Renaissance Studies Vol. 19 No.

Original
Blackwell
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Renaissance
REST
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0269-1213
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2005
Rhetoric,Article
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in the Renaissance

Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 1

Peter Mack

Peter Mack

In many classical authors, and also today, there is a perceived contradiction

between rhetoric and ethics. Plato famously defined rhetoric as flattery and
likened it to cookery 2 and we are accustomed to attacks on the market
researchers, spindoctors and advertising gurus who are the close confidantes
of our politicians. Against the immorality of rhetoric, Plato sets up the ideal
of the philosopher, the good man seeking to teach the right way of living.3
Renaissance thinkers, by contrast, recognised close connections between
the art of persuasion and the promotion of individual and public morality.
In Paul Kristeller’s influential description, rhetoric and ethics are two of
the characteristic activities of Renaissance humanism.4 The programmes
of humanist education derived from Guarino and Erasmus, which spread
throughout Europe in the sixteenth century, inculcate virtue through Latin
grammar, literature and rhetorical exercises.5 We can almost say that the
union of rhetoric and ethics is a defining feature of humanism. In this
paper I want to look at the ways in which connections between rhetoric and
ethics were articulated and, in particular, at their practical consequences for
the way pupils were taught to read classical texts. Ethical and rhetorical
approaches to reading in turn contributed to grammar school composition
exercises, many of them centred on ethical subjects. Then I shall try to show
how school practices of reading and writing encouraged the investigation
and questioning of ethical commonplaces in texts by Erasmus, Montaigne
and Shakespeare. I shall argue that rhetorical elaborations of received ethical
principles could, rather surprisingly, lead to new ways of answering questions
of individual and public morality.
1
This is the text of the annual lecture of the Society for Renaissance Studies, given at the Warburg
Institute, University of London on 9 May 2003, with light alterations to incorporate my handout. I am grateful
to the Society and David Chambers for the invitation, and to Kees Meerhoff and Carol Rutter for their
comments on the original text of the lecture.
2
Plato, Gorgias 463b–65e; see B. Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford, 1988), pp. 83–178.
3
Plato, Gorgias, 526c, Republic, 6, 484a− 85a.
4
Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York, 1979), pp. 22–25, 28–29.
5
Erasmus, De ratione studii, ed. J. C. Margolin in Erasmus, Opera omnia, I-2 (Amsterdam, 1971) pp. 113–14,
trans. Brian McGregor, Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 24 (Toronto, 1978) pp. 666–67; J. Sturm, De litterarum
ludis recte aperiendis (Strasburg, 1539) sig. B7r, translated in L. W. Spitz and B. Sher Tinsley, Johann Sturm on
Education (St Louis, 1995) p. 85; R. Ascham, English Works, ed. W. A. Wright (Cambridge, 1904) pp. 265–66;
T. W. Baldwin, Shakespere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greeke, 2 vols. (Urbana, 1944), I, pp. 77–93 and passim.

© 2005 The Society for Renaissance Studies, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

2 Peter Mack
But we need to begin at a more general and more ancient level, with the
issue of the relations between rhetoric and philosophy. In the Greek cities of
the fifth and fourth centuries BC, there were good reasons for conflicts
between rhetoricians and philosophers. To start with, they were in competi-
tion to provide higher education. The rhetorician offered to teach free men
the way to make speeches that would persuade juries and assemblies to assent
to their point of view. The philosopher found it necessary to expose the
inadequacy of the rhetorician’s view of the world in order to win pupils for
his more esoteric and apparently less useful training.6 But there are also
more fundamental conflicts of approach. The rhetorician is concerned with
the contingent: how to persuade a particular audience to espouse a particular
point of view.7 The rhetorician works on a wide public canvas. In principle,
rhetoric must be concerned with all possible subject matters, with the
arguments, planning, style and delivery of a speech, but also with the dif-
ferent circumstances in which speeches are made and the different kinds of
audience, with voice projection and self-presentation, with emotional manip-
ulation, humour and charm. Rhetoric attempts to maintain contact with this
wide range of different considerations by simplifying each one of them. So,
for example, the manuals of rhetoric recognize only two different kinds of
audience, two ways to begin a speech and three levels of style. By contrast,
in any particular investigation the philosopher focuses on a particular
concept or a small number of propositions and digs deep into the different
meanings of single words or the true nature of particular concepts. The
reasons that the philosopher gives for rejecting rhetoric are usually ethical
reasons: according to the philosopher, the orator has no interest in the truth
or in goodness but is cynically devoted only to victory.
But if Philosophy and Rhetoric have strong reasons for conflict there
are also motives for collaboration, particularly in connection with ethics. For
the orator to persuade an audience that a particular course of action is right, it
is necessary that he or she has an understanding of the ethical beliefs which
prevail among that audience. In practice, therefore, discussion of the virtues
has always formed part of rhetorical training. This connection between rhet-
oric and ethics may also reflect the fact that, however strongly it claims to be
based in universal principles, ethics has more concern with contingency than
other parts of philosophy. Ethics must adapt to differences in belief between
different peoples and different times. It must seek to apply logically derived
principles to the confused situations of practical life. From the point of view
6
H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (London, 1956), pp. 194–216, P. Hadot, ‘Philosophie,
dialectique, rhétorique, dans l’antiquité’, Studia philosophica, 39 (1980), 139–66.
7
On rhetoric generally: [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1954) with Harry
Caplan’s translation and analysis, R Barthes, ‘L’ancienne rhétorique: aide-mémoire’, Communications 16
(1970), 172–229, translated in Barthes, The Semiotic Challenge (Oxford, 1988), pp. 11–93; G. Kennedy, The Art
of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963); B. Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric; T. Conley, Rhetoric in the European
Tradition (New York, 1990). Heinrich Lausberg’s invaluable Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik, 3rd edn
(Stuttgart, 1990) has now been translated into English as Handbook of Literary Rhetoric (Leiden, 1998).
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 3
of practical morality, as Lorenzo Valla recognised, if moral ideas are to win
the acceptance and even the enthusiasm of a populace they will usually need
to be presented using the skills of the orator.8 So preachers and civic leaders
need the specialised training provided by rhetoric. Valla knew that he was
echoing St Augustine in expressing this view, but he expressed it also in a
context in which he wanted to draw attention to the contradictions between
the classical schools of pagan ethics and Christian morality. In this view, as
so often, Valla was in conflict with the main currents of his contemporary
humanist thinkers, but prophetic of what was to come.9
These ideas about the conflicts and connections between rhetoric and
ethics will be important later on when I consider grammar school teaching
of ethical reading. But first I must say something about Renaissance reading
more generally. Some historians have characterised the Renaissance approach
to reading classical texts as reading in fragments.10 For example, when he
is instructed to compile a commonplace book, the pupil is trained to ask
whether each particular sentence of his reading is important enough to
record in his notebook and if so, under which heading of the commonplace
book it ought to be entered. Since the headings of the pages of such books
were generally concerned with moral topics like justice, courage and temper-
ance, commonplace books encouraged ethical reading. By this method, the
text is decomposed into a personal dictionary of quotations from which
pearls may be chosen to adorn the pupil’s own writing.11 While it is certainly
true that the emphasis on commonplace books and moral sententiae could
encourage reading in fragments, this picture needs to be balanced against
evidence of approaches to reading focused on the text as a whole. In the
late fourteenth century Antonio Loschi’s Inquisitio super XI orationes Ciceronis
complements its comments on individual phrases with a rhetorical analysis
of the shape of each speech.12 In De inventione dialectica (composed in 1479)
Rudolph Agricola describes a method for analysing the logical connections
between statements and sections, which articulate the structure and persua-
sive force of entire texts. He called this method dialectical analysis and
exemplified it in his commentary on Cicero’s Pro lege Manilia.13 Later in the
sixteenth century, dialectical commentaries on Cicero and other authors that

8
Valla, Preface to Elegantiae, IV, in Opera omnia (Basel. 1540, repr. Turin, 1962) I, pp. 117–20.
9
Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, IV. 2.3– 5.8; C. Trinkaus, In Our Own image and Likeness (London, 1970),
I, pp. 103 –70, S. I. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanesimo e teologia (Florence, 1972), pp. 1–16, 211–33, P. Mack,
Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic (Leiden, 1993), pp. 108–14.
10
A. Grafton and L. Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities (London, 1986), M. T. Crane, Framing
Authority (Princeton, 1993), P. Mack, ‘Renaissance habits of reading’, in S. Chaudhuri ed., Renaissance Essays
for Kitty Scoular Datta (Calcutta, 1995), pp. 1–25, E. R. Kintgen, Reading in Tudor England (Pittsburgh, 1995).
11
A. Moss, Printed Commonplace Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford, 1996).
12
A. Loschi, In orationes Ciceronis enarrationes Q. A. Paediani, G. Trapezuntii et A. Luschii (Venice, 1477);
P. Mack, ‘Rudolph Agricola’s Reading of Literature’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 48 (1985),
23 – 41.
13
R. Agricola, De inventione dialectica (Cologne, 1539), pp. 355–66, 461–71; M. van der Poel, ‘The Scholia
in orationem Pro lege Manilia of Rudolph Agricola’, Lias, 24 (1997), 1–35.
4 Peter Mack
emphasized the logical structures underpinning the text, were composed by
Latomus, Melanchthon, Ramus and others.14 Such dialectical commentaries
often reveal that the working of the text is more complex than the more
simplifying rules of rhetoric would allow. In fact, we should draw more
general conclusions from this. Teachers like Latomus, Sturm, Melanchthon
and Ramus introduced their pupils to rhetoric by using a textbook but, in order
to show them how orators applied the principles of rhetoric to the demands
of particular circumstances, they read with their pupils examples of the great
orations of Demosthenes and Cicero. In other words, reading served to
deepen and complicate the necessarily simple instructions presented in
the textbooks. And the logical and rhetorical analyses of speeches frequently
centre on ethical issues: Melanchthon’s reading of Cicero’s Pro Archia poeta,
for example, draws attention to the obligation to return kindnesses as the major
proposition for the arguments of the exordium.15
Philipp Melanchthon frequently underlines the necessity of reading texts
as a whole and criticizes the interpretations of scholastic theologians from
that point of view. He takes up the question of fragmentary versus holistic
approaches to ethical reading in the preface to his commentary on the
Aeneid.

Knowledge of things feeds prudence; words nourish eloquence. So Virgil

when he describes Aeneas creates a certain picture of a wise man, who,
among so many dangers overcomes everything that opposes him through
reason and planning. But to this he also adds the Gods, rulers of favourable
occurences. For the poets saw that great things are achieved through
reason, subject to the control and favour of the Fates. In the same way
they conceive undeserved destinies in which someone dies in spite of
the merit of their valour. For example, Pallas here in Virgil. But there are
others who are made excessively bold by fortune and favourable events, as
Euryalus and Nisus were. In places like these, the poets lament the misery
of human kind. There are also places where bad things happen to those
who deserve ill, for example those who abuse their fortune, as happens
to the tyrant Mezentius. In the same way there are those who become
insolent through good fortune, as in

The human mind is ignorant of the fates etc. [10, 501]

These things belong to justice. For the poets see that the final ends of
robbers and tyrants are always cruel. But because Aeneas is imagined to
14
K. Meerhoff and J-C Moisan eds, Autour de Ramus Quebec, 1997), P. Mack, ‘Ramus Reading: The Com-
mentaries on Cicero’s Consular Orations and Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld
Institutes, 61 (1998), 111–41, K. Meerhoff, Entre logique et littérature (Orleans, 2001).
15
P. Mack, ‘Melanchthon’s Commentaries on Latin Literature’, in G. Frank and K. Meerhoff, Melanchthon
und Europa, 2, Westeuropa (Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 29–52, (p. 37).
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 5
be a ruler, so it should be seen that the poet gives him the arts of ruling
a republic, the knowledge of war and justice. Thus he said

I struggle to say whether your justice or feats in war are greater. [11, 126]

The same with clemency.

Also I should like to make peace with the living. [11, 111]

And the authority to suppress rebellions.

Such a man of duty etc. [1, 151]

Throughout, descriptions of emotions are added to the actions being

carried out. In the same way there are descriptions of places and times, of
diseases, of wounds and cures, all of which belong to natural science.
There are also fables in the poems imagined without reason, so much of
the theatre that they recommend the sequence of the rest of the story
and delight the reader with variety and carry out their duty. For example
about the horse, or the fleet changed into nymphs. Some things belong
to nature, such as Venus being born out of the sea. The whole poem is
devoted to the promotion of virtues in general. For it is the image of man
as statesman and commander.16

Like other Renaissance commentators, Melanchthon sees Aeneas as a model

of political action. But he insists that, in order to gather Virgil’s lessons, it
will not be sufficient to extract fragmentary quotations from the text. Rather,
it is necessary to examine the poem as a whole. Such a reading acknowledges
the moral complexity of the poem. The rewards of virtue are not simple, and
the punishments of fate may be delivered also to those who deserve a better

16
Rerum cognitio prudentiam alit, sermones eloquentiam. Ut Virgilius cum Aeneam describit, imaginem
quandam viri prudentis facit, qui inter varia pericula, ratione et consilio omnia adversa vincit. Sed addit illi etiam
Deos, rerum secundarum gubernatores. Viderant enim poetae magnas res geri ratione, sed Fatis fortunantibus
et gubernantibus. Item finguntur indigni casus, ubi contra quam merebatur virtus, quidam pereunt. Sicut
Pallas hic apud Virgilium. Sed tamen qui fortuna et secundis rebus facti fuerant audaciores, sicut Euryalus
et Nisus. Huiusmodi loci miseriam humani generis deplorant. Est et ubi male meritis tale accidunt, ut qui
fortuna abusi sunt, sicut tyranno Mezentio accidit. Item qui secundis rebus insolescunt, ut Nescia mens
hominum fati etc. Haec ad iustitiam pertinent. Viderunt enim poetae exitus latronum et tyrannorum semper
fuisse cruentos. Sed quia Aeneas fingitur esse princeps, ideo videndum est, quas ei tribuat artes reipublicae
gerendae, scientiam belli, iustitiam. Ideo dixit, Iustitiae ne prius miser, belli ne laborem. Item clementiam,
Equidem et vivis concedere velim. Et seditionum comprimendarum autoritatem, Tantum pietate virum etc.
Accedunt obiter descriptiones affectuum in rebus gerendis. Item locorum et temporum, et morborum, vulnerum,
remediorum, quae pertinent ad φυσιολογíαν. Sunt autem fabulae quaedam in poematis sine ratione confictae,
tantum ad admirationem theatralem, ut reliqui argumenti seriem commendent, et lectorem varietate quadam
delectent, et in officio contineant. Sicut de equo, de classe mutata in Nymphas. Quaedam ad naturam pertinent,
sicut Venerem esse mari ortam. Ad mores formandos in genere totum poema. Est enim imago #νδρòς
πολιτικòς καì στρατηγο@. Virgil, Opera, with commentary of Melanchthon (Lyons 1533), sigs a1v-2r, CR 2, 22f.
6 Peter Mack
outcome. Valour can be wasted and vice can prosper for a time. A thorough
and thoughtful reading of a complex text militates against reading off sim-
plistic moral lessons; asks instead for an act of discernment and judgement
from the reader.
At the same time it must be acknowledged that in his preface to Hesiod,
Melanchthon praises precisely the pithy expressions of long-established
principles. In that preface he uses a short quotation from Aeneid book VIII
(515–7), where Evander entrusts his son Pallas to the tutelage of Aeneas, to
illustrate the importance of bringing up the prince with virtuous models
before him. I do not believe that Melanchthon is contradicting himself in
these two prefaces. Rather I would suggest that he is making a distinction
between rhetorical purposes and between stages of reading. In commending
the reading of Hesiod, it is appropriate to encourage students with the hope
of accessible and useful wisdom. Collecting maxims is an obvious reward for the
reading of an archaic text and an elementary stage in moral understanding.
Later on, readers who are aware of the commonplaces will test and enrich
their understanding as they engage with more ambitious texts.
The grammar school is the elementary stage of this education in reading.
Here the first emphasis is on learning to read, write and speak Latin.17 Once
the accidence has been learned by heart, pupils require elementary readers
in order to understand the rules of syntax. But these elementary sentences
on which they are to be drilled, turning present to past and future, singular
to plural, should also be sentences that are useful to the pupils. Hence the
distichs of Cato and the Sententiae pueriles, with their strong and simple moral
guidance. The earliest phrases in the book are only two words long. At least
they are only two words long in Latin.
Help your friends.
Keep away from the property of others.
Keep a secret.
Be friendly.
Know yourself.
Cultivate your relatives.18
Phrases of three, four and five words follow.
Continual practice can achieve all things.
In adversity we recognise who our friends are.
Friendship should come before everything.
Familiarity makes hardship easier to bear.
A liar needs to have a good memory.19

17
P. Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 11–47.
18
‘Amicis opitulare. Alienis abstine. Arcanum cela. Affabilis esto. Cognosce teipsum. Cognatos cole.’
Sententiae pueriles (London, 1639) sig. A2r.
19
Sententiae pueriles : ‘Assidua exercitatio omnia potest. Amicos inter adversa cognoscimus. Amicitia omnibus
rebus anteponenda. (A6r) Consuetudo omnia dura lenit. (A6v) Mendacem memorem esse oportet.’ (A8r).
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 7
Once the pupils have mastered elementary syntax, they move on to dialogues
in Latin, intended to provide them with phrases for their Latin conversations
as well as to exercise their grammar, and to the simpler readers. In their
conversation and writing, pupils were expected to use these moralising
phrases appropriately, to vary them grammatically in order to demonstrate
their knowledge of accidence, but also to play with them. The formulae of
greeting from the fourth edition of Erasmus’ Colloquia give a flavour of this.
The text opens with instructions for greeting an acquaintance and suggests
a few phrases (salve pater . . . salve mi frater . . . salve, praeceptor observande).
Then follow some more playful greetings for lovers and greetings for honoured
acquaintances, which soon become jocular:

Salvete, belli homunculi. Salve congerro lepidissime. Salve, vini pernicies . . .

Salve et tu, gurges helluoque placentarum . . . Bene sit tibi cum tuo
calvicio . . . Bene tibi cum lacero nasu.20

When students moved up from the elementary readers to their earliest Latin
texts – the simpler letters from Cicero’s Ad Familiares and plays by Terenc –
part of the teaching relied on the phrases which these texts provided for
Latin letters and conversation. But they were also used for rhetorical and
ethical purposes. Erasmus’ instructions for reading, which were reprinted in
Lyly’s standard Latin grammar produced for English grammar schools,
emphasize rhetorical and ethical goals together.

Review immediately a reading you have heard in such a way that you fix
the general meaning a little more deeply in your mind. Then go back over
it, starting at the end and working back to the beginning, examining
individual words and observing only points of grammar in the process;
take note of any word that is obscure or of doubtful derivation . . . After
doing this run through the passage again, paying particular attention to
points of rhetorical technique. If any phrasing seems to have special
charm, elegance or neatness, mark it with a pointing finger or an asterisk.
Examine the arrangement of words and the fine turns of expression.
Analyse the author’s purpose, why he phrased things in a certain way . . .

But if there is some saying, maxim, old proverb, anecdote, story, apt
comparison, or anything that strikes you as being phrased with brevity, point,
or in some other clever way, consider it a treasure to be stored carefully
in the mind for use and imitation . . . Read it again a fourth time, seeking
out what relates to philosophy, especially ethics, to discover any example
20
Erasmus, Opera omnia, I-3 (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 125–26, C. R. Thompson, The Colloquies of Erasmus
(Toronto, 1965), p. 558: ‘Greetings to the merriest of comrades. Greetings, my fine fellows. Greetings, you
consumer of quarts . . . Greetings to you, too, you bottomless pit and devourer of cakes . . . Good luck to you
with your baldness . . . Good luck to you with your crooked nose.’
8 Peter Mack
that may be applicable to morals. What is there from which either a model
of life or some illustration or advantage cannot be drawn? For we see in
the noble deeds of others what is fitting and likewise in the base ones what
is not.21

Erasmus suggested that pupils should re-read texts four times: at first straight
through to record the general meaning thoroughly; then word by word
noticing vocabulary and constructions; thirdly for rhetoric, picking out
figures, elegant expressions, sententiae, proverbs, histories, fables and compar-
isons; and finally ethically, noting exemplary stories and moral teaching.22
In this summary, rhetoric is represented partly by the figures whose names
and use must be noted and partly by sententiae, proverbs and comparisons.
Moral teaching is represented by these maxims and also by moral stories and
exemplary histories found in the text.
The elements which grammar school reading is supposed to pick out are
then reused and reinforced in the composition exercises recommended
in Apthonius’ Progymnasmata, which in the translation by Agricola and
Lorichius was one of the most printed textbooks of the sixteenth century.23
In the first of these exercises, the fable, the pupil composes a moral story by
linking a narrative with a moral sentence.24 Lorichius’ commentary explains
that fables are effective in moving and pleasing an audience. He cites
Erasmus’ view that fables please because of their witty portrayal of customary
behaviour and persuade because they put the truth plainly before people’s
eyes.25 The third exercise, the chreia is defined as ‘a brief recollection of

21
Erasmus, Opera omnia, I-2 (Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 496–98: Lectionem quidem auditam continuo relege,
ita ut universam sententiam paulo altius animo infigas. Deinde a calce rursus ad caput redibis, et singula verba
excutere incipies, ea duntaxat inquirens, quae ad grammaticam curam attinent. Videlicet si quod verbum
obscurum, aut ancipitis derivationis . . . Hoc ubi egeris, rursum de integro percurrito, ea iam potissimum
inquirens quae ad artificium rhetoricum spectant. Si quid venustius, si quid elegantius, si quid concinnius
dictum videbitur, annotabis indice, aut asterisco apposito. Verborum compositionem inspicies, orationis
decora scrutabere. Autoris consilium indagabis, qua quidque ratione dixerit . . . Quod si aliquod adagium, si
qua sententia, si quod proverbium vetus, si qua historia, si qua fabula, si qua similitudo non inepta, si quid
breviter, acute, aut alioqui ingeniose dictum esse videbitur, id tanquam thesaurum quendam animo diligenter
reponendum ducito ad usum et ad imitationem . . . Releges igitur quarto, ac quae ad philosophiam, maxime
vero ethicen referri posse videantur, circumspicies, si quod exemplum, quod moribus accommodari possit.
Quid autem est, ex quo non vel exemplum vivendi, vel imago quaedam, vel occasio sumi queat? Nam in
aliorum pulchre ac turpiter factis, quid deceat, quid non, iuxta videmus. Translation by C. Fantazzi from
Collected Works of Erasmus, 25 (Toronto, 1985), pp. 194–95.
22
Lily, Brevissima institutio, (London, 1573) STC 15616, sig. H5r-v. Erasmus, letter 56 in P. S. Allen (ed.),
Opus Epistolarum Erasmi, I, (Oxford, 1906), pp. 171–73; example of epistola monitoria in De conscribendis
epistolis, ed. J. C. Margolin, Opera omnia, I-2 (Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 496–98. This letter had also formed part
of Familiarum colloquiorum formulae, J. Chomarat, Grammaire et Rhétorique chez Erasme, 2 vols. (Paris, 1981)
pp. 513 –16.
23
Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, with the commentary of Lorichius (London: Marsh, 1575); D. L. Clark, ‘The
Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata in Sixteenth Century Grammar Schools’, Speech Monographs 19 (1952), pp. 259–63;
Manfred Kraus will soon publish a paper updating and enlarging Clark’s list of editions.
24
Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, sigs. A1r-B8r.
25
Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, sig. A2r-v, citing Erasmus De copia (1988), p. 254.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 9
26
something that someone did or said aptly’. It presents a saying or an action
as a model for imitation. The chreia consists of a statement (‘Isocrates said
that the root of learning is bitter but the fruits are sweet’)27 and eight
sections: praise of the person speaking or acting, explanation of what was said
or done, argument from the cause, contrary, comparison, example, opinion
of the ancients and epilogue.28 To undertake the exercise the pupil must
select a story or a maxim from his reading. Because there is a recipe, the
exercise is relatively simple for the pupil to complete. Nevertheless, the pupil
is forced to think around the circumstances and consequences of the exem-
plary action or moral phrase. The exercise is a rather formalistic rhetorical
amplification of a received commonplace, but like other grammar school
exercises it opens up a space for linguistic play, which might encourage
innovations of expression and thought.
Erasmus’ Adagia, first published in 1500 and expanded greatly in the
remaining thirty six years of his life, is a dictionary of Latin and Greek
proverbs with explanations.29 The compilation has a mainly rhetorical purpose;
to assist pupils in understanding their texts and to provide material with
which newly composed texts can be decorated and made more elegant.
Work on the Adagia was inextricably connected with Erasmus’ own reading.
As he read new texts and re-read old ones, he found new proverbs to discuss
and new instances of already reported proverbs that altered his view of their
meaning and use. Because he defines the proverb as ‘a saying in popular use,
remarkable for some shrewd and novel term’,30 he tends to look both for the
specifically learned uses of the proverb and for the aspect which it gives it
the quality of newness. In most cases he names the proverb, gives some
examples from classical literature, explains the meaning of the proverb and
gives some advice about its use. This basic pattern responds to the main role
of the Adagia as a reference work to help in reading and composition. Some
of the more ambitious entries develop this form considerably. For example,
in the first adage of all, Amicorum communia sunt omnia ‘Between friends all
is common’, Erasmus reflects on the importance of the proverb:

If only it were so fixed in men’s minds as it is frequent on everybody’s lips,

most of the evils of our lives would promptly be removed.31
26
‘Chreia est commemoratio brevis, alicuius personae factum, vel dictum apte referens.’ Aphthonius, Pro-
gymnasmata, sig. C8r.
27
‘Isocrates doctrinae radicem amaram esse dicebat, fructus vero dulces.’ Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, sig.
C8v.
28
Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, sig. C8r.
29
M. Mann Phillips, The Adages of Erasmus (Cambridge, 1964), J. Chomarat, Grammaire et rhétorique chez
Erasme, 2 vols. (Paris, 1981), II, pp. 761–82, W. Barker ed., The Adages of Erasmus (Toronto, 2001), which selects
from the translations in Collected Works of Erasmus, vols. 31–36.
30
Paroemia est celebre dictum, scita quapiam novitate insigne. Erasmus, Opera omnia, II-1 (Amsterdam,
1993) p. 46; translation, Barker, Adages, p. 4.
31
Quod quidem si tam esset fixum in hominum animis, quam nulli non est in ore, profecto maxima
malorum parte vita nostris levaretur. Ibid, p. 84; translation Barker, p. 29.
10 Peter Mack
Later he says that Plato’s interpretation of this proverb in The Laws as calling
for community of possessions is the most Christian thing he wrote, though it
is opposed by many practising Christians.
Erasmus gives examples of the different deductions that Socrates, Aristotle,
Plutarch and Martial (among many others) draw from this proverb. This
survey of usage has the effect of juxtaposing different philosophical and
literary attitudes to life.
Sometimes Erasmus takes the opportunity which a proverb offers to retell
a well-known story 32 or in the case of ‘A Dung-beetle hunts an Eagle’ (III 7 1)
to elaborate an Aesopian fable with a contemporary allegory against war.
Erasmus draws conclusions about his favourite topic of the education of
princes from ‘One ought to be born a king or a fool’ (I 3 1). ‘Man is a
bubble’ (II 3 48) provides the occasion for a collection of quotations on the
shortness and frailty of life and for a lament on the death in 1506 of Philip,
Archduke of Austria. Some of the longer Adagia entries can be thought of as
variants of school rhetorical exercises, the chreia and the commonplace.
The most powerful of all the Adagia, Dulce bellum inexpertis, ‘War is sweet
to those who have not experienced it’ (IV i 1),33 can be analysed as an
exercise in copious speech. After praising and exemplifying the adage,
Erasmus supports it from an argument from generality (all things seem sweet
to those who have not tasted them). Then he makes a comparison between
war and man – the creature who promotes war. Since in comparison with
other animals, the human body is unarmed and defenceless, gifted chiefly
with speech that promotes collaboration, it is unnatural that man should be
so addicted to war. He describes in detail the sights, sounds, occurences and
consequences of war, later contrasting this description with a commonplace
in praise of peace. He collects quotations from scripture in favour of peace
and examples from classical poetry of the monstrous savagery and madness of
war. Comparisons between men and beasts and between pagan and Christian
kings are used to belittle the Christian enthusiasm for war. Personification
is used both to answer opponents’ arguments and to set out the case for
solving disputes by discussion and sharing, rather than fighting over things
that would be destroyed many times over by battle. The deeply rhetorical
combination of argument, description and figurative language creates an
eloquent moral denunciation of war, which must certainly be ranked among
Erasmus’ finest writings. Its success derives from its exemplification of rhe-
torical principles, copiously elaborating a moral theme to which Erasmus felt
the strongest commitment.
For an instance of a proverb prompting Erasmus to reconsider his position
we may turn to a much shorter adage, Polypae mentem obtine, ‘Adopt the
Outlook of the Polyp’ (I i 93). At first, Erasmus explains the meaning of the

32
For example, the ring of Gyges, Adagia, I i 96.
33
Erasmus, Opera omnia, II-7 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 11–44; translation, Barker, Adages, pp. 317–56.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 11
adage, describing this fish’s chameleonlike ability to take on the colour of
the rocks it swims near and citing examples from Lucian, St Basil, Theognis
and Plutarch. He makes a comparison with Homer’s praise of Ulysses. Then
he draws the lesson from the adage:

This advises us to suit ourselves to every contingency in life, acting

the part of Proteus, and changing ourselves into any form a situation
demands.34

Erasmus makes a comparison with the need to adapt oneself to the customs
of different countries one travels in. But then an anxiety registers.

Let no man think that by this adage we are taught a disgusting type of
flattery, which assents to everything in everybody, or an improper change-
ability of behaviour,35

Immediately citing classical and Christian authors on the evils of changeability

and the benefits of constancy, he then recalls the example of Alcibiades,
wondering whether the different ways he behaved in Athens and Sparta
should be taken as a vice or a virtue, ‘he certainly had a happy and enviable
dexterity of mind and character which made him act the polyp’.36 Later
still he suggests that we could use this adage to criticize people who are too
changeable, though his final example suggests that changeability may offer
someone their only chance of survival. In this adage, we see Erasmus think-
ing on his feet, trying to establish a position that balances the prudential
benefits of changeability against its moral dangers. Perhaps he is better
equipped by his rhetorical training to develop the opposing arguments for
and against changeability than to resolve the question, or perhaps he intends
a demonstration of the very changeability that is the subject of the adage.
Erasmus’ initial assumption was that the proverb ought to offer good
advice and that it therefore ought to be followed. In this adage, he faces up
to the need to judge between different kinds of good, between advantage,
courtesy and moral consistency. Elizabethan writers of fiction confronted the
issue of the relation between moral precepts and actions in a different way.
Both Lyly’s anti-hero Euphues and Sidney’s princes Pyrocles and Musidorus
know the precepts that should guide them. But Lyly recognises that a more
interesting story will result from Euphues’ over-confident failure to listen to
advice, and Sidney understands that strong personal motivations may

34
Qui nos admonet, uti nos ad omnem vitae rationem accommodemus ac Proteum quendam agentes,
prout res postulabit, in quamlibet formam transfiguremus, Erasmus, Opera omnia, II-1, p. 200.
35
Neque quisquam existimet hoc adagio doceri foedam adulationem, qua quidam omnibus omnia assentantur
aut vitiosam morum inaequalitatem, Ibid, p. 200.
36
Certe felicissima quaedam et admiranda fuit morum et ingenii dexteritas, qui sic polypum agebat. Ibid,
p. 200; translations, Barker, Adages, pp. 42–43.
12 Peter Mack
overpower the reason’s assent to moral maxims. At the end of the first version
of the Arcadia, it is the fortunate revival of the old king Basilius that prevents
Pyrocles and Musidorus from being executed for the rape and abduction,
which their indulgence of their feelings has led them to commit. Their
failure to act according to their moral maxims makes the story more inter-
esting in its narrative and in its morality, just to the degree that it renders
the Arcadia’s eventual moral teaching more problematic.37
The rhetorical ability to state opposed positions and the experiential
recognition of the limitations of moral sententiae are both expressed by
Montaigne. His essays originate in reading and reflection. The simplest build-
ing blocks for the essays usually consist of moral statements backed up by
examples from history and poetry, but Montaigne almost always enriches them
with personal comments, reflections on his own life and counter-examples
drawn from further reading. Reading was the activity that set his judgement
to work. ‘Reading because of its different subjects particularly awakes my
linguistic expression; it sets to work my judgement, not my memory’.38 This
is especially true of his rereading of his own writings, which he constantly
annotated and added to.
Most of Montaigne’s essays are concerned with the proper conduct of life.39
In that they seek to give advice about the appropriate way to behave, they
are ethical but, as in Erasmus’ discussion of the polyp, there is sometimes a
tension between teaching about what is prudent and thinking about what is
right. The earliest essays tend to set out from a generalization, followed by
examples. Montaigne then develops the essay by adding further new stories
and maxims from his reading, and consequences and counter-arguments
that result from a re-reading of his own text. I shall take the first essay of book
one, ‘By different ways we reach the same ends’, as an example.40 First I need
to give a plan of the essay, indicating the different stages of publication:

37
John Lyly, Euphues, in Works, ed. R. W. Bond, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1902), I, pp. 187–96; Sidney, The Countess
of Pembroke’s Arcadia (The Old Arcadia) (Oxford, 1973), pp. 13–26, 403 –17; G. K. Hunter, John Lyly: The Humanist
as Courtier (London, 1962); Sidney, The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. W. Ringler jr (Oxford, 1962), pp. 378–9;
Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric, pp. 160–75.
38
(C) La lecture me sert specialement à esveiller par divers objects mon discours: à embesongner mon
jugement, non ma memoyre. Montaigne, Essais, ed. P. Villey, V. Saulnier, 3rd edn, 2 vols. (Paris, 1978), II, p. 819.
Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. J. Céard (Paris, 2001) provides a modernised reading edition based on the text of 1595;
I have usually adopted (sometimes with light alteration) the translations of M. A. Screech (London, 1991).
39
Starting points on Montaigne would include: P. Villey, Les sources et l’évolution des Essais de Montaigne, 2 vols.
(Paris, 1933), H. Friedrich, Montaigne (Berkeley, 1991), R. Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne (London, 1972),
J. Starobinski, Montaigne en mouvement, 3rd edn (Paris, 1993), M. McGowan, Montaigne’s Deceits (London, 1972),
A. Tournon, Montaigne: Le glose et l’essai (Lyon, 1983), G. Mathieu-Castellani, Montaigne: L’écriture de l’essai (Paris, 1988).
40
This essay is discussed in B. Bowen, The Age of Bluff (Urbana, 1972), pp. 129–32; D. Quint, Montaigne and
the Quality of Mercy (Princeton, 1998) pp. 3–21; P. Mack, ‘Rhetoric and the Essay’, Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 23:2
(1993), 41– 9.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 13
Montaigne, ‘By different ways we reach the same ends’, Essais, I 1

Key: (A) 1580 edn; (B) addns in 1588; (C) Ms addns in Bordeaux copy

1 (A) (General observation) Usually we obtain mercy from those about

to harm us by appealing for pity, but sometimes bravery and defiance
leads to pity
2 Example of Black Prince at Limoges
3 Example of Scanderbeg
4 Example of Conrad III
5 (B)Comment (personal): both bravery and pity appeal to me; if
anything compassion moves me more
6 (A) Comment (conclusion): my examples show that souls who steadfastly
resist one approach (compassion) are moved by the other (bravery)
7 Cause: perhaps affable natures and women are more apt to pity
whereas strong noble minds prefer to respond to valour
8 Objection: but less magnanimous minds can also respond the same way.
9 Supporting example: story about Thebans being merciful to a general
who defied them
10 (C) Story of Dionysius, captures Phyton, tortures him in spite of his
bravery then has him secretly murdered because of the effect of his
enemy’s noble defiance on his own troops
11 (A) General Conclusion: Man is a wavering creature, moved first in one
direction, then another. Two examples pointing in opposite directions
12 (B) Contrary to my other examples: story of Alexander provoked to
extreme cruelty by the valour of Betis in opposing him
13 Cause: was this because Alexander was so accustomed to valour that
it didn’t move him?
14 (C) Further reflection: or did he think valour belonged only to him?
Or did the violence of his anger reject all opposition?
15 Example of slaughter at Thebes to confirm Alexander’s violence and
his lack of response to the bravery of those who opposed him.
Using this plan as a key we can now give a plan of the first version of the essay:
Shape of the essay in 1580:
General Observation (1)
3 Supporting Examples (2,3,4)
Conclusion (6)
Cause (7)
Objection to part of cause (with supporting example) (8, 9)
General Conclusion (11)
We may surmise that the essay originally consisted of a general observation,
which may be useful advice for a soldier. Usually we obtain mercy by appealing
for pity, but sometimes it is bravery and defiance that succeed. This was
followed by one or more examples and a conclusion (that souls who resist
one approach may be won over by the other). On further reading, Montaigne
probably added extra examples and began to think more about the causes
14 Peter Mack
and consequences of this observation. Perhaps the reason for the occasional
success of defiance is that noble minds respond to valour. This offered cause
is immediately met by a partial objection (that less magnanimous minds can
react the same way), again backed up with an example from history. This in
turn leads to a more general conclusion (that man is a changeable creature).
So the simple initial structure of observation plus examples and conclusion
is enlarged by a suggested cause, an objection to that cause and a new
conclusion taking account of the objection. This is the shape of the essay
when it is first published.
In the second edition of 1588 Montaigne adds two new elements:
Personal reflection complicating the conclusion (5)
Story about Alexander which functions as a counter example, with a
suggested reason (12–13)
Re-reading the 1588 edition prompted Montaigne to make further manuscript
additions in the Bordeaux copy:
Story of Dionysius about attitude to resistance: complicates question
of effect of bravery (10)
Further reflection on causes of Alexander’s action and another story
showing his lack of mercy (14,15)
An essay that began as an offer of advice to a soldier has turned into a
perplexed acknowledgement of the different motives that may move people
(since human reactions are so varied, it is impossible to make constant
judgements of people) and an analysis of the character (more especially the
cruelty) of Alexander the Great.41 In the final version, the main moral force
of the essay is a strongly worded denunciation of the anger and cruelty of
Alexander (whose clemency Montaigne elsewhere acknowledges) towards Betis
and the people of Thebes.
The impetus for Montaigne’s rethinking in each case comes from reading.
Reading the works of others contributes new examples; rereading his own
text in the light of his judgement of logical reasoning leads to reflection,
statement of objections, conclusions and causes. Instead of providing advice
on practical conduct, supported by historical examples, Montaigne now invites
his readers to follow him in a process of drawing conclusions and making
judgements. Although contrariety and paradox are important features
of portraying the movement of his mind, he still tries to give explanations
and draw lessons. His general conclusion (that people are changeable)
shows the difficulty of attempting to provide practical advice useful in all
circumstances.

41
This prepares for Montaigne’s more detailed discussion of Alexander in II.36 (where he is compared
with Epaminondas, who also makes an appearance in I.1) and for the way in which Alexander gives place
to Socrates in the final essay. I am indebted to Michael Screech’s headnotes to his translations for this
observation.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 15
It is conventional to say that, in the later and more profound essays,
Montaigne moves away from any attempt to teach as he becomes more absorbed
in the task of portraying himself. But even where his focus is on portraying
the moment by moment changing of one individual, he continues to treat
himself as exemplary, inviting his readers to acknowledge the similarities
between his experiences and theirs, and he continues to use his reading to
advance his processes of thought. In the later essays too, there is sometimes
more of a sense of Montaigne using rhetorical means to persuade a reader
into adopting a particular position. In Du repentir (III, 2), in the middle of
the famous passage on the portrayal of the self, he generalises the portrait,
‘Every man bears the whole form of the human condition’.42 When he speaks
of the importance of judging oneself, the shift from the first to the second
person pronoun seeks to involve his readers in his self-exploration:

I restrain my actions according to the standards of others but I enlarge

them according to my own. Only you know if you are base and cruel or
loyal and dedicated; others do not see you at all, they make guesses
about you by uncertain conjectures; they see not so much your nature
as your art.43

By treating first and second persons as equivalent, Montaigne suggests that

his reflections on himself also apply to his audience. Even the statement that
only he truly understands his actions is urged also to be true of other people.
In Du repentir he tries to explain the difficulty of thinking about repenting
the vices that are really close to his own nature.

But the saying that repentance follows closely after sin does not seem to
refer to sin in its full apparel, which is lodged in us as if in its own home.
One can disavow and disclaim vices that surprise us and towards which
emotions carry us, but those which by long habituation are rooted and
anchored in a strong and vigorous will are not subject to denial.44

This is a passage in which Montaigne seems to be moving his ethical thought

beyond his inheritance. Characteristically, he begins the process of elaborating
his own view by opposing a common saying that repentance follows closely

42
(B) chaque homme porte la forme entiere, de l’humaine condition, Montaigne, Essais, ed. P. Villey,
V. Saulnier, II, p. 805.
43
(B) Je restreins bien selon autruy mes actions, mais je ne les estends que selon moy. Il n’y a que vous
qui sçache si vous estes lâche et cruel, ou loyal et devotieux; les autres ne vous voyent poinct, ils vous devinent
par conjectures incertaines; ils voyent non tant vostre nature, que vostre art. Essais, ed. Villey-Saulnier,
pp. 807– 8.
44
(B) Mais ce qu’on dit, que la repentance suit de pres le peché, ne semble pas regarder le peché qui est
en son haut appareil: qui loge en nous comme en son propre domicile. On peut desavouër et desdire les
vices, qui nous surprennent, et vers lesquels les passions nous emportent; mais ceux qui par longue habitude
sont enracinés et ancrez en une volonté forte et vigoureuse, ne sont subjects à contradiction, Essais, p. 808.
16 Peter Mack
after sin. But at the same time he uses the pronouns nous and on to implicate
his audience in this new discovery.
In order to develop this argument about the difficulty of disavowing vices
that have become established in the personality, Montaigne makes use of
quotations from Horace and Lucan and anecdotes and observations from
Plutarch. But the dialogue between his reading and reflection on his own
experience is always carried on in the awareness of an audience that – on
this occasion at least – he is seeking to persuade. The personal difficulty that
he finds in repenting his non-accidental actions leads him to investigate the
human problem of living according to moral principles. To understand the
problem, he brings into focus plausible positions that seem to be in conflict.
While he agrees that all vice is repulsive and carries its own penalty, yet he
acknowledges that there are some vices he cannot truthfully reject. Nevertheless,
he believes that within the limits of the human, he conducts his life in
accordance with reason and with a clear conscience. He does not wish to
reject the moral laws of his society or to avoid moral judgements of himself
or others, but at the same time he acknowledges the likelihood of human
failing without being excessively disgusted with humanity. And he is suspi-
cious of forms of repentance which are on the one hand too easy and self-
serving and on the other too sweeping a rejection of one’s own past and
nature. He seems to argue for a morality that is more understanding of the
limitations of different people, while allowing the possibility that God could
make a more decisive intervention which might lead to true repentance and
comprehensive reform.

My actions are regulated and suit what I am and my condition. I cannot

do better. And repentance is not really concerned with the things that are
not in our power, though they are certainly regretted. I can imagine
countless natures more elevated and better regulated than mine . . . When
I compare my behaviour in youth and age, I find that I have usually
conducted my affairs in an orderly fashion, according to my own lights;
my resistance is capable of no more . . . It is not a small discolouring
but a universal stain which tarnishes me. I do not know any superficial,
moderate or purely formal repentance. Something must touch all parts of
me before I will call it repentance. That must pinch my entrails and afflict
them as deeply and universally as if God should search me.45

45
(B) Mes actions sont reglées, et conformes à ce que je suis, et à ma condition. Je ne puis faire mieux.
Et le repentir ne touche pas proprement les choses qui ne sont pas en nostre force, ouy bien le regretter.
J’imagine infinies natures plus hautes et plus reglées que la mienne . . . Lors que je consulte des deportemens
de ma jeunesse avec ma vieillesse, je trouve que je les ay communement conduits avec ordre, selon moy; c’est
tout ce que peut ma resistance . . . Ce n’est pas macheure, c’est plutost une teinture universelle qui me tache.
Je ne cognoy pas de repentance superficielle, moyenne et de ceremonie. Il faut qu’elle me touche de toutes
parts avant que je la nomme ainsin, et qu’elle pinse mes entrailles, et les afflige autant profondement, que
Dieu me voit, et autant universellement, Essais, p. 813.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 17
Working within a Christian framework, Montaigne accepts the power of the
idea of repentance, but he finds that some of his faults are so ingrained in
his behaviour that he cannot truly repent them. At the same time, he does
not believe that regret that does not involve correction of the vice should be
called repentance. Between his reading and his self-understanding, through
negotiating between contrary positions, he attempts to formulate an attitude
to his own sins that acknowledges the truth about his nature, the serious-
ness of sin and the practicalities of living in the world. This honest and realis-
tic confrontation between religious and philosophical maxims and lived
experience constitutes a new approach to the understanding of human
nature in relation to vice. We should take this seriously as a form of ethical
innovation. At the same time, Montaigne leaves the way open for an almost
Lutheran direction from God. But in the absence of such a direct and
devastating divine intervention, Montaigne will acknowledge his nature and
live according to the moral order of which he is capable. The implication is
that his readers should do the same.
Montaigne’s essay ‘On the Affection of Fathers for their children’ (II, 8)
raises one of the issues that trouble the opening of Shakespeare’s King
Lear.46 Montaigne finds that many old men have ruined their relationships
with their sons, and their wider reputations, by trying to hold on to their
wealth and power for too long. Nevertheless, he advocates a conditional
gift so that the old man can resume control if he is given good cause to
regret his premature retirement (Essais, pp. 387–92). Later in the essay he
describes a neighbour who maintains for himself the illusion of control
over his estate, while his children and servants manipulate him mercilessly
(393–4).
At the beginning of King Lear, Lear attempts to divest himself of
responsibility for the kingdom, along the lines suggested in Montaigne’s
essay. But when Gloucester finds the same idea expressed by Edgar (and
reported by Edmund) ‘that sons at perfect age and fathers declin’d, the
father should be as ward to the son, and the son manage his revenue’
(King Lear, I.2.69–71) he declares it to be ‘unnatural, detested and brutish’
(I.2.73). Lear’s incomplete renunciation and Gloucester’s easily manipulable
retention of power lead equally surely to their expulsion to the storm-swept
heath.47
King Lear is a play that is rich in moral sentences, both received and
original. Some of the Sententiae pueriles have obvious resonances: wisdom
is acquired not by age but by wit, time brings the truth to light, the necessity

46
Leo Salingar, Dramatic Form in Shakespeare and the Jacobeans (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 124–55, discussed
in Warren Boutcher’s soon to be published paper ‘Marginal Commentaries: The Cultural Transmission of
Montaigne’s Essais in Shakespeare’s England’.
47
On King Lear: G. Wilson Knight, The Wheel of Fire (London, 1949), J. Danby, Shakespeare’s Doctrine of
Nature (London, 1949), M. Mack, King Lear in Our Time (Berkeley, 1965). I have used the Arden edition by
R. A. Foakes (London, 1997).
18 Peter Mack
of nature is assuaged with very little.48 Nothing will come of nothing is a
version of the Latin proverb ‘Ex nihilo nihil fit’, which is not in the Sententiae
pueriles but which Shakespeare would have found in Boethius’ Consolation of
Philosophy (V.pr1.24).
More generally King Lear seems to be a play in which topical ideas are
expressed by one character and tested by the events of the plot. The impli-
cation of Edmund’s adoption of materialism (I.2.118–33), which has been
connected with Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s essay ‘Of Judging of
Others’ Death’ (II, 13)49 is exposed and condemned by Albany’s comments
on Goneril, ‘Humanity must perforce prey on itself, Like Monsters of the
deep’ (IV.2.49–50). In Act IV Scene I, Edgar espouses Boethius’ notion of
the wheel of fortune, consoling himself with the idea that the future can only
get better.
The lowest and most dejected thing of Fortune
Stands still in esperance, lives not in fear:
The lamentable change is from the best:
The worst returns to laughter. (IV.1.3–6)
Twenty lines later, when he has seen his bloodied and blinded father led on
by the old man, Edgar rejects any simple Boethian comparison of misery.
O gods! Who is’t can say ‘I am the worst’?
I am worse than e’er I was. (IV.1.25 –6).
King Lear conducts a discussion of the nature of need, which engages the
vocabulary of discussions of poverty and charity in Thomas Aquinas and
Calvin. When Lear’s daughters ask him why he needs even one follower, Lear
replies that humanity’s requirements cannot be thought of simply in terms
of necessities.
Regan What need one?
Lear O Reason not the need; our basest beggars
Are in the poorest thing superfluous:
Allow not nature more than nature needs,
Man’s life is cheap as beast’s. (II.4.261–5)
The pressure of Goneril and Regan’s exposure of the folly of Lear’s opening
position, that love could be expressed in speeches and rewarded in lands,
prompts Lear to a definition of humanity based on a small provision of
excess. The sight of poor Tom naked in the hovel prompts him to draw a
different conclusion from this idea.

48
Non aetate sed ingenio acquiritur sapientia. (Sententiae pueriles, sig. B5r) Tempus ad lucem ducit
veritatem (cf. I 1 282) (B8r) Naturae necessitas exiguo placatur (A8v). M. Andresen, ‘‘‘Ripeness is All”: Sententiae
and commonplaces in King Lear’, in R. L. Colie and F. T. Flahiff eds, Some Facets of King Lear (Toronto, 1974),
pp. 145 – 68.
49
J. M. Robertson, Shakespeare and Montaigne, 2nd edition (London, 1909, repr. New York 1968), pp. 108–9.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 19
Thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such a
poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! (III.4. 104–7)

Within the relatively fixed framework of a play of allegorized characters,

summarized conventional ideas and proverbs, the mad king opens up new
and unexpected perspectives on the world. Throughout the play, his vision
alternates between moments of naïve delusion, crazy self-obsession and
original unequallable clarity. Madness enables Lear to set aside the proprieties
and the assumptions of his society and to reimagine justice from the perspective
of feeling.
Poor naked wretches, whereso’er you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
Your loop’d and window’d raggedness, defend you
From seasons such as these? O! I have ta’en
Too little care of this. Take physic, Pomp;
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them,
And show the heavens more just. (III.4.28–36)
Lear’s sudden turn to a broader understanding of the sufferings of the poor
uses the language of medieval theology, in which the Christian is enjoined
to use his superfluous wealth (the superflux) to support the poor (and is
advised not to impoverish himself by excessive charity)50 but he goes beyond
this calculus of charity in insisting that the ruler should himself experience
poverty so as to feel what the poor feel. Lear argues that only human sympa-
thy and the action which results from it will redeem this injustice. By human
actions, the heavens will be made to appear to be more just than experience
shows them to be. Lear’s paradox, that heaven enjoins justice and charity
but that only humans can bring these about in the world, invites the
audience to reconsider the relationship between mortality and eternity. Lear’s
mad vacillations prompt us to reach after ideas that cool reason can barely
comprehend. The point that human feeling must come before action is
possible is repeated by Gloucester in his echo of this passage.
Let the superfluous and lust dieted man,
That slaves your ordinance, that will not see
Because he does not feel, feel your power quickly;
So distribution should undo excess,
And each man have enough. (IV.1.66–70).

50
St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II.2.32.5, trans English Dominican Fathers (Chicago, 1952), II,
p. 544; John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans F. L. Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1960), III.7.7;
Debora Shuger, ‘Subversive fathers and suffering subjects: Shakespeare and Christianity’, in R. Strier and
D. Hamilton eds, Albion’s Conscience: Religion, Literature and Politics in Post-Reformation England 1540–1688
(Cambridge, 1996) pp. 47–69.
20 Peter Mack
The need for emotional identification as a prelude to understanding is also
the subject of Lear’s final entry.
Howl, howl, howl! O! you are men of stones:
Had I your tongues and eyes, I’d use them so
That heaven’s fault should crack. She’s gone for ever. (V.3.256–8).
In King Lear, sympathy for the wretched is elevated to being a universal
human obligation, but Edgar’s narration of the reconciliation between Kent
and Gloucester understands the overwhelming cost of such true compassion.
(The subject, the ‘he’ in this passage is Kent)
He fasten’d on my neck, and bellow’d out
As he’d burst heaven; threw him on my father;
Told the most piteous tale of Lear and him
That ever ear receiv’d; which in recounting
His grief grew puissant, and the strings of life
Began to crack. (V.3.211–16).

In King Lear Shakespeare proposes a new way of considering social justice, the
human duty of sympathetic feeling and the cost of that feeling. My argument
has been that this is a consequence of applying dialectical and rhetorical
methods to his reading in Montaigne, Boethius and the Christian tradition.
Moral sententiae which can be quoted, amplified and opposed (but which can
also be invented) are intrinsic to this technique, but so is the idea of reading
as a whole, setting the experience of one character against that of another
(as we found in Melanchthon’s reading of the Aeneid ). From his rhetorical
training and from his reading of Montaigne, Shakespeare learnt the art of
counter-statement, of exploring the arguments for and against a moral prop-
osition. But he added to this the special dramatic resource of different voices,
of the trajectories of experience of different people. And he added too the
unique perceptions of the mad king, who by speaking in ‘to and fro conflicting’
fragments, can throw out newly invented maxims for rhetorical development.
In this paper I have explored ways in which rhetoric and ethics collabo-
rated in the Renaissance. Renaissance practices of reading emphasized
both rhetorical and ethical commentary. Ethical maxims were used to teach
schoolboys elementary syntax, but they were also trained to extract such
maxims from their reading of authors and to employ them in their school
compositions. Melanchthon understood the use of such maxims but also the
necessity of balancing their lessons against a more complex reading of a text
as a whole. Fragments are easy to reuse and applicable (often with different
inflections) in many contexts, but the reader (and the writer) must use their
understanding of genre and of logical structure in order to explore the
relationship between fragment and whole.
Erasmus’ Adagia functions as an aid to reading and writing (for grownups
as much as for schoolboys) by explaining the meaning and uses of proverbs.
 Rhetoric, ethics and reading in the Renaissance 21
But Erasmus’ reading of classical texts in search of material forced him to
confront the different ways in which authors used particular proverbs. In
the process of writing his dictionary, to divert himself and his audience, he
developed his discussions of some proverbs into copious displays of rhetoric,
arguing the cause of peace or princely education with all the resources at
his command. He subjected other proverbs to dialectical questioning of their
ethical implications. Montaigne’s essays began like schoolboy exercises,
but reading of new texts and reflecting on them and on his own writing in
the light of his experience encouraged changes of emphasis and perspective.
Even in his later essays Montaigne remains concerned to persuade an audi-
ence. His reading and his experience are re-presented through rhetorical
amplification of a theme and dialectical questioning of lines of argument.
The combination of narrative, which encourages an ambivalent attitude to
moral instruction, and the different voices of dramatic characters provide
Shakespeare with new ways to question and play with ethical ideas. In this
paper I have argued that the ethical originality of Montaigne and Shake-
speare is a product of both reading materials and techniques of reading and
writing promoted by humanist rhetorical education.

University of Warwick