Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline

Mon Aug 5 09:58:43 2019

Citations:

Bluebook 20th ed.

Regina DuFresne; Jonathan S. Greene, Increasing Remedies for Domestic Violence: A
Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 155, 178 (1995).

APA 6th ed.

DuFresne, R.; Greene, J. S. (1995). Increasing remedies for domestic violence: study
of maryland's 1992 domestic violence act in the courtroom. Maryland Journal of
Contemporary Legal Issues, 6(1), 155-178.

Chicago 7th ed.

Regina DuFresne; Jonathan S. Greene, "Increasing Remedies for Domestic Violence: A
Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom," Maryland Journal of
Contemporary Legal Issues 6, no. 1 (1995): 155-178

McGill Guide 9th ed.

Regina DuFresne & Jonathan S Greene, "Increasing Remedies for Domestic Violence: A
Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom" (1995) 6:1 Md J
Contemp Leg Issues 155.

MLA 8th ed.

DuFresne, Regina, and Jonathan S. Greene. "Increasing Remedies for Domestic Violence:
A Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom." Maryland Journal
of Contemporary Legal Issues, vol. 6, no. 1, 1995, pp. 155-178. HeinOnline.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

Regina DuFresne and Jonathan S Greene, 'Increasing Remedies for Domestic Violence: A
Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom' (1995) 6 MD J
CONTEMP LEGAL ISSUES 155

-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement availablehttps://heinonline.org/HOL/License
at
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device
Increasing
Remedies for A Study of Maryland's
Domestic 1992 Domestic Violence
Violence: Act in the Courtroom

Regina DuFresne and

Jonathan S. Greene*
1. INT ODUCTON
The 1992 amendments to the Maryland Domestic Violence Act1 brought sweep-
ing changes to Maryland's domestic violence law.2 Prior to the 1992 changes,
Maryland's civil protection order for domestic violence cases ranked as one of the
least eflective in the nation, 3 offering a narrow group of individuals limited protec-
tion for at most thirty days, but without the ability to enforce the protective order.
Under the new law, many persons formerly denied relief are eligible for protection.
Additionally, victims can now obtain a wide range of relief for up to 200 days.
This shift from near non-recognition of domestic violence to wide-ranging judicial
latitude promised potential upheaval in the court system.

With such concerns in mind, Maryland's non-profit Public Justice Center under-
took a study of the implementation of the new domestic violence law. From April
to September 1993, volunteers observed courtroom proceedings in an effort to
assess the effectiveness of the new civil protection remedies. Observing more than
200 domestic violence cases in Maryland courts of original jurisdiction-that is,

* Regina Dufresne isan associate at the law firm of Kramon & Graham, P.A. and co-chair ofthe PublicJustio
Center's Domestic Violence Task Force. Jonathan S. Greene is a third year student at the University of
Maryland School of Law. The Public Justice Center is a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to
protecting the legal rights of the underrepresented in the state of Maryland.
I Act effective October 1, 1984, ch. 296,1984 Md. Laws 70 (Domestic Violence Act) (codified as amended
at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 55 4-501 to 4-516 (Supp. 1994)).
2 MD. CoDEANN., F m. LAw §§4-501 m4-516 (1991) (amended 1992). The 1992 amendments are codified
in the 1994 Supplement to the AnnotatedCode ofMajyLand.
3 According to the Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence, "Marland provided battered spouses less
relief than almost any other state in the country." MARYLAND NTORJCAcNSr DOME.STIcVIOLENCE, REPORT
ON RNDINGS FROM THE STATEWIDE STUDY ON Dotmsmnc VIOLENcE PEiTnONS FILED FOR THE QUARTER OCMBER
1 - DEcEMBER 31, 1992, at 1 (1994).

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 155

the circuit and district courts4 -- of six jurisdictions, 5 the volunteers collected data
on the following matters: the characteristics of the petitioners, respondents, and
lawyers; the length of hearings; the types of relief sought and granted; the duration
of relief, and the behavior of the participants in the courtroom. The resulting data,
which has been statistically analyzed and compared with other available data on the
same and similar subjects, reveals the problematic nature of legal attempts to
remedy the great social problems of domestic violence.

This article first outlines the 1992 legislative changes to Maryland's domestic
violence law. Following an explanation of the study's methodology and sources of
error, the artide explores the data findings, placing them in context with existing
studies. Finally, this artide draws condusions about the study's results, and com-
ments on the evolving response to domestic violence in the legal community.

IL HISTORY
Prior to 1992, the civil remedies for victims of domestic violence in Maryland were
limited. The enactment of the Domestic Violence Act of 1992 created sweeping
changes in both nature and scope.

The categories of persons eligible for relief is one of the most marked differences
between Maryland's old and new domestic violence laws. On its face, the old
statute's focus was to protect against domestic violence occurring in the home, as it
protected household members only. 6 Household members were considered

4 Thcse courts are defined in the Annotated Code ofMaryland. The Code defines a circuit court as

the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction
within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil
and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been
limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.

MD. CoDE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PRoc. S 1- 501 (1989 & Supp. 1994). The district court is defined as "the court
oflimited jurisdiction created byArtide IV, % 1, 41A [to] 41-I of the Constitution. It isacourt of record and
shall have a seal." Id § 1-601 (1989).
5 The following jurisdictions were included in the study: Anne Arundl County, Baltimore City, Baltimore
County, Howard County, Montgomery County, and Prince George's County.
6 Before the amendments, the statute read, "A household member may seek relief from abuse by filing with
acourta petition thatalleges abuse ofanyhousehold member by anotherhousehold member." MD. CODEANN.,
F/Am. L.Aw § 4-504(a)(1) (1991) (amended 1992).

156 Volume 6 * Issue 1 * Fall/Winter 1994-95

persons related by blood or marriage who resided together at the time of abuse. 7 A
variety of persons could seek relief on behalf of children who resided with their
abuser, induding the child's blood relatives, another adult household member, a
8
police officer, the Department of Social Services or the State's Attorney's Office.

The new statute recognizes that families are not restricted to those who live under
one roof at the time of the abuse andat the time the relief issought. Household
members now indude:

1. the abuser's current or former spouse;

9
2. the abuser's cohabitan,
3. persons related by blood or marriage to the abuser if they
resided with the abuser for at least ninety days in the year before relief is sought,
4. the parent, stepparent, child or stepchild of the abuser or the
abuser's victim if they resided with the abuser for at least ninety days in the year
before relief is sought,

7 Id S 4-501(e) (1991) (amended 1992). According to the pre-amendment statute, "household members"
were defined as "spouses, parents, individuals who are not married but have at least one minor child in common
residing with petitioner, stepparents, children, stepchildren, non-blood relatives, or blood relatives who live
together at the time of the abuse." I
8 I 4-504(a)(2) (1991) (amended 1992). The relevantsection ofthepre-amendmentstatute readas follows:

(2) The following persons may seek relief from abuse on behalf of a minor household
member by filing with the court a petition that alleges abuse of the child by another
household member. (i) the State's Attorney for the county where the child lives, or if
different, where the abuse is alleged to have taken place; (ii) the department of social
services that has jurisdiction in the county where the child lives, or if different, where the
abuse is alleged to have taken place; (iii) a law enforcement officer; (iv) a blood relative
of the child; and (v) an adult household member.
Id
9 A cohabitant is defined as"a person who has had a sexual relationship with the respondent and resided with
the respondent in the home for a period of at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition." MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw S 4-503(c) (Supp. 1994). The statute does not address and the Maryland courts have
not ruled on whether same sex cohabitants are included in this definition. Butsee Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
49 (Haw. 1993) (determining that a state policy of refusing to issue marriage licenses on the sole basis that the
applicant couple are both of the same sex is subject to strict serutiny Equal Protection review).

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 157

 5. a vulnerable adult,10 or,
6. an adult who has a child in common with the abuser.11

In addition, the new law allows the same persons to petition for relief on behalf of
children, except for law enforcement officers. 12 Those other persons who may seek
relief on behalf of a child may also now seek relief on behalf of a vulnerable adult. 13

The impact of expanding the categories of persons who can seek relief has been
tremendous. Although Maryland's courts have wide equitable powers in family law
matters, pre-1992 attempts by lower court judges to offer domestic violence relief
to non-household members met with sharp rebuke. For instance, if a husband and
wife separated 14 before October 1, 1992, neither was entitled to protection under
the old domestic violence law if domestic violence occurred after the husband and
wife separated. The Maryland Court ofAppeals seems to have endorsed this
position when it noted in one case that

[o]n remand, the circuit court must consider whether the provi-
sions of the Domestic Violence Act were properly invoked. As
earlier observed, it does not appear that the husband and wife
resided together at the family home at the time of the alleged
abuse, an apparent requisite under the Act before its provisions
may become applicable. 15

10 Avulnerable adult is"anadult who lacks the physical or mental capacity to provide forthe adu's daily needs."
Id § 14-101(q) (Supp. 1994).
11 Id 5 4-501(h) (Supp. 1994). The entire statute enumerates all of these persons as follows:

(h) 'Person eligible for relief" indudes: (1) the current or formerspouse ofthe respondent;
(2) a cohabitant of the respondent; (3) a person related to the respondent by blood or
marriage, or a parent, stepparent, child or stepchild of the respondent or the person
eligible for relief who rcsides or resided at least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of
the petition; (4) a vulnerable adult; or (5) an individual who has a child in common with
the respondent.
/d.
12 Id S4-501(i) (Supp. 1994).
13 Id
14 Statistically, violence increases in incidence and severity when the victim attempts to leave the abuser. See,
e.g., DorothyE. Roberts, Rape, Vwoence andWomen sAutonomy, 69 C-u .-KET L REv. 359,376-77 (explaining
that a woman's decision to leave a relationship with an abuser often causes the woman to be further abused).
15 Barbee v. Barbee, 537A.2d 224, 226 n.3 (Md. 1988).

158 Volume 6 - Issue I * Fall/Winter 1994-95

Under the new statute, spouses not living together are protected from domestic
violence, as well as former spouses, 16 thus removing a previously difficult problem
for judges faced with domestic violence cases.

A. ReliefAvailable
The 1992 statute further expanded the nature of the relief a judge may grant to a
victim of domestic violence at ex parte 17 and protective order hearings.

1. ExparteHearings
At the ex parte level, the pre-1992 domestic violence law permitted the judge to
order.
a. the alleged abuser to refrain from abusing household members;
b. the alleged abuser to vacate the house for not more than 5 days
18
after service of the order;
c. temporary custody;
d. the household members into a counseling program; and
e. any other relief as necessary. 19

16 MD. CoDE ANN., FAm. LAw § 4-501(h)(1) (Supp. 1994).

17 Adomesticviolence victim first obtains an cx parte order, which is valid up to 7 days, if the judge finds that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person eligible for reficfhad been abused. Id § 4-505(a) (Supp.
1994). A judicial order 'is said to be ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of
one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested." BLacK's LAw
DicnONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990). This order is then served upon the alleged abuser by the sheriff at no cost to
the petitioner, MD. CODE ANN., FM. LAw § 4-505(b) (Supp. 1994), and the alleged abuser then has an
opportunity to be heard on the question ofwhether the court should issue a protective order. Id § 4-506 (Supp.
1994).
18 The order itself, however, was valid for only 5 days. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 4-505(a)(2)(ii) (1991)
(amended 1992).
2
19 Id 5 4-505 (1991) (amended 1992). The pre-199 statute stated, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) In general. - (1) If a petition is filed under this subtitle and the court finds that the
petitioner has shown that a household member has been abused, the court, in an ex parte
proceding, may enter a temporary order to protect the petitioner or another household
member from abuse. (2) The temporary ex parte order shall order the alleged abuser to
refrain from abusing household members and may- (i) except in a case of alleged child
abuse, or alleged abuse ofa vulnerable adult, order the alleged abuser to vacate the family
home immediately and grant temporary possession of the f&mily home to the petitioner
for not more than 5 days after service of the cx parte order, (ii) in a case of alleged child
abuse, or alleged abuse ofa vulnerable adult, order the alleged abuser to vacate the family
home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to an adult
household member for not more than 5 days after service of the ex parte order;, (iii) award
temporary custody of a minor household member, (iv) direct any or all of the household
members to participate in a professionally supervised counseling program; and (v) order
any other relief as necessary.
Id

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 159

The 1992 statute sought to expand both the types of rdief and the duration of that
relief At the ex parte stage, the judge may now order the alleged abuser to:

a. refrain from further abuse (or threats of abuse) of the victim;

b. refrain from contacting (or attempting to contact) or harassing
the victim; and,
c. refrain from entering the victim's residence, place of employ-
20
ment, school or temporary residence.

In addition, the judge isempowered to award custody, and order the alleged abuser
to vacate the residence if the abuser and victim resided together at the time of the
21
alleged abuse.

The relief at the ex parte stage is available for up to seven days, in contrast to the
five day ex parte relief available under the old law.22 The time for relief can be
further extended if the sheriff has not served the order on the alleged abuser within
that period, or for any other reason the court finds necessary in order to provide
protection to the victim. 23 The judicial options are also increased insofar as the

20 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw S 4-505(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). The new statute indicates that the ex parte order
may order any or all of the following relief:

(i) order the respondent o refrain from further abuse or threats ofabuse ofa person eligible
for relief, (ii) order the respondent to refrain from contacting, attempting to contact, or
harassing any person eligible for rdief, (iii) order the respondent to refrain from entering
the residence ofa person eligible for relief- (iv) where the person eligible for relief and the
respondent are residing together at the time of the alleged abuse, order the respondent to
vacate the home immediately and award temporary use and possession of the home to the
person eligible for reliefor in the case ofalleged child abuse or alleged abuse ofa vulnerable
adult, award temporary use and possession of the home to an adult living in the home
provided that the court may not grant an order to vacate and award temporary use and
possession of the home to a nonspouse person eligible for relief unless the name of the
person eligible for relief appears on the lease or deed to the home or the person eligible
for rdiefhas resided in the home with the respondent fora period of at least 90 days within
1 year before the filing of the petition; (v)order the respondent to remain away from the
place of employment, school or temporary residence of a minor child of the persons
eligible for relief or home ofother family members; and (vi) award temporary custody of
a minor child of the persons eligible for relief and respondent.
Id
21 Id §4-505(a)(2)(iv).
22 CompareMD. CODEANN., FAm. LAw S4-505(c)(1) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAWS4-
505(a)(2)(i) & (ii) (1991) (amended 1992).
23 Conmare MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw S 4-505(c)(2) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW S 4-
505(a)(2) (1991) (amended 1992).

160 Volume 6 - Issue 1 • Fall/Winter 1994-95

court has new remedies that indude ordering the alleged abuser to refrain from
contacting the petitioner and to stay away from the petitioner's workplace and
school. 24 In addition, the new statute offers more comprehensive instructions on
appropriate situations for granting use and possession of the parties' home. 25 The
court no longer grants counseling relief for the short seven day ex parte period, 26 as
such relief is now exdusively relegated to the longer and more substantive protec-
tion orders. 27

2. Protective OrderHearings
The relief available at a protective order hearing before the enactment of the 1992
statute was likewise limited in that the judge could order the same relief as at the ex
parte stage, but only for up to thirty days. 28 In addition, there were no specific
provisions for the enforcement of the old law.29 With the new law, judges now
have a greater ability to protect victims of domestic violence. Several categories of
protective order relief mirror those now available at the ex parte stage. The judge
may order:
a. the abuser to refrain from further abuse (or threats of abuse) of
the victim;
b. the abuser to refrain from contacting (or attempting to contact)
or harassing the victim;

24 Compare MD. CODE ANN.. FAm. LAw 5 4-505(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., Ftm. LAw 5 4-
505(a)(2) (1991) (amended 1992).
25 CopareMD. CODE ANN., Fm. LAw S 4-505(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw
4-505(a)(2)(i, (ii) (1991) (amended 1992).
26 Compare MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw S 4-505(a) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CODE ANN., FAM. L-Aw S 4-
505(a)(v) (1991) (amended 1992).
27 According to the original statute, such rdiefwas available for both ex parte and protective orders. MD. CODE
ANN., Fm. LAw§S 4-505(a)(2)(iv) & 4-506(e)(4) (1991) (amended 1992).
28 MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 4-506(e) (1991) (amended 1992). Thc pre-1 9 92 version of§ 4-506(e) stated
that:
[t]he protective order shall order the alleged abuser to refrain from abusing household
members and may- (1) except in a case of alleged child abuse, or alleged abuse of a
vulnerable adult, order the alleged abuser to vacate the family home immediately and
granttemporarypossession ofthe family home to the petitioner for not more than 30 days;
(2) in the case of alleged child abuse, or alleged abuse of a vulnerable adult, order the
alleged abuser to vacate the family home immediately and grant a temporary possession
of the family home to an adult household member for not more than 30 days; (3) award
temporary custody ofa minor household member; (4) direct any or all of the household
members to participate in a professionally supervised counseling program; and (5) order
any other relief as necessary.
Id.
29 See id

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 161

 c. the abuser to refrain from entering the victim's residence, place
of employment, school or temporary residence;, and
d. order the abuser to vacate the residence if the abuser and victim
30
resided together the time of the abuse.
at

As noted earlier, these forms of relief expand the protection available to the victim
of domestic violence significantly over the protection offered before the enactment
of the 1992 statute.

The remaining types of relief offer even more protection by permitting the court to
take any or all of the following actions:

a. award temporary custody;

b. establish temporary visitation;
c. award emergency family maintenance in accordance with the
alleged abuser's duty of support;,
d. award temporary use and possession of a jointly owned vehicle;

30 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw S 4-506(d) (Supp. 1994). The current version of§ 4-506(d) explains that the
protective order may include any or all of the following relief:

(1) order the respondent to refrain from abusing or threatening to abuse any person
eligible for relief, (2) order the respondent to refrain from contacting, attempting to
contact, or harassing any person eligible for relief, (3) order the respondent to refrain from
entering the residence of any person eligible for relief, (4) where the person eligible for
relief and the respondent are residing together at the time of the abuse, order the
respondent to vacate the home immediately and award temporary use and possession of
the home to the person eligible for rliefor, in the case of alleged child abuse or alleged
abuse of a vulnerable adult, award temporary use and possession of the home to an adult
living in the home, provided that the court may not grant an order to vacate and award
temporary use and possession of the home to a nonspouse person eligible for reliefunless
the name of the person eligible for relief appears on the lease or deed to the home or the
person eligible for relief has shared the home with the respondent for a period of at least
90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition; (5) order the respondent to remain
away from the place of employment, school, or temporary residence of a person eligible
for relief or home of other family members ....

I These provisions mirror the types of rliefavailable during the ex pane hearing. Seesupra note 20.

162 Volume 6 • Issue I ° Fall/Winter 1994-95

 e. order the abuser and victim to participate in counseling or a
domestic violence program; and
31
f order the abuser to pay filing fees and costs.
Through the language of the statute, the court can thus address child custody and
visitation, support, vehicle use, counseling and court costs. In addition, the relief is
available for a period lasting up to 200 days, as opposed to the prior thirty-day
32
period of relief.

For the purposes of the Public Justice Center study, three changes are most impor-
tant expanding the types of persons eligible for relief, significantly increasing the
types of protection, and extending the duration of those protections.

I[. THE STUDY: METHODOLOGY

The Domestic Violence Taskforce of the Public Justice Center designed and
performed the domestic violence courtwatch study. This courtwatch study was
modeled on a publidy-funded study on gender bias in the courtroom. 33 Like the

31 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 4-506(d) (Supp. 1994). The newly added provisions, expanding all these types
of relief state that the court may also:

(7) establish temporary visitation with a minor child of the respondent and a person
eligible for relief on a basis which gives primary consideration to the welfare of the minor
child and the safety of any other person eligible for relief. If the court finds that the safety
ofa person eligible for reliefwill be jeopardized by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation,
the court shall condition or restrict visitation as to time, place, duration, or supervision,
or deny visitation entirely, as needed to guard the safety of any person eligible for relief;
(8) award emergency family maintenance as necessary to support any person eligible for
relief to whom the respondent has a duty of support under this article; (9) award
temporary use and possession ofa vehicle jointly owned by the respondent and a person
eligible for relief to the person eligible for relief if necessary for the employment of the
person eligible for relief or for the care of a minor child of the respondent or a person
eligible for relief; . . .or (11) order the respondent to pay filing fees and costs of a
proceeding under this subtitle.
Id
Two provisions of § 4-506(d), previously available under the old statute at both the ex parte and
protective hearing stages, are now more properly restricted to the protective order stage where long term relief
isavailable. The court may"(6) award temporarycustody ofa minor child ofthe respondent and aperson eligible
for relief; . . . (10) direct the respondent or any and all the persons eligible for relief to participate in a
professionally supervised counseling or domestic violence program." 5 4-506(d)(6), (10).
32 Compare MD. CoDEANN., FAM. LAW §4-506(g) (Supp. 1994) with MD. CoDEANN., FAm. LAw 5 4-506(e)
(1991) (amended 1992). Butsee 72 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 115 (1987) (noting that the time limits set forth in
subsection (e)(1) do not apply to the relief authorized by subsections (3) (custody), (4) (counseling) and (5)
(other relief as necessary)). See supra note 28.
33 The gender bias study produced a report in 1989. MARYLAND SPECiALJOiNT COMMn-rE, GENDER BIAs IN
THE Couris (1989). The PublicJustice Center Study, unlike thegender bias study, received no public funding.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 163

gender bias study, the domestic violence study involved training volunteers to
accurately complete a printed form as the volunteers observed a domestic violence
case in the courtroom. To reduce error, most courtroom observations were
performed with more than one volunteer. Each volunteer completed a separate
form, and the study coordinators later compared the completed forms to minimize
the reporting errors.

The courtrooms chosen for observation were selected by the study coordinators.
One of the factors involved in courtroom selection was whether the court being
observed maintained an identifiable courtroom to hear domestic violence cases.
Some courts were not observed if the clerks would randomly assign incoming
domestic violence cases to any available courtroom. Courts in Western Maryland
and the Eastern Shore had limited numbers of domestic violence cases, and thus
were not observed. In addition, locations where few volunteers were available for
observation also received less attention than other locations. However, in all
locations, attempts were made to completely report all the domestic violence cases
heard in those courts for the designated length of the dockets.

The observation schedule was staggered for different court venues. Courtroom
cases were observed after six months had passed from the effective date of the
revised Domestic Violence Act. This ensured that the judiciary had developed
some experience at administering the new law. Times of day and days of the week
for observation usually depended upon the scheduling practices of each court's
derks. Volunteers thus observed cases on all days the court was in session, and all
times of day from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. The resulting distribution gives a wide range of
days and times for data analysis.

Once the Public Justice Center reviewed and assembled the volunteer courtroom
data, the data was entered in two different computer database programs to further
minimize compilation errors. The study coordinators attempted to further reduce
the impact of human reporting error and other forms of error that might affect the
validity of the study by limiting the conclusions to findings with a large number of
responses. The resulting findings therefore should prove usefil in assessing the
courtroom implementation of the statute.

TV. FINDINGS
The study data relate to five basic categories: (a) court jurisdiction and type; (b)
hearing type, time and duration; (c) characteristics of participants; (d) relief sought

164 Volume 6 - Issue I ° Fall/Winter 1994-95

and/or granted; and (e) behavior of participants. The data reported are presented
by the corresponding categories.

A. CmortJurisdictionand Type
Volunteers observed a total of 220 cases in the courts of six Maryland jurisdictions.
Baltimore City courts accounted for sixty-seven cases, and Baltimore County courts
accounted for fifty-one cases. Montgomery County courts accounted for fifty
cases, and Prince George's County accounted for thirty-seven cases observed.
Thirteen cases were observed in Anne Arundel County, and two cases were ob-
served in Howard County. While cases were observed in the district courts of each
of the six jurisdictions, circuit courts were only observed in Baltimore City, Mont-
gomery County and Anne Arundel County.34

B. HearingType, Time andDuradon

All of the cases were observed from April through September 1993, during both
morning and afternoon courtroom sessions. In some courtrooms, cases were heard
throughout the session, while others reserved part of the session for domestic
violence cases only.

During the observation period, the courts heard sixty-seven ex parte cases, 140
protection order cases, and five contempt hearings cases. Three cases were for
modification of prior orders, and three cases were for rescission of prior orders. In
addition, two ex parte petitions filed on the same day were treated as protective
order hearings because both parties were present in the courtroom. Although
appeals may be taken from protective orders, none were observed.

The duration of hearings varied slightly, depending on the type of hearing. The
majority of ex parte hearings took between five and ten minutes, with most of the
remaining cases lasting between ten and fifteen minutes. The majority of protec-
tive order hearings took less than five minutes, with more or less equal numbers of
the remaining hearings lasting from five to ten minutes, ten to fifteen minutes,
fifteen to twenty minutes, and twenty to thirty minutes in length. 35

34 Setsupra note 4 for the definition of district and circuit courts.

35 Thc large group of short protective order hearings is due to the inclusion of 63 cases in the results where
there was no full hearing on the merits. Either the petitioner or both parties filed to appear and the hearing
was therefore dismissed (18 cases), or the petitioner or both parties asked that the case be dismissed (16 cases).
Also, the judge extended the cx parte relief at the request of the parties in ten cases or because the respondent
had not been served in 19 cases. Without these 63 cases, only 9 of the remaining 61 protective order hearings
where date was available were less than five minutes in duration.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 165

C. Char yitcs ofPartic'pants
1. Gender
The data regarding the parties involved in these cases could easily be divided along
gender lines. Of the total petitioners in the observed cases, volunteers reported 177
women and 22 men.36 Of the total respondents, there were 95 men and 14
women. 37 At the ex parte hearing stage, female petitioners outnumbered male
petitioners 59 to 8. At the protective order stage, female petitioners outnumbered
males 110 to 10. Conversely at that stage, 88 of the respondents were male,
compared to only 8 female respondents. In sum, the gender data is not surprising
because previous studies have shown that women are overwhelmingly the victims
38
of domestic violence.

2. Race
The race distribution of the parties was more mixed than the gender distribution.
As reported by observers, 90 petitioners were white, 86 were African-American, 9
were Hispanic and 6 were from various other racial groups. 39 Moreover, there
were 42 white respondents, 55 African-American respondents, 6 Hispanic respon-
dents and 4 respondents from other racial groups. At the ex parte hearing level,
there were 34 white petitioners, 25 African-American, 1 Hispanic and 2 from other
racial groups. During the protective order hearings, 52 petitioners were white, 54
were African-American, 7 were Hispanic and 3 were from other racial groups.
Similarly, those hearings included 38 white respondents, 47 African-American
respondents, 6 Hispanic respondents and 4 respondents who were from other racial
groups.

36 Data concerning the petitioners is available for only 120 of the 140 protective order hearings because both
parties failed to appear in eight cases; the petitioner failed to appear in 10 cases; one petitioner was unknown
because the attorneys for the parties appeared and requested a continuance; and the observers in one Prince
George's County District Court case failed to note the petitioner's gender.
37 The low number of respondents is attributable to several factors, principal among them the fact that the
respondent generally never appears at the ex parte hearing (as implied by its name). In this study, only one male
and three female respondents appeared at the 67 cx pane hearings, just under six percent (4 of 67). At the
protective order stage, 41 respondents did not appear. The majority of those cases included the respondent not
being served (19 cases) and both parties failing to appear (10 cases); the remaining 12 cases generally resulted
in continuances or extending the ex parte order with modifications, but several of the cases lacked data due to
neglect on the part of the volunteers to note the respondent's demographic characteristics.
38 See MAYAND NETrwoRc AGAiNST DomF.c VIoLENcE, supra note 3 at 38. For example, 87.39% of the
petitioners in this report were female. Id The 1984 national crime statistics show that among spousal victims
ofdomesticviolence, approximately 95% of the victims are women. KLAus E A., BUREAU OF JusnCE STATISTICS
SPEcAL REPORT, U.S. DEp'T oF JusicE., FAMILy VOLENCE 4(1984).
39 It should be noted that not all reports by observers indicated the race of the parties involved,

166 Volume 6 * Issue 1 * Fall/Winter 1994-95

 Almost all of these data groupings indicate a higher percentage of non-whites than
whites, as parties to the proceedings. Although the demographic composition of
Maryland reveals significantly more whites than non-whites, 40 it should not
necessarily be assumed that white families are per capita less prone to domestic
violence than non-whites. The study did not examine domestic violence cases
throughout the state on a uniform basis for every county and city. Instead, the
study took 102 of the total 220 cases from Baltimore City and Prince George's
County, where the majority populations are non-white. 4 1 The study has no data
from Western Maryland or the Eastern Shore to balance these jurisdictions, 42 and
therefore, it is not surpirising that the study would show a significantly high
number of non-white parties in these cases.

3. Age
Like the race data, the age data also varied. The total data indicates that 132
petitioners were under age 35, 62 were between the ages of 35 and 55, and 4 were
over 55 years of age. Similarly, respondents included 75 under age 35, 33 between
the ages of 35 and 55, and I over 55. At the ex parte stage, 47 petitioners were
under 35, 19 were between the ages of 35 and 55, and 1 was over 55. At the
protective order hearings, 77 petitioners were under 35, 40 were between the ages
of 35 and 55, and 2 were over 55. Similarly, 667 respondents were under 35, 28
were 35 to 55, and I was over 55. While the volunteers were required to estimate
the ages of the parties by sight, it seems dear that most of the parties in these cases
were firly young, falling into the under-35 category. Conversely, very few of the
parties involved were over 55 years of age.

40 According to the 1990 census, Maryland had a population of4,78 1,000 people. The racial breakdown is
as follows: 3,394,000 white, 1,190.000 African American, 140,000 Asian, 125,000 Hispanic. and 13,000
American Indian. U.S. BuaruOITHECENsS, STATsTCALABTrRAcrOFTHEUNrItI STATE_: 1993,at30 (113th
ed. 1993).
41 Ac cording to the 1990 census, Baltimore City had 287,753 white residents and 435,768 African-American
residents. Prince George's County had 314,616 white residents and 369,791 African-Americans. COUNTYAND
Crr DATA BooK, U.S. DEtsATM ,r OrCOMmERcE (1994).
42 According to the 1990 census, the counties ofWestern Maryland and the Eastern Shore of Maryland had
majority white populations. In Western Maryland, Alleghany County had 72,955 white residents and 1,535
African-American residents: Garrett County had 27,963 white residents and 105 African-American residents;
and Washington County had 112,828 white residents and 7,245 African-American residents. Id.
ArnongCounties on the Eastern Shore, KentCountyhad 14,085 white residents and 3,534African-
American residents; Queen Anne's County had 29,911 white residents and 3,839 African-American residents;
Somerset County had 14,282 white residents and 8,943 African-American residents; Talbot County had
24,833 white residents and 5,502 African-American residents; and Wicomico County had 56,755 white
residents and 16,573 African-American residents. Id.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 167

4. Lawyers andAdvocates
Beyond the parties to the actions, data was also gathered about lawyers and advo-
cates who represented the parties in domestic violence cases. Of the total cases
observed, attorneys represented petitioners in 33 cases, whereas respondents had
attorneys representing them in 26 cases. Attorneys were more likely to be present
at protective order hearings, rather than ex parte hearings. In fact, only one peti-
tioner had an attorney at an ax parte hearing, whereas 29 of 120 of the petitioners
had attorneys at the protective order hearing stage. Additionally, respondents had
attorneys in 22 of 96 protective order hearings.

While there was a fair balance among male and female lawyers for petitioners
during the hearings 17 male versus 16 female attorneys), respondents were gener-
ally represented by male attorneys (20 male versus 6 female attorneys). At protec-
tive order hearings, there were 3 female lawyers and 15 male lawyers for respon-
dents. It isworth noting that 97 of 111 of the respondents were men, so it appears
that male respondents are more indined to seek the assistance of male attorneys.

In addition to attorneys, advocates representing one or both of the parties were

present at 9.1% of the total cases observed (20 of 220). Advocates were present at
5 of the 67 ex parte hearings and 13 of the 140 protective order hearings. Ninety
percent of the advocates were women (18 of 20).

Among the 77 lawyers and advocates, the vast majority were white (65 of 77).
Among the lawyers, 47 were white, 7 were African-American, and 3 were of other
racial groups. Among the advocates, 18 were white, 1 was African-American, and
I was of another racial group. This stands in stark contrast to the racial composi-
tion of the parties, a majority ofwhom were from mostly non-white racial groups.

Fourteen of the 15 white petitioners chose to be represented by white attorneys.

The 15 white respondents all chose white lawyers. Of the 11 African-American
petitioners, 4 chose African-American attorneys. Only I of the 5 African-American
respondents chose an African-American attorney. Because advocates are generally
not chosen by the parties, the statistical significance of the racial correlations is of
little probative value.

The impact of representation in a domestic violence hearing is difficult to assess.

When a petitioner is represented by an attorney, a favorable result (either by
judgment, 13 cases, or by consent order, 7 cases) is obtained 60.6% of the time (20
of 33). In the 197 cases where the petitioner was not represented by counsel,

168 Volume 6 • Issue 1 ° Fall/Winter 1994-95

however, the success ratio fell only slightly to 54.8% (108 of 197), and many of
those cases resulted in a continuance, extension or dismissal for failure to appear.
In the cases where the respondents were represented by an attorney, the respon-
dents prevailed (either by judgment, 2 cases, or by dismissal of the petitioner's case,
2 cases) only 15.4% of the time (4 of 26). When not represented, however, the
respondent prevailed in 28.3% of the cases (55 of 194).

To put these figures in context, it is important to note that the attorneys may be
more interested in seeking an agreement between the parties in these cases. This is
borne out when looking at the number of consent orders entered into by the
parties. Overall, sixteen consent orders were entered into (10.5% of hearings
beyond the ex parte stage or 16 of 153), and 6 of those occurred when the respon-
dent had an attorney (37.5% or 6 of 16).

In 17 of 120 cases, both the petitioner and respondent were represented by counsel.
Fifteen of these cases were protective order hearings, and the other two cases were
contempt hearings. Continuances were ordered or requested in four cases (26.6%
or 4 of 15), all at the protective order stage. Of the 6 cases where the petitioner
obtained relief (35.3% or 6 of 17), 5 were at protective order hearings. However,
consent orders were suggested by the parties in 29.4% of these cases (5 of 17), only
one of which was at a contempt hearing. The respondent prevailed 11.7% of the
time at the protective stage (2 of 17). If one considers a consent order to be a
positive result for the respondent, the respondent then obtains a success ratio of
38.5% (10 of 26). Clearly the most striking finding is the high number of consent
orders in cases where both parties were represented by counsel. Additionally, it is
significant to note that the 4 of the 15 continuances granted during the course of
this study occurred when both parties were represented by counsel.

5. Witnesses
The study noted the roles ofwimesses, who were involved in 23 of the 220 pro-
ceedings observed. The presence of witnesses was reported in 6 of the 67 ex parte
cases (8.9%) and in 14 of the 140 protective order hearings (10%). Witnesses were
also observed at one contempt hearing, one rescission hearing, and one modifica-
tion hearing (3 of 11 such cases). Anecdotal evidence from the volunteer reports
indicates that family members are frequently called as witnesses in these cases.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 169

D. ReliefSought and/or Granted
1. Exparte hearings
Petitioners succeeded in obtaining ex parte orders in 85% of the cases observed (57
of 67), with no county granting ex parte orders in less than 75% of the possible
cases. In over 90% of all cases where a judge granted relief in open court, the court
ordered the respondent to refrain from abuse or making threats of abuse, and from
contacting, attempting to contact or harassing the person eligible for relief. The
court ordered the respondent to refrain from entering the residence 75% of the
time, and ordered the respondent to vacate the residence in only half the cases.

The courts ordered the respondent to remain away from the petitioner's place of
employment in 40% of the cases. Although much less frequently ordered, the
courts appear to be using their new powers to order the respondent to remain away
from: (1) the petitioner's temporary home (15/); (2) the home of another family
member (11%); or (3) school of petitioner/child (9/). Custody of the children,
furthermore, was awarded 55% of the cases. 43

The courts also used their powers to provide additional relief. For instance, the
return of the children's birth certificates was ordered in one case. In another case,
the respondent was ordered to stay away from the home of the petitioner's friend.
Additionally, in a case involving a mother seeking relief from an abusive son who
resided with her, the court ordered an emergency medical evaluation of the
44
petitioner's son.

In the majority of the jurisdictions, the ex parte relief granted did not substantially
vary. The courts in Baltimore City and Montgomery County were distinguishable
in that they consistently filed to order the respondent to refrain from abuse or
threatening abuse (13 of 14 and 3 of 6, respectively). However, the courts in these
two jurisdictions still granted other appropriate relief Two Baltimore City cases
exemplify how the courts granted unique forms of relief to the case at hand. In the
first case, the judge granted the petitioner's request to have her boyfriend refrain
from entering the residence. In the second case, the judged granted the female
petitioner's request to have her abusive daughter vacate the residence. In both

43 When taking into account that theother27 cases may not have involved children at all, the actual percentage
ofcustodyawards isundoubtedlyhigher. Because the volunteers did not review the case fle, but merely observed
the court proceedings, the data concerning children is not available.
44 In a similar case where the son who resided with his mother had allegedly stolen money from her to support
his drug habit, the court denied eliefunder the protective order, but ordered an emergency medical evaluation
of the son.

170 Volume 6 * Issue I * Fall/Winter 1994-95

cases, the judge advised the petitioners to file a petition for forcible entry and
detainer. 4 5 Also, while most counties had at least a 50% rate of custody awards,
only 15% of the petitioners in Prince George's County were awarded custody.

A number of ex parte cases were also dismissed. Ten petitioners did not meet the
requisite burden of proof or voluntarily dismissed their cases. The reasons for the
denials appear to be directly linked to the facts of each case. Of the nineteen ex
parte cases observed in Baltimore County, a petitioner was more likely to be denied
relief in the Catonsville District Court. This finding, however, partly results from
the petitioner's failure to meet the statutory requirements in the three cases where
the Catonsville District Court denied the petitioner's requested relief. For example,
in one Catonsville case, on the advice of the police, a male petitioner sought
custody of two children who were with his wife, the court found that "yelling" at a
child did not rise to the level of domestic violence required to grant the petition. In
another Catonsville case, a female petitioner who sought custody testified that the
male respondent had threatened to "smash her face" and take their daughter two
weeks previously; her petition was apparently denied because she had not filed
sooner. In the third Catonsville case, a woman sought to keep her twenty-one year
old non-resident son out of her house because he was stealing her possessions,
probably on drugs, and suicidal because of his father's death two weeks before the
hearing; the Court denied the petition, but ordered an emergency evaluation of the
son. In comparison, the Baltimore County District Court in Dundalk's only
denial of ex parte relief was a male petitioner's request for custody where there was
no allegation of domestic violence.

In the Baltimore City District Court, orders were not granted in two of the three
cases where a couple who had filed cross petitions against each other voluntarily
dismissed their cases at the hearing. In the third case involving cross-petitions, the
female petitioner reported that her husband did not know where she now lived.
The judge advised her to call the police if she saw him near her home or work, and
further advised that she obtain a divorce. 46

45 A petition for a forcible entry and detainer, also known as a "FED" petition, is a means to evict a person
whose name does not appear on the lease and who has no legal right to remain on the premises. See Grenbdt
ConsumerY.Acme Mkts., 322 A.2d 521 (Md. 1973). Additionally, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction
over the issuance of petitions for a forcible entry and detainer. MD. CODE ANN., Cms. & JuD. PRoc. § 4-401 (4)
(1989 & Supp. 1994).
46 It is not dear from the volunteer's comments whether the petitioner agreed that an order was not necessary.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 171

In Montgomery County, the circuit court denied relief to a male petitioner who
stated that the female respondent had only verbally harassed him, and that he was
not in fear of the female respondent. In the Montgomery County District Court,
relief was denied to a female petitioner who lived with the respondent, the father of
her second child, for only two months and who had last had "problems" with the
respondent more than four weeks before she filed her petition. In Prince George's
County, a male petitioner was denied relief because he did not allege any violence,
merely that the female respondent telephoned him and cursed him.

2. ProtectiveOrderHearings
Of the 140 protective order hearings observed, the petitioner prevailed 44.3% of
the time (62 of 140). Judgment was granted for the petitioner in 33.6% of the
cases (47 of 140) and a consent order was entered in 10.7% of the cases (15 of
140).47 In contrast, the respondent prevailed in only 8.6% of the cases (12 of
140); judgment was granted in respondent's favor in 3.6% of the cases (5 of 140)
and dismissals were entered in 5%of the cases (7 of 140).

Among protective orders granted, more than 93% of the orders provided relief
beyond the 30-day limit of the old statute, 37.3% of the orders provided for relief
between 30 and 180 days and 55% offered relief for more than 180 days. In 5
cases, judges granted relief beyond the 200-day limit of the new law.

The judge granted extensions of ex parte relief in 20.7% of the possible cases (29 of
140). Over 65% of the extensions were caused by lack of service on the respondent
within the seven day period usually given before the protective order hearing. In
two of the thirty cases in which an extension was ordered, the judge also modified
the ex parte order pending the extension. The six extensions not caused by a failure
of service were granted for various reasons. For example, the court allowed exten-
sions in the following situations: to permit the respondent to obtain an attorney; to
allow a respondent served on the day of the protective order hearing time to
prepare for the hearing; to await the outcome of the criminal hearing on the same
facts; and to wait until a respondent was discharged from a hospital.

47 The percentage of orders favorable to the petitioner climbs to 83.8% (62 of 74) when the extensions of ex
pare orders (29 cases), continuances (4 cases), and dismissals resulting from the petitioners' failure to appear
(18 cases) or at the parties' request (15 cases) are excluded. Thus, the favorable outcome for the petitioner at
theex parreand protective orderstages, 85.1% and 83.8% respectively, is nearly identical when looking at only
cases which were adjudicated.

172 Volume 6 o Issue 1 o Fall/Winter 1994-95

Exduding extensions of ex parte orders, Montgomery County had the highest ratio
of protection order hearings with results favorable to the petitioner, 19 of 31 cases
(61.2%). In that area, the court granted 15 orders and 4 consent orders. Baltimore
City ranked second in awarding results favorable to petitioners, with a 47.9%
favorable rate consisting of 16 orders and 6 consent orders granted.

The other jurisdictions hovered near a 40% ratio of hearings favorable to the
petitioner. In Baltimore County, the petitioner was granted relief only 30% of the
time (ten of thirty). Hearings were observed in Catonsville, Owings Mills,
Dundalk and Essex District Courts. 48 Judgment was entered for the respondent in
two of three Catonsville cases, while the petitioner was granted relief in two of four
Owings Mills and two of four Dundalk cases. In Essex, the petitioner was granted
relief in 31.5% of the hearings observed (six of nineteen), one of which was a
consent order.

The Anne Arundel courts found in favor of the petitioner in 37.5% of the cases (3
of 8); two of the favorable verdicts, however, were consent orders. Petitioners in
Prince George's County succeeded in obtaining relief in only 33.3% of the cases (7
of 2 1); six were judgments for petitioner, and one was a consent order suggested by
the parties. In one case, the court found it lacked jurisdiction because both parties
were Montgomery County residents.

Unfortunately, the two Howard County cases were not resolved during the study
period. One case was continued after the hearing had begun, while in the other
case, the ex parte order was extended one week in order to allow the Circuit Court
hearing regarding the guardianship of the vulnerable adult to be decided.

In four of the protective order hearings, based on the following reasons, the judge
granted or ordered a continuance after a full hearing on the merits was held: (1) to
permit the parties to work out long-term custody issues; (2) to obtain a report from
the Department of Social Services on custody recommendations after a hearing was
held to resolve all other issues; (3) to give the judge more time to study the case and
to permit the parties to work out the issues before the next hearing; and (4) at one
hearing where both parties were represented, for unknown reasons.

48 Although volunteers were at the Towson District Court to observe cases, there were no domestic violence
cases at that Court during the study period.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 173

Unlike ex parte hearings, the outcomes at the protective order stage induded
consent orders, extensions and continuances. In the 47 cases where judgment was
entered in favor of the petitioner at the protective order stage, 85.1% ordered the
respondent to refrain from abuse or making threats of abuse (40 of 47).49 The
respondent was ordered to refrain from contacting, attempting to contact or
harassing the petitioner in only 61.7% of the cases (29 of 47).50 The respondent
was ordered to refrain from entering the petitioner's residence 61.7% of the time
(29 of 47),51 and to vacate the home in 29.8% of the cases (14 of 47).52 In one
case, the respondent and petitioner were already living apart; in another, the parties
apparently did not want the respondent to leave;, and in yet another case, the
petitioner only wanted the respondent to be ordered into counseling.

Unlike the ex parte hearings, where the respondent was ordered to remain away
from the petitioner's place of employment in just over 50% of the cases, this relief
was given only 8.5% of the time (4 of 47).53 The new injunctive relief was much
less frequently ordered. The courts ordered the respondent to remain away from:
(1) the petitioner's temporary home (0.2% or 1 of 47);54 (2) the home of another
family member (0.2% or 1 of 47);55 or (3) the school for the petitioner or child
(8.5% or 4 of 47).56

Custody of the children was granted in 53.2% of the cases (25 of 47).57 Visitation
was granted in 38.3% of the cases (18 of 47). 58 Of the 25 cases where custody was

49 Nine of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. It is not known if the contents of the other six orders
grant or deny this relief. Of the 14 cases where relief may have been granted when the ex parte relief was
continued or extended, four of the five cases where relief is known granted this particular relief as well.
50 Eight of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the cx parte relief was continued or extended, four cases granted this particular relief.
51 Eight of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the ex parte relief was continued or extended, five cases granted this particular relief.
52 Fiveofthe 15 consentorders alsoprovidedthis relief. Oftheother 14 caseswhere reliefmayhavebeen granted
when the cx pare relief was continued or extended, three cases granted this particular relief.
53 Three of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the ex parte relief was continued or extended, three cases granted this particular relief.
54 One of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.
55 Three of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.
56 Two of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.
57 Eight of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the ex pane relief was continued or extended, four cases granted this particular relief.
58 Seven of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the cx pane relief was continued or extended, two cases granted this particular relief.

174 Volume 6 * Issue 1 • Fall/Winter 1994-95

 awarded, 16 awarded visitation to the respondent (64%),59 although often condi-
60
tionaUy.
Emergency fa.mily maintenance was also ordered in 21.3% of the cases (10 of
47).61 The amounts awarded ranged from $15 per week 62 to $700 per month. In
two cases, the respondents were ordered either to pay half of the mortgage pay-
ment, or to pay an undisdosed amount of emergency family maintenance when
the respondent found a job.

Use of a jointly owned vehicle was awarded to the petitioner 12.8% of the time (6
of 47),63 and the parties were ordered into counseling in 38.3% of the cases (18 of
47).64 In each case involving an order of counseling, the respondent was always
ordered into counseling. However, in seven cases, the petitioner was also ordered
to seek counseling.

Additional forms of reliefwere also provided in several cases. For example, in one
case, the respondent was ordered to vacate the premises or refrain from entering
them. In addition to the two primary types of relief awarded, the respondent was
ordered that only consensual sexual relations were permitted. In another case, the
judge ordered a second hearing thirty days later to determine if the counseling was
successfil. Court costs were also allocated between the parties in some cases.

The relief granted by jurisdiction did not greatly deviate, although there were a few
exceptions. In Baltimore County District Court and in Montgomery County
Circuit Court, no respondents were ordered to remain away from the petitioner's
temporary home, school or work, or the home of a family member.

In addition, the Baltimore City Circuit Court was the only court that ordered an
investigation into possible child abuse. In Baltimore County's Dundalk District

59 Seven of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief. Of the other 14 cases where relief may have been
granted when the ex parte relief was continued or extended, one case granted this particular relief.
60 The conditions imposed were varied. For example, if the parent had an alcohol problem, the parent was
ordered to remain soberduringvisitation and to attend treatment programs. In other cases, supervised visitation
was required. Further, in some cases, either the parties themselves or a thirdparty were designated to work out
a visitation schedule.
61 One of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.
62 In this particular case, the petitioner requested that the respondent pay half of the weekly babysitting
expenses.
63 One of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.
64 Six of the 15 consent orders also provided this relief.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 175

Court, a judge did not believe that emergency financial maintenance also induded
a default on a house payment. In the Owings Mills District Court, a judge was
unsure whether custody could be awarded, although it was ordered.

E Behavior ofparti'pants
The information gathered regarding the behavior of the participants is anecdotal in
nature only. Observers generally noted that the judges were patient, helpfil and
willing to let the parties set forth their respective cases. Only fourteen cases featured
any behavior that was disrespectful. While some of those cases were marked by
acrimony between the parties, several of those few cases involved judges who made
questionable comments to the parties. On the whole, however, nearly all observed
proceedings involved courteous behavior among the participants.

IV. CONCLUSION
The 1992 amendments to Maryland's Domestic Violence Act expanded the dass
of victims eligible for relief, and greatly increased the relief available and the dura-
tion of that relief. The Public Justice Center's study examined the courtroom in an
attempt to measure the impact of these changes.

The initial results are dear. Victims not eligible for relief under the old statute,
such as cohabitants, are now seeking and obtaining the protection of the courts.
District Court judges are taking advantage of their new powers, as are the Circuit
Court judges who only began hearing domestic violence cases when granted
jurisdiction under the new statute. In both courts, abusers were ordered away from
the victim's school, work, and temporary homes. In addition, in some cases, use
and possession of the family vehide was awarded. Most of the protective orders are
over the 30 day time period allowed under the old law, and just over half are at or
near the 200 day limit.

The application of the new law, moreover, has not dogged the courts. Only a few
protective orders cases observed lasted longer than thirty minutes, and the vast
majority of the ex parte cases lasted less than fifteen minutes.

The institution of the new judicial powers has not been smooth in all quarters. A
few judges ordered relief for only thirty days. In a couple of cases, judges denied
the new relief available when the relief appeared to be appropriate.

On the whole, however, the increased equity powers of the judges has benefited
victims of domestic violence. In fact, some judges, as permitted under the law,

176 Volume 6 - Issue 1 - Fall/Winter 1994-95

have ordered relief not specifically set forth in the new statute. Judicial flexibility
has increased the judges' ability to meet the difficult and sometimes complex needs
of domestic violence victims.

In creating future legislation, state lawmakers should keep an eye to increasing this
flexibility. The 1994 amendments set forth tougher penalties for violating a
protective order 65 and dear instructions for appealing a denial of a protective
order.66 Future modifications, for example, might specifically permit judges to
treat an cx parte hearing with cross petitions as a protective order hearing when
both parties are present.

65 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw SS 4-508 to 4-509 (Supp. 1994).

66 Id § 4-507. An appeal taken from the District Court is reviewed de novo by the Circuit Court. Id.

Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 177

178 Volume 6 • Issue 1 • Fall/Winter 1994-95