18-2868 Documents3

Selected docket entries for case 18−2868
Generated: 08/20/2019 12:24:51
Filed Document Description Page Docket Text

03/19/2019 147 Response to Show Cause FILED 6 RESPONSE to order to show cause, on behalf of Appellee
Virginia L. Giuffre, FILED. Service date 03/19/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2521584] [18−2868]
03/19/2019 148 Notice of Appearance for Amicus 33 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AS AMICUS COUNSEL,
Counsel FILED FILED. Service date 03/19/2019 by CM/ECF. [2521585]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 03/21/2019 by JW]
03/19/2019 149 Response to Show Cause FILED 34 RESPONSE to order to show cause, on behalf of Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED. Service date 03/19/2019 by
CM/ECF, email, US mail.[2521586] [18−2868]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 03/21/2019 by JW]
03/19/2019 151 Motion for Leave for Non−Party 48 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, on behalf of
Limited Intervenor to File Unredacted Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date03/19/2019 by
Motions Ex CM/ECF.[2521598] [18−2868]
03/19/2019 152 Motion for Limited Intervention 49 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, on behalf of
by Non−Party J. Doe FILED Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date03/19/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2521599] [18−2868]
03/19/2019 153 MOTION TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, on behalf
153 Motion for Leave to File as 50 of Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date03/19/2019 by
Amicus FILED CM/ECF.[2521600] [18−2868]
153 John Doe Amicus Brief 56
03/19/2019 154 Motion for Leave for Non−Party 69 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, on behalf of
Limited Intervenor to Proceed Under Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date03/19/2019 by
Pseudonym (2) CM/ECF.[2521601] [18−2868]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 03/21/2019 by JW]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 03/21/2019 by JW]
03/20/2019 159 Response to Show Cause FILED 72 RESPONSE to order to show cause, on behalf of Appellant
Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media Company, FILED.
Service date 03/20/2019 by CM/ECF.[2522580] [18−2868]
03/22/2019 168 Opposition FILED 80 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, [154], [152], [151], on behalf
of Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre, FILED. Service date
03/22/2019 by CM/ECF. [2524513] [18−2868]
03/22/2019 169 Opposition FILED 89 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, [153], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF. [2524514] [18−2868]
03/27/2019 172 Opposition FILED 106 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, [154], [152], [151], on behalf
of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED. Service date
03/27/2019 by CM/ECF, email, US mail. [2526870]
[18−2868]
03/27/2019 REPLY TO OPPOSITION [169], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, email, US mail.[2526880][173] [18−2868]
03/27/2019 175 Defective_Document_Notice 114 DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT, reply to opposition[173], on
behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED.[2526948]
[18−2868]
03/27/2019 176 Opposition FILED 116 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, to file amicus curiae brief
[153], on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED.
Service date 03/27/2019 by CM/ECF, email, US mail.
[2526952] [18−2868]
03/27/2019 CURED DEFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO MOTION[176],
on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell,
FILED.[2526963] [18−2868]
03/28/2019 180 Motion FILED 120 MOTION, for leave to respond, on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, email, US mail. [2528261] [18−2868]
03/29/2019 MOTION TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF, on behalf
of Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date03/29/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2529235] [18−2868]
04/01/2019 184 Defective_Document_Notice 134 DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT, Motion to file Amicus Curiae
Brief, on behalf of Non−Party Filer, [183], [2529334]
[18−2868]
04/02/2019 185 Papers RECEIVED 136 PAPERS, Consolidated reply of John Doe in support of
Motion for leave to file brief as amicus curiae in support of
Defendanrt−Appellee Maxwell's Objection to the Court;s
03/11/2019 Order to show cause, RECEIVED.[2530431]
[18−2868]
04/02/2019 CURED DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT: PAPERS,
Consolidated reply of John Doe in support of Motion for
leave to file brief as amicus curiae in support of
Defendanrt−Appellee Maxwell's Objection to the Court;s
03/11/2019 Order to show cause, FILED.[2530436]
[18−2868]
04/08/2019 191 FRAP 28(j) Letter RECEIVED 151 FRAP 28(j) LETTER, dated 04/08/2019, on behalf of
Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre, RECEIVED. Service date
04/08/2019 by CM/ECF.[2534985] [18−2868]
04/12/2019 193 Motion FILED 153 MOTION, to strike [191] [191], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, US mail. [2539027] [18−2868]
Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, RECEIVED. Service date
04/12/2019 by CM/ECF, email.[2539523] [18−2868]
04/15/2019 198 Opposition FILED 161 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, [193], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF. [2540278] [18−2868]
04/15/2019 200 Letter RECEIVED 166 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre, in re:
response to Appellee Maxwell's FRAP 28(j) letter,
RECEIVED. Service date 04/15/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2540321] [18−2868]−−[Edited 04/15/2019 by
JW]
04/17/2019 203 Letter RECEIVED 168 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, in re:
in response to Appellee Giuffre's letter, RECEIVED.
Service date 04/17/2019 by CM/ECF, email.[2542676]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 04/18/2019 by JW]
04/18/2019 205 Reply to Opposition FILED 169 REPLY TO OPPOSITION [198], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, US mail.[2543433][205] [18−2868]
Appellant Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media Company,
CM/ECF.[2597631] [18−2868]
07/03/2019 212 208 NEW CASE MANAGER, Yana Segal,
Notice_of_Case_Manager_Change ASSIGNED.[2600222] [18−2868]
07/03/2019 213 OPINION, vacating the 11/02/2016, 05/03/2017, and
213 Opinion FILED 209 08/27/2018 orders of the District Court, ordering the
unsealing of the summary judgment record, and remanding
213 Bill_of_Cost_Itemized_Notice_1 234
the case for particularized review of the remaining
213 Bill_of_Cost_Itemized_Notice_2 235 documents, by JAC, RSP (dissenting), CFD,
FILED.[2600261] [18−2868]
07/03/2019 214 Concurring or Dissenting 236 OPINION, Dissenting, by judge RSP, FILED.[2600267]
Opinion FILED [18−2868]
07/03/2019 MOTION ORDER, denying motion to dismiss [63] filed
by Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell; denying motion to strike
[87] filed by Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, denying motion
to strike [193] filed by Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell;
denying motion for___relief [97] filed by Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell; denying as moot motion to intervene
[151], denying as moot motion to intervene [152], denying
as moot motion to intervene [154]; denying motion to file
amicus curiae brief [153]; denying motion for leave to
respond [180] filed by Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, by
JAC, RSP, CFD, FILED. [2600278][215] [18−2868]
07/03/2019 CAPTION, in light of Opinion filed,
AMENDED.[2600286] [18−2868]
07/03/2019 217 CERTIFIED OPINION, dated 07/03/2019, to SDNY
217 Certified copy ISSUED 237 (NEW YORK CITY), ISSUED.[2600298] [18−2868]
217 Supporting Document 262
07/03/2019 224 Judgment FILED 263 JUDGMENT, FILED.[2600622] [18−2868]
07/08/2019 225 Order FILED 264 AMENDED ORDER, dated 07/08/2019, denying
outstanding motions and denying as moot 03/19/2019
motions, by JAC, RSP, CFD, FILED.[2602560] [18−2868]
07/12/2019 226 Motion to Intervene FILED 266 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, on behalf of
Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date07/12/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2607539] [18−2868]
07/17/2019 229 Order FILED 267 ORDER, dated 07/17/2019, ordering the parties Virginia L.
Giuffre and Ghislaine Maxwell to file one−page letter
briefs no later than 07/19/2019 indicating any additional
locations in the record that might implicate the privacy
interests of the individuals named on page 59, line 25
Exhibit KK of the motion for summary judgment, by JAC,
RSP, CFD, FILED.[2610854] [18−2868]
07/17/2019 230 Itemized Bill of costs FILED 268 ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS, on behalf of Appellant Julie
Brown and Miami Herald Media Company, FILED.
Service date 07/17/2019 by CM/ECF.[2611121] [18−2868]
07/17/2019 232 Petition for Rehearing/Rehearing 272 PETITION FOR REHEARING/REHEARING EN BANC,
En Banc FILED on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED. Service
date 07/17/2019 by CM/ECF, US mail.[2611181]
[18−2868]
07/17/2019 233 Petition for Rehearing/Rehearing 322 PETITION FOR REHEARING/REHEARING EN BANC,
En Banc FILED on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED. Service
date 07/17/2019 by CM/ECF, US mail.[2611189]
[18−2868]
07/19/2019 237 Letter RECEIVED 372 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre,
indicating additional locations in the record that might
implicate the privacy interests of the individuals named on
page 59, line 25 Exhibit KK of the motion for summary
judgment, RECEIVED. Service date 07/19/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2613227] [18−2868]−−[Edited 07/19/2019 by
YS]
07/19/2019 239 Letter RECEIVED 374 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell,
requesting leave to file a two−page letter brief,
RECEIVED. Service date 07/19/2019 by CM/ECF,
email.[2613286] [18−2868]−−[Edited 07/19/2019 by YS]
07/22/2019 242 Motion to Intervene FILED 376 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE, on behalf of
Non−Party Filer(s), FILED. Service date07/22/2019 by
CM/ECF.[2613592] [18−2868]
07/22/2019 243 Amended Letter Brief 377 LETTER BRIEF, on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell, RECEIVED. Service date 07/22/2019 by
CM/ECF, email.[2613965] [18−2868]−−[Edited
07/22/2019 by RO]
07/22/2019 245 Motion FILED 379 MOTION, to file supplemental brief, on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF. [2614382] [18−2868]
07/22/2019 248 Exhibits FILED 383 EXHIBITS, volume(s) 1 of 1, on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF.[2614391] [18−2868]
07/23/2019 LETTER, on behalf of Appellant Julie Brown and Miami
Herald Media Company, in opposition to J.Doe’s motion to
file an ex parte letter brief under seal (Dkt. 242),
CM/ECF.[2615581] [18−2868]−−[Edited 07/24/2019 by
YS]
07/24/2019 253 Defective_Document_Notice 393 DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT, opposition to J Doe's motion,
[252], on behalf of Appellant Julie Brown and Miami
Herald Media Company, FILED.[2615718]
[18−2868]−−[Edited 07/24/2019 by YS]
07/24/2019 254 Opposition FILED 395 OPPOSITION TO , [242], on behalf of Appellant Julie
Brown and Miami Herald Media Company, FILED.
Service date 07/24/2019 by CM/ECF. [2615746]
[18−2868]
07/24/2019 CURED DEFECTIVE Opposition [254], [253], on behalf
of Appellant Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media
Company, FILED.[2615757] [18−2868]
07/24/2019 259 Motion Order FILED 396 MOTION ORDER, granting motion for leave to file a
supplement to an amended petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc [245] filed by Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell, by RSP, FILED. [2616031][259] [18−2868]
07/24/2019 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, US mail.[2616174] [18−2868]
07/24/2019 262 Defective_Document_Notice 397 DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT, supplementary papers to an
amended petition for rehearing/rehearing en banc, [261], on
behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, FILED.[2616203]
[18−2868]
07/24/2019 263 Supplementary Papers FILED 399 SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS TO PETITION FOR
REHEARING EN BANC [233], on behalf of Appellee
CM/ECF, US mail.[2616215][263] [18−2868]
07/24/2019 CURED DEFECTIVE supplementary papers to an
amended petition for rehearing/rehearing en banc [263],
[262], on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell,
FILED.[2616217] [18−2868]
07/31/2019 269 Motion Order FILED 408 MOTION ORDER, denying motion for leave to intervene
to file an ex parte letter brief under seal in response to the
Court’s July 17, 2019 Order [242], by JAC, RSP, CFD,
FILED. [2621318][269] [18−2868]
08/05/2019 270 Errata Sheet FILED 409 ERRATA SHEET, for Opinion dated 07/03/2019, by JAC.
FILED.[2623914] [18−2868]
Case 18-2868, Document 147, 03/19/2019, 2521584, Page1 of 27
IIN THE
'IN THE UNITED
UNITED STATES
STATES COURT
COURT OF
OF APPEALS
APPEALS
FOR
FOR THE
THE SECOND
SECOND CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT
Virginia L.
Virginia L. Giuffre,
Giuffre,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
v.
Ghislaine
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
v.
Sharon
Sharon Church,
Church, Jeffrey
Jeffrey Epstein,
Epstein,
Docket
Docket No.
No. 16-3945
16-3945
Respondents,
Respondents,
Alan M.
Alan M. Dershowitz,
Dershowitz, Michael
Michael
Cernovich, DBA Cernovich
Cernovich, DBA Cernovich Media,
Media,
Intervenors-Appellants
___________________________
Virginia L.
Giuffre,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
v. Docket No. 18-2868
Docket No. 18-2868
Ghislaine
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
v.
Sharon Church, Jeffrey

Sharon Church, Jeffrey Epstein,
Epstein,
Respondents,
Respondents,
Julie
Julie Brown,
Brown, Miami
Miami Herald Company,
Herald Company,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VIRGINIA
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VIRGINIA GIUFFRE’S RESPONSE TO
GIUFFRE'S RESPONSE TO THE
THE
COURT’S ORDER
COURT'S ORDER TO
TO SHOW
SHOW CAUSE
CAUSE
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,Ms.
Ms. Virginia
Virginia Giuffre,
Giuffre, hereby
hereby files
files this
this response
response to the
to the
Court’s Order to
Court's Order to Show
Show Cause. Ms. Giuffre
Cause. Ms. Giuffre fully
fully agrees
agrees with
with the
the Court’s suggestion
Court's suggestion
that the
that the summary
summary judgment
judgment opinion
opinion in
in this
this case
case and
and related
related materials
materials (including
(including Ms.
Ms.
Giuffre’s factual materials

Giuffre's factual materials related
related to
to that
that motion)
motion) should
should be
be immediately
immediately unsealed
unsealed
for
for the
the reasons
reasons that
that follow.
follow.
I.
I. NO CAUSE
NO CAUSE EXISTS
EXISTS FOR
FOR DELAYING
DELAYING UNSEALING
UNSEALING OF
OF THE
THE SUMMARY
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DOCUMENTS
JUDGMENT DOCUMENTS
As the
As the Court's
Court’s order
order indicates,
indicates, binding
binding precedent
precedent in
in this
this Circuit
Circuit "clearly
“clearly
establishes
establishes that
that ‘documents submitted to
'documents submitted to aa court
court for
for its
its consideration
consideration in
in aa summary
summary
judgment motion
judgment motion are
are —
– as
as aa matter
matter of law —
of law – judicial
judicialdocuments
documents to
to which
which aa strong
strong
presumption ofof access

presumption access attaches,
attaches,under
underboth
both the
the common
common law
law and the First
and the First
Amendment.’” Order
Amendment.'" Order at
at 1
1 (quoting
(quoting Lugosch
Lugosch v.
v. Pyramid
Pyramid Co.
Co. of
of Onondaga, 435 F.3d
Onondaga, 435 F.3d
110, 121
110, 121 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 2006)). Indeed, this
2006)). Indeed, this Court
Court has
has created
created something
something akin
akin to
to aa super-
super-
presumption of
presumption access for
of access for summary
summary judgments
judgments materials,
materials, explaining
explaining recently
recently that
that
“[d]ocuments used
"[d]ocuments used by
by parties
parties moving
moving for,
for, or
or opposing,
opposing, summary
summary judgment
judgment should
should
not remain
not remain under
under seal
seal absent the most
absent the most compelling
compelling reasons.’” Cox v.
reasons." Cox v. Onondaga
Onondaga Cnty.
Cnty.
2
Sheriff’s Dep’t,
Sheriff's Dep't, 760
760 F.3d 139, 150
F.3d 139, (2d Cir.
150 (2d Cir. 2014)
2014) (emphasis
(emphasis added)
added) (quoting
(quoting Joy
Joy v.
v.
North, 692
North, 692 F.2d
F.2d 880,
880, 893
893 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1982)). At this
1982)). At this time,
time, despite
despite extended
extended litigation
litigation
spanning several
spanning several years,
years, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell is the only
is the only participant
participant in
in these
these appeals
appeals who
who
opposes
opposes unsealing;
unsealing; she
she has barely shown
has barely shown any
any reason
reason for
for keeping
keeping the
the documents
documents
sealed, let
sealed, let alone
alone “the
"the most
most compelling
compelling reasons.” As aa result,
reasons." As result, the
the obvious
obvious next
next step
step
for this Court

for this Court is
is to
tosimply
simplyunseal
unsealthe
thesummary
summaryjudgment
judgmentmaterials
materials—– specifically
specifically
including Ms.
including Ms. Giuffre’s Response to
Giuffre's Response to Defendant's
Defendant’s Motion
Motion for
for Summary
Summary Judgment
Judgment
and Undisputed
and Undisputed Facts and related
Facts and related materials
materials (district
(district court
court docket
docket entries
entries 538,
538, 586,
586,
and 620).
and 620).
Ms. Maxwell
Ms. Maxwell has
has had
had four
four previous
previous opportunities
opportunities to
to provide
provide something
something
approaching the
approaching “most compelling
the "most compelling reasons” for keeping
reasons" for keeping the
the summary
summary judgment
judgment
materials under
materials under seal:
seal: (1)
(1) in
in her briefing to
her briefing to this
this Court
Court in
in appeal
appeal No.
No. 16-3945;
16-3945; (2)
(2) in
in
her briefing
her briefing to
to this
this Court
Court in appeal No.
in appeal No. 18-2868;
18-2868; (3)
(3) during
during oral
oral argument
argument on
on both
both
these appeals;
these appeals; and
and (4)
(4) in her recent
in her recent motion
motion for
for the
the court
court to
to reconsider
reconsider its order to
its order to
show cause
show cause (filed
(filed Friday,
Friday, March
March 15,
15, 2019,
2019, and
and summarily
summarily denied
denied Monday,
Monday, March
March
18, 2019).
18, 2019). The
Thearguments
arguments she
she has
has advanced
advanced during
during these
these opportunities
opportunities and
and in her
in her
most briefing
most briefing last
last Friday
Friday fall
fall far
far short. In her
short. In hermost
most recent
recent effort,
effort, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell
alluded vaguely
alluded vaguely and
and generally
generally to “sexual and
to "sexual other private
and other private acts"
acts” and
and "highly
“highly
confidential,
confidential, sensitive,
sensitive, embarrassing
embarrassing and/or
and/or oppressive
oppressive information”
information" that
that might be
might be
disclosed. Mot.
disclosed. Mot. to
to Reconsider
Reconsider at
at 2,
2, 20. Ms. Maxwell
20. Ms. Maxwell is
is dodging
dodging the
the key
key point:
point: The
The
33
summary judgment
summary judgment filings
filings focused
focused on
on whether
whether Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell was
was an essential co-
an essential co-
conspirator
conspirator in
in Epstein’s
Epstein's international
internationalsex
sex trafficking
traffickingorganization.
organization. ItIt may
may be
be
“embarrassing” for
"embarrassing" forMs.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwelltoto have
have the
the world
world know
know the scope of
the scope her
of her
involvement in
involvement in the
the trafficking
trafficking of
of underage
underage girls
girls internationally
internationally for sexual purposes.
for sexual purposes.
But her
But her involvement
involvement in
in aa criminal
criminal enterprise
enterprise does
does not
not remotely
remotely approach
approach any
any
legitimate ground
legitimate ground for
for sealing.
sealing.
In her
In her most
most recent
recent filing,
filing, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell also
also shed
shed crocodile
crocodile tears
tears over
over the
the
interests of
interests of third
third parties
parties —
– particularly
particularly including
including the
the victims
victims whom
whom she sexually
she sexually
trafficked. Apart
trafficked. Apart from
from Ms.
Ms. Giuffre,
Giuffre, none
none of
of Ms.
Ms. Maxwell's
Maxwell’s victims
victims have
have chosen
chosen to
to
be involved
be involved in the multiple
in the multiple appeals. Presumably this
appeals. Presumably this is
is because
because the
the victims
victims (and
(and
other third parties)

other third parties) understood,
understood, through
through the plain language
the plain language of
of the
the protective
protective order,
order,
that confidentiality
that confidentiality was
was to
to be
be lifted
lifted when
when this
this case
case went
went to
to trial. See Protective
trial. See Protective Order
Order
at 55 ("This
at (“This Protective
Protective Order
Order shall
shall have
have no
no force
force and
and effect
effect on
on the use of
the use of any
any
confidential
confidential information
information at
at trial
trial in
in this
this matter”). Accordingly, everyone
matter"). Accordingly, everyone involved
involved in
in
this litigation
this litigation had
had (at
(at most)
most) aa reasonable
reasonable expectation
expectation of
of privacy
privacy in
in the
the materials
materials only
only
through the
through the June
June 2017 trial date.
2017 trial date.
In her
In her most
most recent
recent filing,
filing, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell also
also argued
argued that
that the appeal should
the appeal should be
be
remanded to
remanded to the
the district
district court
court for
for further
further fact-finding. But aa remand
fact-finding. But remand should
should be
be
granted only
granted only where
where there
there is
is something
something for
for the
the district
district court
courtto
todo. In the
do. In the absence
absence of
of
allegations of
allegations of something
something akin
akin to
to aa "most
“most compelling
compelling reason"
reason” for
for maintaining
maintaining the
the
4
documents under
documents under seal,
seal, aa remand
remand to
to the
thedistrict
districtcourt
courtisisentirely
entirelyunnecessary
unnecessary—
– and
and aa
waste of
waste of scarce
scarce judicial
judicial resources.
resources.
Waiting for
Waiting for aa remand
remand would
would also
alsonecessarily
necessarily involve
involve delay
delay—– perhaps
perhaps
considerable
considerable delay. As Ms.
delay. As Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell no
no doubt
doubt recognizes,
recognizes, the
the district
district court
court currently
currently
lacks jurisdiction
lacks jurisdiction in
in this
this case,
case, as
as aa “notice of appeal
"notice of appeal confers
confers jurisdiction
jurisdiction on
on the
the court
court
of appeals and
of appeals divests the
and divests the district
district court
court of
of its control over
its control over those
those aspects
aspects of the case
of the case
involved in
involved in the
the appeal.”
appeal." United
United States
States v.
v. Ransom, 866 F.2d
Ransom, 866 F.2d 574,
574, 575
575 (2d
(2d Cir.
Cir. 1989)
1989)
(internal quotation
(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, aa remand
omitted). Accordingly, remand to
to the district court
the district court is not
is not
possible while
possible while this Court continues
this Court continues to
to work
work on other aspects
on other aspects of
of the
the two
two appeals.
appeals.
Because this
Because this Court
Court currently
currently possesses jurisdiction and
possesses jurisdiction and aa simple
simple path
path forward
forward exists
exists
to resolve
to resolve the
the question
question of
of unsealing
unsealing the
the summary
summary judgment
judgment materials,
materials, this
this Court
Court
should promptly
should promptly move
move down
down that
that path.
path.
II.
II. REDACTIONS ARE
REDACTIONS ARE EASY
EASY TO
TO ACCOMPLISH
ACCOMPLISH
In her
In her most
most recent
recent filing,
filing, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell claimed that
Maxwell claimed that it
it is
is difficult
difficult to
to determine
determine
what redactions
what redactions would
would need
need to
to be
be made
made to
to unseal
unseal the
the documents.
documents. Mot.
Mot. to
to Reconsider
Reconsider
at 19.
at But here
19. But here again,
again, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell fails
fails to
to come
come to
to grips
grips with
with the
the overarching
overarching fact:
fact:
Most of
Most of the
the materials
materials do
do nothing
nothing more
more than
than demonstrate her role
demonstrate her role as
as aa lynchpin in an
lynchpin in an
international sex
international sex trafficking
trafficking organization. Thus, no
organization. Thus, no basis
basis exists
exists for
for keeping
keeping most
most of
of
the materials
the materials under
under seal.
seal.
55
To be
To be sure,
sure, aa small
small part
part of
of these materials may
these materials may need
need aa few
few limited
limited redactions,
redactions,
such as
such as redactions
redactions for
for specific
specific references
references to the names
to the names of
of minor
minor sexual
sexual assault
assault
victims or
victims personal identifiers
or personal identifiers such
such as
as social
social security
security numbers. But all
numbers. But all parties
parties
seeking unsealing
seeking unsealing of
of the
the materials
materials have
have agreed
agreed to
to these
these kinds
kinds of
of redactions. And
redactions. And
protecting this
protecting this limited
limited information
information isis aa routine
routine task
task for
for lawyers
lawyers making
making filings
filings
throughout this
throughout this country,
country, hardly
hardly requiring
requiring further
further review
review in
in the
the district
district court.
court. Indeed,
Indeed,
this is
this is aa simple
simple scrivener's
scrivener’s task
task—
– as
as demonstrated
demonstrated by
by Ms.
Ms. Giuffre's
Giuffre’s attached
attached
appendix with
appendix with the
the necessary
necessary redactions
redactions and
and the
the reasons therefore.1
reasons therefore.1
And Ms.
And Ms. Maxwell,
Maxwell, too,
too, will
will obviously
obviously have
have an
an opportunity
opportunity to
to suggest
suggest to
to this
this
Court
Court any necessary and
any necessary and appropriate
appropriate redactions. The Court's
redactions. The Court’s show
show cause
cause order
order
obviously envisions that,

obviously envisions that, if
if good
good “cause” is shown
"cause" is shown for
for aa redaction,
redaction, that
that redaction
redaction can
can
be made.
be made. There
Thereisis nothing
nothing unworkable
unworkable about
about this
this procedure
procedure or
or any
any real
real difficulty
difficulty in
in
determining whether
determining whether aa compelling
compelling reason
reason exists
existsfor
foraaredaction
redaction—
– and
and thus
thus no
no cause
cause
for the Court

for the Court to
to delay
delay in
in moving
moving forward
forward with
with aa redaction
redaction review
review as
as part
part of
of aa
procedure for
procedure for promptly
promptly unsealing
unsealing the
the summary
summary judgment materials.
judgment materials.
1
Asaabelt-and-suspender
1 As belt-and-suspendermeasure,
measure, itit may
may be
be useful
useful for
for this
this Court
Court to make the redactions
it believes are appropriate in the materials and then circulate those redacted materials to
Ms. Giuffre and Ms. Maxwell for one last review to make sure nothing has slipped through
the cracks through inadvertence or miscommunication.
miscommunication. Ms.Ms. Giuffre would be prepared to
review those
those redactions
redactions and
and respond
respond to
to the
the Court
Court within
within 48
48 hours
hours (two
(two business
business days)
days) of
of
receipt of the materials.
6
III. EQUITY
III. EQUITY FAVORS
FAVORS UNSEALINGTHE
UNSEALING THEMATERIALS
MATERIALS
Finally, in
Finally, her most
in her most recent
recent filing,
filing, Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell alluded
alluded to
to general
general equitable
equitable
principles as
principles justifying maintaining
as justifying maintaining the seal on
the seal on the
the summary
summary judgment
judgment materials.
materials.
Mot. to
Mot. to Reconsider
Reconsider at
at 7-8. Presumably she
7-8. Presumably she will
will advance
advance similar
similar claims
claims in her
in her
response to
response to this
this Court’s
Court's Order
Order to
to Show
Show Cause.
Cause. IfIfanything,
anything, equity
equity argues
argues for
for broad
broad
unsealing.
unsealing.
Ms. Giuffre
Ms. Giuffre wants
wants the
the summary
summary judgment
judgment materials
materials unsealed
unsealed to
to demonstrate
demonstrate
that she
that she was
was sexually
sexually trafficked
trafficked by
by Jeffrey
Jeffrey Epstein
Epstein and
and Ghislaine
Ghislaine Maxwell
Maxwell to their
to their
powerful friends,
powerful friends, both
both in
in this
this country
country and
and overseas. Indeed, Ms.
overseas. Indeed, Ms. Giuffre
Giuffre continues
continues
to suffer
to suffer severe
severe prejudice
prejudice from
from every
every day
day that
that Ms.
Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell succeeds
succeeds in
in delaying
delaying
that disclosure.
that disclosure.
While Ms.
While Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell is
is arguing
arguing before
before this
this Court
Court for
for extended
extended proceedings
proceedings to
to
evaluate
evaluate disclosure
disclosure of
of documents,
documents, her
her surrogates
surrogates continue
continue to
to attack
attack Ms.
Ms.Giuffre.
Giuffre. For
For
example,
example, four prominent attorneys
four prominent attorneys of
of Ms.
Ms. Maxwell's
Maxwell’sco-conspirator
co-conspirator —
– Jeffrey
Jeffrey
Epstein
Epstein –— recently
recently launched
launched an
an attack
attack on Ms. Giuffre
on Ms. Giuffre (and
(and other
other Epstein
Epstein sexual
sexual
trafficking victims),
trafficking victims), writing
writing in
in aa letter
letter published
published in
in one
one of
of the
the nation’s most widely
nation's most widely
circulated
circulated newspapers
newspapers that
that “[t]he number of
"[t]he number of young
young women
women involved
involved in
in the
the [Epstein]
[Epstein]
investigation has
investigation has been
been vastly
vastly exaggerated,
exaggerated, there
there was
was no
no‘international
'international sex-trafficking
sex-trafficking
operation’ and there

operation' and there was
was never
never evidence
evidence that
that Mr.
Mr. Epstein
Epstein ‘hosted
'hosted sex
sex parties’ at his
parties' at his
home.” See
home." See Letter
Letter to
to the Editor from
the Editor from Kenneth
Kenneth W.
W. Starr,
Starr, Martin
Martin G.
G. Weinberg,
Weinberg, Jack
Jack
77
Goldberger
Goldberger &
& Lilly
Lilly Ann
Ann Sanchez,
Sanchez, N.Y.
N.Y. Times,
Times, March
March 4,
4, 2019. And another
2019. And another of
of Mr.
Mr.
Epstein’s attorney’s, Alan

Epstein's attorney's, Alan Dershowitz,
Dershowitz, has
has attacked
attacked Ms.
Ms. Giuffre,
Giuffre, tweeting
tweeting several
several
days before
days before the
the oral
oral argument
argument in
in this
this Court
Court that
that “My
"My perjuring
perjuring accusers
accusers are
are Virginia
Virginia
Roberts
Roberts [Giuffre]
[Giuffre] and
and Sarah
Sarah Ransomme.
Ransomme. Both
Both have
have long
long records
recordsof
oflying.” Twitter,
lying." Twitter,
@AlanDersh,
@AlanDersh, March
March 2,
2, 2019
2019
While hiding
While hiding behind
behind their
their mansions’ walls, Ms.
mansions' walls, Ms. Maxwell
Maxwell and
and Mr.
Mr. Epstein
Epstein can
can
hire legions
hire legions of
of high-priced
high-priced lawyers
lawyers to
to continue
continue to
to create
create aa smokescreen
smokescreen about
about what
what
really happened,
really happened, hoping
hoping to conceal the
to conceal breadth of
the breadth of their
their criminal
criminal sex
sex trafficking
trafficking
conspiracy. But Ms.

conspiracy. But Ms. Giuffre
Giuffre has
has aa more
more powerful
powerful weapon
weapon in
in her
her arsenal:
arsenal: The truth.
The truth.
The truth
The truth is
is that Ms. Maxwell
that Ms. and Mr.
Maxwell and Mr. Epstein
Epstein sexually
sexually trafficked
trafficked her
her to
to their
their
well-connected friends,
well-connected friends, both
both in
in this
this country
country and
and elsewhere. Unfortunately, critical
elsewhere. Unfortunately, critical
documents and
documents and transcripts
transcripts proving
proving the
the truth
truth of Ms. Giuffre's
of Ms. Giuffre’s allegations
allegations remain
remain
sealed in
sealed in the
the vault
vault of
of the
the U.S.
U.S. District
District Court
Court for
for the
the Southern
Southern District
District of
of New
New York.
York.
It is
It is time
time for
for the
the truth
truth to
to come
come out.
out. The
Theonly
onlyequitable
equitable approach
approach to
to resolving
resolving this
this
dispute is
dispute is for
for all
all of
of those
those documents
documents to
to be
be unsealed,
unsealed, beginning
beginning immediately
immediately with
with the
the
summary judgment
summary judgment materials
materials and
and as
as soon
soon as
as possible
possible thereafter
thereafter all
all of
of the
the others.
others.
88
Ms. Maxwell,
Ms. Maxwell, Mr.
Mr. Epstein,
Epstein, and
and others
others sexually
sexually trafficked
trafficked and
and abused
abused Ms.
Ms.
Giuffre. The public

Giuffre. The public should
should now
now see
see the
the evidence.
evidence.
March 19,
March 19, 2019
2019 Respectfully
Respectfully Submitted,
Submitted,
/s/ Paul
/s/ Paul Cassell
Cassell
PAUL
PAUL G. G. CASSELL
CASSELL
S.J.
S.J. Quinney
Quinney College
College of
of Law
Law
University of
University of Utah
Utah
383 S.
383 S. University
University St.
St.
Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake City, UT
UT 84112
84112
2
(801) 585-52022
(801) 585-5202
BOIES SCHILLER
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER
FLEXNER LLP LLP
Sigrid
Sigrid McCawley
McCawley
Boies Schiller
Boies Schiller Flexner
Flexner LLP
LLP
401 E.
401 E. Las
Las Olas
Olas Blvd.,
Blvd., Suite
Suite 1200
1200
Ft. Lauderdale,
Ft. Lauderdale, FL
FL 33301
33301
(954) 356-0011
(954) 356-0011
2
2 This daytime business address is provided for contact purposes only
only and
and is not intended
to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation.
representation.
99
CERTIFICATE OF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVICE
II HEREBY
HEREBY CERTIFY
CERTIFY that
that on
on March
March 19,
19, 2019,
2019, II electronically
electronically filed
filed the
the
foregoing
foregoing document
document with
with the
the Clerk
Clerk of
of Court
Court by using the
by using the CM/ECF
CM/ECF system.
system. II also
also
certify
certify that the foregoing
that the foregoing document
document isis being
being served
served to
to all parties of
all parties of record
record via
via
transmission of
transmission of the
the Electronic
Electronic Court
Court Filing
Filing System
System generated by CM/ECF.
generated by CM/ECF.
/s/
Is! Paul
Paul Cassell
Cassell
Paul
Paul Cassell
Cassell
10
10
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
ITEM TO
ITEM TO BE
BE REASON FOR
REASON FOR
RECORD CITATION
RECORD CITATION
REDACTED
REDACTED REDACTION
REDACTION
As aa result
As result of
of aa scrivener’s
scrivener's
2017-01-06 Motion
2017-01-06 Motion for
for Summary
Summary
Name of
Name of error,
error, the
the person
person whose
whose name
name
Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit KK,
KK, page
page 59
59
Individual
Individual appears is
appears is not
not the
the person
person toto
(GIUFFRE004192), line
(GIUFFRE004192), 25; 32
line 25; 32
which the writing refers.
which the writing refers.
Ms. Giuffre’s
Ms. School ID
Giuffre's School ID is
is
2017-01-06 Motion
for Summary
Summary
Social
Social Security
Security her social
her social security
security number
number
Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit O, GIUFFRE004981-
Exhibit 0, GIUFFRE004981-
Number
Number and her
and her social
social security
security
GIUFFRE004988, line 33
GIUFFRE004988, line
number is
number is listed.
listed.
2017-01-06 Motion
for Summary
Summary Ms. Giuffre’s
Ms. social security
Giuffre's social security
Social
Social Security
Security
Judgment, Exhibit W, GIUFFRE009201,
Judgment, Exhibit W, GIUFFRE009201, number is listed.
number is listed.
Number
Number
line
line 33
2017-01-06 Motion
for Summary
Summary Ms. Giuffre’s
Ms. social security
Social
Social Security
Security
Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit W, GIUFFRE009209,
W, GIUFFRE009209 card and
card and driver’s license are
driver's license are
' Number
Number
Image
Image shown.
shown.
2017-01-06 Motion
for Summary
Summary
Social
Social Security
Security Ms. Giuffre’s
Ms. Social Security
Giuffre's Social Security
Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit W, GIUFFRE009210,
Exhibit W, GIUFFRE009210,
Number
Number number is
number is listed
listed
Box 22 of
Box of W-4
W-4 Form
Form
2017-01-06 Motion
for Summary
Summary Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit AA,
AA, page
page 260,
260, line
line 18
18 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT Motion
Response IOT Motion for for Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 20,
20, lines
lines 3;
3; 99 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT Motion for for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 20,
20, lines
lines 11;
11; 20;
20; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
21; 23-24
21; 23-24
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 20,
20, lines
lines 27;
27; 2929 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary Judgement, Page 20, lines
Summary Judgement, Page 20, lines 28-29 28-29 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary Judgement, Page 20, line
Summary Judgement, Page 20, line 30 30 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement, Page 21, lines 24; 27
Judgement, Page 21, lines 24; 27 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT Motion for for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 21,
21, lines
lines 34-35;
34-35; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
38
38
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 21,
21, line
line 27
27 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 22,
22, lines
lines 22 Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page 22, line
Page 22, line 33 Individual
1
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 22,
22, line
line 55 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 22,
22, line
line 88 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 23,
23, lines
lines 9-10
9-10 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 23,
23, line10
linel0 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Summary
Summary Judgement,
Judgement, Page
Page 23,
23, line10
linel0 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF Statement of Contested
2017-01-31 PTF Statement of Contested Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Facts and
Facts and Undisputed
Undisputed Facts,
Facts, Page
Page 8, 8, line
line 17
17 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF Statement of Contested
2017-01-31 PTF Statement of Contested Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Facts and
Undisputed Facts,
Facts, Page
Page 8, 8, line
line 17
17 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Statement
Statement of
of Contested
Contested Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Facts and
Undisputed Facts,
Facts, Page
Page 8, 8, line
line 18
18 Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Statement of
of Contested
Contested
Name of
Name of
Facts and
Facts Undisputed Facts,
and Undisputed Facts, Page
Page 10,10, line
line Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
13
13
2017-01-31 PTF
Statement of
of Contested
Contested
Name of
Name of
Facts and Undisputed Facts, Page
Facts and Undisputed Facts, Page 18,18, line
line Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
17
17
2017-01-31 PTF
Statement of
of Contested
Contested
Name of
Name of
Facts and
Page 18,18, line
line Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
17
17
2017-01-31 PTF
Statement of
of Contested
Contested
Name of
Name of
Facts and
Page 18,18, line
line Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
18
18
Name of
Name of
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Declaration,
Declaration, Page
Page 2,
2, line
line 66 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 7,
7, page
page 1,
1, line
line Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
12
12
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit 7, page
Exhibit 7, page 54,
54, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 55,
55, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line 1
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 56,
56, Name of minor
Name minor.
Individual
line
line 11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 57,
57, minor.
Name of minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 11
22
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 7,
7, page
page 57,
57 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line 12
line 12
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 71
71, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 71
71, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 66
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 7, page 71
71, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line 21
line 21
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 11, Name of
Name of victim.
victim.
, Individual
Individual
line
line 35
35
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 1,
1, Address
Address Address of
Address of aa victim.
victim.
lines
lines 36-37
36-37
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 1,
1,
Birth/Age
Birth/Age victim.
victim.
line
line 38
38
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 1,
1, License
License License
License Number
Number of
of victim.
victim.
line
line 39
39
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 1,
1, Phone Number
Phone Number Phone number
Phone number of
of victim.
victim.
line
line 40
40
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 3,
3, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 15
15
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 3,
3, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor
minor.
line
line 16-17
16-17
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 3,
3,
Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line
line 18
18
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 3, 3, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 20
20
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name if
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 3,
3, minor.
Name of minor
Individual
Individual
line 32
line 32
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age or
or
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 3, 3,
Birth./Age
Birth./Age minor.
minor
line
line 35
35
33
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name if
Name if
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 33, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 49
49
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age or
or
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 33,
, Birth./Age
Birth./Age minor child.
minor child.
line 52
line 52
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name if
Name if
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 4,
4 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
' Individual
line
line 17
17
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age or
or
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39, page 4,
39, page 4
' Birth./Age
Birth./Age minor child.
minor child.
line
line 20
20
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 4,
4 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
' Individual
Individual
line
line 34
34
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39, page 4,
39, page 4
' Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor child.
minor child.
line
line 37
37
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 4,
4, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line 51
line 51
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 5,
5,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 66
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 5,
5, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 20
20
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 5,
5,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line 23
line 23
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 5,
5 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 37
37
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 5,
5,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 40
40
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 6 6, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 44
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 6,
6,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 77
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 6,6, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line 22
line 22
4
4
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 6,
6
, Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 25
25
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 6,
6 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 39
39
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 6,
6
, Birth/Age
minor child.
line 42
line 42
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 7,
7 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 66
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 7,
7
, Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 99
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 7,
7 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line 23
line 23
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 7,
7,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line
line 26
26
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 7,
7, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 40
40
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 7,
7,
Birth/Age
minor child.
line 43
line 43
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 8,
8, Name of
Name of victim.
victim.
Individual
Individual
line
line 88
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 8,
8
, Birth/Age
Birth/Age victim.
victim.
line 11
line 11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 8,
8, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 25
25
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 8,
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line
line 28
28
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 8,
8, minor.
Name of minor
Individual
Individual
line 42
line 42
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line
line 45
45
55
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 99
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor
minor.
lines 10-11
lines 10-11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9
, Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line 12
line 12
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Phone Number
Phone Number Phone Number
Phone Number of
of minor.
minor
line
line 14
14
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9 Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
, Individual
Individual
line
line 29
29
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
line
line 30-31
30-31
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9
, Birth/Age
Birth/Age parent of
parent of minor.
minor
line 32
line 32
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 34
34
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 39
39
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
lines 40-41
lines 40-41
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9
, Birth/Age
Birth/Age parent of
parent of minor.
minor
line 42
line 42
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 9,
9, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 44
44
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 19
19
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor
minor.
lines 20-21
lines 20-21
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line 22
line 22
66
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 24
24
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, School
School School
School of
of minor.
minor
line
line 29
29
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Address
Address Address of
Address of school
school of
of minor.
minor
lines 30-31
lines 30-31
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 34
34
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
lines
lines 35-36
35-36
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 39
39
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 44
44
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
lines
lines 45-46
45-46
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
10, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 49
49
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 77
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 8-9
8-9
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11,
Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line
line 10
10
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Driver License
Driver License Driver License
Driver License number
number of
of
Number
Number minor.
minor
line 11
line 11
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, minor.
Name of minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 21-22;
21-22; 27;
27; 34;
34; 36; 47; 49
36; 47; 49
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 11, 11, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
lines
lines 37
37 and
and 39
39
77
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of Name of
Name of two
two parents
parents of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11,
Individual
Individual minors.
minors.
line
line 20;
20; 23;
23; 29-30;
29-30; 32;
32; 35;
35; 37;
37; 40-41;
40-41; 47-48
47-48
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, Date of
Date of Birth
Birth Date of
Date of Birth
Birth of
of minor.
minor
line
line 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
line
line 49
49
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
11, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 49
49
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
12, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of four
four minors.
minors.
line
line 4;6;
4;6; 12;
12; 16;
16; 26;
26; 2931-32;
2931-32; 35;
35; 38-40;
38-40; Individual
Individual
43;47-48
43;47-48
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
12, Name of
Name of Names of
Names of three
three Parents
Parents of
of two
two
lines
lines 4;
4; 8;
8; 11;15;
11;15; 17;
17; 22;
22; 25-26;
25-26; 30;37-38;
30;37-38; Individual
Individual Minors.
Minors.
42; 46-48
42; 46-48
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
13, Name of
Name of
Names of
Names of three
three Minors.
Minors.
line
line 8;
8; 16;
16; 18;
18; 21-22;
21-22; 26;
26; 28-30;
28-30; 31-34;
31-34; 36;
36; Individual
Individual
38;
38; 41;
41; 43;
43; 45;
45; 47
47
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 13, 13, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 39-40
39-40
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
13, Address
Address Address of
Address of parent
parent of
of minor.
minor
line
line 37
37
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
14, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
lines
lines 4;
4; 8-12;
8-12; 15;
15; 17-19;
17-19; 22;
22; 24;
24; 26-28;
26-28; 30;
30; Individual
Individual
33-39;
33-39; 42;
42; 45-48; 50; 52
45-48; 50; 52
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
15, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
lines
lines 4;
4; 6;
6; 8;-9;
8;-9; 11;-13;
11;-13; 15-16;
15-16; 18-19;
18-19; 23;
23; Individual
Individual
25;27;29; 31;
25;27;29; 31; 33-34;
33-34; 36-40;
36-40; 43-45;
43-45; 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
16, Name of
Name of
Names of
Names of four
four minors.
minors.
lines 4-9; 11-13; 15; 17; 20; 23-25; 27-28; Individual
32
32
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
16, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
lines
lines 20; 23-24; 29-30;
20; 23-24; 29-30; 32
32
88
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Response
Response IOTIOT Motion
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
39, page 17 Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 4-6;
4-6; 9-10; 15-16; 21;
9-10; 15-16; 21; 26;
26; 43
43
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 17,
17 Parents of
Parents of two minors.
two minors.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 14;
14; 20;
20; 25;
25; 27-29;
27-29; 38-42;
38-42; 44
44
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
17, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 38
38
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
18, Name of
Name of
Name or
Name or minor
minor.
lines
lines 6-7;
6-7; 11;
11; 14;
14; 16;
16; 34;
34; 36-38;
36-38; 40;
40; 42;
42; 44-
44- Individual
Individual
47; 50-51
47; 50-51
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
18, Name of
Name of Name of
Name of two
two parents
parents of
of
lines
lines 4-5;
4-5; 7;
7; 8-10;
8-10; 12;
12; 14;
14; 16;
16; 18-19;
18-19; 22;
22; 29;
29; Individual
Individual minors.
minors.
32;
32; 34;
34;
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOTIOT Motion for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
19 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 7-13;
7-13; 15-16;
15-16; 19;
19; 21;
21; 25;
25; 27;
27; 38
38
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
19, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 27
27
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
20, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of nine
nine minors.
minors.
line
line 6-7;
6-7; 12;
12; 15-16;
15-16; 20;
20; 24;
24; 26;
26; 27;
27; 30;
30; 41;
41; Individual
Individual
43
43
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of minor
minor and
and
Summary
Summary Judgment,
20, Phone Number
Phone Number
parent of
parent of minor.
minor
line 21;32
line 21;32
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Date of
Date of Date of
Date of Birth
Birth and
and Age
Age of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
20,
Birth/Age
Birth/Age minor.
minor
line
line 30
30
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
20, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
line
line 30-31
30-31
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
21, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines 14; 16; 27; 37
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
21, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 11-12;
11-12; 16;
16; 25-27;
25-27; 30
30
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 22
22, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
, Individual
lines 14; 30
99
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 22
22, Names of
Names of parents
parents of
of minor.
minor
, Individual
Individual
lines
lines 14; 16; 29;
14; 16; 29; 31
31
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 24,
24 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 22-23; 25; 30;
22-23; 25; 30; 33
33
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
24, Phone Number
Phone Number Phone numbers
Phone numbers of
of minors.
minors.
lines
lines 23;
23; 30-31;
30-31; 33;
33; 35
35
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
28, Name of
Name of five
five minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 43-44
43-44
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
29 Name of
Name of five
five minors.
minors.
, Individual
Individual
lines
lines 5-6;27-28;
5-6;27-28; 42;
42; 44;
44; 46-47; 49; 51
46-47; 49; 51
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
29, Date of
Date of Birth
Birth Date of
Date of Birth
Birth of
of minors.
minors.
lines
lines 27-28;
27-28; 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
29 Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
, Individual
Individual
line 43
line 43
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
29, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor
minor.
line 41
line 41
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
30, Name of
Name of
Names of
Names of four
four minors.
minors.
lines
lines 6;
6; 12;
12; 14-17;
14-17; 22;
22; 24;
24; 27-29;
27-29; 31;
31; 36;
36; Individual
Individual
39-47; 50
39-47; 50
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 30 30, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
, Individual
line
line 10
10
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
30, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 14-15;
14-15; 27
27
2017-01-31 PTF
for
Name of
Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 5-8;
5-8; 11-12; 14-16; 40
11-12; 14-16; 40
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT IOT Motion
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 32
32, Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
, Individual
Individual
line
line 37
37
Summary
Summary Judgment,
34, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
lines 11; 17; 25; 27; 30; 34; 39; 40; 43-45; Individual
Individual
47-48
47-48
10
10
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
34, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 17
17
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
35, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of four
four minors.
minors.
lines
lines 4;
4; 7;
7; 12-16;
12-16; 21;23;27;
21;23;27; 30-31;
30-31; 33;
33; Individual
Individual
35;37-38;
35;37-38; 40;40; 44;
44; 46;
46; 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
35, Address
Address Address of
Address of minors.
minors.
line
line 12-15
12-15
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
35, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 77
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
36, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
lines
lines 8;10;
8;10; 12;
12; 14;
14; 15-16;
15-16; 18;
18; 21-23;
21-23; 25-28;
25-28; Individual
Individual
31-32;
31-32; 37; 39; 42;
37; 39; 42; 45;
45; 47;
47; 52-53
52-53
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
36, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 16
16
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
36, Parent of
Parent of minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines 17; 21
lines 17; 21
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
37, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
lines
lines 4-6;
4-6; 8-10;
8-10; 12;
12; 14-16;
14-16; 18-20;
18-20; 22-23;
22-23; Individual
Individual
32-33;
32-33; 35;
35; 37-38;
37-38; 40-43;
40-43; 45;
45; 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
38, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
lines
lines 4;
4; 6;
6; 8;
8; 10;
10; 13;
13; 16;
16; 18-19;
18-19; 25;
25; 27-
27- Individual
Individual
28;32; 37-38;
28;32; 37-38; 40;
40; 42;
42; 44
44
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
38, Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 49
49
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Phone number
Phone number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
38, Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 50
50
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
39, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
lines
lines 8;
8; 10-13;
10-13; 16;
16; 18-19;
18-19; 21;
21; 24;
24; 28-29;
28-29; 31;
31; Individual
Individual
33-34;
33-34; 36;
36; 39;
39; 41;
41; 46-47;
46-47; 49-50
49-50
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
40, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
lines
lines 6-7;
6-7; 10-11;
10-11; 13-14;
13-14; 16-17;
16-17; 20;
20; 22;
22; 24;
24; Individual
Individual
28; 30-31;
28; 30-31; 33;
33; 37-38;
37-38; 41;
41; 45;
45; 47;
47; 50
50
11
11
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
40, Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines 10-11
lines 10-11
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
41, Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
lines
lines 4-7;
4-7; 9;
9; 12;
12; 15;
15; 19-22;
19-22; 24;
24; 27;
27; 29;
29; 32;
32; Individual
Individual
34-35;
34-35; 37;
37; 39-41;
39-41; 46; 48-50
46; 48-50
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 42
42, Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
, Individual
Individual
lines
lines 6-7;
6-7; 9;
9; 11;
11; 21-23;
21-23; 25-26;
25-26; 29-30;
29-30; 32;
32; 3737
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
39, page 44 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
, Individual
Individual
lines
lines 6-7
6-7
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 46,
46 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 26;
26; 29; 33; 34;
29; 33; 34; 39;
39; 43;
43; 44.
44.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
46, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 29.
29.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
46, Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
lines
lines 38-39;
38-39; 41–42; 43.
41-42; 43.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
47, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines 4;27
4;27
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
47, Name of
Name of
Names of
Names of two
two minors.
minors.
lines
lines 7;8;11;14;16;
7;8;11;14;16; 19;
19; 22;
22; 25;
25; 28;
28; 29;
29; 30;
30; Individual
Individual
34; 35.
34; 35.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
47, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 9;
9; 10; 12; 26.
10; 12; 26.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39,
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 47, page 47, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 42;
42; 45;
45; 47;
47; 48;
48; 50.
50.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOTIOT
Name of
Name of
Motion for
Motion for Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 48,
48, lines
lines 4;
4; 11;
11; 15;
15; 19.
19.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 48,
48 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 6-7.
6-7.
2017-01-31 PTF
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
48, Names of
Names of four
four minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 27-28;
27-28; 31;
31; 37; 42; 44;
37; 42; 44; 49;50.
49;50.
12
12
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 48,
48 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
line
line 42.
42.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
49 Names of
Names of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 4;
4; 5;
5; 8;
8; 15; 16; 18.
15; 16; 18.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
49, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 17.
17.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
49 Names of
Names of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 26;
26; 27;
27; 32; 35; 41;
32; 35; 41; 43;47;
43;47; 49.
49.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
49, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 34;
34; 37; 40; 47.
37; 40; 47.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
50 Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
, Individual
lines
lines 6;
6; 9;
9; 12;
12; 15;
15; 17; 21; 23;
17; 21; 23; 24.
24.
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT
Response IOT
Name of
Name of
Motion for
Motion for Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 50;
50; lines 26-27.
lines 26-27.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 50;
50; Names of
Names of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 38;
38; 40;
40; 43;
43; 45;
45; 47.
47.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 51;
51; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 31-32.
31-32.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 51;
51; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 32-33;
32-33; 36-7;
36-7; 39;
39; 45; 46; 48.
45; 46; 48.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 52;
52; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
lines
lines 4;
4; 5;
5; 7;
7; 10;
10; 13;
13; 14;
14; 16;
16; 19-20;
19-20; 26;
26; 27;
27; Individual
Individual
28; 34;
28; 34; 35.
35.
2017-01-31 PTF
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT
Response IOT
Name of
Name of
Motion for Summary Judgment,
Motion for Summary Judgment, Name of
Name of victim.
victim.
Individual
Individual
Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 52;
52; lines
lines 37; 39.
37; 39.
2017-01-31 PTF Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 52;
52; Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
line
line 38.
38.
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 54;
54; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines 4-5.
13
13
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 54;
54; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of two
two minors
minors
lines
lines 5;
5; 18;
18; 20-21;
20-21; 23-25;
23-25; 28;
28; 31;
31; 33-37;
33-37; 41-
41- Individual
Individual
42; 44;
42; 44; 47-49;
47-49; 52
52
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 54;
54; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 7;
7; 12;
12; 14;
14; 16
16
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 55;
55; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4;
4; 20
20
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 55;
55; Name of
Name of victim.
victim.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 38-40; 42-43; 48.
38-40; 42-43; 48.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 56;
56; Name of
Name of victim.
victim.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 5;
5; 12; 16; 17;
12; 16; 17; 21;
21; 23;
23; 27;
27; 29.
29.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 59;
59; Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
line
line 30; 33; 42
30; 33; 42
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 59;
59; Parent of
Parent of minor
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 42-43;
42-43; 48.
48.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 59;
59; Address
Address Addresses of
Addresses of three
three minors.
minors.
lines
lines 33;
33; 42; 44; 47.
42; 44; 47.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 59;
59; Phone Number
Phone number of
of minor
minor.
lines
lines 40-41.
40-41.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 60; 60; Parents of
Parents of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4;
4; 15;
15; 18
18
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 60;
60; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minors.
minors.
lines
lines 5-6;
5-6; 10;
10; 14-16;
14-16; 17;
17; 22;
22; 24;
24; 27-31;
27-31; 38;
38; Individual
Individual
46; 48;
46; 48; 51.
51.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 61;
61; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
lines
lines 4-5;
4-5; 9-10;
9-10; 12;
12; 14;
14; 16;
16; 18-19;
18-19; 21;
21; 23;
23; Individual
Individual
25; 31; 32; 36; 41; 44.
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 64;
64; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line 42
line 42
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Exhibit 39, page 65;
65. Name of
Name of nine
nine minors.
minors.
' Individual
lines 22-23; 33-35; 45-46
14
14
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 65;
65; Phone Number
Phone Number Phone numbers
Phone numbers of
of minors.
minors.
lines
lines 38;
38; 46
46
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 66;
66. Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
' Individual
Individual
lines
lines 5;
5; 6;
6; 8;
8; 14;
14; 24;
24; 29
29
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 66;
66; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
line
line 15
15
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 67; 67; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of five
five minors.
minors.
lines
lines 16;
16; 8;
8; 12;
12; 16;
16; 21;
21; 28-29;
28-29; 34-35;
34-35; 37-39;
37-39; Individual
Individual
44
44
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
70. Name of
Name of minor
minor.
' Individual
Individual
line
line 25
25
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 70;
70; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 25-26; 31-32; 35
25-26; 31-32; 35
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 72;
72; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 44;
44; 46
46
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 73;
73; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 14;
14; 17; 19; 27;
17; 19; 27; 30-
30- 37;
37; 41;
41; 52
52
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
39, page 74. Name of
Name of four
four minors.
minors.
' Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4;
4; 9;
9; 12
12 21-22;
21-22; 25;
25; 29;
29; 31;
31; 35;
35; 37-38
37-38
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
39, page 74. Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
' Individual
Individual
line
line 29
29
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Phone Number
Phone Number of
of parent
parent of
of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 75;
75; Phone Number
Phone Number
minor.
minor
line
line 28
28
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 75;
75; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
line19-21
line19-21
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 75;
75; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 18
18
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 76;
76; minor.
Parent of minor
Individual
line
line 30
30
15
15
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 76;
76; Date of
Date of Birth
Birth Date of
Date of Birth
Birth of
of minor.
minor
line
line 34
34
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 76;
76; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 34-35
34-35
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 76;
76; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 31;
31; 33-35;
33-35; 46
46
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 76;
76; Social
Social Media
Media Name of
Name of minor
minor social
social media.
media.
lines
lines 36
36
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 77;
77; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of minor
minor.
lines
lines 8;
8; 11;
11; 12;
12; 14-16;
14-16; 19;
19; 22;
22; 24;
24; 27;
27; 30;
30; Individual
Individual
32;
32; 37;
37; 40;
40; 45-47
45-47
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 77;
77; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 7-8
7-8
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 78;
78. Name of
Name of minor
minor.
' Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4-5;
4-5; 7;
7; 9;
9; 11;
11; 13-17
13-17
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 78;
78; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line
line 19
19
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 79;
79; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
line
line 45
45
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 80; 80; Name of
Name of victims.
victims.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 21; 23; 49;
21; 23; 49; 51
51
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 80;
80; Phone Number
Phone number of
of victim.
victim.
line 22
line 22
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit 39, page 80; 80; Address
Address Address of
Address of victims.
victims.
lines
lines 23;
23; 49-50
49-50
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 81;
81; Name of
Name of minor
minor.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4;
4; 10; 12-13; 16;
10; 12-13; 16; 22
22
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 82;
82; Name of
Name of
Name of
Name of four
four minors.
minors.
lines 4-6; 8; 12-13; 15-16; 18-19; 22; 24-26; Individual
29; 31;
29; 31; 48
48
16
16
MOTION FOR
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT REDACTIONS
REDACTIONS
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 82;
82; Address
Address Address of
Address of minor.
minor
lines
lines 4-5
4-5
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 83;
83; Name of
Name of five
five minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 4-6;
4-6; 8-9;
8-9; 11;
11; 13;
13; 17;
17; 19-20;
19-20; 23;
23; 48
48
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 83;
83; Date of
Date of Birth
Birth Date of
Date of Birth
Birth of
of minor.
minor
line
line 18
18
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 84;
84; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 16-17
16-17
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 86;
86; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 6-7;
6-7; 10; 17; 19;
10; 17; 19; 22
22
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 86;
86; Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 28-29; 35
28-29; 35
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 87;
87; Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
lines
lines 5-6;
5-6; 8; 11; 20;
8; 11; 20; 41
41
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name if
Name if
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit
Exhibit 39,
39, page
page 87;
87; Parent of
Parent of minor.
minor
Individual
Individual
line 41
line 41
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, page
page 18;
18; line14
linel4 Name of
Name of two
two minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
[picture snippet]
[picture snippet]
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for
Name of
Name of
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, page
page 18;
18; line1 [picture
linel [picture Name of
Name of three
three minors.
minors.
Individual
Individual
snippet]
snippet]
Ms. Giuffre’s
Ms. social security
2017-01-31 PTF
Response IOT for
Motion for Social
Social Security
Security
card and
card and driver’s license are
driver's license are
Summary
Summary Judgment,
Judgment, Exhibit 51, Image
Exhibit 51, Image Number
Number
shown.
shown.
17
17
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
Short Title: Guiffre v. Maxwell Docket No.:_1_8 -_2_86_8_ _ _ _ _ __
Lead Cou nsel of Record (name/firm) or Prose Party (name),...:.K..:.:ec:..rr_ie'----"-

L'-.C
-=-a::.c.mc:=.p. :. be.:cl-'--1_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
KCampbell-Law, PLLC, 1629 K St., NW, Washington, DC 20006
Appearance for (party/designation): J. Doe, Non-Party Limited Intervenor,
DOCKET SHEET ACKNOWLEDGMENT/AMENDMENTS

Caption as indicated is:
0) Correct
0 Incorrect. See attached caption page with corrections.
Appellate Designation is:

0 Correct
0 Incorrect. The following parties do not wish to participate in this appeal:
Parties:
0 Incorrect. Please change the following parties' designations:
~ Correct Designation
Contact Information for Lead Coun sel/Pro Se Party is:

0 Correct
0 Incorrect or Incomplete. A5 an e-filer, I h ave updated my contact information in the PACER "Manage My Account" screen.
Name: Kerrie L. Campbell

Firm: KCampbell-Law, PLLC
Add ress: 1629 K St., NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: 202.681 .5432 Fax: 202.318.4450
Em ail: kcampbell@kcamlaw.com
RELATED CASES
0 This case has n ot been before tl1is Court p reviously.

0 This case has been before this Court previously. The short title, docket number, and citation are:_ __ __ __ _
0 Matters re lated to this appeal or involving the same issue have been or presently are before this Court. The short titles,
docket n u mbers, and citatio ns are: Giuffre v. Maxwell, Docket No. 16-3945
CERTIFICATION
I certify that 0 I am admitted to practice in this Court and, if r equired by LR 46. l(a)(2), have renewed my admission on
_ __ __ _ _ _ _ OR that O I applied for adm i sion o n,_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _or renewal on
_ _ _ _ _ __ _ . If the Cou rt h as not yettaJ~ ~ - y renewal, I have completed Addendum A
Sign ature of Lead Counsel of Record=- -- - ~ t"'l!~~ic..!!~.L.4~~~~---~"::::_____________
Type or Print Name:._K_e_r_rie.:.....=Lc....-=C-=a::..:m-'-'-p'-"bc...:e-"ll_ _ _ ____,>c---1- --'l-- -f--- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - -
OR
Signature of prose litigant: - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
Type or Print Name:_ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ __
0 I am a pro se litigant who is n ot an attorney.
0 I am an incarcerated pro se litigant.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant,
v. No. 18-2868
SHARON CHURCHER, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,

Respondents,
JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD MEDIA
COMPANY,
Appellee Maxwell’s Response to Order to Show Cause

Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, through her attorneys Haddon, Morgan and
Foreman, P.C., submits this Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause
(“OTSC”).
I. Objections to the Order to Show Cause.

For the reasons stated in Ms. Maxwell’s Motion to Reconsider and Vacate
the Court’s Order to Show Cause and March 13 Order to Produce Sealed
Materials, we respectfully object to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Motion to
Reconsider”). In the event the Court finds on the merits that the district court
abused its discretion in sealing or redacting summary judgment materials, the
appropriate procedure is to remand the case and direct the court to exercise its
sound discretion whether to seal or redact the materials “in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances of the particular case,” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978).
II. General objections to unsealing of summary judgment materials.

As an initial matter, it is essential that the Giuffre v. Maxwell parties, i.e.,
Ms. Giuffre and Ms. Maxwell, understand precisely the scope of the OTSC. As we
noted in the Motion to Reconsider, the scope is not clear because of the different
references to summary judgment “materials.” See Mot. to Reconsider, at 18 n.4.
For purposes of this Response, we assume the Court is referring to the summary
judgment motion, response, reply, and all the documents and information
1
submitted in support of and opposition to the summary judgment motion
(collectively “summary judgment materials” or “materials”). And we assume the
Court via the OTSC is notifying the Giuffre v. Maxwell parties (“parties”) that they
may object to the Court’s public disclosure of any sealed or redacted summary
judgment materials. The OTSC is, however, incomplete because the dozens of
individuals who relied on the Protective Order had no notice of the Order and have
had no opportunity to respond.
We interpose the following general objections:
1. All sealed and redacted summary judgment materials should remain
sealed and redacted with the exception of materials that also are in the public
domain.
2. We respectfully object to this Court’s substitution of its discretion for
that of the district court in deciding whether to unseal and unredact the summary
judgment materials and in deciding the extent to which, if at all, the Protective
Order or the order disclosing materials should be narrowly tailored to protect the
compelling interests of Ms. Maxwell and non-parties whose information is
contained or referenced in the materials. The issues implicated by the decision to
unseal and unredact the materials is complex and requires familiarity with, among
other things, the district court’s prior oral and written rulings, the parties’
arguments and representations, the statements by non-parties and their counsel, the
2
interrelationship between and among factual allegations contained in the materials.
We incorporate here by reference the Motion for Reconsideration.
3. We object to the disclosure of any materials or statements therein that
did not constitute, reflect or result in any judicial action or that the district court did
not rely on, including (a) materials that were irrelevant or otherwise were not
competent/admissible evidence under the rules of evidence and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, and (b) allegations not evidentially supported as required under
Rule 56.
4. We object to the disclosure of any materials submitted to the district
court, and any related factual allegation, without any valid Rule 56 purpose. This
includes materials Ms. Giuffre’s counsel submitted with the sole intention that they
eventually would be revealed to the public to advance her non-Rule 56-related
ulterior purposes, including the purpose of gaining publicity and notoriety and
creating an environment in which she could continue to profit from her allegations.
5. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were inadmissible
under the rules of evidence and were the subject of multiple pending and later-filed
motions to exclude their use. Virtually all of the exhibits attached to the Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Response were subject to significant in limine motions and
were inadmissible for any legitimate evidentiary purpose. These objections are
incorporated by reference.
3
6. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were provided by
parties or non-parties pursuant to the Protective Order (Jt. App. 131-36) and the
district court’s decisions concerning the Protective Order (collectively, “Protective
Order”), pursuant to assurances or representations by the parties’ counsel that these
materials would be subject to the Protective Order, or pursuant to the parties’ and
non-parties’ reliance on the Protective Order to maintain the secrecy and
confidentiality of the materials. These non-parties include numerous individuals
(many public figures) falsely accused by Ms. Giuffre, witnesses who discredit her
claims, employees of businesses, and family members and friends of Ms. Giuffre.
7. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were provided by non-
parties under the circumstances set forth in Objection No. 6 who have not been
given notice of or an opportunity to participate in litigation in this Court on
whether sealed and redacted materials should be unsealed and unredacted and
disclosed to the public.
8. We object to the unredaction of statements by Ms. Giuffre’s counsel
referring to and misrepresenting the content of sealed and/or redacted materials.
9. We object to the unredaction and circulation of Ms. Giuffre’s numerous
defamatory claims under the cloak of a “litigation” or “judicial privilege,” thereby
de facto immunizing the statements and insulating them from tort liability.
4
III. Specific objections to unsealing of summary judgment materials.

ASSOCIATED
PENDING
OBJECTION
DOCKET EXHIBIT OBJECTIONS/
# # PLEADINGS
in Giuffre v.
Maxwell
Proposed redactions to Def. Statement of Undisputed
537
Facts: Numbered paragraphs 11-17, 35, 37-52
Proposed redactions: Numbered paragraphs 11-17, 35, 37-
541
52; Section 6(A) (pp. 40 et seq.); Section 6(E) (pp. 56-68)
Document titles redacted consistent with Appellee’s
542
objections herein
Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
542-4 D Florida Order
portions stricken by Judge Marra
I Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court; 3rd
ECF 566 at 6-7,
L Party Confidentiality; repeats previously unpublicized
826 at 6-7;
defamatory hearsay from Plaintiff
M Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
Party Confidentiality (some represented, no notice of
N proceedings); contains defamatory statements about
previously undisclosed 3rd parties accused of sex
trafficking; repeats material stricken by Judge Marra
O Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
ECF 566 at 32-
Party Confidentiality (unrepresented); inadmissible
P 39; 633 at 4;
evidence contained within transcript; repeats defamatory
826 at 32-39
hearsay from Plaintiff
Q Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
R Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;

S numerous non-parties' employment records; counsel not
given notice of these proceedings
Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court; 3rd ECF 566 at 57;
T Party Confidentiality (unrepresented); inadmissible 633 at 12; 826 at
evidence contained within transcript 57
5

U contains proprietary employee handbook; counsel not
V Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
W contains proprietary employee information; counsel not
given notice of proceedings
X Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
Y Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
Z Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
AA Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court

BB
Party Confidentiality (counsel)
CC
Party Confidentiality (counsel)
EE Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
FF Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court

ECF 677, 693,
GG 566 at 49; 633 at
Party Confidentiality; Inadmissible, Motions in Limine
11; 826 at 49
HH Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
Deposition taken in another matter (Maxwell did not
participate or cross-examine); 3rd Party Confidentiality
II (some represented by counsel, no notice of proceedings);
contains defamatory accusations re previously
undisclosed 3rd parties; repeats material stricken by
Marra
Deposition taken in another matter (Maxwell did not
participate or cross-examine); 3rd Party Confidentiality
JJ
(some represented by counsel, no notice); contains
defamatory accusations re previously undisclosed 3rd
parties; repeats material stricken by Judge Marra
6

Party Confidentiality; contains defamatory statements
KK
about previously undisclosed 3rd parties accusing of sex
trafficking; repeats material stricken by Judge Marra
542-9 MM Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
Proposed redactions: pp. 1-27 up to III (not addressing
any summary judgment issues); p. 44 (“for example”
586 through end of paragraph); p. 48-49 (to end of section); p.
53-54 (last paragraph continued to next page); p. 56 (“In
sum” thru 57 1st paragraph); p.57-67 (Sections 8(A)-(F))
Proposed redactions: Statement of Undisputed Facts
paragraphs 11-17 and 35-52; all of “Plaintiff’s Undisputed
586-1 Facts,” paragraphs 55-74 (p. 62-65) (nothing in rules
permits non-movant to submit undisputed facts)

586-2
objections herein
ECF 566 at 2,
586-3 1 633 at 2, and
Party Confidentiality (unrepresented, no notice)
826 at 2
ECF 566 at 6-7,
2 Party Confidentiality; repeats previously unpublicized
826 at 6-7;
defamatory hearsay from Plaintiff; inadmissible hearsay
3 Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice). The ECF 567 at 5
transcript was inadmissible and not relied on by the Court.
Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court; 3rd ECF 566 at 32-
4 Party Confidentiality (unrepresented, no notice); 39; 633 at 4;
inadmissible evidence; defamatory hearsay from Plaintiff 826 at 32-39
5 Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;
7 Party Confidentiality (represented). The transcript is 566 at 44, 833 at
inadmissible 44;
8 Party Confidentiality (represented). The transcript is ECF 673, 674-1
inadmissible
9 Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court

10 Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice of these ECF 673, 674-1
proceedings). The transcript is inadmissible
7

11
Party Confidentiality; Right to Privacy
12 ECF 566
Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice)
13 Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice). The ECF 677, 678
testimony is inadmissible and not relied on by Court
ECF 566, 693,
14 Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice). The
694, 694-1
testimony is inadmissible.
15 Party Confidentiality (represented by Counsel, no notice). ECF 566
The testimony is inadmissible and not relied on by Court
Party Confidentiality (represented by counsel, no notice); ECF 566 at 64-
16
Right to privacy; Transcript contains inadmissible 65; 826 at 64-65
evidence
17 Party Confidentiality (unrepresented, no notice); 633 at 12; 826 at
inadmissible evidence contained within transcript 57
Not a judicial document; Deposition taken in another
18 case, Maxwell did not participate or cross exam. The ECF 566
testimony is inadmissible and was not relied on by Court
Not a judicial document; Deposition taken in unrelated
19 case, Maxwell did not participate or cross exam); The ECF 567
20 case, Maxwell did not participate or cross exam) The ECF 567
21 case, Maxwell did not participate or cross exam; The ECF 567, 646
Not a Judicial Document; Attorney Client Privilege. The
22
document was not relied on by the Court
Not a judicial document; the document is an inadmissible

23 ECF 524, 525-1
opinion, FRE 702, not relied on by the Court
Not a judicial document; This document is inadmissible, ECF 528, 786,
24
FRE 702, and was not relied on by the Court 787, 788
27
FERPA protected
8
Not a judicial document; The compilation document is

28 ECF 677
inadmissible and was not relied on by the Court
Not a judicial document; This document is inadmissible

29 ECF 679, 680
and was not relied on by the Court

30 ECF 681
31 ECF 667, 783
32 hearsay without foundation and was not relied on by ECF 677, 693
Court
Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court; repeats

38
defamatory hearsay of Plaintiff

Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court; The
40 document is inadmissible and was not relied on by the ECF 677
Court
Party Confidentiality (represented, no notice of these
41
proceedings). The document was not relied on by the
Court
43 Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court

44
Inadmissible
Not a judicial document; The document is inadmissible
45 ECF 677
9

47 contains proprietary employee information; counsel not
given notice of proceedings
49 numerous non-parties' employment records; counsel not
50 Florida Order
stricken by Judge Marra;

Proposed redactions: p. 26, last paragraph thru end of p.
620
27; p. 28 last paragraph thru conclusion on top of p. 29
620-1 Proposed redactions: numbered paragraphs 11-17, 35-52

621
objections herein
621-1 NN Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court
621-2 OO Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;

Party Confidentiality (some represented by counsel, no
621-3 PP notice); contains defamatory statements re previously
undisclosed 3rd parties accused of sex trafficking; repeats
material stricken by Judge Marra
621-4 QQ Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;

Party Confidentiality (some represented by counsel, no
621-5 RR notice); contains defamatory statements about previously
undisclosed 3rd parties accusing of sex trafficking;
repeats material stricken by Judge Marra
Proposed Redactions: Statement of Undisputed Facts 11-

872
17 and 35-52
10
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
tgee@hmflaw.com; lmenninger@hmflaw.com;
amueller@hmflaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell
11
Certificate of Service
I certify that on March 19, 2019, I served via CM/ECF a copy of this
Appellee Maxwell’s Response to Order to Show Cause on the following persons:
The Hon. Robert W. Sweet Paul G. Cassell

District Judge (cassellp@law.utah.edu)
United States District Court for the Sigrid S. McCawley
Southern District of New York (smccawley@bsfllp.com)
(via United States mail)
Christine N. Walz Andrew G. Celli
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) (acelli@ecbalaw.com)
Madelaine J. Harrington David Lebowitz
(madelaine.harrington@hklaw.com) (dlebowitz@ecbalaw.com)
Sanford L. Bohrer
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com) Jay M. Wolman
(jmw@randazza.com)
s/ Nicole Simmons
12
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL
Short Title: Giuffre v. Maxwell _____ Docket No.: 18-2868 ________
Substitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:
Name: Paul M. Krieger
Firm: Krieger Kim & Lewin LLP
Address: 500 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
Telephone: (212) 390-9550

___________________________ Fax: (212) 390-9550
E-mail: paul.krieger@KKLllp.com
Appearance for: Amicus Curiae John Doe

(party/designation)
Select One:
G Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )
(name/firm)
G Substitute counsel (replacing other counsel: _______ )

(name/firm)
G Additional counsel (co-counsel with: )

(name/firm)
G Amicus (in support of: Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell

✔ )
(party/designation)
CERTIFICATION
I certify that:
✔
G I am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed
my admission on 01/29/2015 OR
G I applied for admission on .
Signature of Counsel: /s/ Paul M. Krieger
Type or Print Name: Paul M. Krieger

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Thurgood MarsbaU U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500
MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT
Docket Numbe r(s ): _1_8_-2_8_6_

8 _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ Caption [ use short titlej
Motion ror: Leave for Non-Party Seeking
Limited Intervention to File Unredacted Motions
Ex Parte, Under Seal, for in camera Review
Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:
Leave to file unredacted motions seeking (1) limited

Giuffre v. Maxwell
intervention to lodge objections/show good cause why
specific summary judgment material should remain
sealed/be redacted; and (2) leave to use pseudonym,
for in camera review, pending review of the district
court's sealing orders and this Court's further direction.
MOVING PARTY: J. Doe, Non-Party Limited Intervenor OPPOSING PARTY: Virginia Giuffre, Plaintiff-Appellee
□Plaintiff □Defendant
D A ppellant/Petitioner D ppellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: Kerrie L. Campbell OPPOSING ATTORNEY: Sigrid Mccawley

- ~ -----'--- -- - - - - -
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]
KCampbell-Law, PLLC BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
1629 K St. , NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006 401 E. Las Olas Blvd. Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL, 33301
202.681-5432; kcampbell@kcamlaw.com 954 377 4223; smccawley@bsfllp.com

- - - -- - - - - ' - --='----- - - - - -
Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J.)
Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND
lNJlJCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notifiedr--2IlP°sing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1 ): Has this request for relief been made below? U es O No
0 Yes LJNo(explain):_ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
Has this relief been previously sought in this court? D es []No
Requested return date and explanation of emergency:
Opposing counsel's position on motion:

[]unopposed 0 opposed0 Don'tKnow
Does oppo~ counsel intend ,Kl:,file a response:
LJYes 0 No ~on't Know
Is oral argument on motion requested? 0 Yes ~ o (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set? 0 ves 0 No If yes, enter date.:_M h_6_, _2 _019
_a_r_c_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Signature of Moving Attorney:
_K_e_r_ri_e_L_._C_a_m_,_p_b_e_ll _ __ Date:03.19.19 Service by: 0 cM/ECF* D Other [Attach proof of service)

*Motion Information Statement only; Motions to be filed ex parte
with Court, under seal, for in camera review
Form T-1080 (rev.12-13)

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500
Docket Number(s): _1_8_-2

_8_6_8____________ Caption [use short title1
Motion for. Limited Intervention

by Non-Party J. Doe

Non-party movant seeks leave to intervene for the limited
Giuffre v. Maxwell
purpose of lodging objections and demonstrating good cause
why specific content pertaining to Doe in materials subject
to district court sealing orders and this Court's March 11, 2019
Order to Show Cause [DE 138] should remain sealed or be
redacted to protect Doe's compelling privacy interests.
MOVING PARTY: J . Doe, Non-Party Limited Intervenor OPPOSING PARTY: Virginia Giuffre, Plaintiff-Appellee
□Plaintiff O nefendant
□Appellant/Petitioner D ppellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: Kerrie L. Campbell o PPos1NG ATTORNEY: Sigrid Mccawley

[name of attorney, with fnm, address, phone number and e-maiij
1629 K St., NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006 401 Las Olas Blvd. Suite 1200, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
202.681-5432; kcampbell@kcamlaw.com 954.337.4223; smccawley@bsfllp.com
- - - -- -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J.)
Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, M OTIONS FOR STAYS AND
INJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notified~sing counsel (require d by Local Rule 27.1): Has t his request for relief been made below? U es O No
0 Yes LJNo(explain):_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Has this relief been previously sm1ght in this court? U es D o
Opposing p.2-,
unsel's position on motion:
LJUnopposed 0 opposed0 Don' tKnow
Does oppo~ counsel intend .mJtle a response:
LJYes Q No ~ Don'tKnow
l s oral argument on motion requested? Dyes _0No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set? _0ves 0 _a_ r_c_h_6_,_2_0_1_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
No If yes, enter date.:_M
Signature ofMoving Attorney:
_/s_/_K_e_rr_ie_L._C_a_m~p~b_e_ll_ _ Date: 03. 19. 19 Service by: ~ CM/Ee/ 0

Other [Attach proof of service)
*Motion Information Statement only; Motions to be filed ex parte w ith
Court, under seal, for in camera review
Form T-1080 (rev. 12-13)

Case 18-2868, Document 153-1, 03/19/2019, 2521600, Page1 of 6
18-2868
Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellee Maxwell's Objections to The Court's
March 11, 2019 Order to Show Cause
Amicus respectfully requests leave to file the

Giuffre v. Maxwell
attached amicus brief.
Amicus Curiae John Doe N/A
Nicholas Lewin N/A
Krieger Kim and Lewin LLP, 500 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
New York, New York 10110
212-390-9550
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York - Judge Robert W. Sweet
✔ N/A
✔
✔
/s/ Nicholas Lewin 3/19/2019 ✔

18-2868
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

Plaintiff-Appellee,
---against---
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
(Caption continued on inside cover)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MOTION OF JOHN DOE FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MAXWELL’S OBJECTIONS TO
THE COURT’S MARCH 11, 2019 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
KRIEGER KIM & LEWIN LLP
500 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
Tel.: (212) 390-9550
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae John Doe

---against---

Respondents,
JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD MEDIA COMPANY,

Intervenors-Appellants.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(3) and Second Circuit
Local Rule 29.1(b), John Doe respectfully requests leave of this Court to file the
attached brief as amicus curiae in support of Defendant-Appellee Maxwell’s
(“Maxwell”) objections to this Court’s March 11, 2019 Order to Show Cause (the
“Order to Show Cause”). The Order to Show Cause directs the parties to show cause
why the underlying summary judgment motion, any materials filed in connection
with that motion, and the District Court’s decision (collectively the “Summary
Judgment Materials”) should not be unsealed.
Amicus is not a party and is not otherwise affiliated or associated with a party
to the underlying litigation.1 Amicus was not a participant in, or otherwise privy to,
what the District Court describes as “vigorous litigation” and a “lengthy and
tumultuous discovery process.” R-953, at 4. Similarly, Amicus is not, and has never
been, a party in any judicial proceeding involving Maxwell, involving Plaintiff-
Appellee Giuffre (“Giuffre”), or otherwise relating to Giuffre’s allegation that
Respondent Epstein (“Epstein”) sexually abused her. Nor is Amicus aware of any
legal proceeding or law enforcement reports in which Giuffre identified Amicus as
a co-conspirator of Epstein or a person with whom she had sexual relations.
1
Pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Second Circuit Local
Rule 29.1(b), the undersigned counsel states: (a) that no party’s counsel authored this brief in
whole or in part; (b) that no party or his/her counsel contributed money that was intended to fund
the preparation and submission of this filing; and (c) no person, other than Amicus, contributed
money that was intended for the preparation or submission of this brief.
The proposed brief supports the objections of Maxwell insofar as she objects
to the unsealing of the Summary Judgment Materials until appropriate protections
are imposed (specifically, the redactions of names and personal identifying
information) to protect third persons whose privacy and reputations may be
jeopardized by the release and publication of unadjudicated allegations. The release
of unredacted Summary Judgment Materials may well substantially infringe the
privacy and reputational interests of many third persons, potentially including
Amicus, who have never been charged with a crime, have never been subject to civil
proceedings, and have never been publicly identified by Giuffre.
Amicus seeks to file the proposed brief as “John Doe” due to the
aforementioned third-party privacy concerns. Raising these concerns as a “John
Doe” amicus is appropriate under these circumstances – indeed, it is the only viable
option for Amicus to seek protection of these interests. To proceed otherwise would
be to forfeit the very privacy rights which are the object of the attached brief. See
United States v. Silver, No. 15 Cr. 93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *2 & *2 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (allowing two non-parties to file anonymous briefs as
“Jane Does” to challenge the disclosure of materials containing their identities);
Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, No. 00 Civ. 0676 (JCF), 2001 WL 1425381, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2001) (permitting “John Doe” to challenge disclosure of
materials containing his identity).
2
Accordingly, Amicus respectfully submits that this Motion satisfies the
mandates of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 and Local Rule 29.1(b), and
requests that the Court therefore grant its motion for leave to file a brief
contemporaneously with this motion as amicus curiae in support of Maxwell’s
objections to the Order to Show Cause.
Dated: March 19, 2019

New York, New York
By: ________________________
Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
Tel.: (212) 390-9550
3
18-2868
IN THE

Plaintiff-Appellee,
---against---
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE JOHN DOE IN SUPPORT

OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MAXWELL’S OBJECTIONS TO
THE COURT’S MARCH 11, 2019 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
Tel.: (212) 390-9550

---against---

Respondents,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND AMICUS STATEMENT OF INTEREST ........................1
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................4
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, 814 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
2016) .......................................................................................................................7
Douglas Oil Co. of Ca. v. Petrol Stops NW, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) ............................7
Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990) .............................................5
In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) .................................. 4, 5, 8
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) .......................4
Miller v. City of Ithaca, No. 10 Civ. 597 (TJM), 2013 WL 12310711 (N.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2013)...........................................................................................................6
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) ................................... 4, 5, 6
Scott v. Graham, No. 16 Civ. 2372 (KPF) (JLC), 2016 WL 6804999 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2016) ........................................................................................................8
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) .........................................5, 6
United States v. Cohen, 18 Cr. 602 (WHP), 2019 WL 472577 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,
2019) .......................................................................................................................8
United States v. Silver, No. 15 Cr. 93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
14, 2016) .............................................................................................................6, 8
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985) ...............................................7
United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..................................7
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 29 ......................................................................................................1
L.R. 29.1(b) ................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION AND AMICUS STATEMENT OF INTEREST
Amicus John Doe submits this Brief in support of Defendant-Appellee
Maxwell’s (“Maxwell”) objections to the Court’s March 11, 2019 Order requiring
the parties to show cause why the underlying summary judgment motion, any
materials filed in connection with said motion, and the District Court’s decision
(collectively the “Summary Judgment Materials”) should not be unsealed (the
“Order to Show Cause”). Amicus objects to the unsealing of the Summary Judgment
Materials until appropriate protections are imposed (specifically, the redactions of
names and personal identifying information) to protect third persons whose privacy
and reputations are jeopardized by the release and publication of unadjudicated
allegations – allegations that will never be resolved in the instant case in light of the
parties’ settlement; allegations that are not believed to be pending for adjudication
in any other forum; and allegations that presumably will never be litigated in the
future, as the underlying events occurred more than sixteen years ago. R-1, Compl.
¶ 9.
Amicus is, of course, not a party and is not otherwise affiliated or associated
with a party to the underlying litigation. 1 Amicus was not a participant in, or
1
Pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Second Circuit Local
Rule 29.1(b), the undersigned counsel states: (a) that no party’s counsel authored this brief in
whole or in part; (b) that no party or his/her counsel contributed money that was intended to fund
the preparation and submission of this filing; and (c) no person, other than Amicus, contributed
money that was intended for the preparation or submission of this brief.
otherwise privy to, what the District Court describes as “vigorous litigation” and a
“lengthy and tumultuous discovery process.” R-953, at 4. Similarly, Amicus is not,
and has never been, a party in any judicial proceeding involving Maxwell, involving
Plaintiff-Appellee Giuffre (“Giuffre”), or otherwise relating to Giuffre’s allegation
that Respondent Epstein (“Epstein”) sexually abused her. Nor is Amicus aware of
any legal proceeding or law enforcement reports in which Giuffre identified Amicus
as a co-conspirator of Epstein or a person with whom she had sexual relations.
Amicus, thus, admittedly lacks any specific knowledge of the contents of the
sealed Summary Judgment Materials. But the record below is clear that the contents
pertain to, and otherwise directly implicate, the privacy and reputational interests of
persons other than the two primary parties, Giuffre and Maxwell, and Respondent
Epstein. As described by the District Court’s own summary of the allegations and
filings under seal, the Summary Judgment Materials pertain to numerous non-parties
on matters of private interest:
This defamation action from its inception in September

2015 to its settlement in May 2017 has been bitterly
contested and difficult to administer because of the truth
or falsity of the allegations concerning the intimate,
sexual, and private conduct of the parties and of third
persons, some prominent, some private.
* * *
Documents designated confidential included a range of

allegations of sexual acts involving Plaintiff and non-
parties to this litigation, some famous, some not; the
2
identities of non-parties who either allegedly engaged in

sexual acts with Plaintiff or who allegedly facilitated such
acts[.]
R-953, at 1–2, 24 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, wholesale unsealing of the Summary Judgment Materials will
almost certainly disclose unadjudicated allegations against third persons –
allegations that may be the product of false statements or, perhaps, simply mistake,
confusion, or failing memories of events alleged to have occurred over a decade and
half ago.
No court has adjudicated the identities of third persons who allegedly
participated in sexual acts with Giuffre, or may otherwise be identified in connection
with that conduct. In fact, save for proceedings involving Epstein and the underlying
proceeding involving Maxwell, Amicus is unaware of any legal proceedings
initiated by Giuffre, any governmental agency, or any other alleged victim against
the unnamed third persons referenced in the District Court’s summary.
The release of unredacted Summary Judgment Materials will thus
substantially infringe the privacy and reputational interests of many third persons,
potentially including Amicus, who have never been charged with a crime, have never
been subject to civil proceedings, and have never been publicly identified by Giuffre.
Lacking knowledge as to who precisely is implicated in the Summary Judgment
Materials, such invasion of privacy would occur without fair notice and the
3
opportunity to be heard. Indeed, the presently unidentified persons would receive
notice only after the harm resulting from publication had already occurred. At that
point, the harm occasioned is irreparable.
ARGUMENT
It is hard to conceive of a case in which the privacy interests of third parties
is more pointedly threatened: the Summary Judgment Materials, according to the
District Court, “concern[] the intimate, sexual, and private conduct of . . . third
persons, some prominent, some private.” R-953, at 2. Long-established precedent
requires courts to diligently and carefully protect these interests of non-parties.
Indeed, if the courts do not, who will?
In the event that this Court ultimately determines that the District Court erred
in denying the motions to unseal the record below, Amicus respectfully submits that
the appropriate remedy would be to remand proceedings for an expeditious
document-by-document review. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
599 (1978) (observing that decisions regarding the appropriateness of sealing the
record are “best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be
exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case”);
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding
to the district court for “specific, on-the-record findings”); In re New York Times
Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing that “[t]he job of protecting
4
[privacy rights] rests heavily upon the shoulders of the trial judge, since all the
parties who may be harmed by disclosure are typically not before the court”).
Because of the District Court’s familiarity with this case, it is in the best position to
balance the interests of the public with the interests of non-parties, such as Amicus,
whose privacy and reputational interests may be impacted by blanket disclosure. See
Nixon, 435 U.S. 589; United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Amodeo II”) (observing that the district court was “in the best position” to conduct
a sealing analysis).
Nevertheless, whether or not this Court remands this matter, the Summary
Judgment Materials must not be released without proper redactions – at a minimum,
redactions protecting the privacy interests of non-parties.
As this Court has long recognized, both the common law and First
Amendment rights of access can be overcome by legitimate competing interests like
privacy. See Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
common law right of access is qualified by recognition of the privacy rights of the
persons whose intimate relations may thereby be disclosed . . . .”); In re New York
Times, 828 F.2d at 116 (“Certainly, the privacy interests of innocent third
parties . . . should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation in determining what
portions of motion papers in question should remain sealed or should be redacted.”).
If the identities of non-parties are not adequately protected, the release of the
5
Summary Judgment Materials in this case would likely cause severe and irreparable
harm to a wide variety of non-parties, including those implicated in the conduct and
those potentially victimized by it.
Courts routinely protect the identities of non-parties who are subject to
unproven allegations of impropriety. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (“[C]ourts have
refused to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for press
consumption . . . .”); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (“Raw, unverified information
should not be as readily disclosed as matters that are verified. Similarly, a court may
consider whether the nature of the materials is such that there is a fair opportunity
for the subject to respond to any accusations contained therein.”). This is particularly
true where the alleged impropriety is sexual in nature. See, e.g., United States v.
Silver, No. 15 Cr. 93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *6 n.5 & *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2016) (permitting redaction of the names of two women with whom the defendant
had allegedly had extramarital affairs, despite the fact that – in the court’s view – the
women were “not entirely ‘innocent’ third parties”); 2 cf. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051
(“In determining the weight to be accorded an assertion of a right of privacy, courts
should first consider the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally
2
Courts have even redacted allegations of sexual misconduct involving
parties from judicial documents. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Ithaca, No. 10 Civ. 597
(TJM), 2013 WL 12310711, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013).
6
considered private rather than public. . . . The nature and degree of injury must also
be weighed.”).
Whereas named parties can avail themselves of the litigation process to refute
false accusations, see, e.g., Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP,
814 F.3d 132, 143−144 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of defendants’ application
to seal a civil complaint), non-parties whose names become associated with
misconduct can suffer the “unfairness of being stigmatized from sensationalized and
potentially out-of-context insinuations of wrongdoing.” United States v. Smith, 985
F. Supp. 2d 506, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). As the Third Circuit has explained in
declining to publicize a list of unindicted co-conspirators in a criminal case:
The individuals on the sealed list are faced with more than
mere embarrassment. It is no exaggeration to suggest that
publication of the list might be career ending for some.
Clearly, it will inflict serious injury on the reputations of
all. In some instances, there may be truth to the
prosecutor’s accusation. On the other hand . . . it is
virtually certain that serious injury will be inflicted upon
innocent individuals as well. In these circumstances, we
have no hesitancy in holding that the trial court had a
compelling governmental interest in making sure its own
process was not utilized to unnecessarily jeopardize the
privacy and reputational interests of the named
individuals.
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985); cf. Douglas Oil Co. of
Ca. v. Petrol Stops NW, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (observing that grand jury secrecy
is designed in part to “assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the
7
grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule”). Similar considerations recently
motivated Judge Pauley to order the redaction of the names of non-parties from
warrant materials filed in connection with the Michael Cohen case. See United States
v. Cohen, 18 Cr. 602 (WHP), 2019 WL 472577, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2019)
(“[R]eferences to those around Cohen from which the public might infer criminal
complicity . . . should also be redacted.”).
While generalized assertions of privacy cannot justify the wholesale sealing
of judicial documents, see In re New York Times, 828 F.2d at 116, the redaction of
names and identifying information is an appropriate and narrowly tailored means of
balancing the public’s interest in disclosure with individuals’ privacy interests. See,
e.g., Scott v. Graham, No. 16 Civ. 2372 (KPF) (JLC), 2016 WL 6804999, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2016) (“The Court further concludes that respondents’ request
to redact the names of the victim and her mother (as opposed to requesting that the
Court seal this entire proceeding) is ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve the higher value of
safeguarding the victim’s identity.”); Silver, 2016 WL 1572993, at *7 (“The Court’s
redactions are narrowly tailored to obscure the identities of the Jane Does while
simultaneously disclosing the nature of the evidence that the Government sought to
admit as rebuttal evidence, the arguments for and against admitting that evidence,
the Court’s ruling on the Motion, and the reasons for sealing the Motion during trial.”
(footnotes omitted)). Thus, before any of the Summary Judgment Materials become
8
public, this Court or the District Court should redact the names and identifying
information of non-parties who are victims or whose privacy and reputational
interests might otherwise be harmed.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this matter should be remanded with instructions to redact
the names and personal identifying information of non-parties whose privacy and
reputational interests are endangered by a blanket release and publication of the
Summary Judgment Materials. In the alternative, if this Court decides to release and
publish the Summary Judgment Materials, this Court should similarly redact the
names and personal identifying information of non-parties.

New York, New York
By: ________________________
Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
Tel.: (212) 390-9550
9
Docket Number(s): _1_8_

-2_8_6_8_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ Caption ruse short titlel
Motion for: Leave for Non-Party Limited
Intervenor to Proceed Under Pseudonym
J. Doe
For the same reasons innocent third-party Doe

Giuffre v. Maxwell
seeks to intervene for the limited purpose of
objecting to public disclosure of specific content
pertaining to Doe to protect compelling personal
privacy interests, Doe seeks leave to proceed
proceed under the pseudonym J. Doe.
MOVING PARTY: J. Doe, Non-Party Limited Intervenor OPPOSING PARTY: Virginia Giuffre, Plaintiff-Appellee
□Plaintiff O oefendant
0 Appe Uant/Petitioner D ppellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: Kerrie L. Campbell OPPOSING ATTORNEY: Sigrid Mccawley

[name of attorney, with fmn, address, phone number and e-mail]
1629 K St., NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006 401 E. Las Olas Blvd. Suite 1200 Fort Lauderdale, FL, 33301
202.681-5432; kcampbell@kcamlaw.com 954 377 4223; smccawley@bsfllp.com
- -- -- -----'------='----- - - - - -
Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from:-- -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- -
Please check appropriate boxes:
Has movant notified~sing counse l (required by Local Rule 27. I):

~ Yes LJNo (explain):._ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND
Has this request for relief been made below?
Bes
□
No
Has this relief been previously sought in th.is court? es []No
Opposing counse I's position on motion:
O unopposed 0 opposed0 Don' t Know
Does oppo~ counsel intend ,tajtle a response:
LJYes 0 No ~ Don' tKnow
ls oral argument on motion requested? D Yes ,0N'o (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set? 0 Yes □No If yes, enter date:._M_a_r_c_h_6_:_,_2_0_1_9_ _ ___________
Signature ofMoving Attome y:
.C
_/s_/_K_e_rr_ie_L_ _ am
__,_
p_b_el_l_ _ Date: 03.19.19 Service by: 0
*cM/ECF D Other [Attach proof of service]
* Motion informaiton Statement only: Motions to be filed under
seal for in camera review
Form T-1080 (rev.12-13)

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL
Short Title: Giuffre v. Maxwell _____ Docket No.: 18-2868 ________
Substitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:
Name: Nicholas James Lewin
Firm: Krieger Kim & Lewin LLP
Address: 500 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
Telephone: (212) 390-9550

___________________________ Fax: (212) 390-9550
E-mail: nick.lewin@KKLllp.com
Appearance for: John Doe

(party/designation)
Select One:
G Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )
(name/firm)
G Substitute counsel (replacing other counsel: _______ )

(name/firm)
G Additional counsel (co-counsel with: )

(name/firm)
G Amicus (in support of: Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell

✔ )
(party/designation)
CERTIFICATION
I certify that:
✔
G I am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed
my admission on 04/14/2014 OR
G I applied for admission on .
Signature of Counsel: /s/ Nicholas James Lewin
Type or Print Name: Nicholas James Lewin

N O TI C E O F A P P E A R A N C E F O R S U B S TI T U T E, A D DI TI O N A L, O R A MI C U S C O U N S E L
S h ort Titl e: Gi uffr e v. M a x w ell D oc k et N o.: 1 8- 2 8 6 8
S u bstit ut e, A d diti o n al, or A mi c us C o u ns el’s C o nt a ct I nf or m ati o n is as f oll o ws:
N a m e: J o n at h a n F. B ol z
Fir m: Kri e g er Ki m & L e wi n L L P
A d dr ess: 5 0 0 Fift h A v e n u e, 3 4t h Fl o or
T el e p h o n e: ( 2 1 2) 3 9 0- 9 5 5 3 F a x:
E- m ail: J o n at h a n. B ol z @ K K Lll p. c o m
A p p e ar a n c e f or : A mi c u s C uri a e J o h n D o e
( p arty / d esi g n ati o n)
S el e ct O n e:
S u bstit ut e c o u ns el (r e pl aci n g l e a d c o u ns el: )
( n a m e /fir m)
S u bstit ut e c o u ns el (r e pl aci n g ot h er c o u ns el: )

( n a m e /fir m)
A d diti o n al c o u ns el ( c o-c o u ns el wit h: )

( n a m e /fir m)
✔ A mic us (i n s u p p ort of: D ef e n d a nt- A p p ell e e G hi sl ai n e M a x w ell )

( p arty / d esi g n ati o n)
C E R TI FI C A TI O N
I c ertify t h at:
✔ I a m a d mitt e d t o pr a ctic e i n t his C o urt a n d, if r e q uir e d by I nt eri m L oc al R ul e 4 6. 1( a)( 2), h a v e r e n e w e d
my a d missi o n o n 0 9/ 1 7/ 2 0 1 8 OR
I a p pli e d f or a d missi o n o n .
Si g n at ur e of C o u ns el: / s/ J o n at h a n F. B ol z
Ty p e or Pri nt N a m e: J o n at h a n F. B ol z

Plaintiff-Apellee,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
Docket No. 18-2868
v.
Respondents,
Julie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company,

INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS JULIE BROWN AND MIAMI HERALD

MEDIA COMPANY’S RESPONSE TO THE COURT’S ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE
Intervenors-Appellants Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media Company
(“Miami Herald”, and together with Julie Brown “Intervenors-Appellants”) hereby
respond in opposition to the redactions proposed by Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell and proposed Amicus Curiae John Doe and in support of the limited
reactions proposed by Plaintiff-Appellee Virginia Giuffre.
ARGUMENT
I. INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS SUPPORT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

VIRGINIA GIUFFRE’S RESPONSE TO THIS COURT’S ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
Intervenors-Appellants agree with the arguments and authorities cited by
Plaintiff-Appellee Virginia Giuffre in her response to this Court’s Order to Show
Cause. The proposed redactions set forth in Appendix A to her response are
sufficient to protect the personal identifying information of the alleged victims and
their relations without encroaching on the public’s First Amendment and common
law right to access the majority of the material on the docket. (see Doc. No. 147,
pp. 11-17.) Redactions for such limited purposes are permitted by courts in this
Circuit. See, e.g. Inclan v. New York Hosp. Grp., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 490, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (permitting limited redaction of home addresses and social
security numbers); Prescient Acquisition Grp., Inc. v. MJ Pub. Tr., 487 F. Supp. 2d
374, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (ordering unsealing of deposition transcripts
submitted on motion for summary judgment but permitting sealing of exhibit
1
showing copies of two bank checks); United States v. Madoff, 626 F. Supp. 2d 420,
427 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (authorizing redaction of emails to withhold personal
identifying information of victims of financial crimes and noting that “the
substance of the emails has been made public”). Ms. Giuffres’s proposed
redactions accomplish this goal by limiting redactions to, variously, social security
numbers, the names of minors, alleged victims and their relations, and other
personal identifying information (addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers) of the
same.
These limited redactions conform with the law of the Circuit, and, as
detailed below stand in stark contrast to the vague, conclusory statements of
Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell and proposed Amicus Curiae John Doe
regarding potential reputational harm. Such generalizations are insufficient to
overcome the presumption of access under the common law and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. THE ARGUMENTS OF PROPOSED AMICUS CURIAE JOHN DOE

SHOULD BE REJECTED
As a preliminary matter, John Doe’s proposed amicus brief is an improper
vehicle by which to submit his arguments. See United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp.
1157, 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the “phrase amicus curiae means,
literally, ‘friend of the court,’” and ‘serv[es] for the benefit of the court and for the
purpose of assisting the court in cases of general public interest”); Long Island
2
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club of City of New York, No. 94
CIV. 0436 (RPP), 1995 WL 358777, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1995) (“Denial of
leave to appear as amicus in a situation such as this, in which the applicant appears
to have its own particular interests in the outcome of the litigation, is far from
unprecedented”); S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., No. 03 CIV.2937 WHP, 2003
WL 22000340, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (“Conferring amicus status on such
partisan interests is inappropriate” where the “Court does not believe that [the
petitioners] are seeking to assist the Court in clarifying the issues as an objective,
neutral, dispassionate friend of the court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). John Doe is admittedly self-interested in seeking closure: “The release of
unredacted Summary Judgment Materials may well substantially infringe the
privacy and reputational interests of many third persons, potentially including
Amicus. . .”. (Doc No. 153-1, at p. 5.) And, John Doe’s anonymity due to personal
privacy concerns confirms the same. Therefore, proposed Amicus Curiae John
Doe’s motion for leave to file an amicus brief should be denied.1
Should the Court accept his amicus brief, the Court should reject the
generalized, conclusory statements purporting to justify redactions, as the law
requires specific reasons for each requested redactions, sufficient to justify the
1
Intervenors-Appellants note that proposed Amicus Curiae John Doe has also filed
a motion to intervene (Doc. No. 152), however John Doe has not submitted a brief
in support of this motion.
3
appropriate findings by a judge. Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, No. 14-CV-6867 (VEC), 2016 WL 1071107, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2016), aff'd, 814 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2016). Similar to Defendant-Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell, John Doe merely makes generalized allusions to “reputational
interests” (Doc. No. 153-2, at 13) to support his attempt to seal information and in
no way attempts to satisfy the standards imposed by United States v. Amodeo, 44
F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co, if Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d
Cir. 2016) and their progeny. Indeed, proposed Amicus Curiae “admittedly lacks
any specific knowledge of the contents of the sealed ‘Summary Judgment
Materials’” (Doc. 153-2, at p. 6) and thus cannot make the requisite factual
showing that any of the material should be redacted.
III. DEFENDANT-APPELLEE GHISLAINE MAXWELL’S VAGUE

PRIVACY ASSERTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED
The privacy arguments proffered by Defendant-Appellee Maxwell are the
same as those presented at oral argument: speculation and conclusions without any
factual or evidentiary basis regarding possible reasons for redaction, and
misrepresentations of the law. If a party seeks closure, the law requires a
document-by-document, and in some cases line-by-line, analysis to determine
whether there are reasons for closure compelling enough to overcome the
presumption of access under the common law and the First Amendment. See
4
Bernstein 2016 WL 1071107, at *10 (“Accordingly, determining whether the
ethical concerns raised by providing public access to a judicial document outweigh
the public’s constitutional right of access must be done on a case-by-case basis”);
United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Rather, the
courts should evaluate the extent of the harm to public officials caused by the
discovery materials on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the nature of
the information in the discovery materials, as well as the public officials at issue”).
Instead of making this demonstration, Ms. Maxwell has asserted – incorrectly and
in contravention to the law of this Circuit – that many of the summary judgment
documents are not “judicial documents” and has otherwise proposed redaction or
wholesale sealing of documents without any particularized showing of a
compelling privacy interest.
IV. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOCUMENTS ARE JUDICIAL

DOCUMENTS
Finally, it bears emphasis that the summary judgment documents, including
the District Court’s summary judgment decision, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Virginia Giuffre’s response in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, Maxwell’s reply, and the materials filed in
connection with the motion, opposition, and reply are judicial documents subject to
the presumption of access. Lugoscha, 435 F.3d at 121. Notwithstanding this
finding, Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell has asserted that a majority of

5
these documents are “not [] judicial document[s]” because they were “not relied
upon by the Court.” (Doc. No. 149 at pp. 5-10.) This position misstates the law.
As recognized by this Circuit “a document is judicial not only if the judge actually
relied upon it, but also if ‘the judge should have considered or relied upon [it], but
did not.’” Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d
132, n. 3 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lugosch 435 F.3d at 123). This rule is in keeping
with the purpose of the presumption of access, which is, in part, to “allow the
public an opportunity to assess the correctness of the judge’s decision.” Lugosch,
814 F.3d at 123 (citation omitted).
Here, the summary judgment motion, opposition, reply, and their supporting
documentation were submitted to influence the judicial determination of the merits
of the underlying defamation action. The public has a right to know how the
District Court treated this information, whether it found the documents compelling
or not. See, e.g. Prescient Acquisition Grp., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76
(finding that deposition transcripts submitted on a motion for summary judgment
document were judicial documents because “once submitted, [the documents],
could be relied upon by either party or the court”) (emphasis supplied).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the proposed redactions of Defendant-Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell and proposed Amicus Curiae John Doe should be rejected and
6
the summary judgment documents should be unsealed subject to the redactions
proposed by Plaintiff-Appellee Virginia Giuffre. Intervenors-Appellants further
urge the court, after making the summary judgment papers public because there
has been no showing of good cause not to do so, to remand the remainder of the
case to the district court to conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether any
documents should be redacted, with instructions to permit Intervenors-Appellants,
as the public’s surrogate, to present argument regarding redaction along with the
original parties.
Dated: New York, NY

March 20, 2019
/s/ Sanford L. Bohrer .

Sanford L. Bohrer
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3300
Miami, Florida 33131
(305) 374-8500
Christine N. Walz
Madelaine J. Harrington
31 West 52nd Street
(212) 513-3200
Attorneys for Intervenors-Appellants
7

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee, Docket No. 18-2868
v.
Respondents,
Julie Brown, Miami Herald Company,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VIRGINIA GIUFFRE’S OPPOSITION TO EX

PARTE MOTIONS TO INTERVENE AND NOTICE OF POSSIBLE
MOOTNESS
Plaintiff-Appellee, Ms. Virginia Giuffre, hereby files this response in
opposition to three ex parte, sealed motions filed on behalf of non-party “J. Doe,”
specifically: (1) Motion to Intervene by “J. Doe” (DE 151); (2) Motion to Intervene
by “J. Doe” (DE 152); and Motion for Limited Intervenor to Proceed Under
Pseudonym J. Doe (DE 154).1 While the motions have been filed ex parte and under
seal, it is likely that several or all of the motions are (or soon will be) moot. And, in
any event, the motions are untimely and should not be resolved through ex parte
procedures.
I. THE MOTIONS MAY WELL BE MOOT
Counsel for Ms. Giuffre was contacted by counsel for “J. Doe” (hereinafter
after referred to as “Jack Doe” for convenience2) several days before the above-listed
motions were filed. Ms. Giuffre indicated a willingness to try and respond to Jack
Doe’s concerns but objected to handling the issues through ex parte procedures. Jack
Doe decided to nonetheless proceed ex parte.
Mr. Giuffre has some general understanding of Jack Doe’s concerns from
those earlier contacts. And based on that general understanding, it appears that some
(or even all) of the motions may relate to very limited information that Ms. Giuffre
has already proposed redacting from the materials that the Court has proposed
releasing.
1
Unless otherwise specifically noted, all references to Docket Entries (“DE”) in
this case are to the Miami Herald’s appeal, Case No. 18-2868.
2
Ms. Giuffre notes that another filing has been made by “John Doe.” DE 153. To
avoid confusion. Ms. Giuffre will refer to the “J. Doe” referenced in the three
motions described above as “Jack Doe.” Ms. Giuffre assumes that since the same
pseudonym – “J. Doe” – is used in all three motions (rather than some separate
enumeration of J. Doe 1, J. Doe 2, etc.) that “J. Doe” is a single person.
2
Ms. Giuffre directs the Court’s attention to the very first entry on her list of
proposed redactions. See Ms. Giuffre’s Response to the Court’s Order to Show
Cause, Appendix A (proposing to redact 2017-01-06 Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit KK, page 59 (GIUFFRE004192), line 25; 32). If this material is
redacted,3 Ms. Giuffre believes that some (or even all) of the concerns raised by Jack
Doe in his ex parte motion may disappear, rendering Jack Doe’s motion moot. See
Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc, Inc., 909 F.3d 534, 541 (2d Cir. 2018) (a
claim “becomes moot when a plaintiff actually received all of the relief her or she
could receive on the claim through further litigation”) (internal emphasis deleted).
If Jack Doe’s concerns are moot, then the Court must deny the motion to intervene
(and the motion to proceed pseudonymously) because its lacks jurisdiction over any
moot questions of law. See, e.g., Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49,
69 (2d Cir. 2001).
II. THE MOTIONS TO INTERVENE ARE UNTIMELY
While the motions to intervene may be soon be moot, they are also obviously
untimely. The motions do not provide any reason why they are being filed at the
3
No party has objected to the redactions. Ms. Maxwell has argued that the entire
document should not be released, obviously including the limited material Ms.
Giuffre proposes to redact. DE 149 at 7 (arguing the Ex. KK is not a “judicial
document”). The Miami Herald agrees with Ms. Giuffre’s proposed redactions. See
DE 159 at 1. And Mr. Dershowitz, in a response filed two days after Ms. Giuffre’s
pleading, raised no objection to her proposed redactions. See Case. No. 16-3945,
DE 262.
3
eleventh hour – or, to be more precise, after the eleventh hour as this Court is in the
process of finalizing its ruling on the case. Litigation seeking the unsealing of this
document began in the District Court on about August 11, 2016. The litigation has
followed a long and very public process, both before the trial court and this Court,
culminating in three different appeals filed in this Court and orally argued on March
6, 2019. Thereafter, on March 11, 2019, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause
to the parties as to why the document in question should be unsealed. On Friday,
March 15, 2019, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion to reconsider the Court’s order, which
this Court summarily denied on Monday, March 18, 2019. And then, the next day,
as the parties were in process of filing their responses, Jack Doe filed his motion to
intervene to oppose unsealing.
To the extent that intervention is allowed belatedly in this Court (rather than
in the trial court), it would be appear that this Court would need to consider such
factors as “(1) how long the applicant had notice of the interest before [he] made the
motion to intervene; (2) prejudice to existing parties resulting from any delay; (3)
prejudice to the applicant if the motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances
militating for or against a finding of timeliness.” D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236
F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66,
70 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted)). In light of these factors, it is hard to understand
how such belated motions could possibly be timely.
4
III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADJUDICATE JACK DOE’S

CONCERNS EX PARTE
Ms. Giuffre believes that Jack Doe’s concerns may be moot and that the
motions are untimely, but she has no way to say for certain because the motions to
intervene are being pursued ex parte. Jack Doe (whomever he or she may be) asks
the Court to decide the merits of his claims in secret based on arguments from just
one side of the dispute. This not only violates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c) (“A motion to intervene must be served on the parties . . .
.” (emphasis added)), but also constitutes a dramatic departure from adversarial
proceedings that are the hallmark of the American justice system. This Court allows
ex parte submissions to be made, but only in very “rare circumstances” where
“extraordinary circumstances” justify departure from normal procedural safeguards.
See, e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 328 (2d Cir. 2004) (“we do not
foreclose the possibility that, on rare occasions, extraordinary circumstances might
warrant receipt of ex parte evidence in opposition to bail release”). And this Court
has also cautioned that ex parte procedures are a last resort, to be adopted only after
all other “reasonable alternatives” have been considered. See id. at 329; see also
Waller v. Georgia, 4467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
Here Jack Doe has not explained why ex parte procedure must be used. For
example, if his concern is that his name might become public, he could file his
pleadings in the open court file, redacting any identifying information and making a
5
motion to proceed in this pseudonymous fashion. Or, alternatively, he could provide
a summary of the substance of his arguments, giving Ms. Giuffre (and any other
affected parties) and opportunity to respond. See Abuhamra, 389 F.3d at 331 (“on
remand, the district court should not again consider the ex parte submission unless
the government makes the required summary disclosure and the defendant is
afforded an opportunity to respond”). This is the approach that this Court uses when
handling far more sensitive materials than those at issue here – classified materials
covered by the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) – where the
Government often will file a substitute “summary” of the classified information at
issue in the public court file. See 18 U.S.C.A.App. 3 § 6(c)(1)(B).
This Court’s rigorous enforcement of the ordinary rules of procedure is
particularly important in this case, where appearances abound that the rich and
powerful (e.g., Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirator Ghislaine Maxwell, along with
their well-connected friends) are receiving preferential treatment. See, e.g., Abby
Goodnough, Questions of Preferential Treatment Are Raised in Florida Sex Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, at A19; Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump Cabinet
Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29,
2018. While “privacy” claims are easy to advance, they are often used for
illegitimate purposes. As two respected constitutional commenters have explained,
“some judges claim an inherent power to close civil trials, in order, it is alleged, to
6
protect ‘privacy.’ In fact, judges are more likely to close civil trials in order to
protect the establishment (and the sons and daughters of the wealthy) from public
scrutiny.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th Ed.
2010) (citing Rooney, Sealed Court Files a Growing Concern, 136 CHICAGO DAILY
LAW BULL.,at 1 (Apr. 1990) (showing that many judges routinely seal court files to
protect well-known people)). It would be perverse if litigation designed to promote
transparency and public confidence in the judicial process instead ended up creating
more suspicions – as, indeed, the ex parte motions appear to have done in recent
media accounts of the proceedings. See, e.g., Julie K. Brown, Two Mystery Parties
Try to Restrict Release of Documents in Jeffrey Epstein Civil Trial, MIAMI HERALD,
March 20, 2019 (“Two mysterious parties, labeling themselves Jane Doe and John
Doe, have filed separate legal briefs in an attempt to limit the public release of
personal information that could connect them to an underage sex trafficking
operation allegedly run by New York financier Jeffrey Epstein and his partner,
Ghislaine Maxwell). “Jack Doe” has failed to provide the compelling – and public
– justification that should accompany any effort to have important matters in this
case decided ex parte.
CONCLUSION
The Court should either find the motions to intervene are moot or deny them
as untimely and inappropriate to be litigated ex parte.
7
March 22, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Paul Cassell

PAUL G. CASSELL
S.J. Quinney College of Law
University of Utah
383 S. University St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
(801) 585-52024
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

Sigrid McCawley
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
(954) 356-0011
4
This daytime business address is provided for contact purposes only and is not
intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private
representation.
8
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 22, 2019, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also
certify that the foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via
transmission of the Electronic Court Filing System generated by CM/ECF.
/s/ Paul Cassell

Paul Cassell
9

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee, Docket No. 18-2868
v.
Respondents,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VIRGINIA GIUFFRE’S OPPOSITION TO JOHN

DOE’S MOTION TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF
SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY PAUL CASSELL

BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, S.J. QUINNEY
401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1200 COLLEGE OF LAW
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 332 South 1400 East, Room 101
(954)356-0011 Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
(801) 585-5202
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii

I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSED AMICUS
BRIEF BECAUSE JOHN DOE FAILS TO REVEAL HIS TRUE
INTERESTS IN THIS APPEAL ..........................................................1
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSED AMICUS

BRIEF BECAUSE IT IS NOT TIMELY FILED .................................4
III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE BRIEF BECAUSE THE

MATTERS ASSERTED ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ............................................................6
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................14
i
Page(s)
Cases
Cox v. Onondaga Cty. Sheriff's Dep't,

760 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2014) .................................................................................12
Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................9
United States v. Amodeo,

71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) ...............................................................................6, 8
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 29(3)(A)............................................................................................1
Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(6) .............................................................................................4
ii
Plaintiff-Appellee, Ms. Virginia Giuffre, hereby files this response in
opposition John Doe’s Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Defendant-Appellee Maxwell’s Objections to the Court’s Order to Show Cause
(DE 154). The Court should deny the motion, because “John Doe” fails to reveal
his true interest in this case, asserts his interests too late in the day, and advances
alleged “privacy” interests of sex traffickers that this Court should not recognize.
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSED AMICUS BRIEF

BECAUSE JOHN DOE FAILS TO REVEAL HIS TRUE INTERESTS
IN THIS APPEAL
A foundational requirement for a person moving to appear as an amicus is that
the person must at least disclose “the movant’s interest” in the appeal. Fed. R. App.
P. 29(3)(A). In this case, even while “John Doe” appears pseudonymously, he never
directly explains why he wants to file an amicus brief. This unidentified man claims
that he “is not a party and is not otherwise affiliated or associated with a party to the
underlying litigation.” John Doe. Mot. at 1 (emphasis added). Assuming this
assertion is in fact true,1 then he has no business being involved in this appeal. The
only persons who are mentioned in the materials subject to unsealing are those who
1
So far as Ms. Giuffre can determine, “John Doe” has not provided his true name
to the Court so that it can attempt to verify this claim. Before the Court grants any
motion by John Doe, Ms. Giuffre respectfully requests that this person at least
present, under seal, his name to the parties in this case and to the Court. This would
permit the parties to either demonstrate that does have an association with the this
case or, alternatively, that he has no interests at stake in this case.
1
are potentially “affiliated or associated” with Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine
Maxwell’s international sex trafficking organization – including, for example, some
of the powerful men to whom underage girls were trafficked to.
John Doe simply cannot have it both ways. He claims to be unconnected to
the sex trafficking organization – while simultaneously wanting to assert the
interests of “third persons whose privacy and reputations may be jeopardized by the
release and publication of unadjudicated allegations” about that organization. Mot.
at 1. The “privacy” of such persons can only be affected if they are associated with
the sex trafficking organization through the allegations made in the materials at
issue.
John Doe also concedes that he “lacks any specific knowledge of the contents
of the sealed Summary Judgment Materials.” Proposed Amicus Br. of John Doe at
2. He thus can venture only that his personal interests may be “potentially” be at
stake. Id. at 3. Thus, John Doe lacks, by his own admission, any revealed and actual
interest that would support his amicus participation.
Enforcement of the amicus “interest” requirement is particularly important
here, where possibly surrogate litigators have conveniently appeared at various
times, as if on cue. See, e.g., Br. for Ms. Giuffre, No. 16-3945, at 23-25 (noting
appearance of self-described “slut shamer” at propitious time for seeking unsealing
of documents regarding Ms. Giuffre). The circumstances for John Doe’s last-minute
2
arrival in support of Ms. Maxwell at least raises questions about whether he is acting
as her cat’s paw. On Friday, March 15, 2019, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion for this
Court to reconsider its order to show cause, complaining (among other things) about
the ten-page limit this Court has imposed for its response and the lack of standing
for the existing parties to raise the interests of non-parties. See Maxwell’s Motion
to Reconsider and Vacate Court’s Order to Show Cause at 18, 22-23. The next
business day (Monday, March 18, 2019), this Court summarily denied Ms.
Maxwell’s motion. And then – as if on cue – on the next business day (Tuesday,
March 19, 2019) “John Doe” appeared on the scene, proposing that he be allowed to
file a lengthy brief in support of Ms. Maxwell’s position while professing the
complete absence of any “affiliation” or “association” with her.
Ms. Giuffre has no way of assessing John Doe’s assertion that he lacks any
such connection to Ms. Maxwell. But Ms. Giuffre can report to the Court that John
Doe’s motion has generated public concern about what is afoot. See, e.g., Julie K.
Brown, Two Mystery Parties Try to Restrict Release of Documents in Jeffrey Epstein
Civil Trial, MIAMI HERALD, March 20, 2019 (“Two mysterious parties, labeling
themselves Jane Doe and John Doe, have filed separate legal briefs in an attempt to
limit the public release of personal information that could connect them to an
underage sex trafficking operation allegedly run by New York financier Jeffrey
Epstein and his partner, Ghislaine Maxwell”). And this concern arises against a
3
backdrop of long-held suspicions that the rich and powerful (e.g., Jeffrey Epstein
and his co-conspirator Ghislaine Maxwell, along with their well-connected friends)
are receiving preferential treatment in the courts. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough,
Questions of Preferential Treatment Are Raised in Florida Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2006, at A19; Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump Cabinet Member Gave
a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29, 2018. Indeed,
a federal court recently held that Epstein and his co-conspirators were able to avoid
federal prosecution for federal sex trafficking crimes through orchestrating a non-
prosecution agreement that was “deliberately ke[pt] . . . secret from the victims.”
Opinion and Order, Jane Doe 1 and 2 v. United States, No. 9:08-cv-80736, DE 435
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2019).
Rather than add to the already substantial suspicions of preferential treatment
for powerful people that stalks this case, this Court should simply enforce its normal
rules – i.e., a person cannot participate as an amicus without clearly stating his
interest in the case. John Doe has failed to do so. His motion should accordingly be
denied.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSED AMICUS BRIEF

BECAUSE IT IS NOT TIMELY FILED
This Court should also enforce the clear appellate rule that an amicus brief
must be filed within seven days of the filing of the principal brief that is being
supported. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(6) (“An amicus curiae must file its brief . . .
4
no later than 7 days after the principal brief of the party being supported is filed”
(emphasis added)). John Doe seeks to support Ms. Maxwell’s position in this
litigation. Her “principal brief” was filed months ago. Specifically, the Miami
Herald filed its principal brief in this appeal on December 10, 2019, seeking
unsealing of all the documents at issue in the order to show cause, and Ms. Giuffre
responded on December 19, 2019. Ms. Maxwell then filed her principal brief on
January 10, 2019. This Court then heard oral argument on March 6, 2019. And, as
described above, following this Court’s entry of an order to the parties to show cause
by no later than March 19, 2019 as to why the some of the documents at issue in the
briefing should not be unsealed, the unidentified “John Doe” filed his motion to
appear as an amicus.
John Doe offers not even a hint of why he is suddenly seeking to participate
in this case, much less a sworn affidavit regarding the circumstances of his last-
minute arrival. In particular, he offers no explanation for why he failed to file within
seven days of Ms. Maxwell’s filing of her principal brief on January 10, 2019. In
short, John Doe is truly a “Johnny-come-lately” to these long-running proceedings,
waiting until the eve of a possible court ruling before entering the fray.
John Doe should not be given special treatment. If he is now allowed to file a
brief, Ms. Giuffre would ask to have an opportunity respond and the other parties
would likely do so as well. Indeed, it is precisely to permit orderly briefing in
5
advance of oral argument that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure set out a
specific time for amicus filings. If John Doe was worried that the Miami Herald
might prevail in this appeal and obtain the unsealing of documents “potentially”
relating to him, he had ample opportunity to voice that concern back in January (or
years earlier in the district court). John Doe’s motion is simply filed too late and
should be denied.
III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE BRIEF BECAUSE THE

MATTERS ASSERTED ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Finally, the Court should not grant John Doe leave to file his proposed amicus
brief because it asserts matters irrelevant to the proper disposition of the case. See
Fed. R. App. P. (a)(3) (providing that amicus must explain “why an amicus brief is
desirable and why the matters asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case).
John Doe repeatedly claims that he should be permitted to assert the “privacy and
reputational interests” of himself and other similarly situated third parties. See John
Doe Proposed Amicus Br. at 5. But John Doe has no legitimate “privacy” or
“reputational” interest at stake if he was associated with a sex trafficking
organization. John Doe cannot properly assert the privacy rights regarding “intimate
relations” (id.) that are actually sex crimes with underage girls. This is not a case
involving mere “embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications,” United States
v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995), but rather one involving allegations
6
that an international sex trafficking organization has received improper protection
from public exposure at the highest levels of the federal government. See, e.g., N.Y
Times Editorial Board, The Cowardly Labor Secretary: A Judge Says That as a
Prosecutor, Alexander Acosta Broke the Law to Help a Powerful Man Accused of
Abusing Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2019; Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump
Cabinet Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime, Miami Herald,
Nov. 28, 2018 (three part, award-winning series of articles).
Ms. Giuffre has already addressed the only legitimate “privacy” and
“reputational” interests at stake in this appeal: Those of the minor girls who were
sexually trafficked and abused. Ms. Giuffre has proposed a specific list of redactions
to shield these victims from improper disclosures – redactions to which the Miami
Herald has agreed.
But John Doe seeks something entirely different. John Doe seeks to assert
alleged “privacy” interests of the sexual abusers of the victims. These powerful men
may suffer “reputational” consequences if the materials are unsealed. But it would
be a perversion of the right of privacy to allow co-conspirators in an alleged sex
trafficking organization to shield themselves from public scrutiny by claiming (as
John Doe does) that evidence of sexual trafficking crimes is somehow merely
information relating to “sexual impropreit[ies].” John Doe Proposed Amicus Br. at
6 (order rearranged).
7
John Doe inaccurately argues that unsealing the evidence supporting Ms.
Giuffre’s allegations would reveal “unadjudicated allegations against third persons.”
Id. at 3. But he fails to recognize that the summary judgment materials in question
– including a summary judgment ruling – specifically did involve an “adjudication”
of Ms. Giuffre’s allegations of being a victim of federal sex trafficking crime by
Maxwell and her powerful friends. Ms. Giuffre’s complaint in this case alleged that
she had been the victim of “sex crimes committed around the world by Maxwell,
Epstein, and other powerful persons.” Complaint, Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 1:15-cv-
7433 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015), DE 1 at 6, ¶ 32. In response to the complaint,
Maxwell’s answer expansively alleged that Ms. Giuffre had “fabricated a story of
abuse at the hands of Ms. Maxwell . . . without regard for truth, veracity or
substantiation.” Answer, Giuffre v. Maxwell, DE 54 at 2, ¶ 3. Ms. Maxwell went
on to allege that “[t]he more time that passes and the more potential for monetary
gain she and her attorneys perceive, the more Giuffre’s story, like Pinocchio’s nose,
continues to grow without limitation: more and more famous people, more lurid
accounts of tawdry sexual encounters, and more exploitive circumstances.” Id.
Ms. Maxwell had a more than a year to collect evidence in discovery to back
up her broad challenge to Ms. Giuffre’s credibility. And then Ms. Maxwell filed a
motion in the district court for summary judgment, claiming that no disputed facts
existed requiring a trial in this matter. And after reviewing Ms. Maxwell’s summary
8
judgment motion – and Ms. Giuffre’s detailed evidence in response – the District
Courte denied Ms. Maxwell’s motion.
The District Court’s denial of Ms. Maxwell’s summary judgment motion was
an adjudication. “An adjudication is a formal act of government, the basis of which
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be subject to public scrutiny.” Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing order placing summary judgment
materials under seal). The public is entitled to scrutinize the relevant materials to
determine whether the District Court properly sided with Ms. Giuffre in ruling on
the summary judgment motion.
Obviously, the names of the powerful persons to whom Ms. Giuffre was
trafficked are part and parcel of that summary judgment ruling. This entire case
revolved around whether Ms. Giuffre was telling “obvious lies” (as Ms. Maxwell
contended) by adding “more and more people” to the ranks of the sex trafficking
conspiracy. Redacting those names would effectively prevent the public from
scrutinizing the substance of the district court’s ruling.
The redactions would also unfairly harm Ms. Giuffre’s reputation. For
example, contained in the materials that Ms. Giuffre used to respond to Ms.
Maxwell’s summary judgment motion is a photograph clearly depicting Ms.
Maxwell, Ms. Giuffre (then an underage girl), and one of Ms. Maxwell’s powerful
friends to whom Ms. Giuffre has alleged that she was sexually trafficked, all standing
9
together in an overseas location associated with Ms. Maxwell. If John Doe has his
way, presumably that photograph will be redacted to prevent the identity of Ms.
Maxwell’s powerful friend from being revealed. But that very act of redaction will
then allow Ms. Maxwell, Jeffrey Epstein, and their allies to continue to contend that
Ms. Giuffre is making sexual trafficking allegations “without regard for truth,
veracity or substantiation.” Answer, Giuffre v. Maxwell, DE 54 at 2, ¶ 3. The
unredacted photograph was part of Ms. Giuffre’s substantiation of allegations and is
an important piece of evidence related to the District Court’s denial of the summary
judgment motion that the public is entitled to review.
John Doe and other third parties cannot claim any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the evidence sealed in this case. All of the information in this case was
slated to be revealed during a public trial, when the protective order by its own terms
was to have expired. See Protective Order at 5 (“This Protective Order shall have
no force and effect on the use of any confidential information at trial in this matter”).
Accordingly, everyone involved in this litigation had (at most) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sealed materials only through the May 2017 trial date.
John Doe asks this Court to extend the protective order and now permanently
cloak important aspects of the summary judgement ruling (and the documents that
lead to that ruling) under a “privacy” seal. As is all too often the case with such
sealing requests, he seeks not to protect legitimate interests but rather “to protect the
10
establishment (and the sons and daughters of the wealthy) from public scrutiny.”
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th Ed. 2010)
(citing Rooney, Sealed Court Files a Growing Concern, 136 CHICAGO DAILY LAW
BULL.,at 1 (Apr. 1990) (showing that many judges routinely seal court files to protect
well-known people)).
Epstein’s and Maxwell’s co-conspirators should not be permitted to use this
Court to craft special exemptions to avoid public identification. If this case proves
nothing else, it is that those accused of trafficking Ms. Giuffre have ample ability to
protect their interests in the court of public opinion. The “John Does” have the
resources and the political connection to hire the most expensive lawyers to make
their case. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor from Kenneth W. Starr, Martin G.
Weinberg, Jack Goldberger & Lilly Ann Sanchez, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2019
(“[t]he number of young women involved in the [Epstein] investigation has been
vastly exaggerated, there was no ‘international sex-trafficking operation’ and there
was never evidence that Mr. Epstein ‘hosted sex parties’ at his home); Twitter,
@AlanDersh, March 2, 2019 (“My perjuring accusers are Virginia Roberts [Giuffre]
and Sarah Ransomme. Both have long records of lying.”).
In multiple media stories, Ms. Giuffre has been viciously attacked for coming
forward to expose a powerful sex trafficking organization. Now anonymous “John
Does” remarkably try to claim that if the summary judgment documents were to be
11
unsealed, the document would simultaneously prove that she is liar – while harming
their reputations by proving their connection federal and state sex crimes.
Ms. Giuffre simply asks this Court to treat her and her powerful abusers the
way other litigants are treated. It is well-settled law in this Circuit that “documents
used by parties moving for, or opposing, summary judgment should not remain
under seal absent the most compelling reasons.” Cox v. Onondaga Cty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 760 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Given the
attacks that Ms. Giuffre is facing, no “compelling reason” exists for keeping secret
the extensive evidence that she used to defeat Ms. Maxwell’s summary judgment
motion.
CONCLUSION
This Court can properly decide the issues in this case without the anonymous
assistance of proposed amicus “John Doe.” This Court should deny his motion to
file an amicus brief.
March 22, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Paul Cassell

PAUL G. CASSELL
University of Utah
12
(801) 585-52022
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP

Sigrid McCawley
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP
(954) 356-0011
2
representation.
13
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 22, 2019, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also
certify that the foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via
transmission of the Electronic Court Filing System generated by CM/ECF.
/s/ Paul Cassell

Paul Cassell
14

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Appellee Maxwell’s Response to J. Doe’s Motions re Limited

Intervention
Foreman, P.C., submits this Response to the motions by non-party “J. Doe”
relating to limited intervention.
1. On March 19, 2019, non-party J. Doe filed two Form T-1080 motion
information statements. See Docs.151-152.
2. Doc.151 gave notice that J. Doe was moving for leave to “Seek[] Limited
Intervention to File Unredacted Motions Ex Parte, Under Seal, for in camera
Review.” These motions would request (a) limited intervention to lodge objections
and show good cause why specific summary judgment material should remain
sealed or be redacted; and (b) leave to use a pseudonym.
3. Doc.152 gave notice J. Doe was moving for “Limited Intervention,” and
indicated that Doe would be filing the motion(s) “ex parte with Court [sic], under
seal, for in camera review.” In the limited intervention motion(s), Doe said she
would seek leave to intervene “for the limited purpose of lodging objections and
demonstrating good cause why specific content pertaining to Doe in materials
subject to district court sealing and this Court’s March 11, 2019 Order to Show
Cause . . . should remain sealed or be redacted to protect Doe’s compelling privacy
interests.”
4. Although the motions apparently were filed ex parte Ms. Maxwell does
not object to Doe’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym or to file motions under
seal or to intervene for the purpose of lodging objections to unsealing. We do not
know the specific relief Doe is requesting, and therefore reserve the right to object
to that relief. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a hearing on the specific relief Doe is
requesting; at that hearing we may or may not object to the relief requested.
5. We respectfully submit that Doe’s motions underscore the need for a
remand to the district court to undertake the balancing of interests required under
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978). As we pointed out
2
in the Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Order to Show Cause (Doc.141) and in
our Response to the Order to Show Cause (Doc.147), the identification of
compelling interests and balancing of the parties’ and non-parties’ interests are a
complex undertaking. It is not simply that it requires a familiarity with the facts and
the district court’s prior rulings. That familiarity is imperative in the face of
Ms. Giuffre’s deliberate inclusion in her summary judgment submissions of highly
confidential and sensitive materials—wholly irrelevant to summary judgment—
relating to parties and non-parties for the sole purpose of placing those materials in
the public domain for ulterior reasons. It is also that all the parties and non-parties
who have compelling interests at stake should be permitted to present the facts and
law supporting those interests in a closed hearing so that they can speak freely
without disclosing publicly the very information they contend is subject to
protection from public disclosure under Nixon and this Court’s Nixon progeny.
6. Doe’s motions point to another problem. As the Court has suggested in
its prior cases—and during oral argument in the case at bar—non-parties have a
right to contest the unsealing of materials implicating their privacy and other
compelling interests. See In re New York Times, 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987).
But these proceedings simply are inadequate to notify the non-parties whose
information is at stake in the Court’s proposed appellate unsealing of summary
3
judgment materials, let alone to give those non-parties an ability to understand
what confidential information of theirs might be unsealed or to give them a proper
forum to advance their claim of a compelling interest. See id. at 116 (“[t]he job of
protecting [privacy rights] rests heavily upon the shoulders of the trial judge, since
all the parties who may be harmed by disclosure are typically not before the
court”).
7. There are yet other problems that are foreseeable. For example, in her
motions Doe apparently has taken the position that “specific content” should
remain sealed or redacted. This specific content presumably includes Doe’s
identifying information, such as his or her name. However, even if specific
identifying information remains sealed or redacted, the context around the
sealed/redacted identifying information or other non-specific references to Doe
nonetheless easily could result in “outing” Doe to family, friends, non-parties or
“investigative journalists.” That is to say, neither Doe nor other non-parties
adequately can protect against disclosure of their identities without their attorneys
reviewing the currently-sealed/redacted summary judgment materials.
8. Meanwhile, some non-parties have countervailing interests.
Mr. Dershowitz, a non-party, seeks to use the summary judgment and other
material to prove Ms. Giuffre falsely accused him of having sex with her. He will be
4
motivated to urge unsealing of all information relating to other non-parties,
including their identities, because he justifiably believes that this information would
prove Ms. Giuffre lied repeatedly about “a range of allegations of sexual acts
involving [her] and non-parties to this litigation, some famous, some not; [and] the
identities of non-parties who either allegedly engaged in sexual acts with Plaintiff or
who allegedly facilitated such acts,” Sp. App. 27.
9. Ms. Giuffre argues J. Doe’s motions are moot and untimely. Doc.168 at
2-4. Neither argument has any merit. Ms. Giuffre’s mootness argument is
premised on her speculation that “some or even all of the motions may relate to
very limited information that Ms. Giuffre has already proposed redacting from the
materials that the Court has proposed releasing.” Id. at 2 (parentheses omitted).
Setting aside her speculation, Ms. Giuffre assumes mere redaction of “very limited
information” addresses fully either Doe’s concerns or that of other non-parties (or
Ms. Maxwell’s concerns and objections, which are set forth in Doc.149). For
example, as discussed in Paragraph 7, above, mere redaction of Doe’s or another
non-party’s identifying information nonetheless could allow identification through
an indirect reference on some other page of the summary judgment materials. As
discussed in Ms. Maxwell’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc.141), Ms. Giuffre does not
represent any non-party and has no incentive to advance any non-party’s privacy
5
interests, given her desire to continue to profit from telling and adding to her story,
contrary to the non-parties’ interests.
10. Ms. Giuffre argues Doe’s motions are “untimely” because Doe did not
file the motions until March 19, 2019, even though “[this] litigation has followed a
long and very public process.” Doc.168 at 4. This is a peculiar argument coming
from Ms. Giuffre. One year after she dismissed her case with prejudice, Ms. Giuffre
suddenly decided to change her tune about the Protective Order, joining the Miami
Herald in requesting unsealing and unredacting of all court filings. Yet it was
Ms. Giuffre who during the litigation readily stipulated to the Protective Order and
urged non-parties to rely on it when it served her purposes to do so, namely, to
coerce non-parties to reveal confidential, sensitive and embarrassing information
about, e.g., their legitimate consensual adult sexual activities. If it was not
“untimely” for Ms. Giuffre to join forces with the Herald a year after the case was
closed to effectively vacate the Protective Order, Ms. Giuffre hardly is in a position
to assert that any non-party’s assertion now or later of a compelling privacy interest
is “untimely.” More fundamentally Ms. Giuffre’s argument unwittingly points out
that neither she, the Herald, Mr. Dershowitz nor this Court has undertaken any
effort to give notice to the dozens of non-parties who relied on the Protective Order
that the Court has issued a show-cause order stating it will unseal and unredact all
6
summary judgment materials unless the parties to the appeal lodge sufficiently
weighty objections to persuade the Court not to do so.
11. As for Ms. Giuffre’s concerns about ex parte adjudication of J. Doe’s
motions, except to the extent we have stated we do not object to the relief
requested in those motions, we share those concerns.
The Court should permit J. Doe to proceed under a pseudonym, to file
Doe’s motions under seal, and to intervene, and then remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings. If the Court intends to grant J. Doe
unseal/unredaction relief, we respectfully request that the Court provide
Ms. Maxwell with an opportunity to be heard on the specific relief requested by
J. Doe.
March 27, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
Attorneys for Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell
7
I certify that on March 27, 2019, I served via CM/ECF a copy of this Appellee
Maxwell’s Response to J. Doe’s Motions re Limited Intervention on the following
persons:
United States District Court for the Paul G. Cassell (cassellp@law.utah.edu)

Southern District of New York Sigrid S. McCawley
(via United States mail) (smccawley@bsfllp.com)
Christine N. Walz
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) Andrew G. Celli
Madelaine J. Harrington (acelli@ecbalaw.com)
(madelaine.harrington@hklaw.com) David Lebowitz
Sanford L. Bohrer (dlebowitz@ecbalaw.com)
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com)
Kerrie L. Campbell
Jay M. Wolman (kcampbell@kcamlaw.com)
(jmw@randazza.com)
Nicholas James Lewin
(nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
Paul M. Krieger
(paul.krieger@KKLllp.com)
s/ Nicole Simmons
8
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
ROBERT A. KATZMANN CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
Date: March 27, 2019 DC Docket #: 15-cv-7433

Docket #: 18-2868cv DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK
Short Title: Giuffre v. Maxwell CITY)
DC Judge: Sweet
NOTICE OF DEFECTIVE FILING
On March 27, 2019 the reply to opposition, on behalf of the Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, was
submitted in the above referenced case. The document does not comply with the FRAP or the
Court's Local Rules for the following reason(s):
______ Failure to submit acknowledgment and notice of appearance (Local Rule 12.3)
______ Failure to file the Record on Appeal (FRAP 10, FRAP 11)
______ Missing motion information statement (T-1080 - Local Rule 27.1)
______ Missing supporting papers for motion (e.g, affidavit/affirmation/declaration) (FRAP 27)
______ Insufficient number of copies (Local Rules: 21.1, 27.1, 30.1, 31.1)
______ Improper proof of service (FRAP 25)
______ Missing proof of service
______ Served to an incorrect address
______ Incomplete service (Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967))
______ Failure to submit document in digital format (Local Rule 25.1)
______ Not Text-Searchable (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2), click here
for instructions on how to make PDFs text searchable
______ Failure to file appendix on CD-ROM (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2)
______ Failure to file special appendix (Local Rule 32.1)
______ Defective cover (FRAP 32)
______ Incorrect caption (FRAP 32)
______ Wrong color cover (FRAP 32)
______ Docket number font too small (Local Rule 32.1)
______ Incorrect pagination, click here for instructions on how to paginate PDFs
(Local Rule 32.1)
______ Incorrect font (FRAP 32)
______ Oversized filing (FRAP 27 (motion), FRAP 32 (brief))
______ Missing Amicus Curiae filing or motion (Local Rule 29.1)
______ Untimely filing
__X___ Incorrect Filing Event: This must be re-filed as, “Opposition FILED” and you
must select the motion to file amicus curiae.
______ Other: ___________________________________________________
Please cure the defect(s) and resubmit the document, with the required copies if
necessary, no later than March 29, 2019. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP
and the Local Rules, will be deemed timely filed.
Failure to cure the defect(s) by the date set forth above will result in the document being
stricken. An appellant's failure to cure a defective filing may result in the dismissal of the appeal.
Inquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8612.


Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Appellee Maxwell’s Response to John Doe’s Motion for Leave

to File Amicus Brief in Support of Maxwell’s Objections to
Unsealing Summary Judgment Materials
Foreman, P.C., submits this Response to John Doe’s motion for leave to file an
amicus brief in support of Ms. Maxwell’s objections to unsealing the summary
judgment materials (Doc.153-1).
1. Ms. Maxwell consents to the relief requested in Mr. Doe’s motion.
2. We submit this Response to point out, with respect, the inadequacy of
the procedure this Court is using to discharge the obligations the Supreme Court
imposed upon district courts in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978).
3. The amicus brief by Mr. Doe’s lawyers—written without the benefit of
their having reviewed any of the sealed summary judgment papers—argues:
“[B]efore any of the Summary Judgment Materials become public, this Court or
the District Court should redact the names and identifying information of non-
parties who are victims or whose privacy and reputational interests might otherwise
be harmed.” Doc.153-2, at 8-9. As we pointed out in Paragraph 7 of our response to
J. Doe’s intervention motions (Docs.151 & 152), such relief might be adequate in
some cases involving non-party information and will be wholly ineffectual in others.
We noted that even when sealed information does not state explicitly the name of a
non-party or doesn’t specifically identify that non-party, there may be indirect
references to that non-party that will make his or her identity obvious to family,
friends, “investigative journalists,” and other members of the public. Ms. Giuffre
will not identify such references, since she intends to publicize as much of the
unsealed/redacted material as is consistent with her profit motive. And with all due
respect this appellate Court lacks familiarity with the entire record and is not
equipped to hold the kind of hearings needed to permit non-parties to protect their
own privacy interests (or Ms. Maxwell’s compelling interests).
2
March 27, 2019.
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
3
I certify that on March 27, 2019, I served via CM/ECF a copy of this Appellee
Maxwell’s Response to John Doe’s Motion to File an Amicus Brief in Support of
Maxwell’s Objections on the following persons:

Christine N. Walz
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) Andrew G. Celli
Madelaine J. Harrington (acelli@ecbalaw.com)
(madelaine.harrington@hklaw.com) David Lebowitz
Sanford L. Bohrer (dlebowitz@ecbalaw.com)
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com)
Kerrie L. Campbell
Jay M. Wolman (kcampbell@kcamlaw.com)
(jmw@randazza.com)
Nicholas James Lewin
(nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
Paul M. Krieger
s/ Nicole Simmons
4

18-2868
Docket Number(s): ________________________________________ _______________Caption [use short title]_____________________
Leave to File Reply to Response to Order
Motion for: ______________________________________________
to Show Cause
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

Ms. Maxwell seeks leave to file her reply to Appellant
________________________________________________________
Giuffre v. Maxwell
Michael Cernovich's Response re. Order to Show
________________________________________________________
Case in related Case No. 16-3945
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
Ghislaine Maxwell
MOVING PARTY:_______________________________________ Miami Herald
OPPOSING PARTY:____________________________________________
___Plaintiff ✔
___Defendant
___Appellant/Petitioner ___Appellee/Respondent
Ty Gee
MOVING ATTORNEY:___________________________________ Sandford L. Bohrer
OPPOSING ATTORNEY:________________________________________
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.
________________________________________________________ Holland & Knight LLP
_______________________________________________________________
150 E. 10th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203
________________________________________________________ 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3300, Miami, FL 33131
_______________________________________________________________
303.831.7364; tgee@hmflaw.com
________________________________________________________ 305.374.8500; sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com
_______________________________________________________________
Hon. Robert W. Sweet, District Judge (S.D.N.Y.)
Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from: _________________________________________________________________________________________
Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has this request for relief been made below? ___Yes ___No
✔
___Yes ___No (explain):__________________________ Has this relief been previously sought in this court? ___Yes ___No
_______________________________________________ Requested return date and explanation of emergency: ________________
_____________________________________________________________
Opposing counsel’s position on motion:
_____________________________________________________________
✔
___Unopposed ___Opposed ___Don’t Know
_____________________________________________________________
Does opposing counsel intend to file a response:
_____________________________________________________________
✔
___Yes ___No ___Don’t Know
Is oral argument on motion requested? ✔ (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
___Yes ___No
Has argument date of appeal been set? ___ March 6, 2019

✔ Yes ___No If yes, enter date:_______________________________________________________

s/ Ty Gee
_________________________________ 3/28/2019
Date:__________________ ✔
Service by: ___CM/ECF ___Other [Attach proof of service]
Form T-1080 (rev.12-13)


Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Appellee Maxwell’s Motion for Leave to Submit Reply to

Appellant Cernovich’s Response re Order to Show Cause
Foreman, P.C., moves under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 for leave to
submit a reply to Appellant Michael Cernovich’s (Appeal No. 16-3945)
“response” to Ms. Maxwell’s response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause.
1. This appeal was consolidated with No. 16-3945 for oral argument.
Ms. Maxwell is not a party to that appeal.

2. On March 11, 2019, after hearing oral argument, the Court entered in
both Appeal Nos. 16-3945 and 18-2868 an Order to Show Cause. The Court
directed the parties in both appeals to submit by March 19, 2019, objections and
responses to the Order to Show Cause.
3. On March 19, 2019, Ms. Maxwell submitted her response, including
objections to unsealing and unredacting. We served a courtesy copy of the response
on the parties in Appeal No. 16-3945, including Mr. Cernovich, the appellant in
that appeal.
4. Also on March 19, J. Doe and John Doe filed papers with the Court. J.
Doe moved for limited intervention. John Doe moved for leave to file an amicus
brief.
5. On March 25, without seeking leave of the Court, Mr. Cernovich filed in
his appeal, No. 16-3945, a “Response to Maxwell and Doe’s Responses Order [sic]
to Show Cause.” Doc.264, No. 16-3945. He served a copy on Ms. Maxwell’s
counsel. Among other things, Mr. Cernovich’s response argues that Ms. Maxwell
has “waived” the right to object to the unsealing of the summary judgment
materials and that the Court should deny the motions filed by the Does, who are
non-parties to and have filed no papers in his appeal.
2
6. In the face of Mr. Cernovich’s arguments addressing the merits of
Ms. Maxwell’s response to the Order to Show Cause, she should be permitted to
reply.
7. We conferred with counsel for the parties in this appeal. Appellants
oppose. Appellee Virginia Giuffre takes no position.
Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court grant her leave to submit a
reply to Mr. Cernovich’s response. A copy of the reply is attached to this Motion.
March 28, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
3
Appellee Maxwell’s Motion for Leave to Submit Reply to Appellant Cernovich’s Response
re Order to Show Cause on the following persons:

Christine N. Walz
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) Kerrie L. Campbell
Madelaine J. Harrington (kcampbell@kcamlaw.com)
(madelaine.harrington@hklaw.com)
Sanford L. Bohrer Nicholas James Lewin
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com) (nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
Paul M. Krieger
s/ Nicole Simmons
4

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Appellee Maxwell’s Reply to Appellant Cernovich’s Response

re Order to Show Cause
Foreman, P.C., submits this Reply to Appellant Cernovich’s “response” to
Ms. Maxwell’s response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause.1
1
We filed our response to the Order to Show Cause in Appeal No. 18-2868,
in which Ms. Maxwell is an appellee and Mr. Cernovich is a non-party.
Mr. Cernovich filed his “response” to our response in No. 16-3945, in which
Mr. Cernovich is a party and Ms. Maxwell is a non-party.
Mr. Cernovich complains that our response to the Order to Show Cause
made “broad assertions of what should remain sealed, without clear explanation.”
Doc.264 at 1. The complaint blithely ignores the central problems we identified
with the Order to Show Cause: There are more than 2,000 pages of summary
judgment material, much of it sealed and redacted. The Order said all of it will be
unsealed and unredacted subject to an adequate showing of why it should not be
unsealed/unredacted. The Court imposed a 10-page limit for this showing. Only
“the parties” were invited to submit objections; non-parties are not mentioned in
the Order. See Docs. 141 & 149.
Not even Mr. Cernovich (or the other appellants) takes the position that
non-parties have no interest in the Court’s contemplated unsealing/unredaction or
that non-parties could not possibly establish a compelling interest which would
outweigh or trump Mr. Cernovich’s “journalistic” curiosity about the contents of
the summary judgment materials. Indeed Mr. Cernovich (and the other appellants)
does not address the non-parties’ interests in their privacy. Such is the nature of
filterless blogs and podcasts indiscriminately blasted into the internet ether.
This case presses the boundaries of what Mr. Cernovich’s counsel at oral
argument quaintly called “the First Amendment.” In this First Amendment age
2
when everyone is a worldwide publisher, if not a journalist,2 there is a thin line
between responsible journalism and the pursuit of the prurient. The only way the
courts have developed to police that line is to entrust district courts with the task of
balancing the respective interests of the parties seeking privacy and the non-parties
seeking access.
Instead of addressing the non-parties’ privacy interests Mr. Cernovich
argues some form of “waiver” and the need for speed, and speculates that maybe
both putative intervenor-Does “are high ranking members of government, other
public figures, or perpetrators of horrible crimes trying to hide their involvement.”
Doc.264 at 2. Mr. Cernovich’s offensive speculation about the Does—and,
necessarily, more than two dozen non-parties who provided information in the
case—proves our point about the thin line.
2
A journalist’s content is to be distinguished from “‘the “stuff out there,’”
(The American Press Institute,
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/what-is-
journalism/makes-journalism-different-forms-communication/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2019)), which is the vast majority of what is purveyed on the internet.
Unlike the stuff out there—which Mr. Cernovich will recognize—journalism
“provide[s] people with verified information they can use to make better
decisions” and uses a systematic process – a discipline of verification – … to find
not just the facts, but also the ‘truth about the facts.’” Id. Journalism also knows
the important difference between seeking information to titillate and seeking
information to contribute to useful public discourse. A demand to unseal and
unredact all materials in this case is a confession to not knowing the difference.
3
It also unwittingly shows—beyond speculation—how Mr. Cernovich, as a
member of the “media,” intends to use the prurient information he seeks. The
reckless dissemination of heretofore sealed and redacted information about non-
parties to the underlying lawsuit is the realization of the non-parties’ greatest fear
when the district court coerced—and Ms. Giuffre, waving the Protective Order,
encouraged—the non-parties to surrender in discovery their most intimate, private
and sensitive personal information.
Mr. Cernovich’s idea that he may use the summary judgment materials to
judge non-parties to be “perpetrators of horrible crimes” is particularly reckless.
The summary judgment materials contain factually baseless accusations lodged
against dozens of individuals, “some famous, some not,” Sp. App. 27, and
documents wholly irrelevant to summary judgment but inserted into the record by
Ms. Giuffre to titillate members of the “media” like Mr. Cernovich and support
her 15-year-long publicity tour.
We assume Mr. Cernovich’s lack of charity toward non-parties falsely
accused by Ms. Giuffre does not extend to his co-appellant Mr. Dershowitz, who by
Mr. Cernovich said gave him career “inspir[ation]” and for whom Mr. Cernovich
is producing a film in which Mr. Dershowitz has the starring role. See Giuffre’s Op.
Br., Doc.132 at 23 (Giuffre v. Maxwell, Nos. 17-1625 & 1722 (2d Cir.)).
4
Mr. Dershowitz, himself a non-party to the underlying lawsuit, has presented a
compelling case, without the use of summary judgment materials, that to gin up
publicity and increase her story’s value to potential buyers, Ms. Giuffre fabricated
from the ground up out of whole cloth her “false and grotesque” sexual allegations
against him and others. Dershowitz’s Op. Br., Doc.67 at 1 (Giuffre v. Maxwell, Nos.
17-1625 & 1722 (2d Cir.)).
Mr. Cernovich suggests John Doe somehow waived his privacy interest in
the information he disclosed under the Protective Order because he “took no
action below to intervene and oppose [sic].” Doc.264 at 2. This is fatuous. Neither
Mr. Doe nor any other non-party had any need to “intervene” and “take action”
below so long as the district court held to its long-stated view that it should
safeguard the parties’ and non-parties’ private sexual information obtained
pursuant to the Protective Order.
Mr. Cernovich also argues that the Protective Order “provided no
guarantee” that non-parties’ information would remain sealed “if [it became] part
of the summary judgment record.” Doc.264 at 2. There are few “guarantees” in
life; so that argument merely erects a straw man who begs the question. What the
non-parties—and the parties—had was not a “guarantee” but the Second Circuit’s
commitment to the “strong presumption against access to sealed documents when
5
there was reasonable reliance on a previously granted protective order, absent
extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need.” Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG,
377 F.3d 133, 142 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). How much that
strong presumption should weigh in the context of a motion to unseal summary
judgment materials is the question here, the answer to which Mr. Cernovich’s
“guarantee” argument makes no contribution.
Mr. Cernovich misrepresented Ms. Maxwell’s position in the district court
regarding the summary judgment materials. He argues that “only” Ms. Giuffre
opposed his district court motion relating to the summary judgment materials, and
Ms. Maxwell did not. Doc.264 at 2. Revealing the motivation for the
misrepresentation, Mr. Cernovich then argues Ms. Maxwell “has waived any
objection” to reversal of the district court’s 5/3/2017 Order from which
Mr. Cernovich appealed. There are multiple problems with this argument.
The district court found that Mr. Cernovich did not seek to unseal any court
filings; instead he sought to modify the Protective Order, an issue not before the
Court in the appeal, No. 18-2868, in which Ms. Maxwell is an appellee.
Additionally, he conflates (a) not filing a response to his motion to modify the
Protective Order and (b) consenting to the relief he requested. A party may have
any number of reasons to decline to file a response to a motion, from none of which
6
may the movant properly infer consent to the requested relief. This is why
Mr. Cernovich cites no authority to support his conflation. As to Mr. Cernovich’s
district court motion, for instance, Ms. Giuffre had filed a strenuous opposition; an
opposition from Ms. Maxwell would have been superfluous.
The argument that Ms. Maxwell “waived any objection” on appeal to this
Court’s unsealing of the summary judgment materials is substantially groundless.
As we pointed out in our motion to add Ms. Maxwell as a party to Appeal
No. 18-2868, she was the only party to object to the Herald’s motion to unseal and
unredact all court filings, including the summary judgment materials. Doc.41 at 2.
Finally, Mr. Cernovich argues that the district court “had the opportunity to
unseal” the summary judgment materials and because it “abused its discretion
when it failed to do so,” this Court should do so on appeal to avoid “delays.”
Doc.264 at 2-3. This is a non-sequitur unmoored to legal authority. When a district
court abuses its discretion, the Supreme Court and this Court uniformly have held
that the remedy is remand of the case to the district court. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit never has
appropriated the district court’s Nixon balancing function.
7
The “delay” from a remand does not bear on this remedy. By the time this
Court in Lugosch concluded the district court had abused its discretion in denying
the unseal motion, the movant-newspapers had waited eighteen months. Unlike
this case, which was dismissed and closed nearly two years ago, the Lugosch
litigation was ongoing. Despite this “delay” and despite the Second Circuit’s
attribution of the delay to the district court, the Lugosch Court nonetheless
remanded the case to the district court to conduct promptly the balancing of
interests required by Nixon.
March 28, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
8
Appellee Maxwell’s Reply to Appellant Cernovich’s Response re Order to Show Cause on
the following persons:

Christine N. Walz
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) Andrew G. Celli (acelli@ecbalaw.com)
Sanford L. Bohrer
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com) Kerrie L. Campbell
(kcampbell@kcamlaw.com)
Jay M. Wolman
(jmw@randazza.com) Nicholas James Lewin
Marc J. Randazza (nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
(mjr@randazza.com) Paul M. Krieger
s/ Nicole Simmons
9

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007

Date: April 01, 2019 DC Docket #: 15-cv-7433

DC Judge: Sweet
On March 29, 2019 the Motion to file Amicus, on behalf of the Amicus John Doe, was submitted
in the above referenced case. The document does not comply with the FRAP or the Court's Local
Rules for the following reason(s):
(Local Rule 32.1)
___X___ Incorrect Filing Event : Please use the filing event “Reply to Opposition
______ Other:
necessary, no later than April 3, 2019. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and
the Local Rules, will be deemed timely filed.

Case 18-2868, Document 185,
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page1 of 15
18-2868
IN THE

Plaintiff-Appellee,
---against---
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,

CONSOLIDATED REPLY OF JOHN DOE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MAXWELL’S OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT’S
MARCH 11, 2019 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
Tel.: (212) 390-9550
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page2 of 15
---against---

Respondents,

183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page3 of 15
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
A. Amicus Proceeded In A Timely Fashion—This Court’s Show

Cause Order Served As The Triggering Event ................................................ 3
B. The Stated Interest of Amicus Is Properly Before The Court ......................... 6
C. The Basis Compelling Redaction Is Plainly Evident ...................................... 8
D. Amicus Has Properly Identified The Interest Of Amicus And

Other Third Persons Relevant To The Disposition Of This
Matter .............................................................................................................10
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................11
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page4 of 15
Cases
Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, 814 F.3d

132 (2d Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................6
Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm,

834 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ..................................................................... 8
In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) ........................................... 6
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) ...................... 9
Shi Liang Lin v. United States DOJ, 2d Cir. Nos. 02-4611, 02-4629,
03-40837, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28465 (Nov. 13, 2006) ................................. 8
Trendi Sportswear, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda (In re Indu Craft Inc.), 580
F.App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................8
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) .........................................3, 9
United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D.N.Y.1991)....................................... 8
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 2d Cir. No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13127 (May 25, 2017) ............................................................................. 8
ii
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page5 of 15
Amicus John Doe submits this Brief in reply to the opposition of Plaintiff-
Appellee-Giuffre (“Plaintiff”) and Intervenor-Appellant Miami Herald (“Herald”)
to his Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Brief.
The oppositions offered in response to Amicus’ Motion are without
merit. Indeed, Plaintiff’s arguments are in stark contrast to those she made in the
underlying proceeding advocating for closure of the record because of privacy
concerns – claiming the allegations contained in the file included “misstatements
and falsehoods”; claiming the Second Circuit does “not allow a court to unseal
private and otherwise protected materials to conduct a public smear campaign”;
and claiming if the summary judgment motion was denied, “no adjudication” of
the allegations would occur. R-589, at 7−11. Amicus agrees. These same
arguments fully support Amicus’ interest and compel the relief sought.
But having fully secured the benefits of the privacy protections afforded by
the District Court and a confidential settlement, Plaintiff now elects to reverse
course and oppose the redaction of names and other identifying information of
non-participant third persons.
The proffered justification for now opposing the redactions, that the public
needs to know her claims, rings hollow: For more than a decade, Plaintiff has been
permitted to publish her claims to the world. No gag order has been imposed – her
ability to share her story and personal experiences remains unfettered.

183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page6 of 15
Of course, a judicial disclosure of her unadjudicated claims is significant in
one obvious regard: statements made outside of this judicial proceeding do not
enjoy the same privilege from a defamation claim; the unadjudicated allegations
can only become the subject of defamation claims if published outside a judicial
forum. Thus shielded by the litigation privilege, Plaintiff now asks this Court to
disclose her unadjudicated claims without affording innocent third parties a forum
for protecting their privacy interests, challenging these claims, or seeking redress
for the resulting reputation damage.
As does the Herald. Rather than securing information directly from the
primary source, namely Plaintiff, it advocates for an order compelling disclosure of
judicial records so that it can publish unadjudicated allegations against persons
who have never been charged, never been sued, and have never once publicly
identified as alleged conspirators. Such attacks presume guilt; the
mischaracterizations and false statements repeated throughout the briefing
demonstrate the reputational damage that will arise in the absence of careful
redactions.
Defamation-defense and publishing strategy are not permissible
considerations in accounting for, and weighing, the privacy rights of third persons
against the public’s right of access to ensure the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Nor is the presumption of access intended to serve as a tool for a litigant to publish
2
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page7 of 15
scandalous allegations against third persons who never participated in the
proceedings. Rather, “[t]he presumption of access is based on the need for federal
courts, although independent – indeed, particularly because they are independent –
to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the
administration of justice.” United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”). Noteworthy here, none of the many briefs submitted
suggest any impropriety or irregularity in the District Court proceedings.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff and the Herald vigorously oppose Amicus speaking
on behalf of the interest of third persons potentially implicated by disclosure of the
unadjudicated allegations – even though this Court’s precedent specifically
instructs that “the privacy interests of innocent third parties . . . should weigh
heavily in a court’s balancing equation.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050. Indeed, the
Court itself has a specific responsibility to protect the interest of non-parties in
determining that balance.
Amicus should be heard. Plaintiff and the Herald offer no legitimate reason
for the Court not to grant Amicus’ motion and consider Amicus’ brief.
A. Amicus Proceeded In A Timely Fashion—This Court’s Show

Cause Order Served As The Triggering Event.
Arguments that the Amicus Brief is untimely ignore both the proceedings
before the District Court and Second Circuit precedent. Before the District Court,
there was no necessity or cause for Amicus to participate: each party sought a
3
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page8 of 15
Protective Order; each party filed, and did not otherwise object to the filing of,
materials under seal; and the parties subsequently privately settled their dispute,
thus eliminating a trial and public adjudication of the dispute. The Protective
Order expressly provided for disposition of all confidential materials at the
conclusion of the proceedings. R-62, ¶ 12.
Plaintiff attempts a misdirection ploy, arguing that third parties “understood,
through the plain language of the protective order, that confidentiality was to be
lifted when this case went to trial,” and any reasonable expectation of privacy
existed only through the trial date. App. Doc. 147, at 4. Setting aside the obvious
point that the District Court would have ultimately determined admissibility, no
trial ever occurred. Thus, Plaintiff cites the wrong section of the Protective Order
– Paragraph 12 controls, and the expectation of privacy never ceased either under
the procedures implemented before the District Court or, more importantly, this
Court’s precedent.
Plaintiff’s argument before this Court is especially remarkable when one
considers the arguments she previously asserted in response to Mr. Cernovich’s
Motion to Intervene in the Court below:
• “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56.1

Statement of Fact is rife with misstatements and falsehoods.” R-589,
at 7.
4
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page9 of 15
• “The Second Circuit does not allow a court to unseal private and
otherwise protected material to enable a non-party to conduct a public
smear campaign.” Id. at 9.
• “Courts routinely maintain the seal over materials for which

confidentiality is important, including summary judgment materials.”
Id. at 10.
• “If the motion is denied, then there will be no ‘adjudication’ as a

result of the motion- the jury will make the adjudication at trial- a trial
that will be open to the public.” Id. at 11.
• “The pages and pages of exhibits (for example) attached to

Defendant’s summary judgment will play, at best, a neglible [sic] role
in resolving this lawsuit.” Id.
• “In this case, Ms. Giuffre - and multiple other deponents - reasonably
relied on this Court’s Protective Order in giving testimony and
producing documents.” Id. at 13.
• “Third-party witnesses have done the same. Under Martindell, this

Court cannot take away those protections after the fact.” Id. at 14.
Plaintiff’s opposition to Amicus’s motion is replete with statements squarely
contradicting her prior arguments to the District Court.
Even then, it was unnecessary for Amicus to pursue any action or argument
before the lower court because this Court’s precedent charged the District Court
with the task, in the first instance, of protecting the interest and privacy of third
persons. As stated by this Court in In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116
(2d Cir. 1987), “[t]he job of protecting [privacy rights] rests heavily upon the
shoulders of the trial judge, since all the parties who may be harmed by disclosure
5
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page10 of 15
are typically not before the court.” The District Court discharged this obligation.
It found that privacy was the compelling reason rebutting the presumption of
access, and the court’s privacy analysis expressly considered the privacy interests
of third persons. R-953, at 37.
Nothing changed with the subsequent appeal before this Court. The
consensus issue on appeal was whether the District Court abused its discretion.
See Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 2016). The remedy for an abuse of discretion is reversal with instructions
on remand. Accordingly, only if this Court found an abuse of discretion and
remanded for further proceedings before the District Court would the potential
involvement of Amicus in the litigation have arisen. It was only following this
Court’s Order to Show Cause, which appeared to contemplate the potential release
of the Summary Judgment Materials by this Court, that Amicus had reason to
become involved.
B. The Stated Interest of Amicus Is Properly Before The Court.
Plaintiff and the Herald argue that Amicus has not properly stated his
interest, or that the interest Amicus has proffered is personal and thus not properly
considered. But Amicus has readily satisfied the standard for its submission. First,
Amicus has plainly stated it is not affiliated or associated with any of the parties –
and thus it is appropriate to submit an amicus brief. Plaintiff’s speculation and
6
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page11 of 15
conspiracy theories as to connectivity and relationships are simply that:
speculation and unfounded theories. And Amicus’ voice is particularly needed
where, as here, Defendant-Appellee advances arguments intended to protect the
privacy interest of the parties and discovery participants while Amicus, in contrast,
advocates on behalf of third parties who did not participate in the underlying
proceedings.
Second, Amicus has identified the specific interest implicated – the
disclosure of private facts and false accusations against non-participants who never
had the prior opportunity (or even a future opportunity in light of the litigation
privilege) to respond. This interest which Amicus seeks to protect is not confined
to his personal situation, but applies more broadly to other similarly situated third
persons who may also be identified in the Summary Judgment Materials.
The Herald, in opposing our motion on the basis that Doe is pursuing his
own interests, cherry-picks a quotation from United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp.
1157, 1158 (E.D.N.Y.1991). See Doc. 159, at 3. That is deeply misleading. The
Gotti court goes on to explain that the “literal translation of the phrase [amicus
curiae] does not always accurately translate in fact.” Gotti, at 1158. That court
noted that “[o]ther functions served by amicus curiae are to provide supplementary
assistance to existing counsel and insuring a complete and plenary presentation of
difficult issues so that the court may reach a proper decision.” Id.
7
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page12 of 15
Indeed, “there is no rule . . . that amici must be totally
disinterested.” Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm,
834 F.Supp. 1410, 1413 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). To that end, this Court has conferred
amicus status on those with a direct interest in the outcome of the case. See, e.g.,
Trendi Sportswear, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda (In re Indu Craft Inc.), 580 F.App’x 33,
34 (2d Cir. 2014) (“given [the bank’s] equitable interest in the outcome of this
case, we sua sponte grant [the bank] status as amicus curiae in each of the appeals,
and consider the arguments it presented to this Court”).
It is not uncommon for this Court to even “invite amicus curiae briefs from
interested parties.” See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 2d Cir. No. 15-3775,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127, at *6 (May 25, 2017) (emphasis added); Shi Liang
Lin v. United States DOJ, 2d Cir. Nos. 02-4611, 02-4629, 03-40837, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28465, at *1 (Nov. 13, 2006) (same).
The interest of Amicus and similarly situated third persons is thus properly
identified and presented to this Court.
C. The Basis Compelling Redaction Is Plainly Evident.
Implicit in the oppositions is the contention that the analysis begins and ends
with a determination that the Summary Judgment Materials are judicial documents.
Plaintiff even goes so far as to characterize this Court’s Order to Show Cause as
“creat[ing] something akin to a super-presumption of access.” App. R-147, at 2.
8
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page13 of 15
That Order does, and ought do, nothing of the sort. It merely cites this Court’s
prior decision in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir.
2006) for the proposition that the Summary Judgment Materials are judicial
documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches.
But this presumption of access is not absolute. It may be overridden by
specific findings that restrictions are necessary to preserve a legitimate competing
interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Perhaps the clearest
example occurs when the privacy or reputational interest of third persons is
implicated in the court records: “the privacy interests of innocent third parties . . .
should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at
1050.
Knowing the Court’s duty to protect such privacy interests, Plaintiff and the
Herald resort to the rhetorical argument that Amicus must offer specific reasons for
each requested redaction – even though Amicus is not privy to the actual record
and even though it is the court that is charged with undertaking such review. And
their argument that Amicus’ concerns are “generalized” fares no better. It is the
parties’ own representations and the District Court’s own description of the
contents of the contested documents upon which Amicus relies. They collectively
make clear that the contents are not confined to statements about the litigants or
persons who participated in the discovery process – they specifically include
9
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page14 of 15
references to untested allegations of wrongdoing implicating third persons.
Statements implicating a person in a crime or injuring a person in his business or
occupation constitute libel per se. No speculation is required; reputational harm is
presumed as a matter of law.
D. Amicus Has Properly Identified The Interest Of Amicus And

Other Third Persons Relevant To The Disposition Of This Matter.
Finally, Plaintiff and the Herald challenge Amicus’ interest in these
proceedings, claiming Amicus and other third persons have no privacy interest in a
matter involving underage sex trafficking. This argument is part and parcel of
their apparent theory that anyone named in a judicial filing presumptively forfeits
any privacy interest.
But allegations that appear in the Summary Judgment Documents are just
that: allegations. They have not been litigated anywhere. Plaintiff’s contention
that they were actually adjudicated by the summary judgment process is not only
demonstrably false, it flatly contradicts her statement to the District Court that
denial of the motion for summary judgment would leave the allegations
unadjudicated. R-589, at 11.
Amicus and other third persons possess privacy interests that are deserving
of protection. Their rights are particularly compelling given that these allegations
may be the product of false statements, mistake, confusion, or failing memories.
And appropriate protections are required here to protect third persons whose
10
183, 04/02/2019,
03/29/2019, 2530431,
2529235, Page15 of 15
privacy and reputations are jeopardized by the release and publication of
unadjudicated allegations – allegations that will never be resolved in the instant
case in light of the parties’ settlement, that are not believed to be pending for
adjudication elsewhere, and that, because the underlying events occurred more
than sixteen years ago, presumably will never be litigated in the future. R-1,
Compl. ¶ 9. What public interest is served in releasing accusations that Plaintiff
herself has been unwilling to publicly state?
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Amicus should be granted leave to file his brief. 1

New York, New York
By: /s/ Nicholas J. Lewin

Nicholas J. Lewin
Paul M. Krieger
Jonathan F. Bolz
Tel.: (212) 390-9550

1
This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2)(C) because,
excluding certain parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f) this document
contains 2,422 words.
11
PAUL G. CASSELL
Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah
Telephone: 801-585-5202
cassellp@law.utah.edu*
April 8, 2019
VIA CM/ECF
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Rule 28(j) Letter Regarding Dershowitz and Cernovich v. Maxwell,

Court of Appeals Docket No. 16-3945, and Giuffre v. Maxwell, Court of
Appeals Docket No. 18-2868
Dear Ms. O’Hagan-Wolfe:
This appeal involves whether certain materials sealed by the district court during
pre-trial proceedings should remain under seal. The Court recently issued an Order to
Show Cause why various materials under seal in the district court filed in connection
with a summary judgment motion involving sex trafficking allegations against Jeffrey
Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell should not be unsealed (DE 138). Various briefs and
motions have been submitted in connection with that order.
Under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), Ms. Giuffre now submits the following newly-
available information supporting her position. On April 3, 2019, the House
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies
of the House Appropriation Committee held a hearing during which U.S. Labor
Secretary Alex Acosta testified. Secretary Acosta (when he was the U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida) had approved a highly controversial non-prosecution
agreement blocking federal prosecution of Epstein for various sex trafficking and
related offenses. During last week’s hearing, Secretary Acosta testified that that a
Florida grand jury had reviewed “all of the evidence” related to Epstein’s sex trafficking
and had decided to return only a single count state indictment in which only one of
Epstein’s victims was involved. A recording can be found at the link below.
https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/department-of-labor-budget-
request-for-fy-2020.
*
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended
to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah.
April 8, 2019
Page |2
The sealed summary judgment materials that Ms. Giuffre has asked to have
unsealed are part of the “evidence” concerning Epstein’s sex trafficking crimes. The
materials thus bear directly on the accuracy of Secretary Acosta’s testimony and, more
broadly, on the propriety of his actions in approving the non-prosecution agreement.
Ms. Giuffre respectfully submits that the fact that a U.S. House Subcommittee
was directly questioning Secretary Acosta about these matters just last week support
Ms. Giuffre’s (and The Miami Herald’s) assertions that an important public interest will
be served by unsealing the materials in question.
Paul G. Cassell
For Ms. Giuffre
cc: All counsel of record (via CM/ECF)
2

18-2868
to Strike Virgina L. Giuffre's Rule 28(j) Letter
Motion for: ______________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

Strike Ms. Giuffre's April 8, 2019 letter
________________________________________________________
Giuffre v. Maxwell
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell
MOVING PARTY:_______________________________________ Virginia L. Giuffre
OPPOSING PARTY:____________________________________________
___Plaintiff ✔
___Defendant
Adam Mueller
MOVING ATTORNEY:___________________________________ Paul Cassell
________________________________________________________ S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah
_______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 383 S. University Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
_______________________________________________________________
303.831.7364; amueller@hmflaw.com
________________________________________________________ 801.585.5202; cassellp@law.utah.edu
_______________________________________________________________
✔
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
___Yes ___No


s/ Adam Mueller
_________________________________ 4/12/2019
Date:__________________ ✔
Form T-1080 (rev.12-13)


Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Ghislaine Maxwell’s Motion to Strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s Rule

28(j) Letter
Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell moves to strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s April 8,
2019 letter to this Court purportedly filed under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(j).
Ms. Giuffre’s letter directed this Court’s attention to congressional
testimony offered by U.S. Labor Secretary Alex Acosta. Ms. Giuffre’s use of Rule
28(j) is improper for at least two reasons.

First, Secretary Acosta’s testimony is not “authority” under Rule 28(j),
which provides:
If pertinent and significant authorities come to a party’s attention after

the party’s brief has been filed--or after oral argument but before
decision--a party may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter, with a
copy to all other parties, setting forth the citations. The letter must
state the reasons for the supplemental citations, referring either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally.
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (emphasis added). Under Rule 28(j), “authority” includes
cases, statutes, rules, and the like, which provide a basis for decision by the court.
See Eric Magnuson & David Herr, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
§ 12:21 (2018 ed.); see also United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.
1987) (refusing to consider a 28(j) letter that sought to “clarify” a point made by
counsel in oral argument rather than bring to the attention of the court
supplemental authority). Secretary Acosta’s congressional testimony is not
authority of anything. See Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 442, 455 (6th Cir.
2006) (unpublished) (refusing to consider an Rule 28(j) letter and its attachments
because the attachments “are not supplemental authorities at all; instead, they are
evidence of what has transpired in Lawrence’s application process”); Bowman v.
City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1107 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (striking Rule 28(j) letter
that brought to the court’s attention two reports issued by the district attorney and
the sheriff’s department because Rule 28(j) “deal[s] only with citation of
2
supplemental authority” while the two “reports constitute[d] additional evidence
and not authority” (emphasis in original)).
Second, Secretary Acosta’s testimony is not part of the record in this appeal.
While “Rule 28(j) permits a party to bring new authorities to the attention of the
court[,] it is not designed to bring new evidence through the back door.” Trans-
Sterling, Inc. v. Bible, 804 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis omitted). As
recognized by this Court, “The Rule cannot be used to submit new evidence to the
appeals court.” DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2005). See also
Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (striking purported Rule 28(j)
letter because it “offers no new authorities, but rather seeks to supplement the
record with new evidence”); Moore v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 549 F. App’x 651, 653
n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (striking 28(j) letter that tried to “provide new
evidence that was not part of the appellate record”).
Ms. Giuffre’s letter does not alert this Court to “authority” under Rule 28(j)
and instead attempts to put before the Court new, extra-record evidence. For these
reasons, this Court should strike Ms. Giuffre’s April 8, 2019 letter.
April 12, 2019
3
s/ Adam Mueller
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
4
I certify that on April 12, 2019, I served a copy of this Ghislaine Maxwell’s
Motion to Strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s Rule 28(j) Letter on the following persons:

Christine N. Walz
Sanford L. Bohrer
Jay M. Wolman
s/ Nicole Simmons
5
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C

Adam Mueller

Denver, Colorado 80203
PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628
www.hmflaw.com
amueller@hmflaw.com
April 12, 2019
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe

Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868, Response to Ms. Giuffre’s

April 8, 2019 Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter
Dear Ms. Wolfe:
On April 8, 2019, counsel for Ms. Giuffre submitted congressional

testimony by Secretary of Labor Alex Acosta as “supplemental authority”
under Rule 28(j). (Doc. 191). As explained in Ms. Maxwell’s motion to strike,
Ms. Giuffre’s letter does not supply “authority” within the meaning of Rule
28(j) and instead attempts to put before the Court new, extra-record evidence.
(Doc. 193). This Court should strike the letter. If this Court disagrees, we
submit this Rule 28(j) response.
Secretary Acosta’s testimony has no relevance to this appeal. He is not

mentioned in the summary judgment materials at the center of this case, and
his testimony, which lasted more than two hours, only briefly touched on the
non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the federal
government. The testimony did not involve Ms. Maxwell, and it has nothing to
do with this defamation action.
Nevertheless, if this Court concludes that Secretary Acosta’s testimony

is somehow relevant to the appeal, it should also consider Attorney General
William Barr’s testimony regarding his intended redactions to Special Counsel
Robert Mueller’s report. Attorney General Barr notified the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee that he intends to redact from the public report

April 12, 2019
Page 2
“information that implicates the privacy or reputational interests of peripheral

third parties who were not charged.”1
The privacy and reputational interests of peripheral third parties are at

stake in this case as well. These individuals provided highly sensitive, private,
and embarrassing testimony in reliance on the protective order and Ms.
Giuffre’s assurance of confidentiality.
If this Court does not affirm the district court’s order, the only
mechanism to protect the reliance interests of third parties is to remand the
case for further proceedings in the district court. These third parties were not
served with the briefs or this Court’s Order to Show Cause. And because they
do not have access to the sealed/redacted material, they cannot point to
information indirectly but clearly revealing their identity to the press or their
communities. An appellate court is not the proper forum to balance the
interests of all those who have a stake in this appeal.
Very Truly Yours,
Adam Mueller
cc: All counsel of record via CM/ECF and email
1
https://www.c-span.org/video/?459640-1/attorney-general-barr-thinks-spying-
occurred-trump-campaign&start=1310 (time stamp 21:55 – 22:07).

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
No. 18-2868
v.
SHARON CHURCH, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Respondents,
COMPANY,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VIRGINIA GIUFFRE’S RESPONSE IN

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE GHISLAINE
MAXWELL’S MOTION TO STRIKE MS. GIUFFRE’S RULE 28(J)
LETTER
Appellee Ms. Virginia Giuffre, by her counsel, hereby files this Response in
Opposition to Defendant-Appellee Maxwell’s Motion to Strike Ms. Giuffre’s Rule 28(j)
Letter. The motion is meritless and should be denied.
On March 11, 2019, this Court entered an order to show cause why materials
regarding a summary judgment motion in this case should not be unsealed. After all the
1
briefing regarding that motion had been filed, on April 3, 2019, the House
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee held a hearing during which
U.S. Labor Secretary Alex Acosta testified about Epstein-related subjects
connected to the summary judgment materials.
On April 8, 2019, Ms. Giuffre filed a supplemental authority letter calling
the Court’s attention to the hearing in support of her position that the summary
judgment materials related to matters of public interest.
April 12, 2019, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion to strike the letter.1
Maxwell first argues that testimony by the U.S. Secretary of Labor before
a congressional subcommittee is not an “authority” under Rule 28(j). Mot. at 2.
She cites no authority for that proposition and contrary persuasive authority
exists. See, e.g., Solze v. Shinseki, 2012 WL 4801411 at *1 (U.S. Ct. Vet. Apps.
2012) (denying motion to strike supplemental authorities consisting of “two
pieces of legislative history”). And standard legal usage is that an “authority”
can be any kind of “source, such as a statute, case, or treatise, cited in support
of a legal argument” – including not only “primary authority” but also
“secondary authority.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (10th ed. 2009).
1
Ms. Maxwell has previously filed multiple other motions in this case, including a
Motion to Dismiss (DE 63), a Motion to Strike (DE 87), a Motion for an Order to
Show Cause (DE 97), and a Motion to Reconsider and Hold in Abeyance (DE 141).
2
Indeed, supplemental authorities are commonly understood to include an
“intervening matter,” U.S. Supreme Court Rule 25, or “new developments,”
Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761, 763 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 8th Cir. R.
Appx. III(I)(2)).
Maxwell next argues that Secretary Acosta’s testimony is “not part of the
record in his appeal.” Mot. at 3. But obviously congressional materials are
never part of the “record” in a case, but rather are simply materials that a court
may examine to make an appropriate ruling in a case. During the April 3, 2019
hearing, the Chair of the Subcommittee began by noting, a few seconds after the
hearing started, that the Secretary of Labor was testifying “under a cloud of
controversy regarding the Epstein case.” This newly available statement (and
others like it during the hearing) are not offered to build a trial court “record”
providing or disproving any particular factual point but rather to support Ms.
Giuffre’s argument on appeal that the materials at issue relate to a matter of great
current public interest. 2
2
Maxwell cites Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1107 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992),
for the proposition that additional “evidence” is not a proper subject for a supplemental
authority letter. But the Seventh Circuit later noted its “longstanding rule that we will
make exceptions [to the Bowman position] where the new evidence is of a
‘proceeding[] in other courts, both within and outside of the federal judiciary system, if
the proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Phillips Medical System
Int’l, B.V. v. Bruetman, 982 F.2d 211, 215 n.2 (1992) (citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Hope,
906 F.2d 254, 260-61 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990)). While the congressional hearing Ms.
Giuffre cites is not “evidence,” the principle that later “proceedings” having a “direct
3
For all these reasons, the Court should deny Ms. Maxwell’s motion to
strike.
Dated: April 15, 2019
/s/ Paul G.Cassell

Paul G. Cassell
University of Utah
(801) 585-52023
relation” to matters at issue are the proper subject of a Rule 28(j) letter supports Ms.
Giuffre’s position.
3
representation.
4
I hereby certify that on April 15, 2019, I caused the foregoing document(s) to
be submitted to the Court’s ECF system for service and filing, and the document
was thereby served upon counsel of record through that system.
/s/ Paul G. Cassell

___________________________
PAUL G. CASSELL
University of Utah
(801) 585-52024
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
Sigrid McCawley
Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP
(954) 356-0011
4
This daytime business address is provided for contact purposes only and is not intended
to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private
representation.
4
PAUL G. CASSELL
Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law
Telephone: 801-585-5202
April 15, 2019

VIA CM/ECF

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868, Response to Ms. Maxwell’s April 12, 2019
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter on Redactions by Attorney General Barr
This appeal concerns whether to unseal a summary judgment ruling and related
materials. Ms. Maxwell now contends that her position is supported by Attorney
General William Barr’s recent testimony that he plans to redact from the soon-to-be-
released public version of the Mueller Report “information that implicates the privacy
or reputational interests of peripheral third parties who were not charged.” The
Attorney General’s testimony actually supports Ms. Giuffre’s position that the materials
at issue here should be unsealed.
The Attorney General’s controversial proposed redactions arise in different

circumstances, where the Mueller report found no collusion/conspiracy – in contrast to
Judge Sweet’s summary judgment ruling finding sufficient evidence of an international
sex trafficking conspiracy to move forward to trial.
More fundamentally, the Attorney General is redacting information collected

through secret grand jury proceeding and classified law enforcement investigations,
where the resulting materials are typically sealed permanently. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e). In contrast, here the materials relate to a federal court’s summary judgment ruling
that is presumptively public covered by a temporary protective order that (through its
own terms) was set to expire at trial.
*
The Attorney General also plans to redact only information about “peripheral
third parties,” not key figures in the alleged collusion/conspiracy. Here, Ms. Maxwell
has not proposed limited redactions related to peripheral third parties, but rather
wholesale redactions of entire documents. In contrast, Ms. Giuffre has already
submitted proposed redactions removing the name of the one peripheral third party
mentioned in the summary judgment materials. The other third parties mentioned are
not peripheral to the sex trafficking allegations.
Finally, whatever “privacy” interests third parties might have in possible

interactions with alleged Russian agents, here third parties can have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in their interactions with underage girls who have been sexually
trafficked to them. (The minor victims do have privacy interests, and Ms. Giuffre has
proposed appropriate redactions for their names.)
For all these reasons, Attorney General Barr’s approach, if anything, supports
Ms. Giuffre’s position that all the summary judgment materials should be immediately
released, with only the limited redactions she has proposed.
Paul G. Cassell
for Ms. Giuffre
2

Adam Mueller

PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628
www.hmflaw.com
amueller@hmflaw.com
April 17, 2019

Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868, Ms. Giuffre’s April 15, 2019
Letter
Dear Ms. Wolfe:
On April 8, 2019, Ms. Giuffre submitted congressional testimony by

Secretary of Labor Alex Acosta as “supplemental authority” under Rule 28(j).
(Doc. 191). On April 12, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion to strike. (Doc. 193). As
expressly permitted by Rule 28(j), Ms. Maxwell also filed a response letter for
this Court’s consideration should it deny the motion to strike. (Doc. 196).
On April 15, Ms. Giuffre filed yet another letter. (Doc. 200). Like Ms.
Giuffre’s April 8 letter, however, the April 15 letter is improper.
The April 15 letter is improper because Rule 28(j) permits a response to

supplemental authority; it does not permit a reply. Ms. Maxwell did not file
supplemental authority of her own; she merely and properly filed a response to
Ms. Giuffre’s letter. Accordingly, Ms. Giuffre’s April 15 letter is improper,
and this Court should decline to consider it.
Very Truly Yours,
Adam Mueller
cc: All counsel of record via CM/ECF and email


Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellee,
v. No. 18-2868

Respondents,
COMPANY,
Ghislaine Maxwell’s Reply in Support of Her Motion to Strike

Virginia L. Giuffre’s Rule 28(j) Letter
Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell submits this reply in support of her motion to
strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s April 8, 2019 letter to this Court purportedly filed under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j).
Ms. Giuffre asserts that Ms. Maxwell “cite[d] no authority” in support of
her motion to strike. Resp. at 2. That is not true. In fact, the motion cited a treatise
and three decisions from federal courts of appeals, including one from this Court.
Mot. at 2 (citing Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 442, 455 (6th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished); Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1107 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1987); Eric Magnuson &
David Herr, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (2018 ed.)).
The response next likens Secretary Acosta’s testimony to “legislative
history.” Resp. at 2 (citing Solze v. Shinseki, 2012 WL 4801411, * 1 (Vet. App. No.
12-1512, Oct. 10, 2012) (unpublished)). But this Court does not have before it a
question of statutory interpretation, and Secretary Acosta did not purport to
explain any legislative intent. His testimony is neither “primary” nor “secondary”
authority.1 See Resp. at 2.
Ms. Giuffre’s final argument mischaracterizes Ms. Maxwell’s objection. Ms.
Giuffre is correct that Secretary Acosta’s testimony is not part of this appellate
“record” in the sense that Acosta testified before Congress and not the district
court. Resp. at 3. That would not be a problem if Ms. Giuffre were using his
testimony as “legislative history.” But she’s not. She’s using Acosta’s testimony
to establish facts outside the record, facts that have nothing to do with Ms. Maxwell
1
Ms. Giuffre’s reliance on the decision in Solze is misleading for another
reason: The motion to strike in that case was based in part on the assertion that the
supplemental authority raised a new argument “not addressed in the Secretary’s
[prior submissions].” 2012 WL 4801411, at *1. Ms. Maxwell did not make a similar
assertion in her motion to strike.
2
(she was not mentioned at the hearing), that are very much in dispute, and that Ms.
Maxwell cannot test through cross-examination. That is improper under Rule
28(j). E.g., DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 118 (2d. Cir. 2005) (“The Rule cannot
be used to submit new evidence to the appeals court.”).
For these reasons, as well as those given in the motion, this Court should
strike Ms. Giuffre’s April 8, 2019 letter.
April 18, 2019.
s/ Adam Mueller
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
3
I certify that on April 18, 2019, I served a copy of this Ghislaine Maxwell’s
Reply in Support of Her Motion to Strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s Rule 28(j) Letter on the
following persons:

Christine N. Walz
Sanford L. Bohrer
Jay M. Wolman
s/ Nicole Simmons
4
Holland & Knight

701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3300 | Miami, FL 33131 | T 305.374.8500 | F 305.789.7799
Flolland & Knight LLP | www.hklaw.com
Sanford L. Bohrer
+1 305-789-7678
Sandy.Bohrer@hklaw.com
June 28, 2019
VIA CM/ECF
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of the Court

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 18-2868

Intervenor-Appellants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28 (j)
Dear Ms. O’Hagan Wolfe:
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), Intervenors-Appellants Miami Herald Media Company

and Julie Brown (together, “Appellants”) respectfully submit this Notice of Supplemental
Authority and the attached Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Submission on Proposed
Remedies (“Government’s Submission”) filed earlier this week in the action Jane Doe 1 and 2 v.
United States, Civil Action No. 08-80736, pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (the “Florida Action”).
Appellants seek the unsealing of the full District Court docket in this action under the
common law and First Amendment rights of access to judicial documents. The documents sought
concern the allegations that Jeffrey Epstein and others related to him were involved in the sexual
abuse of underage girls. It is expected that these documents will shed light on the question of
whether the criminal case against Epstein was properly handled.
The Government’s Submission highlights the on-going need for public access to these
documents. In February 2019, Judge Kenneth Marra ruled that the Government violated the
victims’ right to conferral under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act and ordered filings regarding the
parties’ proposed remedies to address these violations. {See Florida Action, Dkt. 435.) The
Government’s Submission makes clear that access to the documents Appellants seek in this matter
remains an issue of critical public concern, as the Government essentially argues that Epstein’s
victims are not entitled to any meaningful redress, including partial recission, declaratory relief,
and specific injunctive relief requested. If adopted, the Government’s proposal would continue to
Anchorage | Atlanta | Austin | Boston | Charlotte | Chicago | Dallas | Denver | Fort Lauderdale | Fiouston | Jacksonville
Lakeland | Los Angeles | Miami | New York | Orlando | Philadelphia | Portland | San Francisco | Stamford | Tallahassee | Tampa
Tysons | Washington, D.C. | West Palm Beach
Bogota | London | Mexico City

June 28, 2019

Page 2
deprive Epstein’s victims and the public the opportunity to fully review the facts of Epstein’s case
and reach their own conclusions about the Government’s decision to enter into the non-prosecution
agreement with Epstein.
Although the Government has acknowledged that it “should have communicated with the
victims in a straightforward and transparent way,” it provides no mechanism for public
examination of the Government’s decision-making process. This further attempt to evade public
accountability makes the unsealing of the judicial documents in this matter all the more important.
Sincerely yours,
/s Sanford L. Bohrer
Sanford L. Bohrer
SLB:es
Attachment
#68858136 vl
Supplemental Authority
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 462 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/24/2019 Page 1 of 32
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2,

Civil Action No.
Petitioners,
08-80736-CIV-MARRA
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
• Government's Response to Petitioners' Submission on Proposed Remedies

The United States of America, by Byung J. Pak, United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Georgia, and Jill E. Steinberg and Nathan P. Kitchens,
Special Attorneys for the Southern District of Florida, files this response to
Petitioners' proposed remedies.
INTRODUCTION
The question before this Court is what remedies, if any, should be accorded
Petitioners under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) based on this Court's
finding that the government failed to confer with Petitioners prior to entering
into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Jeffrey Epstein.1 Petitioners seek
1 This Court previously found that Petitioners are crime victims under the
CVRA; a crime victim's rights under the CVRA attach before the
government brings formal charges against a defendant; the CVRA's
"reasonable right to confer" extends to conferring about non-prosecution
agreements; the CVRA authorizes the rescission of a non-prosecution
agreement reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations; and
the government violated the CVRA by failing to advise the victims that it
intended to enter into the NPA with Epstein. The government will not
what they call "rescission remedies," "apology remedies," "informational

remedies," "educational remedies," and "miscellaneous remedies" — all of which
constitute equitable relief, and none of which is authorized by the CYRA. But
even if the statute did allow equitable relief, Petitioners are not entitled to the
specific relief they are seeking.
Nevertheless, the government believes that it should have communicated its
resolution of the federal criminal investigation of Epstein to his victims more
effectively and in a more transparent manner. Although we cannot turn back
time and put the victims back in the position they would have been in over a
decade ago, the government believes the following proposed remedies would
respect their rights under the CYRA, balance the constitutional and statutory
obligations imposed on the government, and bring some level of finality to all
the parties.
DISCUSSION
1. The Government's Proposed Remedies.
A. The government should have communicated in a more transparent way

with victims.
As a matter of law, the government's position is that the legal obligations

under the CYRA do not attach prior to the government charging a case. Nor does
the CYRA authorize any of the remedies sought by the Petitioners — in part
because the CYRA does not contemplate its invocation in the context of
revisit these findings here except to note that it maintains all of its
objections.
2
Case 9;08-cv-80736-KAM Document 462 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/24/2019 Page 3 of 32
uncharged criminal conduct.2 At the same time, the government strives to

communicate with crime victims effectively and as transparently as possible.
There are myriad reasons why a prosecutor may decline to indict a case or
resolve a case with a plea to a less serious charge. These considerations are
highly contextual and involve a host of factors based upon the current state of
the law and provable evidence, as well as the experience that prosecutors and
their law enforcement partners develop working cases over many years. There
are instances when victims of a crime or third parties may disagree with a
/
prosecutor's decision, but that decision nevertheless remains with the prosecutor
and her supervisors, and this discretion is expressly preserved in the CVRA. See
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
Although the CVRA may not have required it, here, the government engaged
with the Petitioners about the status of the investigation and advised them that
the case was being actively pursued. At the same time, potential federal charges
were being resolved with a state court guilty plea in conjunction with the NPA.
Regardless of whether the government ultimately chose to pursue, decline, or
2 Indeed, under the CVRA, "crime victim" is a person directly and

proximately harmed as a result of the "commission of a Federal offense." 18
U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A). Thus, without identifying exactly which federal offense
was committed by filing formal charges, it is difficult to determine who was
directly and proximately harmed. Moreover, the crime victims' rights are tied to
a court proceeding, see 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1), which indicates that formal charges
are required prior to the attachment of rights under the CVRA. By Department
policy and practice, however, federal prosecutors usually go above and beyond
the obligations defined by the CVRA and interact with victims early on in a case.
3
otherwise resolve federal prosecution —a decision upon which we do not opine

here — the government should have communicated with the victims in a
straightforward and transparent way. Because the government did not
communicate more clearly and directly with the victims, the resolution in this
case has led some to conclude that the government chose for improper reasons
not to prosecute Epstein, a conclusion that remains unsubstantiated. The
government places high value in its work to support victims of crime, and its
communications with victims must reflect that value. The government regrets
that the manner in which it communicated the resolution of the Epstein case to
the victims fell short.
B. The Department of Justice's commitment to victims of human

trafficking and child exploitation supports targeted remedies to give the
Epstein victims a voice, an explanation, and finality.
Over the past decade, the Department of Justice has made combatting human
trafficking and child exploitation a national priority.3 Between Fiscal Years (FY)
2009 and 2016, the Department increased the number of human trafficking cases
3 See Department of Justice Releases First National Strategy for Child Exploitation
Prevention and Interdiction (Aug. 2,2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
department-justice-releases-first-national-strategy-child-exploitation-prevention-
and (Eric Holder comments); Introduction by Attorney General Loretta Lynch,
National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking (January 2017),
https: / / www.justice.gov/humantrafficking/ page / file / 922791 / download
(hereinafter National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking); Attorney General Jeff
Sessions Delivers Remarks at National Law Enforcement Training on Child Exploitation
(June 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ attorney-general-jeff-
sessions-delivers-remarks-national-law-enforcement-training-child.
4
Case 9;08-cv-80736-KAM Document 462 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/24/2019 Page 5 of 32
charged, defendants charged, and defendants convicted by roughly 70 percent in

comparison to the prior eight years, in addition to higher prosecution results in
cases involving child sex trafficking.4 In FY 2009, the Department charged 2,315
child exploitation cases involving 2,427 defendants; in FY 2015, that number
almost doubled to 4,211 cases involving 4,458 defendants.5 In addition, through
its Office of Justice Programs, the Department funds 61 coordinated task forces to
fight internet-facilitated crimes against children (ICAC).6 In FY 2008, the task
forces were funded at $16.9 million; in FY 2018 the funding for the ICAC
program was $28.6 million.7 Through its Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), the
Department provides more grant funding than any other federal agency to
programs that provide direct services to victims of human trafficking.8 Indeed,
this month, OVC announced its FY 2019 grant, which will award millions of
4 National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking at 1.

5 National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction (Aug. 2010),
at 5, https://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf; National Strategy
for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction (Apr. 2016), at 110-11,
https://www.justice.gov/psc/file/842411/download (hereinafter 2016 National
Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention).
6 Program Summary, Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program,
https: / / www.ojjdp .gov / programs / ProgSummary .asp?pi=3.
7 Id.
8 Announcements, Office for Victims of Crime,
https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/humantrafficking/ announcements.html.
5
dollars in funding to assist victims of trafficking.9 In April 2016, the Department

published a comprehensive strategy, in conjunction with several other federal
agencies, to combat child exploitation, including child sex trafficking.10 In 2013,
the Department and other agencies published a victim-dedicated action plan that
described the process by which the government will combat trafficking offenses
with a focus on providing support and services to victims.11
These programs and accomplishments matter because they reflect a
commitment on the part of the Department of Justice, which includes all federal
prosecutors, to combat human trafficking and crimes against children and fully
support and protect victims of crime. Any remedy the Court imposes in this
matter should reflect the fact that any mistakes made in this case stand in
contrast to the Department's commitment to victims.
Any remedy the Court imposes should also have a nexus to the purpose of
the CVRA, which is to give victims a voice in the criminal justice process, but not
decision-making authority over prosecution decisions. Here the Court found that
the government violated the CVRA by failing to confer with the victims about
the NPA. The past cannot be undone; the government committed itself to the
terms of the NPA, and the parties have not disputed that Epstein complied with
9 OVC Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Direct Services to Support Victims of Human
Trafficking, https://www.ovc.gov/grants/pdftxt/FY19-Direct-Services-Human-
Trafficking-Solicitation.pdf.
10 2016 National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention.
11 Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking,
https: / / www.ovc. gov /pubs / Feder alHumanTr affickingStrategicPlan.p df.
6
its provisions. A number of Epstein's victims subsequently invoked the NPA to

enter into civil settlements with Epstein and, in that respect, also relied on its
terms.12 Any remedy for the CYRA violation should thus serve to give the
victims a voice, even though the prosecution decision remains out of their hands.
As such, the government proposes the following remedies:
• The Department of Justice will designate a representative to meet with

Petitioners, and any other Epstein victim who wishes to participate, to
discuss the government's decision to resolve the Epstein case and engage
in an open dialogue about that decision.
• The government will participate in a public court proceeding, presided

over by this Court, in which the Petitioners, and any other Epstein victim
who wishes to participate, can make a victim impact statement. That
hearing would be handled in a manner similar to the way the Court would
handle victim impact statements in the context of a criminal sentencing.
• All criminal prosecutors in the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) will undergo additional
training on the CYRA, victim rights, and victim assistance issues to be
completed no later than one year from the date of the Court's final order in
this case.
2. The CYRA Specifies the Enforcement Mechanism To Address Violations of

Its Terms and Does Not Authorize the Equitable Remedies Petitioners
Seek.
The government offers the proposed remedies above, not because it is

required to do so by law, but because it believes these corrective actions are
12 Based on information provided in response to the government's recent

efforts to confer with victims, more than a dozen victims invoked the NPA to
enter civil settlements with Epstein while protecting their anonymity.
7
necessary to give a voice to the victims of Jeffrey Epstein and an opportunity for
them to understand the true reasons why the government resolved the case in
the manner it did since they did not have that opportunity at the time. These
remedies are generally consistent with several remedies proposed by Petitioners.
But the law does not authorize this Court to grant other remedies Petitioners
seek, nor would such remedies promote the underlying purpose of the CVRA to
promote victims' participatory rights in the criminal justice process while
respecting their dignity and privacy.
Although Petitioners assert that the CVRA gives this Court "broad power to
craft appropriate remedies," Doc. 458 at 7, the statute's plain language says
otherwise. That language explicitly provides that a crime victim may not seek
damages against the United States:
No cause of action. — Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply
any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of
which the United States or any of its officers or employees could be held
liable in damages.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (emphasis in original).

Perhaps because Congress provided no cause of action for damages, it sought
compliance a different way: it included a section in the CVRA entitled
"Procedures to [P]remote [Cjompliance," in which it directed the United States
Attorney General to "promulgate regulations to enforce the rights of crime
victims and to ensure compliance by responsible officials with the obligations"
8
set out by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f). Congress further directed that these
regulations: (1) designate someone within the Department of Justice to receive
and investigate complaints relating to a rights violation; (2) require that DOJ
officials be trained on crime victims' rights and assist such employees in
responding to crime victims' needs; (3) provide "disciplinary sanctions,
including suspension or termination from employment, for employees of the
Department of Justice who willfully or wantonly fail to comply with provisions
of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims"; and (4) instruct that
the "Attorney General, or the designee of the Attorney General, shall be the final
arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be no judicial review of the final
decision of the Attorney General by a complainant." Id. at (f)(l)(A)-(D).
The Department of Justice did as Congress directed, and the resulting
regulations are found at 28 C.F.R. § 45.10. These regulations outline the
procedures a crime victim shall take when he or she believes that one of their
CYRA rights has been violated. 28 C.F.R. § 45.10(c). Notably here, the regulations
provide that the Department of Justice Victims' Rights Ombudsman is "the final
arbiter of the complaint," and the complainant "may not seek judicial review" of
that determination. Id. at (c)(7)-(8). The Ombudsman alone decides whether to
notify the complainant of the result of the investigation. Id. at (c)(9). Empowering
the Ombudsman to remedy a victim's complaint without the risk of delay from
prolonged litigation is consistent with congressional intent that the CVRA's
administrative remedy should " create [] a framework to quickly enforce victims'
rights." 150 Cong. Rec. 7312 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
9
With respect to disciplinary sanctions, if the Ombudsman finds that a DOJ

employee violated a crime victim's rights, but not in a willful or wanton manner,
the Ombudsman shall require the employee "to undergo training on victims'
rights." 28 C.F.R. § 45.10(d). If, however, the Ombudsman finds that the DOJ
employee willfully or wantonly violated a crime victim's rights, the Ombudsman
shall recommend "a range of disciplinary sanctions." Id. at (e)(1). "Disciplinary
sanctions" means "those sanctions provided under the Department of Justice
Human Resources Order, 1200.1," which include written reprimands,
suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, removals, and furloughs for 30 days or
less. Id. at (e)(2); DOJ Human Resources Order, 1200.1, Part 3, B(2). Thus, the
CYRA provides sanctions that the government and its employees may be
subjected to if they violate the CYRA.
The CVRA's plain text lays out the procedures that crime victims must follow
when they believe their CYRA rights have been violated, the actions DOJ must
take when it receives a complaint, and the sanctions DOJ may employ when a
violation has occurred. And this carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme undermines any suggestion that Congress intended, but simply forgot, to
provide additional remedies beyond those already specified. Courts agree. See
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the
CVRA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme," provides "strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply
forgot to incorporate expressly") (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S.
248, 254 (1993)); United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308,1315 (10th Cir. 2008)
10
(declining to "to read additional remedies" into the CYRA beyond those
expressly contained in the Act); see also Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees,
489 U.S. 527,533 (1989) ("[I]t is ... an 'elemental canon' of statutory construction
that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially
reluctant to provide additional remedies.") (quoting Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,19 (1979)); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (" [W]hen legislation expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the
coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies."); McDonald v. Southern Farm
Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When Congress creates
certain remedial procedures, we are, 'in the absence of strong indicia of contrary
congressional intent,.. . compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely
the remedies it considered appropriate.'") (quoting Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533).
Because Petitioners seek remedies not authorized by the CVRA's plain language,
their requests should be denied.
What's more, the plain text is supported by the CVRA's location in the United
States Code. Specifically, the CYRA is found in Part II of Title 18, which is the
part of the United States Code specifically devoted to "Criminal Procedure." The
CYRA does not contemplate civil litigation, and the civil remedies that
Petitioners seek are simply unavailable under the CYRA. Doc. 147 at 15-19.
Instead of authorizing a victim to institute a civil action, the CYRA created a
specific victims-rights-enforcement scheme within the federal criminal justice
process - indeed, within Title 18 of the United States Code, which addresses
11
"Crimes and Criminal Procedure." That rights-enforcement scheme is based on

the filing of a "motion asserting a victim's rights" - not a civil complaint or a civil
lawsuit. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see Sieverding v. U.S. Dept, of Justice, 693 F. Supp.
2d 93,110 (D.D.C. 2010) (recognizing that it is "only through a motion" that the
CVRA "permits" individuals to assert statutory rights arising under the CVRA,
such as the "right to confer" and '"discuss ... allegations of criminal acts and
[DOJ's] decisions to prosecute or not prosecute'") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3));
see also, e.g., In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092,1097 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The CVRA
contemplates that individuals asserting victim status may bring a motion in the
district court even when criminal proceedings are not ongoing, and that the
district court's denial of such a motion is reviewable by mandamus.") (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)); compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court."). Congress expressly recognized in enacting
the CVRA that the statute did not "[a]llow[] victims to vindicate their rights
through separate proceedings for damages instead of through mandamus actions
in the criminal case." 150 Cong. Rec. 7306 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(expressing regret that the CVRA "den[ied] victims any cause of action for
damages in the event that their rights are violated"); 150 Cong. Rec. 7312
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("For those who may be concerned that this bill
might lead to new tort causes of action, let me assure you, that victims are not
seeking to sue the government and get rich.. . . Accordingly, the bill states that
there will be no cause of action for damages.").
12
The cases cited by Petitioners do not advance their efforts to expand the
CYRA into a civil remedial scheme allowing for civil equitable relief. Those cases
support the unremarkable proposition that courts generally have power to grant
appropriate relief for recognized civil causes of action, but, as previously
explained, there is no civil cause of action under the CYRA. And the case to
which they do cite. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008), is not applicable here.
Specifically, in In re Dean, a criminal charge was actually filed, and the case
involved a plea agreement that the court would have to accept or reject; here,
however, the NPA was never before this Court. Regardless, the Court in In re
Dean never opined on the types of equitable relief Petitioners seek here.
In addition. Petitioners identify no other federal statute under which they can
bring their claims for relief. Because the law does not provide Petitioners an
avenue for the relief they seek, this Court must find that it does not have the
authority to order the government to do as Petitioners ask, but may still accept
the governmenTs proposed remedies.
3. Even if the CYRA Allows for Civil Relief, the Remedies Petitioners Seek
Go Well Beyond What Is Appropriate.
But even if the CYRA or some other statute allowed equitable relief, the
remedies that Petitioners seek go well beyond what equity allows.
A. Petitioners' request for partial rescission
Petitioners have repeatedly requested some form of rescission of the NPA, but
their submission on remedies is telling more for what they seek to preserve from
that agreement than what they seek to rescind. Specifically, Petitioners do not
13
ask the Court to scrap the agreement in its entirety; instead. Petitioners request
that the Court leave in force all but three sentences of the agreement and stress
that they "are only seeking that these particular provisions be set aside." Doc.
458 at 13 n.5,19.
Petitioners' effort to preserve almost the entirety of the NPA is
understandable because eliminating the complete agreement could harm many
of the very victims the CYRA was designed to protect. As the Court is well
aware, the NPA guaranteed a felony conviction and more than a year of
incarceration for Epstein, which he agreed not to appeal; required him to register
as a sex offender; provided for an attorney representative for victims, at Epstein's
expense; and gave victims the equivalent of uncontested restitution by
mandating that he waive his right to contest liability for victims who pursued a
claim for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 48-5. Rescission could imperil
these penalties as well as the benefits and settlements obtained by the more than
dozen victims who invoked the NPA terms.
Petitioners attempt to avoid that outcome by asking the Court to spare
provisions of the NPA they like while excising portions they do not. Given the
potential harm that complete rescission would pose for many victims, the
government understands this proposal to be well-meaning. Indeed, the
government itself would benefit from partial rescission by reaping the
advantages arising from Epstein's concessions without having to abide by its
own commitments in the agreement. But partial rescission is not a proper
remedy in this action because it would harm certain victims, has no basis under
14
the law,13 and would undermine the CVRA's purpose to encourage proper
treatment of victims.
i. Partial rescission would pose harm to, and is contrary to the

desires of, certain victims.
Despite Petitioners' best intentions, partial rescission would pose a significant
risk of harm to certain victims, which must be considered in crafting an equitable
remedy. The Eleventh Circuit has admonished courts considering equitable
remedies to "bear in mind that a poorly crafted remedy may achieve justice for
one by working a substantial injustice on another." Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803
F.2d 1135,1149 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200,1205 (7th Cir.
1996) ("Of course the effect on innocent third parties is a factor to be taken
into account in the formulation of an equitable remedy"); Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d
1049 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "equitable" relief "may have effects on third
parties ... and so should not be entered without consideration of those effects").
13 For the reasons stated in the Government's prior filings. Docs. 119 & 147,
the Government respectfully maintains that rescission is not an authorized
remedy under the CVRA for the agreement in this matter. Petitioners'
submission highlights the problematic logic underpinning their request for any
form of rescission. Petitioners claim that the CVRA's limitations on efforts to "re
open a plea" under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) do not apply here because rescission of
a non-prosecution agreement is not a request to re-open a plea. Doc. 458 at 9, but
the Court found that rescission of a non-prosecution agreement was authorized
under Section 3771(d)(5) precisely because re-opening a non-prosecution
agreement is akin to re-opening a plea. Doc. 189 at 7-9. Petitioners thus embrace
the Court's finding while contradicting its underlying reasoning, all in an effort
to avoid the consequences of their inability to fulfill all of the conditions on relief
outlined in Section 3771(d)(5). Petitioners cannot have it both ways.
15
The government's recent effort to confer with victims has established that
eliminating the immunity provisions would benefit certain victims and harm
others. The government contacted all attorneys representing victims known to
the government at the time of the NPA, attempted to locate other victims known
at the time of the NPA, and conferred with additional victims who were not
known at the time of the NPA. Indeed, the government has repeatedly invited
Petitioners to confer with U.S. Attorney Pak in person "to share with [him]
directly their thoughts about how the government should handle every aspect of
this matter, both in civil and potential criminal proceedings." Letter from Byung
J. Pak to Paul G. Cassell (May 7, 2019), attached as Exhibit 1. This invitation
remains open. The government's efforts to speak with victims are ongoing, and it
will seek leave to make a supplemental filing summarizing the steps taken to
confer with victims and the victims' opinions on a proper remedy to ensure that
their diverse voices are heard.
Based on the conversations with victims to date, it is apparent that any form
of rescission would cause unintended harm to many of them. During these
discussions with victims and their representatives, several victims passionately
expressed their desire to see Epstein be prosecuted and were eager to serve as
witnesses in any investigation of Epstein. On the other hand, other victims
stated, through their counsel, that while they would like to see Epstein
prosecuted for his crimes, they valued anonymity above all and were not willing
to speak with law enforcement or otherwise participate in any criminal or civil
litigation due to the risk that their involvement may become known to family.
16
friends, or the public. Several victims previously expressed, during the

investigation of Epstein, that they suffered emotional distress and were troubled
by the prospect of any involvement in the government's investigation. Doc. 403-
18 Tf 12. For these victims, setting aside the immunity provisions in a partial
rescission could only undermine their desire to stay anonymous more than ten
years after obtaining settlements from Epstein.
The passage of more than ten years since the NPA was entered only
compounds the potential harm to victims that would arise from partial
rescission. The Court is well aware of "Petitioners' counsel's initial 'indecision'
on whether to seek rescission, as expressed at an earlier hearing held in August
2008," Doc. 189 at 12 n.6, in which counsel stated that "because of the legal
consequences of invalidating the current agreement, it is likely not in my clients'
best interest to ask for the relief that we initially asked for." Doc. 403-21 at 4.
Petitioners' counsel told the Court in 2008 that "an immediate resolution was not
necessary. Doc. 99 at 4, and the CVRA case then "stalled" for eighteen months
"as petitioners pursued collateral civil claims against Epstein," resulting in the
CVRA case being administratively closed in late 2010.14 Doc. 189 at 5. Even if
rescission is a permissible remedy for certain violations of the CVRA, the more
than decade-long delay here renders this remedy inappropriate given these
14 For the reasons stated in its prior filings. Doc. 147 at 8-12; Doc. 401-2 at 28-
29, the government maintains that Petitioners should be estopped from seeking
any form of rescission based on this delay.
17
unique circumstances and exacerbates the harm to victims who have attempted
to readjust their lives in the interim.15
ii. Partial rescission contravenes governing tenets of contract law.
In addition to the potential harm posed to innocent third parties, the law
unfortunately restricts the government's and Court's ability to rewrite the NPA a
decade later. It is not uncommon for one party to a contract to wish to rework or
eliminate terms after entering the agreement. But no matter how regrettable an
agreement may appear in hindsight, fundamental tenets of contract law prohibit
the rewriting of terms when the parties intended the agreement to be fulfilled in
its entirety. Such principles bind the government's hands in this case.
Although the parties agree that the NPA should be governed by principles of
contract law. Doc. 458 at 18, Petitioners cite no authority providing for partial
rescission of a prosecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement,
and ignore precedent foreclosing such a remedy when "the entire fulfillment of
the contract is contemplated by the parties as the basis of the arrangement." Local
No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, 66 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla.1953); see also Frankenmuth
Mutual Ins. v. Escambia County, 289 F.3d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreting
15 Although Petitioners' counsel have not spoken with the majority of the
victims, they acknowledge that certain victims would be eager for rescission
while a "large group .. . will respond by saying 'I have buried these experiences
deep in the past and I don't want to do anything at all to unearth all the hurt and
pain it has taken me this long to process.'" Julie K. Brown, Prosecutors finally want
to hear from Jeffrey Epstein's victims, Miami Herald, 2019,
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article230275434.html (last
visited June 21, 2019).
18
Florida law). Partial rescission of an agreement is "a remedy that is not generally
cognizable under Florida law except in the unusual circumstances where a
contract is clearly divisible." Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Cablevision of Marion Cty., LLC,
No. 5:05-CV-303-OC-GRJ, 2006 WL 2265419, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2006). A
contract is considered to be "indivisible" when "each and all of its parts appear
to be interdependent and common to one another and to the consideration."
Local No. 234, 66 So. 2d at 822 (holding that contract was indivisible when "it is
impossible to conclude that the very significant promise on one side. . . can be
entirely eliminated from the contract and still leave a valid working arrangement
fairly reflecting the original mutual understanding between the parties"); see also
Wilderness Country Club Partnership v. Groves, 458 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (concluding that, despite the illegality of only one contract provision,
partial rescission was improper because illegal term was "vital," and severing
that term "eliminates the essence of the contracting parties' agreement"). Courts
determine whether an agreement is divisible based on the "intention of the
parties" as revealed "by a fair construction of the terms and provisions of the
contract itself, and by the subject matter to which it has reference." Local No. 234,
66 So. 2d at 822 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, excising the "immunity" or non-prosecution provisions plainly would
eliminate the essence of the "Non-Prosecution Agreement." The three sentences
that Petitioners seek to write out of the agreement are the only contractual
consideration that the government provided in exchange for Epstein's
concessions to a felony conviction, prison sentence, sex offender registration, and
19
uncontested restitution settlements. Doc. 48-5. Moreover, the agreement

expressly states that its provisions were indivisible, noting that "each of these
terms is material to this agreement and is supported by independent
consideration," and a breach of any condition allowed the government to
terminate the entire agreement. Id. at 7. Accordingly, omitting the immunity
provisions "eliminates the essence of the contracting parties' agreement," and the
NPA is thus an indivisible agreement not subject to partial rescission. Wilderness
Country Club Partnership, 458 So. 2d at 771. Petitioners' request thus must be
denied as a matter of law.
Petitioners point to authority setting aside agreements containing illegal
provisions in support of their request. Doc. 458 at 15-17, but this argument is
meritless for two reasons. First, while Petitioners contend that the government
failed to accord victims their rights in communicating the terms of the NPA,
Petitioners have not identified any illegal provision in the NPA itself. Doc. 147 at
4-5. Petitioners cite no precedent authorizing the rescission of an agreement
containing legally valid terms based solely on an extrinsic violation in
communicating the terms of that agreement to a third party. Second, none of
Petitioners' cases authorizes partial rescission, the remedy they request here.16 * * * 20
16 See United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that complete
rescission of plea agreement was only permissible remedy when defendant was
induced to enter plea based on mistake of law); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 966
(Colo. 1990) (noting that if plea was induced by illegal promise, proper remedy
was defendant's option to withdraw from plea agreement in its entirety); State v.
Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998) (holding that if plea agreement could
not be fulfilled based on illegal term, only remedy was withdrawal from entire
20
iii. Partial rescission would reward, not remedy, a violation of the

CYRA.
Even if there were a legal basis for partial rescission, granting partial
rescission in this matter would have the perverse effect of harming certain
victims, who must be treated with "respect for [their] dignity and privacy" under
the CYRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), while rewarding the government for what the
Court determined was a violation of the CYRA. The parties appear to have
agreed for the purposes of this litigation that Epstein has fully performed his
obligations under the NPA. By eliminating the immunity provisions of the
agreement, Petitioners' proposal would thus allow the government to enjoy all
the benefits of Epstein's compliance without binding it to its commitments under
the NPA. Accordingly, Petitioners would place the government in a more
favorable position than if it had fully conferred with victims prior to entering the
NPA. Such a result would not encourage strict adherence to the CYRA, and
partial rescission in this case would not foster the goals of the CYRA.
B. Petitioners' request for declaratory relief
Petitioners also request that this Court declare that the Constitution permits
the government to prosecute Epstein in the event of rescission, but they cite no
legal basis for this request. Declaratory relief serves only to clarify the legal
relationship between the parties and does not serve to make factual
plea agreement); State v. Wall, 502 S.E.2d 585, 588 (N.C. 1998) (same); Ex parte
Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (same); State v. Mazzone, 572
S.E.2d 891, 897 (W.Va. 2002) ("[A] plea agreement which cannot be fulfilled
based upon legal impossibility must be vacated in its entirety.").
21
determinations. See Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pineiro & Byrd PLLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d
1214,1216 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Sierra Equity Group, Inc. v. White Oak Equity
Partners, EEC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1213,1231 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Eisenberg v. Standard Ins.
Co., No. 09-80199, 2009 WL 1809994, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2009)). But that is
precisely what Petitioners seek here. Accordingly, Petitioners fail to allege a basis
on which declaratory relief would be appropriate.
C. Petitioners' request for injunctive relief
Next, Petitioners ask this Court to:

• order the government to issue a letter of apology. Doc. 458 at 5,22-23;
• enjoin the government to make its "best efforts" to protect the victims'
rights and confer with the victims and give them accurate and timely
notice of future cases, id. at 5, 21;
• order DOJ to provide training to the USAO-SDFL, id. at 6, 29;
• order the government to meet with the victims, confer about the case, and
explain why it chose not to prosecute Epstein, id. at 5,23;
• hold a hearing where victims can be heard, id. at 5, 23-24; and
• order that the government provide all information in its possession;

provide all grand jury materials; provide any information regarding FBI
Miami's investigation, including un-redacted 302s; provide all sealed
materials previously submitted for in camera review; and provide all
materials covered by its previously filed motions, id. at 5-6, 24-29.
As a threshold matter, Petitioners do not have standing to seek injunctive

relief. As the Supreme Court held in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,102-
03 (1983), "federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain" claims for
22
injunctive relief where a defendant points only to "past exposure to illegal

conduct/' and does not show "a continuing, present adverse effect." But even if
Petitioners had standing to bring their request for injunctive relief, each request
fails.
With respect to Petitioners' request for a letter of apology, such a remedy is
not cognizable. In Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002), the
Sixth Circuit held that the district court exceeded its equitable powers when it
ordered a party to apologize. In so holding, the court cited the Ninth Circuit,
which has recognized that courts "are not commissioned to run around getting
apologies," and reasoned that the law is not usually concerned with procuring
apologies to make morally right a legal wrong done to the plaintiff. Id. (quoting
McKee v. Turner, 491 F.2d 1106,1107 (9th Cir. 1974)). And certainly, a court may
not order a defendant to speak in a manner that may contravene the beliefs the
defendant holds. See id.; see also Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 WL 2682606,
at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Woodruff, 29 F. App'x at 346) ("Here, the district court
exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize.").
Petitioners' request that this Court order the government to use its "best
efforts" to comply with the CYRA and "confer" with the victims pursuant to the
CYRA asks the Court to order the government to follow the law.17 Such "obey-
the law" injunctions are "disfavored because they often run afoul of Rule 65(d)'s
17 Petitioners' request that the Court enjoin the government to confer with
Jane Doe 1 and 2 is particularly unnecessary and unjustified in light of the
government's standing invitation for them to do precisely that. See Exhibit 1.
23
requirement that injunctions state their terms specifically and 'describe in

reasonable detail' the 'act or acts restrained or required.'" United States v. Asians
& Miller Orthopaedics, P.A., 924 F.3d 1348,1361 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(d)). Obey-the-law injunctions are proper only when the "statutory
terms are specific and the defendant clearly knows what conduct is prohibited or
required." Id. at 1362 (citing SEC v. v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934, 950 (11th Cir. 2012)).
Accordingly, such injunctions are permissible if they require parties to follow
statutory terms with "specific, objective criteria for compliance," Goble, 682 F.3d
at 951, or specify "numerous concrete actions for the defendants to take . .. well
beyond" what the law requires, Askins & Miller Orthopaedics, 924 F.3d at 1362.
Obey-the-law injunctions concerning statutes lacking specific terms, or that
require consultation with an "ever-changing judicial landscape" to interpret, do
not inform the defendant of what conduct is forbidden under Rule 65(d). Goble,
682 F.3d at 951-52 (noting that "in some instances an injunction which merely
tracks the language of the securities statutes and regulations will not clearly and
specifically describe permissible and impermissible conduct"). Here, a statute
requiring the government to make its "best efforts" to protect victims, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(c)(1), plainly does not provide "specific, objective criteria for compliance,"
Goble, 682 F.3d at 951. The requested obey-the-law injunction is thus both
unwarranted and in violation of Rule 65(d).
So too would any order requiring the government to conduct training. The
CYRA itself mandates that DOJ regulations "require a course of training for
employees ... of the Department of Justice that fail to comply" with victim
24
protections under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(2)(B). DOJ regulations do so. 28

C.F.R. § 45.10(d). There is no need to require the government to do what it has
already undertaken to do, and prescribing the specific content or duration of
such training would contravene the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. Still, the government recognizes that training is always beneficial and
offers to do so, as explained above.
Next, Petitioners seek to meet with the government, attend a hearing, and
review all government documents as a way of putting themselves in the position
they would have been in had the government conferred with them before
entering into the NPA. See Doc. 458 at 23 (explaining that "[a] chance to discuss
this matter with Mr. Acosta to get answers about that and other related questions
will, Jane Doe 1 and 2 believe, provide the kind of information that they would
have received had the U.S. Attorney's Office properly conferred in a timely
fashion back in 2007"); id. at 24-25 ("If the Government had properly conferred
with the two Jane Does ... [t]hese events would have provided Jane Doe 1 and 2
with much more information about Epstein's criminal conspiracy and its scope
and operation," and "[s]ince one of the harms that flows from that illegality is the
loss of any chance to obtain information, the obvious remedy is to disclose that
information"). But the problem with Petitioners' requests is that they, if granted,
would place Petitioners in an entirely different position than the CYRA allows.
The law does not countenance such a result. See Feldkamp v. Long Bay Partners,
LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1273,1285 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that an injured party
25
shall not be placed in a position "better than that which he would have occupied
had the contract been performed").
To begin, while the CVRA grants victims the right to "confer" with the
government, this means only that, and not necessarily that the government is
required to explain the "next steps" it intends to make or to share confidential
information, including grand jury materials or sensitive information from other
witnesses. Petitioners' request would intrude on the government's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, which is expressly prohibited by the CVRA. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(d)(6). Moreover, such an order would violate, or fall perilously close to
violating, the separation-of-powers doctrine under girding our democracy. It is
axiomatic that "federal district courts cannot order a United States Attorney to
conduct an investigation or to initiate a prosecution because it would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers." O'Connor v. Nevada, 507 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.
Nev. 1981) (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,171 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[T]he
attorney for the United States is ... an executive official of the Government, and
it is as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to
whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case . . . and courts are
not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the [United
States attorneys] in their control over criminal prosecutions."). The decision
whether to prosecute Epstein lies solely within the Executive Branch, and any
order today, by this Court, as to what the government must do in the future
would be wholly inappropriate.
26
Nor does it mean that the government must give victims the discovery in the
criminal case. As one court has explained, the CYRA does "not authorize an
unbridled gallop to any and all information in the government's files." United
States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also United States v.
Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that CYRA did not empower
district court in a civil matter to order disclosure of documents to victims); United
States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308,1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding "that the CYRA
does not provide 'victims' with a right of access to the government's files"); cf. In
re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that "the CYRA does not
provide an independent right to obtain PSRs"); Kenna v. United States, 453 F.3d
1136,1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court's rejection of victim's argument
that the CYRA conferred a general right for crime victims to obtain disclosure of
PSRs). The CYRA provides victims with rights associated with the defendant's
trial, such as notice of proceedings against the defendant, the right to be heard at
a proceeding, and the right to confer with the government's attorney, but is silent
as to documents offered during the trial. See In re Siler, 571 F.3d at 609-10.
Petitioners' argument that they are entitled to grand jury records similarly
fails. The traditional rule of grand jury secrecy may be set aside under certain
circumstances prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). The
Supreme Court has explained that a party seeking disclosure of grand jury
materials must make a showing of a "particularized need." United States v.
Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327,1348 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
27
Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)). For the reasons previously found by the
Court, Petitioners have not, and cannot, make such a showing. Doc. 330 at 7-10.
In addition, the law enforcement investigative privilege protects the
documents Petitioners seek. The purpose of this privilege is "to prevent
disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the
confidentiality of sources, to protect witnesses and law enforcement personnel, to
safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise
to prevent interference with an investigation." In re Dep't of Investigation of the
City of New York, 856 F.2d 481, 482 (2nd Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Disclosure
to third parties of the interview reports of the young women sexually abused by
Epstein could cause their identities to become widely known and result in their
harm or embarrassment. The disclosure of information contained in the FBI
investigative file to third parties could cause additional psychological trauma,
disruption of family relationships or professional careers, and possible public
release of personal information.18
The law enforcement investigative privilege is recognized under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, which specifically exempts from
18 Disclosure of information from the FBI file would also reveal sensitive FBI
investigative and operational methods, procedures, and techniques. Information
contained within an FBI investigative file, if revealed, might compromise the
effective use of such methods in future cases. The FBTs investigative tools must
remain confidential so that law enforcement can retain an element of surprise
and prevent the use of countermeasures by targets and suspects to thwart
effective law enforcement.
28
disclosure "records of information compiled for law enforcement purposes" that

"could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" or "would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement
investigations or prosecutions .5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) and (E). Certainly
Congress did not contemplate granting victims an end-run around the FOIA
disclosure exemptions when it drafted the CVRA.
D. Petitioners' request for monetary damages
Finally, Petitioners assert that they are entitled to "monetary sanctions,"

attorneys' fees, and restitution. As explained above, however, the CVRA
explicitly prohibits a cause of action for damages against the United States
arising from any violation of the CVRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). Attempting to
recast a claim for damages as monetary "sanctions" does not make it any less an
impermissible claim for damages.
Regarding restitution, Petitioners are entitled under the CVRA to " [t]he right
to full and timely restitution as provided in law." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). Congress
modified a crime victim's entitlement to restitution by restricting it to only those
circumstances "provided in law," thus recognizing that there would be
numerous situations when it would be impossible for a victim to receive
restitution. See In re W.R. Huff, 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005). The statute under
which Petitioners urge this Court to award restitution does not make the
government liable for restitution for harms caused by others. Calling something
"restitution" does not make it so. In reality. Petitioners seek money damages
from the government, and this they cannot do.
29
With respect to attorneys' fees, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars an

award of attorneys' fees against the United States unless there is express
statutory authorization for such an award. Joe v. United States, 772 F.2d 1535,1536
(11th Cir. 1985). Waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed in
favor of the sovereign. Id. (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590
(1941)). The CYRA does not provide for attorneys' fees against the United States,
and thus Petitioners' argument that they are entitled to attorneys' fees must be
rejected.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of what the CYRA required the government to do in this matter,
the victims are right to expect better from their Justice Department. The
government's commitment in the decade since this action was filed to combat
human trafficking and child exploitation and protect victims of such offenses
underscores that its conduct in this matter, no matter how well-intentioned, fell
short of the government's dedication to serve victims to the best of its ability.
While the Court cannot unwind the past, the remedies proposed by the
government would give the victims a meaningful opportunity to have their
voices heard and to understand, if not accept, the decisions made in this matter.
Petitioners' requested remedies, on the other hand, run afoul of the remedial
scheme contemplated by the CYRA, are contrary to law, and may cause
unintended harm to the victims whose interests are also protected by the CYRA.
30
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should endorse the government's proposed
remedies.
BYUNG J. PAK
United States Attorney
/s/Jill E. Steinberg
Special Attorney
Georgia Bar No. 502042
J ill .Steinber g@usdoj. gov
/s/Nathan P. Kitchens
Special Attorney
Georgia Bar No. 263930
N athan.Kitchens@usdoj. gov
31
I served this document today by filing it using the Court's CM/ECF system,
which automatically notifies the parties and counsel of record.
June 24, 2019
/s/ Nathan P. Kitchens

Nathan P. Kitchens
Special Attorney

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007

Date: July 03, 2019 DC Docket #: 15-cv-7433

DC Judge: Sweet
NOTICE OF CASE MANAGER CHANGE
The case manager assigned to this matter has been changed.

18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
Brown v. Maxwell; Dershowitz v. Giuffre
In the
for the Second Circuit

AUGUST TERM 2018

No. 18‐2868‐cv

JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD COMPANY,
Intervenors‐Appellants,

v.

GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee,

v.

Plaintiff‐Appellee.

No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)

ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH
MEDIA,

V.

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant‐Appellee.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York

ARGUED: MARCH 6, 2019
DECIDED: JULY 3, 2019

Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

Intervenors‐Appellants Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich,

and the Miami Herald Company (with reporter Julie Brown) appeal
from certain orders of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective
motions to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the captions as set out above.
*
2
District Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review

when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time,
we recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We
therefore clarify the legal tools that district courts should use in
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017,
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment
record as described further herein, and REMAND the cause to the
District Court for particularized review of the remaining sealed
materials.
Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders
the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a
remand.

SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz,
Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on
the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL,
for Intervenors‐Appellants Julie Brown and
Miami Herald.
TY GEE (Adam Mueller, on the brief),
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,
Denver, CO, for Defendant‐Appellee Ghislaine
Maxwell.
3
PAUL G. CASSELL (Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, on
the brief), S.J Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre.
ANDREW G. CELLI JR. (David A. Lebowitz, on
the brief), Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff &
Abady LLP, New York, NY, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Alan M. Dershowitz.
MARC RANDAZZA (Jay Marshall Wolman,
Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal
Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Michael Cernovich.

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan M. Dershowitz (“Dershowitz”),

Michael Cernovich (“Cernovich”), and the Miami Herald Company
(with reporter Julie Brown, jointly the “Herald”) appeal from certain
orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective motions
to unseal filings in a defamation suit. We conclude that the District
Court failed to conduct the requisite particularized review when
ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time, we
4
recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jeffrey Epstein’s Conviction and the CVRA Suit
The origins of this case lie in a decade‐old criminal proceeding
against financier Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein”). On June 30, 2008, Epstein
pleaded guilty to Florida state charges of soliciting, and procuring a
person under the age of eighteen for, prostitution. The charges
stemmed from sexual activity with privately hired “masseuses,” some
of whom were under eighteen, Florida’s age of consent. Pursuant to
an agreement with state and federal prosecutors, Epstein pleaded to
the state charges. He received limited jail‐time, registered as a sex
offender, and agreed to pay compensation to his victims. In return,
prosecutors declined to bring federal charges.
Shortly after Epstein entered his plea, two of his victims,
proceeding as “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2,” filed suit against the
Government in the Southern District of Florida under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). The victims sought to nullify the plea
5
agreement, alleging that the Government failed to fulfill its legal
obligations to inform and consult with them in the process leading up
to Epstein’s plea deal.1
On December 30, 2014, two additional unnamed victims—one
of whom has now self‐identified as Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia Giuffre
(“Giuffre”)—petitioned to join in the CVRA case. These petitioners
included in their filings not only descriptions of sexual abuse by
Epstein, but also new allegations of sexual abuse by several other
prominent individuals, “including numerous prominent American
politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a well‐
known Prime Minister, and other world leaders,” as well as
Dershowitz (a long‐time member of the Harvard Law School faculty
who had worked on Epstein’s legal defense) and Defendant‐Appellee
Ghislaine Maxwell (“Maxwell”).2
Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to “strike the

outrageous and impertinent allegations made against him and to
request a show cause order to the attorneys that have made them.”3
Exercising its authority to “strike from a pleading an insufficient
1 On February 21, 2019, the Florida District Court ruled that federal
prosecutors had violated the CVRA by failing to adequately notify the two victims‐
plaintiffs of the plea deal. The District Court has not yet determined the appropriate
remedy. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204–17 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
2 Doe 1 v. United States, No. 08‐CV‐80736‐KAM, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
6
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter . . . on its own,”4 the Florida District Court (Kenneth A. Marra,
Judge) sua sponte struck all allegations against additional parties from
the pleadings, including those against Dershowitz, and therefore
denied Dershowitz’s motion as moot.5
The stricken allegations, however, quickly found their way into
the press, and several media outlets published articles repeating
Giuffre’s accusations. In response to the allegations, on January 3,
2015, Maxwell’s publicist issued a press statement declaring that
Giuffre’s allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue” and that
her “claims are obvious lies.”6
B. Giuffre Sues Maxwell
On September 21, 2015, Giuffre filed the underlying action

against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. Giuffre alleged
that Maxwell had defamed her through this and other public
statements. Extensive and hard‐fought discovery followed. Due to the
volume of sealing requests filed during discovery, on August 9, 2016,
the District Court entered a Sealing Order that effectively ceded
control of the sealing process to the parties themselves. The Sealing
Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file individual letter
briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of the parties’
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
4
Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
5
See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
6
7
future sealing requests. In total, 167 documents—nearly one‐fifth of

the docket—were filed under seal. These sealed documents include,
inter alia, motions to compel discovery, motions for sanctions and
adverse inferences, motions in limine, and similar material.
On January 6, 2017, Maxwell filed a motion for summary

judgment. The parties submitted their memoranda of law and
supporting exhibits contesting this motion under seal. On March 22,
2017, the District Court denied the motion in a heavily redacted 76‐
page opinion. Once again, the entire summary judgment record,
including the unredacted version of the District Court opinion
denying summary judgment, remained under seal. On May 24, 2017,
Maxwell and Giuffre executed a settlement agreement, and the case
was closed the next day.
C. Motions to Intervene and Unseal
Over the course of the litigation before Judge Sweet, three
outside parties attempted to unseal some or all of the sealed material.
On August 11, 2016, Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to unseal
three documents that, he argues, demonstrate that Giuffre invented
the accusations against him. On January 19, 2017, Cernovich, an
independent blogger and self‐described “popular political
journalist,”7 moved to intervene, seeking to unseal the summary
judgment record, and Dershowitz joined his motion. On April 6, 2018,
after the case had settled, the Herald moved to intervene and unseal
Br. Appellant (Cernovich) 4.
7
8
the entire docket. The District Court granted each of these motions to
intervene, but denied the related requests to unseal in orders entered
November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018, respectively.
The Appellants timely appealed from each of the orders

denying their respective motions to unseal. Although each Appellant
seeks the release of a different set of documents, all argue that the
District Court failed to analyze the documents individually or
properly apply the presumption of public access to court documents.
We therefore ordered that the appeals be heard in tandem and held
argument on March 6, 2019.
On March 11, 2019, we issued an order to show cause why we
“should not unseal the summary judgment motion, including any
materials filed in connection with this motion, and the District Court’s
summary judgment decision.”8 The parties timely filed their
responses.
II. DISCUSSION
There are two categories of sealed material at issue in these
appeals: (1) the summary judgment record, which includes the parties’
summary judgment briefs, their statements of undisputed facts, and
incorporated exhibits; and (2) court filings made in the course of the
discovery process and with respect to motions in limine. In this
Opinion, we explain that our law requires the unsealing of the
Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18‐2868‐cv, Docket No. 138.
8
9
summary judgment materials and individualized review of the

remaining sealed materials.
While the law governing public access to these materials is
largely settled, we have not yet adequately addressed the potential
harms that often accompany such access. These harms are apparent.
Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court observed that, without
vigilance, courts’ files might “become a vehicle for improper
purposes.”9 Our legal process is already susceptible to abuse.
Unscrupulous litigants can weaponize the discovery process to
humiliate and embarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the “litigation
privilege,”10 bad actors can defame opponents in court pleadings or
depositions without fear of lawsuit and liability. Unfortunately, the
presumption of public access to court documents has the potential to
exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that
damaging material irrevocably enters the public record.
We therefore take the opportunity to describe the tools available
to district courts in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, and
emphasize the courts’ responsibility to exercise these powerful tools.
We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in
judicial pleadings.
9 Nixon v. Warner Commcʹns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
10 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text, post.
10
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s decision to seal a filing or

maintain such a seal, “we examine the court’s factual findings for clear
error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to seal
or unseal for abuse of discretion.”11
B. The Summary Judgment Materials
With respect to the first category of materials, it is well‐settled
that “documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a
summary judgment motion are—as a matter of law—judicial
documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under
both the common law and the First Amendment.”12 In light of this
strong First Amendment presumption, “continued sealing of the
documents may be justified only with specific, on‐the‐record findings
that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the
sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”13
11 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 2016).
12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We
observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may
“be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and non‐
frivolous arguments.” Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a
filing, specifically found that assumption inapplicable, the categorical rule in
Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42–43 and accompanying text, post.
Id. at 124. Examples of such countervailing values may include,
13
depending on the circumstances, preserving “the right of an accused to
fundamental fairness in the jury selection process,” Press‐Enter. Co. v. Superior Court
11
In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.14 First, it
failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches
to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions.
The District Court reasoned that the summary judgment materials
were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary
judgment was denied by the Court.”15 In assigning a “lesser
presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single
sentence of dicta from our decision in United States v. Amodeo.16 We
have since clarified, however, that this sentence was based on a
“quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C.
Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court
or the D.C. Circuit.”17 In fact, we have expressly rejected the
proposition that “different types of documents might receive different
of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney‐client
privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of impairing law enforcement or
judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the
privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id.
Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of
14
the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief
to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District
Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal.
15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444.
71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”) (“One judge [in the District
16
of Columbia Circuit] has pointed out, for example, that where a district court
denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination
of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)).
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
12
weights of presumption based on the extent to which they were relied
upon in resolving [a] motion [for summary judgment].”18
Second, in contravention of our precedent, the District Court

failed to review the documents individually and produce “specific, on‐
the‐record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher
values.”19 Instead, the District Court made generalized statements
about the record as a whole.20 This too was legal error.
Finally, upon reviewing the summary judgment materials in

connection with this appeal, we find that there is no countervailing
privacy interest sufficient to justify their continued sealing. Remand
with respect to these documents is thus unnecessary. Accordingly, and
to avoid any further delay,21 we order that the summary judgment
documents (with minimal redactions) be unsealed upon issuance of
our mandate.22
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
See, e.g., Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (summarily concluding that all
20
“[t]he Summary Judgment Judicial Documents openly refer to and discuss these
allegations [of sexual assault and sexual trafficking] in comprehensive detail, and
that those allegations “establish[] a strong privacy interest here”).
Cf. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 127 (ordering that “the mandate shall issue
21
forthwith” to expedite the unsealing process).
Upon issuance of our mandate, a minimally redacted version of the
22
summary judgment record will be made accessible on the Court of Appeals docket.
We have implemented minimal redactions to protect personally identifying
information such as personal phone numbers, contact lists, birth dates, and social
13
C. The Remaining Sealed Materials
The law governing disclosure of the remaining sealed material
in this case is only slightly more complex. The Supreme Court has
recognized a qualified right “to inspect and copy judicial records and
documents.”23 In defining “judicial records and documents,” we have
emphasized that “the mere filing of a paper or document with the
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to
the right of public access.”24 Instead, “the item filed must be relevant
to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial
process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”25
As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the judicial
function” not only when it rules on motions currently before it, but
also when properly exercising its inherent “supervisory powers.”26 A
security numbers. We have also redacted the names of alleged minor victims of
sexual abuse from deposition testimony and police reports, as well as deposition
responses concerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only
permitted—and the responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of
continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate the views
expressed in Judge Pooler’s separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the
efforts invested by three former district judges in reviewing these materials
adequately address those concerns.
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
24 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”).
25 Id.
Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017)
26
(explaining that, in considering whether the report of a monitor charged with
assessing compliance with a deferred prosecution agreement is a judicial
14
document is thus “relevant to the performance of the judicial function”
if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s
ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without
regard to which way the court ultimately rules or whether the
document ultimately in fact influences the court’s decision.27
Accordingly, if in applying these standards, a court determines that
documents filed by a party are not relevant to the performance of a
judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.28
Once an item is deemed relevant to the exercise of judicial
power, “the weight to be given the presumption of access must be
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article
III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those
document, “[i]f the district court’s conception of its supervisory power in this
context were correct, the Monitor’s Report would quite obviously be relevant to the
performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Whether a specific judicial decision constitutes a
“performance of the judicial function” is a question of law. Accordingly, we review
such determinations de novo. Id. at 134.
27 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145–46 (concluding that documents were relevant to
the performance of a judicial function because they would have “informed” the
district court’s decision whether to discharge or retain a Receiver); see also FTC. v.
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 401’s “having any tendency” definition of relevance in determining
whether documents were “judicial documents”).
28 As we explain below, there are several (often preferable) tools beyond
sealing that district courts can use to protect their dockets from becoming a vehicle
for irrelevant—and potentially defamatory—accusations. See Section D, post.
15
monitoring the federal courts.”29 Thus, while evidence introduced at
trial or in connection with summary judgment enjoys a strong
presumption of public access, documents that “play only a negligible
role in the performance of Article III duties” are accorded only a low
presumption that “amounts to little more than a prediction of public
access absent a countervailing reason.”30 Documents that are never
filed with the court, but simply “passed between the parties in
discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.”31
The remaining sealed materials at issue here include filings

related to, inter alia, motions to compel testimony, to quash trial
subpoenae, and to exclude certain deposition testimony. All such
motions, at least on their face, call upon the court to exercise its Article
III powers. Moreover, erroneous judicial decision‐making with respect
to such evidentiary and discovery matters can cause substantial harm.
Such materials are therefore of value “to those monitoring the federal
courts.”32 Thus, all documents submitted in connection with, and
relevant to, such judicial decision‐making are subject to at least some
presumption of public access.33
29 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
33 In previous decisions, we have identified an important exception to this
general rule: the presumption of public access does not apply to material that is
submitted to the court solely so that the court may decide whether that same
16
Although a court’s authority to oversee discovery and control
the evidence introduced at trial surely constitutes an exercise of
judicial power, we note that this authority is ancillary to the court’s
core role in adjudicating a case. Accordingly, the presumption of
public access in filings submitted in connection with discovery
disputes or motions in limine is generally somewhat lower than the
presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection
with dispositive motions such as motions for dismissal or summary
judgment.34 Thus, while a court must still articulate specific and
substantial reasons for sealing such material, the reasons usually need
not be as compelling as those required to seal summary judgment
filings.
Here, the precise basis for the District Court’s decision to deny
the motion to unseal these remaining materials is unclear. In the three
paragraphs devoted to the issue, the District Court emphasized the
potential for embarrassment “given the highly sensitive nature of the
underlying allegations,” and concluded that “the documents sealed in
the course of discovery were neither relied upon by [the District] Court
in the rendering of an adjudication, nor necessary to or helpful in
resolving a motion.”35 It is therefore unclear whether the District Court
held that these materials were not judicial documents (and thus are
material must be disclosed in the discovery process or shielded by a Protective
Order. See TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 233.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 442 (internal quotation marks and brackets
35
omitted).
17
not subject to a presumption of public access), or found that privacy
interests outweighed a limited right of public access.
On either interpretation, however, the District Court’s holding
was error. Insofar as the District Court held that these materials are not
judicial documents because it did not rely on them in adjudicating a
motion, this was legal error. As explained above, the proper inquiry is
whether the documents are relevant to the performance of the judicial
function, not whether they were relied upon.36 Indeed, decision‐
makers often find that a great deal of relevant material does not
ultimately sway their decision. And insofar as the District Court held
that privacy interests outweigh the presumption of public access in
each of the thousands of pages at issue, that decision—which appears
to have been made without particularized review—amounts to an
abuse of discretion.37
In light of the District Court’s failure to conduct an
individualized review of the sealed materials, it is necessary to do so
now. We believe the District Court is best situated to conduct this
review. The District Court can directly communicate with the parties,
and can therefore more swiftly and thoroughly consider particular
objections to unsealing specific materials. Relatedly, the District Court
can obtain the parties’ assistance in effecting any necessary redactions,
and in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
36 See text accompanying notes 12–18 and 26–28, ante.
37 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining
that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative, legal “term of art”).
18
implicated by the unsealing. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the
District Court to conduct such a particularized review and unseal all
documents for which the presumption of public access outweighs any
countervailing privacy interests.
D. Protecting the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
While we disagree with the District Court’s disposition of the
motions to unseal, we share its concern that court files might be used
to “promote scandal arising out of unproven potentially libelous
statements.”38 We therefore describe certain methods courts can
employ to protect the judicial process from being coopted for such
purposes.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[e]very court has

supervisory power over its own records and files” to ensure they “are
not used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” or “serve
as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”39 This
supervisory function is not only within a district court’s power, but
also among its responsibilities.
In practice, district courts may employ several methods to fulfill
this function. They may, for instance, issue protective orders
forbidding dissemination of certain material “to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
39 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks).
19
burden” and require that filings containing such material be submitted
under seal.40 If parties then seek to file such materials, the court may
deny them leave to do so.41 District courts may also seek to counteract
the effect of defamatory statements by explaining on the record that
the statements appear to lack credibility. Moreover, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the district court may strike such
material from the filings on the grounds that it is “redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.”42 Because such rejected or
stricken material is not “relevant to the performance of the judicial
function” it would not be considered a “judicial document” and would
enjoy no presumption of public access.43 Finally, in appropriate
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229–30.
See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, February 1,
41
2019 Edition, Rule 6.1,

http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20Rules%20020119%20Final.pdf.
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts may strike material from the pleadings either
“on its own” or “on motion made by a party.” Id. Although motions to strike
material solely “on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial” are
disfavored, when material is also “scandalous,” no such presumption applies. Cf.
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Talbot
v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Allegations may be stricken as scandalous if the matter bears no possible relation
to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.”); Wine Markets Intʹl,
Inc. v. Bass, 177 F.R.D. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Motions to strike are not generally
favored, except in relation to scandalous matters.”); Alvarado‐Morales v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617–18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous “matter
which impugned the character of defendants”).
43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
20
circumstances, district courts may impose sanctions on attorneys and
parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).44
E. A Cautionary Note
We conclude with a note of caution to the public regarding the
reliability of court filings such as those unsealed today.
Materials submitted by parties to a court should be understood
for what they are. They do not reflect the court’s own findings. Rather,
they are prepared by parties seeking to advance their own interests in
an adversarial process. Although affidavits and depositions are
offered “under penalty of perjury,” it is in fact exceedingly rare for
anyone to be prosecuted for perjury in a civil proceeding.45 Similarly,
44 In relevant part, Rule 11 provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that . . . it is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation . . . . [T]he court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the
rule or is responsible for the violation . . . . The sanction may include
nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed
on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and
other expenses directly resulting from the violation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (describing sanctions available
to the court).
45 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and
Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) (ʺPerjury cases
are not often pursued . . . .”).
21
pleadings, complaints, and briefs—while supposedly based on

underlying evidentiary material—can be misleading. Such documents
sometimes draw dubious inferences from already questionable
material or present ambiguous material as definitive.
Moreover, court filings are, in some respects, particularly

susceptible to fraud. For while the threat of defamation actions may
deter malicious falsehoods in standard publications, this threat is non‐
existent with respect to certain court filings. This is so because, under
New York law (which governs the underlying defamation claim here),
“absolute immunity from liability for defamation exists for oral or
written statements made . . . in connection with a proceeding before a
court.”46 Thus, although the act of filing a document with a court might
be thought to lend that document additional credibility, in fact,
allegations appearing in such documents might be less credible than
those published elsewhere.47
Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 718 (2015); see also Kelly v. Albarino, 485
46
F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of the District Court explaining
that this privilege is “the broadest of possible privileges”); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 587 (1977) (“A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or
defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial
proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the
proceeding.”). But see note 47, post.
While common law courts have generally interpreted the litigation privilege
47
broadly, they nevertheless maintain an important (if rarely implemented)

limitation on its scope: to qualify for the privilege, a statement must be “material
and pertinent to the questions involved.” Front, 24 N.Y.3d at 718 (quoting Youmans
22
We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring
the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the factfinding process.”48 When faithfully observing
its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public
understanding of the rule of law” and “validates [its] claim of
functioning as surrogates for the public.”49
At the same time, the media does the public a profound
disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have
previously observed that courts cannot possibly “discredit every
statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we
have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term
‘court records’ in referring to such items.”50 Even ordinarily critical
v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 219–20 (1897)). It follows, then, that immaterial and
impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they
are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the inference of express malice.” Id.
(same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and
“immaterial,” it makes the very same determination that permits a defamation
action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served
were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation
privilege.
48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982)).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality
49
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23
readers may take the reference to “court papers” as some sort of
marker of reliability. This would be a mistake.
We therefore urge the media to exercise restraint in covering
potentially defamatory allegations, and we caution the public to read
such accounts with discernment.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold as follows:
(1) Materials submitted in connection with a motion for

summary judgment are subject to a strong presumption of
public access.
(2) The summary judgment record at issue will be unsealed
upon issuance of our mandate, subject to minimal
redactions.51
(3) Materials submitted in connection with, and relevant to,

discovery motions, motions in limine, and other non‐
dispositive motions are subject to a lesser—but still
substantial— presumption of public access.
(4) The District Court is directed to review the remaining sealed
materials individually and unseal those materials as
appropriate.
51 See note 22, ante.
24
(5) District courts should exercise the full range of their
substantial powers to ensure their files do not become
vehicles for defamation.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the orders of the
District Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August
27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment record as
described herein, and REMAND the cause to the District Court for
particularized review of the remaining materials.
In undertaking this task, the District Court may be well‐served
by ordering the parties to submit to the Court unredacted, electronic
copies of the remaining sealed materials, as well as specific, proposed
redactions. The District Court may also order the parties to identify
and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be
implicated by disclosure of these materials.
In the interests of judicial economy, any future appeal in this
matter shall be referred to this panel.
25

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007


DC Judge: Sweet
BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS
The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of
costs is on the Court's website.
The bill of costs must:

* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;
* be verified;
* be served on all adversaries;
* not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;
* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;
* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a
cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;
* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;
* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New
York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;
* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007


DC Judge: Sweet
VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS
Counsel for
_________________________________________________________________________
respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to
prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the
________________________________________________________________
and in favor of
_________________________________________________________________________
for insertion in the mandate.
Docketing Fee _____________________
Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________
Costs of printing brief (necessary copies ______________ ____) _____________________
Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________
(VERIFICATION HERE)
________________________
Signature
POOLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
I join the Court’s opinion in every respect but one: the decision to unseal
the summary judgment record ourselves. I agree that all or most of the material
must be unsealed. Nevertheless, in my view, the district court is better suited to
the task. As the Court’s opinion recognizes in connection with the remaining
sealed materials, the district court is better positioned to communicate with the
parties and any nonparties whose privacy interests might be affected by
unsealing. On that score, it is worth clarifying here the breadth of the Court’s
unsealing order: it unseals nearly 2000 pages of material. The task of identifying
and making specific redactions in such a substantial volume is perilous; the
consequences of even a seemingly minor error may be grave and are irrevocable.
Moreover, although I share the majority’s concern about avoiding delay, I would
alleviate that concern through other means—perhaps with an order directing the
district court to act expeditiously and by making clear what types of limited
redactions are and are not appropriate. In sum, I would unseal the district court’s
summary judgment decision only and leave the remainder of the materials for
the district court to review, redact, and unseal on remand.
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
In the
AUGUST TERM 2018
No. 18‐2868‐cv
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
v.
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)
MEDIA,
CERTIFIED COPY ISSUED ON 07/03/2019


V.


v.

GHISLAINE MAXWELL,





*
2

materials.
remand.

Miami Herald.
Maxwell.
3


4
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
5

6


4
Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
5
6
7


7
8

responses.
II. DISCUSSION
8
9

judicial pleadings.
10

(2d Cir. 2016).
13
11
14
16
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
12


our mandate.22
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
20
21
22
13
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
25 Id.
26
14
15

30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
16
filings.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
35
omitted).
17
18
purposes.

19
41

43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
20
to the court).
21


46
47

22
privilege.
(1982)).
49
23
III. CONCLUSION

public access.
redactions.51

appropriate.
24
25

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3rd day of July, two thousand and nineteen.
Before: José A. Cabranes,

Rosemary S. Pooler,
Christopher F. Droney,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________

JUDGMENT
Intervenors - Appellants. Docket Nos. 18-2868
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant - Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff - Appellee.
________________________________
The appeal in the above captioned case from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York was argued on the district court’s record and the
parties’ briefs. Upon consideration thereof,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the orders of the District
Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018 are VACATED. The
Court further ORDERS the unsealing of the summary judgment record as described in its
opinion. The case is REMANDED to the District Court for a particularized review of the
remaining materials.
For the Court:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court
S.D.N.Y.
15-cv-7433
Sweet, J.

FOR T HE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
8th day of July, two thousand nineteen.

Rosemary S. Pooler,
Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant, AMENDED ORDER
v. 18-2868
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Sharon Churcher, Jeffrey Epstein,
Respondents,
v.
Julia Brown, Miami Herald Company,
The following outstanding motions in the captioned cases, including:
1. Ghislaine Maxwell’s December 13, 2018 motion to dismiss Virginia L. Giuffre

from the appeal (Dkt. No. 63);
2. Ghislaine Maxwell’s December 27, 2018 motion to strike Virginia L. Giuffre’s
brief (Dkt. No. 87);
3. Ghislaine Maxwell’s January 10, 2019 motion for an order to show cause (Dkt.
No. 97);
4. The March 19, 2019 John Doe motion for leave to file an amicus brief (Dkt. No.
153);
5. Ghislaine Maxwell’s March 28, 2019 motion for leave to respond to Michael
Cernovich’s response to our order (Dkt. No. 180); and
6. Ghislaine Maxwell’s April 12, 2019 motion to strike Giuffre’s April 8, 2019 28(j)
letter (Dkt. No. 193)
are hereby DENIED.
The March 19, 2019 motions for leave to intervene for the limited purpose of seeking to
have a name redacted, filed by another person styled “J. Doe,” (Dkt. Nos. 151, 152, 154) are
DENIED AS MOOT.
FOR THE COURT:

Clerk of Court
2

18-2868
Non-Party J. Doe's Motion for Leave to

Motion for: ______________________________________________
Intervene for Limited Purpose of Protecting Doe's
________________________________________________________
Compelling Privacy Interests and Seeking Related Relief
________________________________________________________

(1) Order granting non-party J. Doe leave to intervene;
________________________________________________________
Giuffre v. Maxwell
(2) Clarification of Order (Dkt. 225)
________________________________________________________
(3) Leave to file Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing
________________________________________________________
En Banc within 14 days of issuance of Court's ruling on
________________________________________________________
Doe's Motion for Clarification; (4) Leave to file motions
________________________________________________________
ex parte, under seal, pending Court's further direction.
________________________________________________________
Non-Party J. Doe
MOVING PARTY:_______________________________________ OPPOSING PARTY:____________________________________________
___Plaintiff ___Defendant
Kerrie L. Campbell
MOVING ATTORNEY:___________________________________ OPPOSING ATTORNEY:________________________________________
KCampbell-Law, PLLC
________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________
1629 K St., NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006
________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________
202.681-5432; kcampbell@kcamlaw.com
________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________
✔
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
___Unopposed ✔
___Opposed ___Don’t Know
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
*
___Yes ___No
Has argument date of appeal been set? ___ Yes ___No If yes, enter date:_______________________________________________________

/s/ Kerrie L. Campbell
_________________________________ 07.12.19
Date:__________________ ✔
Service by: ___CM/ECF* ___Other [Attach proof of service]
*Motion Information Statement only; Motion to be filed
ex parte with Court, under seal, for in camera review
Form T
Fo T-1080 12 13)
1080 ((rev.12
(rev.12-13)
S.D.N.Y.
15-cv-7433
Sweet, J.

FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
17th day of July, two thousand nineteen.

Rosemary S. Pooler,
Circuit Judges.
Julia Brown, Miami Herald Company,
Intervenors-Appellants,
ORDER
v. 18-2868
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
The parties Virginia L. Giuffre and Ghislaine Maxwell are hereby ORDERED to review
the record and file one-page letter briefs no later than July 19, 2019 directing the Court’s
attention to any additional locations in the record that might implicate the privacy interests of the
individual named on page 59, line 25 of Exhibit KK to the motion for summary judgment (and
whom Giuffre states was included erroneously due to a “scrivener’s error”).
FOR THE COURT:

Clerk of Court
Case 18-2868, Document 213-3, 07/03/2019, 2600261, Pagel of 1

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007


Docket #: 18-2868cv DC Court: SONY (NEW YORK
DC Judge: Sweet
VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS
Counsel for
Intervenors-Appellants Tulie Brown and the Miami Herald Media Company
respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to
prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the
Defendant-Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell
and in favor of
Intervenors-Appellants Tulie Brown and the Miami Herald Media Company
for insertion in the mandate.
Docketing Fee $505.00_____________
Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies_____ 8________ ) __ $2,525.35______________
Costs of printing brief (necessary copies_______ 9___________) $1,647.74______________
Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies___ £ ) $1.151.73___________

VERIFICATION
I Christine N. Walz, declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing costs are correct
and were necessarily incurred in this appeal and that the services for which fees have been charged
were actually and necessarily performed. A copy of this Bill of Costs has been served on all the
parties via CM/ECF service.
By: /s/Christine N. Walz

Christine N. Walz
31 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
Tel: 212-513-3200
Email: christine.walz@hklaw.com
Counsel for Intervenors-Appellants

Julie Brown and the Miami Herald
Media Company
RECORD PRESS, INC.

229 West 36th Street
8th Floor
New York, NY 10018 > - PRESS
dmisser@reGprdpress.com Appellate Management Dntumen: Solution*
BILL TO INVOICE# 100909

DATE 12/21/2018
Elviri Ramos
Holland & Knight LLP DUE DATE 01/05/2019
TERMS Net 15
31 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019-6118
CAPTION JOB# REP

Giuffre y Maxwell 77045/77046 NMA
ACTIVITY QTY .. RATE: AMOUNT

2ND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant's Briel/ Special Appendix & Joint Appendix
Brief w/ Special Appendix - 9 Copies / 35 Pages

(Printing, 2 Sided Covers & Binding) 1 559.00 559.00
Table of Contents 2 85.00 170.00
Table Of Authorities 3 125.00 375,00
Certificate of Compliance 1 40.00 40.00
Blue Sheet 1 15.00 15.00
Joint Appendix - 8 Copies / 450 Pages

(Includes Priming, 2 Sided Cover & Binding) - 2 Volumes 450 3.17 1,426.50
Table of Contents 9 . 85.00 765.00
Subtotal: 3,350.50
15% Courtesy Discount 3,350.50 -0.15 -502.58

Paralegal Time 5 95.00 475.00
Paralegal Overtime - (1 Day Turnaround) 3 120.00 360.00
Electronic Service and Filing 2 65.00 130.00
Messenger 1 20.00 20.00
For your convenience, credit card payments SUBTOTAL 3,832.92

can be processed through the link below: TAX (8.875%) 340.17
TOTAL 4,173.09
https://payments.recordpress.com BALANCE DUE
$4,173.09
(American Express, Visa, MasterCard & Discover)
RECORD PRESS, INC.

TAX ID #13-5654060
RECORD PRESS, INC.

229 West 36th Street
8th Floor
New York, NY 10018 58*' PRESS
dmisser@recordpress.com Appellate Management Document Solutions
BILL TO INVOICE# 101307

Elvin Ramos DATE 02/12/2019
Holland & Knight LLP DUE DATE 02/27/2019
31 West 52nd Street TERMS Net 15
New York, NY 10019-6118
CAPTION JOB# REP

Giuffre v Maxwell 77047 NMA
2ND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Reply Brief - 9 Copies /19 Pages
(Printing, 2 Sided Covers & Binding) 1 346.00 346.00

Table of Contents . 1 85.00 85.00
Table of Authorities 2 125.00 250.00
Certificate of Compliance 1 40.00 40.00
Subtotal: 721.00
15% Courtesy Discount 721 -0.15 -108.15

Paralegal Overtime - (1 Day Turnaround) 2.50 120.00 300.00
Hard Copy Filing 1 60.00 60.00
Electronic Service and Filing 1 65.00 65.00
Messenger 1 20.00 20.00
For your convenience, credit card payments SUBTOTAL 1,057.85

can be processed through the link below: TAX (8.875%) 93.88
TOTAL 1,151.73
https://payments.recordpress.com BALANCE DUE
$1,151.73
(American Express, Visa, MasterCard & Discover)
RECORD PRESS, INC.

TAX ID #13-5654060

______________
No. 18-2868-cv

v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________
No. 16-3945-cv(L)
No. 17-1625 (CON)
No. 17-1722 (CON)
Alan M. Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich, DBA
Cernovich Media,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________

______________
Appellee Maxwell’s Petition for

Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
150 East Tenth Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
tgee@hmflaw.com
Counsel for Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... i
Table of Authorities ............................................................................................... ii
Why Rehearing Should Be Granted ........................................................................ 1
I. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon and New York Times. ....................... 4
A. Nixon holds that right of access decisions should be made in the first
instance by trial courts, subject to review by appellate courts. .................... 4
B. New York Times requires that trial courts give substantial weight to third
parties’ privacy interests in right to access decisions. ................................. 9
II. The panel’s decision ignoring reliance on the Protective Order conflicts with
Nixon and raises a question of exceptional importance relating to the effect of
such reliance on the access decision. ............................................................... 12
III. The post-panel decision events raise a question of exceptional importance:

whether immediate unsealing of the summary judgment materials without
remand to the district court implicates Ms. Maxwell’s fundamental
constitutional rights. ....................................................................................... 15
IV. No circuit court has displaced the trial court in conducting the Nixon analysis
and itself unsealed the materials at issue in the appeal..................................... 17
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 18
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A) ........................................................... 19
Certificate of Service............................................................................................. 19
i
Table of Authorities
Cases
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)....................................................... 8
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) .......................................... 9
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004) .......................................... 2
In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987)............................................ 2
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) .......................................passim
Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,

594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) ......................................................................passim
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) ........................... passim
People v. Novak, 88 N.E.3d 305 (N.Y. 2017) ........................................................... 9
SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................ 14
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 1965) ............................12, 15
United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) ............................. 1, 5, 10, 14, 18
United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014) ..................................... 4, 11
United States v. Lasseque, 806 F.3d 618 (1st Cir. 2015)............................................ 9
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) ......................................... 8
Rules
Fed.R.App.P. 35(b)(1)(B)........................................................................................ 3
Other Authorities
Charles Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla.L.Rev. 501 (1998) ................. 9
ii
Why Rehearing Should Be Granted

The panel reversed the trial court’s denial of the appellants-intervenors’
motions to unseal court filings. As to summary judgment evidentiary materials,
over Judge Pooler’s dissent, the panel ordered their release (along with the
summary judgment order and briefing) upon issuance of the mandate. As to all
other sealed materials, the panel remanded the case to the district court. See
Attachment A.
1. Appellate fact-finding. The panel decision conflicts with Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), and an unbroken line of cases in this
Circuit, including Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006), and United
States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995). These cases stand for the
proposition that because of the trial court’s familiarity with the facts and parties,
the task of identifying and weighing the parties’ and third parties’ interests is one
“best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, … to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599,
602 (footnote omitted).
The panel concluded the trial court failed to review the documents before
sealing and failed to make findings when it denied motions to unseal voluminous
and highly sensitive information in summary-judgment and other materials. Instead
1
of remanding to the district with directions to conduct the right to access analysis,
the panel undertook the district court’s role. It reviewed the summary judgment
order, briefing, and evidentiary record, totaling some 2,000 pages (collectively,
“summary judgment materials”), purported to identify and weigh the parties’
interests, and decided to unseal all the materials with “minimal redactions.” Slip
op. at 13. The panel directed this Court’s Clerk’s Office to release the summary
judgment order and—with Judge Pooler dissenting—the summary judgment
record. This is without precedent.
2. Third parties. The panel decision conflicts with Nixon and In re New York
Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987). Both require a trial court conducting a right
of access analysis to give substantial weight to third parties’ privacy interests.
Other than redacting some names, the panel did not address the interests of the
numerous third parties referenced in the summary judgment materials.
3. Reliance. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon in a third important
way. Nixon suggests a third party witness’s reliance on a protective order to induce
it to provide information may outweigh the public’s right of access to a document.
This Court in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1979), and Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004), also
gave significant weight to this reliance. The panel did not address Ms. Maxwell’s
2
argument that her and the third parties’ reliance on the Protective Order
outweighed any presumption of access.
4. Exceptional importance. The panel decision raises two important
questions.
One, in light of the significant post-panel decision events, including the
arrest and indictment of Jeffrey Epstein this month, does the panel decision to
release immediately all summary judgment materials without remand conflict with
Nixon and Martindell? The media have shown an insatiable appetite for any shred
of information/ speculation to publish and broadcast since Mr. Epstein’s arrest.
They have published articles speculating Ms. Maxwell may be the subject of the
ongoing criminal investigation of Mr. Epstein. Their actions implicate substantial
due process concerns for Mr. Epstein and all other potential targets and witnesses
of the investigation.
Two, the panel’s decision to displace the district court, conduct the Nixon
analysis itself without trial court findings, and itself release the summary judgment
materials is without precedent in the other circuit courts. This is an issue of
exceptional importance. See Fed.R.App.P. 35(b)(1)(B).
3
I. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon and New York Times.
instance by trial courts, subject to review by appellate courts.
The failure to remand here was profoundly at odds with Nixon and this
Court’s jurisprudence. Nixon recognized, as does this Court, that district courts,
not appellate courts, have the ability and expertise to conduct evidentiary and other
hearings and “to engage in whatever additional fact-finding [i]s needed,”1 to
determine whether a person resisting unsealing can establish compelling interests
that warrant a narrowly tailored sealing. Nor would appellate courts—to which
parties bring only a subset of questions and facts of a case—be able to exercise
“discretion ... in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted).
The panel concluded the trial court entered a sealing order that “effectively
ceded control of the sealing process to the parties themselves.” Slip op. at 7. As a
result, the parties were able to file documents under seal without judicial oversight.
Id. at 7-8. Upon reaching these conclusions, the panel could not, consistent with
Nixon, avoid remand to the district court to review the documents in the first
instance, make findings, and exercise its discretion whether to unseal the materials.
1
United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235, 243 (2d Cir. 2014).
4
The public may obtain access to sealed documents through the common law
right of access or the First Amendment. To determine whether access should be
granted under either, the trial court first must determine that the item is a judicial
document, that is, one “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and
useful in the judicial process.” Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 145. If it is a judicial document,
the common law presumption of access attaches, and the court must determine the
presumption’s weight. The weight generally “will fall somewhere on a continuum
from matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a
court’s purview solely to insure their relevance.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (internal
quotations omitted). The trial court must balance competing considerations against
the presumption, including “the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id.
at 120 (internal quotations omitted).
If the item is a judicial document, a court may authorize access under the
First Amendment after considering the public’s historical access to such a
document, whether public access is useful, and the extent to which the judicial
document is related to public participation in the proceeding. There is no absolute
right of access. Sealing is proper if it “preserve[s] higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.” Id.
5
Because the trial court below “ceded control of the sealing process to the
parties themselves,” a fortiori the parties were not called upon to address whether
an item was a judicial document—critical to all access questions—or to
“advance[]”2 competing considerations against sealing. And a fortiori the trial
court made no common-law or First Amendment findings for any of the contested
items before they were sealed.
There was thus no factual foundation from which the panel—which was not
competent to make findings—could draw legal conclusions bearing on the access
right under the common law or the First Amendment. In this factual vacuum, it
was not simply that “the decision as to access is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court... in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted). It was that only the trial
court had the institutional ability and expertise in the first instance to conduct the
Nixon analysis, which it never did. When the Lugosch court found the trial court’s
Nixon analysis wanting, it concluded: “Because we are not in a position to assess
whether the presumption is overcome by countervailing factors, we remand for the
district court to make specific ... findings.” 435 F.3d at 113.
2
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
6
The panel suggested immediate unsealing and disclosure are warranted
because of the need for speed. As Judge Pooler suggested, however, speed should
not override due process and the risk of “grave and … irrevocable” consequences.
As Judge Pooler suggested and as the Lugosch court did, the Court can accomplish
all its goals by remanding to the trial court with directions to “act expeditiously,”
dissenting op. See Doc.141 at 12-13.
The panel did not afford Ms. Maxwell an adequate opportunity to
“advance” her “interests,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602, or show the need to “preserve
higher values,” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. The only opportunity to do so was in
response to the panel’s Order to Show Cause, entered after briefing and oral
argument had been completed. It limited Ms. Maxwell’s response to ten pages in
which to make objections and show good cause why the summary judgment
materials should not be disclosed. Doc.138. The limitation was arbitrary and
unreasonable. One objection was that many of the sealed items, including the
summary judgment materials, were not judicial documents and therefore not
subject to any public access. For example, anticipating public disclosure, the
plaintiff introduced into the summary judgment record irrelevant documents solely
to advance her ulterior, non-litigation profit purposes. See Doc.149 at 3. As the
7
panel acknowledged, such documents are not judicial documents subject to a
presumption of access. See slip op. at 11 n.12.
The panel suggested it was competent to find facts3 and conduct the access
analysis because it consisted of “three former district judges” who had reviewed
the summary judgment materials. Slip op. at 14 n.22. We respectfully submit this is
incorrect.
Nixon held that the access decision is “best left” to the trial court’s
discretion in conjunction with its fact-finding role. See 435 U.S. at 599-02. The
Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985), held:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited
to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations
of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication
of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.
See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 76 n.14 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has specifically cautioned courts of appeals not to engage in
independent fact-finding after concluding that a district court has applied the
3
For example, the panel found “there is no countervailing privacy interest”
of the parties or non-parties warranting continued sealing. Slip op. at 13,
8
wrong factors in classifying an individual or an entity under the FLSA.”); United
States v. Lasseque, 806 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Our job is to monitor the
boundaries of reasonable fact-finding, not to engage in it ourselves.”).
Additionally, it violates the Due Process Clause for appellate judges—
regardless of their prior experience as district judges—to perform both trial and
appellate-review functions. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868, 880 (2009) (holding that due process prohibits judge from presiding when he
has a “conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding”); People v.
Novak, 88 N.E.3d 305, 307 (N.Y. 2017) (where same judge served as trier of fact,
convicted defendant, and then served as sole judge on appeal, judge’s recusal from
appeal was required under state and federal Due Process Clauses); Charles
Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla.L.Rev. 501, 515 (1998) (“Appellate
courts work from a cold record. They do not hear or see the witnesses, nor are they
participants in the dynamics of the trial. Appellate courts simply cannot adequately
afford litigants due process of law if they purport to function as fact finders.”).
B. New York Times requires that trial courts give substantial weight to
third parties’ privacy interests in right to access decisions.
Nixon acknowledged that the privacy interests of third parties weigh against
access. The petitioner, President Nixon, was a third party to a criminal case, at
which the tapes he had produced pursuant to a subpoena were transcribed,
9
introduced into evidence and played to the jury. He intervened to prevent public
distribution of the tapes. See 435 U.S. at 599-602. The Nixon Court noted but did
not consider the merits of the argument that the President’s “third-party ... privacy
interests preclude[d] release of the tapes to the public.” Id. at 599 n.11. However, it
made clear the privacy interests against release must be considered and weighed by
the trial court in its access decision. See id. at 602-03.
In New York Times this Court held “the privacy interests of innocent third
parties as well as those of [the litigants] that may be harmed by disclosure of the ...
material should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation in determining what
should... remain sealed or ... redacted.” 828 F.2d at 116 (emphasis supplied). The
Court on other occasions has given significant weight to third parties’ privacy
interests. In Amodeo the Court concluded that a report filed with the trial court was
a judicial document; yet it gave considerable weight to the third parties’ privacy
interests, directing the trial court to “make its own redactions, supported by
specific findings, after a careful review of all claims for and against access,” 44 F.3d
at 147.
The panel did not invite third parties to participate. It denied two third
parties’ motions to intervene in the appeal. Without stating whether it considered
the privacy interests of the numerous third parties affected by its decision, the
10
panel said it found no privacy interest outweighing the presumption of access. Slip
op. at 13.
But the panel did not identify which or whose privacy interests it considered;
it did not consider whether there were “higher values” warranting continued
sealing or redactions; although it factually found “there is no countervailing
privacy interest” warranting continued sealing, it did not explain why an appellate
court can or should engage in “fact-finding,” Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d at 243; it did not
disclose which, if any, of Ms. Maxwell’s objections to unsealing related to third
parties were sustained or which, if any, of her proposed redactions related to third
parties were accepted. There is no indication in the panel’s decision it considered
any third party’s privacy interests or how it would know of all the third parties’
privacy interests. Nor is there any indication the panel “weigh[ed] heavily” the
parties’ or third parties’ privacy interests.
The panel did not share with the parties or third parties its “minimally
redacted version of the summary judgment record,” slip op. at 13 n.22; so none can
alert the panel that the Clerk’s Office’s public disclosure of the summary judgment
materials will improperly or inadvertently let “[t]he genie ... out of the bottle” with
no “means to put the genie back,” Gambale, 377 F.3d at 144. The panel’s appellate
Nixon analysis and its decision to release the summary judgment materials through
11
the Second Circuit are, as Judge Pooler observed, fraught with “peril[],”
dissenting op.
II. The panel’s decision ignoring reliance on the Protective Order conflicts
with Nixon and raises a question of exceptional importance relating to
the effect of such reliance on the access decision.
After holding that the access decision is best left to the trial court’s sound
discretion, the Nixon Court cited with approval State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137
N.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Wis. 1965). In Youmans the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave
“[a]n illustration of a type of situation in which the harm to the public interest, if
inspection [of a public document] were permitted, was held to outweigh the
individual’s [common law] right to inspect.” 137 N.W.2d at 474. The illustration
concerned governmental disclosure of a public document obtained from third
parties “under [a governmental] pledge that it would be kept confidential.” Id.
In citing Youmans, the Nixon Court suggested reliance on a protective order
shielding information produced in litigation is an important factor in a trial court’s
decision whether to unseal. The trial court in the criminal case underlying Nixon
had not entered a protective order protecting the audiotapes the President had
produced pursuant to a subpoena, but the Supreme Court noted that the President
had resisted production. Additionally, the Court held, even though the tapes had
12
been introduced into evidence at the criminal trial of the President’s former
advisers and played for the jury, the trial court
has a responsibility to exercise an informed discretion as to release of

the tapes, with a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to their
production. This responsibility does not permit copying upon demand.
Otherwise, there would exist a danger that the court could become a
partner in the use of the subpoenaed material to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal.
Id. at 603 (emphasis supplied; internal quotations omitted).
In a series of cases this Court has addressed the effect on sealed documents
of the parties’ reliance on a protective order that preceded the production and
subsequent sealing of those documents. It has not addressed the effect on sealed
documents of a third party’s reliance on a protective order.
In Martindell this Court—without referencing Nixon—“established a strong
presumption against access to sealed documents when there was reasonable reliance
on a protective order, absent extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need.”
Gambale, 377 F.3d at 142 n.7 (emphasis supplied). In Gambale, which concerned
the disclosure of sealed summary judgment materials, the Court concluded the
Martindell presumption was inapplicable because the protective order in Gambale
was “explicitly temporary.” Id.
13
In SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001), the trial court
unsealed a deposition transcript sealed by the parties under a protective order. The
SEC Court appeared to resolve in dictum—without referencing Nixon—the conflict
between Martindell’s “general and strong presumption against access” and
Amodeo’s “presumption in favor of access” to “judicial documents,” that is, court-
filed items relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the
judicial process. The Court noted, “Though Amodeo did not refer to Martindell, it
left the general rule of Martindell undisturbed.” 273 F.3d at 231. Applying Amodeo,
the Court concluded the deposition transcript was not a judicial document and so
the presumption of access did not apply. Id. at 234. Applying Martindell, the Court
concluded the parties resisting unsealing did not reasonably rely on the protective
order, since they were deposed before entry of the order; so the presumption
against access did not apply. Id. at 234. The Court concluded the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in unsealing the transcripts. It suggested in dictum that the
Martindell rule applies only to non-judicial documents placed under seal pursuant
to a protective order. See id.
In Lugosch, decided after SEC, two newspapers moved to unseal summary
judgment materials. The defendants argued on appeal that the newspapers were
trying improperly to modify a confidentiality order on which the parties relied in
14
producing the sealed items. 435 F.3d at 116, 125. Without citing Nixon or Martindell
the Lugosch Court disagreed with the trial court’s suggestion that the
confidentiality order was a strong factor against access, noting that litigants have a
duty to produce all relevant information. Id. at 125. The Court also held the
defendants could not have reasonably relied on the order because it explicitly said
anyone could request relief from it. Id. at 126.
As Nixon and Youmans suggest, the effect on the public’s right of access of
reliance on a protective order is a question of exceptional importance. Nixon did
not address the question directly. This Circuit’s jurisprudence on the question is
unsettled. Lugosch suggests reliance on a protective order that does not permit third
parties from seeking modification is sufficient to rebut any presumption of access to
judicial documents. Ms. Maxwell raised the issue, but the panel did not address it.
III. The post-panel decision events raise a question of exceptional

importance: whether immediate unsealing of the summary judgment
materials without remand to the district court implicates Ms. Maxwell’s
fundamental constitutional rights.
Eleven days ago the government arrested and indicted Mr. Epstein on sex-
trafficking charges. The indictment alleges that three unidentified employees
engaged in acts that facilitated Mr. Epstein’s offenses.
The “media”—the mainstream press, the internet “press,” and other
worldwide publishers of information, opinion, gossip and conjecture—have
15
engaged in a furious feeding frenzy. They recklessly have targeted Ms. Maxwell.
For example, Appellants Brown and the Miami Herald published a story one day
after Mr. Epstein’s arrest titled “With Jeffrey Epstein locked up, these are nervous
times for his friends, enablers.”4 In the story these appellants speculated: “[T]here
are indications that others involved in his crimes could be charged or named as
cooperating witnesses. Among those potentially on the list: Ghislaine Maxwell ...
who has been accused of working as Epstein’s madam ....”5
In Nixon the Court explicitly noted that even though the broadcasters had
requested the tapes after the criminal trial had concluded, the trial court
nonetheless expressed concern about disclosing the tapes because of “the need to
safeguard the defendants’ rights on appeal.” 435 U.S. at 595. The Court made it
clear the rights of criminal defendants must be considered as part of the trial
court’s “task of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public
interest and the duty of the courts,” id. at 602. In a footnote the Court observed
4
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article232385422.html
(last visited July 16, 2019).
5
The panel issued a “note of caution” to the media, “urg[ing] the media to
exercise restraint in covering potentially defamatory allegations.” Slip op. at 24.
The media’s reckless and disgraceful behavior following Mr. Epstein’s arrest
establishes how unrealistic it is for courts to rely on the media’s “self-restraint” in
publishing anything the media believe to be provocative, lurid or titillating—
anything, in short, that sells newspapers and internet “clicks.”
16
that by the time of its decision in Nixon the defendants’ constitutional rights were
no longer an issue because all criminal proceedings had been resolved. Id. at 602
n.14.
In Martindell various witnesses were deposed in a civil action pursuant to a
protective order. Although not a party, the government moved for access to the
deposition transcripts for use in a related criminal investigation targeting some of
the deponents. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that disclosure would
violate the witnesses’ Fifth Amendment right. This Court affirmed. There was no
need, the Court said, to consider the Fifth Amendment because of “the overriding
policy in favor of enforcing the civil protective order.” 594 F.2d at 297. It held the
motion properly was denied because “a more significant counterbalancing factor”
against access is “the vital function of a protective order.” Id. at 295. Protective
orders, on which witnesses justifiably rely, encourage full disclosure of evidence,
and such disclosure “represents the cornerstone of our administration of civil
justice.” Id.
IV. No circuit court has displaced the trial court in conducting the Nixon
analysis and itself unsealed the materials at issue in the appeal.
As discussed above, there are sound jurisprudential reasons for a circuit
court, upon finding an abuse of discretion in a trial court’s denial of an unseal
motion, to remand the case to the trial court. This Court without fail has done so,
17
in accordance with Nixon. See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126-27; Gambale, 377 F.3d
at 145; Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 148. No circuit court has unsealed and released
documents at the appellate level based on the trial court’s access-analysis errors.
Conclusion
The Court should grant this Petition.
18
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A)

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App.
P. 32(a)(7)(B). It contains 3,897 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(III).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.

P. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). It has been
prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt.
Equity.
s/ Ty Gee
I certify that on July 17, 2019, a copy of the foregoing Appellee Maxwell’s
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was served via CM/ECF on the
following:

Christine N. Walz
Sanford L. Bohrer
Jay M. Wolman
s/ Nicole Simmons
19
ATTACHMENT A
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page25
Page1 of
of 50
25
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
In the
AUGUST TERM 2018
No. 18‐2868‐cv
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
v.
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)
MEDIA,

Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page26
Page2 of
of 50
25

V.


v.

GHISLAINE MAXWELL,





*
2
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page27
Page3 of
of 50
25

materials.
remand.

Miami Herald.
Maxwell.
3
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page28
Page4 of
of 50
25


4
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page29
Page5 of
of 50
25
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
5
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page30
Page6 of
of 50
25

6
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page31
Page7 of
of 50
25


4
Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
5
6
7
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page32
Page8 of
of 50
25


7
8
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page33
Page9 of
of 50
25

responses.
II. DISCUSSION
8
9
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page34
Page10ofof50
25

judicial pleadings.
10
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page35
Page11ofof50
25

(2d Cir. 2016).
13
11
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page36
Page12ofof50
25
14
16
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
12
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page37
Page13ofof50
25


our mandate.22
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
20
21
22
13
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page38
Page14ofof50
25
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
25 Id.
26
14
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page39
Page15ofof50
25
15
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page40
Page16ofof50
25

30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
16
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page41
Page17ofof50
25
filings.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
35
omitted).
17
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page42
Page18ofof50
25
18
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page43
Page19ofof50
25
purposes.

19
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page44
Page20ofof50
25
41

43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
20
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page45
Page21ofof50
25
to the court).
21
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page46
Page22ofof50
25


46
47

22
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page47
Page23ofof50
25
privilege.
(1982)).
49
23
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page48
Page24ofof50
25
III. CONCLUSION

public access.
redactions.51

appropriate.
24
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
232, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600298,Page49
Page25ofof50
25
25
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document232,
214,07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611181,
2600267,Page50
Page1 of 50
1

______________
No. 18-2868-cv

v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________
No. 16-3945-cv(L)
No. 17-1625 (CON)
No. 17-1722 (CON)
Cernovich Media,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________

______________
Appellee Maxwell’s Amended Petition for

Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
tgee@hmflaw.com
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... i
Table of Authorities ............................................................................................... ii
Why Rehearing Should Be Granted ........................................................................ 1
I. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon and New York Times. ....................... 4
instance by trial courts, subject to review by appellate courts. .................... 4
B. New York Times requires that trial courts give substantial weight to third
parties’ privacy interests in right to access decisions. ................................. 9
II. The panel’s decision ignoring reliance on the Protective Order conflicts with
Nixon and raises a question of exceptional importance relating to the effect of
such reliance on the access decision. ............................................................... 12
III. The post-panel decision events raise a question of exceptional importance:

whether immediate unsealing of the summary judgment materials without
remand to the district court implicates Ms. Maxwell’s fundamental
constitutional rights. ....................................................................................... 15
IV. No circuit court has displaced the trial court in conducting the Nixon analysis
and itself unsealed the materials at issue in the appeal..................................... 17
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 18
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A) ........................................................... 19
Certificate of Service............................................................................................. 19
i
Table of Authorities
Cases
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)....................................................... 8
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) .......................................... 9
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004) .......................................... 2
In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987)............................................ 2
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) .......................................passim
Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,

594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) ......................................................................passim
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) ........................... passim
People v. Novak, 88 N.E.3d 305 (N.Y. 2017) ........................................................... 9
SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................ 14
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 1965) ............................12, 15
United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) ............................. 1, 5, 10, 14, 18
United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014) ..................................... 4, 11
United States v. Lasseque, 806 F.3d 618 (1st Cir. 2015)............................................ 9
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) ......................................... 8
Rules
Fed.R.App.P. 35(b)(1)(B)........................................................................................ 3
Other Authorities
Charles Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla.L.Rev. 501 (1998) ................. 9
ii
Why Rehearing Should Be Granted

The panel reversed the trial court’s denial of the appellants-intervenors’
motions to unseal court filings. As to summary judgment evidentiary materials,
over Judge Pooler’s dissent, the panel ordered their release (along with the
summary judgment order and briefing) upon issuance of the mandate. As to all
other sealed materials, the panel remanded the case to the district court. See
Attachment A.
1. Appellate fact-finding. The panel decision conflicts with Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), and an unbroken line of cases in this
Circuit, including Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006), and United
States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995). These cases stand for the
proposition that because of the trial court’s familiarity with the facts and parties,
the task of identifying and weighing the parties’ and third parties’ interests is one
“best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, … to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599,
602 (footnote omitted).
The panel concluded the trial court failed to review the documents before
sealing and failed to make findings when it denied motions to unseal voluminous
and highly sensitive information in summary-judgment and other materials. Instead
1
of remanding to the district with directions to conduct the right to access analysis,
the panel undertook the district court’s role. It reviewed the summary judgment
order, briefing, and evidentiary record, totaling some 2,000 pages (collectively,
“summary judgment materials”), purported to identify and weigh the parties’
interests, and decided to unseal all the materials with “minimal redactions.” Slip
op. at 13. The panel directed this Court’s Clerk’s Office to release the summary
judgment order and—with Judge Pooler dissenting—the summary judgment
record. This is without precedent.
2. Third parties. The panel decision conflicts with Nixon and In re New York
Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987). Both require a trial court conducting a right
of access analysis to give substantial weight to third parties’ privacy interests.
Other than redacting some names, the panel did not address the interests of the
numerous third parties referenced in the summary judgment materials.
3. Reliance. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon in a third important
way. Nixon suggests a third party witness’s reliance on a protective order to induce
it to provide information may outweigh the public’s right of access to a document.
This Court in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1979), and Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004), also
gave significant weight to this reliance. The panel did not address Ms. Maxwell’s
2
argument that her and the third parties’ reliance on the Protective Order
outweighed any presumption of access.
4. Exceptional importance. The panel decision raises two important
questions.
One, in light of the significant post-panel decision events, including the
arrest and indictment of Jeffrey Epstein this month, does the panel decision to
release immediately all summary judgment materials without remand conflict with
Nixon and Martindell? The media have shown an insatiable appetite for any shred
of information/speculation to publish and broadcast since Mr. Epstein’s arrest.
They have published articles speculating Ms. Maxwell may be the subject of the
ongoing criminal investigation of Mr. Epstein. Their actions implicate substantial
due process concerns for Mr. Epstein and all other potential targets and witnesses
of the investigation.
Two, the panel’s decision to displace the district court, conduct the Nixon
analysis itself without trial court findings, and itself release the summary judgment
materials is without precedent in the other circuit courts. This is an issue of
exceptional importance. See Fed.R.App.P. 35(b)(1)(B).
3
I. The panel’s decision conflicts with Nixon and New York Times.
instance by trial courts, subject to review by appellate courts.
The failure to remand here was profoundly at odds with Nixon and this
Court’s jurisprudence. Nixon recognized, as does this Court, that district courts,
not appellate courts, have the ability and expertise to conduct evidentiary and other
hearings and “to engage in whatever additional fact-finding [i]s needed,”1 to
determine whether a person resisting unsealing can establish compelling interests
that warrant a narrowly tailored sealing. Nor would appellate courts—to which
parties bring only a subset of questions and facts of a case—be able to exercise
“discretion ... in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted).
The panel concluded the trial court entered a sealing order that “effectively
ceded control of the sealing process to the parties themselves.” Slip op. at 7. As a
result, the parties were able to file documents under seal without judicial oversight.
Id. at 7-8. Upon reaching these conclusions, the panel could not, consistent with
Nixon, avoid remand to the district court to review the documents in the first
instance, make findings, and exercise its discretion whether to unseal the materials.
1
United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235, 243 (2d Cir. 2014).
4
The public may obtain access to sealed documents through the common law
right of access or the First Amendment. To determine whether access should be
granted under either, the trial court first must determine that the item is a judicial
document, that is, one “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and
useful in the judicial process.” Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 145. If it is a judicial document,
the common law presumption of access attaches, and the court must determine the
presumption’s weight. The weight generally “will fall somewhere on a continuum
from matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a
court’s purview solely to insure their relevance.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (internal
quotations omitted). The trial court must balance competing considerations against
the presumption, including “the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id.
at 120 (internal quotations omitted).
If the item is a judicial document, a court may authorize access under the
First Amendment after considering the public’s historical access to such a
document, whether public access is useful, and the extent to which the judicial
document is related to public participation in the proceeding. There is no absolute
right of access. Sealing is proper if it “preserve[s] higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.” Id.
5
Because the trial court below “ceded control of the sealing process to the
parties themselves,” a fortiori the parties were not called upon to address whether
an item was a judicial document—critical to all access questions—or to
“advance[]”2 competing considerations against sealing. And a fortiori the trial
court made no common-law or First Amendment findings for any of the contested
items before they were sealed.
There was thus no factual foundation from which the panel—which was not
competent to make findings—could draw legal conclusions bearing on the access
right under the common law or the First Amendment. In this factual vacuum, it
was not simply that “the decision as to access is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court... in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted). It was that only the trial
court had the institutional ability and expertise in the first instance to conduct the
Nixon analysis, which it never did. When the Lugosch court found the trial court’s
Nixon analysis wanting, it concluded: “Because we are not in a position to assess
whether the presumption is overcome by countervailing factors, we remand for the
district court to make specific ... findings.” 435 F.3d at 113.
2
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
6
The panel suggested immediate unsealing and disclosure are warranted
because of the need for speed. As Judge Pooler suggested, however, speed should
not override due process and the risk of “grave and … irrevocable” consequences.
As Judge Pooler suggested and as the Lugosch court did, the Court can accomplish
all its goals by remanding to the trial court with directions to “act expeditiously,”
dissenting op. See Doc.141 at 12-13.
The panel did not afford Ms. Maxwell an adequate opportunity to
“advance” her “interests,” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602, or show the need to “preserve
higher values,” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. The only opportunity to do so was in
response to the panel’s Order to Show Cause, entered after briefing and oral
argument had been completed. It limited Ms. Maxwell’s response to ten pages in
which to make objections and show good cause why the summary judgment
materials should not be disclosed. Doc.138. The limitation was arbitrary and
unreasonable. One objection was that many of the sealed items, including the
summary judgment materials, were not judicial documents and therefore not
subject to any public access. For example, anticipating public disclosure, the
plaintiff introduced into the summary judgment record irrelevant documents solely
to advance her ulterior, non-litigation profit purposes. See Doc.149 at 3. As the
7
panel acknowledged, such documents are not judicial documents subject to a
presumption of access. See slip op. at 11 n.12.
The panel suggested it was competent to find facts3 and conduct the access
analysis because it consisted of “three former district judges” who had reviewed
the summary judgment materials. Slip op. at 14 n.22. We respectfully submit this is
incorrect.
Nixon held that the access decision is “best left” to the trial court’s
discretion in conjunction with its fact-finding role. See 435 U.S. at 599-02. The
Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985), held:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited
to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations
of credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication
of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.
See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 76 n.14 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has specifically cautioned courts of appeals not to engage in
independent fact-finding after concluding that a district court has applied the
3
For example, the panel found “there is no countervailing privacy interest”
of the parties or non-parties warranting continued sealing. Slip op. at 13,
8
wrong factors in classifying an individual or an entity under the FLSA.”); United
States v. Lasseque, 806 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Our job is to monitor the
boundaries of reasonable fact-finding, not to engage in it ourselves.”).
Additionally, it violates the Due Process Clause for appellate judges—
regardless of their prior experience as district judges—to perform both trial and
appellate-review functions. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868, 880 (2009) (holding that due process prohibits judge from presiding when he
has a “conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding”); People v.
Novak, 88 N.E.3d 305, 307 (N.Y. 2017) (where same judge served as trier of fact,
convicted defendant, and then served as sole judge on appeal, judge’s recusal from
appeal was required under state and federal Due Process Clauses); Charles
Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla.L.Rev. 501, 515 (1998) (“Appellate
courts work from a cold record. They do not hear or see the witnesses, nor are they
participants in the dynamics of the trial. Appellate courts simply cannot adequately
afford litigants due process of law if they purport to function as fact finders.”).
B. New York Times requires that trial courts give substantial weight to
third parties’ privacy interests in right to access decisions.
Nixon acknowledged that the privacy interests of third parties weigh against
access. The petitioner, President Nixon, was a third party to a criminal case, at
which the tapes he had produced pursuant to a subpoena were transcribed,
9
introduced into evidence and played to the jury. He intervened to prevent public
distribution of the tapes. See 435 U.S. at 599-602. The Nixon Court noted but did
not consider the merits of the argument that the President’s “third-party ... privacy
interests preclude[d] release of the tapes to the public.” Id. at 599 n.11. However, it
made clear the privacy interests against release must be considered and weighed by
the trial court in its access decision. See id. at 602-03.
In New York Times this Court held “the privacy interests of innocent third
parties as well as those of [the litigants] that may be harmed by disclosure of the ...
material should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation in determining what
should... remain sealed or ... redacted.” 828 F.2d at 116 (emphasis supplied). The
Court on other occasions has given significant weight to third parties’ privacy
interests. In Amodeo the Court concluded that a report filed with the trial court was
a judicial document; yet it gave considerable weight to the third parties’ privacy
interests, directing the trial court to “make its own redactions, supported by
specific findings, after a careful review of all claims for and against access,” 44 F.3d
at 147.
The panel did not invite third parties to participate. It denied two third
parties’ motions to intervene in the appeal. Without stating whether it considered
the privacy interests of the numerous third parties affected by its decision, the
10
panel said it found no privacy interest outweighing the presumption of access. Slip
op. at 13.
But the panel did not identify which or whose privacy interests it considered;
it did not consider whether there were “higher values” warranting continued
sealing or redactions; although it factually found “there is no countervailing
privacy interest” warranting continued sealing, it did not explain why an appellate
court can or should engage in “fact-finding,” Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d at 243; it did not
disclose which, if any, of Ms. Maxwell’s objections to unsealing related to third
parties were sustained or which, if any, of her proposed redactions related to third
parties were accepted. There is no indication in the panel’s decision it considered
any third party’s privacy interests or how it would know of all the third parties’
privacy interests. Nor is there any indication the panel “weigh[ed] heavily” the
parties’ or third parties’ privacy interests.
The panel did not share with the parties or third parties its “minimally
redacted version of the summary judgment record,” slip op. at 13 n.22; so none can
alert the panel that the Clerk’s Office’s public disclosure of the summary judgment
materials will improperly or inadvertently let “[t]he genie ... out of the bottle” with
no “means to put the genie back,” Gambale, 377 F.3d at 144. The panel’s appellate
Nixon analysis and its decision to release the summary judgment materials through
11
the Second Circuit are, as Judge Pooler observed, fraught with “peril[],”
dissenting op.
II. The panel’s decision ignoring reliance on the Protective Order conflicts
with Nixon and raises a question of exceptional importance relating to
the effect of such reliance on the access decision.
After holding that the access decision is best left to the trial court’s sound
discretion, the Nixon Court cited with approval State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 137
N.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Wis. 1965). In Youmans the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave
“[a]n illustration of a type of situation in which the harm to the public interest, if
inspection [of a public document] were permitted, was held to outweigh the
individual’s [common law] right to inspect.” 137 N.W.2d at 474. The illustration
concerned governmental disclosure of a public document obtained from third
parties “under [a governmental] pledge that it would be kept confidential.” Id.
In citing Youmans, the Nixon Court suggested reliance on a protective order
shielding information produced in litigation is an important factor in a trial court’s
decision whether to unseal. The trial court in the criminal case underlying Nixon
had not entered a protective order protecting the audiotapes the President had
produced pursuant to a subpoena, but the Supreme Court noted that the President
had resisted production. Additionally, the Court held, even though the tapes had
12
been introduced into evidence at the criminal trial of the President’s former
advisers and played for the jury, the trial court
has a responsibility to exercise an informed discretion as to release of

the tapes, with a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to their
production. This responsibility does not permit copying upon demand.
Otherwise, there would exist a danger that the court could become a
partner in the use of the subpoenaed material to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal.
Id. at 603 (emphasis supplied; internal quotations omitted).
In a series of cases this Court has addressed the effect on sealed documents
of the parties’ reliance on a protective order that preceded the production and
subsequent sealing of those documents. It has not addressed the effect on sealed
documents of a third party’s reliance on a protective order.
In Martindell this Court—without referencing Nixon—“established a strong
presumption against access to sealed documents when there was reasonable reliance
on a protective order, absent extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need.”
Gambale, 377 F.3d at 142 n.7 (emphasis supplied). In Gambale, which concerned
the disclosure of sealed summary judgment materials, the Court concluded the
Martindell presumption was inapplicable because the protective order in Gambale
was “explicitly temporary.” Id.
13
In SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001), the trial court
unsealed a deposition transcript sealed by the parties under a protective order. The
SEC Court appeared to resolve in dictum—without referencing Nixon—the conflict
between Martindell’s “general and strong presumption against access” and
Amodeo’s “presumption in favor of access” to “judicial documents,” that is, court-
filed items relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the
judicial process. The Court noted, “Though Amodeo did not refer to Martindell, it
left the general rule of Martindell undisturbed.” 273 F.3d at 231. Applying Amodeo,
the Court concluded the deposition transcript was not a judicial document and so
the presumption of access did not apply. Id. at 234. Applying Martindell, the Court
concluded the parties resisting unsealing did not reasonably rely on the protective
order, since they were deposed before entry of the order; so the presumption
against access did not apply. Id. at 234. The Court concluded the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in unsealing the transcripts. It suggested in dictum that the
Martindell rule applies only to non-judicial documents placed under seal pursuant
to a protective order. See id.
In Lugosch, decided after SEC, two newspapers moved to unseal summary
judgment materials. The defendants argued on appeal that the newspapers were
trying improperly to modify a confidentiality order on which the parties relied in
14
producing the sealed items. 435 F.3d at 116, 125. Without citing Nixon or Martindell
the Lugosch Court disagreed with the trial court’s suggestion that the
confidentiality order was a strong factor against access, noting that litigants have a
duty to produce all relevant information. Id. at 125. The Court also held the
defendants could not have reasonably relied on the order because it explicitly said
anyone could request relief from it. Id. at 126.
As Nixon and Youmans suggest, the effect on the public’s right of access of
reliance on a protective order is a question of exceptional importance. Nixon did
not address the question directly. This Circuit’s jurisprudence on the question is
unsettled. Lugosch suggests reliance on a protective order that does not permit third
parties from seeking modification is sufficient to rebut any presumption of access to
judicial documents. Ms. Maxwell raised the issue, but the panel did not address it.
III. The post-panel decision events raise a question of exceptional

importance: whether immediate unsealing of the summary judgment
materials without remand to the district court implicates Ms. Maxwell’s
fundamental constitutional rights.
Eleven days ago the government arrested and indicted Mr. Epstein on sex-
trafficking charges. The indictment alleges that three unidentified employees
engaged in acts that facilitated Mr. Epstein’s offenses.
The “media”—the mainstream press, the internet “press,” and other
worldwide publishers of information, opinion, gossip and conjecture—have
15
engaged in a furious feeding frenzy. They recklessly have targeted Ms. Maxwell.
For example, Appellants Brown and the Miami Herald published a story one day
after Mr. Epstein’s arrest titled “With Jeffrey Epstein locked up, these are nervous
times for his friends, enablers.”4 In the story these appellants speculated: “[T]here
are indications that others involved in his crimes could be charged or named as
cooperating witnesses. Among those potentially on the list: Ghislaine Maxwell ...
who has been accused of working as Epstein’s madam ....”5
In Nixon the Court explicitly noted that even though the broadcasters had
requested the tapes after the criminal trial had concluded, the trial court
nonetheless expressed concern about disclosing the tapes because of “the need to
safeguard the defendants’ rights on appeal.” 435 U.S. at 595. The Court made it
clear the rights of criminal defendants must be considered as part of the trial
court’s “task of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public
interest and the duty of the courts,” id. at 602. In a footnote the Court observed
4
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article232385422.html
(last visited July 16, 2019).
5
The panel issued a “note of caution” to the media, “urg[ing] the media to
exercise restraint in covering potentially defamatory allegations.” Slip op. at 24.
The media’s reckless and disgraceful behavior following Mr. Epstein’s arrest
establishes how unrealistic it is for courts to rely on the media’s “self-restraint” in
publishing anything the media believe to be provocative, lurid or titillating—
anything, in short, that sells newspapers and internet “clicks.”
16
that by the time of its decision in Nixon the defendants’ constitutional rights were
no longer an issue because all criminal proceedings had been resolved. Id. at 602
n.14.
In Martindell various witnesses were deposed in a civil action pursuant to a
protective order. Although not a party, the government moved for access to the
deposition transcripts for use in a related criminal investigation targeting some of
the deponents. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that disclosure would
violate the witnesses’ Fifth Amendment right. This Court affirmed. There was no
need, the Court said, to consider the Fifth Amendment because of “the overriding
policy in favor of enforcing the civil protective order.” 594 F.2d at 297. It held the
motion properly was denied because “a more significant counterbalancing factor”
against access is “the vital function of a protective order.” Id. at 295. Protective
orders, on which witnesses justifiably rely, encourage full disclosure of evidence,
and such disclosure “represents the cornerstone of our administration of civil
justice.” Id.
IV. No circuit court has displaced the trial court in conducting the Nixon
analysis and itself unsealed the materials at issue in the appeal.
As discussed above, there are sound jurisprudential reasons for a circuit
court, upon finding an abuse of discretion in a trial court’s denial of an unseal
motion, to remand the case to the trial court. This Court without fail has done so,
17
in accordance with Nixon. See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126-27; Gambale, 377 F.3d
at 145; Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 148. No circuit court has unsealed and released
documents at the appellate level based on the trial court’s access-analysis errors.
Conclusion
The Court should grant this Petition.
July 17, 2019.
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
18
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A)

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App.
P. 32(a)(7)(B). It contains 3,897 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(III).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.

P. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). It has been
prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt.
Equity.
s/ Ty Gee
Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was served via
CM/ECF on the following:

Christine N. Walz
Sanford L. Bohrer
Jay M. Wolman
s/ Nicole Simmons
19
ATTACHMENT A
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page25
Page1 of
of 50
25
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L)
In the
AUGUST TERM 2018
No. 18‐2868‐cv
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
v.
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L)
No. 17‐1625 (CON)
No. 17‐1722(CON)
MEDIA,

Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page26
Page2 of
of 50
25

V.


v.

GHISLAINE MAXWELL,





*
2
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page27
Page3 of
of 50
25

materials.
remand.

Miami Herald.
Maxwell.
3
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page28
Page4 of
of 50
25


4
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page29
Page5 of
of 50
25
materials.
I. BACKGROUND
5
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page30
Page6 of
of 50
25

6
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page31
Page7 of
of 50
25


4
Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3.
5
6
7
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page32
Page8 of
of 50
25


7
8
Case
Case 18-2868,
18-2868, Document
Document 217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page33
Page9 of
of 50
25

responses.
II. DISCUSSION
8
9
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page34
Page10ofof50
25

judicial pleadings.
10
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page35
Page11ofof50
25

(2d Cir. 2016).
13
11
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page36
Page12ofof50
25
14
16
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121.
12
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page37
Page13ofof50
25


our mandate.22
18 Id. at 123.
19 Id. at 124.
20
21
22
13
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page38
Page14ofof50
25
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98.
25 Id.
26
14
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page39
Page15ofof50
25
15
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page40
Page16ofof50
25

30 Id. at 1050.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1049.
16
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page41
Page17ofof50
25
filings.
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50.
35
omitted).
17
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page42
Page18ofof50
25
18
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page43
Page19ofof50
25
purposes.

19
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page44
Page20ofof50
25
41

43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145.
20
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page45
Page21ofof50
25
to the court).
21
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page46
Page22ofof50
25


46
47

22
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page47
Page23ofof50
25
privilege.
(1982)).
49
23
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page48
Page24ofof50
25
III. CONCLUSION

public access.
redactions.51

appropriate.
24
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document217-1,
233, 07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600298,Page49
Page25ofof50
25
25
Case
Case18-2868,
18-2868,Document
Document233,
214,07/17/2019,
07/03/2019,2611189,
2600267,Page50
Page1 of 50
1
PAUL G. CASSELL
Telephone: 801-585-5202
July 19, 2019
Via CM/ECF

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Julie Brown v. Ghislaine Maxwell, Court of Appeals Docket No. 18-2868 etc.
Redaction of name
On July 17, 2019, the Court directed Ms. Giuffre (and Ms. Maxwell) to file letter
briefs regarding the individual named on page 59, line 25 of Exhibit KK to the motion
for summary judgment.
Based on our review of the materials, we believe that the privacy interests (i.e.,
name) of this individual are implicated in three places in the record:
1. Page 59, line 25 of Exhibit KK (as identified by the Court);

2. Page 59, line 32 of Exhibit KK (where the same individual is identified by first
name); and
3. McCawley Decl. at Sealed Exhibit 29 at p. 79 (this document has previously
been made public).
Ms. Giuffre supports redacting references #1 and #2 above. However, with

regard to reference #3, the name has already been made public. Thus, a redaction
would, in Ms. Giuffre’s view, only serve to highlight the name. Accordingly, Ms.
Giuffre believes that reference #3 should not be redacted.
*
Ms. Giuffre invited counsel for Ms. Maxwell to work jointly on reviewing
materials, but they declined and preferred to submit a separate letter.
Paul G. Cassell
for Ms. Giuffre
2

Ty Gee

PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628
www.hmflaw.com
tgee@hmflaw.com
July 19, 2019

Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Letter Brief Requested in July 17 Order (Doc.229)

Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir.)
Dear Ms. Wolfe:
I am submitting this letter brief on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell. We

respectfully request leave to file a two-page letter brief so that we can address
important matters raised by the Court’s July 17, 2019 Order. The Court ordered
the non-intervention parties by July 19 to direct the Court’s attention to:
any additional locations in the record that might implicate the

privacy interests of the individual named on page 59, line 25 of
Exhibit KK to the motion for summary judgment (and whom
Giuffre states was included erroneously due to a ‘scrivener’s error’).
We have concerns about the Order. One, For the reasons stated in our Petition
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, we do not believe it is appropriate
for the Court to undertake the district court’s role in sealing and redaction
matters.
Two, the Order references “the record.” On appeal “the record,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(a), is the appendix assembled by the parties under Rules 10 and 11. See
Docs.51, 52-1 to -2, 53-1 to -2, and 96. “The record” here is irregular. After
oral argument, the Court ordered the non-intervention parties to provide the
Court with electronic copies of the summary judgment briefing and the
summary judgment evidentiary documents (collectively, “summary judgment
materials”). Doc.139. We do not believe the post-argument submission is a part
of the Rule 10 and 11 “record on appeal,” since it was not part of the appendix
Ms. Wolfe
July 19, 2019
Page 2
or available to the parties during briefing or oral argument, but we assume the
Court believes it is for purposes of the July 17 Order. Appellee Giuffre’s
counsel provided the court with a USB containing various summary judgment
items. Ms. Giuffre’s counsel provided us with a description of the items she
would include in the USB she would submit to the Court but did not supply us
with a copy of the USB. We assume the description is accurate. We
electronically searched those items in our database for the name of the
individual referenced in the Court’s Order. Based on that search we direct the
Court’s attention to page 59, lines 25 and 32, of Exhibit KK to the summary
judgment motion and page 79 of Exhibit 29 to the response to the summary
judgment motion. We must note, however, the limitations of our name search.
It is only as good as the scanning and OCR’ing of the images in which it is
searching. We did not conduct a manual page-by-page, line-by-line search.
Three, the Order requires Ms. Maxwell to identify locations in the record “that
might implicate the privacy interests” of the referenced individual. We
respectfully submit it is not proper to require us to identify parts of the record
that “might implicate” a third party’s “privacy interests.” We do not represent
the referenced individual or any other third party; we do not know all the ways
in which information, a statement or an allegation might implicate that
individual’s privacy interests. For example, we do not know whether what we
might view as an innocuous statement might be seen by that individual as a
means for the “investigative” media or anyone other than the parties to the
Protective Order to identify him or link him to this case, thereby “implicating”
this individual’s privacy interests. We submit that that individual’s counsel
should be permitted on remand to conduct the search for locations in sealed
judicial documents that might implicate the individual’s privacy interests.
We are unaware of any statement by Ms. Giuffre that the individual was
“included erroneously due to a ‘scrivener’s error,’” Doc.229. In fact, such a
statement would be contrary to Ms. Giuffre’s and her counsel’s statements and
conduct and contrary to pages 59-60 of Exhibit KK itself.
Very truly yours,
Ty Gee
C: Counsel for parties; Kerrie Campbell, Esq.


Ty Gee

PH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628
www.hmflaw.com
tgee@hmflaw.com
July 22, 2019

Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Amended Letter Brief Requested in July 17 Order (Doc.229)

Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir.)
Dear Ms. Wolfe:
I am submitting this letter brief on behalf of Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell. (We

amended the original letter brief in non-substantive ways.) We respectfully
request leave to file a two-page letter brief so that we can address important
matters raised by the Court’s July 17, 2019 Order. The Court ordered the
non-intervention parties by July 19 to direct the Court’s attention to:
any additional locations in the record that might implicate the

privacy interests of the individual named on page 59, line 25 of
Exhibit KK to the motion for summary judgment (and whom
Giuffre states was included erroneously due to a ‘scrivener’s error’).
We have concerns about the Order. One, for the reasons stated in our Petition
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, we do not believe it is appropriate
for the Court to undertake the district court’s role in sealing and redaction
matters.
Two, the Order references “the record.” On appeal “the record,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(a), is the appendix assembled by the parties under Rules 10 and 11. See
Docs.51, 52-1 to -2, 53-1 to -2, and 96. “The record” here is irregular. After
oral argument, the Court ordered the non-intervention parties to provide the
Court with electronic copies of the summary judgment briefing and the
summary judgment evidentiary documents (collectively, “summary judgment
materials”). Doc.139. We do not believe the post-argument submission is a part
of the Rule 10 and 11 “record on appeal,” since it was not part of the appendix
or available to the parties during briefing or oral argument, but we assume the
Ms. Wolfe
July 22, 2019
Page 2
Court believes it is for purposes of the July 17 Order. Appellee Giuffre’s

counsel provided the court with a USB containing various summary judgment
items. Ms. Giuffre’s counsel provided us with a description of the items she
would include in the USB she would submit to the Court but did not supply us
with a copy of the USB. We assume the description is accurate. We
electronically searched those items in our database for the name of the
individual referenced in the Court’s Order. Based on that search we direct the
Court’s attention to page 59, lines 25 and 32, of Exhibit KK to the summary
judgment motion and page 79 of Exhibit 29 to the response to the summary
judgment motion. We must note, however, the limitations of our name search.
It is only as good as the scanning and OCR’ing of the images in which it is
searching. We did not conduct a manual page-by-page, line-by-line search.
Three, the Order requires Ms. Maxwell to identify locations in the record “that
might implicate the privacy interests” of the referenced individual. We
respectfully submit it is not proper to require us to identify parts of the record
that “might implicate” a third party’s “privacy interests.” We do not represent
the referenced individual or any other third party; we do not know all the ways
in which information, a statement or an allegation might implicate that
individual’s privacy interests. For example, what we might view as an
innocuous statement might be seen by that individual as a means for the
“investigative” media or anyone other than the parties to the Protective Order
to identify or link that person to this case, thereby “implicating” this
individual’s privacy interests. We submit that that individual’s counsel should
be permitted on remand to conduct the search for locations in sealed judicial
documents that might implicate the individual’s privacy interests.
Ms. Giuffre’s statement that she included the individual due to a “‘scrivener’s
error,’” Doc.229, is contrary to Ms. Giuffre’s and her counsel’s statements and
conduct and contrary to pages 59-60 of Exhibit KK itself.
Very truly yours,
Ty Gee
C: Counsel for parties; Kerrie Campbell, Esq.


18-2868
Leave to Supplement Amended Petition
Motion for: ______________________________________________
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

Ms. Maxwell seeks leave to supplement her Amended
________________________________________________________
Giuffre v. Maxwell
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell
MOVING PARTY:_______________________________________ Virginia L. Giuffre
OPPOSING PARTY:____________________________________________
___Plaintiff ✔
___Defendant
Ty Gee
MOVING ATTORNEY:___________________________________ Paul Cassell
________________________________________________________ S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah
_______________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 383 S. University Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
_______________________________________________________________
303.831.7364; tgee@hmflaw.com
________________________________________________________ 801.585.5202; cassellp@law.utah.edu
_______________________________________________________________
✔
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
✔
___Yes ___No


s/ Ty Gee
_________________________________ 7/22/2019
Date:__________________ ✔
Form T-1080 (rev.12-13)



COMPANY,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
No. 18-2868-cv
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appellee Maxwell’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Her

Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Foreman, P.C., moves for leave to supplement her Amended Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc (Doc.233).
Fourteen days after issuing its decision in this appeal and on the same day
Ms. Maxwell filed her Petition, the panel sua sponte issued an Order requiring the
non-intervention parties, plaintiff Giuffre and Ms. Maxwell, to:
review the record and file one-page letter briefs no later than July 19,
2019 directing the Court’s attention to any additional locations in the
record that might implicate the privacy interests of the individual
named on page 59, line 25 of Exhibit KK to the motion for summary
judgment . . . .
Doc.229.
For the reasons stated in the Supplement to the Petition, which is attached
and incorporated here by reference, the Order provides additional support for the
Court to grant panel or en banc rehearing. As discussed in the Supplement, the
Order is an implicit recognition that this Court is no substitute—with or without
the briefing assistance of the non-intervention parties—for the district court in
carrying out the fact-finding and weighing-of-interests required by Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), and the sealing and redaction functions
required under this Court’s access cases, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110
(2d Cir. 2006). As Judge Pooler observed, “The task of identifying and making
specific redactions in such a substantial volume is perilous; the consequences of
even a seemingly minor error may be grave and are irrevocable.” Dissenting op.
We respectfully request that the Court grant Ms. Maxwell leave to
supplement the Petition.
2
July 22, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
I certify that on July 22, 2019, I served via CM/ECF a copy of this Appellee
Maxwell’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Her Petition for Panel Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc on the following persons:

Christine N. Walz Andrew G. Celli (acelli@ecbalaw.com)
(christine.walz@hklaw.com) David Lebowitz
Madelaine J. Harrington (dlebowitz@ecbalaw.com)
(madelaine.harrington@hklaw.com) Nicholas James Lewin
Sanford L. Bohrer (nick.lewin@kklllp.com)
(sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com) Paul M. Krieger
Jay M. Wolman (paul.krieger@kklllp.com)
(jmw@randazza.com)
Marc J. Randazza
(mjr@randazza.com)
s/ Nicole Simmons
3
ATTACHMENT

______________
No. 18-2868-cv

v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________
No. 16-3945-cv(L)
No. 17-1625 (CON)
No. 17-1722 (CON)
Cernovich Media,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________

______________
Appellee Maxwell’s Supplement to Amended Petition

Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
tgee@hmflaw.com
On July 17, 2019, fourteen days after issuing its decision in this appeal, the
panel sua sponte issued an Order requiring the non-intervention parties, plaintiff-
appellee Giuffre and defendant-appellee Maxwell, to:
judgment (and whom Giuffre states was included erroneously due to a
“scrivener’s error”).
Doc.229 (emphasis supplied). On July 19 Ms. Maxwell submitted her letter brief
describing her inability to identify information, statements and allegations in the
court filings that “might implicate” the privacy interests of a third party. See
Doc.239.
The panel’s July 17 Order underscores the need for the panel and the Court
en banc to rehear this appeal.
This is an extraordinarily complex situation. The panel concluded the trial
court did not review individual documents and make findings. Instead the trial
court “effectively ceded control of the sealing process to the parties themselves,”
slip op. at 7, allowing the parties to file sealed documents without judicial oversight.
Id. at 7-8. The summary judgment record contains references to numerous third
3
parties. Many of the references are not benign.1 For example, plaintiff Giuffre made
numerous allegations of sexual, if not criminal, conduct against a wide range of
third parties. As appellant and third-party intervenor Dershowitz has established,
Ms. Giuffre has fabricated from whole cloth “false and grotesque” sexual
allegations against him and others.2 The July 17 Order noted that as to at least one
reference to a third party, Ms. Giuffre has recanted; she now claims she named the
third party due to a “scrivener’s error,” as opposed to, e.g., a fabrication that she
knows can no longer can be factually sustained. The context of that “scrivener’s
error” suggests the latter is closer to the truth. Regardless, a vast quantity of
uncorroborated, speculative and false allegations found its way into the court’s
files, including the summary judgment materials. From this stew of allegations,
there were no adjudications of “truth” before the case was settled and dismissed
1
Because of the media, no reference to anyone in this case is benign: a
reference to any person is toxic and lethal to that person’s reputation. Facts and
truth are all but irrelevant, as Mr. Dershowitz is learning. The panel urged the
media to behave responsibly and “exercise restraint in covering potentially
defamatory allegations.” Slip op. at 21, 24. We submit that since Mr. Epstein’s
arrest after the panel decision, no one reasonably believes any of the media—
mainstream, internet, social, blogger, etc.—will “exercise restraint” in publishing
worldwide and “irrevocabl[y],” dissenting op., any and all allegations, statements
and information that are unsealed.
2
Dershowitz’s Op. Br., Doc.67 at 1 (Dershowitz v. Giuffre, Nos. 17-1625 &
1722 (2d Cir.))
4
with prejudice. This is the larger context in which unseal decisions that implicate
the reputation and privacy interests of Ms. Maxwell and third parties are being
made.
The panel’s July 17 Order recognizes the importance of ensuring that the
privacy of third parties is protected when the “minimally redacted”3 summary
judgment materials are released by this Court’s Clerk’s Office, as the panel
decision requires. At the same time, the July 17 Order accentuates two problems
with panel decision itself.
The first problem is the panel’s different treatment of the summary
judgment and the non-summary judgment materials. As to the former, the panel
reviewed the materials, made Nixon4 and Lugosch5 factual findings (that are not
subject to appellate review, since the appellate court made the findings), and
ordered them released with “minimal redactions” that only the panel has seen. See
slip op. at 13. As to the latter, the panel remanded to the trial court because of that
court’s “failure to conduct an individualized review” and because it is “best
situated to conduct this review.” Id. at 18. One reason it is best situated, the panel
3
Slip op. at 13 n.22.
4
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
5
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006).
5
said, is it “can directly communicate with the parties, and can therefore more
swiftly and thoroughly consider particular objections” and “can obtain the parties’
assistance . . . in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
implicated by the unsealing.” Id. at 18-19. But there is no difference between the
summary judgment and non-summary judgment materials. The trial court “fail[ed]
to conduct an individualized review” of any of it, and made no individualized
factual findings. Id. at 7-8.
The July 17 Order reveals the difficulty with the panel’s two-track approach.
Dissenting on the decision to release the summary judgment record, Judge Pooler
expressed concerns about the panel’s unsealing nearly 2,000 pages of materials:
“[T]he district court is better suited to the task [of unsealing the summary
judgment record]. . . . The task of identifying and making specific redactions in
such a substantial volume is perilous; the consequences of even a seemingly minor
error may be grave and are irrevocable.” Dissenting op. The panel majority
disagreed and gave the assurance that “the efforts invested by three former district
judges in reviewing these materials adequately address those concerns.” Slip op. at
13 n.22. The Order belies the panel majority’s assurance and accentuates Judge
Pooler’s concerns. Even after reviewing the materials and issuing its decision, the
panel found it necessary a week before the materials were to be released (but for the
6
submission of the Petition for Rehearing) to order the non-intervention parties to
review the record to determine, apparently, whether it had identified all the
locations of a third party’s name and accounted for that third party’s privacy
interests.
The second problem revealed by the July 17 Order is actually a set of
problems relating to the protection of third parties. The Order directed the non-
intervention parties to notify the panel of “any additional locations in the record
that might implicate the privacy interests” of a third party. The Order is an implicit
recognition that the panel decision cannot adequately protect third parties and their
privacy interests, because of a number of factors—the volume of materials, the
difficulty in knowing whether seemingly innocuous information might result in
“grave” and “irrevocable”6 harm to a third party, and the difficulty in knowing
what are a third party’s privacy interests. Rejecting two third-party motions to
intervene in the appeal and declining to notify any third parties of its intent to
release all the summary judgment materials itself, the panel apparently concluded
in the panel opinion that it was unnecessary for third parties referenced directly or
indirectly in the materials to participate in the unsealing process. But the July 17
6
Dissenting op. (Pooler, J.).
7
Order—and the panel decision itself7—suggests that third-party participation is
important if not essential to the decision whether and what to unseal. As we
suggested in response to the Order, none of the non-intervention parties and their
counsel is competent or should be relied upon to identify parts of the record that
“might implicate” the privacy interests of third parties.
The Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing.
July 22, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
7
See slip op. at 25 (on remand trial court “may also order the parties to
identify and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be
implicated by disclosure of these materials”).
8
Supplement to Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was
served via CM/ECF on the following:

Sanford L. Bohrer (nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
Jay M. Wolman (paul.krieger@KKLllp.com)
(jmw@randazza.com)
Marc J. Randazza
(mjr@randazza.com)
s/ Nicole Simmons
9

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007


DC Judge: Sweet
On July 23, 2019 the letter in opposition to J Doe’s motion (Dkt. 242) on behalf of the
Intervenors-Appellants Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media Company (“Miami Herald”), was
submitted in the above referenced case. The document does not comply with the FRAP or the
Court's Local Rules for the following reason(s):
(Local Rule 32.1)
__X____ Incorrect Filing Event

__X____ Other: _____Please re-file your opposition using event “opposition filed” and selecting
the motion you are opposing. ______________________________________________
necessary, no later than 07/26/2019. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and

31 West 52nd Street | New York, NY 10019 | T 212.513.3200 | F 212.385.9010

Holland & Knight LLP | www.hklaw.com
Sanford L. Bohrer
(212) 513-3536
sandy.bohrer@hklaw.com
July 23, 2019

VIA CM/ECF

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Re: Brown v. Maxwell, Court of Appeals Docket No. 18-2868
This firm represents Intervenors-Appellants Julie Brown and Miami Herald Media
Company (“Miami Herald”) in the above-referenced appeal. We write in opposition to J.Doe’s
motion to file an ex parte letter brief under seal (Dkt. 242).
This Court has just re-affirmed the long-established presumption of public access to
“judicial documents.” In light of this strong First Amendment presumption, a sealing order
may be properly entered “only with specific, on‐the‐record findings that sealing is necessary to
preserve higher values and only if the sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”
See Brown v. Maxwell, No. 16-3945-CV, 2019 WL 2814839 (2d Cir. July 3, 2019).
Notwithstanding this clear direction from the Court, non-party J.Doe seeks to file a letter
motion under seal in order to assert unspecified privacy interests. The publicly-filed Motion
Information Statement contains no information that could support a finding that J.Doe’s alleged
privacy interests outweigh the public’s presumption of access in this case.
Therefore, J.Doe’s motion for leave to file a letter motion under seal should be denied
and the letter brief should be unsealed.
Respectfully,
/s/ Sanford L. Bohrer

Sanford L. Bohrer

FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
24th day of July, two thousand and nineteen.
Before: Rosemary S. Pooler,

Circuit Judge.
________________________________
Julie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company, ORDER
Intervenors - Appellants. Docket No. 18-2868

v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
v.
________________________________
Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell moves for leave to file a supplement to her amended
petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
For the Court:

Clerk of Court

40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007


DC Judge: Sweet
On July 24, 2019 the supplementary papers to an amended petition for rehearing/rehearing en
banc, on behalf of the Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell was submitted in the above referenced case.
The document does not comply with the FRAP or the Court's Local Rules for the following
reason(s):
(Local Rule 32.1)

__X____ Incorrect Filing Event
__X____ Other: __Please refile your document using Event Category “Applications, Motions,
Petitions, Supp, Opps” and selecting Event “Supplementary Papers Filed”
_________________________________________________
necessary, no later than 07/26/2019. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and


______________
No. 18-2868-cv

v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________
No. 16-3945-cv(L)
No. 17-1625 (CON)
No. 17-1722 (CON)
Cernovich Media,
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Plaintiff-Appellee.
______________

______________
Appellee Maxwell’s Supplement to Amended Petition

Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
tgee@hmflaw.com
On July 17, 2019, fourteen days after issuing its decision in this appeal, the
panel sua sponte issued an Order requiring the non-intervention parties, plaintiff-
appellee Giuffre and defendant-appellee Maxwell, to:
judgment (and whom Giuffre states was included erroneously due to a
“scrivener’s error”).
Doc.229 (emphasis supplied). On July 19 Ms. Maxwell submitted her letter brief
describing her inability to identify information, statements and allegations in the
court filings that “might implicate” the privacy interests of a third party. See
Doc.239.
The panel’s July 17 Order underscores the need for the panel and the Court
en banc to rehear this appeal.
This is an extraordinarily complex situation. The panel concluded the trial
court did not review individual documents and make findings. Instead the trial
court “effectively ceded control of the sealing process to the parties themselves,”
slip op. at 7, allowing the parties to file sealed documents without judicial oversight.
Id. at 7-8. The summary judgment record contains references to numerous third
3
parties. Many of the references are not benign.1 For example, plaintiff Giuffre made
numerous allegations of sexual, if not criminal, conduct against a wide range of
third parties. As appellant and third-party intervenor Dershowitz has established,
Ms. Giuffre has fabricated from whole cloth “false and grotesque” sexual
allegations against him and others.2 The July 17 Order noted that as to at least one
reference to a third party, Ms. Giuffre has recanted; she now claims she named the
third party due to a “scrivener’s error,” as opposed to, e.g., a fabrication that she
knows can no longer can be factually sustained. The context of that “scrivener’s
error” suggests the latter is closer to the truth. Regardless, a vast quantity of
uncorroborated, speculative and false allegations found its way into the court’s
files, including the summary judgment materials. From this stew of allegations,
there were no adjudications of “truth” before the case was settled and dismissed
1
Because of the media, no reference to anyone in this case is benign: a
reference to any person is toxic and lethal to that person’s reputation. Facts and
truth are all but irrelevant, as Mr. Dershowitz is learning. The panel urged the
media to behave responsibly and “exercise restraint in covering potentially
defamatory allegations.” Slip op. at 21, 24. We submit that since Mr. Epstein’s
arrest after the panel decision, no one reasonably believes any of the media—
mainstream, internet, social, blogger, etc.—will “exercise restraint” in publishing
worldwide and “irrevocabl[y],” dissenting op., any and all allegations, statements
and information that are unsealed.
2
Dershowitz’s Op. Br., Doc.67 at 1 (Dershowitz v. Giuffre, Nos. 17-1625 &
1722 (2d Cir.))
4
with prejudice. This is the larger context in which unseal decisions that implicate
the reputation and privacy interests of Ms. Maxwell and third parties are being
made.
The panel’s July 17 Order recognizes the importance of ensuring that the
privacy of third parties is protected when the “minimally redacted”3 summary
judgment materials are released by this Court’s Clerk’s Office, as the panel
decision requires. At the same time, the July 17 Order accentuates two problems
with panel decision itself.
The first problem is the panel’s different treatment of the summary
judgment and the non-summary judgment materials. As to the former, the panel
reviewed the materials, made Nixon4 and Lugosch5 factual findings (that are not
subject to appellate review, since the appellate court made the findings), and
ordered them released with “minimal redactions” that only the panel has seen. See
slip op. at 13. As to the latter, the panel remanded to the trial court because of that
court’s “failure to conduct an individualized review” and because it is “best
situated to conduct this review.” Id. at 18. One reason it is best situated, the panel
3
Slip op. at 13 n.22.
4
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
5
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006).
5
said, is it “can directly communicate with the parties, and can therefore more
swiftly and thoroughly consider particular objections” and “can obtain the parties’
assistance . . . in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be
implicated by the unsealing.” Id. at 18-19. But there is no difference between the
summary judgment and non-summary judgment materials. The trial court “fail[ed]
to conduct an individualized review” of any of it, and made no individualized
factual findings. Id. at 7-8.
The July 17 Order reveals the difficulty with the panel’s two-track approach.
Dissenting on the decision to release the summary judgment record, Judge Pooler
expressed concerns about the panel’s unsealing nearly 2,000 pages of materials:
“[T]he district court is better suited to the task [of unsealing the summary
judgment record]. . . . The task of identifying and making specific redactions in
such a substantial volume is perilous; the consequences of even a seemingly minor
error may be grave and are irrevocable.” Dissenting op. The panel majority
disagreed and gave the assurance that “the efforts invested by three former district
judges in reviewing these materials adequately address those concerns.” Slip op. at
13 n.22. The Order belies the panel majority’s assurance and accentuates Judge
Pooler’s concerns. Even after reviewing the materials and issuing its decision, the
panel found it necessary a week before the materials were to be released (but for the
6
submission of the Petition for Rehearing) to order the non-intervention parties to
review the record to determine, apparently, whether it had identified all the
locations of a third party’s name and accounted for that third party’s privacy
interests.
The second problem revealed by the July 17 Order is actually a set of
problems relating to the protection of third parties. The Order directed the non-
intervention parties to notify the panel of “any additional locations in the record
that might implicate the privacy interests” of a third party. The Order is an implicit
recognition that the panel decision cannot adequately protect third parties and their
privacy interests, because of a number of factors—the volume of materials, the
difficulty in knowing whether seemingly innocuous information might result in
“grave” and “irrevocable”6 harm to a third party, and the difficulty in knowing
what are a third party’s privacy interests. Rejecting two third-party motions to
intervene in the appeal and declining to notify any third parties of its intent to
release all the summary judgment materials itself, the panel apparently concluded
in the panel opinion that it was unnecessary for third parties referenced directly or
indirectly in the materials to participate in the unsealing process. But the July 17
6
Dissenting op. (Pooler, J.).
7
Order—and the panel decision itself7—suggests that third-party participation is
important if not essential to the decision whether and what to unseal. As we
suggested in response to the Order, none of the non-intervention parties and their
counsel is competent or should be relied upon to identify parts of the record that
“might implicate” the privacy interests of third parties.
The Court should grant the Petition for Rehearing.
July 22, 2019
s/ Ty Gee
Ty Gee
Laura Menninger
Adam Mueller
Denver, CO 80203
Tel 303.831.7364
amueller@hmflaw.com
7
See slip op. at 25 (on remand trial court “may also order the parties to
identify and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be
implicated by disclosure of these materials”).
8
Supplement to Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc was
served via CM/ECF on the following:

Sanford L. Bohrer (nick.lewin@KKLllp.com)
Jay M. Wolman (paul.krieger@KKLllp.com)
(jmw@randazza.com)
Marc J. Randazza
(mjr@randazza.com)
s/ Nicole Simmons
9

FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
31st day of July, two thousand and nineteen.

Rosemary S. Pooler,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________

ORDER
Intervenors - Appellants.
v. Docket No. 18-2868
Ghislaine Maxwell,
v.
________________________________
Non-Party J. Doe moves for leave to intervene to file an ex parte letter brief under seal in
response to the Court’s July 17, 2019 Order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
For the Court:

Clerk of Court
Aug.2.2019 Case
5:41PM18-2868, Document 270, 08/05/2019, 2623914, Page1 ofNo.1 7722 P. 1/1
~
~
I
CJ
A,(
A,(
~
~ ·-a
..t
u0
9
.... ·-~
(I)'
0 ~
a:,
~ Pl'
~~.s
~'
~~z
T---4 ~ .
-
~I
it ~~
0
~ N
~
'5' = ,::
Q
~
i 00
\0
00 l: tt
'I\>
c., ~
-~~
>uO
y ._.,U
~ -
;:: ~ ~ ~
ii' t
Q c:"I
«-I f-4 I I> ~ I> 0\
fw 00 .,.J
~ ~
... ~ ~i :S :;:: rl
~~ t&
H
\t) I t-!.
CJ
g z0 ij -ij H r;,... l"""1
,t-1
t
-:!
"p ~
~
~
QI
~
~
a
<
~i
~ ~
c., 0 ~
>
i5:: Zz z
0 0
~
i ~
r.o
...... ~
8.0
~ ·~
It')~
t;
~
~
.....t
·.._t
~
s:::::
a
~
rt;). 5
~~
~p
~ ~
~ E
~llQ
ERRATA
PAGE: 4
LINE: 11-13
DELETE: ''Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal
Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT,for intervenor--
Appellant Michael Cernovich. "
INSERT; Hartford, CT, on the brief) RandazzaLegal

Group, PLLC, Las Vegas, NV,for intervenor-
Appellant }{ichael Cernovich,"
Copies have been sent

by chambers to:
.X, Panel Members

X W~t Publishing Co.
X Clerk of Court
Date 8/2/2019

18-2868 Documents3

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

18-2868 Documents3

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Selected docket entries for case 18−2868

Generated: 08/20/2019 12:24:51

Filed Document Description Page Docket Text

Sharon Church, Jeffrey

Giuffre’s factual materials

presumption ofof access

for this Court

other third parties)

obviously envisions that,

for the Court

operation’ and there

Epstein’s attorney’s, Alan

conspiracy. But Ms.

Giuffre. The public

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Short Title: Guiffre v. Maxwell Docket No.:_1_8 -_2_86_8_ _ _ _ _ __

Lead Cou nsel of Record (name/firm) or Prose Party (name),...:.K..:.:ec:..rr_ie'----"-

DOCKET SHEET ACKNOWLEDGMENT/AMENDMENTS

Appellate Designation is:

Contact Information for Lead Coun sel/Pro Se Party is:

Name: Kerrie L. Campbell

0 This case has n ot been before tl1is Court p reviously.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SHARON CHURCHER, JEFFREY EPSTEIN,

Appellee Maxwell’s Response to Order to Show Cause

Appellee Ghislaine Maxwell, through her attorneys Haddon, Morgan and

I. Objections to the Order to Show Cause.

Materials, we respectfully object to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Motion to

abused its discretion in sealing or redacting summary judgment materials, the

435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978).

II. General objections to unsealing of summary judgment materials.

references to summary judgment “materials.” See Mot. to Reconsider, at 18 n.4.

submitted in support of and opposition to the summary judgment motion

(collectively “summary judgment materials” or “materials”). And we assume the

had no opportunity to respond.

We interpose the following general objections:

1. All sealed and redacted summary judgment materials should remain

2. We respectfully object to this Court’s substitution of its discretion for

compelling interests of Ms. Maxwell and non-parties whose information is

contained or referenced in the materials. The issues implicated by the decision to

interrelationship between and among factual allegations contained in the materials.

We incorporate here by reference the Motion for Reconsideration.

3. We object to the disclosure of any materials or statements therein that

competent/admissible evidence under the rules of evidence and Federal Rule of

4. We object to the disclosure of any materials submitted to the district

eventually would be revealed to the public to advance her non-Rule 56-related

5. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were inadmissible

Summary Judgment Response were subject to significant in limine motions and

6. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were provided by

district court’s decisions concerning the Protective Order (collectively, “Protective

Order”), pursuant to assurances or representations by the parties’ counsel that these

non-parties’ reliance on the Protective Order to maintain the secrecy and

confidentiality of the materials. These non-parties include numerous individuals

7. We object to the disclosure of any materials that were provided by non-

given notice of or an opportunity to participate in litigation in this Court on

disclosed to the public.

8. We object to the unredaction of statements by Ms. Giuffre’s counsel

referring to and misrepresenting the content of sealed and/or redacted materials.

9. We object to the unredaction and circulation of Ms. Giuffre’s numerous

defamatory claims under the cloak of a “litigation” or “judicial privilege,” thereby

III. Specific objections to unsealing of summary judgment materials.

R Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;

Not a judicial document, not relied upon by Court;

Short Title: Giuffre v. Maxwell _ Docket No.: 18-2868 ____