avila took over when he was designated the Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan
City, Samar.
● In Judge Avila’s report, the complainant testified that she met the respondent
while she was a member of the Singles for Christ, they dated until the lived together in a
rented room.
● The respondent confirmed that he had met her in the Singles for Christ and that
they were dating. He admitted that the complainant would stay in his room for 3-4 times a

24
week. He however denied that he forced the complainant to abort the baby. The
respondent claimed that the miscarriage was due to the complainant’s epileptic attacks,
and that the complainant’s mother did not approve of him and she forced the complainant
to return home, hence their separation since.
● Judge Avila recommended the dismissal of the case, reporting that the relationship
between a court employee and an equally unmarried woman has nothing to do with the
former’s public employment, the complainant freely cohabitated with him.
● The judge stated that there was no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual
activity of two unmarried persons. Although the accusation of the complainant that the
act of the respondent to initiate the abortion was within the ambit of an immoral,
disgraceful and gross misconduct, there was not enough evidence to support it.
-
ISSUES
W/N the respondent’s acts were considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct?

RATIO DECIDENDI
Were the complained acts considered disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct? NO.

The SC held that sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were
consensual, and that these relations were not enough to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behavior. The SC repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under an impediment to marry and
where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action.

While the SC has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private
conduct, it is not within their authority to decide on matters touching on employee’s
personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their family’s future.

Metroheights Subd. V CMS Construction, G.R. No. 209359, Oct. 17,

2018
- In 1990, due to insufficient water supply, the Metroheights sought assistance
from MWSS, and was advised the improvement and upgrading of its internal water
distribution lines. As such, Metroheights entered into a contract with MWSS for the new
water service connected and MWSS awarded the projected to a contractor, the cost of
which was shouldered by Metroheights. Since then, there was sufficient and strong
water pressure 24 hours a day in the subdivision.
- In 1992, CMS Construction made diggings and excavations in the neighboring
subdivision with the knowledge and consent of MWSS but without such of
Metroheights. Metroheight’s water service connection was cut-off and disconnected in
the process and were waterless for 3 days. Furthermore, their PVC pipes and radius
elbow were allegedly stolen by CMS Construction’s workers. When Metroheights
discovered such, they immediately complained and demanded restoration of the
waterline, and a temporary connection was made. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands, the same was not restored.

25
 ISSUES

Should the respondents be held for damages for the cutting off, disconnection and
transfer of petitioner’s existing separate water service connection without the latter’s
knowledge and consent?

RATIO DECIDENTI

- Yes. Article 19 of the New Civil Code states, every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
- The respondents admitted that because of the rehabilitation project they were
undertaking, petitioner’s current line had to be cut off. Good faith and prudence dictate
that petitioner should be given prior notice of such actions. Such prior notice could not
be substantiated by the respondents. In fact, it was only after the petitioner’s officer
investigated the cause of the loss of water supply that they learned that their line was
cut-off. If the petitioner’s officer had not complained, petitioner’s homeowners would
have continuously suffered loss of water service.

III. PERSONS & PERSONALITY

A. The concept of a ‘person’ and ‘personality’

NCC 37 – 39
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances
are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity
to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law.

26
Classes of persons and their distinctions

Elements of civil capacity

Juridical capacity v. personality

Juridical capacity v. capacity to act

B. Commencement and termination of personality

1. Natural Persons

(a) Birth

27
 NCC 40 – 41
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified
in the following article. (29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

1987 Constitution, Art. II Sec. 12

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

P.D. 603 [Child and Youth Welfare Code], Art. 5

Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall
commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to
the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code

FC 164, 2nd par., FC 180

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his
wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall
be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.

Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child’s birth.

RPC Arts. 256 – 259

ARTICLE 256. Intentional Abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusión temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the
pregnant woman.

2. The penalty of prisión mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the
consent of the woman.

3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman

28
shall have consented.

ARTICLE 257. Unintentional Abortion. — The penalty of prisión correccional in its

minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an
abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

ARTICLE 258. Abortion Practiced by the Woman Herself or by Her Parents. — The
penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon a woman who shall practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other
person should do so.

Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the
penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and
they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the
offenders shall suffer the penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

ARTICLE 259. Abortion Practiced by a Physician or Midwife and Dispensing of

Abortives. — The penalties provided in article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum
period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.

Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any
abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801

a. Dead child has no right
b. Against the 1987 Constitution and PD603
c. Legal capacity e.g. inheritance
d. LIFE at BIRTH: absolute precedent of rights

Quimiging v. Icao 34 SCRA 134

Nature: Appeal from order of the Zamboanga del
Norte CFI. Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
Facts: Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex
with Quimiguing several times by force and
intimidation and without her consent (rape!); as a
result Quimiguing became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by Icao. Quimiguing claims
support at Php 120.00/month, damages and
attorney‘s fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of cause of action since complainant did not

29
allege that the child had indeed been born; trial judge
sustained defendant‘s motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON the case merits the protection of Art. 40
NCC and if so then does the child have the rights,
through the mother, to claim support.
Held: YES.
Ratio: Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers
that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given
birth to a baby girl. The SC says that since, as
provided in Article 40 NCC (the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes favorable to it,
provided, it be born later with the conditions specified
in following article), petitioner Quimiguing‘s child,
since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the
requirement of having been born later, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee.
Disposition: Orders of the lower court reversed and
set aside and case remanded to lower court for
further proceedings

De Jesus v. Syquia 58 Phil 866

Facts: Antonia de Jesus went to court for the purpose
of recovering damages from Cesar Syquia stemming
from a breach of a promise to marry and to compel
the defendant to recognize and support her two
children. Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de
Jesus which resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a
baby boy on June 17, 1931. For a year or so, Syquia
supported de Jesus and his child. He, however, lost
interest in the relationship when De Jesus became
pregnant with their second child. Syquia left and
eventually married another woman. De Jesus now
claims that Syquia broke his promise to marry her.

Issue: Whether de Jesus can claim damages for

breach of promise to marry (Not the main issue)

Held: The trial court did not grant damages to de

Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil
law. At any rate, such promise was not satisfactorily
proven by De Jesus. During the course of their
relationship, defendant never expressed anything to
that effect.

30
 Continental Steel v. Montano, GR 182836, October 13, 2009
FACTS:

1. This is a petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the decision of the CA which
affirmed the resolution of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montano which
granted bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano, on account
of the death of the latter’s unborn child.
2. Hortillano is an employee at Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation and a
member of Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation – Solidarity of Trade
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms. He filed for paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and death and accident insurance for his unborn child, in line with the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Continental and the Union. The child
died in the 38th week of pregnancy, during labor.
3. Article 10 of the CBA states that in case of death of the employees’ legitimate
dependent (arents, spouse, children, siblings), the employee is entitled to a leave for 7
days if within Metro Manila to Marilao, Bulacan, and 11 days for provincial. Article 18
states that the company shall grant death and accident insurance in case of death of the
employees’ legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, children, siblings), with proper legal
document to be presented (death certificate, etc.).
4. Continental Steel granted the leave, but not the death and accident insurance.
When the parties failed to settle their dispute, the Union called in the National
Conciliation and Mediation board of DOLE. The parties mutually chose Atty. Montano as
their Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator.
5. Union argues that the CBA does not state that the child needs to be born alive, and
then to die, to be qualified as a dependent. They cite other cases from sister companies of
employees who received the insurance for their unborn children. They also invoked
Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which says that in case of ambiguity in legislation, the
ruling should favor the laborer.
6. Continental argues that because the unborn child is without juridical personality, it
could not be considered as a “dependent,” which is one of the qualifications for the
insurance. They also state that only one with civil personality can die.
7. Atty. Montano ruled in favor of Hortillano, saying that the fetus is a dependent
because it needed to be supported by the parents from the moment it was conceived, so
Continental filed a petition for review on certiorari. The CA affirmed Atty. Montano’s
resolution. Hence, the case at the SC.

ISSUE:
W/N: Hortillano’s unborn child is considered a dependent, thus qualifying the father to
receive the insurance. – Yes.

RULING:
1. Whether or not the child has juridical personality is not relevant in this case. It is
not a question of whether the child has acquired any rights or obtained any obligations
before death.
2. Continental Steel relies on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the civil code, which,
respectively, provides that a child only receives personality upon birth, when a child is

31
considered born, and that personality is extinguished by death. However, these do not
provide for the definition of death. Nor does it say that only those that have acquired
juridical personality could die. Death is the cessation of life. A person is not considered to
be alive only when he has acquired civil personality, and one does not need to acquire it
first to die. The constitution considers a child inside the womb to be alive from
conception. If the child dies in the womb before even being born, it still qualifies as
death.
3. According to the CBA, the unborn child is considered as a dependent, as it needs
his parents, more specifically the mother, to survive. It is also explicit in the CBA that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child. There were no qualifications for the child
to have been born, so the word “child” is to be understood in the general sense, which
includes the unborn child.
4. One of the requirements for the dependents to qualify for the insurance is the
legitimacy of the filiation to the employee. The unborn child is considered legitimate
when he is a product of a lawful union. Article 164 of the FC is clear on this.
DISPOSITION:
Petition is denied. Decision of CA to affirm Atty. Allan Montano’s resolution is affirmed.
Costs against Continental Steel.

(b) Death

NCC 42
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law,
by contract and by will.

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante 80 Phil 776

FACTS:
• 21 MAY 1946 The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibanez rendered its decision on case No. 4572 of Pedro Fragante, authorizing him to operate and
maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.
• Sec. 15 of the Commonwealth Act 146 “No public service shall operate without a
certificate of public convenience”.
• However Fragante, the applicant for a certificate of public convenience, died before his
application was granted. (It was granted to his estate)
• Limjoco (petitioner) claims that granting the certificate is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE:
W/N the estate of Pedro Fragante may be extended as having an “artificial judicial personality”
and is a “person” within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

HELD:
YES. The definition of “person” includes “whatever other persons or entities that may
own/possess/operate public services” including ARTIFICIAL as well as natural persons.

32
Art. 44, Sec. 3 states that the “estate of a dead person can be considered an artificial juridical
person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties”.

Had Fragante not died, his application would have been granted. The circumstance of death does
not extinguish his right to the certificate.
In Barrios vs. Dolor and Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio Taysan, “it is the estate (mass of property, rights
and assets left by the decedent) that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
not extinguished by death” (Art. 415, Sec. 10).
In Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, it was held that the estate of the deceased person has legal
personality independent of their heirs.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics 70 SCRA 472

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
- Summons cannot be served upon a deceased litigant since a person's juridical capacity,
which is his fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is lost through death.

FACTS
- The Court of First Instance rendered judgment ordering defendants, including Pedro Oria,
to pay a certain amount to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. In case the defendants fail to pay, Quality
Plastic is authorized to foreclose the bond in accordance with the law.
- Quality Plastic ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction
of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. The sale was confirmed
by the lower court.
- It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic.
- Oria's heirs, appellants in this case, sued the company to annul the judgment against Oria
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES
Should the Court annul the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased Oria?

RATIO DECIDENDI
Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, was lost through death.

Eugenio v. Velez 185 SCRA 425

RELEVANT FACTS
On October 5, 1988, Eugenio came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case, the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge, and to declare said writ and orders as
null and void.

33
Antecedent Facts:
❏ The siblings of Vitalian Vargas Vitaliana who were unaware of her death on August 28,
1988, filed a petition for habeas corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by Eugenio
in his palacial residence. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her
liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana
was 25 years of age, single, and living with Eugenio.
❏ The RTC issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Eugenio
refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot
be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already
obtained a burial permit.
❏ Eugenio also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in
his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, Eugenio claimed legal custody of
her body.

ISSUES
1. Can Eugenio claim custody of the corpse of Vitaliana?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. NO. Although, Eugenio claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code (Art. 199 NFC) which states:
The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made
in the following order:
(1) From the spouse; xxx xxx xxx
he is not legally the spouse of Vitaliana as Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. Moreover, Eugenio has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Thus, custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases) as per Sec. 1103(b) of the Revised Administrative Code.

RELEVANT LAWS
- NCC Art. 294 (NFC Art. 199): Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
- NCC Art. 305: The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
- NCC Art. 308: No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
- Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code:
Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx

34
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

Dicta:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even
apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Eugenio was legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211. Oct. 27, 1989

Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to
order respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President "s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue:
WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise
of the powers granted in her by the Constitution.

Ruling:
Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power ". The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has
recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses
from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.

Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.

Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.

Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar
the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

------------------
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a "travel documents "to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the

35
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses "to return "in the Philippines is guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically "Sections
"1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under "international law, their right "to return "to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by "the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to "travel from "the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right "to return "to one's
country, a distinct right under "international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil
"and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of "movement "and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of "movement "and residence
within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty
of "movement "and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the "national security,
public order, "public health "or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter
one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right "to return "to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right "to return "may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
"International Law "and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. "

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the
Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Berot v. Siapno, G.R. No. 188944, July 09, 2014

This is a petition to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed RTC Dagupan
City’s decision - allowing the foreclosure of a mortgaged property despite the objections of Berot
spouses. They claim that the registered owner was impleaded in the suit despite being deceased.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

36
In 2002, Macaria Berot, and spouses Rodolfo A. Berot and Lilia P. Berot (the borrowers) obtained
a P250K loan from Felipe Siapno (the lender) with an interest rate of 2% every year until fully
paid. And in order to secure the loan, the Berots mortgaged a portion of the contested property in
Pangasinan to Siapno. In other words, they used the contested property as collateral incase they
fail to pay the loan.

A year later, Macaria died. Siapno claimed the Berots failed to pay the agreed sum and interest
rate so he filed for foreclosure of mortgage and damages in the RTC (this is a legal process to
seize and obtain the property for unpaid balance of the loan).
In response, the Berot spouses claim that the contested property was the inheritance of the former
from his deceased father, Pedro; that on said property is their family home; that the mortgage is
void as it was constituted over the family home without the consent of their children, who are the
beneficiaries thereof; that their obligation is only joint; and that the substitution of the estate of
Macaria for her is improper as the estate has no legal personality to be sued as she is already
DEAD.

The decision of the lower court is in favor of Siapno. It also substituted the estate of Macaria in
her stead. Thus, the defendants named in the amended complaint are now the "ESTATE OF
MACARIA BEROT, represented by Rodolfo A. Berot, RODOLFO A. BEROT and LILIA P.
BEROT".

This was affirmed by the CA as well for the main reason that the Berots are deemed to have
waived any objection on the personality of the estate of Macaria Berot when they did not question
the change of name of defendants to “ESTATE OF MACARIA BEROT”. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES
1. Did Macaria Berot’s legal personality cease to exist upon her death? YES.

Sub-issues:
2. Did the CA err in holding that the intestate estate of Macaria Berot could be a proper party by
express or implied waiver? NO.
3. Did the CA err in NOT holding the obligation solidary and joint? YES.

RATIO DECIDENDI
Did Macaria Berot’s legal personality cease to exist upon her death? YES.
Macaria Berot could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure suit. It is also true
that her death opened to her heirs the succession of her estate, which in this case was an intestate
succession. Citing the Court’s ruling in Ventura v. Militante, it correctly ruled that a deceased
person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. Siapno
filed the foreclosure suit a year after her death so no summons was served on her.

2. Did the CA err in holding that the intestate estate of Macaria Berot could be a proper party by
express or implied waiver? NO.

The petitioners did not object when the estate of Macaria was impleaded as respondent in the
foreclosure case and Petitioner Rodolfo Berot did not object either when the original Complaint
was amended and respondent impleaded him as the administrator of Macaria’s estate. The trial

37
and appellate courts were correct in ruling that, indeed, petitioners impliedly waived any
objection to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over their persons at the inception of the case.
In Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Panlalapi, it was held that a party’s appearance in a
case is equivalent to a service of summons and that objections must be timely raised.

3. Did the CA err in NOT holding the obligation solidary and joint? YES.
A liability is solidary "only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or
when the nature of the obligation so requires."
In this case, the petitioners fail to make such pronouncements hence what is applicable to this
case is the presumption under the law that the nature of the obligation herein can only be
considered as joint. It is a must upon the party alleging otherwise to prove with a preponderance
of evidence that petitioners' obligation under the loan contract is indeed solidary in character.

Valino v Adriano, GR 182894, April 22, 2014

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

● Philippine law does not recognize common law

marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
● The law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner.

● The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any

other right, will not be considered as having been waived
or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intend to that
end.
● Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the
deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.
● It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is
outside the commerce of man. However, the law
recognizes that a certain right of possession over the
corpse exist, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their
dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead
body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final
resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where
the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the
living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that
persons having this right may recover the corpse from
third persons.

38
FACTS

● Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent

Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The
couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three
(3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one
(1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette. Their marriage,
however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-
in-fact.
● Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients,
until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
● Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide
financial support to Rosario and their children
(respondents).
● In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that
time, Rosario was in the US spending Christmas with her
children. As none of the family members was around,
Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and
burial expenses for Atty. Adriano.
● When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded.
● The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the
mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial
Park. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish
that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
● Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the
remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that his
burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes.
● Respondents commenced suit against Valino and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
ISSUE/S

Is the family of Adriano entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano?

RATIO DECIDENDI

Is the family of Adriano entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano?

YES.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. It should be noted, however,
that the other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario
equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the

39
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the
supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased,
it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
presumption can be said to have been created in Valino's favor,
solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral
are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article
199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged
with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury
the remains of their loved-one.

NCC 43
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) - (kk) (1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)
RULE 131

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 3. Disputable presumptions.

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no
particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;

2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;

3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;

4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;

5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.

(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.

Joaquin v. Navarro 93 Phil 257

40
On February 6, 1945, in the battle for the liberation of Manila, spouses Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. and Angela Joaquin sought refuge at the German Club together with their three
daughters, their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and his wife Adela Conde. The building was
packed with refugees, shells were exploding all around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japs started shooting at people inside the building, especially those
who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the
entrance. Joaquin Sr. and his son, as well as the latter’s wife and a friend by the name of
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning building. They could not convince Angela
Joaquin to go with them.
As they came out, Joaquin Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately died. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping
many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
Joaquin Sr., Adela Conde, and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid
shelter. Three days later, they were forced to leave the shelter and fled to St. Theresa
Academy, but they unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at the refugees, killing
Joaquin Sr. and Adela Conde. Francisco Lopez survived.

ISSUE
Did Joaquin Navarro Jr. survive his mother, Angela Joaquin?

RULING
NO, Joaquin Jr. did not survive his mother, Angela.
Much has been discussed over whether section 334 (37) of Act. No. 190, now
section 69(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed Art. 43 of the New Civil
Code. The point is not of much relevance and will be left open for consideration when
absolute necessity arises.
Both provisions, as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts,
and so are not to be available when there are facts. It is manifest from the language of
section 69(ii) of Rule 123 that the evidence of survivorship need not be direct: it may be
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
The testimony of Francisco Lopez contains adequate facts to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela and Joaquin Jr. In the light of conditions painted by Lopez,
it can be reasonably inferred that Joaquin Jr. died before his mother. While the possibility
that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, this possibility is entirely
speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was
the other way around.
In conclusion, the presumption that Angela died before her son is based purely on
surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The
opposite theory—that mother outlived son—is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of
decedents’ estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This

41
result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of “reserve truncal” which was
put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro’s death preceded that of
her son. Without costs.

2. Juridical Persons

NCC 44-47
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or

purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)

Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding

article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the

subject.

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by

the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)

Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds,
as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity
with the laws and regulations of their organization. (38a)

Article 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other

entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of article 44, their
property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the
charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the
property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit
of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of

42
the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corp. Code), Secs. 2, 4, 17

Section 2. Corporation defined. – A corporation is an artificial being created by operation
of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly
authorized by law or incident to its existence.

Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. – Corporations created by

special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law
or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this
Code, insofar as they are applicable.

Section 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or

disapproved. – The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of
incorporation or disapprove any amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance with
the requirements of this Code: Provided, That the Commission shall give the
incorporators a reasonable time within which to correct or modify the objectionable
portions of the articles or amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or
disapproval:

1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not substantially in

accordance with the form prescribed herein;

2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently unconstitutional, illegal,
immoral, or contrary to government rules and regulations;

3. That the Treasurer’s Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock subscribed and/or
paid is false;

4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the
Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution.

No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks, banking

and quasi-banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies and other
financial intermediaries, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions,
and other corporations governed by special laws shall be accepted or approved by the
Commission unless accompanied by a favorable recommendation of the appropriate
government agency to the effect that such articles or amendment is in accordance with
law.

NCC 1767-1768
Article 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves.

43
Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession.

Article 1768. The partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of article
1772, first paragraph.

C. Restrictions on civil capacity

1. Presumption of capacity, Art. 37 NCC

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost

Catalan vs. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007

Facts:
• October 20, 1948: Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service because
he was found to be schizophrenic.
• September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo
• June 16, 1951: Feliciano allegedly executed an Absolute Deed of Donation of one-half of
an 801 sq. m. property to his sister Mercedes Catalan
• December 11, 1953: Peoples Bank and Trust Company (later renamed BPI) filed Special
Proceedings No. 4563 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano
incompetent. Two days later BPI was appointed as Feliciano’s guardian.
• March 26, 1979: Mercedes sold the property in issue to her children Delia and Jesus Basa.
• April 1, 1997: BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership against respondents, alleging that the Deed of
Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to
Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to
her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of
giving valid consent.
• December 7, 1999: RTC ruled in favor of respondents, CA affirmed decision
• Petitioners argue that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since 1948
which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August 14,
1997.

Issue/Holding:

• WON Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation.

• YES.
• A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be

44
spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable.
• In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges
on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person
who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
• A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of
the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation
cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
• A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed
capable of attending to his property rights.
• A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan
had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano
was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary
was adduced. Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established
when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22,
1953.
• It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a
contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other
properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts,
despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom
from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are
presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.
• Since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she
chose.
• HENCE, petition is DENIED.

2. Restrictions on capacity to act

NCC 38 - 39, cf. NCC 1327

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality
and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these
circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special
laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

45
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.

(a) Minority

1. Age of majority, R.A. 6809, FC 234, 236, 221, 225

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO
EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as
follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life,
save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in
the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Art. 234. When there is danger that a person obliged to give support may lose his or her
fortune because of grave mismanagement or on account of riotous living, his or her
spouse, if any, and a majority of those entitled to be supported by him or by her may
petition the Court of First Instance for the creation of the family home.

Art. 236. The family home may be dissolved upon the petition of the person who has
constituted the same, with the written consent of his or her spouse and of at least one half
of all the other beneficiaries who are eighteen years of age or over. The court may grant
the petition if it is satisfactorily shown that the best interest of the family requires the
dissolution of the family home.

46
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between
husband and wife;

(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of

marriage;

(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory
heirs of their legitime.

Art. 225. The family home may be constituted by a verified petition to the Court of First
Instance by the owner of the property, and by approval thereof by the court.

2. A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship

3. Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution [cf. Sangguniang

Kabataan]
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

4. Marriage, FC 5; 14, 45 (1); 35 (1); cf. R.A. 6809; FC 79

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by
a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in
addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar,
the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or
persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be
manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper
local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses
and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal

47
manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent
of parents or guardians;

RA 6809 *see previous pages*

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other
disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be
made a party thereto.

5. Contracts

NCC 1327
Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.

NCC 1390 (par. 1), 1403 (par. 3)

Article 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.

These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.

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Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

NCC 1397, 1399

Article 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are
thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot
allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted
intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base
their action upon these flaws of the contract.

Article 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as
he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.

NCC 1489
Article 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may
enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following articles.

Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without
capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries are those referred to
in article 290.

NCC 1426 – 1427

Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment
of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the
fact that he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price
thus returned.

Article 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a
sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be
no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.

Mercado v. Espiritu 37 Phil 215

Estoppel - the principle which precludes a person from
asserting something contrary to what is implied by a previous
action or statement of that person or by a previous pertinent
judicial determination.

The sale of real estate made by a minor who pretend to be of

legal age, when in fact he is not, is VALID, and he will not be
permitted to excuse himself from the fulfillment of the obligations

49
contracted by him or to have it annulled.

FACTS

- April 9, 1913 counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan against Luis Espiritu, who died afterwards.
- Since Luis Espiritu died, the complaint was amended and was filed against Jose Espiritu.
- The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz Mercado were the
children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, who is the sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu.
- Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving a tract of land of 48 hectares in area as her
paraphernal property, which is located in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of
Calumpit, Bulacan.
- 1910, Luis Espiritu was accused to have induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting
the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its assessed value of
P3,795.
- The annulment of a deed of sale was sought by the plaintiffs.
- They asserted that two of the four parties were minors (Domingo and Josefa Mercado);
- The minors presented themselves to be of legal age upon signing the deed of sale and
before the notary public.

ISSUES
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.

RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even
if it were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be of
legal age.

- Whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, cannot be permitted to
falsify it.
- Furthermore, the sale of real estate made by a minor who pretend to be of legal age, when
in fact he is not, is VALID, and he will not be permitted to excuse himself from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by him or to have it annulled.
- The judgment that holds such sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minor’s
property, nor the judicial rules established in consonance therewith.
- In the given case, annulment of the sale cannot be invoked on the ground of minority,
since at the time of the perfection of the contract; Domingo and Josefa presented
themselves to be of legal age.

DISPOSITIVE POSITION

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the

judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said
judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record,
we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

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 Bambalan v. Maramba 51 Phil 417
FACTS:
1. In 1915, Bambalan’s mother, Paula Prado, and her second husband, Vicente, received a loan
from Muerong ( Php 200, but according to Paula: Php 150)
2. In 1922, having learned that Bambalan is the only heir to his deceased father’s land,
Muerong forced Bambalan to sell the land as payment for the loan.
3. At the time, Bambalan was still a minor. He claimed that he only executed the deed of sale
because Muerong threatened to imprison Paula.
4. Bambalan seeks to annul the sale.

ISSUE:
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.

RATIO:
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution as shown
by the cedula which the respondents purchased from him. It was also not his intention to sell it.
The Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case,
because Bambalan made no misrepresentation as to his age. The defendant was also aware that
the petitioner was still a minor when he conveyed the land.

Suan Chian v. Alcantara 85 Phil 669

DOCTRINE/PRECEDENT
While the old Civil Code provides that contracts where one of the parties is a minor is a
void contract (take note: in the New Civil Code [NCC] the contract is now voidable), that minor
can ratify the contract and give the contract a binding effect. Furthermore, sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled.

RELEVANT FACTS
● On 3 August 1931 a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso
Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara, conveying to Sia Suan 5 parcels of land. Ramon
Alcantara was then 17 years old.
● On 27 August 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco
Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was
a minor and accordingly cancelling the contract.
● However, after being contacted by Gaw Chiao, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in
the office of the Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon ratified (sign or
give formal consent to making it officially valid) the deed of sale. On this occasion
Ramon received from Gaw Chiao P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to
Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
● On 8 August 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided
share in 2 parcels of land. The CFI ruled against the annulment.
● The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court’s decision on the ground that the deed
of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of the
contract’s execution, and sentence Sia Suan to pay Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750 in
lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores, and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an

51
 undivided 1/4th interest in the lot plus the cost of the suit.
● Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUE

● Is the deed of sale valid and binding against Ramon Alcantara, in view of the fact
that he was a minor on the date of the contract’s execution?

RATIO DECIDENDI

● Yes. It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by Ramon Alcantara showed that he, like
his co-signers, was then of legal age (or at least treated like one). There is nothing to
indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such fact. The fact that when
informed of Ramon’s minority, Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao took no steps in 9 years to
protect their interest beyond requiring Ramon to execute a ratification of the sale while
still a minor, strongly indicates that they knew of his minority when the deed of sale was
executed. Simply put, while Ramon Alcantara was a minor during the time when the deed
of sale was executed and such a contract is void under the civil code, his act of
ratification gave the contract a binding effect. The contract became fully efficacious
as if it was a contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.

- In support of the contention that the deed of sale is binding on Ramon, their counsel
invoked the decision in Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu where the SC held that the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact
they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled.

Braganza v. Villa-Abrille 105 Phil 456

FACTS
- Petitioners received a loan from Villa Abrille on October 30, 1944
worth P70,000 in Japanese war notes. In return, petitioner promised
in writing to pay him P10,000 “in legal currency of the Philippines,
two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as
International Exchange has been established in the Philippines”, plus
2% per annum. Payment was not made, thus Villa Abrille sued on
March 1949.

- The promissory note given to Villa Abrille from Braganza was signed
by her sons, both of whom were at minority age at the time of the
signing. Therefore, they cannot be legally bound by their signatures.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not can be legally bound by their signatures in the
promissory note?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Whether or not can be legally bound by their signatures in the
promissory note? NO. The contract is unenforceable due to
non-age, and they shall make restitutions to the extent that
they have profited by the money they received.

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 6. Criminal liability

RPC 12 (2) - (3);

ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following
are exempt from criminal liability:
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.

RPC 13 (2); PD 603 Secs. 189 – 204

ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. — The following are mitigating
circumstances:

2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of
the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.

PD 603
Art. 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but
under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability and shall be committed to the care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or
family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done
for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192.

The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty of the law-enforcement agency
concerned to take the youthful offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the proper
medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental examination. Whenever treatment for
any physical or mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the
same.

The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the record of the case of the youthful
offender.

Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender held for
physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from
the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local
rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or

53
agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal
jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in
its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or
agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of
his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever
required.

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the
evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including
any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the
custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have
reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after
considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency
or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.

The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may
designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order
of the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases.

Art. 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the care and
maintenance of the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his
parents or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his parents or those persons
liable to support him can not pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality in which the
offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which
the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the
National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a
chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the
unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness.

All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the immediate establishment of local
detention homes for youthful offenders.

Art. 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of Social Welfare or its representative or
duly licensed agency or individual under whose care the youthful offender has been committed
shall submit to the court every four months or oftener as may be required in special cases, a
written report on the conduct of said youthful offender as well as the intellectual, physical, moral,
social and emotional progress made by him.

Art. 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful
offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability
to be a useful member of the community, even before reaching the age of majority, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order his final
discharge.

Art. 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has been

54
found incorrigible or has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation
programs, or should his continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable, he shall be
returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.

When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in commitment, the court
shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article or to
pronounce the judgment of conviction.

In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention effected under the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. - The final release of a child
pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such
release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil
damages.

Art. 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of conviction is
pronounced in accordance with the provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said
pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be committed to the
proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his sentence: Provided, That penal
institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate quarters and, as far as practicable,
group them according to appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their speedy
rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain agricultural and
forestry camps where youthful offenders may serve their sentence in lieu of confinement in
regular penitentiaries.

Art. 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city
or provincial fiscal or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all
the records of the case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or
commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the
records of his case shall be destroyed immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release,
unless civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in which case such records shall
be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be
held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by
reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any
inquiry made of him for any purpose.

"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may be in the files of the
National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department, or any other government
agency which may have been involved in the case.

Art. 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by a
youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also
be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.

Art. 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social Welfare shall establish regional
rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders. The local government and other non-governmental

55
entities shall collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and maintenance of
these facilities.

Art. 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local Government and Community
Development shall establish detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and separate from
jails pending the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders.

Art. 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the Commission of Delinquent Acts
by Their Children or Wards. - A person whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who
knowingly or willfully,

(1) Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child of a delinquency, or
(2) Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or becoming a juvenile
delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

Also see: Rule 3, Section 5 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Sec. 5. Minor or incompetent persons.
A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistance of
his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.

Juvenile Justice Law, Secs 6 and 7

Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven
to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to
the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the

56
case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.

Atizado vs People, GR No. 173822, October 13, 2010

FACTS
- On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the
petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder.
- After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7,
1994, the trial ensued.
- On May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo.
- The Court referred the petitioners' direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.
- On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction.
- After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners now appeal before
the Supreme Court.

SC: The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed
on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal's minority at the time of the commission of the
murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.

ISSUES
1. Is Monreal, who is over 15 years of age and under 18 years of age, liable for damages?

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Is Monreal, who is over 15 years of age and under 18 years of age, liable for damages?

Yes. Pursuant to section 6 of Juvenile Justice Law, a child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

It is right that the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death according to Article 248 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty
for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Article 61 (2) of the RPC states that
reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Therefore, the range
of the penalty of imprisonment imposable to Monreal is from 6 years and one day (prison mayor)
as the minimum period, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day or reclusion temporal, as the maximum.

Sec. 6, par. 3 of the Juvenile Justice states that exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance
with existing laws. With this, the court entitled the offended party to an award of exemplary

57
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

(b) Insanity

1. Marriage, FC 45 (2), Art. 79

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other
disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be
made a party thereto.

2. Contracts, NCC 1327 (1), 1328

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

Article 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to
in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.

3. Criminal liability,

RPC 12 (1)
ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following
are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court

Rule 101, Rules of Court

RULE 101

Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons

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 US v. Vaguilar, 27 Phil 88
FACTS
- Evaristo Vaquilar was proven to have killed his wife and daughter and wounded others
with a bolo. They do not deny the commission of these crimes.
- Witnesses were introduced testifying that Vaquilar appeared to be insane both before and
during the crime. They also said he would complain about head and stomach pains.
- Martin Agustin (witness of prosecution) testified he heard noise, rushed to the house and
witnessed the killing, that he and seven others were also cut, did not know of any disagreement in
that family, and that someone else heard him say he felt pain in head and stomach. “eyes were
very big and red and sight penetrating” during killing
- Sister of Vaquilar said he “looked very sad” and “pursued her” so “he must have been
crazy because he cut me”
- Prisoner confined in the same jail with Vaquilar said “his head is not all right”
- The health officer examined Vaquilar and said “he did not notice whether defendant was
suffering from any mental derangement or not”
- Court says there is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked
himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he
does. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. It is not unnatural for a
murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike
promisuously at those who attempt to capture him.
- Cited Cylopedia of Law and Procedure: “ Although there have been some decisions to the
contrary, it is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which
results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where
the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under
its influence”
- Citing State vs Bundy: “it may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal
intent did not exist at the time the act was committed… and like other defenses must be made out
by the party claiming the benefit of it… sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first
place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered”
-

ISSUES
1. Should Vaquilar be exempt from criminal liability on the basis of insanity?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Should Vaquilar be exempt from criminal liability on the basis of insanity? NO. Insanity
must be proven not just claimed. “It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to put his
sanity ‘in issue’. That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to
make out such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first
place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.”

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
The appellant’s conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enraged
criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he
committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the
penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed with
costs against the appellant.

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65

59
DOCTRINE/ LESSON OF THE CASE
- The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.
- Complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged is
critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained.

FACTS
- In February 1976, Estellita Ronaya (14 years old) was hired as a househelper of
Policaprio Rafanan’s mother. On March 1976, Estellita was asked to help in the family store,
which was currently being tended by Policarpio. As they were closing up the store, Policarpio
suddenly grabbed Estellita and threatened her with a bolo to have sexual intercourse with him.
Despite Estellita’s struggles, Policarpio succeeded, and afterwards cautioned Estellita not to
report the matter to his mother or anybody in the house, or he will kill her. Regional Trial Court
originally rules in favor of Policarpio on account of insanity by schizophrenia.
- Upon appeal, Policarpio is confined at the National Mental Hospital for two years for
observation and treatment. His attendants later testify in the case.

ISSUES
Can Policaprio be held liable for his actions?

RATIO DECIDENTI
- The defense of insanity comes under 2 tests in reference to a ruling of the Supreme Court
of Spain: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
[criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the
will.
- Testimony of experts attest that Policarpio was conscious of the act, and that there was no
complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged. This is critical
if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. Further, the court finds that as Policarpio asked
Estellita not to speak of the matter to anyone, there was awareness of the reprehensibility of what
he had done.

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of
moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

Standard Oil v. Arenas, GR No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
- Medico-legal doctrine- that a person’s believing himself to be what he is not or his taking
a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind
himself in a contact.

FACTS
- December 15, 1908, Arenas and Lara, as principals, and Locso, Villanueva, and Siy Ho,
as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of
P3,305.76, at 3 months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
- April 6, 1909, SOCNY sued the five debtors for payment.
- Defendants were summoned, summons was served to Villanueva April 17, 1909.
- While judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente,
appeared and alleged that (1) On July 24, 1909, he was declared insane by court of first instance,
(2) she was appointed his guardian, (3) on October 11, she was authorized to institute proper legal

60
proceedings for the annulment of the bonds given by her husband who was in the state of insanity,
(4) she was not informed of the proceedings as a guardian, and (5) that when her husband gave
the bund, he was already permanently insane.
- Court granted petition and trial was reopened after which, he was deemed sane and knew
perfectly well the nature and consequences, and gave his consent. He was denied.
- A bill of exception was presented and still, the trial court found its judgment on the basis
of the medico-legal doctrine which supports that the monomer of wealth does not necessarily
imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was incapable of executing a contract.
ISSUES
1. Is Vincent Villanueva liable?

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. Yes. This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the
lower court. It is necessary to show that such monomania of wealth was habitual and of real
mental perturbation, that the bond was executed as a result of such monomania and not the effect
of other causes, and that the monomania existed on the date of the executed bond. It should show
that it more or less deprave the human will of necessary liberty. The bond was executed on
December 15, 1908 and his incapacity was only declared until July 24 1909.Two of physicians
gave testimonies of Vicente Villanueva, one between 1902-1903 and one for 1908, both of which
stated they found no trace that Villanueva could be suffering of mental incapacity. Even Mr.
Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, stated that the mental condition appeared to be normal and
regular, observed nothing of the contrary. The capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a
person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to
continue so long as the contrary be not proved. In the opinion of the court, it was not proven.
There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth
nor any proof that he was dominated by his monomania when he executed the bond. There should
be direct proof that he could not, in the performance of the act, give his conscious, free, voluntary,
deliberate, and intentional consent.

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of the instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

(c) Deaf-Mutism, NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.

Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if
able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to
him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof.

Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not
blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a
will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.

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 (d) Prodigality, ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2
Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the word "incompetent"
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation.

(e) Civil Interdiction, RPC 34, 41

ARTICLE 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the
person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property
and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

ARTICLE 41. Reclusión Perpetua and Reclusión Temporal — Their accessory penalties.
— The penalties of reclusión perpetua and reclusión temporal shall carry with them that
of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted
in the pardon.

(f) Family Relations

FC 150-151; cf. FC 87, 37, 38

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply

62
to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.

NCC 1490
Article 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:

(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or

(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under article 191.

NCC 2035
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

63
(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime.

cf. NCC 963-967

Article 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each
generation forms a degree.

Article 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (916a)

Article 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.

The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)

Article 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons,
excluding the progenitor.

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree
removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from
his first cousin, and so forth. (918a)

Article 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same
father and the same mother.

Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not
the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.

(g) Alienage, cf. Art. XII, Secs. 11, 1987 Constitution

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations

64
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither
shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive
and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.

Cordora vs COMELEC, February 19, 2009

Reyes v COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

David v Agbay, G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

(h) Absence, NCC 381 – 396, FC 41

PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF ABSENCE (See Civil Code)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

65
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Olaguer v Purugganan, GR 158907, February 12, 2007

(i) Insolvency and Trusteeship, NCC 1381, 1491, 2236, 2237

Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom
they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the
things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the
lesion stated in the preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any
other manner collect the claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered
into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants
or of competent judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.

Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a

public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under
his guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;

66
 (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under
administration;

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been intrusted
to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who,
in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior

courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration
of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.

Art. 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the
fulfillment of his obligations, subject to the exemptions provided by law.

Art. 2237. Insolvency shall be governed by special laws insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.

Umale v ASB Realty, GR 181126, June 15, 2011

ISSUE

1. W/N a corporate officer of ASB, duly authorized, can file a suit to recover
an unlawfully detained property despite the fact that ASB is placed under
corporate rehabilitation.

RELEVANT FACTS
- Amethyst Peal executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of a piece of
land in Ortigas in favor of ASB Realty in consideration of full redemption of
Amethyst’s outstanding capital stock from ASB Corp.
- ASB became the owner and eventually obtained a transfer certificate of
title and was registered with the registry of deeds of Pasig city
- Sometime in 2003, ABS commenced an action for unlawful detainer of the
land against Umale
- ABS alleged it entered into a lease contract with Umale for the period June
1, 1999 to May 31, 2000. Umale was to operate it as a parking lot and pay monthly

67
rent of 60,720 pesos. After the contract, Umale kept on using the land, but paid a
higher rent of 100,000 pesos.
- On June 23, 2003, ABS served a notice of termination of Lease and
Demand to vacate and pay on Umale. Umale did not heed this and even put up
commercial establishments on the lot.
- Umale admitted occupying the land since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease
contract but asserted that his lessor was Amethyst, not ASB. If this were true,
would mean ABS would not have a course of action against Umale.
- Umale asserted other things like an oral contract to sell and rent he alleged
to have paid in advance.
- Umale challenged ASB’s personality to recover the land since ASB has
been placed under receivership or corporate rehabilitation by the SEC and a
rehabilitation officer had been duly appointed, claiming that it is the rehabilitation
officer who has the
- personality to sue, and not ASB.
o Corporate rehabilitation is defined as “the restoration of the debtor to a position
of successful operation and solvency” mainly through the continuing operation of
the business.

RATIO DECIDENDI
1. W/N a corporate officer of ASB, duly authorized, can file a suit to recover
an unlawfully detained property despite the fact that ASB is placed under
corporate rehabilitation.

YES. There is no denying that ABS is the real party in interest who stands to be
benefitted or injured depending on the outcome of the case.
- Under PD no. 902-A and the interim rules, the rehab officer has the power
to take custody and control of the corporation’s assets
- But the true intention of this rule is “to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as a going concern because
assets of a business are often more valuable when so maintained that they would
be when liquidated.”
- This is called the concept of debtor-in-possession (or place) and this means
that the debtor corp thru its Board of Directors remains in control of its business
and properties subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehab receiver
o There is nothing in PD 902-A or the interim rules that say a rehab receiver
takes over the control and management of the debtor corporation. As a matter of
fact, Sec. 14 rule 4 of the interim rules explicitly limits the powers of the receiver
and says that the receiver does not take over the management and control of the
corp but is only tasked to monitor situation
o Also no indication that the SEC gave ABS’ receiver the right to sue (since
it is the SEC who assigns receivers to the corps)
o It is still necessary to keep the receiver apprised of the proceedings and any
developments of the case.
- A corporate rehab does impose several restrictions on the actions of the
debtor corp but there is nothing in the provisions that touch on the debtor corp’s

68
 right to sue.

Sub-issue: WON a lessor-lessee relationship exists between ABS and Umale.

YES. ABS was able to prove thru facts that he was indeed a lessor to Umale.
o Thru receipts of rentals
o Umale’s claims are mere speculation
o Lack of documentation in the part of Umale’s claims

(j) Gender, Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC 403
SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Art. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above
twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home
without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives, except to
become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or
mother has contracted a subsequent marriage.

See also: Rule 3 Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided by law.

(k) Physical Incapacity/Disease, FC 45(5), 45(6), 46, NCC 820

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to
be serious and appears to be incurable.
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of

a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature,

existing at the time of the marriage; or

69
 (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or
lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or

chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.

D. Domicile and residence of persons

1. Juridical persons, NCC 51

Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix
the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their
legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.

2. Natural persons

NCC 50
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.

FC 69, cf. NCC 110

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.

cf. FC 55, 101, 149, 152, 101

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner,
a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;

70
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years,
even if pardoned;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by
adoption.

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,
for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling
for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling

Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed
by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given effect.

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and

71
the land on which it is situated.

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,
for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling
for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

SEE ALSO FOR REFERENCE: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-

Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-
700. April 5, 2016

IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE

Legarda, Mawis and Vargas, “Family Law in the Philippines.”

A. Effect and Retroactivity

E.O. 29, as amended by E.O. 227, R.A. 6809, R.A. 7610

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES”

I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

72
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

SECTION 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

SECTION 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and
falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall
have taken effect.”

SECTION 4. This Executive Order shall take effect upon the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

RA 6809

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN

YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents
and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and
third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

73
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to
minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: December 13, 1989

Republic Act No. 7610 June 17, 1992

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION

AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

FC 256, cf. FC 36 in rel. to 39, FC 105, FC 162, FC 257

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall
not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The
phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and
falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code
shall taken effect"has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23,
1998]).

Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, 243 SCRA 32

Bernabe vs. Alejo, 374 SCRA 180
Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

B. Repeal/Amendment

FC 254, 255
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic
Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith

74
are hereby repealed.

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

V. MARRIAGE & PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

A. The concept of “marriage”

FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149

Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution
Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
Obergefell Et Al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department Of
Health, Et Al. Supreme Court Of The United States, Nos. 14–556, 14-562,
14-571 and 14–574 (http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-
556_3204.pdf)

B. Nature of marriage in Philippine law

FC 1
cf. Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa), 1989 Rules on Evidence,
NCC 220
Muslim Code, (P.D. 1083) Sec. 14

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252

Sermonia v Republic, 233 SCRA 155
Perido v Perido, 63 SCRA 97
Silverio vs Republic, October 22, 2007
People v De La Cruz, G.R. No.187683, February 11, 2010
De Santis v Intestate Estate Jalandoni, December 1, 2010
Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Calimag v Heirs of Macapaz, GR No. 191936, June 1, 2016

C. Agreements during and prior to marriage

75
 1. Stipulations in marriage

FC 1 cf. NCC 221, FC 75

Espinosa v Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

2. Breach of promise to marry

NCC 19 - 21; NCC 1403 (2) (c); MC 22

Hermosisima v. CA 109 Phil 629

Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648
Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994
Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115
Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11-2922, April 4, 2011

D. Requisites for a valid marriage

Mariategui v. CA 205 SCRA 337

1. Kinds of requisites & effects of non-compliance

FC 2-3; FC 4; FC 5; FC 35, 36, 37, 38; FC 45 cf. NCC

53
RPC 350; Rep. Act No. 1065
ARTICLE 350. Marriage Contracted Against Provisions of Laws. — The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without
being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard
of a legal impediment.

De Mijares vs Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1

2. Essential requisites

(a) Legal Capacity

(i) Gender, FC 2 (1) cf. FC 148

76
 Silverio vs Republic, October 22, 2007

(ii). Age

FC 5; FC 35 (1); R.A. 6809 cf. FC 21

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN
YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents
and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and
third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to
minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

NCC 54 & 80 (1)

RPC 344
ARTICLE 344. Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, Rape
and Acts of Lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

77
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor,
in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case
may be.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon
him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices
and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes.

cf. DOJ Opinion 145 S.1991 (Oct. 1991)

(iii) Absence of impediment, FC 5, 35

Garcia vs. Recio, 365 SCRA 437

Te vs. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346 SCRA
327)
Nollora v People, GR 191425, September 7, 2011
Avenido v Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, Jan 22, 2014

(iv). Parental consent

FC 14; FC 15; FC 45 (1)

(v) Consent freely given by both spouses

(a). Mistake as to identity,

FC 35 (5); NCC 86 (1)

(b). Effect of insanity, FC 45 (2)

(c). Effect of fraud, FC 45 (3); FC 46, NCC 1338 –

1344

Anaya vs Palaroan, Nov. 26, 1970

(d). Effect of force, intimidation and undue

influence, FC 45 (4); NCC 1335 –
1337

78
 Villanueva vs CA, 505 SCRA 564

(e). Effect of physical incapacity/impotence, FC

45 (5)

Jimenez v. Cañizares 109 Phil 27

Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13,
2009

(f) Effect of affliction with STD, FC 45 (6); 46 (3)

5. Formal Requisites

(a) Marriage license

Republic v. CA, 236 SCRA 257

Sy vs. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
Alcantara vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008
Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Villarica v Villarica, G.R. No. 210764, April 15, 2015
Kho v Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016

1. Where to apply, FC 9 - 10

2. Requirements for issuance

a. application, FC 11
b. proof of capacity, FC 12-14; FC 21 cf. NCC 84

cf. DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991)

DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991)

Corpus v Sto Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

c. parental advice, FC 15
d. marriage counseling, FC 16

79
 e. publication, FC 17
f. investigation of impediments, FC 18
g. payment of fees, FC 19
h. family planning certificate, P.D. 965

3. Place where valid, FC 20

4. Period of validity, FC 20

De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13,

2008

5. Duties of the Civil Registrar, FC 24-25

Republic v CA, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994

Alcantara vs Alcantara, GR No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007
Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Kho v Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016

6. Marriages exempt from license requirement

FC 27-34, cf. NCC 76, P.D. 1083

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1083

A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF

FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING
FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

Republic vs Dayot, March 28, 2008

(b) Authority of the solemnizing officer

1. Who are authorized

FC 7, 10, 31 & 32
NCC 56, 74, 76
R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code),

80
 Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii)
Sec. 444
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor
shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of
the municipal government, and in this connection, shall:
(xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;

Sec. 455
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of
the city government. and in this connection, shall:
(xviii) Solemnize marriage, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;

Beso v Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 (2000)

2. How authorized

FC 7 (2) cf. NCC 92-96

Villar v. Paraiso 96 Phil 659

OCA vs. Tormis, A.C. No. 9920, August 30, 2016

3. Effect of absence of authority

FC 4; FC 35 (2)
RPC 352
ARTICLE 352. Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the marriage law.

cf. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 at page 360

Ronulo vs People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

4. Duties of the solemnizing officer, FC 23-24

5. Effect of irregularity, FC 4

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 (c) Marriage Ceremony

1. Form of ceremony, FC 3 (3); FC 6 cf. FC 33, FC 8

Martinez v. Tan 12 Phil 731

COMPARE TO: Morigo v People, G.R. No. 145226.
February 06, 2004

2. Place for ceremony, FC 8; FC 28-29; FC 32-33

3. Issuance of marriage certificate, FC 6; FC 22, 23

Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1

People v. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106

E. Law governing validity of marriages abroad

1. General rule in contracts

(a) As to form, NCC 17 (1) and (2)

(b) As to substantive requirements, NCC 15 & 17 (3)

2. Special rule in marriage

(a) lex loci celebrationis, FC 26; FC 21, FC 10

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786

Republic vs. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5,
2005
Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

(b) Exceptions

FC 26 in relation to
FC 35(1), 35(4), 35(5) and (6), 36, 37 & 38
cf. NCC 71

82
 DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)

F. Common-law marriages/ ‘live-in’ relationships

FC 147, cf. RPC 350

FC 148 (“adulterous”)
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa) – (cc), 1989 Rules on Evidence cf. NCC
220
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;

(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit are equal.

FC 26 par. 1
NCC Book II, Title III (484-501)

Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil 135

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489
Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Estrada v Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

G. Void Marriages

General rule, FC 4

1. Kinds of void marriages

(a) Absence of formal requisites

FC 35 cf. FC 234, RA 6809

Alcantara v Alcantara, GR NO. 1677446, Aug. 18,
2007

83
 So v Valera, GR 150677, June 5, 2009
De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13,
2008
Republic v Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008
Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Kho v Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016

(b) Bigamous and polygamous marriages,

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986)

FC 35(4), 39, 40, 41, 44, RPC 344, 349

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6

Domingo v. CA 226 SCRA 572
Cariño vs. Cariño 351 SCRA 127
Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Mercado vs.Tan, G.R. No 137110, August 1, 2000
Ty vs CA, 346 SCRA 327
Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004
(read concurring of Justice Vitug and dissent of Justice
Carpio)
Morigo vs Morigo, 422 SCRA 376
Teves v People, GR 188775, August 24, 2011
Nollora v People, GR 191425, September 7, 2011
Montanez vs Cipriano, GR 181089, October 22, 2012
See: Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30,
2013
Capili v People, GR 183805, July 3, 2013
Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
People v Odtuhan, GR 191566, July 17, 2013
Lasanas vs People, GR 159031, June 23, 2014
SSS v Azote, G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
Santiago vs. Phils, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
Castillo vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, Apr. 18, 2016

(c) Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse

FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44

84
NCC 390-391.

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179

Republic vs. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993
Bienvenido vs. CA, 237 SCRA 676, October 24, 1994
Republic v Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, Dec. 10, 2013
Republic v Hon. Estrada, G.R. No. 214792, March 18, 2015
Republic v Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
Republic vs. Sareñogon, G.R. No. 199194, Feb. 10, 2016
Republic v Tampus, GR 214243, March 16, 2016
Republic v Catubag, GR 210580, April 18, 2018
Matias v Republic, GR 230751, April 25, 2018

Procedure
SSS vs Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
Republic v Granada, GR No. 187512, June 13, 2012

(d) Bad faith of both spouses, under FC 44. Other effects of

bad faith: 43, 40, 45, 81, 86

(e) Psychological incapacity under FC 36

FC 36, 39, 68-71

R.A. 8533

Santos v. CA 240 SCRA 20

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA G.R. No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997
Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76,
December 08, 1999
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
Republic vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425
RP vs. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20,
2004
Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10, 2005

85
 Republic vs. Tanyag-San Jose, 517 SCRA 123, February
6, 2007
Almelor vs RTC-Las Pinas, GR No. 179620, Aug. 26,
2008
Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009
Azcueta vs RP, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009
Halili v Halili, GR 165424, June 9, 2009 (Motion for
Recon)
Najera v Najera, GR 164817, July 3, 2009
Camacho-Reyes v Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18,
2010
Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, September 19, 2011
Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, January 14, 2015
Vinas v Vinas, G. R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
Mallilin v Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, 18 Feb. 2015
Republic vs. Romero, February 24, 2016
Castillo v Republic, G.R. No. 214064. Feb. 6, 2017
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, GR 222541, Feb 15, 2017
De la Fuente v De la Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, March 8,
2017
Bakunawa v Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993, August 9,
2017
Republic v Tionglico, GR 218630, Jan. 11, 2018
Singson v Singson, GR 210766, Jan. 8, 2018
Dan v Dan, GR 209031, April 16, 2018
Republic v Javier, GR 210518, April 18, 2018
Republic v Mola Cruz, GR 236629, July 23, 2018 [note
concurring J. Leonen]
Republic v Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018
Go-Yu vs. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, April 03, 2019

(f) Incestuous marriages, FC 37 cf. NCC 963-967

(g) Marriages against public policy

FC 38 compare FC 38(6) with NCC 80(6)

86
 RPC 246
NCC 80(7), 82
NCC 963-967

(h) Non-compliance under FC 35 (2), 53, 52. 102, 129

Sec. 21, 22 and 23, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003
NOTE: FC 147 and 148

2. Who can invoke nullity, FC 36, FC 39, FC 40

Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

Catalan vs. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 607, February 6, 2007
Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614,
September 28, 2007
Carlos s. Sandoval, GR 179922, December 16, 2008
Ablaza v Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

3. When to file action for declaration of nullity

FC 39 in relation to FC 255, 256

FC 42, par. 2

4. Procedure in actions for declaration of nullity

a. Requisite for valid remarriage, see VII (E)(10)(b)

above
b. Safeguards against collusion, FC 48

Malcampo Sin vs. Sin, 355 SCRA 285

Ancheta vs Ancheta, 424 SCRA 725
Yuk Ling Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 206653, 25 Feb. 2015
Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012
Republic v Dimarucut, GR 202069, March 7, 2018
Tortal v Taniguchi, G.R. No. 212683, Nov. 12, 2018

c. No confession of judgment, FC 48; cf. NCC 2035

87
 d. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Jocson v. Robles 22 SCRA 521

Tolentino v. Villanueva 56 SCRA 1

e. Participation of the OSG

Mendoza v Republic, GR 157854, November 12, 2012

f. No Motion to Dismiss

Aurelio v Aurelio, G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011

5. Other Matters

Chan v Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July, 14, 2013

6. Effects of pendency of action for declaration of nullity - Art.

49, 198

7. Effects of res judicata

Mallion vs Alcantara, 506 SCRA 336

8. Effects of final judgment declaring nullity

(a) In general, FC 50-54, but see FC 147-148; 198, 213

Villarica v Villarica, G.R. No. 210764, April 15, 2015

(b) On remarriage, FC 40, 41

(c) On rights & obligations between the former spouses,

FC Arts. 68-72

(d) On the property regime of the marriage, FC 147-148

Valdes v. QC-RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011

88
 Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

(e) On ‘legitimes’ of the common children

FC 50-53, FC 51 in rel. to NCC 886, 888;

FC 176
NCC 908, 1061
Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003
COMPARE TO: FC 147

Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011

(f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213, 164,

165, NCC 369

Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614,

January 12, 2016

(g) On use of surnames, NCC Art. 371, 364, 369, FC 176

Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995

B. M. NO. 1625 -JOSEPHINE P. UY-TIMOSA [en banc]
Remo v DFA, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010

(h) On hereditary rights of the former spouses, FC 43 (5), 50

(i) Effect of death, Art. 103, 130

Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011

Domingo vs. Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Uy v Estate of Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5,
2017

H. Voidable Marriages

1. Void v. voidable marriages, FC 4 cf. 45

89
 Ninal v Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

2. Grounds for annulment

(a) Absence of parental consent,

FC 4, 5, 14, 45(1), 47(1), 35 (1), cf R.A. 6809, FC 234,

236

Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F.Supp. 623 (1981), 669 F.2d 67 (1982)

(b) Insanity, FC 45(2), 47(2), NCC Art. 1149

Katipunan v Tenorio, 38 OG 172, 1937

(c) Fraud

FC 45(3), 46, 47(3)

NCC 1338-1344
Anaya v. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010.
December 8, 1999
Buccat v. Buccat 72 Phil 49
Aquino v. Delizo 108 Phil 21
Almelor vs. RTC, G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008

(d) Force, intimidation and undue influence

FC 45(4), 47(4)
NCC 1335-1337

Ruiz v Atienza, 40 O.G. 1903 (1941)

Villanueva v CA, 505 SCRA 564

(e) Physical incapacity/impotence

FC 45(5), 47(5)

Jimenez v. Cañizares 109 Phil 273

90
 Sarao v Guevara, 1940, 40 OG 11 Supp 263
Alcazar vs Alcazar, GR 174451, October 13, 2009

(f) Affliction with STD, FC (45(6), compare with FC 46(3),

47(5), 47 (3)

(g) Others

Republic v Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

3. Who can seek annulment, FC 47, Sec. 3, AM No. 02-11-10-SC,

March 4, 2003

4. When to seek annulment. FC 47, NCC 1149

5. Procedure in actions for annulment

FC Art. 48, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

Barcelona vs. CA, G. R. 130087, Sept. 24, 2003

6. Effects of pendency of action for annulment

FC 49, 198, 213

A.M No. 02-11-12-SC. March 4, 2003

7. Effects of annulment, FC 50-54, 43, 44, 86 (3), 99, 102, 129

(a) In general

Chan-Tan v Chan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010

(b) On remarriage, FC Art. 40

(c) On rights & obligations between the former spouses, 68,
98
(d) On the property regime of the marriage

FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4), 129, 138, 106

(e) On ‘presumptive legitimes/hereditary rights

91
 FC 50, 43, FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888;
NCC 908, 1061
FC 102 (5) and (6), 129 (8) and (9)

Yu v Reyes-Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011

(f) On the status and custody of children, FC 54, 213

Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614,

January 12, 2016

(g) On use of surnames, NCC Art. 371, 364, 369

Yasin vs Shari'a, G.R. No.94986 February 23, 1995

B.M. NO. 1625 -Josephine P. Uy-Timosa
Remo v DFA, March 2010

I. Marriage when one spouse is absent

FC 41-44 compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2)

cf. RPC 349
SSS vs. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

J. Forfeiture and Delivery of Presumptive Legitimes

K. Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment

NCC 15, 17 (3)

FC 26

Arca vs Javier, July 31, 1954

Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
Somera v. Pilapil, 174 SCRA 663
Quita vs CA, 300 SCRA 406
Llorente vs CA, 345 SCRA 592
Roehr v Rodriguez, GR 142820, June 30, 2003.

92
 Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437
Diego vs Castillo, 436 SCRA 67
RP vs. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
Amor-Catalan vs. CA, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
Corpus v Sto Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Catalan v Catalan-Lee, G. R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012
Lavadia v Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Noveras v Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Edelina T. Ando v DFA, G.R. No. 195432, Aug. 27, 2014
Medina vs. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
Misalucha v People, GR 206284, Feb. 28, 2018
Republic v Manalo, GR 221029, April 24, 2018 [note
DISSENT of J. Caguioa; CONCURRING of J. Leonen]
Republic v Cote, GR 212860, March 14, 2018
Morisono v Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018
Sakai v Republic, GR 224015, July 23, 2018 [note; Separate
Concurring, J. Caguioa]

L. Marriages giving rise to criminal liability

FC Arts. 4, 35, 38, 16, 41

NCC 84, RPC 351-352 repealed by RA 10655, March 13, 2015,
FC 167-169

People v De Guzman, GR 185843, March 3, 2010

Ronulo vs People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Former Judge Tormis,
A.C. No. 9920, August 30, 2016
Misalucha v People, GR 206284, Feb. 28, 2018

R.A. 6955, “An Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching

Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals”

R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by

RA 10364

93
 People vs. Villanueva, 210798, Sept. 14, 2016

VI. THE LAW ON SEPARATION OF THE SPOUSES

A. Concepts of separation & divorce

Benedicto v. De la Rama 3 Phil 34

1. Separation in fact/abandonment, FC 239, 100-101, 127-128

Villanueva v Chiong, GR 159889, June 5, 2008

2. Agreements to separate, FC 1, NCC 221 (1)

Espinosa v Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October, 12, 2011

3. Absolute divorce

(a) Divorce under the Family Code

FC 26, paragraph 2
Gorayeb v Hashim, 50 Phil. 22
Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
Somera v. Pilapil, 174 SCRA 663
Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Medina vs. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016

(b) Divorce under the Muslim Code, MC 45-55

Llave v Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Zamoranos v People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011
Pacasum v Zamoranos, G.R. No. 193719, March 21,
2017 (en banc)

B. Concept of legal separation

1. Grounds for legal separation – Art. 55 FC, RA 9262,

compare with NCC 97

94
 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003

(a) Sexual infidelity or perversion

FC 55(8)
NCC 36
RPC 333 & 334
RPC 247

Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, September 19, 2011

Republic v Quintos, GR 159594, November 12, 2012

(b) Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or

homosexuality

FCC 55 (5) and (6) compare with FC 46(4)

Almelor v RTC, GR No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

Campos v Campos, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, Feb. 08, 2012

(c) Attempt on the life of the other spouse

FC 55(9) compare with NCC 97(2)

Rep. Act 9262

(d) Abandonment

FC Art. 55 (10)
FC 101 par. 3, compare with separation in fact
Partosa-Jo v. CA, G.R. No. 82606, Dec. 18, 1992
Republic v Quintos, GR 159594, November 12, 2012

(e) Other grounds

FC 55 (1)
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252
Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, September 19, 2011

2. Who can ask for legal separation

95
 FC 55 compare with NCC 99

3. When may petition be filed

FC 57 compare with NCC 102, NCC 99

People v. Zapata 88 Phil 688

4. Court procedure in legal separation

FC 58-60;
Sec. 19 and Sec. 33, RA 9262
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003

Araneta vs Concepcion, 99 Phil 709

Pacete v. Cariaga, 231 SCRA 321
Ocampo v Florenciano, 107 Phil 35
Somosa vs Vamenta, Jr., 46 SCRA 110
De la Viña v. Villareal 41 Phil 13
Gandionco v. Peñaranda 155 SCRA 725
Lapuz vs Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177

5. Effect of pendency of the petition, FC 61-62

6. Support and pendente lite

FC 62 cf. FC 49, FC 198

Yangco v. Rhode, 1 Phil 404
Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79
De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13
Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709
Lerma v. CA 61 SCRA 440

7. Defenses in actions for legal separation – FC Art. 56

(a) Consent

FC 56(2); NCC 100

People v. Sansano, 50 Phil 73

96
 People v. Schneckenberger, 73 Phil 413

(b) Condonation

FC 56(1)
Ginez v. Bugayong 100 Phil 616

(c) Recrimination

FC 56(4)
Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168
Ong vs Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006

(d) Collusion/Mutual Consent

FC 60
FC 56(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(2)
People v. Schneckenberger 73 Phil 413
Ocampo v. Florenciano 107 Phil 35
Republic v CA, November 12, 2012

(e) Prescription, FC Art. 57

8. Effects of decree of legal separation, FC Art. 68

(a) On personal relations, FC 63 (1), 68

(b) On the custody of children

FC 63(3); FC 213
NCC 106(3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3
Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil 340, May 30, 1956

(c) On property relations

FC 63(2), FC 64, FC Art. 102 (4), 129 (7), 43

Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

97
 Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August
03, 2015

(d) On support, FC 198

(e) On the use of surname, NCC 372

Laperal v. Republic 116 Phil 672

(f) On hereditary rights, FC 63(4)

(g) Other Effects, FC 64, 198

(h) Solo Parents Act – RA 8972

9. Reconciliation, FC 65-67, cf 141

10. Effect of death of one of the parties

Lapuz vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 314

VII. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES, FC 68-72

A. Obligation to love each other, FC 68

B. Obligation to live with the other spouse

1. General rule and exceptions

FC 68
Art. 100 (1); 127 (1); 101; 128
NCC 921 (4)
RPC 11 (2)
RPC 247
Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252
Arroyo v. Vasques-Arroyo 42 Phil 54
Cuaderno v. Cuaderno 12 SCRA 505
Ilusorio vs. Bildner, G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000.

98
 2. Designation of domicile

(a) General rule: jointly

FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110, Art. 156

(b) Exception, FC 69 par. 2

De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13 at pp. 16-21

C. Joint management of family life

FC 71, 94 (last par.), 121 (last par.), 122, 146

D. Joint Obligation to Support

FC 70, 194, 94 (1) and (last par.), 121 (1) and (last par.), 146

E. The right to exercise a profession or calling

FC 73 as amended by RA 10572 (May 24, 2013), compare with

NCC 117, FC Art. 94 (2), (3); FC Art. 121 (2), (3)
Art. II Sec. 14 and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. NCC 113 compare with ROC Rule 3 Sec. 4

cf. R.A. 7192, “An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as

Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development and Nation
Building”

cf. R.A. 8187, “An Act Granting Paternity Leave...”

RA 9710, Magna Carta of Women

F. Related rights/obligations

Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Yasin v. Shariah Court 241 SCRA (1995)

G. Civil and Criminal Sanctions

99
 H. Enforcement of Rights of Women and Children

Republic Act No. 9262 – Anti-Violence Against Women and Children

Sharica Mari Go Tan vs Spouses Tan, GR No. 168852, Sept.

30, 2008
San Diego vs RTC, G.R. No. 193960, Jan. 07, 2013
Tua v Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014
BBB v AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015
AAA v BBB, G.R. No. 212448, Jan. 11, 2018
AAA v People, G.R. No. 229762, Nov. 28, 2018

VIII. PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

A. Requisites for validity of marriage settlements

FC Art. 75; 130 (3); 103 (3); 105

1. Prior to marriage: modifications

FC 1; FC 76 (modifications after marriage)

FC 66, 67, 128, 101, 134, 135, 136

Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201,

December 10, 2012

2. Form & registration requirement, FC 77, NCC 1357, 1358,

NCC 709

3. Celebration of the marriage, FC 81, 86, 43(3), 44, 50

B. Parties to a marriage settlement

(a) minors, FC 78, 211, 225, 234, 236

(b) persons under civil interdiction, NCC Art. 38, 39,
FC 79, RPC 34, FC 135 (1)

100
 (c) incapacitated persons, FC 79, in rel. to NCC 38-39

C. Which law governs property relations, FC 74

1. Stipulation in marriage settlements, FC 80, NCC 16 and 17

2. If both Filipinos
3. Mixed marriage between Filipino and alien
4. If both aliens
5. For property located outside RP

D. Donations propter nuptias

1. Definition, FC 82

Solis v Solis, 53 Phil 912 [1928]

2. Form of Donations, FC Art. 83, NCC Arts. 748-749

Velasquez v CA, G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000

3. Who may be donors – FC Art 82, 83, 84

4. What may be donated by a spouse as donor

(a) present property, FC 84, 1070, 760, 764, 765

Mateo v Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

(b) future property, FC 84

(c) encumbered property, FC 85
(d) donations in the marriage settlements, FC 81

5. Void donations by the spouses, FC 87. NCC 1490

(a) Donations during the marriage

(b) Donations in common law marriages

Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284

101
 Arcaba v de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683. Nov. 22, 2001

6. Revocation of donations propter nuptias, FC 81, 86(1)

(a) revocation by donor, FC 86; NCC 765; FC Art. 50; 43 (3)

Mateo vs Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

(b) by operation of law, FC 44; 43 (3); 64

E. Absolute Community of Property

a. When applicable, Art. 75, 103, 130, 92 (3)

b. Commencement, Art. 88
c. Waiver during marriage, Art. 89
d. Waiver after marriage, Art. 89, 136
e. Suppletory rule, Art. 90, NCC 484 – 486
f. What constitutes ACP, Art. 91
g. What is excluded from the ACP, Art. 92, 95

Muller v Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006

Beumer v Amores, GR 195670, December 3, 2012
Abrenica v Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012

h. Presumption of ACP, Art. 93

i. Charges upon ACP, Art. 94, 197, 98

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111

Gelano vs CA, 103 SCRA 90
G-Tractors, Inc., vs CA, 135 SCRA 192
Francisco v Gonzales, G.R. No. 177667, September 17,
2008
Buado vs. CA, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009

j. Administration and enjoyment of ACP, 96

Dar v Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000

102
 (1) incapacity, FC 96 (2) – no court order

Uy vs. CA, 346 SCRA 246

(2) separation in fact FC 100 (3), 142, 72, 239 –

with court order, of separate property

(3) abandonment, FC 101. 72, 239 – with court

order

(4) pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC

61 – with court order

Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79

k. Disposition and encumbrance, Arts. 96 – 98

l. Causes for dissolution, FC 99

(a) Death, FC 103 cf. Rule 73 Sec. 12 ROC

Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011

Uy v Estate of Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5,
2017

(b) Legal separation, FC 61, 63(2); FC 66

Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79

(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to

FC 43 (2), 147, 148

Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03,

2015

(d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008

103
 m. Effects of dissolution, FC 102

(a) Liquidation procedure

Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

(b) For cause other than death, FC 50; FC 43 (2); FC

63(2); 147; 148

Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03,

2015
Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011

(c) Termination due to death, FC 103

n. For marriages before FC, cf Art. 103 (3)

Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

o. Support during ACP liquidation, FC 198, 100 (1)

Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728

F. Conjugal partnership of gains

a. When applicable, Art. 75, 105, 130, 256

Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303

Sps. Estonina v. CA G.R. No. 111547, Jan. 27, 1997
Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
Castro vs. Miat, 397 SCRA 271
Heirs of Jarque v Jarque, GR 196733, Nov. 21, 2018

b. Commencement, Art. 88
c. Waiver during marriage, Art. 89
d. Waiver after marriage, Art. 89, 136
e. Suppletory rule, Art. 108, NCC 1767-1768
f. What constitutes CPG, Art. 106, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123

104
 Titan v David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Imani vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, Nov. 17, 2010.
Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439
Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154
Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011
Berciles v. GSIS,128 SCRA 53, cf. FC 115
Jovellanos v CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez, GR 156125, August 25,
2010
Padilla v Padilla, October 4, 1943
Padilla v Paterno, December 26, 1961
Coingco v Flores, 82 Phil. 284

g. What is excluded from the CPG, Art. 109, 113, 114, 115, 118,
119, 120, 123, NCC 1015, 1601, 1619

Laperal v. Katigbak, 10 SCRA 493

Francisco v CA, G.R. No. 102330, Nov. 25, 1998
Tan v Andrade, GR 171904, Aug 7, 2013
Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255
Plata v. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718

h. Presumption of CPG, Art. 116

Dewara v Lamela, GR 179010, April 11, 2011

De La Pena v Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012

i. Administration of exclusive property, Arts. 110, 111

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255

Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372

j. Encumbrance and disposition of exclusive property, FC 111,

112

Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792

k. Charges upon CPG, Art. 121, 122, RPC 108

105
 Mariano vs CA, 174 SCRA 59
Ayala vs CA, 286 SCRA 272
Ching vs CA, 423 SCRA 356
Homeowners vs. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005
Ando v Campo, GR 184007, February 16, 2011
De Los Santos v Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017

(a) With consent

G-Tractors v. CA, 135 SCRA 192

Ong v. CA 204 SCRA 297
Ayala Investment vs. CA (February 12, 1998)
Security Bank vs. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382,
Nov. 29, 2006
Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011

(b) Without consent

Costuna vs. Domondon, 180 SCRA 333

Jader-Manalo v Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January 23,
2002
Carlos vs. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361
Borlongan v BDO, G.R. No. 217617, G. R. No. April 5,
2017
People v. Lagrimas, G.R. No. L-25355, August 28, 1969
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201,
December 10, 2012

l. Administration and enjoyment of CPG, Art. 124

Dar v Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000

Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658

(1) incapacity, FC 124 (2)– no court order

Uy vs. CA, 346 SCRA 246

(2) separation in fact FC 127, 239 – with court

order, of separate property

106
 Noveras v Noveras. G.R. No. 188289, Aug. 20,
2014

(3) abandonment, FC 128, 239 – with court order

Partosa-Jo v. CA 216 SCRA 693

(4) pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC

61 – with court order

Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79

l. Disposition and encumbrance, Arts. 124, 125

Jader-Manalo v Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002

Guiang vs CA, 291 SCRA 372
Roxas v. CA 198 SCRA 541 [1991]
Alinas vs Alinas, GR No. 158040, April 14, 2008
Siochi v Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
Aggabao vs. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010
Ko v Aramburo, G. R. No. 190995, August 9, 2017

m. Causes for dissolution, Art. 126

(a) Death, FC 130 cf. Rule 73 Sec. 12 ROC

Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011

Domingo vs. Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Uy v Estate of Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5,
2017

(b) Legal separation, FC 61, 63(2); FC 66

Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79

(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to

FC 43 (2), 147, 148

107
 Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03,
2015

(d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008

n. Effects of dissolution, FC 129

Tarrosa vs De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009

Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 171260, September 11, 2009

(a) Liquidation procedure

Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

(b) For cause other than death, FC 50; FC 43 (2); FC

63(2); 147; 148

Buenaventura v CA, G.R. No. 127358. March 31,

2005
Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011
Barrido v Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, Oct. 20,
2014
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03,
2015

(c) Termination due to death, FC 130, 132, 133

o. For marriages before FC, 131

Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216

p. Support during ACP liquidation, FC 133

Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728

108
G. Regime of separation of property

1. When applicable

(a) In the marriage settlements, FC 75, 143-146.

(b) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130
(c) Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2)
(d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-146

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008

Noveras v Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014

2. Property covered, FC 144

3. Administration

(a) By the owner-spouse, FC 145

(b) By the other spouse, FC 142, 101 (3), 127 (3)

4. Family expenses, FC 146

5. Conveyances between the spouses, FC 87, NCC 1490

H. Judicial separation of property

1. When possible, FC 134

Maquilan vs Maquilan, June 8, 2007

Lavadia v Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23,
2014

2. For sufficient cause, FC 135, RPC 34, cf. FC 55 (10);

229(4), 231, 232

Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008

Noveras v Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014

3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136

109
 4. Effects of judicial separation of property

(a) liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 par. 1

(b) support pendente lite, FC 137 par. 2, 198
(c) regime after JSP, FC 138 of FC 66 (2), see 63(2)
(d) binding effect on third parties, FC 139-140; cf FC 63 (2)

Laperal v Katigbak, 116 Phil 672

5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 cf. FC 67, 135,

142

6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142, FC

96; FC 124

I. Property regime of unions without marriage

Review: FC 6, 35 (2), 35 (3), 35 (5), 36, 38, 53; FC 41, 44; FC 45

(Void and voidable marriages)

1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53, cf. NCC 144

Valdes v. QC RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

Carino vs. Carino, GR 132539, February 3, 2001
San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
Diño v Diño, GR 178004, January 19, 2011
Salas, Jr. vs Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, Sept. 23, 2013
Barrido v Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, Oct. 20, 2014
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015

2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC

50, 37, 38, and 44

Bienvenido v. CA 237 SCRA 676

Agapay vs Agapay, 276 SCRA 340
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000
Adriano v CA, 328 SCRA 738
Malilin vs Castillo, 333 SCRA 628

110
 Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439
Atienza vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006
San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009
Lacbayan v Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011 (see
J. Brion’s Separate Opinion)
Go- Bangayan v Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

J. Property Relations of Mixed Marriages

Borromeo vs Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009

Cheeseman v. IAC 193 SCRA 93
Matthews vs. Taylor, GR 164584, June 22, 2009
Frenzel vs. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Muller v Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Beumer v Amores, GR 195670, December 3, 2012
Fullido v Grilli, G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

IX. FAMILY RELATIONS

A. What governs family relations, FC 149, Constitution Art. II, Sec.

12 and Art. XV, NCC 220-221

B. Effects of family relationship on legal disputes

FC 150 - 151
NCC 2035
ROC Rule 16 Sec. 1(j)
RPC 20, 247 and 332

Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104

Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78
Magbaleta vs Gonong, 76 SCRA 511
Tribiana vs. Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004
Hiyas Savings vs. Acuña, G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006
Moreno v Kahn, GR 217744, July 30, 2018

C. The Family Home

111
 1. What constitutes the family home, FC 152, 156, 69, 120,
118, 161

2. Who may constitute the family home, FC 152, 161, 92

3. When deemed constituted, FC 153, 162

4. Beneficiaries, FC 154, 194-196, 199

Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

5. Exemptions, FC 155, FC 157, FC 160

6. Rights of creditors, FC 155, 160-161

Ramos v Pangilinan, GR 185920, July 20, 2010

Equitable v OJ Mark, G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010
De Mesa v Acero, G.R. No. 185064, January 16,
2012

7. When terminated, FC 153 compare with FC 159, 102 (9),

129 (9)

Arriola v Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008

Eulogio v. Bell, G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015

8. When may be sold, FC 158

Honrado v CA, GR 166333, Nov. 25, 2005

Cabang vs Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009
Fortaleza v Lapitan, GR 178288, August 15, 2012
Eulogio v. Bell, G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015

X. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Concepts of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163

112
 Uy v Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009

B. Legitimate children, FC 164 cf. FC 165 in rel to NCC 256-257,

166, 167, 168 in relation to Republic Act No. 10655, An Act Repealing the
Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 Of Act No. 3815, otherwise
known as The Revised Penal Code, March 2015, FC 169

Angeles vs Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005

1. Who are considered legitimate children

(a) Conceived during marriage cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec.

3(dd), FC Art. 168 in relation to Republic Act No. 10655, An Act
Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 Of Act
No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code, March 2015,
NCC 40-41.

1. Valid marriage

Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003

Continental Steel v Montano, Oct. 13, 2009
SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006

2. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC

43(1)
3. Void marriages under FC 54
4. Voidable marriages, FC 45

Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998

(b) Born during marriage, FC 164

(c) Conceived by artificial insemination, cf. NCC 40, FC 164
(d) Adopted children, RA 8552, Sec. 17
(e) Legitimated children, 177, 178

2. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174, NCC 364, 374,

376, NCC 888, NCC 979

113
 Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282
Naldoza v. Republic, 112 SCRA 658
Rep. vs CA, 300 SCRA 138
Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773, September 10,
2014

C. Illegitimate children

1. Who are considered illegitimate

(a) Under NCC

(b) FC 165
(c) FC 166

2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176

Osmeña de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil 222

Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004
Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009
De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012
Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Barcelote v Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7,
2017
Masbate v Relucio, GR 235498, July 30, 2018

D. Action to impugn legitimacy

Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010

1. Grounds, FC 166

(a) Physical impossibility of access

Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73
Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005

(b) Biological or other scientific grounds

114
 A.M. No. 06­11­5­SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence)

Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005

Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Estate v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007
Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011

(c) FC 166(3)

2. Effect of a mother’s declaration, FC 167

3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168 in relation to Republic Act

No. 10655, An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under
Article 351 Of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code,
March 2015, 169

4. Who may impugn, 171

Benitez-Badua v. CA, 229 SCRA 468

Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961. March 7,
2002
Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011
Geronimo v Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 25, 2015

5. Prescription of action to impugn, FC 170

E. Proof of Filiation

1. Of legitimate children, FC 172-173

Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984
Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997
Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998
Heirs of Conti v CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499
Aguilar v Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28, 2015
Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R.191936, June 27,
2016

115
 Tabuada v Tabuada, GR 196510, Sept. 12, 2018

2. Of illegitimate children, FC 175, 176

Gaspay v. CA, 238 SCRA 163

Ong vs CA, G.R. No. 95386. May 29, 1997
Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495
Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009
Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012
San Agustin vs. Sales, G.R. N0. 189289, August 31,
2016
Barcelote v Republic, GR 222095, August 7, 2017
Calma v Turla, GR 221684, July 30, 2018

3. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345

F. Legitimated Children

1. who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447

2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178

3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181
4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182
5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179

XI. ADOPTION

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575
Bartolome v SSS, G.R. No. 19253, Nov. 12, 2014
Oribello v CA, G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5, 2015
R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)
R.A. 8043, “The Law on Inter-Country Adoption”
A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)

116
 A. Requisites to be an adopter –

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

1. Age and capacity required

2. Husband and wife jointly

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R.

Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

3. Need for consent

Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

4. Aliens as adopters

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9

B. Who may not adopt

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

C. Who may be adopted

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

D. Who may not be adopted

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

E. Who must give consent

117
Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption
Law

F. Procedure in adoption

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

Republic Act No. 9253, March 12, 2009 - AN ACT REQUIRING

CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS

Rep. Act 11222, February 21, 2019 - AN ACT ALLOWING THE

RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATED BIRTH RECORDS, etc.”

G. Effects of a decree of adoption

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

1. On status

2. On parental authority

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

3. On hereditary rights, Sec. 18; FC 189-190; Art. 39, PD 603,

Rule 99, Section 5

See: Balane, Ruben, Jottings in Succession, [2006 ed.]

Bartolome v SSS, G.R. No. 19253, Nov. 12, 2014

118
 4. On name, NCC 365

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454

SCRA 541

5. Other Effects

H. Rescission of adoption

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

Bartolome v SSS, G.R. No. 19253, Nov. 12, 2014

I. Effects of rescission

Compare: Domestic Adoption Code, RA 8552 and the Intercountry Adoption

Law

XII. SUPPORT

A. What comprises support, FC 194

B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196, 197, 94 (1), 102
(1)

Perkins v Perkins. 57 Phil. 217 (1932)

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453
Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999
Rondina v People, GR 179059, June 13, 2012
Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012
Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

119
 Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440
Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204

Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006

Spouses Lim v Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009

E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-204

Canonizado v. Benitez, GR No. 72746, May 7, 1987

F. Amount of support, FC 200-208

Lacson vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006

Lim-Lua v Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013

G. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194; NCC 152

H. Support pendente lite, FC 198; Rules of Court, Rule 61

I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61

XIII. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

A. Concept of parental authority, Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution,

FC 209, 211, 176, 225, NCC 356-363

Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969

Unson vs. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980
Habeas Corpus Of Minor Shang Ko Vingson v Cabcaban, UDK
No. 14817, January 13, 2014
Caram v Segui, GR 193652, Aug. 5, 2014
Mendez vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 201614,
January 12, 2016

120
B. Who exercises PA, FC 211-213, 221 cf. FC 221, 49, 176. 49, 102
(6), 129 (9), 14-16, 35, 45, 78

Celis v Cafuir, 86 Phil. 554 (1950)

Unson v. Navarro 101 SCRA 183
Espiritu & Layug v. CA, G.R. No. 115640 (1995)
Santos Sr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 113054 (1995)
David vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995
Tonog vs. CA, 376 SCRA 642
Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Gualberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005
Grande v Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Bucal v Bucal, G.R. No. 206957, June 17, 2015,
Masbate , Petitioners, Vs. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30,
2018

C. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234, 217, 214, 49

Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317

D. Substitute PA, FC 214, 216, FC 217, 233

Rep. Act No. 10165, Foster Care Act of 2012.

Vancil vs Belmes, 358 SCRA 707

E. Special PA

FC 218-219, FC 233
cf. FC 221 in rel. to NCC 2180, FC 236
Cybercrime Prevention Act, RA 10175, September 12, 2012

F. Filial privilege, FC 215

ROC Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23

Lee v CA, GR 177861, July 13, 2010

121
 G. Effects of PA over the child’s person,

FC 220-222
FC 223-224

Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160

R.A. 7610, The Child Abuse Law

H. Effects of PA over the child’s property,

FC 225-227, RA 9231, Secs. 12-B and 12-C

Hebron vs. Loyola, G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010

I. Suspension or termination of PA

1. permanent termination, FC 228, 232, cf. RA 6809, FC 234

2. non-permanent termination, FC 229 cf. FC 193

Secs. 16 and 19, RA 8552 re parental authority and revocation

of adoption

3. suspension of PA, FC 231-230, 233

Chua v. Cabangbang, 27 SCRA 791

De Guzman vs Perez, 496 SCRA 474

4. revival

See: R.A. 8369, “An Act Establishing Family Courts, Granting Them
Exclusive Original Jurisdiction Over Child and Family Cases.”

See: R.A. 7610, “Child Abuse Act”

XIV. EMANCIPATION

RA 6809

122
 A. Cause of emancipation, FC 234 as amended

B. Effect of emancipation, FC 236 as amended

cf. FC 15, NCC 2180

XV. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER FC

Arts. 238-253, 100(2), 127(2), 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124, 217, 225

XVI CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

NCC 356-363, FC 213

XVII. SURNAMES

NCC 364-380
RA 6085 – regulating the use of aliases, August 4, 1969
RA 9255, FC 176

Llaneta v. Agrava, 57 SCRA 29

Telmo v. Republic, 73 SCRA 29
Tolentino v. CA, 162 SCRA 66
Legamia v. IAC, 131 SCRA 479
Change of Name, Wang, G.R. No. 159966.March 30, 2005
Gonzaludo v People, G.R. No. 150910, February 6, 2006
Dapar v. Biascan, 439 SCRA 179

XVIII. RULES GOVERNING PERSONS WHO ARE ABSENT

NCC 381-383, 384-389, FC 96, 101, 124, NCC 390-396, FC 41

Reyes v. Alejandro, 141 SCRA 65

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425
Manuel vs. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005

XIX. FUNERALS

123
 NCC 305-310, FC 195, 194
NCC 309 cf. Sec. 95, PD 856 – Sanitation Code

Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

Valino v Adriano, GR 182894, April 22, 2014

XX. ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER

NCC 407-413
ROC, Rule 108
RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172

Barretto vs Local Civil Registrar, 74 SCRA 257

Republic v Valencia, GR L-32181, March 5, 1986
Republic v. Marcos, 182 SCRA 223
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294
Leonor v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 69
Silverio vs. RP, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Rep. vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008
Dela Cruz v Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Braza v The Registrar, G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Baldos vs. CA, G.R. No. 170645, July 9, 2010
Iwasawa vs Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, SEP 11, 2013
Republic v Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Onde v. Office of The Local Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 197174,
September 10, 2014
Republic v De la Vega, GR 195873, Feb. 23, 2015
Almojuela vs. Republic, G.R. No. 211724, August 24, 2016
Republic v Sali, G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017
Barcelote v Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
Republic v Gallo, GR 207074, Jan. 17, 2018
Republic v Tipay, GR 209527, Feb. 14, 2018
Morisono v Morisono, GR No. 226013, July 2, 2018

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