Of man against woman

A man who takes indecent liberties with a woman may be liable for criminal assault. But not every
indecent act of a man toward a woman constitutes a criminal assault. Thus, applying the general
rule that words alone are not sufficient to constitute a criminal assault, and that an additional
overt act is required, it has been held that a mere indecent proposal made by a man to a woman
is not sufficient to constitute a criminal assault. The courts vary considerably in regard to the
added factors needed to support a charge of assault. In some jurisdictions the courts have gone
very far in applying the principle that a sufficient overt act must be involved. According to some
authorities, it is a sufficient overt act to support a charge of criminal assault that a man, by his
indecent behavior toward a woman, puts her in fear, although he does this merely by words.

When an indecent proposal is accompanied by actual or attempted physical contacts, it is

generally held that an assault has been committed.

Sexual assault and battery---of man against woman.

The act of a man taking indecent liberties with a woman may amount to the crime of assault and
battery, as where a man puts his arm licentiously, though tenderly, about the neck of a woman
against her will, indecently fondles a woman without her consent, or takes hold of the arm of a
married woman, not his wife, against her will, with a request to kiss him.

Although generally an indecent proposal of a man to a woman, if merely of a verbal nature, is

held not sufficient to support a charge of criminal assault, where such indecent proposal is
accompanied by actual or attempted physical contact, a charge of criminal assault and battery is
made out.

Effect, on Criminality, of Family Relationship or Position of Authority

Generally.

An act otherwise amounting to an assault, or assault and battery, does not necessarily cease to
be subject to criminal prosecution because it was committed by one spouse against the other or
by a person exercising authority, as, for instance, a peace officer, a teacher, a parent, or a person
standing in loco parentis. However, the exercise of authority will not render the person exercising
it immune from criminal liability for assault, or assault and battery, where there is an excess of
authority or a malicious or perverse intent indulged in on the occasion of the exercise of
authority.

Where the relation of parent and child or teacher and pupil, or any similar relation is stablished
in defense of a prosecution for assault and battery, the legal presumption is that the
chastisement inflicted by the defendant was proper, and this presumption must be rebutted by
a showing by the prosecution that it was excessive or without any proper cause.
Husband and wife
The prevailing view is that the existence of a husband and wife relationship does not necessarily
eliminate criminal liability for an act otherwise amounting to an assault, or assault and battery,
merely because it was committed by one spouse against the other. In some of the earlier cases
the courts were inclined to take a lenient view where a husband was accused of an assault or
battery against his wife, even where the incident occurred between spouses who had separated
from each other. But even according to the early common-law rule the husband was liable for
assault and battery if he inflicted excessive and unreasonable punishment on his wife. The
modern rule appears to be that a husband cannot commit even a slight assault upon his wife,
with immunity therefor, and that her person is as sacred from his violence as from that of any
other person.

It seems never to have been questioned that a husband may be convicted of assault with intent
to murder his wife, and that a wife may be convicted of assault with intent to kill her husband.

Where an assault is committed by one spouse against the other, the assaulted spouse can testify
against the other in a criminal prosecution for that assault.

Placing wife in house of prostitution

It is made an offense by statute in some jurisdiction to place, procure another to place, or permit
the placing of one’s wife in a house of prostitution, or to permit one’s wife to remain there. Under
such a statute, the placing of the wife in a house of prostitution is a crime distinct from that of
allowing or permitting her to remain therein, and the crime is not confined to placing or keeping
her in a house of prostitution but may be committed by merely permitting or allowing her to
remain there. Moreover, it has been held, the offense of placing or permitting one’s wife to be
placed in a house of prostitution may be committed merely by placing the wife in such a house,
not to practice prostitution, but to follow a lawful occupation such as cook, seamstress, or
housemaid: the husband need not even intent that the wife become a prostitute.

It has been stated that a husband may be guilty of the offense of permitting or allowing his wife
to remain in a house of prostitution, though he had nothing to do with placing or keeping her
there. However, it has been held that mere indifference to the wife’s whereabouts, or passive
sufferance under circumstances not making it his duty to interfere with the wife’s conduct, is not
the “allowing” or “permitting” contemplated by the statute creating the offense; it must appear
that there was some active wish, or at least willingness, in the husband’s mind, after he had
knowledge of his wife’s presence in the house, that she should continue there, before he may be
found guilty of the penalty of the law by showing that he has in good faith used all lawful means
to cause the removal of his wife from the house of prostitution, or that he was anxious to have
her leave the place, then he is not guilty. But a showing that the wife was a prostitute before her
marriage has been held to have no bearing on the husband’s attempted showing that he is not
responsible for her remaining there. The offense under discussion presupposes the existence of
a lawful marriage between the defendant and the woman placed by him in the house of
prostitution. Thus, if their marriage ceremony took place while he was legally married to another
wife, he is not guilty of the offense.
Procuring and placing female in custody of another.
Knowingly receiving money for procuring and placing women in the custody of another person
for immoral purposes is made a crime by statute in some jurisdictions. The offense involves some
force, restraint, or persuasion exercised over the female in question, as distinguished from
conduct on the part of the accused constituting him a mere intermediary. Moral restraint or
persuasion is all that is required, however, Physical restraint or force is not essential. But the
accused’s persuasions, inducements, or suggestions must have been the efficient or moving
cause in bringing about the illicit relations proposed. However, the commission of the offense
does not depend upon the intention of the person in whose custody the female is placed. The
offense is completed when the accused knowingly receives the money, procures the woman, and
delivers her for an immoral purpose with her consent. The accomplishment of the ultimate
purpose of immorality is not essential.

In some states, statutes make it criminal to transport a female for the purpose of prostitution; to
procure a woman to go from one place to another for such purpose; or to induce a woman to
come into or leave the state for such purpose.

Transporting female for purpose of prostitution.

The distinctive feature of such acts is the element of movement from place to place to made
essential to the commission of the offense. In accordance with the well-settled principle that, in
the event of conflict between federal legislation regulating interstate commerce and a state
statute, the federal legislation prevails and the state legislation is of no effect insofar as it
impinges upon the field of interstate commerce occupied by the federal enactment, state
legislation relating to the transportation of females for purposes of immorality is valid only
insofar as it does not conflict with federal legislation on the subject. A state statute, insofar as it
assumed to prohibit the transportation of women and girls into the state from another state for
immoral purposes, and to punish persons who should aid in obtaining such transportation, has
been held invalid as in conflict with the federal White Slave Traffic Act.

Crimes by one spouse against other.

Husband and wife are criminally liable for crimes against each other, and this is true at common
law. Whether certain acts of one of them with respect to the other, which would be criminal if
they were not married, are not criminal for the reason that they are married is another question.

At common law, owing to the unity of the spouses and the rights of the husband to the property
of his wife, husband and wife cannot commit crimes against the property of each other. Under
appropriate statutes, sometimes by express provision, husband and wife can be guilty of crimes
with respect to the property of each other. In the absence of such express statutory provision,
the question depends on the construction of the Married Women’s Acts and statues defining the
crime in question. According to some courts, under the Married Women’s Acts husband and wife
are liable for crimes with respect to the property of each other, at least where there are no
common-law crimes in the state, and where the particular crime is defined quite differently under
statute than at common law. Other courts, however, take the view that the common-law non
liability of one spouse for crimes with respect to the property of the other is not changed by the
Married Women’s Acts securing to a wife her separate property, at least as to a crime the
statutory definition of which is substantially the same as at common law. In support of this view,
it has been ruled that an intention by the legislature to abolish an established rule of the common
law and to create a crime where none existed before must clearly and unmistakably appear.

Character of injury to wife.

While the great majority of the cases involving a husband’s right of recovery for loss of
consortium and for expenses he has incurred in consequence of a tortious act have been cases
in which the wife has received some personal injury, due to the defendant’s negligence, the right
to recover also exists wherever such loss is caused by another’s wrongful act intentionally
inflicted as, for example, a malicious prosecution of the wife, or a defamation of her character. It
has been held, however, that neither grief experienced by the plaintiff’s wife on reading an
alleged libelous article regarding him nor the influence of her grief on the plaintiff’s mind is an
element of damages recoverable in an action for libel. The husband may recover for loss of
consortium and expenses resulting from injuries or illness of the wife caused by malpractice, by
the unwholesomeness of food purchased for domestic consumption, by the negligence of a
carrier, or by the negligence of a municipality with respect to a defective street, except, in the
latter case, as statutes may restrict the liability of the municipality to bodily injuries.

Generally a cause of action for loss of consortium of the wife does not exist in the husband unless
the defendant would have been liable directly to the wife for her injury occasioning the loss of
consortium. Nevertheless, it is now generally held that one spouse may maintain an action
against a person selling a habit-forming drug to the other spouse where it appears that such
person knew, or had good reason to know, that it was not to be used for a medicinal purpose,
but, on the contrary, was intended to satisfy the craving created by habitual use.

Injury to the wife causing the husband the loss of her consortium and giving rise to a cause of
action in him may be the consequence of a trespass on the property of the husband, or the
maintenance of a nuisance in proximity to the residence of the spouses, causing the wife to
become ill.

Criminal Responsibility for Abuse or Disregard of Parental Relation

Generally--- A parent or person in loco parentis who so flagrantly violates his parental duties or
obligations to a minor or dependent child as to constitute an abuse or disregard by him of the
parental relation is, under the law of most jurisdictions, guilty of a criminal offense. The state will
ordinarily punish him for gross abuse of his parental power of control and discipline resulting in
injury to the child, although in a few jurisdictions there appears to be no criminal liability for
disciplinary measures taken unless the injury is permanent or the act is done maliciously, in a
legal sense. A parent or one standing in his place may be criminally liable as for assault and
battery if he exceeds or abuses his authority to correct a child and inflicts a corporal punishment
which exceeds the bounds of due moderation, either in the measure of it or in the instrument
used for the purposes. He may be guilty of murder or manslaughter, according to the
circumstances, if the child dies as the result of such acts, or because of his wilful or negligent
omission to provide for it the necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance and
treatment.

Parents who so violate their privileges and obligations with respect to their children as to have
sexual relations with them are subject to criminal prosecution for incest or rape. Under the codes
and statutes of many jurisdictions, not only the positive ill-treatment, but also the abandonment
or desertion of a minor child and the neglect or wilful omission to provide it with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment are crimes for which a person sustaining a parental
relationship to such child may be convicted and punished. In some jurisdictions, statutes make it
a criminal offense for parents publicly to exhibit their children under a certain age in spectacles
or performances which are deemed prejudicial to the physical, mental, or moral well-being of
such children. The failure of a parent, in the event of death of his child, to fulfil his duties with
respect to burial or appropriate disposition of the body may subject him to criminal prosecution
under certain circumstances.