TELEBAP vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that
it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it
denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate
the operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of
election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC
Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can
advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time
unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know.
Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use
of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate
economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so demands.”

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation
to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with
free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring
that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of
the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92,
therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in
the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of
elections is for that common good.
REPUBLIC v. DAISY R. YAHON, GR No. 201043, 2014-06-16
Facts:
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[3] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired
in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The
couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in...
partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO
, as follows:
To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent's retirement and other
benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement,
pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately
refused to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no
source of livelihood since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate o... n
keeping their house),... the RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give
respondent spousal support in the amount of P4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%)
of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to
respondent.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,[6] as follows:
Economically, petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite
order of the court directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00.
S/Sgt. CHARLES A. YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R. YAHON... the
amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal support.
S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement
benefits and other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the
said share of petitioner... shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits and
claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC)
AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To Lift Temporary Protection Order
Against the AFP)[8] dated
November 10, 2008. Stating that it was making a limited and special appearance, petitioner
manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. The PGMC, on
September 2, 2008,... requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-
six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008,
PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on
the TPO, and requesting for legal... opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of
S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon's check representing his 36
MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date said check
has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO,
the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons,
and hence the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally,... petitioner
contended that the AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the
proceedings before the RTC on the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the
case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded due process and it was thus improper to...
issue execution against the AFPFC. Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that
the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without violating its right to
procedural due process.
In its Order[9] dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having
been filed out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007
Decision granting Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become...
final and executory.
After due hearing, the CA's Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution[11] granting
respondent's application, viz:
While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already
been... given to him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the
mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been released to him. It appears that the release
of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue
enjoining the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents,
representatives, and any all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining
pension that may be due... to S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon.
Issues:
whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage
from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the
latter's lawful wife as spousal support in... compliance with a protection order issued by the
RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
Ruling:
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or
BPO, to wit:
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to
legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by
the... respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the
woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his
employer liable for... indirect contempt of court;
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic deduction
of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to
respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement
and separation... of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,[15] which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not
be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall
they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[16] we held that a court order directing the
Philippine National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and
to deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as... the latter's conjugal share is
illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts
retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:... x x x x
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws,
the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will.[17] Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other... statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.[18] However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the
earlier statute must yield to the later enactment.
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed
as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of
a... percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt.
Yahon's retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its
coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers,...
whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation.
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one
form of violence committed against women economic abuse.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women
who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats
to their personal safety and security.
LIM VS FELIX

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity
of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality
of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante
another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination
plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the
incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated

investigator filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order

concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of named accused..

On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12)
accused with a recommendation of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us
a verified petition for change of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of
Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were
raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court
several motions and manifestations, among others was an order be issued
requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its
determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of
the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall
have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.

Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a
probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in

this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she
has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.
The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of
the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a
swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and
asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he
could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the
officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept
the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further
investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any
proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
respondent court.
People of the Philippines v Edison Sucro, March 18, 1991
FACTS:

Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP) to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that
Sucro was selling marijuana.

Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be
marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting
with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at
the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag
of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The police team
was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante

ISSUES:

Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that
Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when
confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that
Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal
act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance
with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.
People vs. Valdez
o. 129296, September 25, 2000

FACTS:

Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The
accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted,
cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp
from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned
and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut,
all member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of
Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away
from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and
arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also
presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found,
was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the
occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He
was asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100
meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him
stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked
a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to
the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he
knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that
there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than
ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in
an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and
other possessions.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample
time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of
the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants
as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may
be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The
evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,
it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally
admissible” evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that
the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as
earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences
against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said
evidence is doubly tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the
conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution
must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he
is entitled to an acquittal.
People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No.
128222, June 17, 1999
Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of
firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring
the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from
ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and
using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored
strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this
time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms,
became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the
man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although CID introduced themselves as police officers,
the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID
then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not
to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then
Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what
he termed “sign language;” he motioned with his hands
for the man to open the bag. This time, the man
apparently understood and acceded to the request. A
search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
which was later found out that it was Shabu. CID then
gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As
CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled
the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend.
Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the
man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The
RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the
reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting

suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling the
police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto
arrest.
Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute
“probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or
package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or
other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or
positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they
will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted
by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
exists in this case. The term probable cause had been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In
cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person,
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case
law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as

incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search
of a person arrested may be effected to deliver
dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the
commission of the crime and which search may extend
to the area within his immediate control where he might
gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy,
a valid arrest must precede the search. The process
cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed.
FACTS:
A group composed of policemen and barangay tanods requested a man, later identified
as appellant, to open his red travelling bag. The man initially refused but later acceded
to the request when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were
approximately a kilo of marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. Appellant was
taken to the police headquarters, tried and convicted for violation of RA 6425
(DangerousDrugs Act of 1972, as amended).

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the package of marijuana seized from appellant may be validly admitted
in evidence.

RULING:
YES. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
his arrest. Although the trial court’s decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant.

Judgement of conviction by the trial court is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED.

The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
Constitutional Law: PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON

Facts:

Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession more than 500 grams of shabu
when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something hard
in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent,
packets of shabu were seized from her.

Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that her constitutional
rights were infringed when such search was conducted.

Issue: WON a valid search was made.

Held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and…

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited,
hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. [18]

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No.
91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command
(NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an
information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a
bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer
asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his
waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It
contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the
bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented
his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy
contained also hashish.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against

unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be
searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a
search warrant.
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA
211
I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
 Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of
public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and
their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms
and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported
in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and
a peaceful community.
People vs. De Gracia G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
233 SCRA 716 (1994)

Facts: The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located
at EDSA, together with his team and was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post. After a while, a group of five men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance
team drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of
Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate
because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of
December 5, 1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to
find and confiscate contrabands inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. On February 22, 1991,
the trial court rendered judgment found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to
serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. That judgment of conviction is now challenged
before us in this appeal.

Issue: Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest of the accused
involved in rebellious act is valid without securing a arrest and search warrant.

Held: Yes, Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the
instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining
in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity
to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could
lawfully be dispensed with. While it is true that the officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however,
under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers
to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator
and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose
a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987
Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications
for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both
the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He
adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the
qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws
or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified
in the Constitution.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
Facts

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of

an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team
and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined
by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson
David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave,
to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman,
such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the
charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the
prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by
the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
therespondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the
appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful
and did not violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso,
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not
lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause
nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008,
570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the
fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized
by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer
reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571
SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which
the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO
G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 255

FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement Group together with a female
informant went to the parking area of McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.

Edaño arrived at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon. The informant approached Edaño and
talked to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the informant waived at PO3 Corbe who then approached Edaño. The latter went out of
the vehicle and ran away.

PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edaño, causing the latter to fell on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a
“knot-tied” transparent plastic bag from Edaño’s right hand.

ISSUES: Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid. Consequently, the search and seizure that
followed the warrantless arrest was likewise not valid.

In this case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to Edaño to rouse suspicion in the mind of the police that he had just committed, was
actually committing or was attempting to commit a crime in their presence.

Informant and Edaño were just talking to each other, there was no exchange of money and drugs as the
police approached the car.

Edaño is entitled to acquittal since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.