Albenson Enterprises v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at

Baltao Building mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a
bouncing check was issued by one “Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make
good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand. However, there was a mistake
of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos” conducting business in the same building
– Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of
the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a
complaint for damages anchored on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in
damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:

No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What
prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced
check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private respondent,
however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time
he thought was propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another,
shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing
of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud
and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.
Nikko Hotel Manila v. Reyes
G.R. No. 154259, 28 February 2005

FACTS:

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to
Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for
him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon
as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people
around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him
to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister,
Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr.
Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since
the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be
intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly
kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the
request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim
that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ruled
that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a
loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. CA held petitioner liable for
damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an entertainment artist.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

RULING:

No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim
who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party.

Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel
business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated,
the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is
indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct. Considering the closeness of
defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employees.

Sps. Quisumbing v MERALCO

G.R. No. 142943, 3 April 2002

FACTS:

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located
at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995,
defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a
routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as
standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s
secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The
result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the
house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors
returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless
they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply
will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due
process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business
reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

RULING:

Art 32 of the Civil Code provides that “Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages” and one of the rights as provided by part 6 of this article states, “The
right against deprivation of property without due process of law”. As provided by this
article, MERALCO directly deprived the Quisumbing’s of their property in the form of
electricity without due process of law.

Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the
billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and
exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when
rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process
of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of
example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing
illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the
rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may
immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but
only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of
the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During
the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.

Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was
premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put
the injure position where it was before it was injured.

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C.

HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE
MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and
reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report,
petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and
ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave
his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the
forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler."
Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report
(Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col.
Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding
Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to
be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum

suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document
Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous
transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his
previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks
and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias.
The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the
fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). Two of these complaints
lâwphî1.ñè t

were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to
the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints
with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal
from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the
Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the
appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a
compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company

(RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a
letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness,
did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX,
through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages,
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the
other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of
Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review
on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise
of their right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive
manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the
Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION
ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the
Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden
threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced
in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law
since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This
does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil
Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA
237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no
rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19
whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo
v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953;
PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries,
Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No.
50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent
Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry
"showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the
number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the
office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But
regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering
an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to
uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to
work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work,
Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in
this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner
Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and
Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under
the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts
were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work.
Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal
complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against
him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or
else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's
bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful
remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a
"crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26,
Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO
sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with
RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of
time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable
for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend
that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of
employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15].
Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man
to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or
property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in
dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect"
[Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to
prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was
dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against
Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution
and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking
justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect
in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free
resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v.
Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30,
1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31,
1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be
used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be
a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice.
And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the
judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly,
the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution
[Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere
dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages
for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant
had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad
faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru
seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence."
The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said
Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of
these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but
this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians
to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt.
Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing
plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff
to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a
supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered,"
defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5)
for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of
the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were
dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one
case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident
likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there
can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the
criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed,
which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the
fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly
filed one hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed
against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made
by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be
filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to
hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency
of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that
the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from
involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that
petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against
Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed
against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a
computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp.
154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of
committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they
dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the
harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well
as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in
Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under
the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle
of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that
plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having
been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the
defendants-appellants (petitioners herein). " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
lâwphî1.ñ èt

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano
v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v.
Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August
14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears
repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias
from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by
Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already
ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653,
that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article

2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled
that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is
its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with
bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary
damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

University of the East vs Jader

TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader

CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000

FACTS:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During

his last year, 1stsemester, he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete
grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete
grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required
fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor
gave him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16,

1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for
the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20-
Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon
learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not
able to take the bar exam.

Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish,

serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless
nights due to UE’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into

believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to

respondent for the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are
duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered
shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what
CA held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether
he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible
in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his
academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the
subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of
the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALSand MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at
Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old.
Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old.
Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise
marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment.
It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to
inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However,
the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment
experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.

The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held
in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that
the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not
true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were
in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred
by the petitioner.

RULING:

Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the

respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just
let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a
promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages.
Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she
believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire,
then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of
the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage
reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused
by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the
respondent against the petitioner.

Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. Pe

CITATION: 5 SCRA 200

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar
and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son
by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his
children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of
Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they
fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove
Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s
affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the

ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit
affair.

HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to

morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of
the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio
and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with
Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is

hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.
Costs against appellee.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez
went away and Beatriz did not hear from him
again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages.
Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for
breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find
this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for
breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public
humiliation.

ISSUE:

Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?

RULING:

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not
considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a
marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the
plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the
previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral
damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for
the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted
fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the
wedding will push through.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE

MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for
relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day
his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for
relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City —
the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two
weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired
on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were
nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.
Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached
to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due
to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like
this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29,
1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary,
or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it
having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province
of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court
of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa
vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set
for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned
to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive.
No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really
assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however,
is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's

judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.