Perez,Shana Alexandra P.

Succession Mon/Tue (6:00-9:00/8:00-9:30)

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

FACTS: Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who is domiciled in the Philippines for 30
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. When Audrey died, she left a will. In it, she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. Richard married
Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties.
Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife’s estate. The will was also admitted in
a court in her native land (Maryland).

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The
motion and project of partition were granted. The ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will
also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was
allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent
,opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled.

2. Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated.

RULING:
1. Yes,indeed a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. There is an in exception to this
rule, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. In
the case of Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Ergo,Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.

2. Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.The first wife
being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national
law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the property may be found in Article
16 of the Civil code which provides that Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Even though the properties of the first wife may be found in the Philippines, the successional rights
over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator.

Discussion: A final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, and
must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. The CA found merit in
respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite
the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16
of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should
have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will.

Lastly,whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones
 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS,
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS: Amos Bellis was born in Texas was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first
wife whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children. Bellis executed a will before he died in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

However in both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed
the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if
Philippine law were to apply.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

RULING: No, The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. Further, even if the deceased
had given them share, such would be invalid because the law governing the deceased does not allow such.
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Hence, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

DISCUSSION: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. Article 16 states that Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920

FACTS: Juliana Nieva, is the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate,her son, Alfeo De
Ocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, parcels of land. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and the parcels
of land passed to his father, Francisco De Ocampo, by intestate succession. Francisco Deocampo married
Manuela Alcala,they had a son Jose De Ocampo.

On August 15, 1914,Francisco De Ocampo died his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession
of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that Jose De Ocampo ,a minor had inherited the same,
ab intestate, from his deceased father.Plaintiff,Segunda, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter
of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants
the parcels of land in question invoking reservatroncal.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural
daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion,
an illegitimate relative has no right to the reservatroncal.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal
provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

RULING: No, an illegitimate child is not entitled to the reserve troncal. Manresa, in determining the
persons in whose favor the reservation is stablished, says: Persons in whose favor the reservation is
established. — This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this
article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong
to the line from which the properties came.It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions
on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity
is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to
favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what
this article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who
inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true,
there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that
family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the
object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law.

Therefore,To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of Article 943 .

DISCUSSION: Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows”A natural or legitimated child
has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
 OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA ET AL
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

FACTS: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.On October 12, 1973, Don Andres
Pascual died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children.He was survived by Adela Soldevilla de Pascual assurviving spouse, children of Wenceslao
Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half
blood of the deceased, acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased and te intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by his heirs

When Adela filed for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. all the above-mentioned
heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners
Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

RULING: No, The petition is devoid of merit.

As enunciated in the case of in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that .Article 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Hence, Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children cannot cannot
represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

DISCUSSION: Article 992 of the civil Code, provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
 ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL.
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919

FACTS: Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage
he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and
Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time
Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived
by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son,
Apolonio III.

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten
children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.

That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos
son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of
gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned
in the complaint.When Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891,
Severina, succeeded to all his property.The latter died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as
her universal heiress her only living daughter Mercedes.Mercedes daughter took possession of all the
property left at the death of her mother,The the properties Severina inherited from her son Apolonio III
are reservable property with Severina as a reservist, meaning she could not have instituted Mercedes as
sole heir, but should’ve respected the reservation in favor of complainants and that Mercedes should be
similarly situated a reservatario only.

The plaintiffs pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs
had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned
paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to
deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question.

ISSUE: Whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio II, was or
was not invested with the character of reservable.

RULING: Yes,it is reservable.The Court ruled that the subject property without a doubt is from the
common ancestor Apolonio II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by
operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina, it became reservable property, in
accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into
the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of
said property.

Severina who inherited same from her son Apolonio III, did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to
deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree,
among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Therefore,the property inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino
III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third
degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled
to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall
deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land
and of the quantity claimed.

DISCUSSION: Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the
relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such
character.
 Francisca Tioco De Papa, et. al. v. Dalisay Tongko Camacho
G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986

FACTS: Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant’s grandaunt and
granduncles.Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather
of defendant.

Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four 4 parcels of land to her niece
ToribiaTiocowhich were later inherited by her husband Eustacio Dizon and two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho

In 1928, BalbinoTioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among
them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizonand Trinidad Dizon.

On 1937, Faustino Dizon (prepositus) died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the subject seven parcels of land to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate
heir, who received the said property subject to a reservatroncal.

On June 14, 1965, EustacioDizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. Defendant Dalisay claims the other half of the said seven parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reservatroncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs oppose her said claim because they claim three-
fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Camacho (niece of the prepositus) excluded the plaintiffs (aunt and uncles of the
prepositus) in inheriting over the reservable property despite the fact that they are all reservatarios.

RULING: YES. The Court held that defendant-appellant DalisayTongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety
of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs- appellees.

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-
appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. As held in the case of Abellana v.
Ferraris, under the Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is
a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. Hence, a
decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed, similar to the case at hand.

DISCUSSION: Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato
so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
COMPARATIVE CASES:

MARCELINA EDROSO
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

FACTS: Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan In this marriage they had a son named
Pedro,who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried
and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother,
Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership. Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration claiming that the registration of the parcels of land must
be either denied or if granted, be reserved in their favor.

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration.Registration was denied because the trial court
held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the
said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE: Whether the parcels of land may be registered in the name of the reservista?

RULING: Yes, MarcelIna is entitled to register in her own name. However, the right required by the law to
be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive
her.The reservista has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it;
and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although
under a condition.

The ascendants who inherits from descendants, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of
the right of ownership belong to him exclusive use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery .During the whole
period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the
extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to
them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
 CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961

FACTS: The disputed land in this case ,Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. In his first wife,
Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his
second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. OCT No. 10275 covering Lot 3368, his
inheritance, was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother
administered the property.

However,when Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his
mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument of extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby,
among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to
appellants Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of
Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a
deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.

The trial court held that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by
operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea
Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale made by the reservista Andrea was void there being no right to dispose
the same.

RULING: NO. The Court held that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable
property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without
being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea
Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale
made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject
matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and CiprianaYaeso in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The
reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which
the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of,
albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only
if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve.
Therefore, since CiprianaYaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon
Andrea’s death.
Discussion: