Philosophy of Educational Knowledge

Philosophy and Education

VOLUME 3

Series Editors:
C. J. B. Macmillan
College ofEducation. The Florida State University. Tallahassee
D. C. Phillips
School ofEducation. Stanford University

Editorial Board:
Richard J. Bernstein, Haverford College
David W. Hamlyn, University ofLondon
Richard J. Shavelson, U.C.LA.
Harvey Siegel, University ofMiami
Patrick Suppes, Stanford University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end ofthis volume.
Philosophy of
Educational Knowledge
An Introduction to the Foundations of Science of Education,
Philosophy of Education and Practical Pedagogics

by

WOLFGANG BREZINKA
The University of Konstanz, Germany

translated by
JAMES STUART BRICE and RAOUL ESHELMAN

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

ISBN 978-94-010-5141-5 ISBN 978-94-011-2586-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-2586-4

Printed on acid-jree paper

Original text published in Gennan under the title

Metatheorie der Erziehung. Eine Einftlhrung in die Grundlagen der Erziehungswissenschaft,
der Philosophie der Erziehung und der Praktischen Piidagogik, 1978

Emst Reinhardt Verlag, Munich, Basel

Ali Rights Reserved

© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1992
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover lst edition 1992
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any fonn or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any infonnation storage and
retrieval system, without written pennission from the copyright owner.
EDITORS'INTRODUCTION
For two reasons, we are particularly proud to include Wolfgang Brezinka's
Philosophy of Educational Knowledge in this series of books on Philosophy of Education.
The first is the philosophical interest of the work itself - its remarkable scholarship and the
importance of the philosophical positions will be obvious to all readers. The second is that
it brings to the English-speaking world a wonderful example of educational philosophy as
now being practiced in the German-speaking world. All too often philosophers in the
Anglo-American tradition have not seen the sort of perspective on educational thinking
that infuses this work. And since this book has been widely read in its original version, it
has had a considerable impact upon philosophy of educational research and science in the
German-speaking countries. An understanding of this may help in the development of
even more cooperative relations among students of education in all countries.

C. 1. B. Macmillan
D. C. Phillips
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDmON

'1 am not unmindful how little can be done... in a mere

treatise on Logic, or how vague and unsatisfactory all precepts
of Method must necessarily appear, when not practically
exemplified in the establishment of a body of doctrine.
Doubtless, the most effectual mode of showing how the
sciences ... may be constructed, would be to construct them".
JOHN STUART MILL (1843)1

Parents have a duty to educate their children, teachers to educate their pupils. For
this reason there is widespread interest in education. Knowledge of education has long
been offered under names like "pedagogics", "pedagogy" or "educational theory". Originally
this meant practical knowledge based on common sense. Since the Enlightenment,
however, attempts have been made to acquire scientific knowledge of education.
Superficially viewed this program has been quite sucessful. Most of the world's universities
have created departments for "education", "scientific pedagogy" or the "science of
education". There are vast numbers of publications which promise scientific knowledge of
education.
In reality, however, the rise of pedagogics to the status of a scientific discipline is
more fictitious than real. Its scientific character is still disputed and many doubt that it has
any value for educational praxis. As an academic subject pedagogics is mired in a deep
crisis 2• More contradictory opinions than knowledge, more wishful thinking than realism,
more ideology and Weltanschauung than science are to be found in the discipline. 'There is
scarcely any other science in which unscientific gossip, partisan zeal and dogmatic narrow-
mindedness have become so widespread as in pedagogics"3.
In order to free pedagogics from this unhappy state, it is necessary to submit
pedagogical knowledge to critical examination. It must be shown in detail what parts of
existing educational theories are inadequate and which mistakes must be avoided in order
that better educational theories can be created. We need epistemological standards.
Which norms should apply to educational theories? This depends on their purpose. To
some extent, the rules applicable to practical and philosophical theories are different from
those applicable to scientific theories. However, since statements about reality are made in

1 MILL (1974: 834).

2 See e.g. BREZINKA (1989).
3 BOLLNOW (1971: 708).
viii PREFACE

all educational theories, I will base my critique on maxims which apply to empirical
sciences in general. Accordingly in this book the criterion used to evaluate educational
theories will be the scientific ideal of an empirical-analytical philosophy of knowledge.
This will be additionally supplemented with maxims from philosophical pragmatism.
Studies of this type do not have educational phenomena (education) as their object,
but rather theories of education (educology). Thus what will be presented here is a eritieal-
normative theory of educational theories - or abbreviated: a metatheory of edueation4 (meta-
educologf).
Metatheoretical studies can also have indirect practical significance. The quality of
educational theories depends to a great degree on which epistemological norms are
recognized by educational theoreticians and how they comply with these norms. Through
the mediation of educational theory transmitted by texts and lectures their epistemological
views have an influence on the level of training provided for careers in education and thus
also on the quality of educational practice.
Because of my concern for the improvement of educational praxis, I decided to
undertake a critique of pedagogics and analyze its epistemological principles. The first
step was a 1966 essay on ''The Crisis of Scientific Pedagogy" in the German "Zeitschrift fur
Padagogik"6. It triggered an intensive discussion in Central and Eastern Europe which has
become internationally known under the name ''The Positivism Debate in German
Pedagogics"7.
This great public interest motivated me to write the present book, which provides a
thorough presentation of my scientific critique of pedagogics. It first appeared in 1971, and
the completely revised fourth edition was released in 1978. Apart from a few small
improvements, the present English translation corresponds to the fourth German edition
and has been approved by the author. An Italian translation was published in 1980 under
the title "Metateoria dell' educazione" by Armando Editore in Rome; a Japanese edition
appeared in 1990 under the title "Kyoikugaku kara Kyouikukagaku e - Kyoiku no
Metariron", published by Tamagawa University Press in Tokyo.
Twenty-five years ago the epistemological critique of traditional pedagogics was still
a pioneering work. Since then, however, epistemological studies have become fashionable,
even in this discipline. Today there is even cause to fear that a secondary matter will

4 From the Greek "meta" = after, coming after. A metatheory of education thus presupposes theories of
education and follows them. Cf. the tripartite schema on page 35 of this text.
s Cf. CHRISTENSEN (1981).
6 Vol. 12 (1966: 53-88). Reprinted in BREZINKA (1989: 80(121).
7 Cf. BUTTEMEYER and MOLLER (1979); BREZINKA (1989: n ff.).
 PREFACE ix

become the primary concern, carried on for its own sake and distracting from the
essentials: constructive work toward better educationai theories8•
Thus I have attempted in this book to treat the metatheory of education in such a
way that it can serve its original purpose: it should assist in making existing educational
theories more understandable and in creating better educational theories. Something
which I find to be completely unproductive is a philosophy of educational knowledge
which does not stay close to real educational problems and the ways in which they could be
solved. Metatheoretical studies are part of the preparation for educational theories, but
they are in no way substitutes.

Konstanz, Germany
21 June 1991 Wolfgang Brezinka

8 See BREZINKA (1989: 188 ff.).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Pedagogics, Science and Metatheory 1

Lack ofAgreement on the Scientific Character ofPedagogics 2

Critique of the Present State of Pedagogics 2; Doubts about the Possibility
of a Scientific Pedagowcs 3; Scientific and Practical Theories of Education
4; Pedagogics as a Mixed Normative-Descriptive Discipline 5; Pedago~cs
as a Philosophical Discipline 5; Gradual Transition to Ideological
Pedagogics 6, Pedagogics as a Pure Empirical Science 7; Numerous
Schools of Thought 8; Reasons for the Lack of Agreement 9

The Origins ofPedagogics in Practical Theories ofEducation 10

Education as an Art 11; Educational Theories as Prescriptions for the Art
of Educating 12; Informing and Inspiring Educators 13; Dominance of the
Normative Standpoint 14; Elements of Traditional Peda~ogics 14;
Dissatisfaction and Critique 15; The Modem Concept of SCIence as a
Standard for Pedagogics 16

The Dependency ofPedagogics on Value Judgements,

Norms and Weltanschauung 18
The Indispensability of a Philosophy of Life in Practical Theories of
Education 18; The Misinterpretation of Practical Theory as Scientific
Theory 19; Ideology and Pedagogics 20; Ideology and Empirical Theory 22

Reasons for Distinguishing between Types ofPedagogical Knowledge 23

The Deficiencies of Mixed Pedagogics 23; Division of Labor and
Specialization 24; Three Classes of Educational Theories. Educational
Science, Philosophy of Education, Practical Pedagogics 24; Terminological
Problems 26; Practical Importance of Agreement on Usage 26;
Differentiation of Pedagogical Statement Systems rather than the
Classification of Educationists 27; Truth and Social Utility of Statement
Systems 28

Concepts of Science and Methodological Rules as Stipulations 28

Science as a System of Statements and as an Activity 28; The Ideal of
Science 29; Basic Epistemolowcal Positions 29; Knowledge as the Goal of
Scientific Activity 30; The EpIstemology of Analytic Philosophy 31

The Tasks ofa Metatheory ofEducation 33

The Concept of Metatheory 33; Analysis, Critique and Standardization of
Educational Theories 33; Relationships among Education, Educational
Theories and Metatheory of Education 35
xii CONTENTS

I. Science of Education 37

The Concept ofEducation 38

Social Action 38; Psychic Dispositions 39; Purposes, Aims and Ideals 40;
Definition of the Concept of Education 40

The Variety ofEducational Phenomena 42

Different Aims of Education 43; Differences among Educands 45;
Differences Among Educators 46; Different Situations 46; Different
Forms of Education 47

The Subject Matter ofScience ofEducation. 48

Education as Fact 48; Educational Situations, Educational Fields 49;
Principal Topics 49; Material Object and Formal Object 49; Formulation
of Questions 50; Description and Explanation of Psychic Objectivations
51; Ends-Means Relationships 53; Educational Science as a Teleological
Causal-Analytic Science 53; Different Names for the Same Problems 57

Science ofEducation as an Empirical Social Science 58

Difficulties in Classifying Sciences 58; Human Sciences 59; Behavioral
Sciences 60; Sciences of Actions 61; Cultural Sciences 61; Social Sciences
63; Relationships to Psychology and Sociology 63; Practical Grounds for
an Autonomous Science of Education 63

Demarcating Science ofEducation

from the Pseudo-Science of Ideological Pedagogics 65
Confessional Pedagogics 65; Political Pedagogics 66; Marxist Pedago~cs
66; "Critical" Social Science 67; "Critical" or "Emancipatory PedagOgICS"
67; Misuse of Science for Propaganda Purposes 68; Value-Neutrality as a
Distinguishing Feature 69

Requirements for the Language ofScience ofEducation 69

Descriptive, Prescriptive and Emotive Use of Language 70; Carity 72;
Ambiguity and Vagueness 72; Concepts and Their Clarification 73;
Normative and Emotive Connotations 75; "Socialization" as an Example
76; Theoretical Concepts 77; Hypothetical Constructs 78; Informational
Content 78; Comprehensibility 79; Objective Language and Meta-
Language 82

The Meaning and Limits ofthe Requirement of Value-Neutrality 82

Educating and Valuating 82; Value Experience, Valuating, Value Bearer
83; Value 83; Value Judgements 83; Norms 85; Valuative Basis of Science
86; Moral Problems in Disseminating and Applying Scientific Knowledge
88; Valuations and Norms as Subjects of Educational Science 88;
Explanation of the Norm of Value-Neutrality 89
 CONTENTS xiii

Questions about Particulars and Questions about the Universal

in the Past and the Present 93
Individual Phenomena and Nomothetical Knowledge 93; Historiography
of Education 95; Nomothetical or Theoretical Educational Science 96

la. The Nomothetical Field of Study in Science of Education 99

Problems and Hypotheses as Points ofDeparture 100

Observation and Prior Knowledge 101; Descriptive Pedagogics 102;
Critique of Naive Empiricism 102

Scientific Theories as the·Goal ofResearch 103

Meanings of the Word "Theory" 103; The Concept of Justification 104;
The Call for Intersubjective Testability 104; Nomological Statements 106;
Nomological Statements of a Lower and Higher Order 111; Theory as a
System of Nomological Statements 111

On the Difference between Producing and Justifying

Scientific Statement Systems 112
Tolerance in the Context of Discovery 113; Rigorousness in the Context of
Justification 114; Meaning and the Limits of "Sympathetic Understanding"
(Verstehen) 114

Testing, Justifying and Rejecting Hypotheses and Theories 116

Logical and Empirical Testing Procedures 116; The Problem of Induction
117; Falsification 119; Reasonable Rejection 120; Confirmation 120;
Theory and Experience 121

Laws and Theories in the Social Sciences............................................................ 122

The lack of Universal Nomological Statements 123; Subject-Matter-
Related Differences between the Natural and Social Scrences 124;
Inaccessibility of others' Consciousness and the Necessity of Interpreting
124; comPlexi~125; Uniqueness and Changeability 125; Complex
Totalities of erience instead of Elements 126; Possibility and
Indispensability 0 Nomological Knowledge 126

The Construction and Application of Theories in Science ofEducation.

127
The Interest of Educators in Problems of Application 127; Primary
Importance of Theory Construction 128

The Role ofthe Determination ofFacts in Constrnctmg Theories

ofEducational Science 129
Description 129; Exploratory Field Studies 130; Case Studies 131;
Experimentation 132; "ex post facto" Studies 133; Hypothesis-Testing Field
Studies 133; Multivanate Studies and their Limitations 134;
Incompleteness and Openness of Educational Science Theories 135
xiv CONTENTS

The Application of Theories in Explanation 137

The Model of Scientific Explanation 137; Deductive-Nomological
Explanation 138; Inductive-Statistical Explanation 138; Incompleteness of
Explanations 139; Partial Explanation 140; Explanatory Outlines 140

The Application of Theories in Prediction 142

Similarities in the Structure of Explanation and Prediction 142;
Differences 142; Uncertainty in Particular Cases 143

The Application of Theories in Solving Technological Problems ofEducation 144

On the Logic of Technology 144; Ends and Value Judgements 145;
Relationships between Nomothetical Hypotheses and Technological
Statements 146; Difficulties of a Theoretically Based Technology of
Education 147

lb. Historiography of Education 149

Various Tenns for the Historical Subdiscipline ofEducational Science 149

Historiography of Education and Pedagogics 150

Differing Views on the Tasks ofHistoriography ofEducation 151

Increasing Factual Knowledge 151; Finding, Justifying and Supporting
Norms 152; Technical Norms for Education 152; Ideological and Moral
Norms 152; Normative Tasks of Historio~aphy of Education in
Pedagogics as a "Historico-Systematic" Discipline 153; in Hermeneutical
Pedagogics 154; in Marxist-Leninist Pedagogics 156; in Neo-Marxist
Pedagogics 156

The Epistemology ofHistoriography 158

Questions about Changes Taking Place in the Course of Time 159;
Methodological Difficulties 159; Research Methods 160; Sympathetic
Understanding (Verstehen) and Value-Neutrality 160

Subject Matter ofan Historiography ofEducation. 162

History of Education and History of Pedagogical Thought 162; The
Special Role of the History of Educational Science 163; Multiplicity and
Interdependence of Past Educational Phenomena 163; Danger of
~anding into Historical Socialization Research 164; Action-Concept of
Education as a Guideline 164; Indirect Education 165; Dem~hifying the
Historiography of Schools 165; History of Pedagogical Superstition 165
 CONTENTS xv

ll. Philosophy of Education 167

Various Concepts ofPhilosophy 167

Philosophy as a Universal Science, Weltanschauung, Wisdom and
Epistemology 168; Scienticity as a Distinguishing Feature? 169; Analytic
or Epistemological Philosoehy 171; World-View or Metaphysical
Philosophy 171; Normative Philosophy 173

Views on the Philosophy ofEducation 173

Rational-Empirical Statement System with Insignificant Normative
Additions 173; Pansophic Philosophy of Education 175; Practical
Pedagogics under the Guise of Philosophy 175; Historio~raphy of Ideas
176; Interpretation of Philosophical Texts from a Pedagogical Perspective
176; Analytic-Epistemological Philosophy of Pedagogical Statement
Systems 176; Ideological Philosophy of Education 177; Normative
Philosophy of Education 178

Normative Shortcomings of Traditional Normative-Descriptive Pedagogics.... 183

Lack of Concrete Normative Content 183; Educational Aims Inadequately
Justified and Lacking in Content 183; Inadequate Moral Norms for
Educational Action 185; Inappropriate Abstention from Evaluative Acts
186

Valuations and Norms as an Empirical, Normative

and Epistemological Problem 187
Valuation Phenomena and Norms as Psychic and Social Facts 187; Giving
Meaning, Valuating and Setting Norms 189; Epistemological Critique of
Value Judgements, Norms and their Justification 190

The Tasks and Problems ofa Normative Philosophy ofEducation 191

Decline of Institutionalized Normative Aids to Orientation for Educators
191; Perplexity, Fear of Valuating, Dependency on Fashions 192; Setting
Norms through Rationally Grounded DeCiSions 193; Classification
According to Educational Ends and Means 194

The Normative Philosophy ofEducational Aims and its Metatheory 195

Selecting and Settin~ Educational Aims 195; Norm Content and
Interpretation 196; Epistemological Views Concerning Norms 196; Types
of Norm JustificatiOns 198; Logical Justification 199; Fallacious
Deductions from Is to Ought 200; lllusions about Deriving Substantively
Rich from Substantively Poor Educational Aims 200; Formal or
"Procedural" Legitimation 201; Material-Evaluative Justification 202

Normative Ethics for Educators and the Normative Philosophy

of Teaching Content and Educational Organization 203
Theory of Virtues for Educators 203; Theory of Duties for Educators 204;
Normative Philosol?hy of Teaching Content 206; Normative Philosophy of
Educational Orgamzation 206
xvi CONTENTS

ill. Practical Pedagogics 209

Practical Pedagogics and Science ofEducation 209

Indispensability of Practical Pedagogics 209; Relationships to Educational
Science According to WILLMANN 209; According to DURKHEIM 210;
According to LOCHNER 212; Dependency of Practical Pedagogics on
Weltanschauung 214

The Demarcation and Designation ofPractical Pedagogics 215

Definition of Practical Pedagogics 215; Its Demarcation from the
Normative PhilosoJ?hy of Education 216; "Normative Pedagogics" 217;
"Applied PedagOgICS" 217; "Practical Pedagogics" 217; "Pragmatic
Pedagogics" 218; "Praxiological Pedagogics" 218

Hermeneutical Pedagogics as Practical Pedagogics 219

DIL1HEY 219; UTI 220; WILHELM FUTNER 222; Socially-Critical
Pedagogics 223

The Elements ofPractical Pedagogics 224

The Situation-Analytical Element 224; The Teleological Element 225; The
Methodical Element 227; The Ethical-Motivational Element 229

Objections to Practical Pedagogics 231

From the Standpoint of a Different Concept of Science 231; The
Inadequate Norm-Critique Argument 234; RefUtation 234; Norm-Critical
ConsCIousness as Highest Good? 235; Reminder and Justification 236;
From the Standpoint of Analytic Philosophy and its Concept of Science
237; Limitations of Educational Technology 237

Basic Requirements for Practical Pedagogics 239

The Ideal of a "Practical Canon" 239; Seven Minimal Requirements 239

Conclusion: On the Variety and Unity of Pedagogical KnowIedge 243

Bibliography 249
Name Index 287
Subject Index 295
INTRODUCTION: PEDAGOGICS, SCIENCE AND
METATHEORY

The development of a science of education is pitted against

powerful forces. The concept itself barely exists, and certainly
lacking is a general readiness to think scientifically in matters
of education.
SIEGFRIED BERNFELD (1925)1

For almost ZOO years attempts have been made to develop a science of education2•
The debate as to whether such a science is at all possible, which problems it should deal
with and how these problems should be solved has been going on just as lont. There have
been many highly disparate answers to these questions, which even today are the object of
considerable controversy.
There is no doubt, however, that there are a vast number of texts about education
claiming to make contributions to scientific pedagogics or educational science. The word
pedagogics (Piidagogikj4 is used to designate the theory of education, whereby it is unclear
whether the term refers to practical or to scientific theory. As early as 1869, a (German)
"Society for Scientific Pedagogics" was founded, and more recently, in 1963, the "German
Society for the Science of Education". Furthermore, it goes without saying that university
chairs for "Pedagogics" or "Educational Science" exist, that the discipline can be studied
and that academic degrees can be acquired in it. Thus in at least some countries it is

1 BERNFELD (1928: 8).

2 The first important contribution to pedagogics was TRAPP's Versucb elner Piidagogik (1780) [An Attempt
at Pedagogics]. TRAPP (1745-1818) received the first professorship for pedagogics at a German university
(Halle) in 1779.
3 cr. LOCHNER (1%3); NICOLIN (1%9).
4 The word is derived from the Greek words "pais" = child, youth and "ago" = I lead, draw. Originally the
word "paidagogos· referred to a servant who accompanied a child on his rounds between home and school.
Later the word acquired the sense of "educator". The art of education was termed "paidagogike t~e"
(Latin: "ars paedagogica"). Cf. SCHUPPE 1958. Today the word ·Piidagoge" means (in German) a
professional educator and "Piidagogiker" an educational theorist, though it remains open whether the
educational theory to which the latter is dedicated is practical or scientific. cr. RICHTER (1932).
The German word Piidagogik, which is translated here throughout with the term pedagogics, refers
solely to the theory of education, whereas Erziehung (in English: education) refers to the practice of
educating. This necessary distinction is frequently ignored in English, i.e. education, pedagogy and
pedagogics are used in English to mean both the theory of education and the practice of educating. An
English term which makes the distinction clear is educology. Educology designates "the theory of education".
Education is the practice of educating (which includes teaching).
2 INTRODUCflON

officially recognized that a science called "pedagogics", "science of education", or

"educology" exists. Nevertheless, doubts still remain as to whether pedagogics should
rightly be considered a science.

LACK OF AGREEMENT ON THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PEDAGOGICS

Part of the criticism aimed at pedagogics applies only to its present state, without
fundamentally excluding the possibility that it could become a science. MARIA
MONTESSORI, for example, was of the opinion that "in reality ... there has never been a
solidly founded, clearly delineated scientific pedagogics". What could be understood as
pedagogics is "something very indefinite, something hardly palpable. One could say that up
to now it is only the presentiment of a science, which must first develop out of the chaos of
results" of the "positive and experimental sciences"s.
In a similar fashion BERNFELD called the pedagogics of his time "unscientific" and
viewed its texts as "literary works about education" without an empirical basis. From his
point of view, a "psychologically and sociologically grounded science of education"
appeared to exist only in its "first groping and unclear beginnings", but he was convinced
that such a science could be created6 •
To be sure, other critics believe that pedagogics already exists as a science, but they
do not consider the majority of publications on the subject scientific. ALOYS FISCHER
for example, has rebuked German pedagogics for being more the "imaginative creation of
ideas than reality-oriented discovery", and asserted that pedagogics "at its core. .. has
remained philosophy", "more declarations of belief and calls for action than knowledge
and proof'? In assessing pedagogics in the United States, BRAUNER has disputed the
scientific value of the pedagogical literature published there because "with rare exceptions"
it is based more on speculation than on observation and logical analysis8•
Such critical judgements on pedagogics (or educology) do not seriously threaten
attempts to develop it into a science. On the contrary, they can provide an impetus to
developing the present beginnings of a science of education, and, by delineating them
more clearly, protect them from confusion with non-scientific theories of education. "The
state of a science, even if it justifies criticism", need "not obscure or conceal the idea of this
science"9.

5 MONTESSORI (1913: 1 f.). (my italics).

6 BERNFELD (1928: 44, 32, 28, 8).
7 A. FISCHER (1928: 80).
8 BRAUNER (1964: 303).
9 A. FISCHER (1921: 260).
 INTRODUCTION 3

Of much greater import is the view that an autonomous science of education is neither
necessary nor possible. The following arguments are presented in support of this. The fact
that education exists in the world by no means implies that a science of education must
also exist. Not every sphere of reality has a distinct science specially assigned to it; rather,
most of the things existing in the world can be the objects of more than one science.
Consider for example medicine, which is based, not on an autonomous science of healing,
but rather on a wide variety of very different sciences. In the same fashion, educational
actions can be based on knowledge originating from different sciences. Thus according to
this view, an autonomous science of education is simply unnecessary1O.
Doubts have been raised not only about the necessity, but also about the very
possibility of such a science. The following arguments are cited to support this position.
Education - depending on the standpoint from which it is viewed - is a psychic, social and
historical phenomenon; such phenomena are the responsibility of psychology, sociology
and historiography. Education also raises philosophical problems; their investigation is the
task of philosophy. According to this view, a science of education is not only superfluous,
but also fundamentally impossible, because the subject matter that education claims for
itself already belongs to other sciences.
This view is prevalent in the English-speaking world. Educology (or pedagogics) as
an autonomous scientific discipline does not exist there. Instead, educational problems are
treated by a number of sciences: by psychology in the sub-area "educational psychology",
by sociology in the sub-area "educational sociology", by economics in the sub-area
"economics of education", by historiography in the sub-area "historiography of education",
by philosophy in the sub-area "philosophy of education". Hardly any attempt has been
made to establish a connection between the problems treated in these sub-areas that
would create a system of educational science. These sub-disciplines of different sciences
dealing with education have a certain unity in name only: they are designated "educational
research"l1. In Germany, the term science of education (Erziehungswissenschaft) is
occasionally applied in a broad sense to the sum of "those empirical and normative
disciplines dealing with education"12. In this fashion, however, a mixture of disparate
special areas of different sciences is merely given the deceptive appearance of an
autonomous science.
On the other hand, in English-speaking countries there are also theories of education
that correspond to German pedagogics. These theories have developed as a result of

10 Cf. SCHEFFLER (1966).

11 Cf. for example the Encyclopedia of Educational Research (MITZEL, 1982) and the Review of
Educational Research (1990 Volume 60).
12 DERBOLAV (1959: 10).
4 INTRODUCTION

efforts to give teachers and other educators theoretical preparation for professional praxis.
In the United States such statement systems are usually called ''foundations of education"13
and in Great Britain "educational theory"14. They are not scientific theories, but rather
"theories of practical activities"15, or, to put it more succinctly, practical theories. Their
purpose is "in practical judgements" to determine "what ought to be and what ought not to
be done in educational practice"16. According to HIRST, "scientific theory and educational
theory are as different logically as judgements of what is the case are different from
judgements of what ought to be the case"17. Characteristic of educational theory of this
kind is "the absence of an integrated body of scholarly knowledge"18. Unlike other
academic fields of study, there is no agreement as to what should be taught as the content
of "educational theory". Aversion to this subject is widespread: it provides "knowledge
nobody wants,,19 and its theoretical foundations as a science are as controversial as those of
''pedagogics'' in German-speaking countries20.
There are obviously many different possibilities for formulating theories of
education. The most frequently made distinction is between scientific and practical
theories, which are thought to differ in the ends they are intended to serve. The aim of a
scientific theory of education is to describe and explain "what is". A practical theory seeks
to express "what ought to be" and "what ought to be done". "The aim of educational science
lies not in influencing educational activity, but rather ... in acquiring an understanding of
the facts"21. By contrast, a practical theory has the aim of supplying guidance for action, for
praxis22•
This distinction - which has been known since ARISTOTLE's23 time - sounds
reasonable to many people, but it is not accepted by all educational theorists. This is
because views on what should be understood as "science" and "scientific" diverge sharply.
In the German cultural sphere and in the Soviet sphere of influence, some things are
considered scientific which are not viewed as such in English-speaking countries. In Central
Europe, scientific character is often ascribed to practical, philosophical and world-view

13 Cf. CONNELL, DEBUS, NIBLETI (1967); LASKA (1969); ARNSTINE (1973); LEVIT (1973); BUrrs
(1973).
14 Cf. HIRST (1963 and 1966).
15 HIRST (1966: 40); similar GOWIN (1969: 216).
16 HIRST (1963: 63).
17 HIRST (1966: 42).
18 LASKA (1969: 184).
19 ARNSTINE (1973).
20 Cf. for example WALTON and KUETHE (1963).
21 WCHNER (1934: 2).
22 Cf. HIRST (1966: 40 ff.).
23 Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, § A I 982a (1984: 1554) who refers to theoretical science as "that which is
desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it" and asserts that its task is to investigate the
causes underlying given phenomena.
 INTRODUCTION 5

oriented educational theories. Instead of separating scientific and practical theories from
one another, even practical theories are considered as belonging to the sciences.
This broad concept of science is the reason that scholars in German-speaking
countries (more so than their American and English colleagues) are convinced that an
autonomous science of education is both possible and necessary. Nevertheless, it is still a
matter of controversy what the form of this science should be. One can distinguish among
at least three basic conceptions: pedagogics as a mixed normative-descriptive discipline,
pedagogics as a philosophical discipline and pedagogics as a purely empirical science.
The first and second basic conceptions agree in the sense that they do not view
pedagogics as an empirical science, but rather claim a special status for the field outside
the purely empirical sciences. Pedagogics as a mixed normative-descriptive discipline is
understood to be a theory suitable for "supplying guide-lines for praxis". Pedagogics should
simultaneously "attain a comprehension of reality and a determination of what should
be"24. It cannot "limit itself to studying what is", but is "at least in part also a normative
science which. .. develops guiding ideals and measures existing reality against its own
claims". It "includes normative decisions" and should combine "the establishment of facts"
with the "critical evaluation of these facts in the service of an obligatory norm"2S.
The adherents of this conception consider it possible in one and the same scientific
discipline to both carry out research on the sphere of reality called "education" and to set
up norms and rules for educational activities. They ascribe a "dual character" to
pedagogics; it is held to be a "theoretical-practical science"26 or a "descriptive-normative
science"27. Pedagogics has "necessarily a mixed character, it is neither purely speculative
nor purely empirical". It is a "speculative" or "philosophical" science only insofar as it
studies the purpose of education; on the other hand, pedagogics is "at least partially
empirical in regard to what it teaches about the means and methods through which the
former should be realized"28. "To philosophize in a practical situation" is thus "the basic
form of this science"29. The more the normative side is emphasized and the empirical or
descriptive side neglected, the more clouded become the boundaries separating
normative-descriptive pedagogics from pedagogics conceived of as a purely philosophical
discipline.
Since education is a purposive or aim-conscious activity, it naturally presupposes
knowledge about the aims that the educator wishes to achieve (or what ought to be

24 UTI (1949: 101, 104, 107).

2S BOLLNOW (1964: 227,223,224,227).
26 MEISTER (1%5: 58 ff.).
27 WEINGARTNER (1971: 140).
28 WAlTZ (1898: 20, 17, 19).
29 W. FLITNER (1%6: 19).
6 INTRODUCfION

achieved) and how they can be achieved. For that reason, aims, norms, and
recommendations for acting have from time immemorial been regarded as the most
significant components of a practical theory of education. In order to be able to develop
technical norms relating to the means for realizing ends, educators have consistently relied
upon psychology - which, incidentally, until the middle of the 19th century was considered
a philosophical discipline. More important is the question of the moral norms which
should apply to the persons-to-be-educated (educands) and their educators. Such
questions are the responsibility of ethics or of moral philosophy, and for that reason it was
natural that pedagogics was conceived of as a purely philosophical discipline.
It is thus possible to assume, as did SCHLEIERMACHER, that "to influence the
younger generation" is "part of the moral task" of adults, "thus, a purely ethical matter".
Pedagogics is therefore an "applied science closely bound to and derived from ethics", an
"ethical science"3O.
The necessity of making moral judgements about educational aims and the means for
achieving them, as well as of basing such judgements on value standards, basic norms, or
moral principles is usually given as the main reason for viewing pedagogics as a
philosophical discipline. The aims of education are "authoritative for answering all
individual pedagogical questions", but they are also "dependent on an overall view of life,
i.e. the sum total of views on the value and meaning of human life. This, however, is
traditionally held to be the ultimate philosophical question. Thus pedagogics is essentially
dependent on philosophy. This dependence is not to be understood as meaning that it is
sufficient for pedagogics to assimilate a few philosophical propositions; rather, its entire
structure must be philosophical, everything in it that is not philosophical must fit into the
structure as a supplement"3!.
According to this viewpoint, empirical theories about educational reality are "still not
pedagogics in the true sense". "What gives pedagogics scientific autonomy is rather its ...
philosophical foundation"32. From this it follows, however, that "philosophically founded"
pedagogics "by nature reflects different philosophically constructed systems and
standpoints"33. HERBART put this even more strongly when he wrote that pedagogics
becomes "the plaything of sects"34. Thus there are higWy permeable boundaries separating
the various manifestations of "pedagogics based on a philosophical foundation" and
pedagogics based on Weltanschauung or ideology.

30 SCHLEIERMACHER (1957: Vo!.l: 11 f.).

31 COHN (1919: 11).
32 DERBOlAV (1970: 50).
33 DERBOlAV (1971: 7).
34 HERBART (1913: Vo!. 1: 234).
 INTRODUCTION 7

Much of what appears under the names "scientific pedagogics" and "philosophical
pedagogics" turns out, upon closer examination, to be ideologically determined pedagogics.
The impression that a theory is scientific or philosophical is often attributable simply by its
abstract form and not to the way it is substantiated. The differences between pedagogical
theories arise not so much because they interpret one and the same set of facts differently,
but because theories themselves are above all determined by different ideals of man and
society. Pedagogical theories of the practical, normative-descriptive, and philosophical
type are in most cases "not the impartial cognition of what is but rather the partial
promulgation of what should be"35.
By contrast, the adherents of the third basic conception would like to establish
scientific pedagogics as a purely empirical science. By the term empirical science is meant a
system of sentences which provides information in intersubjectively testable statements
about educational aims and the segments of reality relevant for reaching them36. In
particular, attempts are made to find regularities which would serve to explain relevant
facts, but which could also be used as a basis for predictions and for answering
technological questions (e.g. "What can be done to reach aim X?").
In order to avoid confusion, the adherents of this research program have suggested
that the term "educational science" be used solely to designate such empirical statement
systems concerning education37 . However, as long as this suggestion has not been generally
accepted, it should be least confusing to use the term "empirical science of education" (or
"empirical educational science")38.
Empirical educational science differs from the other forms of pedagogics in that it is
restricted to problems of reality or what is. Empirical educational science seeks to find out
what is and why, what is possible under certain circumstances, what people want, what they
do and what can be done to reach certain aims. By contrast, it does not seek to determine
''what ought to be" and ''what ought to be done". For methodological reasons, empirical
educational science rejects the formulation and justification of normative postulates as
well as the establishment of aims, ideals and norms. The sole intent of this branch of
educology is to search for empirical scientific knowledge, i.e. for hypothetical knowledge

35 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1921: 13).

36 In this book the word sentence denotes a linguistic construct as well as the meaning or content of such a
construct. A sentence expressing an assertion is called a statement. A statement can be true or false. A
sentence expressing a normative postulate is called a nonn and can be either valid or invalid. Cf.
WEINGARTNER (1971: 26 f.). Usage is nevertheless very inconsistent, even in epistemological writings.
The words sentence and statement are often used in the same sense. For example, d. BOCHENSKI (1965:
5), V. KRAFT (1960: 127) and STEGMULLER (1969: 6).
37 For example DURKHEIM, as early as 1911 d. (1956: 95 ff.); LOCHNER (1934 and 1963); BREZINKA
(1966, 1966a and 1967).
38 a. BREZINKA (1970 and 1971). Some opponents of this orientation have given it the misnoIPer
"positivistic educational science", for example BENNER (1973: 178 ff.) and DERBOLAV (1984: 185 ff)
8 INTRODucnON

which from an empirical standpoint is as well founded as possible. Decisions in favor of

particular world views and confessions of faith in particular ideals are regarded as
empirically unconfirmable, and are therefore excluded from the domain of educational
science. The treatment of normative problems is left to the philosophy of education, which
is regarded as an indispensable supplement to educational science. The reason for this
division of labor is the epistemological conviction that normative problems cannot be
solved in the framework of empirical science, and that preconceived notions which are
inaccessible to criticism - as world views of necessity are - are more apt to binder the
advancement of science than to help it.
These three basic conceptions of scientific pedagogics are based on different
formulations of the problem and on different theoretical convictions as to the nature of
science. Under different names they have all been simultaneously advocated for
generations, and different theoretical orientations have been developed on the basis of each
basic conception. There is thus simply no single theory of education, but rather a number
of different pedagogical theories.
To give an impression of the variety of such formulations it is only necessary to
examine the different theoretical orientations which, since the beginning of the 20th
century, have been formulated solely from methodological standpoints.
DURKHEIM, writing in 1911, distinguished between "science of education" ("la
science de l'education") and "pedagogy" ("pedagogie")39. In 1921, FRISCHEISEN-
KOHLER made a distinction among "empirical pedagogics", "critical pedagogics" and
"speculative pedagogics'l4O. In 1922, ERICH STERN treated three groups of pedagogical
theories: "purely speculative pedagogics", "purely empirical pedagogics" and "empirical-
speculative pedagogics"'Il. In 1929, DOLCH distinguished among "sociological pedagogics",
"cultural and value pedagogics", "idealistic pedagogics" and "critical pedagogics"42. In 1927,
LOCHNER published a Descriptive Pedagogics and in 1934 differentiated "educational
science" from "educational teachings·"'3. In 1970, in the framework of West German
pedagogics, BOKELMAN differentiated "hermeneutic-speculative", "descriptive-phenom-
enological" and "empirical-positivistic" types of theory. Other approaches which he
suggested included "transcendental-critical", "fundamental-ontological", and "dialectical
pedagogics''''''. In 1973, BENNER classified the field into "traditional pedagogics", "empir-
ical pedagogics", "hermeneutical" ("geisteswissenschaftliche") pedagogics, and "emancipatory

39 cr. DURKHEIM (1956: 91 ff.).

40 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1921).
41 STERN (1922: 56 ff.).
42 DOLCH (1966: 6 ff.).
43 LOCHNER (1927); (1934: 1 ff.); (1963: 387 ff.).
44 BOKELMANN (1970: 205 ff.).
 INTRODUCTION 9

pedagogics'045. In 1974, LASSAHN identified "hermeneutical pedagogics", "empirical-

analytical educational science", "normative pedagogics", and "Marxist, neo-Marxist and
critical educational science"46. GAMM refers to the last-named approach, to which he
himself adheres, as "critical-materialistic pedagogics"47. BLANKERTZ differentiates
between "pedagogics as positivistic empirical science", "pedagogics as one of the
humanities" and "pedagogics as critical theory"48. KONIG distinguishes between "tradi-
tional normative pedagogics", "hermeneutical pedagogics", "empirical educational science"
and "emancipatory pedagogics"49. Furthermore one comes across "pragmatic pedagogics"50,
"rationalistic pedagogics"51, a program for "structuralist educational science"52 and many
others.
This list may appear confusing at first glance, but actually there are considerably
fewer epistemological alternatives for formulating pedagogical systems than the number of
names suggests. There are doubtless incompatible viewpoints involved here, but on the
other hand, there are also more similarities and agreements than is generally assumed.
One question, however, does immediately come to mind. How could such a variety of
approaches have come about? Why is there still such a lack of agreement over pedagogics'
(educology's) scientific character? Only after this problem has been clarified would it seem
sensible to work towards reconciling the different viewpoints mentioned.
It seems to me that the basic cause of the lack of agreement on the scientific character
of pedagogics lies in the fact that very different things are expected from the field. Many
interested observers believe that educology should not only serve the purpose of acquiring
scientific knowledge, but also practical ends which are foreign to the concept of an
empirical science. This lack of agreement has its roots in contrary views about the
relationship between educational theories and educational praxis. Since all educational
praxis is based on world views and educators are dependent on world-view orientation, the
problem ultimately concerns different views on the relationship between science and world
views (Weltanschauung or ideology).
In the following chapters on the origins of pedagogics in practical educational
theories and the dependency of pedagogics on world views, I will treat the practical as well
as world-view background of the disagreements concerning the scientific character of
pedagogics.

45 BENNER (1973).
46 LASSAHN (1974).
47 GAMM (1974: 98).
48 BLANKERTZ (1974: 634).
49 E. KONIG (1975).
50 WILHELM (1975).
51 ROSSNER (1975).
52 NEZEL (1976).
10 INTRODUCTION

THE ORIGINS OF PEDAGOGICS IN PRACTICAL THEORIES OF EDUCATION

Man has probably been educating ever since the earliest times53• In the beginning,
though, education must have been informal, confined within the family circle and resorted
to as the occasion arose. Even later with the rise of the apprenticeship system of training
craftsmen, education remained of secondary importance. Only when teachers appeared on
the scene was education transformed into a profession.
Teachers are the original educational specialists. According to their field of activity
they are expected to instill in their pupils knowledge, abilities, attitudes, virtues and
convictions. This gives them an incentive to reflect on ways of reaching these goals.
Teaching materials must be selected from the sum total of available knowledge and
arranged according to different levels of difficulty. Teachers must judge the character and
personal qualities of their pupils, their knowledge, interests, and learning capacity. They
must formulate teaching plans, and in putting them into practice they discover how well
their pupils respond to their instruction. Teachers experience successes and failures and
seek to understand why they have succeeded or failed.
Educational activity thus presupposes an intellectual or self-reflective process and
gives rise to further reflection. It depends on assumptions about the relationships between
ends and means as well as on the interpretation of a given situation. The views or opinions
which result from such reflection can be designated as "theory" in the broadest sense of the
word. Meant is the educator's subjective thought structure, which is based in part on his own
reflections and observations and in part on information acquired from others. This type of
theory has existed since education began.
If, to the contrary, one understands "theory" in the narrower sense of a teaching or a
system of theoretical views on a particular subject, then it is accurate to say that "practice is
much older than theory"54. The relationships between educational activities and
educational theory are similar to those between economic activities and economic theory
or between political actions and political theory. Ranching, farming or crafts and trade are
much older than economic theory itself. In the same fashion, power struggles, the exercise
of sovereignty and the governance of states existed long before the first theoretical
formulations of political science and public administration.

cr. MEISTER (1%5: 88-100), WALK (1934), WOODY (1949)

53 On the origins and early forms of education,
and MARROU (1957).
54 SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 11); similarly SCHWARZ (1835: 12).
 INTRODucnON 11

Since antiquity education has been considered an arf5 in the original sense of the
word: as an ability to do something wetp6. ARISTOTLE understood "art" to be "a reasoned
state of capacity to act"57. DURKHEIM defined "art" as "a system of ways of doing which
are oriented to special ends and which are the product either of a traditional experience
communicated by education, or of the personal experience of the individual. One can
acquire them only by coming into contact with the things on which the action is to be
performed and by dealing with them oneself'58.
lt is possible to master an art without understanding its theoretical foundations.
Already in antiquity ARISTOTLE remarked that "some who do not know, and especially
those who have experience, are more practical than others who know"59. There are thus
successful educators who have given little thought to education, and there are educational
theorists who, in spite of intensive pedagogical reflection, still lack educational ability. For
this reason SCHLEIERMACHER was of the opinion that the dignity of practice was
"independent of theory"6O.
On the other hand, however, it seems unlikely that "the art of education"61 can
succeed unless educators sufficiently understand the conditions affecting their educational
actions and the possible causes of educational success or failure. Both parents and
professional educators frequently meet with difficulties in their attempts to shape and
influence young people in accordance with educational aims. What could be more natural
than wanting to recognize the causes of such difficulties and learn how to overcome them?
The practical problems thrust upon us by educational tasks and actions have thus been the
impetus for developing theories of education.
The first educational theories were based on observations of different forms of
educational actions and their effects. They summarize insights which educators believed
they had acquired while educating and describe the principles according to which students
should be taught. The intention was not merely to describe, but rather to evaluate and
prescribe for practical purposes. Distinctions were made between virtues and vices,
important and less important aims of education, proper and improper means, right and
wrong forms of education. Educational theories of this kind were designed to give
educators guidelines for educating and contained recommendations, instructions or norms

55 Cf. HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 120 ff.); SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 11).
56 According to TRIER (1931: 36), "ability" (konnen) originally meant "to be good at doing something on the
basis of previous cognitive contact".
57 ARISTOTLE, Nic. Ethics VI, 4 (1984: 1799).
58 DURKHEIM (1956: 100 f.) (my italics).
59 ARISTOTLE, Nic. Ethics VI, 7 (1984: 1802).
60 SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 11).
61 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 120 ff.; Vol. 3: 569 ff.).
12 INTRODUCTION

for educational activity. For this reason they are referred to as normative theories. They
are instructions in the art of education or theories ofeducation as an art 62•
Such theories of the art of education were employed above all to train educators.
With the Age of Enlightenment the quantity of practical educational literature increased
rapidly, aided by the invention of printing and the spread of literacy. Most of this literature
consisted of manuals for teachers, court tutors63 and catechists64 , but many were directed
at parents, especially mothers 65 •
Among these educational theories there were great differences in normative
(religious, moral, world-view) standpoint, logical and systematic quality, empirical content,
practicality and sphere of applicability, but they all shared a practical purpose. Even so
philosophically sophisticated an author as HERBART left no doubt that his General
Pedagogics (1806) was conceived as a practical theory for educators, as a "map for the
inexperienced". It is confined to "practical considerations" as to the "intent with which the
educator should go about his work ... tentatively particularized, at most, as to the rules
which we must select on the basis of our previous insights"66. HERBART specifically
mentioned that in his time this complex of practical questions and answers was "generally
held for the whole" of pedagogics.
Insofar as an educational theory attempted to offer more than simply a collection of
methodical (or technical) advice, it was conceived as a morally-oriented theory of the art
of educating (Kunstlehre) "related purely to ethics"67. A "Kunstlehre" was understood to be
a type of knowledge oriented towards activity. Long before the modern era the assignment
of educational theory to ethics (the branch of philosophy dealing with morally correct
actions) had already been outlined by ARISTOTLE68. WAlTZ, too, took recourse to this
tradition when in 1852 he called pedagogics a practical Kunstlehre belonging to the
"practical philosophy", i.e. ethics, whose task it is "to attempt to reconcile practical
philosophy with life". According to WAlTZ practical theories of the art of education
contribute to "the introduction of practical (i.e. moral) ideas in life", they "concern

62 Cf. ROLFUS and PFISTER (1863, Vol. 1: 539 ff.), where an "educational teaching" is defined as "the
systematic description of rules, prescriptions and basic principles of education or instruction for the art of
educating".
63 The court tutor (Hofmeister or originally Hofmagister) was the man responsible for educating the offspring
of nobility. Cf. STREBEL (1862). His counterpart in well-to-do burgher families was the private tutor.
64 Catechist (from the Greek katechein meaning to instruct orally) is the technical term for the Christian
clergy insofar as they provide religious instruction. Cf. HIRSCHER (1840: 6 ff.).
65 An early example is the Infonnatorium cler Mutterschul by COMENIUS (1633).
66 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 237); the emphasis is in the original.
67 SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 12). For an interpretation of this viewpoint, cf. footnote 10 by
THEODOR SCHULZE on p. 419 ff. as well as DAHMER (1968: 37 ff.).
68 Cf. WILLMANN (1909: 65 ff.); LICHTENSTEIN (1963: 248 f.); J. RITTER (1969).
 INTRODUCTION 13

themselves solely with the ends which man should set for himself and with the means that
he has the power to control"69.
It is worth noting that, in general, theories of the art of education were not only
supposed to provide information on the ends and means of education, but also to inspire
educators, to fill them with enthusiasm for "the good" and to spur them on to improve
themselves. SAILER, for example, in On Education for Educators (1807), a text typical of
such teachings, expressly wanted to "open closed eyes" (i.e. provide information) and "to
set cold hearts aflame" (i.e. provide inspiration)70.
Because of the close connection between practical educational theories and ethics, in
the 19th century pedagogics was often regarded as a branch of practical philosophy. Even
in those cases where pedagogics was designated a "practical"71 or "applied" science72 - in
keeping with the then current broad concept of science, which also included philosophy -
what was meant was not an empirical-technological science, but rather a normative
discipline.
Up until and on into the 20th century, the majority of educational theoreticians saw
as their most important task the discovery of what pupils ought to become and what
educators ought to do to achieve this goal. Thus it was apparent that one should have the
most precise knowledge of an area for which one wishes to provide guidance. For that
reason most educational investigators directed their attention to the actual circumstances
and events in the educational systems of their time73• Since they were primarily interested
in reforms, they stressed those facts which seemed to best fit their ideas. At the same time
they neglected the empirical investigation of the broader socio-cultural context to which
these facts belonged74 .

69 WAlTZ (1898: 12 ff.) (my addition).

70 SAILER (1962: 191).
71 According to HERBART (1813, Vol. 1: 47), "Kunstlehren" (theories of an art) can also be referred to as
''practical sciences", "since they provide information as to how a person occupied with a certain subject
should treat that subject, in that he produces a pleasing instead of a displeasing result". That Kunstlehre
dealing with ourselves is called "the theory of virtue (Tugendlehre), which in regard to our utterances, acts
and omissions merges with the theory of duty (Pflichteulehre)", (§ 9, ibid., p. 47). "Two of the main branches
of the theory of virtue are politics and pedagogics" (respectively § 91 and § 106 in the 4th ed., loco cit. p. 134).
The "KunstJehren" or "practical sciences" are also characterized as ''practical philosophy": they are "a theory
of conduct (Lehre yom Tun und Lassen) of the institutions found among people in social and civil life"
(respectively § 85 and § 95, in the 4th ed., loco cit. p. 123). In another section, HERBART writes that with
the name practical philosophy "we designate that part of general as well as applied aesthetics containing
definitions of what is praiseworthy and what reprehensible, together with the prescriptions resulting from
them" (§ 10, ibid., p. 48).
72 REIN (1911, Vol. 1: 34 and 71).
73 Cf. MENZE (1%6).
74 Cf. WENIGER (1936) on the origins of pedagogics in the critique of education and its relationship with the
major enlightenment and emancipatory movements.
14 INTRODUCTION

Thus, in the course of time there arose under the heading "pedagogics" a complex of
statements, all of which were in principle concerned with education, but which treated the
subject in a highly heterogeneous fashion. This complex includes the following.
1. Statements about the aims or ends which education seeks to reach. These include
value judgements, i.e. certain personality characteristics are assigned value by means of
value predicates. Insofar as realizing educational aims is required, we are dealing here
with statements of requirements or norms. As norms, educational aims express conceptions
of either the total state of a personality or of specific personality characteristics which
should be realized to the greatest extent possible.
2. Rules or norms for educational actions as means to realizing ends. These call for
certain actions either to be carried out or abstained from (prescriptions and prohibitions).
This can be a matter of moral, legal or technical norms.
3. Suggestions for (or arguments against) certain organizational forms of educational
institutions. These statements, too, deal with the means for realizing aims.
4. The norms, value judgements, instructions and suggestions mentioned in points 1
to 3 are often inserted in a philosophy of the good life, in a "practical philosophy" in the
Aristotelian sense. This type of philosophy does not confine itself to norms asserting what
people should be and do, but also includes a world-view interpretation of the human
condition, "an interpretation of human deterrnination'175.
5. Descriptive, explanatory and predictive statements on the realm of education,
"educational reality", the nature or facts of education and their psychic, social and cultural
preconditions and effects. Among others, this area includes educational aims, educational
actions, educational institutions, curricula (or the subject matter of instruction), educators
and, above all, the persons-to-be-educated (pupils, educands, the objects or addressees of
education).
Referred to as "pedagogics", this complex of statements about education has been
assembled from quite various elements. It has developed into a tradition to which we owe
our first systematic knowledge of this subject area. At the time when this tradition was
developed, many concepts were regarded as knowledge which do not meet the more
stringent requirements of recent epistemology76. Particularly in those disciplines which
study human behavior and accomplishments 77, clear distinctions were still not made

75 w. FLITNER (1958: 14).

76 Cf. V. KRAFf (1960); ESSLER (1972).
77 Since the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, they have been referred to as
"Geisteswissenschaften" or "Kulturwissenschaften" ("cultural studies"). This corresponds approximately to the
modern English usage of "liberal arts" or "the humanities". The German term "Geisteswissenschaften" for
the English "moral sciences" first appeared in the 1849 translation of JOHN STUART MILL's Logic (1843)
by JOHANNES SCHIEL, but the underlying concept had already come into usage through HEGEL. Cf.
ROTHACKER (1927: 6 ff.).
 INTRODUCTION 15

between scientific and non-scientific theories, discovery and validation, the description of
facts and value judgements, existential statements and normative prescriptions.
Methodologically, pedagogics has likewise not advanced much beyond the appeal to
"common sense"78.
As early as 1806 it was already clear to HERBART that the theory of the art of
education, which in his time was held to be "the whole" of pedagogics (or educology), did
not measure up to rigorous scientific criteria. It was his wish that a scientific theory of
education should be created alongside of practical educational teachings. He called this
scientific theory of education the "second half of pedagogics" and later ''psychological
pedagogics" and felt that it should "explain theoretically the possibilities for educating and
the limitations imposed by changing circumstances". At that time, however, such a theory
was no more than a "pipe-dream", since according to HERBART the psychology on which
it would be based did not yet exist79•
In the second half of the 19th century there was no doubt in the minds of critical
observers that traditional normative pedagogics was far from being an empirical science.
WILLMANN wrote in 1882 that although normative pedagogics was "rich in advice and
good intentions", it was "poor in observations and facts"8O. DILTHEY, writing in 1888,
criticized pedagogics for "high-minded popularity, which is a sign of unsuccessful
scienticity"81. Both critics wanted to create a truly empirical science of education.
WILLMANN thought of pedagogics as an "explanatory social science"82, DILTHEY as
"applied psychology"83. Unfortunately, these suggestions remained in the programmatic
stage and received little attention.
As can easily be determined by reading the large encyclopedias and handbooks of
the time 84, at the beginning of the 20th century pedagogics was still little more than a
colorful mixture of practical educational teachings. In comparison with the growth of
knowledge in such related sciences as psychology or economics, pedagogics - in spite of an
incalculable number of publications - has remained relatively unproductive up until the
present day. Even in the small number of more recent systematic publications85 one can
hardly recognize progress vis-a-vis attempts at systematization made three to four decades

78 On the difference between science and prescientific knowledge (acquired through "common sense"
methods), d. NAGEL (1961: 1-14).
79 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 237).
80 WILLMANN (1957: 18).
81 DILTHEY (1963: 14).
82 Cf. WILLMANN (1875: 14 ff.) and (1876: 260 ff.), PFEFFER (1962: 103 ff., especially 113).
83 DILTHEY (1963: 13).
84 Cf. REIN (1903), LOOS (1906), ROLOFF (1913), MONROE (1911).
85 LANGEVELD (1951), PERQUIN (1961), BALLAUF (1962), HENZ (1964), MARz (1965), ELZER
(1968), GIESECKE (1969), SEIFFERT (1969), ROHRS (1969), RITZEL (1973), GROOTHOFF (1975).
16 INTRODUCfION

ag086. Insofar as they contain informative statements at all, these stem predominantly from
other sciences such as psychology, sociology, psychiatry and historiography.
In looking back at the history of the field one gets the impression that both
pedagogical and "philosophical thinking"87 share the common tendency of constantly
having to start over from scratch because of a lack of agreement on aims and methods, and
that their substantive achievements have remained minimal. The traditional pedagogics
(educology) of introductory works, textbooks and pedagogical lexicons has the appearance
and consequently also the reputation of being a tedious and uninspired discipline. As late
as 1966, WILHELM FLITNER confirmed that in Germany pedagogics enjoys little public
favor: "We meet not only with ignorance of our discipline and the rejection of its claim to
scientific status, but also with indifference and even hostility"88.
In other countries the situation is not much better. Even in the United States, where
for decades incomparably more money and human resources have been available for
educational research than in Europe, critical voices are increasingly being heard. In regard
to its scientific quality, pedagogical theory has been placed on a level with folklore and
fiction. Thus TRAVERS, writing in 1964, remarked that ''what is commonly referred to as
educational theory is much more appropriately described as folklore than as science"89. In
his book on American pedagogics BRAUNER comes to the conclusion that American
educational theory is a literary discipline, full of "poetic analogies and fictional
hypotheses"9O • The English writer PElERS claims that for years pedagogical theory has
been no more than "an undifferentiated mush"91. The Dutch critic NIEUWENHUIS
maintains that an empirical science of education dealing with normal educational activity
is almost nonexistent. "In general, our knowledge of educational reality does not exceed
that of the layman"92.
Such severe judgements are of course only justified when one proceeds from the
rigorous concept ofscience which was first developed in the last few decades93• This concept

86 LOCHNER (1927, 1934, 1947), SPRANGER (1933), W. FLITNER (1933), ABB (1933), PETZELT (1947,
1954), F. SCHNEIDER (1948), GUYER (1949).
87 Cf. PLESSNER (1958: 10); KEMPSKI (1964).
88 W. FLITNER (1%6a: 196); cf. also METZGER (1969: 10 ff.).
89 TRAVERS (1964: 15).
90 BRAUNER (1964: 303).
91 PETERS (1966: 7).
92 NlEUWENHUIS (1971: 266 and 262).
93 For a basic and easily understandable survey cf. above all BUNGE (1967), as well as NAGEL (1961),
KAPLAN (1964). An outstanding and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of the empirical
sciences is HEMPEL (1%6); more detailed and placing more demands on the reader's previous knowledge
is STEGMOLLER (1969, 1970, 1973). For an introduction to the philosophy of the social sciences cf.
RYAN (1973), OPP (1976). BRECHT (1961) provides information of exemplary clarity on the rules of the
scientific method and their application in political science (as a discipline especially close to pedagogics or
 INTRODUCflON 17

is based on a presupposition concerning the aim of science, namely that science should
help us acquire knowledge about the world. This means more than merely describing
''what is" and ''what happens" or what existed or what happened at an earlier time. The aim
of science is to discover nomological regularities and devise theories which can serve as
the basis for explanations and predictions and which can be used to solve technical
problems. In order to fulfill this task, we must establish certain criteria for scientific
statement systems. Only statements whose truth has been established or which have been
confirmed should be regarded as scientific knowledge. Such establishment or confirmation
presupposes that in principle each scientific statement (or group of statements) be
intersubjectively testable. If it is a matter of empirical statements, the testing process is
carried out by comparing the statement or the conclusions derived therefrom with
statements describing relevant facts. Whether we provisionally accept a statement as true
depends on both observational results and logical considerations. This assumes that
statements are so precisely formulated that they can also be tested, i.e. they can be
confirmed or disproved by appealing to empirical facts. Nevertheless, scientific knowledge
does not consist solely of observational results, but also of an entire system of mutually
supporting hypotheses. Today, an empirical science is considered to be a theoretical
construct dealing with selected aspects of reality and conceived on the basis of provisional
knowledge. The trustworthiness of its statements depends on an entire system of relevant
knowledge, that is, on a multitude of hypotheses and theories which have been at least
partially confirmed by observation.
If we accept this assessment of the purpose of science and its general method, then it
is inconsistent to insert value judgements or normative demands in the statement systems
of empirical science. Neither value judgements nor norms can be derived from factual
statements. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the description of objects and
their valuation, between "is" and "ought", and between empirical statements and norms.
For this reason care must be taken in the empirical sciences that the validity of results
does not depend on the acceptance of value predicates94. Valuations and norms are, of
course, central aspects of human culture and are therefore also important objects of study
by the humanities and social sciences, but they can and should be studied without value
judgements themselves entering into the results.
If one agrees with this viewpoint, then it is strikingly apparent that traditional
pedagogics contains too little of what belongs to science and too much of what does not. It

educology). Worthwhile collections of articles on the philosophy of the social sciences are TOPITSCH
(1965) and ALBERT (1972).
94 Cf. WEINGARTNER (1971: 128 ff. and 1974) for this important distinction. On the justification of
scientific value relativism, d. BRECHT (1961: 139 ff.); ALBERT (l.972a; 41 ff.).
18 INTRODUCTION

lacks information on educational reality, and in its place is an overabundance of

"essentialistic definitions", value judgements and norrns, professions of belief, political
programs, and calls for action95 • Factual statements, value judgements, normative
postulates and wishful thinking are frequently so naively mixed together that it is difficult
to tell just what one is dealing with in a given instance. This confusion has its roots in the
dependency of pedagogics on world views.

THE DEPENDENCY OF PEDAGOGICS ON VALUE JUDGEMENTS, NORMS AND

WELTANSCHAUUNG

A pedagogics designed as a practical theory for educators cannot be limited to

descriptive statements. It can only achieve its purpose when it contains value judgements,
norms and instructions for acting. This necessitates the taking of world-view positions. In
practical theories much is necessary which is frowned upon in scientific ones.
Like everyone, educators, too, need a general orientation concerning the world and
their duties. This orientation should not be subjected to continual critical questioning, but
should instead, by virtue of its permanence, reduce the pressure of unrelieved doubt. If the
normative content of a system of pedagogical statements is openly designated as such, if, in
other words, the basic valuating principles and norms which the author believes in are
expressly described as the result of a practical decision, then there should be no
uncertainty about its purpose. Much more questionable are those pedagogical systems
whose normative principles are concealed. This occurs mainly because they are passed off
as scientific theories, instead of being explicitly designated as practical ones. What, then, is
the reason for this deception?
In all societies, education is first of all a means for upholding the existing way of life.
This is most successful when the world view (Weltanschauung) and morals corresponding
to a given way of life are intuitively felt to be valid. Behavioral security is greatest in those
who are simply not familiar with alternative world views or who at least do not consider
them equally acceptable. For that reason leadership elites are less concerned with
promoting enlightenment and criticism than with encouraging people's belief in their
society's hierarchy of values and an intuitive affirmation of the existing social order. They
are simply meeting man's primal need for stability, a feeling of security in a familiar world
and freedom from the necessity of choice96. In societies convinced that the sciences are the

95 WILLMANN (1957: 18): "A teacher once said facetiously: in part pedagogics teaches that which everyone
already knows, and in part, that which nobody can know·.
96 Cf. WILSON (1956: 1(0): "Men's desire for knoWledge is more apparent than real. Their basic desire is for
security: and questioning necessarily involves the insecurity of doubt .... Most people find it more snug
 INTRODUCTION 19

only reliable guarantors of truth, this secure state of mind can be effectively insulated from
possible doubts by presenting the contents of a belief-system as scientific knowledge. This
does not have to be a purely politically motivated deception. In fact, a more likely reason
is that a pedagogical author shares the ideological and moral convictions of his
contemporaries, naively publishes them as scientific knowledge and then, thanks to the
public acceptance of a vague concept of science, remains sheltered from criticism.
Similar things can also be said mutatis mutandis about the subgroups of a society,
from the reform-minded to the revolutionary. They see in education a means to realize a
new order, which is conceived as a counter-ideal to the existing one. They, too, attempt to
use the prestige associated with the name science for their own political ends, either by
presenting valuations and demands as though they were factual statements or by claiming
that the facts logically privilege their personal decisions and exclude all other
interpretations.
Thought systems in which value judgements and normative postulates or
prescriptions are formulated as seemingly true statements about indisputable facts are
frequently referred to as "ideological". The word "ideology", however, can lead to
misunderstandings because it is used in quite different senses. In a negative sense, it is
understood as "false consciousness". "Ideologies" in this case are viewed as "untrue, half-
true or incomplete cognitive constructs related to social facts and attributable to
prejudices which their adherents owe to their social situation". Yet we should not assume
that ideologies are formulated with a conscious intention to deceive. "Conceptual content
should only be viewed as ideology when its adherents are subjectively and sincerely
convinced of its correctness, truth and goodness"97. This distinguishes "ideology" in a
negative sense from a spurious or counterfeit theory intended to mislead others to believe
in something that the perpetrators themselves do not. In this sense the word ideology refers
to "group-related truth-convictions which owe their strength not to evidence, but to
practical interests predicated on the belief that things truly are as one believes them to
be"98.
There is, however, also a value-free usage of the word "ideology", whereby it remains
an open question whether the thus designated statement system is true or not. In this
sense, "ideology" refers to a system of ideas which conveys to a group of people both a

and warm to keep their minds closed. When they argue and declare their beliefs, they do not so with the
scientific and rational desire for knowledge, but in order to persuade others and to increase their own sense
of certainty and security."
97 TOPITSCH (1959: 193); cf. also (1965: 17-36); (1966: 15-52, esp. 32).
98 LUBBE (1971: 160).
20 INTRODucnON

valuating interpretation of the world and the norms necessary for acting in that world99.
This concept of "ideology" expresses the same thing for groups that "world view"
("Weltanschauung") does for individuals: "an internally consistent value orientation in the
world"loo.
To avoid the ambiguous word "ideology" with its several easily misunderstood
meanings, one can also speak of a "rationalized belief system", a "dogmatic system of
convictions"IO\ or a "world view" ("Weltanschauung"). In a positive sense, ideology is a
"system of valuations" that is "interpreted as directives". In a negative sense, ideology is the
"concept of a theory which declares hidden valuations to be binding and valid; or
conversely, the concept of a societal or political interest which conceals itself behind a
facade of objectivity (i.e. as theory) and appears to naive souls in the seductive guise of
theoretical truth"I02. When statements of scientific pedagogics are designated as
"ideological", it is usually in the negative sense of the word. Serving as a criterion here is an
ideal of scientific knowledge which includes the postulate of refraining from value
judgements, or the principle of value-neutrality.
It is understandable that none of the ideological groups wishing to exert influence on
both youth and adults is interested in educational theories which strictly adhere to the
rules of scientific method. In dictatorships even tentative movements in this direction are
suppressed. But even in liberal states there are those who feel that strict adherence to
value relativism in scientific statements about education would be incompatible with the
moral responsibility for youth, their educators and the public welfare. Nor would such
people wish to reject partisan support for specific beliefs, normative prescriptions and
existential interpretations in scientific educational theories.
The reasons for this resistance to more rigorous scientific standards for pedagogics
do not, however, lie exclusively in ideological interests, in the political pressure exerted by
rulers, or in the moral zeal of individual educational theorists. It also happens that
educational practitioners have a personal interest in resisting the unrestricted study of
educational reality. Many such educators seem to be interested in scientific pedagogics
only insofar as it does not call into question their own behavior, their accustomed
educational practices, satisfaction with their own performance and a glorified picture of
their own institution. The root cause is not only bad faith, but also the understandable
need for security, justification and social recognition. Scientific investigation of the true
conditions prevailing in educational institutions arouses misgivings among all concerned

99 C£' LEMBERG (1974: 12 ff.); on the positive application of the word in Marxism, d. for example SCHAFF
(1973: 66). For the various concepts of ideology, cf. also BARION (1966).
100 BUSEMANN (1967: 27).
101 C£' ALBERT (1%9: 86 ff.).
102 DERBOlAV (1%8: 473 ff.).
 INTRODUCTION 21

parties, from nursery school teachers, youth counselors and school teachers, principals and
headmasters on up to government bureaucrats and politicians specializing in educational
policy. The reverse side of "pseudo-profound concern with the broad purposes of
education" is "a shocking unwillingness and inability on the part of teachers ... to evaluate
their own work"l03.
Most professional educators expect pedagogics to confirm the personal or collective
opinions with which they justify their praxis as proper and good. They have a societal
monopoly and are protected from competition on the free market. A public school does
not lose its students no matter now badly they are instructed. Most educational institutions
do not attract their clients because they are especially good, but because of compulsory
school attendance, because only diplomas can open the way to better jobs or because in
the absence of competition there is no alternative. Anyone who benefits from this situation
will view detailed studies on the subject as threatening. They have a vested interest in a
pedagogics which is poor in facts, which merely discusses basic concepts, which interprets
reality in philosophical terms and which vaguely calls attention to professional ethics with
agreeable but non-binding phrases. This sort of pedagogics strengthens the belief among
educators that they can simply carry on with their accustomed way of doing things104 .
Finally, when analyzing the reasons for the tenacious adherence of pedagogics to
ideological elements, we should remember that we are dealing not only with the
consumers of pedagogics, but also with the "professional producers and disseminators of
these intellectual creations". They, too, have a special interest in the continued influence of
ideology and they, too, "undertake the most intensive efforts to keep up the market value
of their article"105.
Ideological or world-view connections are nevertheless not typical of pedagogics
alone. They are also more or less evident in the history of most of the social and cultural
sciences. "The number of social science theories fully free from ideological admixtures was
in earlier times negligible, and even today one can still find systems which must be
addressed as classical ideologies"106.
These remarks on the ideological tendencies in pedagogics should not suggest that
normative or normative-descriptive pedagogical statement systems have no scientific value
and that empirical educational science must be built from the ground up. First of all, there
are "scarcely any ideological systems which do not contain at least a grain of empirical

103 LIEBERMAN (1965: 24 f.).

104 For other reasons for indifference and resistance on the part of teachers to educational research, cf.
LAZARSFELD and SIEBER (1964: 55 ff.).
105 TOPITSCH (1966: 50).
106 ALBERT (1956: 262).
22 INTRODUCTION

truth, and there is many an ideological edifice that may in this regard be more fruitful than
certain value-free theories"l07.
Secondly, it should be recalled that neither in science nor in philosophy can one start
without preconceptions and then proceed to observation and "pure" cognition. In this
sense, starting from universal doubt as recommended by DESCARlES is useless.
PEIRCE correctly raised the objection that "we cannot begin with complete doubt. We
must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have .... These prejudices are not to be
dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be
questioned .... A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt
what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for
it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim"108. This applies not only to philosophy, but
also mutatis mutandis to science. We must constantly begin with theoretical assumptions
which we temporarily accept without having tested them empirically. At first, one does not
even notice how many prejudices and mistakes these assumptions contain109• As a defense
against self-deception it is necessary to admit straightforwardly, as did POPPER, that
"science must begin with myths and the critique of myths"110. Science is thus all but
dependent on prescientific knowledge which is still unclear and full of mistakes.
In reality, ideologies and empirical scientific theories are not always mutually
exclusive. They can be regarded as ideal types, which in varying degrees are corresponded
to by actual statement systems. Both are statement systems, but they differ from one
another according to content, aim, methodological assumptions and the manner in which
they are supported.
In addition to factual statements that could be true or false, an ideology also contains
"essentialistic definitions", dogmas, value judgements and norms which can be tested
logically - if they can be tested at all - but never empirically. Usually it is difficult to
ascertain the logical structure of an ideology. An ideology presents a one-sided selection
and interpretation of facts based on certain ideas about ''what ought to be". The aim of
ideology is to teach what is important in life, to motivate its adherents to agree with a
world view and to satisfy their need for behavioral security and social belonging. Rather
than taking into account other possible views or changes in circumstances, an ideology is
justified as "true" and "correct" through appeals to an authority, a social convention or
subjectively convincing experiences ("evidence"). Ideology is held to steadfastly,
dogmatically, or even fanatically. Its adherents feel obligated to live according to its

107 ALBERT (1956: 262).

108 PEIRCE (1%5: 156 f.).
109 For a critique of the untenable ideal of a science free of all prior assumptions, d. among others POPPER
(1957, Vol. II: 212 ff.) and SCHUTZ (1962: 3 ff.).
110 POPPER (1%5a: 50); similarly POPPER (1%4: 92 f.).
 INTRODUCTION 23

precepts and to convince others of its truth. Believers speak and write about ideology in a
predominantly rhetorical-affective tone, in a language which is prescriptive, emotionally
conditioned, solemn, persuasive or exhortative111 •
An empirical scientific theory is a logically structured system of more or less well-
confirmed statements about a given area of reality. It contains descriptions and statements
of recurring patterns in reality (laws or nomological statements). Characteristic of
empirical scientific theory are hypotheses, Le. tentative claims which from the outset are
viewed as emendable and thus as only provisionally acceptedll2. The aim of empirical
scientific theory is to inform. Although scientific theories can also describe valuations, they
are intended to be neither valuating nor normative. A theory is held only tentatively until
it can be replaced by a better theory; it is an aid, an intermediate step in the never-ending
process of acquiring knowledge. It contains no demand for individuals to change their
behavior and is couched in descriptive, impartial, rational or cognitive language.
Pedagogical statement systems are located somewhere between the ideal types of
ideology (or Weltanschauung) and empirical scientific theory. Theories can develop out of
ideologies (or at least out of parts of ideologies), but conversely they can also take on
ideological characteristics113• This occurs when theories are placed above criticism and
become professions of belief.

REASONS FOR DISTINGUISHING BE1WEEN TYPES OF PEDAGOGICAL

KNOWLEDGE

No social group can do without norms and their ideological or world-view support114•
For that reason, a normative pedagogics interspersed with ideological or doctrinaire
elements fulfills a societal function that an empirical science of education cannot. It would
therefore be short-sighted to globally reject normative pedagogics. Nevertheless, it is time
we realized that traditional pedagogics has simultaneously had to serve all too many highly
disparate ends for it to have served each end equally well.
If we do not want to leave the future of our society to chance and that of our children
to mere iIldividual discretion, then education must be critically judged, and planned and

111 According to a compilation of features in an analysis of the relevant conceptual definitions by EASTMAN
(1967: 103 ff.). This conceptual content is approximately the same as the concept of Weltanschauung (world
view). "Weltanschauung" is understood by BARION (1966: 53) to mean "the closed whole of a person's or
group's convictions about the meaning of the world and human life, convictions which are to be realized in
the practical conduct of life".
112 On hypothesis, cr. V. KRAFf (1960: 241 ff.); BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 222 ff.).
113 EASTMAN (1967: 111 ff.) has presented this using as an example JOHN DEWEY's pedagogics, with
FREUD's psychoanalysis and SKINNER's operant behaviorism mentioned as further examples.
114 Cf. for example PARETO (1963, Vol. II: esp. 1345, § 1932); LEMBERG (1974).
24 INTRODUCTION

carried out in the most rational manner possible. We must know whether and under what
conditions educational actions and institutions are appropriate for their intended aims.
This can only be determined through empirical research and can only be expressed in
scientific theories115 • Reflection on proper aims, the philosophical interpretation of life as
a whole, instilling the motivation to act in a morally good way and the design of political
programs for education do not become superfluous because of this. Nevertheless,
experience in many areas has shown that the empirical knowledge needed to act rationally
can best be gained by following the rules of scientific method. If we want to overcome the
stagnation and relative unfruitfulness of pedagogics (as expressed in its meager
informational content), then we should also attempt to apply these rules in solving
educational problems.
This is however only possible through division of labor and specialization. An
empirical science of education must confine itself to a relatively limited range of subject
matter, and therein to those problems that can be handled with rational-empirical
methods. As an individual empirical science, educational science can neither carry out a
philosophical examination of the world and life as a whole from the point of view of
education, nor can it prove the validity of norms. Educational science is not responsible for
all questions which people ask about education. For that reason it is not only justified, but
also even indispensable for society, that in addition to an empirical science of education,
there also exist pedagogical statement systems which serve to establish aims of education,
professional ethics for educators or practical instructions for educating.
Anyone who views the purpose of science as the acquisition of knowledge need not
regret that the logical standards for scientific theories have become more rigorous in the
last few decades. Rather, it should be expected that greater methodological care exercised
in testing the productivity of ideas will soon lead to progress in theory itself. What sensible
grounds could there be for educational theory of all things to content itself with lesser
criteria, and, under the ambiguous name "pedagogics"116, continue to advocate a vague
scientific character for a mixture of hypothetical, dogmatic, descriptive and normative
elements? That traditional pedagogics has thus far contributed little to our knowledge of
education appears attributable to its having precisely this mixed character.
Knowledge can only be acquired when we formulate clear, specialized questions and
treat related questions together. This is the reason for my suggestion not to continue with
the traditional form of pedagogics, but instead to distribute its tasks among three broad
fields of activity, which can be designated (1) science of education (or educational science),

115 Cf. BREZINKA (1981: 21 ff. and 76 ff.).

116 On the ambiguous character of the word pedagogics cr. MEISTER (1965: 42 ff.); ERLINGHAGEN (1963
and 1965); DOHMEN (1966).
 INTRODUCTION 25

(2) philosophy of education, and (3) practical pedagogics (or praxiology of education). In the
place of an ambiguous catch-all discipline which is simultaneously represented as
scientific, philosophical and practical (although it cannot be all of these at the same time),
there should emerge three statement systems. They correspond to three classes of
pedagogical knowledge which are distinguishable on the basis of an analysis of statements
dealing with education. These classes of pedagogical knowledge are scientific,
philosophical and practical. These three forms of knowledge have different bases and
serve different purposes; none can be replaced by another. Instead of speaking about
classes of pedagogical knowledge we can also speak of classes of educational theory. This
tripartite classification is based on the three different theoretical perspectives regarding
educational problems which have been dealt with above: scientific, philosophical and
practical. The three perspectives correspond to three classes of educational theory.
The specific character of each of these three classes of educational theory will be
accorded separate treatment in each main section of this book. It should be stressed once
more that my primary interest here lies in differentiating pedagogical statement systems
and not simply in replacing traditional pedagogics with an empirical educational science.
Not only scientific, but also philosophical and practical problems arise in educating.
Although these problems lie outside the framework of educational science, they are of no
less importance for society. Above all, the moral problems of education deserve a much
more thorough treatment than has been given up until now, and then not only in
analytical, descriptive and comparative terms, but also normatively in the sense of creating
and justifying a system of ethics for educatorsl17 • likewise, it seems to me unquestionable
that an educational science neutral with regard to world views cannot replace practical
theories of education, which must necessarily be influenced by world views. Important here
is simply that the most important classes of educational theories must be separated from
one another as clearly as possible. This is necessary in order that the different tasks which
they serve can be fulfilled better than is possible when a confused mixture of scientific,
philosophical and practical aims are simultaneously pursued in one and the same
discipline.
Before explaining the differences among science of education, philosophy of
education and practical pedagogics in more detail, I would like to emphasize that in
scientific terms, what is important is a theory's content and not its name. We could also
call empirical or scientific pedagogics "Pedagogics}" and philosophical and practical
pedagogical statement systems "Pedagogics2" and "Pedagogics3" if this would ease
communication. In any case, presuming to use a designation such as "science of education"

117 F. SCHNEIDER (1940) called this a "professional ethics fOT pedagogues", SPRANGER (1951)
"educational ethics" and DERBOLAV (1971) called it "pedagogical ethics".
26 INTRODUCTION

or "educational science" does not mean that the sets of statements thus designated actually
have scientific character. Hidden behind the promising title, "Critique of Pedagogics as
Proof of the Necessity of a General Science of Education", bestowed on a 1798 treatise by
RITIER, there lies a prOgram hostile to empiricism and calling for the purely deductive
foundation of "educational science" on FICHlE's speculative philosophy118. PElERSEN,
too, did not have the goal of an empirical science in mind when he used the formula "From
Pedagogics to Educational Science", but rather the "turning away from Southern,
rationally-directed thought to a Nordic-realistic philosophizing whose prime concern is
reality"119. For him, "~ducational science" begins "~th a metaphysics of education"; i~ task
is "to answer the question ... of human being and existence. In doing so it has broke~ with
all positivistic scienc~s from the very start"120. "The human ideal. the so-called ideal of
education, is gained through the science of education"l21.
Such statements about "educational science" should warn us not to be deceived by
mere names. That metaphysics can be met with where science has been promised shows
that naming is not an indifferent practice in social reality. As LOCHNER has complained,
not only does much appear under the cover name "pedagogics" that has nothing at all to do
with actual science, but also under the name "educational science" itselfl22 • Thus, agreement
on the use of terms is urgently needed if false expectations are not to continue being
created in readers and listeners.
As with the differentiation of pedagogical statement systems, the problem of the
practical designation of terms is not confined to Germany, but is international. In the
United States, for example, there is still no other generally accepted term for the
"academic study of education" than the ambiguous expression "foundations of education".
The subject matter taught under this name corresponds approximately to that of the
traditional European "pedagogics". On both continents the view is spreading that "the
found~tions of education represents a somewhat unscholarly field". ''The absence of an
integrated body of scholarly knowledge" is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that "there is
simply no general agreement as yet on what should constitute the basic subject matter of
an introductory foundations of education course. Unlike the situation in other academic
fields, the content of the existing introductory courses does vary markedly from university
to university and from instructor to instructor."I23

118 RITTER (1798).

119 PETERSEN (1943: 19).
120 PE;rERSEN (1953: 17).
121 PETERSEN (1951: 9 f.).
122 LOCHNER (1%3: 55).
123 LASKA (1%9: 183 f.).
 INTRODUCTION 27

This much-discussed situation, which threatens to lead to the abandonment of the

"foundations of education" and the dispersion of pedagogical knowledge among
neighboring disciplines, can nevertheless not simply be disposed of by giving the field a
new name such as "educational studies", "educology", or "educationology"124. Progress
towards a relatively autonomous empirical educational science can only be expected when
the epistemological bases of current "pedagogics" are critically analyzed and
methodological decisions are made which exclude the continued mixing of scientific
statements with ethical or political demands, ideological doctrines and practical
educational instructions 125 . This alone is of course not enough; rather, criticism of and
reflection on methodology must be followed by the drafting of a system of educational
science which will demonstrate how the problems of this widely ramified area relate to one
another.
As in Europe and in the United States, there have also recently been efforts in Japan
to raise the level of scientific pedagogics by applying more rigorous methodological
criteria. MURAl, for example, calls for a "rejection of the traditional, vague concept of
pedagogics"126. In his view, "a theory of how we ought to educate" must be distinguished
from science. MURAl appeals here to the distinction between empirical knowledge of
facts and value judgements: "the temptation to engage in unlimited pedagogical
speculation" arises because "matters actually belonging to the sphere of values are viewed
as objective knowledge". Due to the neglect of this distinction, Japanese pedagogics has
been "considerably hindered on its way to becoming a science"127.
Following these references to the international character of the basic crisis in
pedagogics and attempts to solve it, it must still be emphasized that we are dealing here
with the logical differentiation of statement systems and not with the classification of
individuals. The classification of a pedagogical statement system under the category of
"philosophy of education" or "practical pedagogics" as such does not justify denying its
originators the right to call themselves scientists. Because of the philosophical nature of
many problems arising in the educational process, as well as the demands involved in
training educators and advising politicians, many educational theorists devote their efforts

124 Cf. LASKA (1969: 186).

125 It is worth noting that sharp criticism of traditional pedagogics is not generally accompanied by the
readiness of critics to better it by setting forth a pedagogics based on the methodological rules of the
empirical sciences. Frequently, such criticism is nothing more than the attempt to replace one form of
practical pedagogics (which the critics, depending on their particular political or ideological position, regard
as obsolete, bad or at least worthy of criticism) with another. For examples of this politically committed type
of practical pedagogics under a "scientific" banner, cf. SHIELDS (1968 and 1969) in the American
pedagogical literature and MOLLENHAUER (1968), GAMM (1972 and 1974) in the German.
126 MURAl (1969: 73).
127 MURAl (1969: 69).
28 INTRODUCTION

more to the philosophy of education, practical pedagogics or suggestions for educational

policy than to educational science per se l28 •
There is no reason why educologists should not be involved in a wide variety of
activities. What matters is that the statements they make should not be misleading.
Philosophy, practical pedagogics or political programs should be designated as such, and
should not be endowed with scientific prestige through the use of imprecise or false
nomenclature. Because the boundaries of thought do not coincide with those of science, it
would be unjustified to universally devaluate non-scientific pedagogical statement systems
as inferior, unimportant or even superfluous. Rather, in each case it must be determined
to what extent their statements are empirically substantial, theoretically productive and
practically applicable.
Even if our judgement of a statement is negative, it should still be taken into
consideration that the logically and empirically determinable truth of a statement system and
its social usefulness are two different things. "A theory that is experimentally true may be
now advantageous, now detrimental, to society: and the same applies to a theory that is
experimentally false"129. One can imagine the uses that a practical pedagogics formulated
in accord with a certain world view has for its followers, or the harm that a practical
pedagogics based on atheistic, rationalistic or relativistic principles can cause in a religious
community. From this it follows that in practical terms, even pedagogical conceptions
which are partially untestable, not accessible to logical refutation13O or even false should
not immediately be dismissed as useless or senseless per se.

CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE AND MElliODOLOGICAL RULES AS STIPULATIONS

The word "science" is used in an number of senses. First, it can mean a system of
statements about a certain area of study which stand together in a mutually justifying
relationship 13l. In this sense there is no one "science" as such, but rather only a number of
individual sciences existing side-by-side in different stages of development.
Secondly, science can refer to the activities through which knowledge is acquired. In
this sense, the term refers to the sum of procedures used to test propositions and to create
logically correct statement systems dealing with given areas of study. These procedures

128 My books Erziehung als Lebenshilfe (1957) [Education as an Aid to Living], Erziehung - Kunst des
MiigIichen (1960) (Education - the Art of the Possible] and Erziehung in einer wertunsicheren
GeseUschaft (1986) (Education in a value-uncertain society] are thus not conlnbutions to educational
science, but rather to practical pedagogics (or the praxiology of education).
129 PARETO (1963: 171, § 249).
130 cr. POPPER (1963).
131 cr. DIEMER (1979: 216 ff.).
 INTRODUCTION 29

follow certain rules which are valid for all sciences, namely the general rules of scientific
method. Whether an intellectual activity is scientific or non-scientific depends on whether
these rules are observed.
According to this view, there are not only differences between the sciences, but also
similarities 132• The individual sciences differ according to the problems they are intended
to solve (or according to their subject matter) and the special procedures or research
techniques appropriate to these problems. In one area, chemical analyses may be
necessary; in another, historical source criticism or interviews. However, these differences
do not exclude the possibility that all the individual sciences also belong together, that we
can speak simply of "science". The unity of science can be achieved through an agreement
encompassing two problem areas: first, in regard to the determination of the aims or tasks of
science, and secondly in regard to the general rules ofscientific method. On the basis of such
an agreement, it is possible to distinguish science from such other spheres of human
activity as politics, economics, education, art or religion.
Science was created by man, and therefore its characteristics, tasks and methods are
not rigidly fixed for all time. These must rather be determined in some fashion, and there
are no absolute standards to guide our choice. We are dealing here with decisions which
can be rationally justified, but which can also be made differently if different interests are
involved.
In order to understand the partisan struggles over various_ conceptions of science
which are being fought in the humanities and social sciences, it is necessary to know that
the dispute is not about the knowledge of an "essence" of science existing independently of
man, but rather about an ideal created by man and requiring general recognition. Here we
are dealing with the establishment of norms for that which should be recognized as science.
For that reason the philosophy of science, which is a branch of epistemology, is not an
empirical science, but similar to ethics, a normative philosophical discipline: "it does not
reveal what is, but rather sets aims and norms for intellectual activity". It "defines the
characteristics which something must have in order to be accepted as knowledge". Based
on these criteria, the techniques actually used in acquiring knowledge are then tested
through logical analysis133•
Since the philosophy of science has a normative basis, it is possible to establish
different norms regarding science, the acquisition of knowledge, truth, validity,
justification, etc. Accordingly, there are a number of competing basic positions or "schools"
of philosophy of science. In German-speaking countries, the currently most important are

132 For an analysis of these commonalities, cf. WOHLGENANNT (1969); WEINGARTNER (1971: 51 ff.).
133 V. KRAFT (1960: 32 ff.). On the normative-descriptive character of the philosophy of science, cf. also
STEGMULLER (1973: 8 ff.) and KAPLAN (1964: 6 ff.).
30 INTRODUCTION

analytical, hermeneutical and dialectical philosophyl34. In the last few years, however, the
hermeneutical and dialectical orientations have converged, and both agree on a rejection
of analytic philosophy135. At least in regard to the philosophy of science we can thus
simplify the matter by speaking of two main orientations: analytic and hermeneutical-
dialectical metascience l36.
These theoretical "schools" are not internally consistent, closed or unchangeable, but
rather many-faceted, relatively open and in a constant state of flux. Nor are their teachings
in every respect mutually exclusive, they are in part reconcilable. In any case, one must
reckon with the fact that "there are not one, but many reconstructional possibilities
regarding the thing we call scientific cognition, and that we can perhaps never achieve a
complete overview of all these possibilities"l37. On the other hand, in spite of the diversity
of opinions concerning specialized questions, there are a relatively few basic
epistemological positions which must be decided upon when constructing or reconstructing
an individual science.
This selection is not made arbitrarily, but is rather based upon practical
considerations as to which methodological determinations prove most productive for the
acquisition of knowledge. At the beginning, a decision should be made about the goal,
purpose, task or desired result of science. For practical reasons our choice cannot be
completely free, but is bound to the area already demarcated by the conventionally
accepted rules for the use of the word "science". The basic meaning of this word has been
determined by tradition, according to which science is concerned with cognition. The
scientist seeks to gain knowledge, not to shape the world or influence people. He acts
theoretically, not practically. The goal of scientific activity is knowledge, and in the
empirical sciences, both natural and social, it is knowledge about reality. What, however,
does knowledge consist of and how is it acquired?
In the course of history many different things have been referred to and recognized
as "knowledge", from primitive creation myths and belief in the powers of nature to
superstitious misconceptions about diseases and their causes and cures, from alchemy and
astrology to the theories found today in scientific textbooks. Religious teachings,
metaphysical interpretations of the world, and political ideologies have also been passed
off as knowledge, and they are often still considered such todayl38.

134 a. RADNITZKY (1968).

135 a. ALBERT (1971: 54).
136 This has also been done by RADNITZKY (1968, Vol. 2: 39 f.). A clear treatment of both orientations is
given by FUALKOWSKI (1967).
137 STEGMULLER (1969: xxii).
138 Cf. TOPITSCH (1969).
 INTRODUCfION 31

A common feature of all "knowledge" found in the history of culture is that it consists
of assertions which are considered true or were at least at one time considered true139•
This does not mean, of course, that all such statements really are true. Much of what is
claimed to be knowledge is false. Obviously, a distinction must be made between real and
ostensible knowledge. Whether something is rightly or wrongly presented as knowledge
must be verified. If we were simply to agree with a given claim and made no test of its
truth, we would be defenseless against mistakes, deceptions and lies.
In order to test supposed knowledge, we need a standard, a means for making
distinctions or a criterion. This criterion cannot be empirically discovered in the world of
facts, but can only be introduced as an arbitrary human determination. It is thus up to us to
determine what should be accepted as knowledge. As with the concept of science, the
concept of cognition is normative. With the help of this concept, norms are established
which serve as a yardstick for judging statements. A norm makes a demand or claim: it
states that something ought to have certain characteristics or ought to be done in a certain
manner. The concept of cognition specifies what features something must have to be
accepted as cognition. Depending on what aim has been set, the cognitive norm can be
variously defined. Thus, there are different types of cognition (prescientific cognition,
aesthetic responses to the world, valuating cognition and scientific cognition)l40. Of these
forms of cognition, scientific cognition is the most productive: its aim is to increase our
knowledge of the world.
This aim cannot be reached in an arbitrary fashion. Methodological rules or
stipulations are attempts to indicate the conditions under which the aim of scientific
cognition can best be attained. They are norms to which researchers should orient
themselves if they want to succeedl4l • How useful they are becomes apparent only after
they have been applied, and only when they have proven themselves in research practice
do they deserve to be accepted (at least until more useful rules are found).
With these conditions in mind and having weighed the consequences of various
concepts of cognition and science, I have decided for the epistemology of analytic
philosophy in the broadest sense of the word. I will thus treat the metatheory of education
from the standpoint of modern revised empiricism, termed "constructivism" by KRAFT142
or "theoretism,,143 by POPPER. By modem empiricism I mean the previously outlinedl44

139 Cf. in regard to this V. KRAFT (1960: 5 ff.).

140 Cf. LEINFELLNER (1967: 11 ff. and 182 ff.).
141 Cf. POPPER (1977: 49 ff.); V. KRAFT (1968: 12 ff.).
142 Cf. V. KRAFT (1960: 369); (1968: 46 ff.).
143 POPPER (1965a: 63). This term seems to me to be less open to misunderstanding than "critical
rationalism", which to be sure is used by POPPER much more frequently. The analytic philosophy of
science owes important impulses to POPPER, but "critical rationalism" as championed by POPPER and
ALBERT is only one orientation among others. In particular, the core of the theory - so-called
32 INTRODUCTION

concept according to which knowledge of the world cannot be acquired purely from
observational results (inductivism, classical neopositivism145) or from rational insights
independent of experience (apriorism, classical rationalism), but rather only by means of
"constructive hypotheses" which can be empirically tested. This epistemological standpoint
can be considered a synthesis of rationalism, empiricism and pragmatism146• The reader
can learn more about this viewpoint in the writings of VICTOR KRAFT, KARL
RAIMUND POPPER, CARL GUSTAV HEMPEL, HERBERT FEIGL, ERNEST
NAGEL, MARIO BUNGE, WOLFGANG STEGMOLLER, GEORG HENRIK von
WRIGHT, HANS ALBERT, ERNST TOPITSCH, HANS LENK, RUDOLF
WOHLGENANNT, PAUL WEINGARTNER, KARL ACHAM, WOLFGANG ROD
and others.
The general rules of scientific method set forth by these theoreticians are not
infallible, but up to now there do not seem to be any others which could better help to
achieve the aims of science 147• The natural sciences have long followed these rules, and in
the humanities and social sciences they have also proven usefuI148• The claim is sometimes
made that the investigation of nature on one side and socio-cultural reality, on the other,
are so different that the same methodological rules cannot be used for both, but such
claims are for the most part based on a misunderstanding149 • As soon as one distinguishes
between the general rules of scientific method and specific object-, problem- or subject-
specific research techniques, this question becomes less problematical. One can then regard
scientific method as a research strategy and specific research techniques as research
tactics 150•
In view of the knowledge which has already been acquired through the application of
scientific method in various disciplines, there is reason to believe that it can also be used
to clarify and solve educational problems. This expectation is the basis for my suggestion
that in the future we should carefully distinguish among science of education, philosophy
of education and practical pedagogics. In establishing a science of education, the general
rules of scientific method should be observed.

falsificationism - is highly controversial. Cf. STRaKER (1968) and (1973: 88 ff.); STEGMULLER (1971:
20 ff. and 1973: 288 ff.).
144 Cf. p. 17 of this book.
145 For criticism of this, see FEYERABEND (1965) and (1967); BOHNEN (1972).
146 Cf. LEINFELLNER (1967: 17 ff.).
147 Cf. BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 11).
148 That the observance of these rules is also important for the historical disciplines has been demonstrated by
V. KRAFT (1965) among others.
149 HABERMAS (1967) (among others) champions this view. For criticism of this position, see TOPITSCH
(1965: 65 ff.); ALBERT (1972: 195 ff.).
150 Cf. BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 14 ff.); on the difference between the scientific method and specific, object-
oriented research techniques ef. also R. KONIG (1968: 18 ff.).
 INTRODUCTION 33

THE TASKS OF A METATHEORY OF EDUCATION

A theory of the type discussed in this book has as its subject matter not education,
but rather the theories which have been formulated about education. It assumes that there
are existing educational theories; as a "theory of educational theories", it is located on a
higher theoretical plane. Since it follows or "comes after" educational theories, it is called a
metatheory (from the Greek word "meta", meaning "after" or "afterwards").
In a metatheory of education, educational theories are examined from a logical and
methodological perspective. Metatheory is thus logic applied to educational theories l5l • A
metatheory of education is a descriptive, critical and normative theory of those statement
systems dealing with education. Although it is claimed that these statement systems contain
knowledge, it can never be determined in advance whether or to what degree this claim is
true; rather, this must be tested from case to case. Necessary for such a test are criteria,
rules and norms. To find these criteria, rules or norms, to weigh their comparative
advantages and disadvantages, to precisely define and validate them are essential tasks of
a metatheory of education.
This task can only be fulfilled when we start from previous attempts to acquire
educational or pedagogical knowledge. It is first necessary to become familiar with existing
educational theories and to investigate the intentions with which they were developed and
the way they have been constructed. It is especially important thereby to test whether the
concepts used are sufficiently clear and the statements understandable, and how (or
whether) attempts to validate them have been made. In doing so, we often find relatively
serious logical deficiencies. However, we can only speak of deficiencies when existing
educational theories are measured against a norm specifying what educational theories
should be. Thus, it is unavoidable that already in describing theories we will be guided by
logical criteria and will make judgements about the value of the educational theories we
have described.
The exposure of theoretical deficiencies has the purpose of gaining insight into how
better theories could be created. If it is known in what respect educational theories are
deficient, the causes of their deficiency can be sought. In doing so, we will not only
discover avoidable errors, but also difficulties arising from the subject matter of these
theories, or from the practical purposes for which such theories have been designed.
Under certain circumstances, the investigation of such difficulties can then result in new
methodological knowledge and suggestions, for example, that it would be expedient to
harmonize theoretical educational programs with more realistic goals, to introduce

151 For the identification of the philosophy of science as metatheory and as applied logic, d. STEGMULLER
(1973: 1 ff.).
34 INTRODUCTION

previously neglected distinctions or to subject-specifically differentiate crude

methodological rules which were initially used as criteria.
Research on the metatheory of education cannot directly increase our knowledge of
education. It can, however, contribute to a clearer understanding of whether existing
educational theories fulfill their purpose, and can help us determine which rules could be
expedient in formulating useful educational theories.
The relationships which exist among education, educational theories, and the
metatheory of education are shown in the following diagram:
 INTRODUCTION 35

Level I : - - - - - - - - > education

object ( German: Erziehung)

> scientific theories of

education = science of
education or
educational science
(German:
Erziehungswissenschaf~)

Level II: ------+--> philosophical theories of

theories of education =
education philosophy of education
(German: Padagogik (German: Philosophie der
English: pedagogics, Erziehung)
pedagogy or
educology 152)

> practical theories of

education = praxiology of
education or
practical pedagogics
( German: Prak~ische
Plidagogik)

Level I I I : > meta-educology

theory of (German: Me~a-Plidagogik
educational theories or Metatheorie der
(theories of pedagogics Erziehung)
or educology)

SCHEMA: Relationships among education, theories of education (educology) and the theory of educational
theories (meta-educology)

152 In this schema the use of the English term edllcology follows that of ELIZABETH STEINER MACCIA
(1969) (she has also published in the name of ELIZABETH STEINER) who, working independently of
myself, set forth a plan for the differentiation of pedagogical sentence systems which agrees with a
suggestion I published in 1966. Cf. BREZINKA (1966: 8 ff.).
I. SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

(German: Erziehungswissenschaft; French: la science de l'education; Italian: la scienza

dell' educazione; Spanish: ciencia de la educaci6n; Russian: nauka 0 vospitanii)

Education is the art of the possible ...; educational science

prefers the study of the real, possible and necessary to
speculation about the perfect.
ADOLF BUSEMANN (1932)1

As far as I know, the first attempt to explicitly identify pedagogics as an empirical

social science and to differentiate it from philosophy and "educational teachings" was
made by OTTO WILLMANN (1839 - 1920), during his early period of critical thought. In
a 1876 lecture in Prague, WILLMANN - contrary to the accepted views of his time -
explained that: "Pedagogics can only be dealt with scientifically as part of the social
sciences"z. Accordingly, it must limit itself to statements concerning social and cultural
facts. Scientific pedagogics "does not regulate or instruct, but rather explains; it deals with
what is; it explains education as fact in accordance with its societal and psychological side";
it does not determine ''what ought to happen"3. It is an empirical, analytical, inductive and
explanatory science4 •
Writing in 1911, EMILE DURKHEIM (1858 - 1917) differentiated in a similar
manner between a theoretical social science of education and a "practical theory" for
educators. The former describes and explains education as fact and is called "science of
education"; the latter includes "guiding ideas" and procedural rules for educators, and is
referred to as "pedagogy"s.

1 BUSEMANN (1932: 5 f.).

Z WILLMANN (1876: 261). For interpretation d. PFEFFER (1962: 103 ff. and 150 ff.).
3 WILLMANN (1875: 22).
4 WILLMANN (1875: 14 ff.; 1876: 263 ff.). For a commentary on his relapse into a dualistic normative-
descriptive pedagogics (presumably caused by his religious conversion), d. WILLMANN (1957: 44 ff.). In
his old age, WILLMANN even went so far as to identify "scientific pedagogics" with "philosophical
pedagogics". He ascribed to the former the task of determining the "essence" of education and claimed that
"Christian educational wisdom is the guideline for scientific pedagogics". Cf. WILLMANN (1903: 42);
similarly in WILLMANN (1898: 54): "Only an educational theory conforming to Christianity can rise to the
level of science".
S Cf. DURKHEIM (1956: 91 ff.). Cf. also in this book p. 210 ff.
38 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

In the German-speaking world, it was above all RUDOLF LOCHNER (1895 - 1978)
who since 1934 advocated a careful distinction between science of education (Erziehungs-
wissenschaft) as a "science of facts" and "educational teachings" (Erziehungslehre). "The
goal of science of education does not lie in influencing educational procedure, but
rather ... in recognizing existing realities"6.
These early programs for an empirical science of education shared the common
demand that future attempts to gather knowledge about education should also follow the
general rules of scientific method. It has always been generally accepted that attempts to
make human beings better or more complete pose numerous practical problems of
valuation and norm-setting. Value judgements must be made concerning the aims or ends
of education, i.e. concerning the psychic dispositions which the educand should acquire.
Moral and technical norms must be established which educators can use as guidelines.
Because of the normative-practical nature of its problems, pedagogics was long regarded
as a mere practical teaching of the art of education, as a Kunstlehre 7 instead of a science.
If attempts are made to establish an empirical science of education in addition to
pedagogical theories of the art of education (or "educational teaching"), some light must
first be shed on the subject matter and principal problems of this science. The best way to
begin is by examining the concept of education and the diversity of educational
phenomena.

THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION

Man has an extensive behavioral repertoire, including those actions designated as

"education". What makes educational actions different from other actions? Primarily the
ends which the given actors are pursuing. Their actions are motivated by a definite goal:
they wish to produce a certain effect in one or more other persons. Educational actions are
thus directed at fellow human beings: They are interpersonal or social actions. The person
who educates is called an "educator" and the person educated, an "educand"8. In
pedagogical terminology this person is also the "pupil", the "object of education", or
"addressee of education".
The end result desired by educators is a certain personality state. Educators
endeavor to assist educands in acquiring and retaining certain abilities, skills, knowledge,
attitudes, sentiments and convictions. This can involve a wide variety of experiential and

6 LOCHNER (1934: 2). Cf. also in this book p. 212 ff.

7 Cf. p. 11 in this book.
8 From the Latin educandus meaning the one to be educated. The term derives from the gerundive educare
meaning to educate.
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 39

behavioral readinesses or propensities which can be grouped together in the concept of

psychic disposition. By this is meant a relatively enduring readiness to experience certain
things and to behave in certain ways which underlies the flux of transitory experience and
behavior. Such dispositions cannot be perceived directly, but rather can only be inferred
from introspection and observation of other people's behavior. Everyone who educates
aims at influencing the structure of educands' psychic dispositions. In many cases
educators seek to assist educands in acquiring new dispositions which they do not yet
possess; in other cases they may seek to retain, strengthen, improve or extend already
existing dispositions which they regard as positive. In a third group of cases they attempt to
weaken, reduce or eliminate already existing dispositions which they regard as negative,
and in a fourth group of cases, they seek to prevent the formation of dispositions which
they consider negative.
The act of educating is always concerned with influencing the "inner life" of the
educand, with "improving" or "determining" it9 • Education is inconceivable without our
taking into account the relationship between cause and effect, the "causal relationship
between educator and pupil"lO. Education is perceived as a "shaping of the souI"11; as an
"art" which "shapes" a person "in order that he receive the proper form"12. "Education
consists of a long series of actions whose ends do not lie in themselves, but rather in the
final goal at which they are directed; this final goal is a relatively self-contained structure
of the inner life which is to be impressed upon the pupil"13. Education is the "attempt ... to
change something about a person"14.
Educators ascribe a certain value to the effect which is to be produced in the
educand. All those who educate wish to make their educands in some respect better, more
complete, or more capable than they already are. Educators view as positive the psychic
dispositions which they aim to produce or strengthen, as negative those which they wish to
discourage, eliminate, or prevent. These valuations can be arrived at habitually or after
consideration. In any case, it is assumed that educands will be better and more worthwhile
persons if they reach (or at least approach) the psychic state planned for them by the
educator. The standard of valuation is thereby the respective educator's (and his
employer's) system of values.

9 ZILLER (1901: 113 and 115). cr. HERBART (1919, Vol. 3: 597): "The educator is unavoidably a
determinist, although at the same time he can be modest enough not to believe that the whole
determination lies within his power".
10 ZILLER (1901: 14).
11 HEGEL (1%5: 88).
12 HERBART (1919, Vol. 3: 291).
13 WAlTZ (1898: 65).
14 ZILLER (1901: 78).
40 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

The state which the educator wishes to produce in the educand is usually called the
aim or end of educational action, i.e. the "educational aim". It can involve a specific psychic
disposition or a relatively complicated structure of such dispositions, i.e. either separate
areas of the personality or its general state taken as a whole. I am referring to what
educators are expected to accomplish and what they intend. It is important to make clear
that the state educators intend to produce can be identified and examined independently of
whether it is the effect they ought to produce. If one wants to avoid the concept of norms
with its related problems, educational aims can be viewed as images of human beings as
someone would like them to be, as imagined and desired states of personality, or as
models.
Educational aims are usually regarded as norms, i.e. as normative postulates or
prescriptions. This means that the educand ought to reach the state of personality which
the educator (and possibly the educand himself) wishes to achieve. Norms asserting that
something "ought to be" can be called "ideals", as opposed to norms claiming that
something "ought to be done"15. Often an educational aim is also conceived of as an "ought"
state in contrast to an "is" state of the personality. In our present context it is sufficient to
note that education can only take place if it is possible to compare the present personality
state of a person with the concept of an in some respect more complete personality state
which the educator wishes to bring about. In other words, a given person is contrasted with
an ideal of what that person should be.
To be sure, educators often have unclear conceptions of the aims for whose sake
educational actions are performed. Often they quite carelessly identify the educational
aims in question with whatever knowledge, abilities and attitudes they imagine themselves
to have. In other cases, aims become so vague and so inexactly defined that it is hard to see
why certain educational actions are considered appropriate means for achieving given ends
(for example "the realization of absolute reason in man"16). Educational actions are in
most cases habitual, "customary"17, or "traditional action"18. Although educators'
conceptions of their aims may be blurred, and although they may be only half-conscious of
the relationships between causes and effects and between ends and means, they can still
experience their efforts as meaningful goal-directed or aim-oriented. In any case, only
actions for which this is true can be considered educational.
The essential features of the concept of education explained above can be
summarized in the following definition: Education is defined as those actions through which

15 Cf. BREZINKA (1990: 138 ff.).

16 VOGEL (1881: 49).
17 LOCHNER (1934: 41).
18 MAX WEBER (1972: 12).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 41

human beings attempt to produce lasting improvements in the structure of the psychic
dispositions of other people, to retain components they consider positive or to prevent the
formation of dispositions they regard as negative 19 • For brevity's sake the word "personality"
can be substituted for "structure of psychic dispositions".
This concept of education is a quite comprehensive one at a high level of abstraction.
Though limited in content it covers a broad range of phenomena. The concept contains
only a few features, but precisely this makes it applicable to many objects which, although
sharing these features, are otherwise quite disparate. Education cannot be as easily
observed as actions like writing, ploughing or sawing. Nor is it a concrete activity always
occurring in the same way. Rather, many different types of action can be designated
"educational" as long as they are characterized by an intention to in some respect lastingly
improve the structure of other people's psychic dispositions. A simple glance at the real
world shows us that a wide variety of attempts are indeed made to change human beings in
accordance with certain ends. In one case the means may be reward, in another,
punishment; here, social isolation; there, integration into a group; now advice; or again a
command.
If concepts denoting actions are placed on an axis between the poles "concrete" and
"abstract", it will be apparent that the concept of education lies at as high a level of
abstraction as concepts like "working", "administrating", "playing" or "celebrating". These
concepts cover a vast number of distinct phenomena but contain no exact description of
them. On the contrary, left out of or abstracted from them are precisely those attributes
which constitute the uniqueness of a particuldr phenomenon. These highly general or
abstract concepts are useful because they help us to conceptually order the confusing
diversity of phenomena by grouping together things having certain common features.
Nevertheless, when using such general concepts it should be kept in mind that they are
mental images or constructs, products of abstraction to which nothing in the real world
corresponds; they include only those features contained in the basic concept and exclude a
wide variety of others.
Having clarified the concept of education, we must proceed to a presentation of the
multiplicity of educational phenomena. Only on this basis is it possible to understand the
difficulty of creating pedagogical theories.

19 Cf. the detailed explication of this defmition in BREZINKA (1990: 70 ff.).

42 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

THE VARIETY OF EDUCATIONAL PHENOMENA

Many phenomena included in the concept of education are designated not with the
word "education", but with semantically related words 2o • In English, this includes primarily
those actions denoted by the words "upbringing", "teaching", "instruction", "schooling" and
"training". However, actions that can be completely or at least partially categorized as
education include those designated as "psychotherapy", "behavioral conditioning",
"probation counseling", "resocialization", "rehabilitation", ''youth counseling", "social work",
"group therapy", "family therapy", "leadership training", "missionary work", "pastoral care",
"catechising", "preaching", "propaganda", "indoctrination", "manipulation" and "agitation"
They are educational actions because through them attempts are made to produce a
lasting improvement in the structure of another human being's psychic dispositions, to
retain components considered positive or to prevent the formation of components
considered negative.
Here we are not concerned with the question of whether everyone considers a given
aimed-for result to be positive. The decisive factor in the classification of an action as
"educational" is simply that the desired result should be considered positive by the persons
who intend to bring it about, i.e. it must be in accord with their value system. Thus, for
example, a non-believer would disapprove of actions intended to instill in another person
belief in a personal God, divine revelation, the resurrection of the dead and eternal life.
Such actions must nonetheless be classified as educational because the persons performing
them are convinced of the value of the personality state they wish to bring about. On the
other hand, although practising Christians and Moslems would be horrified by actions
intended to foster atheistic beliefs, attempts to convert human beings to atheism or to
preserve atheistic attitudes which they already possess nevertheless are denoted by the
concept of education.
This also applies in essence to the evaluation of the means used to improve the
structure of other persons' psychic dispositions. The custom among primitive peoples of
inflicting pain on their warriors to toughen them for battle may seem cruel from a
humanistic and pacifist point of view, but this does not change the fact that such actions
are educational. A liberal may express moral reservations when educands are shielded
from challenges to the validity of the religious, ideological, moral or political dogmas of
their society, and when submissiveness is rewarded and criticism punished. From the
standpoint of a liberal value system, such actions are condescendingly termed "mechanical
training", "manipulation" or "indoctrination". Such names make clear that the speaker

20 Cf. DOLCH (1961).

 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 43

regards these actions as negative. However, in no way does this mean that these actions
are not "educational".
In order to gain some perspective on the diversity of educational phenomena, we
must avoid the ethnocentric tendency to regard as education only those actions consistent
with our personal or culture-specific opinions, i.e. with our view of which personality
characteristics are desirable and which actions are permissible for their realization. What
is important is not the ends and means we consider positive or negative, but rather what a
given actor wants. The basic concept we are dealing with here, the scientific concept of
education, is thus so broad and so value-neutral that it can be applied to all societies and
all historical periods.
The variety of educational phenomena can be seen both by observing the present
and looking back through history. We can benefit from looking beyond the limits of our
own cultural environment and examining foreign societies with different cultures. The best
way to start is to ask: who educates whom, under what circumstances, towards what aim,
and in what manner? Thus, we are concerned with investigating the nature of the aim (the
intended or desired structure of the educand's dispositions), the object (educand), the
subject (educator), the socio-cultural circumstances (situation) and the manner (form) of
education. Each of these phenomena appears in a variety of different guises. A few
examples will give a sense of their diversity.
Different Aims of Education. The number of personality states, psychic dispositional
structures and individual dispositions which people have attempted to bring about in
others or have at least called for is incalculable. There is hardly a virtue, type of
knowledge, conviction, skill, ability or competency which has not been set forth as an ideal
for other human beings and whose realization has not been pursued through various
actions.
One thinks of the countless aim statements which begin with the words "education
for ... " or "education to ...". Just to give some examples I offer the following unsystematic
list: education for "personality", "Christian personality", "humanistic personality", "socialist
personality", "humaneness", "responsibility", "manliness", "self-determination", "emanci-
pation", "maturity", "rational thought", "critical discernment", "love", "parental love", "love
of country", "patriotism", "virtue", "punctuality", "willingness to work", "frugality", "clean-
liness", "consciousness of duty", "diligence", "perseverence", "conscientiousness", "help-
fulness", "politeness", "honesty" and so on.
One thinks further of such word combinations as "religious education", "moral
education", "aesthetic", "literary", "scientific", "civic", or "political education" which
designate certain aims to be reached through educational actions. The sole purpose of
these educational actions is to realize these aims. Thus, "religious education" means
44 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

"education through which dispositions toward religious experience or behavior can be

created or encouraged". Similarly, "political education" means "education by means of
which dispositions toward political judgements or actions can be created or encouraged",
etc. In a like manner we can understand more concrete expressions such as ''vocational
training", "recreational education", "legal education", "consumer education", "patriotic
education", "military training", "peace education", "health education", "training in critical
thought", "sentimental education", "traffic-safety education", "sex education", "media
education", "language training", "social training" or "art education", "Vocational training"
aims at developing those abilities needed to pursue a certain profession. "Recreational
education" aims at developing those dispositions which are considered necessary for
productive use of leisure time. "Legal education" aims not only at increased knowledge of,
but also at the readiness to acknowledge and abide by the law. "Traffic-safety education"
tries to develop the knowledge and abilities needed to avoid traffic accidents, etc.
Particular weight is also attached to the aims associated with the word "instruction";
for example "reading", "writing" and "mathematics" instruction, or formal instruction in
"German", "history", "chemistry", "cooking", "sewing", "stenography", "cosmetology" and
"nursing care", etc. In each case, the purpose of instruction can be clearly perceived: it is to
achieve or strengthen a certain ability or knowledge. The aims of instruction are the
psychic dispositions needed to read, write and compute, to understand chemistry, to cook,
sew, etc.
Highly general educational aims contain numerous subordinate special aims. Thus,
behind most aims there lies a complex hierarchy of secondary or partial aims. We need
only think of all the knowledge, attitudes, simple and complex psychic dispositions
included in such aims as "professional ability", "leadership ability", "altruism" or
"mathematical skills".
Furthermore, one must remember that different people interpret highly abstract
educational aims such as "personality", "humaneness", "maturity", "piety" or "morality" in
different ways. There are at least as many concepts of the ideal personality as there are
cultures, religions and ideological groups. Furthermore, depending on the historical epoch
and the state of historical development, similar-sounding educational aims can have
different meanings, even within one and the same society. One example would be the
many forms which the ideal of the "well-educated person" has acquired over the years,
ranging from the "learned piety" (docta pietas) of the Protestant humanists to the concepts
of the Jesuits, the Neo-Humanists and Realists of the nineteenth century and continuing
on to those of today.
Among educational aims, we often find diametrically opposed readinesses for acting.
On the one hand, for example, we find the disposition to fight against people designated as
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 45

"enemies" in relation to ''warlike'', "knightly" or "military ability"; on the other hand, there is
the "disposition for acting non-violently", for "loving one's enemy". On the one hand, we
come across the "capacity for self-sacrifice", and on the other, the "ability to satisfy one's
own needs"; on one hand, "faith", on the other, "reason"; on one hand "obedience", on the
other, "independence"; on one hand "purity" and "chastity", on the other "sexual potency";
and so on. The number and diversity of the desired personality states which have been
proposed as human ideals and whose realization has been pursued through educational
actions can hardly be overestimated.
Differences Among Educands. The concept of "educand" is as highly abstract as that of
"education". It applies to any person who is the object of educational actions. The people
falling into this category are as different in age, sex, culture, social class, profession and
countless other characteristics as are human beings in general.
Originally, only children and juveniles were regarded as educands. However, for
some time now, adults and even the seniors and retirees have also been included in this
concept. The range of potential educands extends from infants to the elderly. One need
only think of the addressees of adult education, vocational retraining, parental education,
psychotherapy, continuing education or "death education".
Educands can also be differentiated by gender (boy/girl, man/woman, husband/wife,
mother/father, etc.), and accordingly one will find girls' schools, motherhood courses,
pastoral counseling for men, etc.
Seen from a sociological point of view, the range of educands extends from the
members of primitive tribes to those of the most technologically advanced industrial
societies. I need only mention the great personality variations caused by different ways of
life, religions, ideologies and world views, political situations, living conditions, economic
systems and technological levels in different societies.
Educands can be further differentiated by social standing or class. In traditional pre-
industrial societies they are influenced to a great extent by their social classes' way of life.
In accordance with class differences, we thus find in the course of history separate
educational systems for the nobility, clergy and the learned, for burgher and peasant
classes; we find education for the elite and for the poor, missions for the well-educated and
for the masses. In the industrial societies, class differences have steadily declined in
importance, but there still exist distinctions according to profession, income, influence and
prestige which, together with class-specific living patterns, play a role in determining the
Weltanschauung, value-orientation and learning potential of the educand.
Far more diverse than the group-specific differences mentioned here are the
individual differences among educands, for example in constitution, vitality, temperament,
talent, intelligence, learning ability, stamina, alertness, attitudes, interests, etc. Through
46 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

particular genetic dispositions and previous life experiences, every educand has acquired a
unique personality state usually described as "individuality". Thus there are no two cases
where the structure of psychic dispositions - the structure which educational action seeks
to change - is the same.
Differences Among Educators. The concept of "educator" is also a very general one. It
applies to any person who is the agent or initiator of educational actions. The group-
specific and individual differences among educators are as numerous as those among
educands.
First of all, one must consider the natural educators, namely mothers and fathers.
Outside the family, there are an enormous number of people who practice education as a
profession. These professional educators 21 include teachers of all kinds, trade masters and
training specialists, kindergarten teachers, tutors, therapists, and social workers,
psychotherapists, catechists, missionaries, etc. Also included are doctors, priests, military
and police officers and all leadership personnel in management, business and politics, who
primarily pursue non-educational activities in their professions but nonetheless engage in
educating as a secondary part of their vocation.
The personalities of educators are as diverse as those found in the general
population. Among them are all possible levels of intelligence, mental health,
communication skills, empathy and morality. Not only every educand, but also every
educator, is an individual personality.
Different Situations. Educational actions always take place under specific socio-
cultural conditions: at a certain time in a certain place and through members of a certain
group in a certain culture. Education is inextricably intertwined with the concrete living
conditions of a society. Educators and educands are thus dependent in their experience
and behavior on numerous external conditions which can be subsumed under the concepts
of "environment", "life space" and "milieu". These external conditions are extremely
complex and can never be described in their entirety.
However, the mere listing of the perceptible objects and events which make up
particular individuals' environments does not in itself provide sufficient knowledge to
understand them. We also need to know how individuals themselves experience their
world. Different people see the same external environment quite differently. This is so
because each of us has a unique subjective manner of perception - one stemming from the
interaction of genetic make-up and life-long experience. "Even in the same surroundings,
every person lives in his own world'l22, because people perceive only selected components
of these surroundings and assign them different meanings according to their particular

21 From the Latin "professio".

22 SCHOPENHAUER (1891: 334).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 47

inner states. Individuals acquire most of these meanings from the people they have grown
up with, from the groups in which they live; however, they adopt these meanings selectively
and modify them in their own individual ways.
The sum total of external and internal, objective and subjective conditions which
influence a person's experience and behavior at a given time is called the person's
"situation"23. The (psychological) concept "field" is also used24 • At different times we all
find ourselves in different situations. Correspondingly, the situations in which educational
actions occur are also quite complex and variegated.
Different Forms of Education. Since the concept of education is highly abstract, we
must concretize it by asking questions like: What actually happens when people are
educated? How does education proceed? In what manner are people educated? What
forms do educational actions take?
As soon as we start to observe and compare concrete actions and systems of actions,
a confusing diversity of phenomena appears. Up until now, only a fraction of such
phenomena have been subsumed under the terms "educational means", "educational
measures", and "educational methods"25. These include (among others) actions such as
habituating, showing, demonstrating, presenting, assigning, recommending, advising,
observing, instructing, rewarding, praising, punishing, warning, reprimanding, threatening,
commanding, occupying, isolating, leading, etc. Many of these concepts, such as
habituating, rewarding, punishing, instructing or leading are themselves relatively abstract
and represent very different types of concrete action. One need only think of the many
forms of reward, punishment, instruction, guidance, etc.
Nevertheless, many of the actions mentioned above need not always be subsumed
under the concept of education. They are forms of human interaction entirely independent
of the intention to improve another human being. On the other hand, there are many
actions which are not counted among the so-called "educational means", but which
nonetheless must be classified as educational actions in cases where they serve as means to
direct educands toward a certain set ideal.
We must therefore assume "that educational action does not take the same form in
all times and places"26, but that it occurs in countless different forms. Apart from direct
educational actions (Le. those aimed directly at the educand), there are many diverse and
very complex forms of indirect education. These are actions which attempt to change the
educands' environments to facilitate their learning what is expected of them. In light of

23 Cf. THOMAS (1951).

24 Cf. LEWIN (1951).
25 BREZINKA (1981: 123 ff.).
26 LOCHNER (1934: 144).
48 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

these circumstances, it is better to avoid the misleading term "educational means" and
instead speak of "forms of education"27. Every educational action is a means in itself. The
concept of education refers only to those actions which are viewed by educational actors
themselves as a means of bringing about lasting improvements in the structure of other
people's psychic dispositions, of retaining components they consider positive, or of
preventing the formation of dispositions they consider negative. The forms or types of such
actions are much more numerous than is generally assumed.

THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

In the first attempts to found an empirical science of education the subject matter of
the science was called education as "fact"28. Education as practiced in a given society was
said to have "the same reality as other social facts"29. The subject matter of the science of
education was considered to be "education as cultural fact"30, "educational reality'l31,
"education as reality"32 or the "phenomenon of education"33.
Education as fact is a contemporary as well as historical reality of every society.
Educational actions and educational institutions comprise a substantial sector, sub-area or
component of a culture, along with such other sub-areas as language, economy, law,
politics, religion, art, science, technology, public health, etc. The task of educational
science is viewed as the description and explanation of education as fact 34 •
As soon as one tries to describe educational phenomena, it becomes apparent that
they are embedded in networks of complex social inter-relationships from which they can
be separated only in thought. "Education itself... consists solely in abstraction. This
abstraction is, however, a necessity for educational theory"3S. The description of
educational phenomena presupposes that one first begin by examining the ''whole of
reality in which education takes place"36. This whole - to put it simply - is a society and its
distinctive culture.
Within a society and its culture, educational phenomena constitute sub-areas,
themselves wholes composed of many interrelated components, which can be described as

27 Cf. LOCHNER (1927: 175 ff.); KROH (1952: 51 ff.).

28 Cf. WILLMANN (1875: 18 and 22); PFEFFER (1962: 104 ff.).
29 DURKHEIM (1956: 94).
30 A. FISCHER (1921: 259); MEISTER (1924: 17 and 1%5: 65); MARTINAK (1928: 15.).
31 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 40 and 1921: 30); MEISTER (1924: 17 and 1965: 65).
32 A. FISCHER (1914: 6).
33 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 36); similarly A. FISCHER (1914: 20).
34 WILLMANN (1875: 14 ff.; 1876: 260 ff.); DURKHEIM (1956: 97 ff.); MARTINAK (1928: 16).
3S DILTHEY (1963: 48).
36 LOCHNER (1927: 10).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 49

educational situations 37 or educational fields 38 • Educational actions are only one component
of an educational situation, since they cannot even be conceived of without considering the
subject and object of a given educational action. Such actions are only means to ends, and
in order to describe them, one must be familiar with the remaining components of the
situations in which education takes place.
To say that the subject matter of educational science is "education as fact" or
"educational reality" is merely to use a convenient oversimplification; in no way does it
mean that the subject matter of the science consists solely of educational actions. Rather,
the ''principal subject matter,,39 of educational science includes the aims or purposes of
education (ideals), subjects (educators) and objects of education (educands), as well as
means (educational actions and institutions). Summarizing, one can speak of educational
situations or "fields" in which the different types of subject matter are not only
interconnected, but also related to the surrounding socio-cultural environment as a whole.
Education is a very broadly-based and complicated field of study. Some of its sub-
areas are also the subject matter of other sciences, in particular psychology and sociology.
Attempts have been made to eliminate the confusion resulting from this by differentiating
between the material object and the formal object of educational science4o. The material
object is considered to be the concrete subject matter which a science studies (for example,
mankind or a particular social structure); the formal object is "the particular consideration
with which this subject matter is regarded; every science is characterized by its specific
formal object, while the same material object may be common to a number of sciences"41.
Educational science and psychology both study educands and educators as bearers of
psychic phenomena. Educational science and sociology also share certain topics, such as
certain social structures, social relationships and social actions. However, educational
science differs from psychology and sociology through the point of view from which these
common objects are investigated. Persons and psychic phenomena (as well as social
structures and other social phenomena) are examined by educational science only in a
specific respect: only so far as they have a connection with educational aims and the means
needed to reach such aims, as well as with the prerequisites and effects of education. This
is what is meant by the abbreviated (but still much too imprecise) claim that the subject
matter of educational science is "the whole of human reality as viewed from the
perspective Df education"42. Instead of speaking of a perspective, standpoint or point of

37 Cf. LEWIN (1948: 11 ff.).

38 Cf. WINNEFELD (1957: 30 ff. and 1%5,49 ff.), who used the expression "pedagogical field".
39 A. FISCHER (1913: 47). Cf. also SCHMIDKUNZ (1930) on the "elements of pedagogics".
40 Cf. EGGERSDORFER (1913: 790); A. FISCHER (1932a: 110); PFEFFER (1%2: 103).
41 VRIES (1976: 473).
42 WINNEFELD (1970: 154).
50 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

view, we can also think in terms of the formulation of questions in regard to an extremely
complex reality. It is possible to pose various questions about one and the same object, or,
conversely, to pursue the same question by investigating different objects, (e.g. children,
juveniles, adults, social actions, social interactions, social groups, cultural values and
institutions).
The subject matter of educational science is thus not only educational phenomena,
but rather all phenomena related to education. Again many possible questions can be
formulated within this field. One example would be the difference between an individual
or personal approach to education and a socio-cultural one. In the first case, education is
regarded as a means for improving individuals. In the second, education is seen as a means
to maintain the integrity of a society and its culture during the transition between
generations. Both points of view are based on the same set of circumstances. By
attempting through education to provide children and juveniles with the knowledge,
abilities and virtues they will need to live independently, society is at the same time
contributing to its own survival and the transmission of its cultural heritage to future
generations43 • Thus within this larger societal context it is possible to emphasize various
problem areas, ranging from the specific lessons taught by specific teachers to specific
pupils under specific conditions, to the effects that a national system of educational
institutions has on a people's character. Thus the subject matter of educational science is
not discovered as a part of reality with distinct natural boundaries, but must rather be
intellectually abstracted through the formulation of questions and concepts about the real
world.
The description of educational phenomena and related aspects of the real world is
generally regarded as the primary task of educational science44 • Its second task is the
explanation of the phenomena described. This means studying the causes of phenomena
and the conditions under which they occur45 • For example, researchers can attempt to
explain a certain form of school organization, a certain hierarchy of educational aims, a
certain curriculum or certain types of punishment by teachers on the basis of certain socio-
cultural conditions. In these studies, comparative analysis can be a useful research tool46 .
Such research can be conducted on a purely historical basis in order to explain how certain
contemporary or historical phenomena originated. However, it can also be undertaken for
purely theoretical reasons, with the aim of discovering the functional regularities which

43 Cf. WILLMANN (1957: 52); similarly DILTHEY (1961: 192); DURKHEIM (1956: 70 ff. and 124 ff.).
44 Cf. WILLMANN, DURKHEIM, A. FISCHER and DILTHEY (1961: 190 ff.); LOCHNER (1927 and
1963: 415 ff.); KRIECK (1931).
45 Cf. WILLMANN (1875: 14; 1876: 263); DURKHEIM (1956: 97 ff.).
46 Cf. WILLMANN (1876: 273); DURKHEIM (1956: 94 ff.); DILTHEY (1961: 229 ff.); A. FISCHER (1913:
45).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 51

make explanations at all possible. In this case attention is directed primarily at the effects
of specific factors.
These remarks indicate that the questions, "What?" "How?" and "Why?" have
assumed a prominent position in programs for empirical educational science. "Using
analytical and comparative methods", attempts were made to find "in the bewildering
fullness of things the repeating, the typical and, if possible, the lawful'047. Accordingly, the
science aspired to was also called "descriptive-analytic educational science'<48.
If the subject matter of empirical educational science is viewed as "educational
reality", it seems reasonable to investigate it and its many-faceted individual forms as a
primarily historical phenomenon. "Only history allows us a free view of the entire richness
of educational reality"49. From this point of view, education and everything connected with
it is perceived as "one of the great objectivations of history,,50.
The word "objectivation" refers to an object in the physical world created by man to
externalize mental phenomena51 . It means "objectivations of the psychic" or - less
awkwardly expressed - ''psychic objectivations". These are the results of processes of
"objectifying" the psychic in which "mental events are externalized in the world of
manifestations, given physical form" and "made physically perceptible"52. This includes, in
addition to expressive phenomena, above all actions, as well as "enduring presentations" or
"cultural objects": things which have acquired a life of their own, processes having their
distinctive characteristics and social structures which can be subsumed under the concept
ofworkS3•
All psychic objectivations are the result of psychic processes. Since psychic
objectivations constitute essential components of educational situations, it seemed at first
reasonable that the science of education be conceived of as the branch of science treating
this specific class of objectivations and be patterned after the cultural sciences or humanities,
as "sciences of man's self-created world"54.
The psychic objectivations which compose the subject matter of educational science
as a cultural science include both actions and works. Transitory actions, however, are much
harder to comprehend than enduring cultural works or artifacts. This may be the reason
that with this approach scientific educational research has aimed predominantly at those

47 MARTINAK (1928: 16).

48 MARTINAK (1928: 17).
49 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 56).
50 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 59).
51 Cf. FREYER (1923: 20 ff.) and HARTMANN (1962: 406 ff.) on this concept, which stems from cultural
philosophy.
52 MEISTER (1947: 56).
53 Cf. MEISTER (1943, 1949, 1952 and 1958).
54 ROTHACKER (1927: 12).
52 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

components of educational fields which comprise a relatively accessible subset of psychic

objectivations - namely "enduring creations", "cultural artifacts" or "cultural objectivations".
Above all, this means objectivations present in written form. Included are first of all the
personality ideals which a particular society establishes as its aims of education for
educands. These ideals comprise an "edifice of norms"55 which can be described just as can
the norms set for the personality and educational actions of the educator. Both classes of
norms are laid down in regulations, laws, curricula, etc. In a similar fashion, educational
institutions such as schools, apprenticeship training shops, etc., along with their particular
subject matter, customary educational or instructional procedures and the material objects
used (textbooks, notebooks, report cards, tools, and so on), are as accessible to scientific
research as are the norms or ideals applying to educands or educators.
It goes without saying that all of the above-mentioned components of educational
fields belong to the subject matter of educational science. Regarding the approach taken
by traditional pedagogics, it would, however, be a great and unnecessary impoverishment
to limit empirical educational science to the descriptive-comparative and explanatory
research of education as "given". The program to give educational science "a form similar
to that of the other branches of the humanities"56 - insofar as this bas been carried out at
all - has resulted in a widespread neglect of the problems of both current as well as future
educational practice. Instead, historical research has been carried out on the various
cultural phenomena appearing in educational environments, for example schools,
curricula, educational ideals, etc.
The program for a ''phenomenological science of education" has also become bogged
down in describing "perceived educational events, facts, processes, and relationships"57. It
does have an advantage over the program for a "cultural" ("geisteswissenschaftliche") or
"hermeneutical" educational science in that it views educational actions as its primary
subject matter58, whereas the latter neglects them in favor of the cultural objects connected
with education. However, both programs do share the common assumption that "education
in the past and present" or "the whole of educational phenomena"59 is a "given", and both
content themselves with the description and explanation of this "given", along with its
causes and effects.
Whereas traditional pedagogics teaches "what ought to be" and what educators
"ought to do" in order to realize given aims (i.e. the ideals which educands are to reach),
the early proponents of an empirical educational science stressed that the subject matter of

55 MEISTER (1949: 20).

56 KRIECK (1931: 374).
57 LOCHNER (1975: 8 ff.).
58 Cf. LOCHNER (1963: 416).
59 LOCHNER (1963: 407 and 415).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 53

this science was exclusively "what is". In their view, the "purpose of the science of
education" was "cognition of the given"6O. However, this definition of educational science's
subject matter paid too little attention to the fact that everything "given" or "existing"
denoted by the concept of education exists in an ends-means relationship and can only be
understood as means to ends. Educational actions are carried out and educational
institutions are created and maintained only because the people responsible for them
believe that these actions and institutions are the appropriate means to realize the ends
they are pursuing (i.e. the psychic dispositions of educands which they consider positive
and desirable). The meaning of actions simply cannot be comprehended as long as they
are considered independently of the ends for which they are intended 61 •
If one accepts this simple fact, it becomes apparent that the subject matter of
educational science must be defined in a different way than has been outlined in plans for
a descriptive-analytical science of education (whether hermeneutically or phenomeno-
logically oriented). It is thus insufficient to accept as "given" such phenomena as
educational actions and educational institutions (which by definition are nothing but
means to ends) and to make them the primary subject matter of descriptive and
explanatory research. The ends-means relationship as a whole - and not just means
separated from ends - must be recognized as the core subject matter of educational science.
It is thus not the means, but rather the ends which must be viewed as "given". From this
perspective the first problem is to determine the sense of ends - on what assumptions they
rest, whether they are attainable and under what conditions, and what possible side-effects
might occur if they are attained. Finally, it should be asked whether the respective means
used in educational situations are actually appropriate for the desired ends. Such questions
can be investigated without going beyond "what is" and making demands or prescriptions
or establishing norrns. The question, "What can be done to attain this particular end?"
concerns things that really exist. Not only is it permissible within the science of education,
it is in fact a central question.
Seen from this point of view, the principal task of educational science is to
investigate the conditions necessary for attaining educational aims. Educational science does
not just describe facts, but is rather a teleological and causal-analytical science.
As with technical, economic, political or medical actions, educational actions always
have a definite aim. The educators' task consists in finding the conditions needed to attain
this aim. In education, attempts are made to bring others to a certain personality state.
This state is not present from the start; rather, its realization is designated as an end.
Educators can do nothing towards reaching this end until they know the causes or

60 LOCHNER (1934: 2).

61 Cf. BREZINKA (1981: 106-147) on education in the light of the ends-means schema.
54 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

conditions needed for the appearance of the desired state and until they know which
actions are needed under the existing conditions62 .
These practical problems which educators have to solve give meaning to educational
actions and form the basis of what is called "education as fact" or "educational reality".
Therefore it is more accurate to view the object of educational science as the educational
ends-means relationship, rather than "education as fact" or "educational reality."
Consequently, educational science is characterized by the two above-mentioned attributes.
It is teleologically (from the Greek "telos" = aim) or finally (Latin "finalis" = concerning
the aim or end) constructed, because one must begin by dealing with the goals, aims or
ends consciously set by various persons or groups. The method of this science is causal-
analytically (Latin: "causa") oriented, because causal relationships must be examined to
discover ways of intervening or of influencing others through educational actions. The
same thing is meant when educational science is designated a technological science.
In traditional pedagogics, the orientation towards the ends-means schema - and
consequently the technological point of view - were taken for granted. HERBARp3,
BENEKE64 and WAITZ65 structured their pedagogics as ends-means theories.
SCHLEIERMACHER taught that education is only possible as technical action, "insofar
as a relationship between means and ends is to be constructed"66. DILlHEY was
convinced that education is "not an end in itself, but rather only a means"67.
FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER noted that "a scientific pedagogics cannot limit itself to a
simple theory of means", but must also "take into account the idea of ends" and develop
from an "ostensibly causal science" into a "teleological one,,68. NELSON, too, saw the task
of "empirical" or "theoretical" pedagogics as the search "for appropriate means", but
stressed at the same time that "the question of means" can only be dealt with "when the
aim to be realized has already been established"69.
In comparison to the above-mentioned opinions advanced by traditional normative-
descriptive pedagogics, it was thus a step backwards to limit the plan for a "pure"70 or
empirical science of education to the investigation of "education as fact" and to relegate
the central technological problems of education to non-scientific "Kunstlehren" (theories

62 Basic works on this subject are MILL (1974: 944 ff.) and V. KRAFf (1968: 106 ff.).
63 Cf. HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 132 ff.).
64 BENEKE (1835, Vol. 1: 30).
65 WAlTZ (1898: 16).
66 SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 373). Cf. also p. 417, annot. 2.
67 DILTHEY (1961: 181).
68 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1921: 37).
69 NELSON (1949: 331).
70 KRIECK (1922: 88 ff.; 1927: 12 ff.; 1931).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 55

of the pedagogical art), "educational teachings" or "practical pedagogics"11. There where

various reasons for this decision, but the primary motive seems to have been the
assumption that ends-means relationships could not be made the subject of educational-
scientific investigation without choosing, setting and justifying aims, that is, without first
valuing and giving norms. Typical of this aversion to aims is LOCHNER's statement that
"the aim of educational science does not lie in influencing educational actions... ; it
consciously excludes all aim- and end-oriented thought; it sees in this ... a guarantee for
the preservation of its scientific nature"72.
There is an error in this stemming from an insufficiently clear distinction between
the factual character of aims, ends, norms and ideals, on the one hand, and the setting and
justification of aims, ends, norms and ideals on the other. Even if the proposal and
justification of educational aims is not considered the task of educational science, it is
absolutely necessary when designing an empirical science of education to proceed from the
given educational aims as socio-cultural facts. Since education is always undertaken for the
sake of specific aims, no scientific knowledge concerning education can be gained without
taking aims into account. Educational actions are not archetypal phenomena which must
simply be accepted as they are. Rather, they are means to ends, have meaning only in
relation to ends and above all deserve to be scientifically investigated to determine
whether they actually contribute to reaching the intended aims.
It is not enough to simply describe the means used in different educational situations.
A far more important problem is whether and under what circumstances given means
succeed and what undesired side-effects accompany them. Thus, the subject matter of
empirical educational science is not just the desired changes in educands (ends) and what
is done to bring them about (means). While knowledge of both is indispensable, it must at
the same time serve as a scientific basis for answering the more difficult questions of
whether respectively employed means are actually appropriate for reaching designated
aims and whether other means as yet untried might be more appropriate. Thus, the
empirical science of education must not only describe educational actions and educational
institutions as psychic objectivations, but must also measure and critically describe them as
means to an end (or as the conditions necessary for reaching an end). This is also the
reason why experimental research is necessary in educational science73• Means as such are
not the central problem of educational science, but rather the means to create conditions
for the appearance of desired effects or to prevent the appearance of negative conditions.

11 Cf. WILLMANN (1875: 19; 1876: 288 cr.); KRIECK (1922: 2 cr. and 1931: 378); MARTINAK (1928: 18 cr.);
LOCHNER (1934: 2 and 1963: 551 cr.); MEISTER (1965).
72 LOCHNER (1934: 2). Contrary to normal scientific usage, LOCHNER (cf. 1947: 8), uses the word
"teleologicaf' not in the sense of "relating to an aim" but rather in the sense of "aim setting'.
73 cr. FRITZSCH (1910); A. FISCHER (1913); GEYSER (1913); MEUMANN (1920); KlAUER (1973).
56 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Stated more simply: The central problem of educational science is finding the causes of
educational success and failure.
In light of these critical questions about the usefulness of educational praxis and the
possibilities for better education, the criticism that the empirical science of education is
limited to "explaining things which are empirically already present" and that it acts
"politically on existing educational reality in a conformistic and legitimizing manner"74
proves to be mistaken. The assertion that the "theoretical ideal of educational science" is
allegedly oriented "not towards (possible) future praxis, but towards (actually present)
empirical reality"75 confuses the ideal of the historiography of education with the ideal of
theoretical educational science. Only historical research limits itself to the description and
explanation of what can be found in (past) "educational reality". The principle task of
theoretical educational science, however, lies precisely in discovering those regularities
which can serve as a basis for a critique of current educational practice and for better
educational planning. This task can certainly not be fulfilled other than by examining real
educational situations. However, since educational actions and institutions are simply
considered to be useful, useless or detrimental means to the realization of ends, they are in
no way uncritically accepted as "already empirically given", but rather are critically tested
as to their usefulness in attaining given ends. If they prove impractical in the given
circumstances, the reason for their impracticality and other, more appropriate means are
sought. The empirical science of education thus offers more possibilities for criticizing and
reforming educational practice than many of its detractors assume.
One consequence of this technological viewpoint is that much more extensive aspects
of reality must be taken into account than has been customary in traditional pedagogics.
Previously, the behavior of educators, so-called "educational means"76 or measures and
educational institutions were assumed to be the causes or determinants of the final aims to
be reached by educands, and scholars attempted to estimate their effects under different
circumstances. Researchers thus began with the means - primarily those already known
and accepted by pedagogical tradition as useful or effective, but also with new means
developed or conceived to complement traditional ones. Proof could not be furnished that
specific means could under specific circumstances be useful for attaining certain ends,
because the ends were left much too indefinite. Early researchers satisfied themselves with
compiling inventories of ostensibly appropriate means, intuitively interpreting and
commenting on them in view of more or less reliable reports of practical experience77.

74 VOGT (1977: 5).

75 VOGT (1977: 26).
76 For a critique of the term educational means cf. BREZINKA (1981: 127 ff.).
77 Cf. for example, W. FLITNER (1930); WICHMANN (1935: 159 ff.); F. SCHNEIDER (1953: 149 ff.);
LANGEVELD (1962: 109 ff.); GEISSLER (1973).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 57

The discontinuity in pedagogics between the theory of ends, aims or ideals and the
theory of means was scornfully commented on by BERNFELD as early as 1925: "All
educational measures which are taught as being appropriate for changing the child in
the name of each high aim are suspiciously simple and banal For as long as there have
been educators, this ancient gamut, from the stem glance to imprisonment, from the mild
word to the voluminous sermon, has been practiced everywhere. Children by the millions
have been subjected to a mishmash of all these means, millions have been educated using
each one singly, there can be no combination left which wouldn't already have worked -
and the result is the humanity of today, of yesterday .... Banal educational means in use
since antiquity do not inherently possess the transforming, wonder-working power that the
systems of the great pedagogues ascribe to them. There is no magic. Not even in the
educator's mild glance, not in a curative thrashing"78.
In contrast to those educational teachings which treat ends and means for their own
sake without any connection to real people and situations, characteristic of a teleological
causal-analytical or technological science of education is that its central subject matter
consists of ends-means relationships relating to certain groups of educands under certain
socio-cultural conditions. This approach begins with ends, and views them as effects to be
brought about, or - in the case of psychic dispositions considered negative - to be
discouraged or eliminated. Then the conditions are sought on which the desired effects
depend, and also the negative conditions whose presence could prevent their occurrence79 .
Only when these conditions are known can it be decided whether the ends are attainable
and what means exist to create the necessary conditions or to eliminate the negative ones.
Only then can it be judged what undesired side-effects will foreseeably result when certain
means are used or will appear after the realization of desired endsBO•
From this formulation of the question it appears that the theories of education,
counseling, psychotherapy, pastoral guidance, social work, rhetoric, mass communication
and propaganda, which up until now have been developed independently of one other, all
deal with basically the same problems. Education, counseling, psychotherapy, pastoral
guidance, social work (to the extent that it does not mean purely material welfare services
or merely care), rhetorical behavior and propaganda have in common that they are all
systems of actions through which the attempt is made to influence other human beings to
acquire personality states which the actors (and/or their employers) consider positive or
socially desirable.

78 BERNFELD (1928: 38).

79 Cf. MILL (1974: 944 C.); SIGWART (1924, Vol. 2: 513 C. and 605).
80 Cf. BREZINKA (1981: 80 ff. and 115 ff.).
58 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists and biologists have

developed important theories based on their research and continue to seek answers in
major problem areas such as "the influence of man on his fellows", "attitude change",
"behavioral modification", and "psychotherapy". Obviously their work could be of the
greatest significance for educational science. Given this situation, fear of overstepping the
customary boundaries of a scientific discipline is out of place. Perceptions of the subject
matter and borders of the different sciences are founded less on reality than on handed-
down theoretical constructs, accidents of history which people have used as aids to
understanding their world. When new viewpoints and problems arise, these conceptions
can again be altered. No single science has an eternally fixed "essence" graven in stone. "A
so-called scientific field is nothing but an arbitrarily demarcated and constructed
conglomeration of problems and attempted solutions,,81.

SCIENCE OF EDUCATION AS AN EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

I have attempted to show that the core subject matter of educational science is the
relationship between the states of personality desired for certain educands (ends) and
certain educational actions and educational institutions (means). Having defined this
subject matter, it must now be determined whether educational science can be assigned to
a particular class of empirical sciences.
Without a doubt educational science belongs to the broad group of descriptive, non-
normative or value-neutral sciences82 • The question is: to which scientific subgroup does it
belong? There are different classifications of the sciences according to various substantive
or methodological classificatory systems. Classifications and assignments are changed in
the course of time, and several names are often used for the same concepts. It is therefore
almost impossible to commit oneself unreservedly. Let me repeat that not even the
widespread distinction between natural sciences and the liberal arts or humanities
(Geisteswissenschaften) is sufficiently clear and uncontroversial83 . Most psychologists, for
example, treat psychology as one of the natural sciences, without excluding cultural objects
as the causes and effects of psychic phenomena from their field of studt". On the other
hand, cultural objects make up the subject matter of the humanities so that in recognition
of this contradiction psychology has been said to be "perhaps neither a natural science nor

81 POPPER (1962: 137). Cf. also ALBERT (1972: 4 ff.).

82 Cf. WEINGARTNER (1971: 124 ff.).
83 Cf. for example J. KRAFT (1957) and (1958).
84 Cf. ROHRACHER (1963: 7 ff.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 59

one of the humanities, but in any case more likely the latter"85. The difficulty of assigning
psychology to a group of sciences does not diminish when one speaks of the "social" or
"behavioral sciences" instead of the "cultural sciences". This example not only shows that
the classification of the sciences is influenced by factual problems, but also that scientific
and philosophical trends affect terminological distinctions. Without the one-sided favoring
of the doctrine of behaviorism in psychology, no one would presumably ever have thought
of designating psychology and an entire group of other sciences as ''behavioral sciences". In
and of itself the classification of the sciences is not an important problem for the individual
scientist, but it does have practical significance. This is because the grouping of a science
together with other sciences and the assignment of a certain name often have a
programmatic character which influences its basic structure, the selection of its research
topics and its research methods.
Certain names are commonly used for the sciences to which educational science is
most closely related by way of its subject matter: "Geisteswissenschaften" or "Kultur-
wissenschaften" (in the German-speaking world), "cultural sciences", "humanities", "social
sciences", "behavioral sciences" (mainly in the English-speaking world), "moral-political
sciences" (mainly in the French-speaking world) and "human sciences". Before the decision
is made to assign one of these names (along with the program which it implies) to
educational science, another look at the nature of educational phenomena is advisable.
Educational actions are social actions. Through them, a given actor seeks to
influence one or more fellow human beings. However, educational actions involve feed-
back. They are not inflexibly determined by the intentions of the educator but are changed
in accordance with the educand's reactions. Educators adjust their actions to constantly
changing situations; they try to make their actions fit changing circumstances, especially
the current mental states of educands, to the extent that this can be determined from their
responses. One can think of education as an activity which sets processes of social
interaction into motion or enters into processes already in motion. Educators attempt to
guide these processes toward the realization of their educational aims. However, educators
are themselves influenced by educands; they assimilate their responses and consequently
react to educands on the basis of altered perspectives. In this sense, educational action is
always part of a relationship of social interaction. Taken together, educators and their
educands can be viewed as a psycho-social feedback system86.
The sciences which research social actions and their causes and effects are for the
most part currently referred to as "social sciences". Since educational action is also a form

85 MEISTER (1951: 514).

86 a. SEARS (1966) on the theory of interaction between pairs of individuals; on interaction in general see
GRAUMANN (1972).
60 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

of social action, it can be considered a special field or problem-area of social-science

research. Not only educational actions themselves, but also most of the other elements of
the educational situations connected with them can be interpreted as socio-cultural
phenomena. However, they are also psychic objectivations and belong as such to the
subject matter of psychology. Already for HERBART empirical pedagogics was identical
with "psychological pedagogics"87. DILTHEY was also convinced that "psychology will
someday be the basis of pedagogics, pedagogics will someday be applied psychology"88.
Now there is little doubt that psychology as such is not one of the social sciences; at
best one can include among them its subdiscipline, social psychology89. Today, psychology
is usually classified as one of the human sciences ("Humanwissenschaften") or as a "science
of man"9O. The choice of this name effectively avoids the problem of classifying psychology
as either one of the "natural sciences" or one of the "cultural sciences". Since educational
science is based on psychology as a whole and not just on social psychology, there are - in
terms of the meanings of these collective names - just as many reasons for classifying
educational science as one of the "sciences of man" as there are to call it a "social science".
Which of these names is preferable depends ultimately on how the sciences closest to
educational science are designated at a given time.
By contrast, the use of the collective term behavioral sciences, which over the past
few decades has become prevalent in the English speaking countries, seems to me to be
much more questionable 91 • The word behavior is often used in connection with inorganic
materials and organisms of all sorts. However, the so-called behavioral sciences (apart
from the special case of behavioral research with animals) concern themselves not merely
with behavior as such, but rather with the specific human behavior which is characterized
by the use of symbols and meanings. "The data for behavioral science are not sheer
movements, but actions - that is, acts performed in a perspective which gives them meaning
or purpose"92. As a result, in contrast to the research practices of the natural sciences,
additional subjective interpretations must be made in these disciplines. In the behavioral
sciences it is not enough to simply describe perceptible events or conditions and place
them in a theoretical framework; rather, it is imperative to comprehend the meaning
which an action has for a given actor. This also applies to educational actions, which - as
noted above - cannot even be understood without first having examined the intentions of

87 Cf. HERBART (1914, Vol. 2: 173 ff.).

88 DILTHEY (1888: 13).
89 Cf. for example MACKENZIE (1%6).
90 Cf. for example PIAGET (1970), (1970a) and (1970b).
91 Cf. for example KERLINGER (1964); KAPLAN (1964).
92 KAPLAN (1964: 32).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 61

the actors or the ends they are pursuing. In this context, the term "science of actions"93
(German: Handlungswissenschaft) would certainly be preferable to that of "behavioral
science".
These two terms nevertheless have a common disadvantage: they both promote too
narrow a conception of the subject matter of the intended sciences. It is not merely a
matter of forms of behavior or actions, but also of the psychic, social and cultural
conditions and consequences of these actions, including among other things the cultural
works of mankind. These works can be designated "cultural objectivations" or "cultural
objects" and subsumed under the concept of culture. The category "culture" includes
physical objects such as tools, works of art, etc., distinctive patterns of action such as
customs, rituals, social structures and institutions, and "cultivated" individuals whose
education has endowed them with the character and status of "cultural objects"94. Thus, the
concept of cultural objectivation is narrower than the concept of psychic objectivation. To
put it another way, not all psychic objectivations are cultural objects, but all cultural
objects are psychic objectivations.
One can, however, easily expand the concept of culture to include actions intended to
create cultural works as well as the ideas, convictions, valuations, goal-settings and norms
which determine these actions 95 • There is thus no reason not to consider education a "sub-
area of culture"96 and to classify educational science as a "cultural science". In view of what
these collective names mean, there are just as many reasons to designate educational
science a "cultural science" as there are to call it a "social science". However, since the term
"social sciences" has already gained widespread acceptance in current international usage,
the latter term is for practical reasons preferable. In spite of this, it should not be forgotten
that educational science deals primarily with psychic phenomena, and not merely with
social and cultural ones97 •
There is some truth in the statement that the social sciences in a certain sense
represent "a single science"98. This means that they all are concerned with the same subject
matter - the social actions of human beings - and make use of the same regularities in
attempting to explain them. These regularities relate to human experience and behavior,

93 For example, this term is used by HABERMAS (1965: 158 and 1%7) but has not found widespread
acceptance.
94 Cf. MEISTER (1958: 74): "Man can even make himself into a 'cultural object"'.
95 MEISTER (1959: 100). On different concepts of culture, d. KROEBER and KLUCKHOHN (1952); on
the relationships between behavior or actions and culture, cf. KLUCKHOHN (1954).
96 Cf. MEISTER (1959: 99; 1951: 195; 1961: 48). The classification of educational science as a "cultural
science" (KLtlturwissenschaft) can already be found in WILLMANN (1875: 15); A. FISCHER (1921: 248); J.
WAGNER (1926: 36).
97 Cf. KERLINGER (1%9: 1127).
98 Cf' HOMANS (1%7: 3 ff.).
62 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

and are thus of a psychological nature. It follows from this viewpoint - by no means
unchallenged - that "the solutions each of the social sciences has reached in dealing with its
particular problems could be seen as relevant to, and contributing to the solution of, the
problems of the others"99.
Under these circumstances it is necessary to abandon two fundamental theoretical
assumptions about science which up to now have been used as the basis for scientific
pedagogics. The contention that pedagogics has a completely different subject matter than
its "neighboring sciences", psychology and sociology, is as mistaken as the claim that
pedagogics has its own, distinctive methods. Insofar as they are still advocated today, these
views relate less to pedagogics as an empirical science than to pedagogics as a sub-area of
philosophy100.
If one has decided in favor of the program for an empirical science of education, it is
no longer. possible - at least in regard to the subject matter of educational science - to
place educational science on the same level as psychology and other sciences of man and to
regard these other sciences as "supportive disciplines" of educational science101. Instead,
one must admit that education is a special form of social action, based on psychic motives
and directed at psychic effects - thus clearly belonging to the diverse subject matter of
psychology, in particular that of social psychology. Since educators and educands belong to
social groups, occupy social positions and are under the influence of institutions, education
also belongs to the subject matter of sociology. Like any other social actions with their
particular causes and effects, education is amenable to the formulation of various research
questions, and can therefore be the subject matter of more than one social science.
The "dispersion of pedagogics among psychology, sociology, etc." is, however, not
necessarily a logical consequence of this stance102. This would only be the case if
psychology were granted a monopoly on all research concerning psychic phenomena, and
sociology exclusive rights to investigate social phenomena. One should not suppose that
each of the sciences is responsible for only one class of phenomena; rather, they are
designed to solve groups of related problems using scientific methods. Thus, the
construction of a science of education as a relatively independent individual science can be

99 Cf. HOMANS (1967: 74). On the construction of general theories of behavior as a goal of the social
sciences, d. also OPP (1970: 1-17).
100 Thus SCHALLER (1967: 2443 f.) has the philosophical "confirmation of meaning" and the establishment of
norms in mind when he writes: "The establishment of pedagogics as an independent science presupposes
that it is possible to clearly separate its subject matter from that of other sciences and then develop a
characteristic method compared to other sciences". "If it were only a matter of recognizing facts, then
educational science could content itself with the compilation of the results of biology, psychology, and
history". SCHALLER's expression compilation seems to me to be ill-suited to allay doubts about the
scientific nature of an "educational science" so understood.
101 This has been done by ROTH (1959: 109) and LOCHNER (1963: 437 if.), among others.
102 w. FLITNER (1961: 12).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 63

justified by making clear the interrelatedness of educational problems and their meaning for
society. Clearly, education is a particularly conspicuous and increasingly important "area of
concentration"103 of socio-cultural reality. If one takes into consideration the close
connection between the human and social sciences, one can conceive of educational
science as a specialized form of the integrated sciences dealing with the social actions and
cultural objectivations of human beings.
It thus follows that the body of statements which are at the present time still
designated "pedagogical psychology" or "psychology of education" and "pedagogical
sociology" or "sociology of education" can no longer be merely considered "neighboring" or
"intermediate sciences"l04 existing side by side with an autonomous educational science.
Insofar as the subject matter of these disciplines consists of educational actions,
educational institutions with their causes and effects, and educators and educands as
components of specific educational situations, the aggregate statements of these disciplines
must rather be considered to be educational science105. If one were to exclude all "psychic"
and "social" facts from the research area of education, there would not be enough material
left to establish an empirical science of education. It is consistent with this approach to
deny pedagogics a "subject matter like those of the specific sciences"l06 and consider it a
subdiscipline of philosophyl07.
Any argument in favor of a relatively independent science of education must begin
by accepting the fact that there is no compelling theoretical reason to treat the problems
of education within an (if not in name then in substance) new, yet-to-be-created science.
The alternative is to let them continue to be treated by the broadly-based sciences of
psychology and sociology, to which we owe most of our present scientific knowledge of
education108. Rather, it is primarily practical reasons which speak for the development of a
specialized science of education. Such reasons include the expectation that both theory
formulation and pertinent research will be furthered and made more productive if all
essentially educational problems and attempts to solve them are carefully sorted out from
the human and social sciences, the majority of whose formulations are non-educational,

103 This term was initially used by GEHLEN (1961: 24).

104 Cf. A. FISCHER (1917: 86; 1932a: 115).
105 For an example of the opposite point of view, cf. among others LINKE (1966: 160): "The empirical research
of psychologists and sociologists in the field of education ... is not ... a part of pedagogics in the narrower
sense of the word".
106 Cf. DERBOLAV (1959: 8).
107 Cf. for example GROOTHOFF (1964: 218 f.), who is of the opinion that educational science "is a reflective
discipline and is as such related to philosophy (theology), which is why it is perfectly legitimate to designate
educational science's core as educational philosophy" (my italics). Cf. also GROOTHOFF (1975: 134 ff.).
108 Cf. SCHEFFLER (1966).
64 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

and conceptually grouped together and ordered in a larger context according to specific
educational considerations.
It is not clear whether such an "integrating" science109 can proceed from the simple
collection and interpretation of the theoretical components of other sciences to the
formulation and evaluation of independent theories. This depends above all on whether its
advocates succeed in concentrating thematically on the formulation of teleological and
causal-analytical or technological questions about specific educational subject matter:
They might instead aim for an encyclopedic hyper-science of personality development as
influenced by society and culture. The danger is great that unclear designations such as
"pedagogical anthropology"110 or "socialization theory"111 will lead to the accumulation of
an immense and ever increasing quantity of unrelated statements taken from various
individual scientific disciplines (as well as from philosophy and theology). Such an
accumulation is more likely to hinder than help the logico-systematic and empirical tasks
of educational science 112• Along with the great amount of data produced by the various
sciences and scientific schools, it is inevitable that the technical jargon in which they are
formulated will find its way into the statements of educational science. Simultaneous with
the unbridled expansion of subject matter there also arises a danger of increasing
terminological confusion.
The only way to protect educational science from both of these dangers is to limit it
to a relatively small number of important and clearly defined problem-areas. This is surely
better than to open it to all material which might somehow be justified by a very general
and vague interest in human beings and their "socialization". The hard core of educational
science consists of the technological problems which must be solved in order to reach
educational aims. HOMANS has formulated this problem with provocative clarity: "But
sooner or later a science must actually stick its neck out and say something definite. If
there is a change in x, what sort of change will occur in y? Don't just tell me there will be
some change. Tell me what change!"113 Even as an "integrating" social science, educational
science needs a sufficiently delineated field of study if it is not to become an omnium
gathernm discipline but rather make theoretical progress.
Theoretical progress means above all that law-like regularities will be found which
will help to explain previous events and possibly help to predict what will occur under
certain circumstances in the future. This is the task of the educational theorist, and until

109 Cf. GEHLEN (1961: 23).

110 Cf. A. FUTNER (1963), LOCH (1963), ROTH (1966 and 1971), ZDARZIL (lm), SPECK (1976) and
BOLLNOW (1976).
111 Cf. for example BRANDTSTADTER (1974).
112 Cf. DERBOLAV (1970: 64 ff.).
113 HOMANS (1967: 18).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 65

attempts have been made to carry it out, educational science will not progress past the
mere compilation of social history. Only then will it be possible to speak of a social science
- and concomitantly an educational science - in the strict sense of the word114 •

DEMARCATING SCIENCE OF EDUCATION FROM THE PSEUDO·SCIENCE OF

IDEOLOGICAL PEDAGOGICS

Not all statement systems designated as "social science" or "educational science"

conform to the concept of science formulated by analytical philosophy (on which the
metatheory of education set forth in this book is based). Rather, there are numerous
educational theorists who reject the differentiation between science and Weltanschauung,
ideology or ideological philosophy. Accordingly, they also reject the requirement of value-
neutrality and on the contrary consider value judgements, norm-setting and partiality in
scientific statement systems both permissible and necessary.
Many forms of ideological pedagogics are clearly recognizable as such. Among these
are types of "confessional pedagogics" which are based on the beliefs of religious
communities, as for example "Christian pedagogics", "Protestant pedagogics" or "Catholic
pedagogics"115. Also included in this group are "political pedagogical theories" based on
political convictions, for example "National Socialist pedagogics"l16, "Marxist pedagogics"ll7
or "emancipatory pedagogics"118.
These obviously ideologically-bound educational theories often claimed in the past -
and still often maintain today - that they are "scientific pedagogics" or "educational
science". To be able to justify this view, the term "science" is simply redefined so that it can
also be applied to ideologies. One need only reject the principle of value-neutrality and
claim that there are no non-ideological sciences. This point of view flatly designates
pedagogics as an "ideological science"1I9.
From the standpoint of one Catholic educational philosopher, "pedagogics is
impossible without an ideologi~al background, without final and ultimate decisions about
the meaning and destiny of human existence, about the roots, the summit, the beginning
and the end of history .... It can thus not be a matter of eliminating the fundamental
ideological view in order to reach a pure science, but rather it is a matter of working out

114 Cf. RUDNER (1966: 10 ff.).

115 Cf. ERLINGHAGEN (1971).
116 Cf. KRIECK (1933), DIETRICH (1940: 205 ff.), LINGELBACH (1970).
117 a. H. KONIG (1966), KOROUOW and GMURMAN (1973).
118 Cf. BREZlNKA (1981a: 66 ff.) and (1986: 32 ff.).
119 GOTTLER (1948: 19). This point of view is also expressed in both the name and the program of the
German (Catholic) "Society for Christian Educational Science" (founded in 1907).
66 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

the 'correct' fundamental view. , . Christian teachings give us the richest conception of
humanity up until now, and they give us hope that by following its trail. , . we can arrive at
a basis for educational science which .. , cannot be surpassed by any further conception
and may thus stand forth as the universally valid pedagogics"120,
The leading National Socialist pedagogue declared: "Every type of cognition" which
helps people structure themselves and their way of life in accordance with their
Weltanschauung "deserves the name and rank of science"12l. Science is "subordinated to the
primacy of the National Socialist idea"; it is described as a "weapon in the ideological
struggle" and is understood to be a "soldierly, militant science"122. In contrast to its political
"fruitfulness", the "scienticity" of knowledge is "of completely secondary importance",
"Knowledge arising out of our decision, corresponding to our values and will and
expressing our position", is "the true, formative, guiding, future-oriented, leading power of
science"123, The task of science should be to give rational form "in conformity with
Weltanschauung to a truth bound to Volk and time and given by race, character, and
fate"I24,
Today, the unity of science and Weltanschauung is most bluntly represented by
Marxist pedagogics. For the Marxists, too, "partiality" belongs to the essence of sciencel25 .
They accept only that science which is "based on Marxist-Leninist ideology". For them, this
kind of "science" is "a powerful weapon for the revolutionary transformation of the
world"I26. The "Marxist orientation" and "objective truth" are, according to BLOCH,
"necessarily one and the same"127.
It is thus taken for granted by Soviet Communists that "pedagogical science" (Russian:
pedagogiceskaja nauka) analyzes "the needs of society" and on this basis defines "which
personality qualities are to be developed in children and what children should learn"I28,
Pedagogical science is, to be sure, designated a ''social science", but the word "science" as it
is used here means "Marxist-Leninist science", "The methodological basis of scientific
pedagogics is Marxist-Leninist philosophy, dialectical and historical materialism as
ideology and method"129. "The Marxist-Leninist principle of partiality in science" rules out
a "de-ideologization" of science in the sense of a differentiation between science and

120 ROMBACH (1965: 84).

121 KRIECK (1933: 2).
122 KRIECK (1934: 11 f.).
123 KRIECK (1933: 8 and 5).
124 KRIECK (1934: 7).
125 Cf. KRAMER (1966).
126 KAMMARI (1958: 702 ff.).
127 BLOCH (1971: 89).
128 KOROUOW and GMURMAN (1973: 187).
129 KOROUOW and GMURMAN (1973: 227).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 67

ideology13O. For Marxist-Leninist social scientists it is "the most important concern that the
uniform and closed character of Marxism-Leninism also be maintained in pedagogical
theory", and that all attempts "to separate pedagogics from ideology ... under the banner
of making pedagogics 'scientific'" should be rejected l31 •
What orthodox Marxist-Leninists say directly is expressed with considerably more
circumlocution by West European neo-Marxists. In Germany, HABERMAS more than
anyone else has tried to find a historico-philosophical justification for the neo-Marxists'
decision to redefine the word "science" so that it includes ideological statements and
philosophical speculation on "society as a totality from the viewpoint of the philosophy of
history". He calls the theoretical systems of societal critique which the neo-Marxists would
like their fellow-citizens to recognize as "science", "critical social science"132. This "critical"
science is said to be based on a so-called "emancipatory interest in the gathering of
knowledge", which is also the foundation of more recent Marxist practical philosophy, in
the form of the so-called "critical theory" of ADORNO, HORKHEIMER and
HABERMAS133• The latter demand that the social sciences be designed to help
promulgate "maturity" (Mundigkeit) and uncover "dependency relationships". The utopia of
an "emancipated society" in which there is a "dialogue free of domination between all
people", serves as their standard. This utopian state is called the "successful life".
According to HABERMAS, "the truth of all statements" is based on their "anticipation of
the successfullife"I34, i.e. on a utopian vision of man and society.
With these ideologico-philosophical presuppositions135 as a basis, the last few years
have seen the publication of plans for a "critical pedagogics", "emancipatory pedagogics", or
"critical educational science". This type of pedagogics is to be based on a commitment to
certain individualistic, societally critical educational aims, which are in tum connected with
socialistic utopian political aims. The concept is one of a normative pedagogics whose
subject matter is termed "education under the claim of emancipation". "Responsibility for
the critical potential of society" is considered a "constitutive element" of this type of
"educational science"136. Objectivity is dismissed as "sterile impartiality"137. Instead,

130 CHWOSTOW (1972: 124). On the relalionship between truth and partisanship from a Marxist-Leninist
perspective, cf. KLAUS (1964: 87 ff.).
131 H. HOFMANN (1972: 149).
132 Cf. HABERMAS (1963: 168) and (1965: 158).
133 Cf. HABERMAS (1965: 155 and 159). O. LOBKOWICZ (1969: 268 ff.) on the problems raised by
HABERMAS' assumption of "perception-guiding interests".
134 HABERMAS (1965: 164).
135 On the distinction between scientific philosophy and Weltanschauungsphilosophie (ideological or world-view
philosophy), cf. J. KRAFT (1957: 64 ff.), V. KRAFT (1967), FUNKE (1965 and 1972) and FREY (1970 and
1971).
136 MOLLENHAUER (1968: 11 and 69).
137 GAMM (1972: 21).
68 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

"partisanship" and "practical political engagement" are called for along with the dissolution
of the boundaries separating knowledge and action, theory and practicel38 . "Educational
science in the sense of critical theory" must "necessarily become a permanent form of
societal criticism, or ally itself with societal criticism"139. This "societally critical position" is
presented as superior to the "empirical, scientific point of view"140.
When one forces a path through the fog of political, ideological, and moral slogans
and arrives at the epistemological core of these programs, it becomes clear that they
contain no alternatives to the epistemology of analytic philosophy. Inasmuch as the desire
to discover the conditions necessary for realizing their own aims is present, the followers of
"critical pedagogics" and "Marxist pedagogics" are dependent on the general rules of
scientific method and on research techniques specific to the topics of social science. The
differences between "critical" educational science and empirical educational science do not
lie in the research domain, in the sense of proposing and testing hypotheses, but rather in
formulating theories.
Advocates of religious, ideological or political pedagogics of different schools
consider it supremely important to incorporate their own religious, ideological, moral or
political convictions, dogmas or principles in educational science, in the form of a self-
evident normative basis. They wish to make propaganda for their own convictions more
effective by promulgating it in the name of science, thereby lending it the authority of
science. This exploitation of the respect given to science for practical and political ends is
only possible when the epistemological ideal of value-neutrality is rejected l41 . In regard to
the acquisition of knowledge (knowledge which will be valid for members of all ideological
groups), the refusal to recognize the principle of value-neutrality in drafting systems of
scientific statements can only be detrimental to science. Any attempt to associate science
with the norms of an ideological group hinders the scientist in the search for truth and
reduces the social sciences in particular to a mere tool for winning or holding onto
political power.
Naturally, members of all ideological groups will make use of scientific knowledge
whenever possible, either in attempting to convert others to their ideology or in trying to
sustain their own belief in it. However, the use of scientific knowledge for practical
purposes is completely different from the intent to infiltrate science with ideological
convictions, in order that the latter will be more credible to the mass of non-scientists than
if it were openly admitted that they are ideological convictions and thus not susceptible to

138 ZENKE (1972: 200 ff.).

139 KLAFKI (1971: 383).
140 Cf. KLAFKI (1971: 380 ff.), GOLDSCHMIDT and HANDLE (1969: 35 f.), LEMPERT (1971: 320),
FEUERSTEIN (1973: 98 ff.). For a critique of "critical pedagogics" d. ROSSNER (1974).
141 Cf. TOPITSCH (1968: 8 ff.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 69

scientific proof. It was above all to combat the misuse of the word "science" for the
utilitarian purpose of propagating an ideology or a political program that the principle of
value-neutrality was introduced. The acceptance of value-neutrality makes it easier to
keep scientific statement systems free of ideological convictions. This norm has
nevertheless nothing to do with a disparagement of values, norms or ideologies, nor is it
directed against attempts to justify valuations, norms or world views. It serves merely to
demarcate science from the ideological statement systems which necessarily result from
these attempts. The purpose of this demarcation is, at the very least, to acquire knowledge
about being and reality which will find universal acceptance. "Science ... begins as soon as
a problem can be isolated in such a way as to relate its solution to investigations that are
universally accessible and verifiable, dissociating them from questions of evaluation or
conviction"142.
What applies to science in general and to the social and human sciences in particular,
also applies to educational science. Already HERBART, who still called empirical
educational science "psychological pedagogics", was convinced that it had no room for
value judgements. Empirical educational science "is useful for each person for whatever
purposes he wishes; according to his purpose, one person can use it to help, another to
harm". It "is purely theoretical, and since it explains education, because of its possibility, as
merely a fact, it thus makes every wrong procedure and its effects just as understandable as
the right one. Since it thus ignores the difference between right and wrong, it can be used
by everyone}o see their actions as though reflected in a mirror. Thus they can also judge
the hypothetically useful. They may now determine their ends however they wish;
subsequently they may choose the best from many possible means. Accordingly,
psychological pedagogics is not at all reformistic: It is simply informative"143.
Since value-neutrality is one of the essential norms for the creation of an empirical
educational science and its demarcation from other pedagogical statement systems, the
meaning of this norm should be explained in somewhat greater detail. In doing so, some
current misunderstandings about it can be clarified. First, however, something must be
said about the requirements which must be made for the language of educational science.

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

All sciences have their origin in mankind's intuitive conception of the world. They
developed because the opinions which human beings formed about natural phenomena,

142 PlAGET (1970: 13).

143 HERBART (1914, Vo!. 2: 191 f.). (my italics) For a more detailed treatment of the meaning and limits of
the value-neutrality principle, see p. 82 ff. of this book.
70 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

their origins and inter-relationships were constantly being critically tested, added to and
improved. Accordingly, most of the words making up scientific statements and statement
systems come from everyday or colloquial language. The sciences are dependent on
everyday language, but everday language, as it exists in practice, is not in every respect
useful to the sciences.
First, we should remember that language can be used for various ends. The three
most important are the following: the representation of objects and facts, the demand for a
behavioral response and the expression of one's own feelings and the arousal of feelings in
others. Psychologically, these three ends can be assigned to cognition, will and feeling.
They are referred to as performances or functions of language, and a distinction is made
between their informative, prescriptive (or imperative) and emotive functions l44 •
For scientific knowledge, only the descriptive (or informative) function of language is
important. The sciences employ a language whose sole purpose is to describe objects and
facts as exactly as possible. It would hinder the comprehension of scientific statements and
divert attention from their essential content if demands for action, expressions of emotion
or emotionally arousing, persuasive or propagandistic forms of speech were allowed to
enter into scientific statement systems. For this reason, a norm has been established that
the language used in the sciences should be limited as much as possible to the clear
description of facts. The words "as much as possible" are meant to emphasize that we are
dealing with an unobtainable ideal, for shades of feeling and hidden valuations can seldom
be completely eliminated.
This norm is farther-reaching for educational science than for most other sciences.
The reason is that educational-theoretical thought processes result from educators'
practical considerations and the needs of professional teacher training. Pedagogics
originated as a practical instruction in educating, as an educational teaching or as a theory
of the art of teaching. Its aim was to set up guidelines for educational praxis. Contributions
to pedagogics were designed not as scientific theories, but as practical ones. They were not
intended to aid empirical research on "educational situations", but rather to teach
educators what they should believe, think and do. In accordance with this practical aim,
the language of pedagogical texts is not only used representationally or descriptively, but
also prescriptively. This prescriptive language is even held to be an essential characteristic
of pedagogics 145 •

144 From the Latin verbs "informare" = describe, "praescribere" = order, prescribe, "imperare" = order and
French "emollvoir" = affect emotionally. Cf. KAINZ (1962: 172 ff.). V. KRAFT (1960: 37 f.), COPI (1972:
44 ff.) and TOPITSCH (1965: 17 ff.).
145 Cf. CLEMENTS (1%2), BEST (1964 and 1%5) and NEWSOME (1%7).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 71

The emotive use of language is also widespread in the field of pedagogics. The
intention is not only to make prescriptions for educators, but rather at the same time to
stimulate, enthuse or motivate them to accept and bring about prescribed aims. A
language which appeals to the emotions is an important means to this end. Naturally, the
vocabulary appropriate to this purpose differs according to time and place, and depending
on the predominant Weltanschauung and the words which are fashionable among the tone-
setting groups of a society. Words such as "authority", "discipline", "lead", "obey", "serve",
"critical", "emancipatory" or "creative" can have emotionally positive or negative
connotations depending on the intellectual inclinations of a certain group. The call to treat
pedagogics as a science has at any rate not resulted in the formulation of a pedagogical
language as emotionally neutral as those of most other sciencesl46 •
It is easy to explain why the language applied to education is especially rich in
prescriptions, demands, admonishments and emotionally arousing words and statements.
Every human being is affected by education. In the course of our lives all of us are exposed
to educational actions and educational institutions. Besides having to fulfill many other
obligations incumbent on citizens, most adults are expected to perform educational
actions, and almost everyone is exposed to a great variety of evaluative opinions about
education, instruction, training, etc. Most people have had good or bad experiences with
their educators, their own pupils, the effects of their own education and that of others as
well as with schools, career training, military training, etc. Education makes a deep
impression on people's minds. They have the experience of being enriched, protected or
encouraged by education, but frequently also of being bored, hurt or tormented. Parents
intervene educationally in the lives of their own children and meet with successes and
failures. Education, in its diverse forms, surrounds us everywhere we go and is thus
thought about and discussed by people in all walks of life. It affects us emotionally, and
evokes feelings ranging from goodwill to hate, from trust and gratitude to fear and
desperation. Inevitably, these emotional experiences spread to and affect the language of
educational discourse, lending words emotional connotations (or emotional value 147) over
and beyond their linguistic content.
One must furthermore not forget that education always involves aims or ends
considered positive by educators (or their employers). Most educational aims, especially
religious or ideological convictions and virtues, are ideals belonging to the central norms
of the groups to which educators and educands belong. Their supporters consider them

146 Cf. BREZINKA (1990: 15 ff.) with examples from recent pedagogical literature.
147 Cf. ERDMANN (1922: 103 ff); KAINZ (1962: 98) differentiates the meaning of a word into (1) the logical
core of meaning, which is of principal importance, (2) the emotional quality of the word and (3) "the sphere
of the word, whereby is meant the associatively aroused area surrounding the central concept, the multitude
of vaguely suggested ideas not moving to the center of consciousness".
72 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

sacred, for they imbue life with meaning and offer a sense of vocation. In closed societies
they are sacrosanct; in open societies they may be a matter of dispute among ideological
groups, but within each of these groups they still form the ideologico-moral ties which bind
members together. Profession of certain educational aims usually means the profession of
certain life ideals; struggles over educational aims are struggles for religious, ideological,
moral or political ideals. Since education is regarded as one of the most important means
of maintaining and realizing the ideals of a group in its individual members, the everyday
language used to discuss education is necessarily permeated with value judgements, norms
and emotional overtones.
Only with these circumstances in mind can one judge how difficult it is to clarify,
improve and supplement everyday pedagogical language to the point where it can be used
in educational science. In order to approach this aim, one has no choice but to begin with
the language currently used to talk and write about education, and critically test it against
the norms of clarity, informational content and intelligibility.
The most important requirement for the language of educational science is clarity. As
soon as we measure pedagogical texts by this standard, it becomes apparent that the
technical language of pedagogics contains many ambiguous expressions. Furthermore, we
notice that many concepts are vague or inadequately defined. However, both of these
observations apply not only to pedagogics but also to most of the social sciences -
particularly to psychology, sociology, political science and philosophy, from which much of
pedagogical language has been borrowed.
Ambiguity means here that a word can be used as a name (sign, symbol) for different
concepts. Thus, for example, the word "lock" can mean a device used to fasten shut a door
or a section of a canal closed off with gates. In this case, one can easily recognize the
intended meaning from the context. Nonetheless, grounds for misunderstanding exist in all
those cases in which concepts referred to by the same word are closely related and
partially coincide so that at first glance only one concept appears to be presentl48 • These
are typical cases of hindrances to the comprehensibility of pedagogical language.
Misunderstandings often result from the use of words such as "education", "training",
"personality", "value" and "socialization", words which are used in numerous senses and
evoke quite different images in the minds of different listeners or readers.
Vagueness means that a word or statement is inexactly defined. In cases of vagueness
we also say that a concept, statement or sentence is unclear, indefinite, blurred or opaque.

148 ERDMANN (1922: 2).

 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 73

Vagueness must be differentiated from ambiguity and generalityl49. Ambiguity means that
a word has several meanings; generality, that a concept can be applied to various objects
which, though differing in many respects, share the given conceptual attributes and thus
form a class. In the case of a vague concept, its content (or intention) is partially unclear,
and as a result its extension (i.e. the objects to which it refers) is also unclear.
Consequently, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether a concept applies to a particular
object. Vagueness is usually caused by a lack of knowledge about the object referred to by
a concept; however, it can also result if available knowledge is neglected when formulating
the concept. Some examples of vague concepts are "educability", "ego-identity", "functional
education" and "educational means".
Concepts can be viewed as more or less vague, depending on the required degree of
exactitude or precision. Vagueness is in no way limited to concepts originating in everyday
language, but can also be found in newly introduced concepts of educational science. By
way of example one could point to the concept "didactic structural grid", which
BLANKERTZ defines as a "set of criteria for educational intentionality, articulated in the
medium of subject-specific compulsion"150. It is questionable whether concepts as vague as
this (along with their auxiliary definitions) are suitable as aids to understanding..
In light of these circumstances, the clarification of concepts through the analysis of
their meaning and their explication and definition151 are essential prerequisites for gaining
and communicating knowledge of educational science. The long-term neglect of these
tasks was due, among other things, to a number of misconceptions concerning both the
purpose of concepts in general and the particular difficulties the social sciences and
humanities confront in formulating concepts.
One of the sources of these misconceptions is the circumstance that not enough
attention is paid to the fundamental differences between words, concepts and reality152 (or
between signs, meanings and extra-linguistic objects). The ambiguity of a word is thus
easily misinterpreted as an expression of the complexity of the real world. If one then
confuses the word and the concept with one another by erroneously ascribing the word's
ambiguity to the concept, there wiii be little prospect for achieving conceptual clarity. For
example, LITT maintains that ambiguity is a "fundamental structural characteristic"
common to "all concepts which are meant to comprehend the reality of the living mind"1S3.

149 HOSPERS (1967: 67 ff.), BlACK (1966: 29), BUNGE (1%7, Vol. 1: 97 ff.); vagueness can be reduced but
seldom completely eliminated. Cf. SCHAFF (1968), KAPlAN (1964: 65 ff.), STEGMULLER (1%9b: 121
ff.), WOHLGENANNT (1969: 110 f.).
150 BlANKERTZ (1971: 37).
151 Cf. BUNGE (1%7, Vol. 1: 107 ff.), HEMPEL (1952), CARNAP (1959: 12 ff.).
152 Cf. BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 57 ff.).
153 UTI (1949: 12).
74 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

WILHELM FLITNER was of the opinion that "the domains related to men's actions resist
any exact description of the objects they encompass... because man is by nature
indefinable .... This peculiarity of all human domains is shared by education: we make
education what it is by existing in it. We can gain its ultimate concept only in the
responsible act... . Such an ultimate concept, however, exists only in its concrete
applications, it cannot be expressed exactly, one can only indicate the point where it
becomes comprehensible"154.
A recent pedagogical lexicon tells us that the terminological confusion in pedagogics
must "be understood as an appropriate expression of the particular character of the field of
education and its vitality". It is "precisely the vitality of educational reality which defies
terminological pinpointing". Thus, "the unique character of education remains hidden from
anyone who expects unambiguous terminology from the science of pedagogics"155.
Such utterances are misleading, for they make it seem as though it were an
unchangeable characteristic of human, mental and educational phenomena that one
cannot speak about them clearly and precisely. It is true that these phenomena are much
more complex than the concepts we use to describe them can be. It is also true that the
content of our concepts depends on our aims and the state of our knowledge concerning
the given phenomena. In regard to a certain phenomenon (in accordance with a given aim
and available knowledge) the same word can simultaneously refer to two different
concepts. This applies just as much to those concepts intended to comprehend non-human
objects as it does to concepts related to human phenomena. All concepts come into being
through the selection of their attributes from the wealth of possible attributes and through
the demarcation of a given concept from other possible ones. No concept can exhaustively
catalogue the attributes of the object which it designates; rather, all concepts simplify their
objects. There are those who believe that the purpose of any given concept is to represent
the unchangeable, fixed "essence" of its object (for example, of human nature, or of
education), and who consider the different meanings of a word to be competing
"essentialistic definitions". They alone have reason to make do with interpreting ambiguity
as an unavoidable lack of agreement over the "essence" of a thing.
Scientific concepts, however, serve a far more humble purpose. They are not
required to give an exhaustive definition of the essence of a phenomenon, but are
understood rather to be aids for unambiguously defining an object of thought by stating its
attributes. Such definitions are not intended to last forever; they are changed as knowledge
of the subject increases. In the course of time, a newer, more precise concept is then
formed, which does, however, share many of its features (or its content) with the old

154 W. RITNER (1966: 27).

155 SCHALLER (1971: 843 f.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 75

concept. Since similar concepts are usually attached to one and the same concept word,
communication is only possible when the user of an ambiguous word does not leave it
undefined, but instead specifically explains the purpose for which it is being used or what it
means in the given text. All definitions are made by describing the contents of a given
concept with those of other concepts. The clarity of the one concept is dependent on the
clarity of the others and thus on that of the entire subject-related statement system to
which it belongs156.
Lack of linguistic clarity results from unclear thinking. If unclear concepts,
statements and statement systems are not recognized as such, no progress can be made in
understanding the objects to which they refer. For this reason a critique of language and
concept analysis are among the basic prerequisites for arriving at clear knowledge. They
are even more necessary in the humanities and social sciences than in the natural sciences,
because their subject matter (mental phenomena and objectivations such as actions and
cultural objects) is harder to define and has much less terminological uniformity.
A particular problem in the analysis of pedagogical language is that many
pedagogical expressions are used not only descriptively, but also evaluatively. Even so basic
an expression as "education" is both consciously and unconsciously often connected with
value judgements concerning certain aims or forms of education which make it harder to
view phenomena impartially. LITI, for example, used a concept of education which was so
constrained by certain politico-moral ideals that its area of reference remains limited to
liberal-democratic constitutional states. According to LITI, there is no "real" education in
a "totalitarian state", but rather only "alleged education", that is, the "conditioning of
officially prescribed opinions and attitudes"157. Similarly, WENIGER has maintained that
totalitarian systems "allow no real education, but rather only force, conditioning, and
propaganda"158. In such cases, a linguistic trick is used to present a norm in the guise of a
descriptive statement. Instead of saying "ought", the impression is given that a "true" or
"real" situation is being described. In this manner, valuations are smuggled into what
appear to be descriptive statements159. Thanks to the supplementary words, "real", "true",
"ostensible", etc., these disguised valuations are relatively easy to spot. By contrast, it is
much more difficult to see through so-called "programmatic definitions", which give no
indication that they contain norms and programs for action in the linguistic guise of a
description16o.

156 For the defInition of concepts and their rules d. among others the German Industrial Norm (DIN) 2330
"Concepts and Designations", in GLOCKNER (1963).
157 LITI (1961: 84 f.).
158 WENIGER (1953: 154).
159 Cf. ROTHACKER (1927: 151).
160 Cf. SCHEFFLER (1971: 34 ff.); examples in BREZINKA (1990: 57 ff.).
76 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Even new expressions created for the purpose of scientific description can become
ambiguous to the point of being unusable and can take on normative and emotive
connotations. One example of this is the word "socialization". It was introduced to
summarize and describe a class of hypothetical learning processes through which human
beings acquire psychic dispositions enabling them to act within the framework of their
society and its normative system l61 . However, it has also been applied to the class of "social
influences"162 which persons or groups exert on human beings. These influences are held to
be the essential (Le. external partial) causes of this class of learning processes. "Social
influences" of this kind can either result unintentionally or can be planned by the
influencer. In a third sense, "socialization" is used to describe the sub-class of intentional
"social influences". Terms used in this regard include "aims of socialization", "socialization
task", "socialization program", "socialization success", "socialization techniques",
"socialiser", "socialisee", etc. 163 This third concept of socialization differs completely in
content from the first and is largely identical to a naive concept of education. I call this
concept naive because it does not consider the fact that in education one cannot assume
that the intended aim will always be realized; education is an attempt, and as such can also
fail l64. With this in mind, "socialization" has been defined as "the transmission of
behavioral dispositions from socializers to those being socialized"I65, as a "process through
which the prevailing values, norms, and life techniques of a society are transmitted to the
individual and made binding"I66. In this definition, "socialization" no longer refers to
something which simply occurs, but rather to something which is done and should be done.
Supported by the positive connotations of the word "social", this definition tempts us to
accept value judgements and norms such as "socialization is necessary", "the aims of
socialization are worthwhile", "socializers and the effects they produce are good",
"socializees need socialization", etc. When socialization is defined as being "intended for
the unfolding of human sociability"167 or even "as education for social thinking"l68 the
average user of language has hardly any choice but to assess the concept thus described as
positive.
These brief examples can only begin to indicate the conceptual confusion prevailing
in many texts on "socialization". Here we have a prime example of how contradictory usage

161 Cf. FROHLICH (1972: 661 ff.).

162 NEIDHARDT (1971: 6).
163 NEIDHARDT (1967: 21 ff. and 1971: 5 ff.).
164 On education as trying d. BREZINKA (1990: 87 ff.); on the problem of the "effect" concept of education,
which corresponds for the most part to the second and third concepts of socialization, cf. ibid, p. 60 ff.
165 NEIDHARDT (1971: 5).
166 NEIDHARDT (1967: 21).
167 ROHRS (1973: 160).
168 STIEGLITZ (1975).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 77

has caused a misleading technical term to become an ambiguous pseudo-scientific

catchword. "Socialization" has actually made the confusion in educology greater that it was
before the term's introduction. Certainly, hypotheses and theories are more important in
the sciences than concepts and their definitions. However, hypotheses can only be tested
when we know exactly what the words in which they are formulated mean, and when the
relationship between word and meaning remains relatively constant. Clear concepts are
necessary for differentiating among objects, ordering them and establishing their
relationships. That observance of this simple rule is not superfluous is apparent from
countless published texts heralded as educational science. As examples I offer the
following statements: There are "no final, rigid borders between socialization,
enculturation and education, for in a pedagogically motivated field one merges with the
other and finally culminates in personalization as the crowning result of all our endeavors";
"enculturation ... is basically the process of becoming human"; "Education is ... the motor
of becoming human"; "socialization is a process accompanying becoming and being human
and can at all times transform itself into education"169, etc. Texts of this kind illustrate what
KAPLAN called "the paradox of conceptualization": "The proper concepts are needed to
formulate a good theory; but we need a good theory to arrive at the proper concepts,mo.
It is not possible here to go into greater detail on the problems and rules of concept
definition171 , let alone treat in greater detail the critique of pedagogical language172•
Nevertheless, I would like also to point out the particular difficulties involved in the
clarification of theoretical concepts, and in doing so link the requirement of clarity to that
of the highest possible infonnational content. As in the case of the requirement of clarity for
concepts and statements, we are also dealing in this instance with a norm which concerns
not only language, but above all the contents and meanings expressed through language.
Only a certain number of scientific concepts correspond directly to observable
objects and their characteristics. They are grouped together under the name "observational
language", as opposed to "theoretical language"173. However, one must keep in mind that it
is impossible to make a sharp distinction between the two; on the one hand, the
observational concepts always contain a theoretical interpretation of purely sensory

169 ROHRS (1973: 160, 161, 162, 260). Cf. the critical analysis of "socialization" terminology in BREZINKA
(1989: 192-270).
170 KAPLAN (1964: 53).
171 Cf. SAVIGNY (1971).
172 On this problem, cf. SOLTIS (1971), SCHEFFLER (1971), SMITH and ENNIS (1961), KNELLER (1966),
LOCH (1967). Also of interest are critical studies of language in related sciences, as for example the
exemplary research on business management language carried out by KROEBER-RIEL (1969); in
psychology, cf. MANDLER and KESSEN (1959); in ethics, cf. STEVENSON (1944), HARE (1972),
WELLMANN (1961); in political science, cf. WELDON (1962).
173 Cf. CARNAP (1959a and 1974), HEMPEL (1960: 10 ff.), KAPLAN (1964: 54 ff.), ACHINSTEIN (1968:
157 ff.).
78 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

impressions l74, and on the other, theoretical concepts must somehow be connected with
observations if they are to be useful for purposes of explanation and prediction175• Since
the most important concepts of a science are theoretical ones - for example learning,
motivation, intelligence, etc. - the problem arises as to how such concepts relate to the
perceptible world. In order to determine whether a statement containing theoretical
concepts is true or false, one must stipulate the consequences drawn from these concepts
as they apply to observable situations. One must thus determine the distinctive features a
thing must have before one can say: "X (learning, etc.) is present".
In educational science, one sub-class of theoretical concepts is of especially great
importance: those concepts referring to such psychic dispositions as attitudes, abilities,
interests, propensities for action, etc. As with process-related concepts such as "learning"
or "socialization", these dispositional concepts are "hypothetical constructs": they refer to
objects which, although not observable, can be inferred to exist l76 • Some examples of these
concepts are "learning ability", "talent", "creativity", "desire to achieve", "conscience", etc.
All concepts describing educational aims belong to this group. The things described by
them cannot be observed, but there are observable phenomena such as achievements, guilt
feelings, etc., which support the assumption that such hypothetical constructs do in fact
exist. Precisely because hypothetical constructs play such a central role in the formation of
theories, one must be careful not to accept the reality of concepts which are mere flights of
fancy lacking any relation to the real world. From this need for caution comes the
methodological postulate that, whenever possible, psychic dispositions and dispositional
changes should be explained with the help of elementary concepts of behavior which can
be observed under certain specific conditions. Certainly, there are differences in the extent
to which theoretical concepts of a higher order can be related to observable facts, but an
attempt should be made to at least establish an indirect relationship by setting up rules
stating how such theoretical concepts are to be interpreted and what observational results
support them177•
Basic concepts related to reality (or empirically relevant ones) are a prerequisite for
fulfilling the requirement that scientific theories have as much "empirical"178 or
"informational content"l79 as possible. Statements poor in informational content are
especially common in pedagogics. These statements are characterized by considerable

174 Cf. BOHNEN (1972).

175 cr. V. KRAPf (1968: 48 ff.), STEGMULLER (1969: 93 ff.).
176 Cf. BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 93).
177 cr. KROEBER-RIEL (1969: 159 ff.).
178 cr. POPPER (1977: 112 ff.).
179 cr. ALBERT (1964: 24 ff.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 79

logical flexibility180, that is, they are compatible with many different factual contents and
exclude few. The following statements may serve as examples: "Where the objective spirit
meets unfolding, searching, subjective spirituality, there lies the process of education"l81.
"Education means initiating people into freedom from themselves, into freedom to take
the responsiblity of starting and supporting for the temporarily appearing and departing:
for the 'being' of their approaching becoming"182. "To be educated and to be human as well
as becoming human and being educated are two mutually supplementary basic
anthropological processes"183.
Statements like these are not false, nor are they entirely divorced from reality, but
since they are practically devoid of all content, they say little or nothing about the world.
They are so formulated that more specific and empirically testable statements cannot be
derived from them. Thus, they cannot be disproved. Informative statements, by contrast,
convey information about reality by "excluding certain possibilities (situations, events,
occurrences, etc.); thus, if these possibilities actually do occur, the statement must be
considered refuted. Information can only be attained by limiting logical possibilities, and
this limitation carries with it by its very nature the risk that the statement in question will
turn out to be false"l84.
The criterion of clarity requires that the meaning of words and statements be
formulated as unambiguously as possible. This is a prerequisite for making statements
testable. What we call "clarity" here is occasionally also referred to as "intersubjective
comprehensibility"l85. In our context, however, the criterion of comprehensibility means a
norm which has less to do with the determination of the sense (the meaning or content) of
statements than with making them easily accessible to the greatest number of people.
"Comprehensibility" is used in this sense when we say that a text is easy or difficult to
grasp. We are thus here concerned with the form or style of presentation.
Thoughts can be expressed in different ways. Scientists, too, have a great many
possibilities of individual expression open to them. The more the number of scientists,
areas of specialization and available knowledge have increased, the richer and less
uniform scientific language has become. A great number of neologisms have been created,
and the new meanings of familiar words have multiplied. Just a few examples are
necessary: As early as 1937, there already existed at least fifty meanings for the root word

180 Cf. CARNAP (1958: 21 ff.).

181 SPRANGER (1928: 64).
182 SCHALLER (1967: 2441)
183 ROHRS (1973: 165).
184 ALBERT (1965: 408), similarly (1964: 24).
185 Cf. for example WOHLGENANNT (1969: 92), STEGMULLER (1973: 6).
80 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

"personality"I86. In seventy pages of a pedagogical report written in 1960, there appeared

more than eighty concepts containing the word "to educate"187. In one book alone, the
currently fashionable word "paradigm" is used in twenty-one different senses l88 • Under
these conditions, it is difficult enough to make oneself understood even within a single
science; it is even more difficult to communicate with representatives of other sciences and
with non-scientists who rely on scientific knowledge in their professions.
The more pedagogics has developed from a system of practical educational teachings
for educators into a philosophical discipline, an empirical science or an enormous
compendium of descriptions, theories, programs, postulates and ideals, the more the
language of educational theorists (educologists) has become removed from everyday
language. Since much of the knowledge needed for educational theories has been acquired
from such other fields as ethics, psychology, psychiatry, biology, sociology, history,
economics, political science, etc., the technical expressions of these neighboring disciplines
have been adopted along with that knowledge. The technical language of pedagogics is
lacking in expressions of its own, but is at the same time overloaded with words borrowed
from other sciences. Many of these can only be understood if one is familiar with the
theories in which they are used.
Under these circumstances, the requirement that the language of educational science
be comprehensible cannot mean that everyone should be able to understand it. Whether
persons can grasp information going beyond the scope of everyday knowledge depends on
whether they already have the relevant basic knowledge and are prepared to exert
themselves intellectually. Consequently, one must know for whom a given text is intended
before one judges its comprehensibility. The complaint that educational science texts are
hard to understand or are even incomprehensible is in part unfair, since these texts are
directed at specialists and not at laymen.
Nonetheless, the norm of comprehensibility is overstepped when the presentation of
topics which could be treated simply becomes unnecessarily difficult, affected and tedious.
The linguistic extravagance of educational science texts frequently stands in inverse
proportion to their informational content. I will mention just a few examples of the
language in which very ordinary thoughts on curriculum theory are nowadays expressed -
thoughts which any educated layman could understand if they were formulated less
bombastically. The language of educology is replete with terms like "curricular
construction", "level of reflection", "taxonomy", "innovation", "innovation strategy",

186 ALLPORT (1937).

187 Cf. DOLCH (1963: 217) on the report of the German Committee for Education, "On the Situation and
Tasks of German Adult Education" (1960).
188 Cf. MASTERMAN (1970: 61ff.) in regard to KUHN (1962).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCAnON 81

"operationalization", "optimized learning sequence", "structural concept", "qualification

analysis", "function analysis", "specification", "transparence", "legitimization", "conceptual
system", "dimension", "repertoire", "motivational basis", "implicational context", "deductive
hypothesis", "complexity reduction", etc189 • If one examines what is hidden behind this
intimidating vocabulary, one finds a meager amount of knowledge. Obviously, the use of
jargon is in many cases confused with having a science19O.
This sorry state of affairs is in no way restricted to educational science; in most
sciences, "not only does the flood of publications reveal an abundance of pompous bluff
and a paucity of new ideas, but even the old and valuable insights ... are being drowned in
a torrent of meaningless verbiage and useless technicalities. Pretentious and nebulous
verbosity, interminable repetition of platitudes and disguised propaganda are the order of
the day"l91.
With the increase in opportunities for social scientists to make a living by academic
pursuits and the lack of strict standards, there have been increasing numbers of writers
trying to "veil trivial concepts in elegant words and to clothe their very ordinary thoughts in
the most unusual expressions". Presumably, some do not quite know what they want to say,
but instead have "only a dull consciousness struggling for an idea. Often, however, they
also want to hide from themselves and others the fact that they don't really have anything
to say. They want ... to appear to know what they don't know, to think what they don't
think and to say what they don't say"192.
It better serves the future progress of educational science to admit openly its lack of
reliable knowledge than to hide this lack behind the mask of a bombastic specialized
vocabulary. An unnecessarily complicated and abstract technical language hinders our
view of the concrete subject matter which is to be investigated and feigns knowledge while
often merely producing words. This language also harms educational practice, in part,
because it hinders communication between educators and educational theorists, and in
part, because some educators who have adopted it are now unable to communicate in
everyday language with young people and their parents. Thus, the norm of
comprehensibility is not only important within the inner circle of educologists. The manner
in which it is complied with also affects the training of professional educators and through
them brings enlightenment or perplexity to countless other persons.

189 Following ACHTENHAGEN and MEYER (1972).

190 Cf. SCRIVEN (1960: 247).
191 ANDRESKI (1974: 11): on the "smokescreen of jargon" cf. also p. 59 ff. with numerous examples from
PARSONS to LEVI·STRAUSS. For a critique of expressions used in business management literature cf.
ENDRES (1969), in pedagogics, BREZINKA (1981a: 101 ff.) and A. FLITNER (1977).
192 SCHOPENHAUER (1891a: 556 f.).
82 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Having examined a few of the claims made on the language of educational science,
we must now turn to the difference between descriptive language and meta-language. To
speak of objects outside of the sphere of language and to speak of statements which
describe these objects are two different things. Thus, a distinction must be made between
the language concerning things or objects ("primary level language") and the language
about the "language of the primary level", which forms a language of the secondary level or
"meta-language" of the first language 193 • Thus for example, any statement which describes
a statement as true or false is a statement about this statement and thus a part of the meta-
language, while the statement being described belongs to the language of the primary
level 194. Accordingly, this book employs a meta-language to the language of the primary
level, since its subject matter is not educational situations, but rather statements and
statement-systems concerning education. Many misunderstanding can thus be avoided by
keeping in mind that language has different semantic 195 levels. One such misunderstanding
concerns the principle of value-neutrality (Le. refraining from value judgements), which we
will examine in the following section.

THE MEANING AND LIMITS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF VALUE-NEUTRALI1Y

No one can educate without recourse to value judgements. Whoever educates

evaluates. Educators judge the personalities of educands and pass judgement on
conceptualized personality states or attributes such as abilities and attitudes. They attach
more value to some than to others and set them as educational aims. They evaluate
situations, the means at their disposal and the possible effects which they could have under
different circumstances. Education means having to select, decide, prefer, avoid, dismiss
and reject. It means the constant subjective evaluation of people and situations, ideas,
wishes and statements of intent, requirements and achievements, institutions and actions,
ends and means. No one who acts can avoid making evaluations. In order to adequately
explain behavior and behavioral patterns, one must take into account the evaluations
made by people acting in specific situations.
In this situation, it goes without saying that peoples' value judgements and the
normative decisions which people make are a central object of study in the human and
social sciences. In educational science as well value judgements are described, explained
and employed to explain actions. Statements dealing with value judgements form an

193 Cf. BOCHENSKI (1965: 50 f.), STEGMULLER (1957: 38 ff.) and (1%9: 30 ff.).
194 V. KRAFT (1960: 40).
195 Semantics (from the Greek "sema" = "sign") is the study of the relationships between signs (for example
words or sentences) and their referents. Cf. STEGMULLER (1957: 42).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 83

important part of educational science. The principle of value-neutrality (literally: freedom

from value judgements, German: "Werturteilsfreiheit") thus does not mean that such
statements should be eliminated from scientific statement systems. What then does it
mean?
To answer this question, we must, first of all, clarify several concepts and make
certain distinctions. The word "value" is ambiguous, and the views expressed under the
headings "value theory" or "philosophy of values" differ widelyl96. But one thing is certain -
there are value experiences. We experience ourselves as innately evaluative beings; we have
a value consciousness in which such experiences as attraction and repulsion, affirmation
and negation, liking more or less appear as observable facts. Our value feelings form the
lowest level of this value consciousness. We try to express these feelings through value
statements. In value judgements positions are consciously taken, be it that value is ascribed
to or denied a person or thing, or that a choice is made among various evaluations. In the
real world, the evaluative process is thus a psychic "archetypal phenomenon"
(Urphiinomen) having a variety of manifestations, all of which can be subsumed under the
concept of evaluation 197•
In the process of evaluating, it is necessary to distinguish between the thing being
evaluated and the value which is ascribed to it. The object to which value is described is
designated the value bearer (Werttrager). This value bearer has a value for someone, or it
is considered valuable, but is not itself a value. Things are thus not valuable per se; rather,
their value is dependent on the person for whom they are valuable. In empirical terms,
value is something generaI198, a general conceptual content, an "ideal unit of meaning" or a
concept which is derived by abstraction from evaluations. "Values are something that have
to be shown to be the same in a large variety of evaluations. In contrast to evaluations,
values represent something uniform and timeless"199. Everything which is valued as useful
thus has the common value character of "usefulness", everything which is judged beautiful
has the value of "beauty"; everything which is judged true has the value of "truth".
Usefulness, beauty and truth are value concepts. Accordingly, a value judgement is defined
as a statement which expresses a valuation. In such a statement, an object is ascribed
positive or negative value on the basis of a particular value concept. Objects or facts are
designated as positive or negative on the basis of value jUdgements200• In grammatical
terms, value judgements are expressed in the indicative, that is, they are outwardly
indistinguishable from descriptive statements.

196 Cf. KRAUS (1937), NAJDER (1975: 42 ff.).

197 REININGER (1946: 26 ff.).
198 HEYDE (1926: 34 ff.).
199 V. KRAFT (1951: 11).
200 V. KRAFT (1951: 72 ff.).
84 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Let us consider some examples of value judgements taken from pedagogical texts:
"The worst sin when teaching is to be boring"201. "Factual knowledge is not at all important;
it is a waste of youth"202. "Lying is rightfully ... always especially punished"203. "Education
by the rod is positively bad education"204. "Education which seriously did nothing more
than to try to satisfy the needs and inclinations of the child... would have as a
consequence ... a regression to barbarity"205. "A unified standard of achievement is ...
absurd"206. "Progressive educational science is in no way morally better than conservative
educational science"207.
These examples demonstrate that not only are facts labeled with such common value
predicates as "true" or "false", "good" or "bad", "useful" or "harmful", "beautiful" or "ugly",
"just" or "unjust", but also that judgements are made with terms like "sin", "waste",
"barbarity", "absurd", "progressive", "conservative", etc. Since many of these expressions are
used not only in a descriptive, but also in an evaluative sense, it is not always easy to tell
whether a particular statement should be considered a value judgement. In addition to
openly admitted value judgements, there are also disguised ones.
As to our question of the meaning of "value-neutrality", it must be kept in mind that
opinions diverge on how value judgements are to be understood. One group of authors
ascribes empirical content to value judgements, and another group contests this claim. In
the philosophical literature, the first view is called "cognitivism" and the second, "non-
cognitivism"208. Those who regard value judgements as mere expressions of feeling or
confuse them with orders will of course hold the opinion that value judgements are totally
unrelated to scientific statements. Careful analysis nonetheless shows that value
judgements do have empirical content and can be shown to be logically correct or
incorrect, valid or invalid. This is, however, only possible if one accepts the existence of
valuative principles - valuative maxims or axioms209 . Thus, for example, the value
judgement, "Monotonous teaching is bad", can be justified by using the valuative principle
"It is good to have a variety of interests,,210 and statements clarifying and commenting on it:

201 HERBART (1913: Vol. 1: 292).

202 W. FLITNER (1953: 61).
203 NOHL (1949: W6).
204 MARITAIN (1943: 32).
205 UTI (1949: 65).
206 HECKHAUSEN (1975: 108).
207 WERDER (1976: 78).
208 From the Latin "cogitare". Cf. NAJDER (1975: 87 ff.).
209 Cf. V. KRAFT (1951: 203 ff.). The fact that KRAFT does not make a sufficiently clear distinction between
value judgements and norms, but rather interprets value judgements as "instructions for taking a certain
stance in regard to an object", is irrelevant in regard to the problem of justification, since logically speaking
there is no difference between the derivation of value judgements from basic valuative principles and the
derivation of norms from basic norms.
210 Cf. HERBART (1913: Vol. 1: 262 ff.); (1914: Vol. 2: 37 ff.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 85

"Interest develops on the basis of interesting subjects and activities"211; "through the art of
teaching one must seek to arouse ... involuntary attention; in it lies interest" etc. 212•
According to this interpretation, a value judgement is a statement whose validity is not
only dependent on agreement with the facts to which it relates, but also on whether it is
directly or indirectly related to a basic evaluative principle213 .
Value judgements must be distinguished from normative statements214 . A norm is a
prescription. It is expressed in a normative statement. This can mean a commandment, an
injunction or a statement expressing permission. Accordingly a normative statement can
be imperative, prohibitive or permissive. The term "norm" designates not only a normative
demand's written form, but also its meaning or content (Le. what should be or what is
called for: the content of the norm)215. A norm states that something should be or should
not be, or that something should or should not have a certain form. Therefore normative
statements, in contrast to "is" statements (descriptive statements), are often also referred
to as "ought" statements. Whether the words "ought" or "is" appear in statements is,
however, not decisive. There are also norms which, although they use the verbs "to have"
and "to be" instead of "ought", are nonetheless norms and not descriptive statements. For
example, the statements, "Students who smoke inside school buildings are to be punished"
or "Teachers have to watch their students during recess" are normative statements. One
can therefore not tell from the type of words used whether a statement is a description or a
norm. In order to decide this, the meaning of the statement must be determined, and in
addition one must take into account the context in which the statement is found 216.
Whereas descriptive statements can be true of false, norms are said to be either valid or
invalid217 •
Classes of norrns can also be distinguished according to their level of reality and
sphere of action for which they are set. In addition to moral norms, there are (among
others) also scientific, technical, economic, political, artistic, religious and educational
thought and action norrns.
In pedagogical statement systems many more normative statements are found than
value judgements. Here are a few examples: "Contact with content should be fruitful; this

211 Cf. HERBART (1913: Vol. 1: 273).

212 Cf. HERBART (1914: Vol. 2: 43).
213 Cf. NAJDER (1975: 75 and 120 ff.), V. KRAFT (1951: 210 ff.).
214 Cf. NAJDER (1975: 102 ff.).
215 Cf. WEINGARTNER (1971: 26).
216 MORSCHER (1974: 13 ff.).
217 This is, however, only the case when one agrees with the meta-ethical viewpoint of cognitivistic non-
naturalism (to which I adhere). By contrast, proponents of naturalism interpret normative statements (and
value judgements) as disguised factual statements whose content can without remainder be fully translated
into descriptive statements. Cf. FRANKENA (1973: 97), MORSCHER (1974: 119 ff.).
86 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

is the methodological imperative"218. "The schools should not be the thing of a party"219.
"The school's task is to contribute to the democratization of society"220. "The educator
should not tell young people what they would like to hear, but should rather educate
them"221. "Instruction must be understandable, however, better difficult than easy,
otherwise it leads to boredom"222. "Those who in acting do not have a correct desire cannot
be allowed to act the way they wish"223. "We must set up new learning and educational
goals that are as independent as possible of those already existing"224. "The development of
a person is a task to be actively pursued through teaching and learning processes"22S. "The
goal of Christian education is the Christian personality"226.
One can see from these examples that norms in pedagogical literature are less often
expressed with the word "ought" than with such phrases as "it is the task of ... ", "the aim
is ... ", "they are to ... ", "it is to be ... ", "must", "may", etc.
Although value judgements only express valuations and not normative demands227,
value judgements and normative statements are seldom clearly differentiated either in
scientific or meta-scientific literature. The reason for this is probably that normative
statements already presuppose and include evaluations of that which they require. The
number of value judgements is much greater that that of normative statements, but since
normative statements are themselves based on value judgements, one can view them in
this regard as a subset of value judgements. Accordingly, the requirement of value-
neutrality is usually not only directed at value judgements in the strict sense of the word,
but also at normative statements. Both types of statements do, however, have in common
that, based on their meaning, they are not purely descriptive statements and that their
validity is not based on derivation from descriptive statements about facts, but rather on
derivation from other, superordinate value judgements or norms.
Having explained the most important concepts, we can now tum to the question of
whether or not science should be free of value judgements. This question is, however,
much too imprecisely stated to be answered unambiguously; it includes a number of
subordinate questions which must first be differentiated.

218 W. FLITNER (1953: 19).

219 DURKHEIM (1956: 81 f.).
220 FEND (1976: 109).
221 HABERLIN (1920: 100).
222 HERBART (1913: Vol. I: 386).
223 HERBART (1913: Vol. I: 369).
224 HENTIG (1968: 11).
225 ROTH (1971: 34).
226 F. SCHNEIDER (1953: 143).
227 Cf. SCHELER (1973: 203 ff.), NAJDER (1975: 102), BREZINKA (1990: 138 ff.).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 87

To begin with, we should keep in mind that the word "science" is itself ambiguous. It
refers to a system of statements about a particular subject area or range of problems. This
system of statements is in turn acquired by applying the general rules of scientific method
and specialized research techniques. The requirement of value-neutrality applies only to this
concept ofscience as a system ofstatements.
In a second sense, the word "science" is used to designate the actions through which
scientific statement systems are formulated. In this sense, science as a process is meant, in
contrast to science as a product, as the result or consequence of scientific aetivitf28.
"Science as a product" is thus a complex of statements, a purely linguistic phenomenon.
The concept of "science as a process", by contrast, relates to non-linguistic phenomena.
Value judgements are an indispensable part of scientific activity. This has never been
denied by the proponents of value-neutrality, but has, to the contrary, always been clearly
understood and explicitly emphasized229 • Scientific activities and the scientific statement
systems resulting from them can only be realized after value judgements and decisions for
certain norms have already been made. Thus science has a normative foundation. All
questions relating to this foundation can be subsumed under the concept of the value
foundation of science. It must be distinguished from the problem of applying scientific
knowledge, the problem of value judgements as the subject matter (or within the sphere)
of science and the actual problem of value judgements23O •
The value foundation of science includes the methodological norms setting forth the
ends and rules of scientific activity. It makes a difference whether one views the aim of
science as limited to the investigation of the world as it is or assigns it the additional task
of interpreting reality according to certain ideals and seeking to influence people
accordingly. Examples of rules include such requirements as clarity of language, logical
correctness, the intersubjective confirmability and information content of statements,
exactitude in observation and measurement, and value-neutrality.
Besides methodological norms, the value foundation of science also includes the
value judgements which must be made in the course of research, from the selection of
problem areas to the interpretation of final results. Decisions must constantly be made on
the usefulness of concepts, the value of hypotheses, the suitability of methods and the
relevance of particular facts for the solution of a given problem. Scientific knowledge is
"the result of an activity which is interwoven with all manner of decisions"231. This has to do
with the fact that, in cognition as in acting, we are forced to choose from a wealth of

228 Cf. RUDNER (1966: 7 ff), WEINGARTNER (1971: 38 ff.).

229 Cf. MAX WEBER (1968: 239 ff.), ALBERT (1972a: 41 ff.).
230 Cf. ALBERT (1965a: 186 ff.).
231 a. ALBERT (1965a: 187).
88 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

possibilities. To do this, points of view, standards or criteria are needed which are not
simply taken from reality, but which we ourselves introduce through our own value
judgements.
It is also necessary to distinguish between problems relating to the value foundation
of science and moral problems conceming the dissemination and application of scientific
knowledge. This group of problems has nothing to do with either science as a system of
statements or with the process of scientific research; rather, it relates to the uses of its
results by customers and all types of interested parties. In this respect, the social scientist -
in contrast to the natural scientist - is faced with the special difficulty that his research
results can, under certain circumstances, influence the consciousness and actions of people
and groups232.
Statements viewed as scientific knowledge differ in how well they are confirmed.
Some are quite certain; others only more or less probable. The majority, however,
originated under conditions which were much simpler that the situations confronting the
practitioner trying to apply such knowledge. Thus the question arises of just how much
confirmation of their hypotheses scientists consider sufficient to be able to publish their
results as scientific knowledge233 • Consider as an example the research results on the
effects of the so-called "authoritarian" style of education on children's personalities. In
view of the complexity of the real interrelationships between educators and educands, as
well as the importance of other dimensions (for example, "warmth" - "emotional distance"),
the isolated study of one dimension of educational behavior - "authoritarian" versus
"democratic" - is already in purely theoretical terms problematical234 • Scientifically
untrained lay people may, without regard for the theoretical context, convert such results
into relatively undifferentiated instructions for realizing "anti-authoritarian education". But
such instructions are not related in a methodologically justifiable way to actually present
"scientific knowledge". The same applies by analogy to the connection between learning
ability in early childhood and pre-school educational institutions or for the meager
empirical arguments used to support political calls for comprehensive schools. In each case
value judgements affect the standards according to which educational knowledge is
published and with what reservations they are recommended for practical application.
The third problem area has to do with valuations as a subject matter of science.
Without a doubt, the value judgements which people make, the ideals which they conceive,
the aims which they set and the norms to which they bind themselves belong to socio-

232 Cf. TOPITSCH (1966: 151 ff.); for a discussion of the special problems resulting from the publication of
predictions in social science cf. MERTON (1967).
233 Cf. RESCHER (1965: 267 ff.).
234 Cf. BECKER (1964), BAUMRIND (1966), ANDERSON (1959).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 89

cultural reality and make up a central research object of the social and cultural sciences.
The statements used in attempting to describe and explain valuations, norms, decisions,
ideals and aims are themselves not value judgements, but rather factual statements235 •
Valuations and norms are particularly important objects of research for educational
science because the latter deals with ends-means relations which are themselves based on
value judgements. Important here are such questions as: Which educational aims are
pursued by whom, when, where and under what circumstances? What do these educational
aims mean? On what basic norms do they depend? What relation do they have to the
given historical situation and to particular interpretations of this situation? Are the
educational aims which have been set for particular educands logically non-contradictory
and psychologically compatible with one another? Can they be realized? Why have people
decided in favor of them? Which desired and undesired effects will result from their
implementation? Which means are judged in what way by which people at what time and
under what circumstances? How are value judgements about the moral value or lack of
value of particular means justified?
The requirement of value-neutrality does not, however, affect any of the three above-
mentioned problem groups. We have established that this postulate is more limited, but
also somewhat different in content from what the name suggests. It does not mean that
value judgements should be excluded from the admissible statements of the empirical
sciences. Furthermore, it relates not only to value judgements as a whole, but also to
normative statements. The term ''value-neutrality'' is thus ambiguous and open to
misunderstanding236. It does not designate a single, clear norm. Rather it is used to
designate a number of norms which contain a relatively large amount of information and
which are more or less clear237 • Thus in the following section I will limit myself to an
explanation of the minimum norm advocated in this book. What is its content and how is
it justified?
The first step in setting forth the norm of value-neutrality is to decide on the aims of
the empirical sciences. They should help us acquire knowledge about the world (or about
existence, reality). In the empirical sciences only those statements are considered
knowledge which are justified by (or confirmed by) statements about observational results
(or facts). Value judgements and normative statements cannot be justified purely in
empirical terms, but are ultimately dependent on decisions. Simply for the sake of clarity,
it is necessary that they not be confused with descriptive statements but that their
uniqueness be recognized and that the method of demonstrating their validity be

235 MAX WEBER (1%8: 268).

236cr. the collection of representative texts in ALBERT and TOPITSCH (1971).
237 Cf. ZECHA (1976).
90 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

separated from the method with which empirical scientific statements are justified. The
theoretical reason for requiring value-neutrality is thus based on a recognition of the
difference between cognition and decision, description and valuation, "is" and "ought",
factual statements, value judgements, and norms.
In addition to this theoretical motive, there also exists a practical one. It frequently
occurs that as a result of mixing descriptive statements with value judgements and
normative statements, readers are influenced in favor of the point of view represented in
these value judgements or norms, an effect which is in many cases intentional. If one
accepts the basic norm that the purpose of science is to accumulate scientific knowledge
and not to propagate an ideology or promote a particular moral standpoint, then this basic
norm would appear to be violated by anyone who creates such a mixture of statements,
whether intentionally or unintentionally.
These theoretical and practical reasons give rise to the minimum requirement that
value judgements and normative statements in the empirical sciences should be clearly
recognizable as such and should not be falsely passed off as factual statements. Nor should
it be acceptable to make the same truth claims for statements based on arbitrary decisions
that are made for empirical statements which can be intersubjectively tested and
confirmed.
MAX WEBER expressed this "in itself rather trivial" minimum requirement as
follows: "in determining empirical facts it is imperative that the researcher or reporter keep
separate these facts (including possible 'evaluations' of the people he has studied) from his
own practical, valuative attitude, which judges these facts (including possible 'evaluations'
by real people who have become objects of an investigation) as either pleasing or
displeasing. .. because this is a matter of heterogeneous problems". Instead of the
imprecise value predicates "pleasing" or "displeasing", WEBER also uses the expressions
"desirable or undesirable in practical terms". WEBER's term "to separate" in this case
means "not to mix", "not to combine" or "to differentiate". WEBER is thus arguing for the
"separation in principle of purely logical or empirical 1}nowledge", on the one hand, and
"value judgements", on the other, as "heterogenous problem areas"238.
Although WEBER did not clearly distinguish between value judgements and
normative statements, there is no doubt that he held both types of statements to be
empirically unprovable. His primary concern was that the limits of scientific knowledge be
seen: "an empirical science cannot teach people what they ought to do, but only what they
can and - under certain circumstances, - what they will"239. The "final value standards" of a
person or a group of persons are not scientifically provable. Rather, they are dependent on

238 MAX WEBER (1968: 239 f.) (emphasis in original); similarly WEBER (1%2: 579 f.).
239 MAX WEBER (1968: 6).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 91

the individual's Weltanschauung, beliefs and conscience. Here, as was the case with basic
norms, we are dealing with convictions, which one either decides upon or rejects without
being able to demonstrate that they are true and that diverging convictions are false.
The minimum content of the requirement of value-neutrality is thus summed up in
the following norm: In scientific statement systems, value judgements and normative
statements should not be presented as factual statements or as having been derived from
factual statements, but rather should be clearly distinguished from them and designated as
empirically non-justifiable. The words "empirically non-justifiable" mean that empirical
knowledge is an insufficient condition for justifying norms and value judgements. Value
judgements can only be justified relative to evaluative principles, and normative
statements relative to more general normative statements, but they "are not absolutely
justifiable"24O.
It is of course undeniable that when deciding upon certain basic evaluative principles
or basic norms empirical data can, should or in fact are taken into consideration. Just as
unchallenged is that value judgements and normative statements have their basis, not only
in value principles or basic norms, but also in the objective qualities of the phenomena
which are being judged or whose realization or non-realization has been required. We can
nonetheless assume that both "final value standards" and people's basic norms are based
on decisions, and that it is not logically justifiable to derive prescriptions, norms or ideals
from factual statements. This last point is based directly on the rules of deductive logic,
which do not allow a logical conclusion to go beyond the content of the premises. In order
to derive a normative statement, at least one of the given premises must be a normative
statement or contain a norm as an essential component. Empirical statements can thus be
derived from empirical statements, but norms cannot241 •
Whether the norm of value-neutrality, which we have discussed using MAX
WEBER's concept, should continue to bear this easily misunderstood name is of
secondary importance. As long as a better term has not been found, we will have to make
do with the old one, but we must make certain through a careful explanation of its
meaning that misunderstandings will be avoided. In an age of "the disenchantment of the
world" by science242, this highly controversial norm seems to me indispensable for the
social sciences. This applies especially if we are to confront those who disseminate
ideological belief systems, partisan value judgements and demands motivated by special

240 DUBISlAV (1937: 453).

241 A basic work on this subject is DUBISlAV (1937). It is, however, not always easy to tell whether a
statement is descriptive or normative. Particularly problematical are mixed statements in which a
descriptive statement is combined with a normative one. Cf. MORSCHER (1973: 38 f.) and (1974: 58 ff.).
242 Cf. LOWITH (1%5), who offers an interpretation of MAX WEBER's theory of science in regard to the
ideological situation of his (and our) time. Cf. also WEBER (1962).
92 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

interests in the guise of "science". Such people wish to verbally camouflage the fact that
theirs are non-scientific opinions. The fact is that their views are based on quite arbitrary
decisions and that equally reasonable alternatives exist243•
Although the norm of value-neutrality is especially important for educational
science, it is, for several reasons, particularly difficult to implement. First, among
educationists there are those who combine a zeal for action with a lack of ability to make
fine distinctions. Misled by the insight that value judgements and norms are indispensable
in their field, they believe that they can discover educational aims using scientific methods
and scientifically justify moral value judgements about educational means. However, one
should note the extenuating circumstance with which most educationists are burdened;
most bear the responsibility for training educators and, as a result, must convincingly
communicate accepted norms as well as constantly make value judgements. Secondly, in
every society the persons in power are concerned with passing off their educational
decisions as "scientifically" justified. The same applies essentially to opposition groups who
want to justify their diverging norms and value judgements. Third, the members of many
groups occupationally involved in education would like to see their professional work
"scientifically" confirmed as beneficial, useful and necessary. At a time when "science" is
believed to be the highest authority and "scienticity" carries more weight in terms of
prestige, income and influence than do, for example, ideologies or morals, there is a great
temptation to pass off one's own norms and value judgements as scientific knowledge.
The norm of value-neutrality is an essential standard for distinguishing empirical
educational science from all types of practical pedagogics, which are themselves
necessarily dependent on world views. Rather than diminishing the importance of norms
and value judgements for man, society and education, the norm of value-neutrality instead
directs attention to the importance of value judgements for the way people live and act. By
analogy it is also contained mutatis mutandis in requirements for the clarity and
intersubjective testability of scientific statements. As a methodological rule, its purpose is
to prevent educational statement systems from giving the impression that idealized wishes
have been arrived at by means of observations, or that norms have been derived from
descriptive statements, when they in fact result from decisions, or that ideologically
conditioned value judgements are purely objective conclusions.
The norm of value-neutrality can serve as a stimulus for recognizing and critically
analyzing norms and value judgements. Its proponents naturally reckon with the fact that
all educational aims, educational actions and practical theories of education depend on the

243 BRECHT (1961: 252 ff.) offers a detailed discussion of scientific value relativism and a critique of
objections raised by scholars favoring a normative social science. Cf. JUNKER (1970) for arguments
against the legitimacy of value judgements in historiography.
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 93

selection of particular evaluative principles and thus on decisions arising from specific
world views244 • They nonetheless consider it expedient - and also possible - that in
acquiring scientific knowledge about education, educational science as a statement system
remain in principle ideologically neutral. What is said in educational science about
educational aims should thus be confined to descriptions and interpretations as well as to
purely theoretical, research-specific assumptions, like the following conditional statements:
"If someone wants to reach educational aim x ...", "based on the assumption that x is
intended ...", "assuming that we want to realize condition x ...", etc. This should also hold
true mutatis mutandis for all statements which scientists make about means, whether
critical or descriptive. Ends-means statements are always to be hypothetical, conditionally
valid or based on neutral (Le. taking no position on their contents) assumptions about the
intended or desired results. When investigating ends-means relations, one should proceed
without reliance on any sort of value judgements and not base agreement or disagreement
on a previously formulated ideal245 •
The principle of value-neutrality is an expression of the wish to ensure that tasks
which are in fact different (but which have often been confused by educational theorists)
will be distinguished from one another. It is not the task of educational science to
persuade educators to agree with a certain world view or moral position, nor should it set
educational aims or prescribe educational means. One should expect from educational
science nothing more - but also nothing less - than that it produce knowledge which is both
sufficiently confirmed and as comprehensive as possible246 •

QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICULARS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT THE UNIVERSAL

IN THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

As with every aspect of reality, one can examine education-related phenomena from
various perspectives. Depending on the research aim being pursued, the same objects can
be examined in regard to their own special characteristics or in regard to similarities with
other objects, e.g. general characteristics, relationships and regularities. Using the
teleological-causal analytical (or technological) approach, educational science is
principally concerned with the discovery and verification of nomological regularities. Such
regularities, however, can hardly be discerned until large numbers of individual
educational situations have been researched and compared from a variety of perspectives.

244 a. for example FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1921), MEISTER (1965: 20 ff.).

245 For a discussion of the claim that statements on ends-means relationships cannot be value-free, d. NAGEL
(1971: 245 ff.).
246 For an analysis and critique of objections to a value-free science of education d. ZECHA (1984).
94 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

It is thus necessary to have detailed knowledge of numerous special forms of educational

phenomena and the circumstances under which they occur before generalizations about
conjectured relationships can be useful. The description of educational situations, their
components and relationships with one another (including the changes occurring in the
course of time) is just as necessary for the discovery of nomological knowledge as for the
application of such knowledge in explanation or prediction.
According to this conception, educational science includes both studies of education-
related phenomena which seek to describe and explain singular (or individual) facts and
those which seek to formulate and test hypotheses about nomological regularities. That
different researchers concentrate more on one or the other task simply represents a
division of labor within the same field.
As soon as it has taken place, education - as with all other actions - is no longer a
part of the present, but of the past. Education is dependent on opinions, convictions and
propensities for acting which, though realized in the present, originate in the educator's
previous experiences and are conditioned by past influences in past situations. This also
applies in essence to all other aspects of present educational situations. In addition,
educands, their partners, educational institutions and all other socio-cultural aspects of
their life space have been co-determined by past events. For that reason it is impossible to
understand present educational situations without going beyond what is presently
observable and taking the past into account. To understand contemporary educational
systems and their inherent tendencies and possibilities, it is necessary to be familiar with
the previous history of these situations as well as with that of the persons and cultural
elements belonging to them.
Research in educational science is nevertheless not limited solely to present-day
educational situations and their historical roots. Education and educationally-related
phenomena also existed in the past. Attempts can also be made to describe and explain
them as individual facts. In the same way, knowledge of past educational situations can
also be of use in developing and/or testing nomological hypotheses. Only after one has
taken into account not only present but also past phenomena can one fully understand the
subject matter of educational science.
Basically, there is no difference between the explanation of past and present
phenomena. It makes just as little difference whether nomological hypotheses are derived
from or tested against true statements about present phenomena or from true statements
about past phenomena. The essential difference between studying past as opposed to
present phenomena is only that past events are much more difficult to describe. This is
because they cannot be directly observed and must be reconstructed from more or less
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 95

incomplete source materials247 • This difficulty poses a number of special problems for
whose solution specialized historical research methods have been developed. The
subdiscipline of educational science dedicated to reconstructing and explaining past
educational situations and their components is the historiography of education 248•
Often called "historical pedagogics", this research field has sometimes been set apart
from "general" or "systematic pedagogics". A thorough analysis of the problems treated by
historiography of education nevertheless shows that this field can be viewed neither as an
autonomous science independent of educational science nor as a "second half' of
educational science. As we have already established, the description, interpretation and
explanation of present-day educational situations is impossible without including past
events in the analysis. We must take into account that if we have described the situations,
actions and states of people and institutions which we observe in the present, they already
belong to the past. Thus it is possible to regard the description of contemporary
phenomena as the historiography of the recent past. Because the insights of educational
science are unthinkable without a knowledge of past events, historiography of education -
insofar as it is thought of as a scientific activity - merely represents a specialized research
technique of educational science. However, to the extent that the designation
"historiography of education" also refers to the statement systems produced by historical
research, its statements belong essentially to the content of educational science249.
The primary task of historiography of education is to acquire knowledge of past
events in the domain of education. In doing so it must be remembered that the past
described by the historian is not the "real" past, "as it was at the time it occurred, but rather
a man-made construct ... used to best explain the material available to the historian. The
historical event ... is a hypothetical construct"250.
The reconstruction of past education is a task which can be clearly defined and
precisely designated with the term "historiography of education". Much more difficult to
name is the central field of study in educational science arising from the tasks of searching
for and testing nomological hypotheses.
It would be possible to take recourse to the old term "systematic pedagogics"251 and
speak of a "systematic educational science". There are, however, two compelling objections

247 Cf. V. KRAFf (1965: 77 ff.) and GOLDSTEIN (1972: 264 ff.).
248 By this is meant scientific historiography. The expression goes back to the Greek (and Latin) "historia" =
history and "graphein" = write. .
249 The position or status ascribed here to the historiography of education is called by DIEMER (1970: 222 ff.)
an "aspect-discipline" within a "domain discipline". In his opinion, "an autonomous science called history
does not even exist. Rather, history is only an aspect-discipline of a particular domain; there exists only the
history of different domains".
250 GOLDSTEIN (1972: 266); cf. also (1976: 50 ff.).
251 Cf. REIN (1911: Vol. 1,72 ff.).
96 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

to this. First, it is claimed that a systematic relationship must exist among the statements in
every scientific statement system· thus also in the historiography of education252 . Secondly,
normative statement systems are also systematically constructed. Traditional "systematic
pedagogics" was explicitly understood to be a system of norms and rules253, and DILlHEY
stipulated in general that the aim of the "systematic liberal arts" (Geisteswissenschaften) "is
not only to attain knowledge, but also to guide both individual and historicallife"254.
The term best describing what is meant here is "nomothetic" (relating to the
establishment of laws or general statements)25S. I thus suggest adopting the phrase
"nomothetical educational science".
In other empirical sciences the term "theoretical" is often used to distinguish between
the task of formulating theories on the basis of nomological statements and the
historiography of the subject matter of the science. It is for example commonplace to
speak of "theoretical sociology" as opposed to social history or of "economic theory" as
opposed to economic history. It would thus also be possible to speak of a "theoretical
educational science". In favor of this term it can be said that the empirical sciences aim not
merely at proposing and testing nomological hypotheses, but at combining confirmed
nomological hypotheses to form theories. A "theory" is understood in this case to be a
system of nomological statements256. On the other hand, the objection can be raised that
the word "theory" has many other meanings and that misunderstandings can arise when the
realm of the "theoretical" is restricted to that of the "general", "universal" or even to that of
the "nomological"257. In accordance with today's usage, however, statements concerning
past occurrences can also be considered "theoretical", and even observational statements
about present phenomena are commonly considered theory-dependent. This naturally
does not exclude the possibility that the word "theoretical" can also be defined as "relating
to nomological statements and systems of nomological statements" and be used in this
sense. This concept of theory is frequently used in this book, although in my opinion the
term "nomological educational science" is less open to misunderstanding than "theoretical
educational science".

252 Cf. WOHLGENANNT (1969: 137 ff.) on the systemic character of science; also DIEMER (1970a: 16 ff.);
WEINGARTNER (1%1: 47 ff.). For the history of the meanings of the word 'system" d. DIEMER (1%8),
especially the article by STEIN (1968).
253 a. REIN (1911: Vol. 1,77 ff.); HENZ (1964).
254 DILTHEY (1895: 251).
25S From the Greek "nomos" = law and "thesis" = establishing. The expression was introduced by
WINDELBAND (1894: 143 ff.) and is now widespread. Cf. e.g. PIAGET (1970: 2 ff.); T. HERRMANN
(1971).
256 For a more detailed treatment see p. 103 ff. below.
257 Cf. in this respect DIEMER (1970: 217).
 SCIENCE OF EDUCATION 97

Apart from the choice of names, it is, however, important to emphasize that
nomothetical (or theoretical) educational science and historiography of education have
one and the same subject matter and cannot be separated from one another in terms of
content258•
Every empirical social science has the task of describing and explaining a particular
psychic or socio-cultural subject matter. In fulfilling these tasks, the sciences must always
rely on statements about individual facts (singular statements) and statements about
universal or general matters (universal statements), for example nomological hypotheses
and theories. Thus the historian seeking to explain past events and the empirical social
researcher seeking to explain present phenomena need "at every step general statements,
which, if they are to be justified in the strictest sense, can only be borrowed from
nomothetical disciplines. Every causal explanation of a given historical occurrence
presupposes general concepts about the course of events as such. If historical evidence is
to be presented in its purely logical form, the presentation must of necessity contain
natural laws - especially those concerning psychic processes - as its ultimate premises"259.
On the other hand, the social scientist seeking to uncover particular nomological
regularities needs not only knowledge of the individual current manifestations of his
subject matter, but also knowledge about its past manifestations (Le. ones that can be
made accessible to him, at least in the hypothetical reconstructions of historians). It is
simply a question of approach whether one seeks to find, test and combine nomological
hypotheses to form theoretical systems or whether one seeks to explain and possibly also
predict individual objects and events with the aid of nomological hypotheses260• In any
case, neither in nature nor in socio-cultural reality are there areas that are fundamentally
exempt from this search for nomological regularities.
In the next section I will examine a number of central problems of the nomothetical
(or theoretical) aspects of educational science and then focus on the historiography of
education.

258 Already DILTHEY (1895: 257 f.) emphasized this for the hberal arts, in opposition to WINDELBAND.
259 WINDELBAND (1894: 156 f.).
260 Cf. SCHULZE (1974: especially 178 ff.) on the present discussion concerning the relationships between
theoretical and historical social science.
la. THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY IN
SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

The educator attempts ... through correct questioning of

nature ... to explore the lawfulness of the phenomena
occurring before him, and thereby also to discover how they
can be modified according to intention and plan.
FRIEDRICH HERBART (1804)1

Anyone who thinks seriously about the problem of how to realize particular
educational aims is forced to search for certain nomological regularities that must of
necessity be taken into account in educational action. In this sense the approach concerned
with acquiring nomological knowledge has always had a place, even in traditional
pedagogics. Nevertheless, up until the present we have hardly advanced beyond a few
relatively well-grounded suppositions, and still do not know in which types of situation they
are or are not true. Traditional pedagogics has remained nomologically - and thus also
technologically - unsatisfactory.
One reason for this no doubt lies in the fact that up to now educational theories have
been formulated without sufficient regard to causal-analytical problems and the scientific
methods appropriate to solving them. Not only a clear understanding of such problems,
but also the methods needed to solve them have been lacking. As soon as this need is
recognized and attempts are made to satisfy it, it becomes apparent that empirical
educational research should be strengthened and technologically useful results should be
expected from it.
However, the fact that our knowledge of the proper means for realizing educational
aims is so limited is not solely attributable to the practice of many educational theorists of
proceeding from different presuppositions about the task of their science (and thus also
from other methodological principles) than those dealt with in the philosophy of science
formulated by analytic philosophy. There are other reasons too. More than anything else,
it is the problems inherent in the subject matter itself that have caused this backwardness
of our technological knowledge of education. As early as 1852, THEODOR WAITZ
directed attention to this difficulty when he mentioned "the great embroilment of causes"
in which educational actions intervene. "An absolutely complete educational science would

1 HERBART (1913: Vol. 1, 94).

100 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

be able to precisely determine every possible mental state of the pupil with all its causes
and consequences and to completely explain the amount and kind of every conceivable
influence exerted by the educator"z. Educational science in this sense is totally impossible.
WAlTZ supported his view by pointing to the incalculable variety of constantly changing
influences to which educands are exposed, whereby the "consequences of many, indeed by
far most of the influences exerted on the pupil either do not corne to light or do so only
indirectly". Even in those cases in which educands do reach the states their educators had
planned for them, it cannot be said with certainty "how much of this success can be
respectively attributed to the character of the individual educator, the pupils and the
external circumstances"3. The great number of at least partially unknown factors playing a
role in the development of a specific personality state introduce "a high degree of
uncertainty into the empirical assessment of the effectiveness of individual educational
means".
In view of these difficulties it is not enough to simply confront the unsatisfactory
reality of traditional pedagogics with an ideal of empirical educational science formulated
as a promising outline. Rather, it is necessary to describe the specific aspects of the science
and how they can be realized. We need to achieve clarity about both the problems that are
to be solved and the obstacles to solving them.

PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE

One can only gain knowledge from reality by approaching it with well-defined
questions. It would make little sense to observe everything that can be observed and trust
that the results would later be usable. The world is extraordinarily complicated and the
number of observable objects almost unlimited. So-called "educational reality" is also
immensely complicated. It does not simply exist to be scientifically studied, but must first
be defined by our mode of inquiry". Educational reality is not clearly demarcated, but is
rather a segment of reality that reveals itself only after the world is observed from a
particular point of view. What we call educational reality is a selection from the
abundance of existing things made on the basis of the questions we pose and the
assumptions we make. In this sense educational reality is a construct, a product of the
human imaginationS.

Z WAITZ (1898: 35 and 24).

3 WAlTZ (1898: 37).
4 Cf. HOLZKAMP (1968: 42 ff.) on the delineation of subject matter.
S For the concept of constructs and the conditions for their validity see V. KRAFT (1968: 46 ff.).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 101

It follows from this that no approach to facts is free of prior assumptions. Rather, we
make observations because we have certain expectations, theoretical assumptions or
hypotheses. In the same manner, statements about observations (descriptions) are "always
interpretations of the facts observed ... in the light of theories"6. Scientific knowledge is
achieved, not by collecting observational results, but by making relatively well-founded
assumptions which are then thoroughly tested. These assumptions are always based on the
present state of our knowledge about a particular subject. We build "on the science of
yesterday, which in turn is built upon an earlier science, etc.; the oldest science is built
upon prescientific myths tt7 • We could not, even if we wanted to, ignore all inherited
knowledge and start from the beginning without any theoretical foreknowledge - "theory
free". Science does not start with facts, but with problems and attempts to solve them 8.
Observations (including those obtained experimentally) serve to test such hypotheses or
attempted solutions. Those statements which stand up to this testing can tentatively be
regarded as confirmed.
In educational science - as in every other discipline - it is important to first establish
as exactly as possible what one wants to know and still does not. What observations we
want to make and which facts could be important depends on the nature of the specific
problems we choose to study and our conjectures as to possible solutions.
If we consider traditional pedagogics in the light of the above-mentioned approach,
we will quickly perceive two major shortcomings. The first is a lack of adequate
distinctions between is and ought, reality and ideals, between statements and demands and
between knowledge and decision. Accordingly, too little attention has been paid to the
difference between scientific-technological problems and moral issues.
The second main shortcoming is that in the past traditional pedagogics (at least the
branches dealing with educational reality) paid scant attention to defining specific problem
areas and thus contained little in the way of specialized hypotheses and problems. Much
has been uncritically passed off as knowledge that was nothing more than untested
subjective conviction. It was seldom admitted that such ostensible knowledge is
incomplete, inexact and questionable, and much that would be necessary for us to know is
still unknown. Basic rules and prescriptions were formulated before the relevant facts were
known. As a result of this disinterest in formulating specific problems, the informational

6 POPPER (1977: 107). Cf. also KAPLAN (1%4: 131 ff.).

7 POPPER (1964: 92).
8 Cf. BUNGE (1%7: Vol. 1, 165 ff., especially 199 ff.) on the rules for problem-solving; HEMPEL (1966: 10
ff.).
102 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

content of pedagogics has remained relatively limited, and its statements have long been
regarded as unscientific and of little use for educational praxis9•
In the attempt to rectify this unfortunate state of affairs, the pioneers of empirical
educational science stressed above all that the subject matter of educational science must
first be observed and described as a "given", as "a large, given fact"10. In the words of one of
these early researchers, there "is hardly a detail of educational praxis that has been
described reliably and thoroughly"l1. For that reason ALOYS FISCHER called for a
"descriptive pedagogics" - a concept which was then further developed by RUDOlF
LOCHNER 12. In using this name, both authors sought merely to emphasize that they
meant an empirical science of pedagogics, not to be confused with a "normative
pedagogics" which, on the basis of ideological convictions, speculates on what the aims and
methods of education should be l3 • The proposal to describe the "given" simply resulted
from the wish to research the specifics of educational situations, instead of passing on
"again and again a false picture" of the facts 14. This proposal was well suited to the infancy
of educational science - a stage from which even today the field has hardly emerged.
This research program directed at the description and classification of "education as
reality" did, however, occasionally give rise to the misunderstanding that observations
should and could be "theory free" or "undertaken without any prior assumptions". The
description of "facts in their natural pre-theoretical giveness" was said to stand "at the
beginning of all science" and it was thought that "possible problem formulations" of
educational science could be discovered in these descriptions 15 . To accurately perceive the
subject required that the scientist distance himself from all substantive presuppositions
and "rigorously reject prescientific beliefs and suppositions"16.
Such statements evince a naive empiricism which directly contradicts the finding of
cognitive psychology that every observation is necessarily based on theoretical
presuppositions. Naive empiricists hold descriptions of observational results (usually called
"facts" or "data") to be the basis or source of knowledge. For this reason they fail to grasp
the significance of the formulation of hypotheses as the first step in attaining nomological
knowledge. Theoretism, on the other hand, emphasizes that it is simply impossible to
research any aspect of reality without first taking into account prior theoretical

9 Cf. WILLMANN (1957: 18); similarly DILTHEY (1888: 14 ft.); MONTESSORI (1913: 1 ft.); BERNFELD
(1925: 8 ft.).
10 WILLMANN (1957: 18); similarly DILTHEY (1961: 190 ft.); KRIECK (1927: 12).
11 A. ASCHER (1914: 23).
12 Cf. A. ASCHER (1914); LOCHNER (1927).
13 Cf. A. ASCHER (1932b: 159 f.).
14 Cf. A. ASCHER (1914: 29).
15 A. ASCHER (1914: 12 and 17 f.).
16 LOCHNER (1963: 24).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 103

assumptions and various possible selection criteria17. Research thus begins by attempting
to clarify and differentiate these assumptions about reality to the point where researchers
can formulate specific hypotheses and test (through theoretically guided observation)
whether they correspond to reality.
The starting point of research in educational science is thus provisional assumptions
or opinions on educational actions (or on educational institutions) and their consequences
in relation to other aspects of educational situations. These assumptions or opinions stem
partly from traditional educational teachings and partly from everyday experience. They
are prescientific theories which can be relatively imprecise, incomplete, undifferentiated
or incorrect. The aim of research is to improve them in order to arrive at scientifically
confirmed theories. This is possible only if we first obtain clarity about what a scientific
theory is. Only then can we examine whether there are different types of theory
corresponding to various subject areas. A particularly important question here is whether
the statement systems considered to be theories in the natural sciences can also serve as
models for the social and cultural sciences. What we need above all is an ideal of theory in
educational science and a sense of how this can be realized.

SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AS THE GOAL OF RESEARCH

The word "theory" has many meanings. In everyday language it is generally used to
designate the opposite of "practice". "Practice" refers to every kind of action or activity;
"theory" means here a system of thoughts, opinions, views or knowledge dealing with a
particular subject matter l8 . When making this simple distinction between "theory" as
knowledge and "practice" as action it should be remembered that there is no action
without knowledge and no practice without theory.
Since every theory is expressed in a language, one can also describe theory as a
system of statements (or statement system). Obviously there is a wide variety of statement
systems to which the term "theory" is applied. In this book, for example, we have already
referred, not only to "prescientific" and "scientific", but also to "philosophical" and
"practical theory". What, then, is the difference between a statement system designated as
"scientific theory" and other kinds of theory? The answer depends on what one means by
"science". In the broadest sense of the word, "science" can be whatever statement systems
are granted the name and taught by our higher educational institutions. "Science" in this
sense thus includes not only the statement systems of the natural, cultural and social

17 Cf. BUNGE (1967: Vol. 2, 187 ff.).

18 cr. KAPlAN (1964: 295 ff.). On the origin of this distinction cr.
in antiquity LOBKOWICZ (1%7:
especially 35 ff.); on the concept of "theory" in antiquity see LEINFELLNER (1966).
104 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

sciences, but also those of jurisprudence, philosophy and theology19. This strictly cultural-
historical enumerative definition of "science" is of course unsatisfactory, for it also includes
such dogmatic statement systems as religious doctrines (theologfO) or ideological
philosophies (e.g. Marxism-Leninism) which pursue other goals and which have
foundations different from those of mathematics, the natural and social sciences and the
humanities. It is not always easy to separate scientific theories from pre-scientific, extra-
scientific or non-scientific theories. This is because scientific knowledge grows out of
everyday knowledge and differs from it only in degree 21 : "all science, and all philosophy,
are enlightened common sense"22.
The most importarlt characteristic of a general concept of science is generally held to
be the fact that a scientific statement system consists of justified statements. The statements
of a scientific system refer to the same subject matter and are related to one another as
reciprocally justifying23 • By this is meant that they mutually support one another and at
least to a certain degree can be tested for truth content, similarity to truth24 , probability, or
degree of corroboration. A theory is regarded as "scientific" only after the basis of its
validity can be stated. One must be able to demonstrate how one has come to "know" the
things a theory asserts or why the theory's assertions are true 25 •
This most general condition for every possible justification of a scientific statement
system is called the criterion of intersubjective testability. It stipulates first of all that
untestable statements - i.e. whose truth content cannot be determined - should be excluded
from the science. These are statements which are incomprehensible or whose meaning is
so unclear that one cannot tell how they should be interpreted or what they assert.
Secondly, the criterion stipulates that it is insufficient for the truth content of a statement
system to be determined by only one judge (subject). Intersubjective (or more accurately
"trans-subjective" or "interpersonal", i.e. possible for more than one person) testability
means that every sufficiently intelligent person can, given the proper training and
materials, test the correctness of a given statement system26 • This does not mean that every
statement must in fact be so tested, "but rather only that every statement should be
testable, or, to put it differently, there should be no statements in science that must simply
be accepted as they are because it is logically impossible to test them"27.

19 Cf. WEINGARTNER (1971: 11 ft.).

20 For a critique of the "scientific" character of theology cr. MORSCHER (1973a).
21 Cf. SPINNER (1974: 1486).
22 POPPER (19n: 34).
23 Cf. DIEMER (1970: 216).
24 Cf. POPPER (1972: 47 ft.).
25 cr. V. KRAFT (1967: 51).
26 Cf. BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1,261 ft.); WOHLGENANNT (1969: 112 ft.).
27 POPPER (1966: 21).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 105

The criterion of intersubjective testability leaves open the question of how such
testing should be undertaken. The concrete process of testing depends rather on the
particular subject matter to which a given scientific theory relates. There exists a
fundamental distinction between statement systems relating to reality or to real situations
and subject matter and statement systems relating to purely conceptualized or ideal subject
matter.
The formal sciences (logic and mathematics) treat only ideal subject matter and for
that reason their theories contain only ideal statements. To test such statements it is
sufficient to determine whether or not they are mutually contradictory. If it can be
demonstrated that they do not contradict one another, then they are said to be logically
valid. This is possible because such statements say nothing about reality, but rather only
about the relationships existing in a conceptual system, which in turn rests upon arbitrarily
defined propositions (postulates or axioms). The coherence theory of truth is thus
appropriate for statements on ideal subject matter28 • This theory defines truth as the non-
contradictory mutual agreement of statements in a given statement system. Such
statements can only be true or false in a logical sense 29 •
In the empirical sciences, real subject matter is researched and statements are made
about reality (reality claims or empirical statements). Put in highly simplified form, such
statements are tested by comparing their asserted factual content with reality and
determining whether there is agreement. The co"espondence theory of tmth 3O , which
defines truth as the agreement of a statement with reality, applies to empirical statements.
Reality, however, is directly accessible to us only through our subjective
experiences31 • Only in the case of statements about immediate experiences can the
experiencing subject ascertain truth by direct comparison with reality (here understood to
be the subjective reality which a given person has experienced). By contrast, the reality
which is thought to exist outside our direct experiences (experience-transcending or
objective reality, which is what empirical science seeks to understand and explain) is not
immediately present to be compared. It is only indirectly accessible through statements
which people make about their experiences (observational statements). It is thus
represented by the observational content present in experience. This content is always
theoretically interpreted beforehand.
We can defer till later a discussion of how specific theories of empirical science are
justified or validated. Of more immediate importance is to clarify what a "theory" is

28 From the Latin "cohaerere" = hold together.

29 Cf. V. KRAFf (1%0: 177 ff. and 347 ff.); (1973a: 57 ff.).
30 From the Latin "correspondere" = correspond to, agree with, be similar to.
31 Cf. V. KRAFT (1960: 197 ff.).
106 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

understood to be in the empirical sciences. In its broadest sense, the word "theory" is
equivalent to "science": a system of statements about a certain aspect of reality which stand
together in a justifying relationship. In this case, "system" means that the statements are
related and have been organized in terms of content. The "justification" (or validation) of
such statements refers first to the fact that they have been at least partially confirmed by
statements on already ascertained facts, and secondly, that the statements of such a system
are mutually supportive or at least do not contradict one another. To "justify" statements in
the empirical sciences, not only empirical but also logical "grounds" are thus necessary.
This concept of theory is still so general that it can be applied to all statement
systems of the empirical sciences. It also includes individual or historiographic statement
systems limited to researching, explaining and classifying individual facts. As opposed to
the group of empirical sciences which study singular events, nomothetical sciences aim to
discover empirical regularities 32• Nomological statements about the real world form the core
of an empirical scientific theory in the narrower sense of the word. For this reason the
nomothetical sciences are often referred to as "theoretical" sciences. In order to
understand what is meant by "theory" in these sciences, it is first necessary to clearly
understand what a "law" is33• How do scientific laws - or, more cautiously, nomological
statements - differ from non-nomological (singular, individual or accidental statements)
which simply describe individual facts, phenomena, states, events or processes? What is
the decisive criterion for establishing a scientific law?
Up until now, no fully satisfactory answer to these questions has been found 34. Thus
there are not one but several concepts of "law"35. In the objective sense of the word, a "law"
refers to a regularity that exists in reality, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not.
Such objective regularities are usually designated "natural laws". "A natural law is an
invariable and universal relationship existing between real conditions and/or processes"36.
Nomological statements must be distinguished from objective natural laws. Such statements
refer to natural laws and correspond to them in more or less exact fashion. It is often said
metaphorically that nomological statements "reflect", "reproduce", or "duplicate" objective
laws 37•

32 Cf. V. KRAFT (1973: 31 ff.); STEGMULLER (1%6: 649).

33 Here we are concerned solely with the descriptive meaning of the word, which must be differentiated from
the prescriptive meaning (law as a regulation or norm). Cf. HOSPERS (1967: 230 ff.).
34 Cf. NAGEL (1961: 47 ff.); STEGMULLER (1%9: 273 ff.); HEMPEL (1966: 54 ff.).
35 Cf. above all BUNGE (1968); in addition SIGWART (1924: Vol. 2, 519 ff.); NAGEL (1%1: 75 ff.);
BUNGE (1%7: Vol. 1, 343 ff.); KROBER (1968); HEROLD (1974).
36 V. KRAFT (1973: 37). The expression "invariant" (from the Latin "variabilis" or "varius" = changeable,
changing) means here: unchangeable, always appearing, consistently present. A well-written introduction to
the problem of "natural law" is CAMPBELL (1953: 37 ff.); d. also BUNGE (l968a); KANITSCHEIDER
(1973).
37 Cf. for example, REICHENBACH (1951); KROBER (1968: 20, 100, 151).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 107

People have come to assume the existence of natural laws on the basis of their daily
experience that repetitions and regularities exist in the world: "certain characteristics of a
given occurrence appear always and everywhere in connection with certain other
characteristics". Special attention is paid to those cases in which a certain group of
characteristics temporally precedes the appearance of another group of characteristics.
"The circumstances which precede a certain frequently observed occurrence (A), can
typically be divided into two groups - constant and variable. When it is further discovered
that the constant group is always followed by A, then one can declare this group of
circumstances to be the conditional cause of A Hand in hand with the cognizance of
special, regular connections between phenomena as an abstraction from its totality, there
thus develops the conviction of their universally necessary connection to one another.
Going beyond experience, it is furthermore postulated that even in those cases in which
the causes of a particular specifiable phenomenon have not been isolated, such causes
must nevertheless be stateable .... By applying this postulate, which can also be called the
causality principle, our knowledge is constantly being strengthened anew by the continuing
recognition of specialized conditional causes. We thus designate as a natural law ... a
regularity that has been established with adequate certainty in the course of events, insofar
as this regularity seems necessary in the sense of the above-mentioned postulate"38.
The nomothetical sciences attempt to discover as many of these regularities as
possible. The aim is to discover which factors (elements or processes) are related and in
what way, as well as to discover what takes place under certain given conditions. In precise
usage, the statements in which such regularities are expressed are called "nomological
statements" or "nomological hypotheses". Speaking less precisely, they can also simply be
called "laws", as an abbreviation for "scientific laws", though we do not mean the objective
laws themselves, but instead conceptual reconstructions, Le. mental images of them39 •
A scientific law can be defined as "a confirmed scientific hypothesis stating a constant
relation between two or more variables each representing (at least partly and indirectly) a
property of a concrete system"40. "System" in this sense refers to something existing in the
real world. The concept "variable" is used to emphasize that scientific laws do not express
relationships between individual facts, but rather between selected sub-elements of facts.
In establishing these relationships, neither the complexity of individual situations and
processes in the real world nor the individuality of the elements involved in relationships
are taken into consideration. Compared with the way things are related in the real world,
scientific laws describe simplified or idealized general relationships. This applies also to all

38 SCHRODINGER (1967: 9 f.).

39 Cf. BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1,345).
40 Cf. BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1,312).
108 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

statement systems of a higher order which contain nomological statements, i.e. to

hierarchies of hypotheses and theories41 •
Nomological statements differ from other statements primarily through their general
character42 • The word "general" in this case signifies the opposite of "single", "individual",
"singular", "special" or "specific". It refers to everything that applies to all members of a
class, what they have in common or how they resemble one another. Nomological
statements are general because they express one and the same relationship between
changing or interchangeable parts (variables). This quality of generality means that the
many singular or individual relationships are special cases of a general relationship and
can be grouped together under this relationship43. There are a number of different types,
grades or levels of generality. Strict generality means that a statement is valid without
exception for all cases at all times. A weaker form of generality exists when a statement is
valid most of the time for most or almost all cases.
Nomological statements of a strictly general nature maintain that without exception
certain empirical phenomena or certain parts of an empirical phenomenon are connected
with one another in a regular way. The sphere of validity of such statements is unlimited.
This means that regularity is posited for all cases of a particular class at all places and at
all times. Such laws are thus called "universal laws'oM and have the logical form of a
spatially and temporally unlimited (universal) conditional statement: "if so, then in all
cases and at all times". The so-called basic laws of physics (for example the law of gravity)
are of this sort.
Nomological statements that relate to a finite number of cases in a spatially or
temporally limited sphere of reality have a limited form of generality. These statements,
too, maintain something about all elements of a particular class (for example "among all
primitive peoples important occurrences give occasion for ceremonies"). Such statements
follow the pattern of "if so, then always at this spatio- and/or temporal location". ("If an
important occurrence takes place in the lives of a people belonging to the subgroup of
primitive peoples, then such an occurrence is always occasion for a ceremony"). These
regionally and/or temporally limited nomological statements are typical for the social

41 a. also V. KRAFT (1960: 195); BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1,348).

42 BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1, 334 ff.).
43 V. KRAFT (1960: 99); (1973: 48 ff.).
44 From the Latin "universus" ~ entire, all-embracing, exceptionless. Cf. CARNAP (1966: 3), HEMPEL
(1966: 54 ff.). Some authors e.g. STEGMULLER (1966: 650), (1969: 83) use the easily misunderstood
concept "deterministic law". This means that something certain (or "deterministic") is said about each
individual element of a class for which a law is valid (as opposed to a statistical or "indeterminate" law). Cf.
BOCHENSKI (1965: 106).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 109

sciences45 . Their form is, however, in most cases statistical and seldom universal (e.g. "In
most primitive societies youth are subjected to puberty rites as an initiation into
adulthood").
An entirely different logic applies to nomological statements which claim that a
regularity occurs in a certain percentage of cases. Such statements are ''probabilistic laws"46
or "statistical laws". (More precisely, they would have to be called "statistical nomological
statements"). A statistical law expresses the relative frequency of certain events or
phenomena within a variety of events or phenomena. Universal laws - put simply -
maintain that "all objects with the quality P also have the characteristic Q. Statistical laws,
on the other hand, maintain that a certain percentage of the objects having the quality P
also have the characteristic Q"47. There are exceptions to statistical laws, "but these
exceptions come to the fore in a regular percentage of cases". Such statements follow the
pattern of "if so, then always in a certain percentage of cases"48.
A statistical law says nothing about individual elements of a class, but rather always
applies to classes of individual elements. It maintains that within a given population of
individuals a certain characteristic occurs with a certain frequency (e.g. "the recidivism rate
for people convicted of crimes is 95%"49). This relative frequency is designated
mathematical (or statistical) probability. Mathematical probability is "the ratio of cases in a
subgroup to cases in a higher group" (or, to use the previous example, "the ratio of repeat
offenders to the total number of persons convicted of crimes")50. Insofar as this numerical
relationship is based on a large number of cases, it can serve to justify the expectation that
under unchanging conditions the relative frequency of cases of a subclass in relation to
cases of a higher class will remain constant. Although in principle nothing can be predicted
for a specific actual event on the basis of a statistical law, the law makes it possible to
establish a reasonable belief or epistemological probability which (in the sense of an

45 Cf. BUNGE (1968: 127 f.). Occasionally the proposal is made that only strictly general nomological
statements should be referred to as "laws". Nomological statements which are spatio-temporally limited in
their sphere of reality are referred to by proponents of this position as "quasi-laws" (from the Latin "quasi"
= as if, almost, roughly, so-to-speak), and the theories derived from them "quasi-theories": d. ALBERT
(1965: 131 ff.); (1973: 144 ff.); D. UUCH (1972: 43). Regarding most of the nomological statements and
theories used in the human sciences as insufficiently justified, this usage is oriented to a scientific ideal
which even for the natural sciences is questionable, and for the social sciences at any rate unrealistic. For a
critique cf. BUNGE (1968: 128 and 140 f.).
46 From the Latin "probabilis" = probable.
47 STEGMULLER (1966: 650); (1969: 452).
48 REICHENBACH (1951).
49 An analysis based on this example can be found in OPP (1976: 135 ff.). For a basic work on the
interpretation of mathematical probability as relative frequency d. MISES (1972).
50 cr. V. KRAFT (1960: 354 ff.).
110 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

estimate) corresponds to the average frequency of occurrence for a given phenomenon in

the sum total of cases51 •
Until recently, it was assumed that the use of probabilistic laws would only be a
temporary aid until the true nomological relationships were discovered. In the meantime,
however, it has become apparent that all natural laws may have to be regarded as ,
statisticallaws52. In any case it can be safely assumed that at least the laws or nomological
relationships found in the social sciences are statistical.
This means that nomological statements in the social sciences are essentially
hypothetical (or only conditionally true). The degree of their confirmation (or the
probability that they are true )53 can be greater or lesser. They are only tentatively valid,
and can be corrected, added to, or differentiated as knowledge increases. Furthermore, it
is important that the characteristic of general validity - which is essential to scientific laws
or nomological statements - is interpreted today much less stringently than in the past. It is
sufficient for a nomological statement to be generally valid in a certain respect (i.e. in
relation to certain phenomena, qualities, relationships, variables and/or particular spatio-
temporal areas) and to a certain degree (somewhere between "mostly" and "always" or
"most" and "all" cases). Finally, another essential characteristic of a nomological statement
is its systemic character: it cannot be isolated but must rather be part of a theory.
Summing up, a nomological statement can be characterized as follows: it is a
statement which has empirical content or a relation to facts and is "generally valid in a
certain regard (i.e. it does not apply to unique objects)", it has "been adequately confirmed
for a certain time and place and belongs to a theory (regardless of whether fully developed
or not)"54.
The search for natural laws or nomological relationships serves to broaden our
knowledge of the world. It is easier to understand the complexity of things and events
when we are familiar with relationships which occur repeatedly. Nomological statements
serve to bring order into our experiences of reality. We need them above all, not only to
explain events, but also to predict future ones. Without nomological statements from
which they can be derived, neither explanations nor predictions55 would be possible.

51 Cf. REICHENBACH (1951); V. KRAFf (1973: 39); BUNGE (1967: Vol. 1, 335 f.).
52 SCHRODINGER (1967: 10 ft.); REICHENBACH (1951); STEGMULLER (1970: 470), as well as (1969:
486 ft.).
53 Referred to here is the concept of epistemological probability (called "logical probability" by CARNAP 1959
and "non-numerical probability'· by POPPER 1977: 147), which must be clearly distinguished from the
concept of mathematical probability (POPPER's "numerical probability") mentioned earlier.
Epistemological probability is essentially not a numerical relationship (even though its degree is expressed
numerically), but rather relates to the reliability or credibility of a statement. Cf. V. KRAPf (1960: 356 ft.).
54 BUNGE (1968: 145); ct. also (1967: Vol. 1,360 f.). For the different types of laws, in particular those in the
social sciences, cf. KAPLAN (1964: 104 ft.).
55 The concepts of explanation and prediction and how they are derived are discussed on p. 137 ft. below.
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 111

Nomological statements are also indispensable for solving technical problems. However,
they can only be used for these purposes if they are related to other nomological
statements in the context of a theory.
Before we once again turn our attention to the concept of theory used in the
nomothetical sciences, it is first necessary to say something about the different levels of
nomological statements.
Basically, scientific laws can have either a low or a high degree of generalitf6. The
former are often called "empirical laws" or "empirical generalizations"; the latter
"theoreticallaws"s7. They differ in their degree of abstraction from observable individual
facts. Nomological statements of a lower order (i.e. on a lower level of abstraction) express
selected relationships which have been observed in various phenomena and then
generalized after it has been ascertained that the relationships are not bound to individual
phenomena, but instead apply to specific categories of phenomena58. The actual
connection of these selected relationships with other nomological relationships in a
particular field of study remains open and is often extremely unclear.
Nomological statements of a higher order (i.e. those on a higher level of abstraction)
deal with the relationships existing between laws of the lower order. They represent the
ordered relationships among specific empirical laws. For that reason they are also called
"theoretical laws", since they relate, not to observable phenomena, but to conjectured
relationships. These relationships are assumed to underlie observable phenomena and are
expressed by means of theoretical concepts, i.e. concepts that are only indirectly related to
observational data (for example "molecules" or "psychic dispositions"). Theoretical laws
are more difficult to discover than empirical generalizations. They cannot be arrived at by
generalizing individual cases, but rather are formulated as hypotheses that can only be
indirectly confirmed. This process consists in deriving empirical laws from hypotheses and
testing them by empirical observations. In some cases these derived empirical laws are
both well known and well confirmed; in others they are new and must be confirmed
through new observations. "The confirmation of such derived laws supplies an indirect
confirmation for the theoreticallaw"59.
In the nomothetical sciences a scientific theory in the strict sense of the word is
understood to be a statement system containing nomological statements of a higher order.
Simply stated, one can say that a theory is a system of nomological statements. Ideally, a
theory represents the logical connections necessary for the justification of all the

56 cr. JUHOS (1956: 12 ff.) on laws of the first and second order.
57 Cf. CARNAP (1966: 225 ff.); STROKER (1973: 60 ff.); KAPLAN (1964: 113 f.); BUNGE (1%7: Vol. 1,
318 and 348 ff.).
58 On the concept of generalization and its presuppositions d. V. KRAFT (1973: 44 ff.).
59 CARNAP (1966: 230 f.).
112 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

statements of a branch of science, in that all assumptions or presuppositions are given in

full and results are derived deductivelf'O. A theory, then, consists of hypothetical
nomological statements about reality whose validity can be confirmed only indirectly and
incompletely. For that reason theories are often referred to as hypothetico-deductive
systems. Theories do not describe the world as we perceive it, but rather their theoretical
nomological statements serve to explain observed phenomena by relating them to
(inferred or constructed) non-perceptible facts.
POPPER has compared scientific theory with a net "that we cast out to catch what we
call 'the world': to rationalize it, to explain, and to master it. We endeavor to make the
mesh ever finer and finer"61. This image makes clear that in gaining knowledge we play an
active rather than a passive role. The nomological relationships between empirical
phenomena are not directly accessible to us through perceptions or common sense
intuition; rather, we can only approach them indirectly by making tentative assumptions
about them (i.e. by formulating hypotheses) and then testing them against the real world to
see whether they hold true. Those nomological hypotheses that have been shown to be
reliable are then combined to form a relatively complicated system, i.e. a logically
constructed hierarchy of hypotheses about a particular field of study or a theory.
Now that I have explained what is meant by scientific theory in the nomothetical (or
theoretical) empirical sciences, we must turn our attention to the important difference
between the creation and the justification of knowledge and theories. I will then deal with
the problem of how theories are established and finally, will examine the question of
whether there are basic differences in the nature, purpose and justification of theories in
the natural, social and cultural sciences. After these preliminary questions have been
clarified, I will discuss the special problems involved in constructing and applying theories
in educational science.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BElWEEN PRODUCING AND JUSTIFYING SCIENTIFIC

STATEMENT SYSTEMS

Many of the misunderstandings plaguing scientific discussions (and in particular the

controversy over the scientific character of pedagogics) can be easily cleared up by
distinguishing between the production of hypotheses, nomological statements and theories
on the one hand and their validity on the other. The manner in which particular allegedly
scientific statements originate is a factual question treated by cognitive psychology or the

60 v. KRAFf (1973: 59).

61 POPPER (1977: 59).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 113

psychology of scientific research. This discipline treats the psychic processes involved in
problem-solving behavior, the conditions leading to creative inspiration and similar
phenomena. The psychology of scientific thought and action is thus an empirical discipline,
as are also historiography of science and sociology of science.
The question of how scientific statements can be justified is entirely different. In this
case we are not concerned with how a statement originates, but with testing purported
knowledge according to established norms or rules (scientific methods) and its acceptance
or rejection. The discipline dealing with the methods by which scientific statements are
tested is called epistemology or the philosophy of scientific cognition. It is occasionally also
called the "logic of science" for short, since it is concerned with the application of formal
logic. Epistemology naturally also takes into account the techniques actually used in
acquiring scientific knowledge, but essentially it is a normative philosophical rather than
empirical discipline62.
The two above-mentioned problem areas are usually referred to by the terms context
of discovery63 and context of justification 64 • To avoid needless controversy it is of central
importance to clearly differentiate questions about the discovery of facts or the derivation,
genesis or origin of statements from questions about their justification, confirmation or
validation. This distinction is necessary, above all because an explanation of how a general
statement or hypothesis has been conceived of does not guarantee that the statement is
true. Neither the origin of a statement in direct common sense insight (intuition) nor in the
observation of facts can guarantee truth. Modern constructivism or theoretism, as opposed
to the classical epistemologies of rationalism and empiricism, assumes that there is no
unquestionably reliable source of knowledge65 . Our knowledge consists of theoretical
conjectures whose validity is determined, not by their origin, but rather by the results of
the critical tests to which they are subjected.
It thus follows that the greatest possible tolerance is advisable in the context of
discovery, whereas a fully critical attitude is expedient in the context of justification. In
educational science, too, every possible way of gaining insight is permissible. The process
called "sympathetic understanding" ("Verstehen") or the phenomenological perception of
"essence" ("Wesensschau") are just as legitimate as are observation, inductive
generalization, comparison or interpretative reflection on inherited knowledge. Intuition,
imagination and creative insights can all playa role in uncovering possible relationships. In
science, however, such creative insights do not arise without advance preparation. Usually,

62 Cf. V. KRAPf (1960: 32 ff.); POPPER (1977: 31); FEIGL (1%4: 472 f.).
63 From REICHENBACH (1938: 3 ff.).
64 Cf. WOHLGENANNT (1969: 57 ff. and 156 ff.); RUDNER (1966: 5 ff.) uses "context of validation" instead
of "context of justification".
65 Cf. POPPER (1965a: 24 ff.); ALBERT (1969: 21 ff.); ROD (1991).
114 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

they come only to those completely familiar with a problem area and the relevant
available information. But whether the result of painstaking reflection or of sudden
inspiration, scientific statements are at first merely viewed as suppositions (hypotheses)
whose truth must be tested. The manner in which statements originate has no bearing on
their validity.
Confusion often arises here because of inexact use of the word "method". If "method"
is simply taken to mean "the manner of proceeding in any particular field'>66, two quite
different things are covered by this broad concept: on one hand the procedure used in
conceiving statements (hypotheses, theories), for which general rules cannot be
established, and on the other the logical-empirical procedures involved in testing
statements. For this reason it is more advisable to differentiate precisely between
processes of discovery and methods of testing. It is the latter that are of decisive
importance in establishing the truth value of scientific statements. In this second sense,
which alone is relevant to the logic of science, "method" means the way "in which the
validity of a claim is to be established; it provides the means for ascertaining whether a
claim is true"67.
If we are to support unlimited freedom in the choice of sources or in the means used
to formulate hypotheses, then we must take into ac~ount that the knowledge we acquire
will also contain errors, deceptions and prejudices. Much of our knowledge is the product
of mere guesswork. Generally speaking, there is only one useful way of discovering and
eliminating errors, namely intersubjective testing or "mutual rational control through
critical discussion"68. Thus statements which are withheld from public inspection because
their proponents claim that they or like-minded colleagues have comprehended their truth
are out of place in scientific discourse.
An unclear concept of method and the lack of a clear distinction between the context
of discovery and the context of justification play a central role in the resistance to the
postulate of intersubjective testing with the inherent possibility of refuting statements. In
the domain of pedagogics this can be easily demonstrated, using as an example so-called
"hermeneutical pedagogics" (German: "geisteswissenschaftliche Padagogik"). The
adherents of this form of pedagogics regard "hermeneutic cognition" as "sympathetic
understanding" (Verstehen), viewing them as identical processes. "Sympathetic
understanding" is described as the "inner comprehension of a construct created by man, an
objectivation of the human mind - or an expression" of the "creative achievement of life,o(j9.

66 BOCHENSKI (1965: 9).

67 V. KRAFT (1967: 58); similarly (1973: 11).
68 Cf. POPPER (1977: 44 ff.); (1957: Vol. TI, 216 ff.).
69 BOLLNOW (1958: 137 f.); for an explanation of the term "expression" cf. also p. 36 ff.
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 115

As is the case with the so-called "natural" concept of "experience't70, the impression is
created that this "inner comprehension" could be simultaneously a discovery procedure
and sufficient confirmation of a truth claim for the "innerly comprehended" or
"sympathetically understood" facts.
It is doubtlessly true that in the social sciences and humanities the process of
"sympathetic understanding" is indispensable for comprehending the supposed meaning of
human actions and cultural objects. However, this does not mean that the subsequent
intersubjective testing of claims resulting from "sympathetic understanding" is superfluous.
Anyone who employs the method of "sympathetic understanding" can err; they can likewise
misinterpret the things they claim to understand. The process of understanding the
meaning of an action or other psychic objectivation "always produces an interpretive
hypothesis which is adopted for the purpose of interpretation, one which in principle always
requires empirical verification"71. It is thus incompatible with the rules of scientific method
to withhold a particular assertion from independent testing by claiming that it has been
arrived at through "sympathetic understanding", "empathy" or "intuition". The subjective
"will to objectivity of understanding"72 (to which anyone can raise claim) has not proven
itself useful in distinguishing true statements from false ones73 . We do not have
"knowledge" until it has been determined that a statement is true. "As long as one does not
know whether a claim is true, it does not represent knowledge, even if it really is true"74.
Hence "sympathetic understanding" and every other sort of subjective "experience" have
only heuristic value75. They are psychic processes which could lead to the creation or
formulation of hypotheses. Whether hypotheses obtained in this manner are true can only
be ascertained by additional logical and empirical testing76.

70 Cf. BOLLNOW (1968) and (1970: 127 ff.).

71 Cf. WEBER (1968: 92); cf. also V. KRAFT (1973: 25 ff.).
72 BOLLNOW (1959: 108).
73 Cf. POPPER (1957, Vol. II: 217 ff.), where the author states that" science and scientific objectivity do not
... result from the attempts of an individual scientist to be 'objective', but from the cooperation of many
scientists". It is "a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and the individual scientist's
impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather the result of this socially or institutionally
organized objectivity of science". Similarly, POPPER asserts (1%2: 240): "The thing we call scientific
objectivity has its sole source in critical tradition", i.e. in the "mutual criticism, in the friend-foe division of
labor between scientists".
74 V. KRAFT (1960: 181).
75 Heuristics is the theory of the art of discovery (from the Greek heuriskein = to fmd). Cf. BROMME and
HOMBERG (1977).
76 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969: 363 ff.).
116 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

TESTING, JUSTIFYING AND REJECTING HYPOmESES AND THEORIES

The purpose of scientific theories is to maximize our understanding of the world.

Nomological statements can be used to explain events, and under certain circumstances
may have predictive value77. Theories can only fulfill their purpose when they are true or
at least closely approximate the truth. The question thus arises of how to prove the validity
of a theory and its most important elements, nomological hypotheses.
The testing of nomological hypotheses is carried out by means of both logical and
empirical procedures. In regard to the purely logical aspects of the problem, it is first
necessary to check for contradictions between the statements being tested and other
nomological statements in a theory. Logical consistency is a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for a nomological hypothesis to be viewed as scientifically proven. Only in the
formal sciences of logic and mathematics is logical consistency a sufficient truth-condition.
The empirical sciences, however, make statements about reality. Their statements must be
not only logically valid, but also empirically verified. A scientific hypothesis can only be
considered valid when sufficient agreement is demonstrated between its content and
descriptive statements based on observational data. In scientific theory, such statements
are commonly called "basis statements", because they represent the empirical basis for
testing nomological hypotheses and theories.
Whereas both practicing scientists and philosophers of science agree on the use of
logical consistency as a test of nomological hypotheses and theories, there is broad
disagreement concerning the empirical conditions of validity. It is here neither possible
nor absolutely necessary to discuss all the pros and cons of this question. For our purposes
it will suffice to call attention to two problems: that of induction and that of the
relationship between theory and experience.
The term "induction" can mean two things. First, it can refer to a procedure for
discovering nomological hypotheses; secondly, to a procedure for testing such hypotheses.
However, it is often maintained that induction is a single procedure encompassing both
tasks. In this fashion, JOHN STUART MILL defined induction as "the operation of
discovering and proving general propositions"78. It is here unnecessary to deal with the
alleged suitability of induction as a procedure for discovering hypotheses, since in this
context we are concerned solely with the procedures involved in testing them. In its second
sense, induction is defined as a procedure "by which we infer that what we know to be true
in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain
assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process by which we conclude that

77 For some qualifying remarks on this subject, cf. STEGMULLER (1966: 656).
78 MILL (1973: 284).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 117

what is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true in similar
circumstances at all times"79.
The problem of induction results because in a nomological hypothesis more is
claimed than can be known through simple observation. Strictly speaking, the only things
we can comprehend by observing reality are individual facts. We are only able to ascertain
a limited number of these facts, which are themselves always historical entities appearing
at certain spatio-temporallocations. It is possible to compare and observe the agreement
and differences among a number of facts and to observe phenomena under varying
conditions in hope of finding regularities which under specified circumstances will always
appear. Because these observational data relate to individual cases confined to certain
points in space-time, they are called "singular statements", "particular statements" or "here
and now statements". Nomological hypotheses are by contrast referred to as ''universal
statements": it is posited that they are valid for every (or any random) point in space-
time 8o • The problem of induction is whether it is logically justified to apply conclusions
obtained from singular statements (which describe observational data) to universal ones.
The question is thus whether a fact which has been ascertained in a limited number
of cases can be generalized. By our psychic nature, we are inclined to assume that
regularities which we have observed will always occur under the same circumstances.
Logically, however, there is no justification for this assumption, since it is impossible to
deduce new, unknown cases from previously known ones. There is no inductive procedure
through which universal statements can be derived from singular ones. Therefore,
universal nomological hypotheses cannot be proven in the strict sense of the word -
regardless of how many supporting basis statements (statements based on observation or
perception) one finds.
What actually takes place in inductive procedure is extrapolation, i.e. the extension of
a statement's sphere of validity beyond the observed cases to cover an unlimited number
of cases. It is assumed that regularities observed in a few cases would also be found in all
other cases. This adds an entirely new quality to the cases already established. For
example, only statements having the following logical structure can be validated:

79 MILL (1973: 288).

80 O. POPPER (1977: 62 f.). The term "universal statement" refers here to strictly universal statements, as
exemplified by natural laws. Such statements are to be distinguished from statements of limited universality,
which relate to elements of a closed class whose number will remain constant, regardless of whether it is
counted. An example of this would be statements about the inhabitants of a town on the day of a census.
The difference between these two forms of universality is "of decisive importance for determining the truth
of universal statements on reality". V. KRAFT (1960: 221). POPPER (1965: 62) also refers to unconditional
universal statements as "strictly universal". In contrast to "numerically universal" statements, which he
includes among the particular statements, the latter are only valid for certain spatio-temporallocations. Cf.
SIGWART (1924: Vol. 2, 445 f.).
118 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

"Whenever event p has occurred in the past, event q also occurred". In induction, however,
the claim is made that "if event p is given, then event q will in every case also appear". It is
assumed "that cases of the same class continue to occur and that the relationships which
have been shown to be constant among the already-established cases remain the same".
Such an assumption can neither be derived from an already established regularity, nor can
it be validated by one. There is a presupposition of lawfulness in the assumption that the
same events will always occur under the same conditions. "It is this assumption alone
which leads beyond confirmed historical cases and yields an unrestricted universal
lawfulness"81.
Thus when viewed more closely, the so-called inductive method reveals itself to be
deductive, drawing upon the following argumentation: under the same circumstances, the
same thing will always happen; under the conditions a, b, C and d the relationship R has
always appeared; thus under these conditions this relationship will always appear: it is a
nomological regularityS2. The universal major premise stating that the same events will
occur under the same conditions cannot be proven logically, but it can be viewed as a
"postulate of our striving for knowledge" whose acceptance is based on a deliberate
decision83 • This universal major premise is itself a product of extrapolation and represents
a hypothesis that is of absolute necessity for understanding reality, for without it neither
explanations nor predictions would be possible84 •
Accordingly, in the inductive process the following takes place. The universal major
premise asserting the existence of nomological regularities in the world is presumed as a
general hypothesis. As far as possible, the particular minor premise is defined in such a
way that it agrees with all empirical results observed up to the time of its formulation. The
conclusion contains nothing more than is contained in the particular minor premise.
Thus we can see that universal statements derived in this manner are not necessarily
true. They are merely hypotheses which must be discarded when newly-observed facts
contradict them. When an observational result does not agree with a nomological
hypothesis, one of the premises is necessarily false. "Complete agreement of a hypothesis
with the facts can never prove the hypothesis to be necessarily true in all cases, but can at
the very most prove it likely. A single case in which A is not B contradicts the statement
asserting that all A are B; on the other hand, 1000 cases in which A has the predicate Bare
insufficient for proving the statement: it is impossible that an A is not B"ss.

81 According to V. KRAFf (1960: 220 ff., quote cited here p. 238); an easily understandable explication is
SIGWART (1924: Vol. 2, 414 ff.); d. also POPPER (1977: 27 ff.) and STEGMULLER (1971: 16 ff.).
82 V. KRAFf (1970: 79).
83 SIGWART (1924: Vol. 2, 415 and 20); d. also V. KRAFT (1968: 72 ff.).
84 V. KRAFf (1960: 241).
SS SIGWART (1924, Vol. 2: 443); similarly V. KRAFf (1%0: 244).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 119

From these logical considerations it follows that universal nomological hypotheses

and the theories built upon them can never be definitively shown to be true (Le. verified).
They can, however, be disproved or falsified by establishing contradictions between the
conclusions drawn from them and confirmed observational data. KARL POPPER
attempted, in his theory of methodology for the empirical sciences, to use this insight,
which was first introduced into logic by DAVID HUME86. POPPER emphasized that
nomological hypotheses and theories can be tested only in a negative sense, i.e. by
attempting to refute or disprove them. Accordingly, the general method of the empirical
sciences consists not in proving what is true, but rather in eliminating what is false.
POPPER therefore calls this the "method ofjalsijication"87.
POPPER is of the opinion that progress in the acquisition of scientific knowledge is
made through the overcoming of errors and inadequate conceptions by means of critical
testing. Attempts to disprove nomological hypotheses show whether or not they stand up
to close examination. The more stringent the tests which a hypothesis has withstood, the
higher its degree of confirmation. Thus a testing procedure is proposed consisting of
attempts to disconfirm hypotheses and theories.
The logical basis for this methodological rule rests on the ability to rephrase
universal nomological statements as "there-are-no" statements. The following example is
often used to demonstrate this: the content of the universal proposition "all swans are
white" can also be expressed in the statement "there are no black swans". If a black swan is
indeed observed at some time or place, this can be formulated in a singular existential
proposition or in a "there-is" statement ("there is a black swan at place p at time t" = basis
statement) which refutes or falsifies the general "there-are-no" statement88. Universal
propositions can of course never be derived from singular propositions, but they can
contradict them. "Consequently it is possible by means of purely deductive inferences ...
to argue from the truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements,,89.
This is logically correct, but it does not follow from these logical relationships that
falsification is a useful procedure for testing hypotheses and theories. Falsification is not a
useful procedure for the simple reason that statistical nomological hypotheses cannot be
falsified. That the falseness of a hypothesis can be deduced from a lack of agreement with
observational data is valid only for universal nomological hypotheses. By contrast, if
statistical hypotheses were rejected because certain observational data did not agree with

86 Cf. HUME (1986: 32 IT.); SIGWART (1924: Vol. 2, 415 and 442 IT.); POPPER (1977: 312 IT. and 369).
87 POPPER (1977: 41 ff.), from the Latin "falsus" = false. Cf. POPPER (1972: 2 ff.) and V. KRAFT (1968a:
105 ff.) for a discussion of how this conception developed.
88 This extremely simplified and, for universal scientific propositions, atypical example is often used in the
literature. Cf. e.g. STEGMULLER (1969a: 401).
89 POPPER (1977: 41 f.).
120 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

them, there would be a risk of mistakenly rejecting true hypotheses. Because of these
difficulties, STEGMULLER recommended expanding the concept of empirical refutation
or falsification to that of "reasonable rejection". 'The decisive difference consists in the fact
that refutation represents something final, whereas reasonable rejection does not". An
initial rejection of a statistical hypothesis can be retracted if new observational results
favor a reassessment90 •
The concept of reasonable rejection expresses a methodological point of view which
fits actual scientific procedure better than the concept of falsification. The latter term was
introduced by POPPER to combat the illusion promulgated by naive empiricism that
reliable knowledge of scientific laws could be gained by use of inductive methods.
"Falsification" served as a counter concept to "verification" and helped to emphasize that
hypotheses and theories can never be completely and definitively verified, but at best can
occasionally be falsified. Since then this logical insight has found almost unanimous
acceptance. For that reason it has also been suggested that the misleading concept of
verification should be replaced by the much less demanding one of confirmation 91 •
However, correctly pointing out that there are no inductive, but only deductive testing
procedures does not make the refutation of statements the best, or even the only
acceptable, method of testing: Equally valid are attempts to confirm nomological
hypotheses and theories92 .
In actual research practice, nomological hypotheses are by no means rejected when
the conclusions derived from them do not agree with relevant observational results93 •
Rather, observations are repeated where this is possible. If the conclusions derived from a
given hypothesis repeatedly disagree with the results of empirical observations, the
hypothesis will not be completely rejected, but instead attempts will first be made to revise
it to better conform to the facts (or, more exactly, to the basis statements describing the
facts). A contradiction between an hypothesis and a basis statement acts as an incentive to
more precisely define the hypothesis, to draw in previously ignored conditions and if
necessary to reduce the hypothesis' field of application. Only after these attempts to better
the original hypothesis have failed does it appear reasonable to discard it.
As we have already seen with the problem of induction, there is no direct connection
between the reality treated by science and the nomological hypotheses and theories
describing this reality. The relationships between theory and experience are indirect. An
empirical theory is a construct, a creation of the intellect which claims more than can be

90 STEGMULLER (1971: 40 f.).

91 CARNAP (1966: 20 f.).
92 Cf. JUHOS (1966) and (1970).
93 Cf. STROKER (1973: 93 ff.).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 121

ascertained by observation. At the same time, however, it must be validated by constantly

checking it against observational results. Only by referring back to perceptual statements
can the trap of theoretical arbitrariness be avoided. In more recent methodology (by
contrast to naive empiricism) observation has an entirely different function. Whereas in
the context of discovery it continues to be viewed as one of several sources of inspiration
and hypotheses, in the context of validation it is no longer accepted as the foundation of
knowledge, but rather merely as an aid for testing hypotheses. Observation is used to
check whether theoretical constructs agree with reality.
One can clarify the structure of scientific theory and the role that experience plays in
it by differentiating schematically between two stages of research: that of empirical
generalization and that of theory-building. Already in the first stage the researcher goes
beyond the observational data, since in formulating a hypothesis all accessible factual
knowledge is usually taken into account. However, the confirmation or rejection of
individual hypotheses is based on systematic observation, the most productive form of
which is experimentation. The concepts used in this stage are derived primarily from the
world of experience, i.e. they either include perceptible phenomena in their content or
they can at least be easily traced back to such phenomena. In the stage of theory-building a
relatively large number of hypotheses at different levels of abstraction are combined to
form a deductive system. In such a system concepts are used that are only very indirectly
related to observable reality. Theory is comparable to a "complex, three-dimensional
network" rising above the level of empirical experience "and anchored in this level only at
its lowest points. The nodal points in the network lying above this level represent
theoretical concepts which, through hypotheses and definitions, are very loosely and
indirectly connected to directly experienceable phenomena"94. In any event, this
relationship with observable reality must be sufficiently maintained that the theory can be
used for explanation and prediction.
Science thus does not have an absolutely certain empirical basis. To use one of
POPPER's metaphors, "science does not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its
theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and
when we cease our attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough
to carry the structure, at least for the time being"95.
According to this view, theory (in the broad sense of the word) takes precedence
over observational data. Naturally this is not to deny that we start with previous experience

94 STEGMULLER (1%9b: 26).

95 POPPER (1977: 110 ft.).
122 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

and set up hypotheses on the basis of that which we have accepted as given through
observation. What is meant is rather that theoretical stipulations (Le. general statements
or nomological hypotheses) are necessary to create nomological order out of empirical
data. Whether this order proves itself valid is tested both logically and empirically:
logically by examining the consistency and mutual derivability of a theory's statements, and
empirically by comparing conclusions derived from the theory with observations of actual
occurrences in the world of experience.
The validity of scientific knowledge cannot be established on the basis of a single
statement, but rather through a "broad logical connection of statements about perceived
and inferred facts as well as about laws"96. More important than the validity of a single
argument is that there exist a system of different nomological statements which mutually
support one another, even if some are better confirmed than others. PEIRCE wisely
comments that scientific "reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its
weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are
sufficiently numerous and intimately connected"97.

LAWS AND THEORIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

As we have seen, a scientific theory in the strict sense of the word is understood to be
a hypothetico-deductive system of nomological statements. At present, almost all theories
corresponding to this concept are found in the natural sciences. In the social sciences
(apart from the special case of economic theory) we "merely find programs and first steps
in theory formulation"98, but not deductive systems comparable to the theories of natural
science. Predominant are descriptive statement systems dealing with specific social
phenomena in specific historical situations, while to the contrary there is a lack of
universal nomological statements which could be used for explanation and prediction99. To
the extent that they are present, nomological statements are mere empirical
generalizations of a statistical nature. Absent are nomological statements of a higher order
which would be suitable for systematizing large numbers of existing nomological
statements of a lower order. The majority of these generalizations are valid only for
specific socio-cultural conditions. The few statements claimed to apply to all people at all
times and places have little in the way of content and seldom express more than

96 ct. v. KRAFT (1973: 56) and (1968: 78).

97 PEIRCE (1965: 157).
98 ALBERT (1973: 134).
99 ct. NAGEL (1961: 447 ft.); LENK (1975: 169 ft., 190 ft. and 228 ft.).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 123

commonplace everyday knowledge. Consider just one example: "The more often a person's
activity is rewarded, the more likely he is to perform the activity"loo.
In the face of these difficulties the question arises as to whether the type of
nomological statements and theories used in the natural sciences can at all be realized in
the social sciences. Is the ideal of theory the same for all nomological, generalizing or
theoretical sciences? Why are so few theories in the humanities and social sciences
constructed as a nomological theory should be lOl ?
The field of study of the social sciences is unquestionably different from that of the
natural sciences. The essential difference is that the social scientist deals not only with
inanimate and animate matter, but also with people thinking, wishing and acting in
particular situations and with their works. In this field of study such phenomena as
intentions, goals, social norms, rules and institutions playa central rolelO2. Along with the
natural conditions on which all higWy developed organisms depend, it is predominantly
these psychic and socio-cultural phenomena which determine human behavior.
Internal determinants of behavior such as thoughts, attitudes, feelings and acts of will
(intentions, goals) are already numerous, diverse and changeable in the case of a single
individual and even more so with large numbers of people. Social norms (prescriptions,
rules, ought claims) as external determinants of behavior also differ from group to group
and change in the course of time. Human behavior is thus determined by the interaction of
numerous more or less variable factors which are only partially observable and so can only
be inferred or assumed. It is extremely difficult and in most cases impossible to isolate
individual factors from this complex web of conditions in order to study their effects
experimentally.
The special character of the subject matter of the social sciences makes it inevitable
that the social sciences will face greater difficulties in obtaining nomological knowledge
than will the natural sciences. As already indicated, among the most important are the
following problems: the impossibility of observing the inner life of others and the
concomitant necessity of interpretation with its many possibilities for error, the great
complexity of psychic, social and cultural contexts, the uniqueness of situations, the
variability of personalities, groups, institutions and norms as well as their conditions and
interrelationships. Let us examine these difficulties and determine whether they are so
insurmountable that we can justifiably regard the search for laws of human behavior as a
hopeless endeavor.

100 HOMANS (1973: 552).

101 cr. HOMANS (1964); similar is THEOBALD (1973: 110).
102 cr. WRIGHT (19n: 131 ff.).
124 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

The first of the above-mentioned difficulties lies in the impossibility of observing the
psychic states and processes which act as the internal determinants of behavior. Only the
external behavior of other people is observable, and it is not directly evident what complex
of conditions underlies this behavior. Thus only indirectly through interpretation can we
attempt to obtain knowledge of the inner determinants of behavior. For this we need
systems of hypotheses about mental phenomena and causal relationships. Unfortunately,
such systems are themselves partially based on interpretations and can be empirically
confirmed only to a limited extent. There is, however, not just one such system of
hypotheses, but a variety, in which different assumptions are expressed by different
concepts. These in turn partially complement and partially contradict one another. As an
example one can take the differences between behavioristic, phenomenological and
psychoanalytical concepts of psychic reality. There has not even been much agreement up
to now on the basic concepts and the classification of mental phenomena, not to mention
the ways in which they function together.
A high probability of error is unavoidable in the interpretation of human behavior.
The results of an interpretation are only temporarily valid and then only in a particular
regard. Not only new observational data, but also different viewpoints can lead to entirely
different results. Man is open, changeable, and his experiences are conditioned by
subconscious forces. Consequently, psychological interpretation is "always interpretation of
the unknown, the latent, the hidden, and the things that are by their very nature
indefinite"103. One could even say that "psychological statements" must always be
understood "dialectically": "Everything that I know about a person must be simultaneously
called into question"104 .
This applies not only to individuals, but also to the interpretation of group behavior.
Think of the widely diverging interpretations of protest behavior among young people105.
Depending on the interpretative framework applied, protest can be seen as a reaction to
too much or too little freedom, to too many or too few demands for achievement, to the
strictness or indulgence shown by authority figures, as a wish for more freedom or an
unconscious desire for social integration. As is reflected in social science literature, there
is often a certain arbitrariness in interpretations of social phenomena, and this can cast
doubts on our very ability to obtain the nomological information needed for making
reliable explanations or even predictions.
The second difficulty in obtaining nomological knowledge in the social sciences lies
in the great complexity of social phenomena and their conditions. Social actions and their

103 USLAR (1970: 343).

104 USLAR (1970: 340).
105 Cf. SCHAFERS (1974).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 125

consequences depend on enormously complicated interactions between a wide variety of

multiply-determined psychic processes and non-psychic factors of every sort. These make
up a complex of relationships in which changes in a single part exert influence on many
other parts. Only to a certain extent can such a complex of relationships be directly
observed. It is also difficult to isolate individual factors from all others and systematically
change them in order to study the effects of these changes through comparison with
control groups. Experimentation, generally the most important means of testing
nomological hypotheses, can seldom be applied to the realm of complex social
phenomena.
In addition, we are also faced with the further difficulties of the uniqueness and
changeability of social phenomena. Think, for example, of the unique character given to
each educational situation by the individual personalities of participating educands and
educators. Similarly unique are educational actions, the circumstances under which they
take place, and their effects. Contributing to the uniqueness of these situations is the
constant change taking place, both in people and in their social environment. No one ever
has the same experience or does the same thing twice.
These facts, however, do not rule out the possibility of acquiring nomological
knowledge. Complexity, uniqueness, and changeability are in no way confined to human
and socio-cultural phenomena, but apply to all phenomena in the real world106• Not even
the smallest atomic particles are ever identical in all details, each is absolutely unique107•
Nevertheless, laws can be discovered and our knowledge of them can be used to influence
events. People too have not only individual traits, but also characteristics that they share,
either with all, or with some people108• As in the natural sciences, it is possible in the social
sciences to ignore individual pecularities and view all phenomena belonging to a particular
group exclusively in terms of their shared characteristics. It goes without saying that people
are more individually distinct than are inanimate objects109 • However, their diversity can
only be understood on the basis of assumptions about their shared characteristics 110 •
A basic source of all problems in acquiring nomological knowledge in the social
sciences is the fact that the socio-cultural phenomena (actions and works) forming
their subject matter belong to the world as we experience it and have meaning only in that
world111 • Not only the mental processes through which they evolve, but also those through

106 Cf. BUNGE (1967, Vol. 1: 305 ff.).

107 Cf. EIGEN (1977: 176 ff.).
108cr. KLUCKHOHN and MURRAY (1955).
109 ALLPORT (1955).
110 KAPLAN (1964: 117).
111 EDMUND HUSSERL has called this world the "life-world" (Lebenswelt). cr. SCHUTZ (1970) for a more
detailed discussion.
126 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

which we understand them are themselves complex totalities of experience. They cannot be
divided into simpler elements which conceptually could be precisely defined, and
empirically could be tested and measured. Because they lie outside our experiental grasp,
we know nothing of the smaller elements which make up the actions or systems of actions
in our conscious experience. We attribute our actions to experiences of volition, imagined
propensities for acting (psychic dispositions and dispositional complexes like attitudes,
value orientations, commitments, expectations), but it is uncertain what these concepts
correspond to in the reality lying outside our internal world of experience, and how they
relate and interact with one another is also unclear. The enormous terminological
confusion in the social sciences can be viewed at least partially as expressing this lack of
clarity.
Our psychological descriptive concepts relate to complex psychic phenomena of
practical importance for our lives. These concepts originate in the "prescientific macro-
psychology of daily life", but are not suitable for differentiating among "psychic processes
in the micro-psychic realm". Psychological concepts concern indivisible totalities which
arise from unknowable micro-psychic depths and can differ significantly from accessible
and describable macro-psychic phenomena112• This is a different situation than is found in
physics or chemistry, but it does not exclude the possibility that there exist relations
between certain empirically accessible phenomena which can be nomological and subject
to research.
None of the above-mentioned difficulties originating in the subject matter of the
social sciences render it impossible to obtain nomological information, even about psychic,
social and cultural phenomena. However, we cannot expect to find regularities in the form
of universal or deterministic natural laws, but must be content with statistical nomological
statements. The validity of these statements is spatially and temporally limited, but even
with their limits they help broaden our knowledge of the world. Many are only tentatively
confirmed, but insufficiently confirmed knowledge is better than none at all. Indeed a
considerable quantity of nomological knowledge already exists attesting to the productivity
of nomothetical research in the social sciences 113. The theories in which nomological
statements are contained admittedly deal mostly with narrow segments of reality and are
still hardly related to theories in neighboring areas. Furthermore, there are competing
theories dealing with the same areas of study (for example learning) which do justice to
only a part of the relevant phenomena114 • In most fields, not even a modest systematization
of the pertinent nomological statements has been achieved.

112 Cf. BUSEMANN (1948: 29, 21, 51).

113 Cf. BERELSON and STEINER (1%4).
114 For psychology cf. T. HERRMANN (1971a: 195); for sociology d. KLIMA (1971).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 127

Due to this unsatisfactory state in the construction of social science theories it is not
reasonable to expect too much from their application in explaining, predicting and
solving technological problems. Basically, however, these three tasks can only be fulfilled
when nomological knowledge is available. In spite of having different subject matters and
the special difficulty this causes in acquiring nomological knowledge, the social sciences do
not seem to differ from the natural sciences in this particular respect115 • However, at the
present time it is uncertain whether nomological knowledge in the social sciences will
remain limited to empirical generalizations or whether social scientists will succeed in
formulating theories in the strict sense of hypothetico-deductive statement systems.

THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF THEORIES IN SCIENCE OF

EDUCATION

Those who are involved in educating or in planning and managing educational

institutions have placed much hope in educational science. They expect it to provide
knowledge which will help solve practical problems. Of the problems facing them the most
urgent are of a technological nature. Educators want to know what can be done so that
educands can acquire, keep or strengthen certain positively regarded psychic dispositions
and reduce, weaken or completely avoid the development of negatively regarded
dispositions. This means they need to know the side effects of specific means and how
undesirable side effects can be avoided. The majority of technological questions concern
extremely complex phenomena, which are composed of a great number of intricately
interrelated sub-elements. The focus here is on ends-means relationships, which requires
the analysis of a variety of ends existing both simultaneously and sequentially and
numerous individual factors connected to means complexes, all of which are conditioned
by continuously changing socio-cultural situations.
In addition to technological problems, educational practitioners are also confronted
by problems of explanation and prediction. An explanation seeks an answer to the question
"Why is this so?" A scientific prediction or prognosis is concerned with answering the
question "What will happen if ... ?" In the daily practice of education there are an
abundance of phenomena calling for explanation. An interest in explaining events is often
coupled with the expectation that discovering what causes particular results or outcomes
will contribute beneficially to our future educational actions. This applies especially to the
interest in prediction.

115 NAGEL (1961: 447 ff.) treats this in greater detail; d. also POPPER (1976: 130 ff.); STEGMULLER
(1%7); ALBERT (1972); V. KRAFT (1973: 12 f.), Particularly for arguments against objections to a
nomological psychology cf. METZGER (1963: 243 ff.); T. HERRMANN (1971).
128 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

Explanations, predictions and technological knowledge of education all assume the

prior existence of empirical theories about education containing the necessary nomological
statements. They are the most important uses of theory in education116• However, since
theories cannot be applied until they have been developed, the construction of theories
must precede their application.
In their desire to meet the expectations of educators, educational theoreticians have
often attempted to solve explanatory, predictive or technological problems without having
the necessary knowledge to do so. They became accustomed to saying more than they
actually knew, and since they did not wish to risk being contradicted by the facts, they
expressed themselves so vaguely that the majority of real situations seemed compatible
with their statements. Because of the lack of theories of a high informational content, it
was unavoidable that their views on problems of application were also lacking in content.
By trying to put the cart before the horse, they did little more than create a poor image of
educational science among educational practitioners.
In response to unrealistic expectations, wishes and promises, three things must be
stressed: 1. The construction of theories is different from their application; 2. The solution
of application problems presupposes the existence of nomological theories with a high
empirical content; 3. Not all theories are suitable for the solution of application problems.
It makes little sense to propose a program for educational science so comprehensive that it
cannot be fulfilled. Even in the exact natural sciences a distinction is made between the
knowledge of natural laws and their application. And even when we have full knowledge of
a given real world system and all laws pertaining to that system, it is still possible that we
"can neither predict nor reconstruct nor in any other way explain certain happenings". For
that reason STEGMOLLER considered it more appropriate to interpret scientific
understanding of the world as the "understanding of the laws governing the course of
events", instead of as "the ability to explain and predict"117. The social sciences are far
removed from knowledge of this sort, and no one knows whether such knowledge can be
obtained. Thus in the social sciences it would be even less advisable than in the natural
sciences to make the applicability of theories for explanation and prediction the measure
of their scientific value 1l8.
Scientific theories of education must first be developed; only afterwards can we test
whether and to what end they can be applied. Explanatory, predictive and technological
problems are of great practical importance, but little can be done to help solve them

116 For other types of theory application cf. SPINNER (1974: 1489 f.).
117 STEGMULLER (1966: 656).
118 Cf. for example SCHAFERS (1974: 247): "Only after sociology ... has shown the ability to predict will it
become a science ...".
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 129

scientifically as long as empirically rich theories are lacking. Educational science, too,
strives for nomological knowledge, not only for the sake of pure knowledge, but also to
solve problems of educational practice. In the ideal case this knowledge could be
combined to form hypothetico-deductive systems, but whether and to what extent this will
happen cannot be foreseen. We must start with the attainable, i.e. establish and organize
facts relating to education, its effects and the conditions presumed necessary for
educational success. In the quest for nomological statements it may not be possible to go
beyond empirical generalizations whose validity is spatio-temporally contingent.
Nevertheless this would still be an improvement on superficial, random unsystematic
everyday knowledge.
Having treated the difference between the construction and application of theories, I
would now like to examine the role of facts (and the search for facts) in the construction of
theories in educational science. I will then discuss the application of educational theories
in explanation, prediction and solving technological problems.

TIlE ROLE OF TIlE DETERMINATION OF FACTS IN CONSTRUCTING TIlEORIES

OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE

Nomological theories of educational science must be built upon established

nomological hypotheses. In order to formulate and test nomological hypotheses we must
already be intimately familiar with the most important phenomena found in educational
situations (or fields). What is currently regarded as an educational situation and which
phenomena are considered important depends on the observer's previous knowledge, his
theoretical framework and the problems he wishes to solve. Our previous knowledge of
education comes predominantly from everyday experience and from the practical
educational teachings which summarize and organize the insights of everyday experience.
This knowledge rests on concepts relatively weak in content, on highly simplified ideas
about educational reality and on more or less inexact and unreliable assumptions about
the complex network of relationships affecting education. The statement systems in which
this traditional educational lore is expressed are themselves already the result of
theoretical construction. They form provisional theories which are used as the starting
point for obtaining theories which are not only more highly confirmed, but also richer in
informational content.
We can only progress from inexact to exact knowledge when inexactitude is
recognized as such and attempts are made to more precisely grasp the phenomena in
130 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

question. The actions leading to this end are generally referred to as "description"ll9. As
with "explanation" or "science", "description" is one of those words burdened by process-
product ambiguity: it can refer either to the act of describing or to the result of this act, i.e.
a statement complex in which certain segments of reality are described l20 • In a description,
one seeks to answer the question "what is the case"? or "what was the case"? The answer
consists of singular "there-are" statements with a designation of time and place. Such
statements are centrally important, not only for obtaining, but above all for testing
nomological hypotheses.
Acts of description can be directed at (present as well as past) individual facts, or at
the nomological relationships between individual facts. Both approaches are necessary,
since there is no other way to obtain nomological knowledge than by examining individual
facts as a prerequisite for formulating nomological hypotheses. Thus, for example, ALOYS
FISCHER called for as "in-depth a description and analysis of the details of pedagogical
praxis as possible"l21, while emphasizing that "description goes much farther than the
depiction of individual facts in that it analyzes the inner relationships of a multitude of
details"122. WINNEFELD expresses this idea even more clearly: for him it is absolutely
necessary to "describe individual cases as exactly as possible"I23, but on the other hand
research in educational science should not simply persist in "describing phenomena", but
should forge ahead to "uncover the underlying conditional complexes"I24.
The groundwork necessary to achieve this end consists of examining typical
educational situations through exploratory field studies l25 • Special note is thereby taken of
factors which, on the basis of our existing knowledge, can be viewed as possible conditions
or as determinants of an educand's behavior. Especially informative are observations of
educational situations, their components and changes in their mutual relationships over
time. In this case, developmental or long-term studies are preferable to simple descriptions
of situations at a single point in time.

119 For a semantic history of this word, cf. KAULBACH (1968); DIEMER (1971); BOLLNOW (1973). For
description in educational science, especially in research on instruction from a hermeneutic perspective, see
K. SCHNEIDER (1971).
120 Cf. BLACK (1952: 194 f.).
121 A. FISCHER (1914: 9).
122 FISCHER (1932b: 159).
123 WINNEFELD (1970: 158).
124 WINNEFELD (1957: 43).
125 In contrast to an experiment, a research procedure is designated a ''field study" when the researcher studies
his subject matter in a "natural" situation which exists independently of and remains uninfluenced by the
research procedure. A further distinction is also made between exploratory and hypothesis-testing field
studies. Cf. BREDENKAMP (1969: 334). Cf. also FRIEDRICHS and LUDTKE (1971) for a description of
participant observation in the framework of field studies.
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 131

The most thorough descriptions of the development of social interrelationships in the

course of time are to be found in case studies. In case studies, the subject matter being
studied is viewed as a whole and its integrity is preserved l26 • A case study can treat the life
history of an individual, a group (family, school class, the inmates of a reformatory) or
reciprocal relationships taken as units, for example relationships among parents and
children, teachers and students, psychotherapists and patients, etc.
As with every other kind of research, case studies assume the existence of previous
theoretical knowledge and specific problems. In the context of obtaining and testing
nomological knowledge, case studies should thoroughly examine the subject matter in its
entire complexity. This is done to press forward from more or less vague assumptions to
relatively clear and specific hypotheses on possible relationships. These can then be tested
by experimental or causal-comparative studies. For example, case studies have provided us
with a great part of our therapeutic knowledge of behaviorally disturbed children living in
institutions 127• We owe our knowledge of many important individual facts to case studies of
new, still umesearched complex phenomena, as for example youth groups in "open-house"
institutionsl28 , authority formation in a school class l29 , or the behavior of vacationing
teenagers l3O • The knowledge of these facts could prove fruitful for later studies using more
specialized approaches. Based on case studies, researchers have discovered behavioral
uniformities among the members of various small groups. This has led to the formulation
and confirmation of nomological hypotheses which can possibly be applied to all types of
groupSl3l.
To establish whether an assumed relationship between individual facts has a
nomological character we must determine which circumstances are always present when
the given relationship appears and which circumstances mayor may not be present. It is a
matter of separating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the given relationship from
accidental factors 132•
In testing nomological hypotheses, both experimental and non-experimental
techniques can be applied. Experimental research is the surest path to nomological
knowledge, but there are many instances in which it cannot be employed.

126 Cf. GOODE and HATI (1952: 330 ff.).

127 Cf. for example AICHHORN (1974); REDL and WINEMAN (1%7) and (1966); BETIELHEIM (1966);
TRIESCHMAN (1969).
128 Cf. for example ROSSNER (1962).
129 Cf. BODECKER (1961).
130 Cf. for example KENTLER (1969: 29 ff.).
131 Cf. HOMANS (1%5: 24 and 442 ff.).
132 Cf. V. KRAFf (1973: 37 ff.). Cf. WRIGHT (1960: 84 ff.) on the rwes worked out by MILL (1843) for the
process of induction; for the problems of generalization and extrapolation d. V. KRAFf (1970a) and (1973:
44 ff.).
132 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

An experiment is defined as a "systematically and replicably induced series of events

during which observations are made on how under invariant conditions at least one
dependent variable changes when at least one independent variable is altered"133. Those
factors whose influence is to be studied are designated independent variables; dependent
variables are defined as the factors which are assumed to be contingent on independent
variables. "Independent" and "dependent" are relative concepts; which factors they
designate depends on the problems to be solved.
The methodological advantage of experimentation lies in the fact that the
phenomena which are to be studied can be isolated from disruptive secondary conditions,
reproduced at will and systematically varied. Thanks to the simplified nature of
experimental situations, in which unnecessary factors are excluded and the remaining
factors controlled (i.e. prevented from influencing the results) we can establish whether
presumed invariant relationships exist between the experimental variables. A good
example of experimental procedure is the study made by UPPITI and WHI1E of the
relationships between the leadership styles of adults (independent variable) and the group
behavior of children (dependent variable?34.
In educational science, there are many hypotheses dealing with the relationships
between certain environmental factors and types of behavior (or psychic dispositions) of
educands which cannot be tested experimentally for practical or ethical reasons. Among
these hypotheses are those dealing with the influence of factors which can neither be
induced at will nor varied (e.g. the intelligence of parents or the number of siblings in a
family). Another type includes hypotheses about highly complex phenomena which cannot
be subdivided into individual research topics. Thus the component factors cannot be
isolated and studied separately in such a way that the effects of disruptive factors are
excluded (e.g. a study of a school system). Ethical reasons preclude the experimental
testing of hypotheses about factors which would presumably lead to psychic damage, for
example reducing a student's contacts with his peers, making excessive demands on
student performance, influencing the behavior of the educand's social partners in ways
incompatible with existing ethical codes, etc. To test such hypotheses, causal-comparative
procedures such as "ex-post-facto" studies and field research are employed. These non-
experimental procedures share the common trait that researchers leave their subjects
unchanged and limit themselves to analyzing the selected elements which they assume are

133 KLAUER (1973: 29); d. also PAGES (1967).

134 LIPPITI and WHITE (1958). Another example is the multi-factorial study by JOHANNESSON (1967) of
the effects of praise and reprimands on the achievement and attitudes of school children. See other
examples of experimental studies in educational science in KLAUER (1973) and
SKOWRONEK/SCHMIED (1977: 76 ff.).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 133

related to one another. Two types of such studies can be differentiated, depending on
whether they start from dependent or independent variables.
An "ex-past-facto" study begins with the analysis of dependent variables and searches
for independent variables. The phenomenon under study is viewed as the result of causal
factors (antecedent conditions135 ) whose existence must be demonstrated. Since a given
causal complex has appeared in the past, it must be discovered after it has already
produced its effects. In other words, the researcher seeks to reconstruct past facts after
they have happened136• Examples of this procedure would be the countless comparative
studies taking psychic disturbances and failure or success in school as a starting point and
relating them to events in the past lives of affected persons. These events are
hypothetically viewed as responsible for their performance. Another example would be the
retrospective studies done on how personality development is affected by early separation
from a mother and long-term institutionalization137•
The hypothesis-testing type of field study starts with independent variables and seeks
to establish whether the events predicted by given hypotheses (dependent variables)
actually occur. One example of this procedure is the studies dealing with the relationship
between teacher behavior and pupils' learning outcomes138 •
In a limited space it is not possible to treat either the exact procedure used in testing
hypotheses among the various types of studies or the problem of whether the results of
such studies can be generalized139 • Proving the existence of causal relationships (instead of
mere correlations) is one of the most difficult tasks facing empirical research. However,
since a presentation of research techniques lies outside the philosophy of educational
knowledge, I shall limit myself to a few commentsl40 •
What is essential for us is above all that the construction of valid nomological
theories in educational science is extremely complex and compounded by countless
potential sources of error. Many theoretical statements are in fact too unclear to be
empirically testable. On the other hand, the validity of tested hypotheses is often so limited
in scope that they do not apply under changed conditions and are inapplicable to the
technological problems of education. Thus for example, some nomological statements on

135 From the Latin "antecedere" = to precede, go before.

136 Latin: "post factum" = after the fact. On this procedure, cf. MAYNTZ (1974: 186 f.); ZIMMERMANN
(1972: 186 ff.).
137 Cf. BREZINKA (1959a); CASLER (1961); BOWLBY (1964).
138 Cf. for example RYANS (1967); SOLOMON (1963).
139 lAUCKEN and SCHICK (1971: 81 ff.) offer a clear introduction to this problem area.
140 Introductions to educational research methods are EIGLER (1970); KlAUER (1973); SKOWRONEK
and SCHMIED (1977); TRAVERS (1972). For more general studies of research methods in the social
sciences (in order of increasing difficulty) cf. ATIESlANDER (1975); MAYNTZ (1974); KERLINGER
(1975).
134 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

learning have been confirmed through experimentation under artificially simplified

laboratory conditions. There is empirical evidence that these statements do not apply to
the way students learn under the complex conditions of their home and school
environments.
We rightly expect that the reality-oriented theories of educational science will
provide information on causal relationships in the complex situations existing between
educators and educands. However, this would mean turning away from the type of causal-
analytic research which has predominated up to now, in which studies were made of the
relationships between as few and as simple a range of variables as possible. Instead,
complex educational means-systems and their varied (intended and unintended) effects on
educands would have to be researched, and then not merely in isolated fashion, but
through an all-encompassing analysis of the additional influences acting on the educand's
personality in any given situation. In order to more closely approximate this ideal,
"multivariate experimental longitudinal strategies" have been recommended which should
also take into consideration the individual differences between educands l41 • Under the
heading "experimental ecology of education", attempts have even been made to carry out
comparative causal-analytic studies of how entire environmental systems act upon
educands and educators l42 . These projects, in spite of their promising appellations, have
few of the features of scientific experimentation, which in addition to being systematic and
reproduceable, can also be varied under controlled conditionsl43 • To attain the status of
scientific experimentation these studies would have to encompass such a variety of
variables and mutual relationships that the sought-after theories would be much too
complicated for either testing or application.
The attempt to research the relationships between complex variable systems instead
of between isolated variables without regard to their systemic context could lead to more
precise theories. This assumes that researchers could obtain an adequate overall view of
relevant conditions which would make it possible to establish which conditions have what
effects in the framework of a given system. This is precisely what seems only to a limited
extent possible in this multivariate (or multifactor) approach. For this reason the results of
such studies cannot be viewed as unequivocal. They will always be subject to various
interpretations depending on which variable (or group of variables) is considered (on the
basis of the respectively presupposed theory) to be the main determinant of the
circumstance or event viewed as an effectl44 •

141 Cf. SHULMAN (1970: 383, esp. 387 ff.).

142 cr. BRONFENBRENNER (1976) and (1979).
143 KlAUER (1973: 38 ff.).
144 Expressed in the language of experimental psychology, we are confronted with the dilemma of choosing
between internal and external validity or between the control ofconditions on the one hand (by shutting out
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 135

A brief mention of these difficulties is perhaps enough to give an idea of the gap
between what can be sought after, what might possibly be attained and the existing
theories of educational science. Most of all, we should remember that theories of
educational science, as with all other social science theories and most natural science
theories, lack both closure and completeness. Closure means that the factors designated by
a given theory's concepts exist only in a relationship with one another and not with other
factors lying outside the scope of the theory. Completeness means that no variable is
omitted which has actual influence and whose discovery would necessitate a change in the
theory145. Knowledge of all relevant variables and their relationships would be the
prerequisite for the completeness of a theory. It is not hard to see that scientific theories of
education are far removed from being either closed or complete. However, this applies to
most other sciences as well.
This situation should encourage humility, but not resignation. Social science research
has already proven that we can discover nomological regularities which can be applied
technologically146. These nomological hypotheses are still incomplete, but they can be
improved and supplemented by additional hypotheses.
As in every other science, the progress of knowledge in educational science depends
on replacing unclear and untestable statements with more exact and testable ones.
Moreover, individual facts must be examined, not only as to their distinguishing, but also
their common traits, and typological concepts must be formulated to enable us to leave
general discussion behind and pose specific questions. Just a few decades ago, for example,
the conditions relevant to personality development were still classified rougWy into
intentional educational acts, hereditary dispositions and "environmental influences" (also
called "functional education" and "secret co-educators")147. Since then these
"environmental influences" (including educational phenomena) have been more exactly
differentiated. Their relative significance has been theoretically weighted and subjected to
empirical investigation. As a consequence we know something more about their potential
use in achieving educational aims. In the course of this, the so-called educational measures
on which traditional pedagogics focused its attention have proved to be of secondary
importance.
A typical example of the relatively more advanced, yet still unsatisfactory state of our
present knowledge is the following statement: "By and large the pervasive emotional tone

situation-specific factors) and a study's realism (or the situational appropriateness of the research) on the
other (which reduces the possibilities for controlling conditions). Cf. lAUCKEN and SCHICK (1971: 85
ff.).
145 BRODBECK (1%3: 75).
146 a. for example IMMISCH and ROSSNER (1975); ASCHERSLEBEN (1977).
147 a. for example F. SCHNEIDER (1953: 12).
136 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

used by the parents in raising children (and especially the loving-rejecting tone) affects
subsequent development more than either the particular techniques of child-rearing (e.g.
permissiveness, restrictiveness, punishment, reward) or the cohesiveness of the marital
unit"l48. For someone seeking technological knowledge of education, this hypothesis is still
much too indefinite, but it can hardly be denied that this represents a cognitive advance
over naive belief in the effectiveness of "educational means" existing independently of the
emotional aspects of educational situations.
If we attempt to interpret the cited example of a nomological hypothesis (along with
ramifications which cannot be discussed here) in a technological fashion, we can say that
positive parental empathy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for children to
acquire certain psychic dispositions. A condition A is called necessary when the appearance
of a phenomenon B would be impossible without its realization. However, the appearance
of A alone is not sufficient for the appearance of B. Other conditions are also necessary. A
condition A is called sufficient when its realization always leads to the appearance of B.
The appearance of B, however, does not mean that the sufficient condition A has been
realized, since it is also possible that B can be produced by the conditions AI' ~, etc. "If
one only knows a sufficient condition, one does not know whether there are perhaps other
conditions that are also sufficient. If on the other hand only necessary conditions are
known, then one knows only when the event in question will not occur"149. Only after we
know not only the necessary, but also the sufficient conditions for a phenomenon B to occur
is our knowledge complete. Sufficient and necessary conditions are those without which B
cannot appear and which consistently result in B.
Because of their potential technological applications, there is a need for theories of
educational science that inform us about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
appearance of certain effects. Most desirable is knowledge of relationships between
determinants ("causes") and results ("effects") following the model: "If A, then B,
regardless of any other factors". In reality, however, the best that we can usually find seems
to be conditional relations following the model: "If A, then B, but only if C". The situation
is even more complicated because certain determinants can at least partially be replaced
by others ("If A, then B; but if F, then also B"150). This assumption underlies the search for
alternative modes of acting151 .
This example shows not only the extent of the gap between desired and existing
causal knowledge, but also how difficult it will be to bridge. In other words, hypotheses and

148 BERELSON and STEINER (1964: 72).

149 KLAUS and BUHR (1970: 175). Cf. also WRIGHT (1960: 66 ff.); THEOBALD (1973: 97 ff.).
150 According to ZETTERBERG (1967: 82 f.).
151 For research on the effects of parental behavior on children cf. BECKER (1964); CALDWELL (1964);
WALTERS and PARKE (1967).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 137

theories of educational science are extremely open152 • This insight can protect us from
utopian expectations of complete and certain knowledge, but it does not justify
abandoning the construction of achievable (though incomplete and tentative) theories of
educational science, merely to content ourselves with untested opinions on education.

THE APPLICATION OF THEORIES IN EXPLANATION

Theories depict the nomological relationships existing in a particular part of the real
world. Although they can be applied to serve different ends, the basic procedure is similar
in all types of application. In educational science, technological applications are of primary
importance, but since the procedure itself can best be demonstrated using the model of
explanation, it is this model that we shall use in the following discussion.
The word "explanation" has several meanings. Explanation refers to the attempt to
answer "why" questions: "Why is something the case"?; "Why was something the case"?;
"Why did a certain event occur"? We are thus concerned with explaining individual facts or
events 153 • We wish to learn something about the conditions through which such facts or
events come about. Frequently we also speak in terms of discovering "causes".
Let us begin with an example. An anxious and insecure student who has previously
done poorly in school consistently gets good grades in a new class with a different teacher.
An explanation is sought. We begin by seeking a theory that contains nomological
statements relevant to the event we wish to explain. In this particular case, a review is
made of the theories pertaining to the relationships between pupil traits, instructional
methods and successful learning154 • In doing so, special attention is paid to nomological
hypotheses relevant to the personality variable "anxiety"155. In our search we come across
the empirically confirmed hypothesis that anxious children react much more positively to
instruction which is firmly guided by the teacher and clearly organized in all details than
they do to instruction which leaves them a great deal of freedom in unsupervised
situations 156 • The next step is to establish whether the conditions given in the hypothesis
are present in the case to be explained. Let us assume that the anxious pupil had
previously attended a school where courses were loosely supervised and after changing
schools was in a more closely supervised situation. If so then any performance

152 On the open nature of nomological statements, theories and explanations cf. KAPlAN (1964: 351 ff.).
153 A basic work on this subject is STEGMULLER (1969: 72 ff.); on explanation in the social sciences d.
RYAN (1970).
154 Cf. for example FLAMMER (1975); SCHWARZER and STEINHAGEN (1975); BENNETT (1976).
155 For an analysis of this variable d. THURNER (1970).
156 Cf. BENNETT (1976: 155 ff.); FLAMMER (1975: 293).
138 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

improvement may be explained by the above-mentioned hypothesis and descriptive

statements detailing the concrete circumstances of the case157•
This example shows that an explanation consists of a logical deduction in which there
are two types of statements: first, nomological statements (or general statements) and
second, particular or singular statements describing the conditions of a given case l58 . In our
example the nomological statement reads as follows: "If anxious students receive
instruction that is well-supervised by the teacher and clearly organized in all its details,
then they perform better than when they receive loosely supervised minimally organized
instruction". The singular statements read as follows: "At point p there is at time t an
anxious student A"; "The anxious student A received loosely supervised minimally
organized instruction before changing schools"; "After changing schools he received firmly
directed, clearly organized instruction from his teacher". From these premises it is possible
to derive a statement describing the events we wish to explainl59 ; "The anxious student A
performs better after changing schools".
In the language of epistemology, the event to be explained is called the
"explanandum-event"; the statement describing the explanandum-event is designated the
"explanandum-statement". For brevity's sake the term "explanandum" is usually employed
and can refer to either the explanandum-statement or the event it describes l60 • The special
circumstances or individual conditions existing either before or at the same time as the
event one wishes to explain are called "antecedent conditions"161. Both classes of
statements forming the premises of an explanatory argument (i.e. nomological statements
and singular statements describing antecedent conditions) are grouped together under the

157 In order not to make the example more complicated, I have intentionally ignored the fact that a single
nomological hypothesis is seldom sufficient to explain such events; usually several hypotheses must be
considered. I have also ignored the possibility that there are alternative explanations to the one offered
here.
158 Cf. POPPER (1977: 59 ff.) and (1977: 59 ff.).
159 Derivation is carried out according to the so-called modus ponens:

Ifp, then q (nomological hypothesis)

p (singular statement on the specific conditions)
then: q (explained singular statement).

The first premise is a conditional statement (or if-then statement), whose if-component is called the
"antecedent" and whose then-component is called the "consequence". If two statements are true, one of
which is a conditional statement while the other claims that the antecedent of this conditional statement
exists, then the statement describing the consequence of the conditional statement is also true. TARSKI
(1941: 48).
160 Cf. HEMPEL (1972: 238 ff.) ("Explanandum" comes from the Latin "explanare" = to explain; its literal
meaning is "that which is to be explained").
161 From the Latin "antecedere" = precede, go before; thus it refers to the conditions preceding the
explanandum.
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 139

concept "explanans"162. A why-question must be interpreted in reference to both parts of

the explanans: "On the basis of which antecedent conditions and which laws or
nomological statements does this event occur"?
Depending on whether strictly general, (universal) nomological statements or
probabilistic (statistical) ones are used we can distinguish between two types of scientific
explanation. In the first case the conclusion follows through logical necessity from the
relationship of the premises in the explanans. Since the explanandum is logically contained
in the explanans, one can say that if the explanans is true (or probable), then the
explanandum must also be true (or probable). Because a logical deduction is made here,
this type of explanation is called a deductive-nomological explanation.
In the second case, nomological hypotheses are used in which it is claimed that under
certain conditions certain events will appear with a certain statistical probability. Since the
explanans does not contain any universal nomological statements which would be valid for
all cases, the explanandum is not a logically necessary conclusion, but merely has a certain
statistical probability. This type of explanation is called a probabilistic or inductive-
statistical163 explanation. The schema for both forms of explanation is the same, but
probabilistic explanations, in contrast to deductive-nomological, result in special
epistemological problems which do not warrant further treatment here l64 .
The ideal schema of explanation (deductive as well as inductive) is used, not only in
the natural sciences, but also in the social sciences and humanities. With explanations of
human actions and genetic historical explanations, however, special problems arise from
the goal-oriented nature of actions and the presence of different alternatives for actingl65 .
It can nevertheless be demonstrated that supposed alternatives - as for example
explanations based on rational motives instead of nomological hypotheses - essentially
correspond to the explanatory schema described above l66.
Since this schema employs a model or ideal type, it is clear that actual explanations
will differ from the ideal in varying degrees. There are incomplete, inexact, fragmentary
and partial explanations. The explanations for such complex phenomena as those found in
educational environments cannot be other than incomplete. In order to explain
complicated events, we must establish not one, but many nomological statements.
"Complete description and explanation of social actions", occasionally proposed as the
ideal goal for social science research l67, is impossible l68 .

162 "Explanans" = that which explains.

163 HEMPEL (1972: 241); STEGMULLER (1969: 83).
164 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969: 627 ff.).
165 Cf. WRIGHT (1971: 83 ff.); GIESEN and SCHMID (1975).
166 Cf. HEMPEL (1972: 254 ff.); STEGMULLER (1969: 335 ff.).
167 DAHRENDORF (1967: 219) (my italics).
140 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

Let us consider a few examples of educational phenomena in need of explanation.

Why are certain children incapable of relating to their peers? Why are some
uncooperative during instruction? Why do some students develop increased self-restraint
in the context of a "partnership" instructional method while others in this context lose their
inhibitions? Why is play therapy successful in one case but not in another? Generally
speaking, why do certain desired or undesired (with regard to specific educational aims)
personality traits (types of behavior or dispositions) appear in the educand? Or, let us turn
our attention from the relationships between the behavior of educators and the personality
structures of educands to the problems of educational institutions. Why do only 30 to 50
percent of the students in a certain school system graduate in the recommended amount of
time? Why do such a high percentage of students need after-school help? Why is general
education encouraged more than vocational education in a certain epoch of a country's
history? Why does mutual distrust exist between parents and teachers?
In each of these cases extremely complex facts are to be explained. One might even
object that these facts are too complex to be satisfactorily explained at all. But while in
many cases the explanandum could be formulated more precisely, the phenomena in
educational fields whose explanation is of the greatest practical importance are usually
also very complex. In this area it is impossible to simplify complex systems to any degree
without radically changing them.
Under these circumstances we must be content with partial explanations or often
simply with mere explanatory outlines 169 • In the case of partial explanations the suggested
explanans is not sufficient "to explain the explanandum-phenomenon in all respects in
which it has been described; however, it does provide an explanation for a number of
aspects". In an explanatory outline, "the explanans exists only as the approximate outline of
an explanation, in more or less vague references to how antecedent data and laws can be
supplemented so that a satisfactory rational explanation results. That we are dealing with a
mere outline becomes clear in cases where it is presently not possible to provide
nomological knowledge with an adequate empirical basis"170.
Hence explanations can be imperfect because of insufficient knowledge of
antecedent conditions or of the relevant laws. The phenomena relevant for reaching
educational aims are as a rule determined by many factors which we can never completely
discover. Since not only psychic objectivations (actions and works), but also personality
traits are relevant in educational situations, a central role in education is played by the

168 O. HEMPEL (1965: 233); STEGMULLER (1969: 337 f.).

169 Cf. HEMPEL and OPPENHEIM (1953: 319 ff.); HEMPEL (1965: 415 ff.) and (1972: 246 ff.);
STEGMULLER (1%9: 105 ff.).
170 STEGMULLER (1969: 108 and 110).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 141

attitudes, emotional dispositions, valuational habits and world views that a person acquires
from lifelong contact with interaction partners. We seldom think of how large the number
of variables is that could playa role in explaining behavioral changes17l. At present we are
aware of at most a fraction of the conditions needed to create the psychic dispositions
desired as aims of education in particular situations.
Even less satisfactory is our knowledge of nomological regularities that could be
applied in explaining educationally relevant facts. It is naive to imagine that the laws
discovered in the basic research of biology, psychology or sociology can simply be applied
to education. These nomological statements are, as a rule, too general and additional
research is needed to establish whether they should be used in the special cases we wish to
explain. Laws valid for the conditioned responses of rats in Skinner boxes cannot be
uncritically used to explain how schoolchildren learn foreign languages. In educational
situations we often find additional factors (or variables) that make them so different from
the simple situations of basic research that experimentally verified hypotheses have no
explanatory value172• This is a result of the research practices of experimental psychology,
which, as already noted, for methodological reasons seek to exclude nearly all of the
complex sets of conditions affecting people's behavior in normal situations. Only when we
limit ourselves to using a small number of basic conditions as independent variables can
we determine their effects with a relatively high degree of accuracy173. In normal
educational interactions, however, these variables do not appear in isolated form, but
coexist with countless other variables within a highly complex system.
For all these reasons, many explanations in educational science cannot be other than
imperfect. Every explanation is tentative. If more exact descriptions of the events to be
explained are achieved, and if more suitable or better confirmed nomological hypotheses
are found, then a given explanation can be replaced by a better one. Where empirically
verified laws are totally lacking, we must in the worst possible case be satisfied with poorly
supported conjectures or with mere "orienting hypotheses"174. As long as we remain aware
of their inadequacies, imperfect explanations are better than none at all, since they act as a
stimulus for further research in the most promising direction.

171 A proposed taxonomy of behavioral determinants is given by SELLS (1963). cr. GRAUMANN (1%9: 63
ff.).
172 Cf. AUSUBEL (1953: 317 ff.); HILGARD (1970: 176 ff.).
173 Cf. HOLZKAMP (1970: 10 ff.).
174 Cf. OPP (1967: 398 f.).
142 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

THE APPLICATION OF THEORIES IN PREDICTION

A scientific prediction or prognosis is an argument answering the question: "What

will happen if ... ?" The ideal model of prediction is very close to that of explanation. In
an explanation the event we wish to explain has already taken place and the laws and
antecedent conditions from which the explanandum can be derived are sought after the
fact. In a prediction, nomological statements and statements based on the observation of
concrete circumstances (or antecedent conditions) are already given: the prediction (a
statement describing a future event) is then derived from these premises. The difference
between explanation and prediction lies primarily in the temporal relationship between
the occurrence of the event and the time at which a statement is derived which describes
this event. In the case of prediction, the deduction is made before the occurrence of the
event 175 •
As with explanations, scientific predictions also require knowledge of laws and
antecedent conditions. In contrast to prophecy, which unconditionally claims that "x will
occur", prediction formulates conditional or hypothetical claims: "x will (or can) occur if
certain laws apply and certain conditions are present"176. Since in an ideal case we can
assume that all the relevant laws are known, the researcher's principal task lies in
determining the concrete conditions given in the initial situation. The prediction is then
deduced from these conditions and the relevant laws.
In its logical form, the schema of prediction corresponds to that of explanation177, but
in other respects considerable differences exist between the two. One critical difference is
that in an explanation the data about the antecedent conditions apply wholly to past
situations about which we can obtain sufficiently reliable information. In prediction, on the
other hand, it is necessary to take into account data about antecedent conditions for future
situations. Thus one must assume that the antecedent conditions established to have been
present in the past will also be present at a future point in time for which a prediction is
made. This, however, is a hypothetical assumption which could subsequently be
disconfirmed. Between the time when a prediction is made and that at which the predicted
event is expected to appear, disruptive events may come into play and prevent its
occurrencel78 .
Despite all such differences between explanation and predictionl79, an explanatory
argument is always usable in a predictive capacity, whereas the opposite is not the case.

175 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969: 84 and 154). For a study of prediction in the social sciences cf. RYAN (1970).
176 Cf. BUNGE (1967: Vol. 2, 68 ff.); ALBERT (1965b: 130 f.).
177 POPPER (1964: 96); HEMPEL (1965: 366 ff.).
178 STEGMULLER (1969: 150 f.).
179 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969: 155 ff.).; BUNGE (1967: Vol. 2, 69 ff.); LENK (1972: 13 ff.).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 143

Let us take another look at an explanatory argument we used in the preceding chapter.
The following nomological hypothesis is already given: "If anxious students receive well-
supervised, clearly organized instruction from their teacher, they will perform better than
if instruction is loosely supervised and minimally structured". If it is maintained in a
singular statement that the anxious student A has until recently received poorly supervised,
minimally-structured instruction, but now receives clearly organized and well-supervised
instruction, then using the nomological hypothesis and this singular statement as premises
we can derive the prediction that under the new conditions student A will perform better
than in the past.
Every scientific prediction is tied to the assumption that the initial conditions will
remain the same. In reality, however, not all the conditions existing in an educational
situation are known. In addition, the conditions under which people live, learn and act
never remain the same for any length of time; the complex of conditions affecting people's
behavior changes continuously. For that reason long-term predictions for open, non-
isolated systems with great freedom for spontaneous actions - as is the case with people
and social groups - are highly uncertain. Even nomological statements possessing great
explanatory power do not help in prediction, if knowledge of the special conditions
involved is lacking. A prediction can thus be only as exact as our knowledge of the relevant
laws and of the individual conditions of the concrete case. If for example a prediction is
made about the anxious student's school achievement, but unforeseen factors such as a
brain dysfunction resulting in a loss of motivation are present, the predicted rise in
achievement may not take place.
In making scientific predictions it is also necessary to take into account universal and
statistical types of nomological statements. Since in educational science we are only able to
use the statistical type of nomological statements and empirical generalizations, it is
fundamentally impossible to predict an individual event. To do so we would have to
employ universal nomological statements as premises. If only statistical statements are
available, it is only possible to make predictions for classes of events. "The appearance of a
certain individual case, by contrast, is completely uncertain; the improbable can take place
at any time"l80. Even if we should succeed in formulating theories of social behavior which
have more content than our present theories, it can hardly be expected that with their help
reliable predictions for educational practice could be made in each individual case. A
theory's nomological hypotheses are valid only for the "pure" or "ideal" case; in the real
world, because of the large number of relevant variables, the concrete behavior of
individuals in complex situations deviates greatly from this ideal181 • It is nevertheless

180 V. KRAPf (1968: 83); cf. also BOCHENSKI (1965: 106).

181 cr. SCRIVEN (1956: 334 ff.).
144 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

possible to increase not only nomological knowledge, but also our knowledge of individual
conditions and to use both types of knowledge to advance from highly inexact to more
precise predictions.

THE APPLICATION OF THEORIES IN SOLVING TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

OF EDUCATION

The technological approach asks "What can be done to reach goal x"? The principal
concern here is to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for realizing a desired result
or outcome. Of particular interest are the conditions subject to our influence.
As with prediction, the logical structure employed in solving a technological problem
is similar to the ideal model of explanation. In the predictive application of a theory,
nomological statements and singular statements about antecedent conditions (initial or
situational conditions) are already given, while the consequences resulting from the known
situation are sought. In the technological application of a theory, nomological statements
and singular statements about an aim are already given (i.e. statements describing a
certain state or event which we are trying to bring about). The researcher looks for the
antecedent conditions which would cause the desired state to occur. In purely logical
terms, the problem will be solved when a statement describing the desired state can be
derived from the nomological hypotheses of the theory and statements about the
conditions being sought182 • The researcher's task then consists in finding the antecedent
conditions in concrete socio-cultural reality corrresponding to his nomological hypotheses.
If they cannot be found, he must try to find out whether and by what means they can be
brought about183 .
As an example, let us assume that our aim is to reconcile two groups of feuding
youths and combine them to create a single larger group. We select from various existing
socio-psychological theories the empirically confirmed nomological hypothesis that the
members of feuding groups will become less antagonistic and achieve a sense of group
solidarity if they share a common experience and act together to achieve a common goal.
A change of attitude occurs especially in situations where a "common opponent", "common
problem", "common advantage" or "common satisfaction" are experienced l84 . It is now
necessary to specify conditions which are applicable to these two groups existing under
specific conditions at a specific time and place which correspond to the if-components of

182 The derived statement specifying the desired state (or aim) thus corresponds to the explanandum in the
model of explanation. Cf. POPPER (1964: 96).
183 Cf. A TTESLANDER's schemas of the different steps involved in research (1975: 16 ff.).
184 Cf. HOFSTATTER (1957: 97).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 145

the nomological hypothesis. For example, the situation "cornmon opponent" could be
created by having both groups take part in a sporting event against some other outside
group, etc.
Seen logically, this is the same model as is used in explanation and prediction. It uses
as premises nomological statements and singular statements on antecedent conditions.
These are used to deduce statements describing desired states or goals.

Nomological hypothesis: "If members of feuding groups have cornmon

Singular statements:
experiences and take part in cooperative actions,
then their mutual animosity will be reduced and a
sense of group identity will arise".
"At place p at time t there are two feuding groups A
andB".
''The groups A and B take part in a situation
involving cornmon experiences and cooperative
actions Sl-Sn (e.g. competition against a cornmon
opponent, etc.)".

Singular conclusion "The members of the feuding groups A and B

reduce their mutual animosity and develop a shared
group identity".

Technological problems relate to the means suitable for realizing set aims (desired
states or events). The problem-solving process starts with the problem of bringing about
the states or events viewed as the desired effects, results or outcomes. What is sought is the
totality of conditions or causes producing the desired results l85 ; we want to discover which
combinations of circumstances can be used to bring them about.
The states or events which we wish to bring about are not the only possible aims. We
can also try to prevent the appearance of certain events or work against certain states
already in existence. The given aims thus depend on decisions, and these decisions
presuppose value judgements. People will only seek to realize states or events which they
view as positive and will only seek to prevent those which they ,~Tiew as negative. However,
it is not necessary to incorporate these value judgements into the statement systems of
educational technology; rather, it is sufficient to begin with states or events which already

185 cr. MILL (1974: 944 ff.).

146 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

have been pursued as aims (or possibly could be pursued as aims)I86. That each decision
for a certain aim rests on a value judgement goes without saying, but this value judgement
need not necessarily belong to a technological statement system. Valuing, desiring or
selecting a phenomenon as an aim is irrelevant to the question of the conditions for
realizing it.
In solving technological problems, we need nomological hypotheses whose then-
components contain specific statements about end-phenomena. In our example the
nomological hypothesis reads: "If members of feuding groups have common experiences
and take part in cooperative actions, their mutual animosity will be reduced and a sense of
group identity will arise". This nomological hypothesis, as with every empirical statement,
is application-neutral; it can be used in pursuing completely opposite aims187• If we seek to
realize a state described in the then-component, we can formulate the following
technological statement: "The desired result or outcome 'reduction of mutual animosity'
can be achieved if the members of feuding groups are brought together in situations where
they share common experiences and take part in cooperative actions". On the other hand,
if we wish to avoid a state described in the then-component, we can formulate the
following technological statement: "The aim of 'maintaining mutual animosity' can be
achieved if the members of feuding groups are prevented from sharing common
experiences and taking part in cooperative actions". This second strategy is followed when
members of a group believe that a hostile attitude toward another group is necessary to
bind their own group together and prevent the loss of their members' comInitment to the
group's norms. This behavior is typical of religious, ideological, political, national or local
groups which wish to shield their members from the influence of groups with deviating
norms.
It is also possible to incorporate the contents of descriptive technological statements
in prescriptive statements expressing mles or technical norms. Whereas technological
statements merely provide information on possibilities for acting, technical rules contain
prescriptions for acting; they prescribe the actions one ought to carry out in order to
achieve a set aim. A technical rule has the form: "In order to realize aim B, perform action
A", or "If you want to produce result B, then employ means A" ("B reached by means of
A"). On the other hand, if one wishes to avoid result B, then the rule is: "To avoid B, do
not perform action A", or "If you wish to avoid result B, then do not use means A" ("non-B
reached by non-A"). Both rules rest on the same nomological hypothesis: "if the condition
A is present, then B will occur" ("If A. then B"). The then-component (or consequence) of
a nomological hypothesis is used in technical rules as an if-component (or antecedent),

186 Cf. ALBERT (1960: 213 ff.) and (1972a: 82 ff.).

187 Cf. TOULMIN (125); BUNGE (1968a: 135).
 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY 147

whereas the if-component (antecedent) of a nomological hypothesis appears in technical

rules as a then-component (consequence). Put differently, the logical antecedent of a
nomological hypothesis (as well as its negation) appears in technical rules as the means,
whereas in technical rules the logical consequence of the nomological hypothesis (and its
negation) make up the desired aim, outcome or end l88.
The relationship between nomological hypotheses and technological statements (or
rules) can be demonstrated more clearly in the following model statements: "Since the
cause (the conditional complex) A has effect B, one can (or ought to) produce A in order
to achieve B". "Since the cause (the conditional complex) A has the effect B, one can (or
should) refrain from producing A in order to avoid BU.
These remarks should suffice to convey an understanding of the logical aspects of
applying theories in solving technological problems. The methods needed in a concrete
case are usually much more complicated. Many of the conceptualized psychic dispositions
and dispositional complexes which have been set as educational aims are only vaguely
defined and the conditions necessary for their appearance are unclear. There is a lack of
relevant nomological hypotheses and often those which seem relevant are too general for
technological application under specific conditions. Apart from this, not all nomological
hypotheses suitable for explaining phenomena are suitable for producing, preventing or
changing these phenomena. It is not enough to be familiar with the conditions on which a
desired effect depends; rather what is important in technology is a knowledge of those
conditions which can be influenced.
Another reason for the great complexity of technological problems is that in concrete
cases (as opposed to conditions included in simplified models) we never deal only with a
single educational aim; instead, each aim is part of a larger complex of aims which must
also be taken into consideration. In these aim complexes there are also aims designating
psychic dispositions which are hardly compatible for one and the same person, for example
"the ability to think critically about ideology", on the one hand, and religious, ideological or
political "faith" on the other. Above all, however, there is a danger that the means suitable
for reaching one aim will hinder or prevent a given educand from reaching another aim.
Thus philosophy is sometimes taught as comparative intellectual history, whereby it is
critically relativized. This can have a debilitating effect on responsiveness to religious faith
or, viewed more generally, on a person's ideological orientation, feelings of security and
ability to act morally. A central problem of educational technology is the undesired side-

188 A basic discussion of this is provided by BUNGE (1966) and (1967: Vol. 2, 132 ff.).
148 THE NOMOTHETICAL FIELD OF STUDY

effects 189 which may be inadvertently brought about by applying certain means to desired
ends, as for example when realizing the psychic dispositions chosen as aims l90 •
By examining the highly complex relationships in which educational actions are
intended to intervene, we can better understand why we are still so far from having a
theoretically-grounded technology of education and why we still depend to a great extent on
the unreliable trial-and-error method. The technological approach to educational science
does not promote a naive faith in planning (as some of its critics suppose), but instead
makes us aware of how little scientific knowledge we have of the conditions for
educational success.

189 Cf. POPPER (1976: 58 ff.).

190 On the problem of the limits of education and educational technology cf. BREZINKA (1981: 181 ff.).
lb. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION
(German: Historiographie der Erziehung; French: la science historique de l'education;
Italian: storiografia d'ell educazione; Spanish: historiografia de la educaci6n; Russian:
istoriografija vospitanija)

The (science of) history is without a doubt the most

unscientific of all sciences, and yet it does pass on to us much
that is worth knowing.
JACOB BURCKHARDT!

Education takes place in time and is constantly becoming a part of the past. The
share of educational actions lying in the past is immeasurably greater than that occurring
in the present. Past education is made up of past happenings, or history, and belongs as
much to the subject matter of educational science as does current education2• To obtain
knowledge on these past events, we must resort to historical research. Thus, educational
science also has a historical subdiscipline in which relevant past educational phenomena
are made accessible and investigated.

VARIOUS TERMS FOR TIlE HISTORICAL SUBDISCIPLINE OF EDUCATIONAL

SCIENCE

The historical subdiscipline of educational science has been designated by various

terms: "history of pedagogy"3, "historical pedagogy 'l4, "historical educational science"s,
"educational history"6, "history of education"7, "pedagogical history"S, "pedagogical
historiography"9, "historiography of education"lO and "historical educational research"ll, to

! BURCKHARDT (115).
2 Cf. WILLMANN (1957: 39 ff.) and (1906: 400 ff.); LOCHNER (1927: 9); MEISTER (1947a: 34 ff.);
SCHINDLER (1976).
3 Cf. SCHALLER and SCHAFER (1967: 9): Geschichte der Piidagogik - eine Disziplin der
Erziehungswissenschaft [History of Pedagogy - a Discipline of Educational Science]; NICOLIN (1970).
4 STOY 1861; WILLMANN (1906); DOLCH (1950).
5 BRUNNENGRABER (1934: 5 ff.); W. FLITNER (1958: 17); LOCHNER (1957: 199).
6 MEISTER (1947a: 30 ff.); DOLCH (1965: 108); LOCHNER (1947: 92 ff.) and (1957); SCHINDLER
(1976).
7 HILLEBRECHT (1972).
S NICOLIN (1975: 101).
9 DOLCH (1930); NICOLIN (1970: 494 and 504 ff.), (1975: 102).
10 THIELE (1932); NIPPERDEY (1964: 249); BREZINKA (1968: 455 ff.) and (1971a: 91 ff.).
150 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

name only a few. This terminological profusion is due, not only to the conceptual discord
prevailing in educational science, but also to a similar lack of unity in historiography12.
In order to promote mutual understanding, we must choose a designation that is as
unambiguous as possible. Such a designation should make clear that we are not referring
to the history of education as a past action, but rather to the scientific investigation and
description of past educational actions. The ambiguous expression "pedagogics" should
also be avoided, because it refers only to statement systems or theories on education,
whereas in the discipline meant here we are concerned with the history of all education-
related phenomona. We are at this point dealing with historical educational research
carried out by educational historians. My suggestion is therefore to name the statement
systems containing the results of this research "historiography ofeducation". By emphasizing
the act of writing (Greek: historiographia; historia = history, graphia = writing), this
designation is best suited to remind us that the results of historical research should not
simply be viewed as the reflection or depiction of actual past happenings, but as a
hypothetical construct created by historians13.
Of course the subject matter of the historiography of education does not consist
solely of past educational actions; it also encompasses all other aspects of past educational
situations or fields, as well as their relationships to the greater socio-cultural systems of
their time. Educational actions presuppose theoretical reflection on educands, their
special situations, aims, means and effects; and educators orient themselves by means of
theoretical plans, models or instructions for acting based on educational theories.
Therefore these theoretical elements also form an essential part of the subject matter of
historical research on education. Past educational theories, past educational literature or
past pedagogics are thus also included in the subject matter of the historiography of
education. One could emphasize this still more by using the term "historiography of
education and pedagogics"14. However, since a simple explanation can make clear that past
thoughts, statements or statement systems on education (traditionally called the "history of
pedagogical ideas") also belong to this area of study, it seems to me that the abbreviated
designation "historiography of education" is justifiable.

11 LUNDGREEN (1977).
12 Cf. FABER (1974: 23 ff.); REDINGER (1974).
13 Cf. MARROU (1973: 63 ff.); GOLDSTEIN (1976: 57 ff.).
14 This would disarm NICOLIN's (1970: 514) objection that the term "historiography of education" merely
comprehends "the history of real educational occurrences".
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 151

DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE TASKS OF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

Whether one views "educational science" (or "scientific pedagogics") as a purely

empirical science or as a "normative science"15 will affect one's opinions of the tasks or
purpose of the historiography of education.
Proponents of an empirical science of education hold that historical research in their
field has the same purpose as in the other social and cultural sciences: "The historical
subdisciplines associated with each field of cultural science have the task ... of placing all
of historical reality at the disposal of each specialized field and, in doing so, of giving each
one possession of its subject matter in the full extent of its factual reality"16. "The analysis
of the entirety of historical materia!"l? is considered indispensable for educational science,
because the latter must support its theories with as broad an empirical base as possible.
The "broadening of our empirical base"18 through knowledge of past educational events is
the aim of historical research on education. This research should increase our knowledge
of the great variety of educational phenomena. It should facilitate a comparison of courses
of events and situations, thereby throwing light on the significance of specific factors under
different conditions.
The basis of this approach is to be found in the epistemological conviction that "the
more conscious of history our theories of the social world become and the more
theoretical our history becomes, the better for both,,19. It is essential that in its
historiographical subdiscipline as well, the empirical science of education be confined to
establishing, interpreting and explaining facts. According to this empirical-analytic view,
the historiography of education should not be limited by previously existing ideological,
moral or political norms. Nor should it be made to serve the practical aim of supporting or
justifying norms recognized by partisan contemporary groups.
By contrast, the supporters of nonnative pedagogics are convinced that historical
research in education should pursue practical ends. Naturally, the empirical-analytical
approach also considers it useful to apply the results of historical research on education in
practical contexts; however, many supporters of normative pedagogics want more: they

15 Cf. for example SPRANGER (1920: 17): "The task of scientific pedagogics lies in ... interpreting an
already-given cultural reality, systematizing it conceptually and shaping it through value standards and
norms". "Science has the right to set norms and establish values:' (my italics). LANGEVELD (1962: 161):
"Pedagogics is a normative science because it rests on the decisive choice between that which we consider
good, proper and helpful for children (or for people) and that which we consider wrong, dubious, harmful
and bad". A similar view is contained in BOLLNOW (1964: 223 and 227).
16 MEISTER (1950: 515); see also (1958a: 16).
17 DOLCH (1961a: 6).
18 SCHINDLER (1976: 439).
19 ACHAM (1974: 16) adapted from CARR (1986: 60 f.). Cf. also MILLS (1959: 143 ff.); BOSL (1%5);
EISERMANN (1967: 625 ff.); SCHULZE (1974: 178 ff.).
152 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

feel that by interpreting past psychic objectivations20, norms could be obtained and
justified for educational actions and present-day educational policy decisions. At the very
least, pedagogical historiography in this normative sense should be primarily concerned
with supporting the norms valid for the ideological group to which the theoretician belongs
or for which he has conceived his normative pedagogical system.
Different problems arise in this case, depending on whether we deal with technical
norms (rules and regulations) related simply to means, or with moral, world-view and
religious norms related primarily to ends. It is quite possible to obtain technological
statements on education by reconstructing past educational phenomena and their effects,
or simply by borrowing statements from older educational theories. Whether such
instructions prove reliable under current conditions will be determined when we try to act
in accordance with their prescriptions. Technical rules for education - as we have already
seen21 - are simply technological statements which have been changed into a prescriptive
form and which are based on nomological hypotheses about if-then relationships. Within
the historiography of education it is possible to make technical educational norms
formulated in the past available for use in contemporary educational situations, but
knowledge of such norms should not be confused with theoretically-founded knowledge of
their usefulness. One can, of course, believe that they were formulated and held to in their
time because they had proved themselves, but in terms of epistemology the technological
statements upon which they are based are nothing more than unproven hypotheses - at
least until they have been more precisely defined and confirmed or disproved using
experimental or causal-comparative methods.
In regard to educational technology we can thus only obtain a collection of
hypotheses from history that might be true, false or untestable (because they are too
vaguely defined). At any rate, educational history is not "the grand teacher for life as for
science"22, as one of the first educational historians imagined when he wrote that "we must
first examine what has happened up to now ... before we can know how to educate our
children well", and that in educational theory "one need only point out what already exists
in history"23.
Far greater problems arise if the historiography of education is expected not only to
provide knowledge of technical norms for education, but also to make a contribution to
obtaining, validating, strengthening and supporting (or in regard to an opponent
debunking or refuting) ideological and/or moral norms.

20 Cf. p. 51 above.
21 Cf. p. 146 ff. above.
22 SCHWARZ (1829: 3).
23 SCHWARZ (1829: XIII). Cf. HERBART's critical review from 1832 (1919, Vol. 3: 457 ff.).
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 153

Since approximately 1880, attempts have been made in German-speaking countries

to justify these normative tasks in epistemological terms by characterizing pedagogics as a
science that is "simultaneously of an historical and philosophical nature"24. This is often
expressed through references to a "historico-systematic" discipline25 • Taken alone, the
designations "historical" and "systematic" could in fact be understood in purely empirical
terms and would then correspond to the empirico-analytic approach on which this book is
based. As I have emphasized, the subject matter of empirical educational science should
be studied using both an historical and a nomological approach (Le. a theoretical or
"systematic" method designed to discover law-like regularities) . Actually, however,
traditional pedagogics normally uses the word "systematic" in a "philosophical" sense26,
whereby "philosophy" means philosophy as world view, normative ethics, or practical
theory on how to lead a good life 27 • Similarly, the word "historical" as used by WILHELM
FLITNER and other pedagogical authors is not used in the sense of "historiographical",
but rather in that of "hermeneutic", in the sense of a normative hermeneutics28 • It thus has
a normative intent that has nothing to do with the tasks and methods of historiography in
the sense of an empirical science 29 •
It is typical for this approach that FLITNER, a leading proponent of "historical-
systematic pedagogics", places heavy emphasis on the "historical character of pedagogics",
but at the same time also segregates it from "actual historiography"3O. FLITNER assigns
pedagogics to the so-called "pragmatic, hermeneutic and norm-interpreting sciences". As
opposed to the natural sciences, these disciplines cannot be content to simply establish
"what is", nor can they simply understand ''what has been testified to and asserted" as do
historico-philological disciplines. "Instead, while determining facts, they must at the same
time formulate what should be done and accomplished, and while understanding they must
at the same time critically refler;;t on norms for the future"31.
Already in his post-critical period, WILLMANN ascribed to pedagogics in its
capacity as a "historico-philosophical" discipline the task of "describing, not merely that

24 WILLMANN (1957: 43); in (1917: 855 f.) he classifies pedagogics as one of the "ethical-historical sciences".
25 Cf. NICOLIN (1966: 312 ff.); GROOTIIOFF (1964a: 120); FROESE (1967: 170).
26 Cf. W. FLITNER (1958: 30). Cf. also DERBOlAV (1966: 126): "What makes pedagogics an autonomous
science is its systematic and thus philosophical thought structure" (my italics). Similar (1971: 7).
27 In addition to W. FLITNER (1958) cf. also NOHL (1949: 120).
28 Hermeneutics (from the Greek "hermeneutike techne") is the art of interpreting texts; in its original sense,
"hermeneutical" meant "relating to the interpretation of texts". Cf. DILTIIEY 1900, as well as BETTI's
basic work (1967). For an explanation of the difference between historical and normative hermeneutics, as
well as a historiographical critique of the latter see FABER (1974: 109 ff.).
29 For an analysis of the affinity between the epistemological ideal of the humanities, in which the
hermeneutical method is used, and that of analytic philosophy, cf. RADNITZKY (1968, Vol. 1: 31).
30 W. FLITNER (1958: 30).
31 W. FLITNER (1964: 45) (my italics).
154 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

which is, but also what ought to be, not only facts, but also that which is right'132. "Here the
quest for truth and the search for what is right coincide". From the historical research of
"the given", thought WILLMANN, norms can "arise" for the way things ought to be in
education. Pedagogical research - so he claimed - "simultaneously discerns the ought
within the is and the ideal within the given". Thus, it is "in no way a leap, in no way a
change of approach when historical reflection extends to the ethical and practical"33.
In 1888, DILTHEY, who was probably inspired by WILLMANN, emphasized that
pedagogics ought to "guide our living"34. We "not only want to know how things were", but,
"based on the knowledge of that which is, attain the rules for that which should be"35. The
supporters of this normative pedagogics, which has its roots in DILTHEY's thought and
was initially called ''geisteswissenschaftliche Piidagogik" and later "hermeneutical
pedagogics"36, have up until today held fast to an epistemological program which seeks to
establish norms by interpreting past events. According to FLIlNER, the so-called
"hermeneutic" procedure is not "describing and verifying, but understanding and ...
interpreting,m. BOLLNOW describes this method, which seemingly allows us to combine
the "understanding of reality and the setting of norms", in the following programmatical
formulation: "In the same way that hermeneutics (in the literal sense of the word) is the
methodically developed interpretation of texts in a language, so does pedagogics view the
structure of educational reality as a 'text' which, to be understood, must be properly
interpreted"38. "Just as the philologist ... goes about interpreting the text before him ... ,
so does pedagogics... interpret pregiven educational reality. From this analysis of

32 WILLMANN (1957: 44).

33 WILLMANN (1957: 46) (my italics).
34 DILTHEY (1888: 24).
35 DILTHEY (1888: 16).
36 Cf. BOLLNOW (1971: 693).
37 W. FLITNER (1958: 25). The opposition of "interpretation" and "verification" only makes sense when one
thinks one can dispense with verifying the results of his interpretation. This is, however, precisely what is
not done in the philological disciplines in which the hermeneutical method was developed. Significantly,
what is called the "hermeneutical procedure" in hermeneutical pedagogics is not associated with philology,
but with the "hermeneutic philosophy" of HEIDEGGER and GADAMER, which must be considered a
part of metaphysics: d. BOLLNOW (1971: 693). This "hermeneutics of a new type", which claims to
interpret our "existence" (Dasein), deals with beliefs and not with scientific knowledge. For a critique of this
d. FUNKE (1966: 72 ff.). Cf. also BETTI (1%7: 64 ff.) on the fundamental difference between "trne
interpretation", the results of which can be tested as to their accuracy and "speculative interpretation, i.e.
finding meaning on the basis of a previously held world view". For a description of the "dangerous
conceptual confusion" resulting from the "sensational catchword" "hermeneutics of existence" and for a
critique of HElDEGGER and BOLLNOW d. ibid. p. 68.
38 BOLLNOW (1951: 930). For a critique of interpretations of the world as a "text" d. KEMPSKI (1964a);
ALBERT (1%9: 131 ff.).
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 155

reality ... the innate or immanent laws must be developed which allow us to judge and
valuate this reality and to develop aims"39.
Since the advocates of hermeneutical pedagogics are concerned more than anything
else with the interpretation, valuation and setting of norms, they pay little attention either
to the limits of empirical educational science or to the difference between the nomological
and historical approaches. According to FUrnER, hermeneutical pedagogics travels
"along a path in which the separation" of the historical and systematic problem approaches
has "not yet taken place"4O. He sees hermeneutical pedagogics' "foremost task" in arriving
at an "agreement on the content and meaning of education"4\ in other words its task is to
"set norms" in the sense of "interpreting human determination"42 and bringing about a
"consensus on the meaning of life"43. In doing so, "the observation of the factual as such" is
of little use44, and thus pedagogics is a "science which has settled in the intermediate area
between experience and specu1ation"45.
The educational phenomena most relevant to normative tasks are religious and
world-view convictions, moral norms, customs, life styles and the educational teachings
arising from them. Their prime concern is with the "structural analysis" of intellectual
history in the sense of a valuating interpretation of traditional beliefs. The purpose is to
obtain, justify or support norms for use in interpreting the world and conducting one's
life 46 • According to the hermeneutical approach, historiography of education has the
primary task of creating a consensus on certain past norms. Based on the example of
important personalities who believed in them and on texts selected on the basis of
preliminary normative decisions, hermeneutical theorists aim to promote the retention of
these norms in the present, to awaken interest in or to revive them47.
The subordination of educational historiographical research on education to
normative ends can be found, not only in "conservative" forms of practical pedagogics
concerned with the preservation of tradition, but also in "progressive" and "revolutionary"
forms inimical to prevailing tradition. Every group engaged in contemporary ideological

39 BOLLNOW (1964: 228 f.) (my italics). What is called a "law" in this case is obviously different from the
concept of law in the empirical sciences, since one cannot acquire nomological knowledge based on a mere
"interpretation ... of reality" nor does nomological knowledge "allow" us to valuate and set goals; for the
laller nomological knowledge is in fact not even necessary. Thus in this case the word "laws" can only refer
to what are usually referred to as norms.
40 W. FLITNER (1958: 30). In agreement with him on this point is also BOLLNOW (1971: 697).
41 W. FLITNER (1958: 23 f.).
42 W. FLITNER (1958: 14).
43 W. FLITNER (1958: 33).
44 W. FLITNER (1958: 24).
45 W. FLITNER (1958: 31).
46 Cf. W. FLITNER (1957: 133) and (1954: 48).
47 Cf. the examples for this given by TENORTH (1976).
156 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

struggles and seeking to promote its own world view tries to put history to its own use. This
leads to one-sided presentations of events, texts and ideas interpreted as a confirmation of
a group's teachings.
Thus for example, in the framework of Marxist-Leninist pedagogics, historiography of
education has the task of contributing to "the development of the socialist consciousness of
teachers"48. Historians of education are called upon to direct their work "towards shaping
both present and future". They are obligated "not only to interpret the developmental
tendencies and lines of the future, but also ... to assist in their formation"49. Teachers are
to "apply the progressive experiences of the past to the problems which are to be solved in
the development of a unified socialist system of education"50.
The West European neo-Marxists, too, emphasize "the political and practical
relationship of historical research to the present" and the "future-oriented form and
function of historiography". According to HERRMANN, "the meaning of historical
research ... is to find current constraints, possibilities and alternatives regarding a yet to
be shaped future"51. One thing he considers possible and includes among the "new goals" or
"tasks" of the historiography of education is to "determine ... the specific contribution of
education to the genesis of ... our future and above all to interpret this with a practical
intent"52. The word "interpret" is a reminder that the epistemological foundation of this
political and practical program is the hermeneutical philosophy also appealed to by the
supporters of traditional "hermeneutical pedagogics". To be sure, neo-Marxist educational
historians call their field "educational science", but leave little doubt that they mean a
"normative" or ''practicar' science: it is a "science of praxis for a praxis which is to be
improved"53.
Neo-Marxists designate their "guiding interest in furthering knowledge" to be the
"reduction of social injustice and discrimination, this being the actual condition for
facilitating emancipation and maturity"54. Accordingly, the historiography of education is
endowed with a double task: first, "directing people's consciousness towards enlightenment
and emancipation" and secondly, "instructing and criticizing political practice as a process of
social change toward reducing excessive authority and alienation"55. It is thus assumed that

48 H. KONIG (1968: 153).

49 H. KONIG (1968: 148 f.).
50 H. KONIG (1968: 151).
51 U. HERRMANN (1975: 278).
52 U. HERRMANN (1974: 285).
53 U. HERRMANN (1975: 277). Cf. also U. HERRMANN (1971: 232): "Insofar as, in the light of 'the aims of
mankind', pedagogics affIrms that its task is the realization of humanity, it perceives itself as a discipline of
practical philosophy".
54 U. HERRMANN (1974: 285). For a critique of "activist", "interest-oriented" or "committed" historiography
d. FABER (1974: 193 ff.); MARROU (1973: 251 ff.).
55 U. HERRMANN (1974: 274).
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 157

the Marxist historian already knows "man's determination" and is capable of "the
reconstruction of the historical subject in regard to its future"56.
Neo-Marxist historiography of education starts from "the current educational
situation't57, which is critically evaluated according to certain ideals of the future and
certain normative concepts of the "determination of man". Since real people and their
institutions fall far short of these utopian ideals and since this is the result of past events or
"history", the neo-Marxists pose "the task of first becoming free from history"58. They wish
to "critically reappraise the past". "According to ADORNO, the past can only be regarded
as critically reappraised after 'the causes of the past have been eliminated'''59.
This is the origin of the neo-Marxists' thoroughly unhistorical interest in the future,
as well as the activist zeal with which they seek to ignore both the difference between
theory and practice and that between scientific and political action. Their goal is nothing
less than "a revision of past historical processes in the course of planning and realizing the
future ... with the aid of education"6O. More precisely, this means planning not only the
political system of a future society, but also the social character of its members. By
implementing these plans through educational means, neo-Marxists wish to prevent past
and present events they consider bad from being repeated in the future.
To help implement this program, the neo-Marxists assign the historiography of
education a "completely new task": historical research should not describe corroboratively
the characteristic features of past and present, but should instead "question the normative
character of pregiven structures ... and bring to consciousness innovations as alternative
solutions, i.e. as real possibilities which are in some way already present in history". The
"urgent point of reference" of research and teaching is "the struggle between progressive
and retarding moments in current and topical educational situations"61. Research on
educational history is"expected to "have a committed interest in the critical advancement
of innovations in school systems"62. It should serve "with a concrete political and
pedagogical intent to improve the younger generation's world"63.
All the manifestations of normative pedagogics discussed here view not only
"history", but also the historiography of education as a "field of decision"64. In accordance

56 U. HERRt-tANN (1974: 285).

57 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 208).
58 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 208).
59 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 205) (the statement quoted from ADORNO (1966: 146), reads in its entirety: 'The
past could only be critically reappraised after the causes of the past have been eliminated").
60 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 206).
61 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 205).
62 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 213).
63 U. HERRMANN (1974: 285).
64 HILLEBRECHT (1972: 200).
158 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

with their common epistemological foundation, it is to be expected that their statements

are partisan. In the words of FLITNER, "scientific pedagogics" is also concerned with
"casting light on existence and man's determination, which can only be understood from
the position of metaphysical philosophy, beliefs or both"65. According to BOLLNOW,
there is "no understanding in which I do not at the same time valuate, and that means in
the absolute sense, by taking a position in favor of one thing and against another,,66.
"Hermeneutical knowledge can never be separated from existential decision"67.
Such claims doubtlessly apply to confessions of faith in ideological doctrines of "the
destiny of man" or in the "unexploited possibilities of human existence"68, but they should
not be confused with empirical knowledge and its validation, which takes place
independently of valuation and decision-making. A historiography of education having the
task of implementing epoch-specific ideological norms or executing political decisions is in
any event not the historical subdiscipline of empirical educational science. "The person ...
wishing to use history to spotlight his own theory is anything else but an historian"69.
In order to critique proposals for a normative historiography of education, we must
first examine the epistemology of historiography itself.

THE EPISTEMOWGY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

In regard to its subject area, the historiography of education is a subdiscipline of

empirical educational science. However, in its epistemological foundations and its
research techniques, it is bound to the rules established for historical research 70.
The historical disciplines too belong to the empirical sciences. Their basis is made up
of statements on phenomena accessible to experience. "The fact that the phenomena
belong to the past does not alter the situation"71. For this reason all historical disciplines
are subject to the general methodological rules valid for all empirical sciences72. Thus it is
a mistake to expect that the historiography of education could both retain its scientific
character and at the same time through the interpretation of past phenomena provide us
with norms for present or future educational actions and politics. The historian

65 W. FLITNER (1954a: 117).

66 BOLLNOW (1959: 105). For a critique of the so-called method of "sympathetic understanding"
(Verstehen), see STEGMULLER (1969: 360 ff.).
67 BOLLNOW (1949: 82).
68 U. HERRMANN (1975: 273).
69 HERBART (1919, Vol. 3: 463).
70 Cf. SCHINDLER (1976: 435 f.).
71 BOCHENSKl (1965: 119 ff.).
72 Cf. V. KRAFf (1965: 79 ff.) and (1973: 22 ff.); HEMPEL (1965) and (1972); STEGMULLER (1969: 335
ff.); FABER (1974); ACHAM (1974).
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 159

researching the world-view, moral or technical educational norms of the past "does not
decide 'what should be'; but rather interprets normative demands raised somewhere,
somehow and in some way"73.
The human-, social- or culture-historical disciplines differ in three respects from
those parts of the human-, social- or cultural sciences which are oriented toward
nomological or theoretical knowledge: first in their approach or aim of inquiry, secondly in
their particular methodological difficulties and thirdly in their individual research
techniques, which must be appropriate to their approach and to their methodological
problems.
The approach of the historical disciplines is usually characterized by the study of past
events74 : past phenomena, conditions, events, actions and achievements. Stated more
precisely, historical disciplines seek to employ causal-analytic methods in studying changes
in people, their works and living conditions at a certain location in the course of time. The
aim is not only to find out about past phenomena in themselves, but to learn about their
development, their course or the changes they underwent in the pases. This rules out the
simple treatment of individual facts and necessitates taking into account the complexity
and interrelationships of phenomena. In seeking to do more than simply reconstruct
unique situations and courses of events, the historian strives to formulate generalizations
about constancies, in the sense of typical manifestations of phenomena, as well as about
situational conditions, processes and patterns of action76 .
Methodological difficulties arise in historical research because its subject matter can
only be understood indirectly and incompletely. "What we casually call historical 'facts' are
only the traces and reflections of a reality that is never to return". The best we can do is to
"grasp segments or fragments of once-present reality,m. Thus in the first stage of research
the historian must obtain statements on facts by finding, critically reviewing and
interpreting sources before he can test their truth and explain the phenomena they
describe. It should be noted that "the facts themselves and the relationships the historian
has established between them ... [are] already the interpretation of results drawn from
past reality; the ordering of facts is not a simple reproduction of the course of history"78.
This is an important distinction with respect to the observational data or basis statements
obtained on current phenomena.

73 FUNKE (1966: 76).

74 FABER (1974: 63).
75 Cf. SCHULZE (1974: 187 ff.).
76 Cf. EISERMANN (1%7: 613 ff.); FABER (1974: 89 ff.).
77 MAIER (1966: 662).
78 MOMMSEN (1%1: 82); similar is CARR (1986: 5 ff.); basic works on the subject are: GOLDSTEIN
(1972) and (1976); MARROU (1973: 144 ff.).
160 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

The only unproblematical facts are the so-called "lower-level" (primary) facts such as
archaeological, chronological and statistical data, which are for the most part not open to
interpretation. On the other hand, where we deal with "processes having actual historical
relevance - for example with the behavior and decisions of individuals and groups - then
sources do not contain simple facts, but only reports ... of some past event or happening
that as such is no longer directly accessible"79. For that reason there is no "history" in the
strict sense of the word which would make up the subject matter of historiography. The
description of past events must be judged in a methodologically different fashion from the
description of events observable in the present. It is impossible to describe past events
exactly as they occurred80.
The research methods of the historical disciplines have been adjusted to the
methodological difficulties present in gaining access to their subject matter. Basically, the
main problem is that of tapping and interpreting sources81 . "Source material are all texts,
objects or facts from which we can obtain knowledge of the past"82. The techniques used in
researching source materials are also important for the empirical study of contempor~
social phenomena83, which can be understood as a kind of "social history of the present"84.
Conversely, when studying past events with a nomological intent, historians also use
procedures developed in the social sciences for testing hypotheses, as for example the
causal-comparative methods of "ex-post-facto" studies.
Apart from the three above-mentioned viewpoints (which can be traced back to the
central problem of reconstructing past phenomena), there are no essential methodological
differences between the historical and the theoretical-systematic areas of the empirical
social sciences. Nor is "sympathetic understanding" (Verstehen) the specific method of
historiography, as the supporters of hermeneutical pedagogics have c1aimed85 •
"Sympathetic understanding", as a psychic process through which we seek to comprehend
the meaning or significance of human actions and works86, is not limited to historical
studies of past personalities, actions and works, but is - as mentioned earlier87 - necessary
for all branches of the social and cultural sciences. The meaning obtained through the act
of understanding is a prerequisite for our attempts to explain actions on the basis of the

79 MAJER (1966: 662); cf. also CARR (1986: 114 f.).

80 Cf. GOLDSTEIN (1976: 60 ff.).
81 Cf. MARROU (1973: 83 ff.); BRANDT (1976: 48 ff.).
82 KIRN (1972: 29).
83 Cf. ALBRECHT (1972), which contains an extensive bibliography.
84 a. SCHELSKY (1967: 74).
85 a. W. FLITNER (1958: 17), where the author speaks of "understanding" which the historian "applies in a
general way". "The historical science of education ... is purely a discipline based on understanding".
86 For an analysis of the semantic content of the word "meaning" (German: Sinn) cf. H. GOMPERZ (1929).
87 Cf. p. 115 above.
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 161

motives, intentions or ends of the person actingSS. Sympathetic understanding does not
result in certain knowledge, only in hypotheses for interpreting the actions in question.
These hypotheses may seem subjectively plausible to the person attempting to understand,
but still must be empirically tested89• A "method of sympathetic understanding" thus does
not exist insofar as this refers to a method of testing hypotheses, but it does have a place in
the context of discovery or genesis of a science.
In no case does the act of understanding include either a value judgement on the
thing one is seeking to understand, or a decision for or against it9O • Thus norms cannot be
obtained solely through the process of understanding. A value judgement can only be
reached through an additional psychic act based on value principles which have already
been established outside of historiography. "Historiography refrains from valuating the
'units of meaning' found in history by investigative understanding, be it in the form of
submission to this meaning or of emancipation from tradition"91.
To avoid misunderstanding it should once more be emphasized that in practical
pedagogics, which is conceived as instructions for educational actions, value judgements
and norms are justified and necessary. In historiography of education, however, two things
are unacceptable: first, claims that value judgements and norms can be obtained from
research on past events, and secondly, attempts to use the camouflage term "research on
educational history" to exploit historical events for the one-sided propagation of
convictions and norms belonging to present-day ideological or political groups. Even
authors viewing pedagogics as a "practical science" have distinguished between the
"informative and imperative functions of practical science" and have assigned to "historical
pedagogics" only the "informative" function92. Historical pedagogics itself "should thus not
make value judgements but rather ... supplies us with facts". It should "not become
research to a certain end", but should instead "retain the form of basic research and ...
with a sure eye for detail and following no other guiding light than that of truth, determine
what happened in the past"93.

88 Cf. WRIGHT (1971: 132 ff.). The distinction between understanding a meaning (Sinn) and explaining on
the basis of motives is often not made; even the latter is also often called "understanding" (Verstehen). Cf.
FABER (1974: 129). The first type of "understanding" (interpretation) is really description; by contrast, the
second type is an attempt at explanation.
89 Cf. ABEL (1964); V. KRAFT (1%5: 75 ff.) and (1973: 22 ff.); HEMPEL (1%5: 239 f.); NAGEL (1961: 480
ff.); STEGMiiLLER (1%9: 363 ff.); FABER (1974: 132 ff.).
90 As BOLLNOW emphasized (d. 158 above).
91 FABER (1974: 128).
92 Cf. STOY (1861: 20 and 17). Even WILLMANN, who emphasized the "normative character" of pedagogics
in regard to its practical application, limited the task of "historical pedagogics" to supplying "empirical
historical material" on the "diversity of given reality". Cf. (1957: 44 f., 39 f. and 64).
93 DOLCH (1950: 223) (in the reprint p. 64).
162 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

SUBJECT MATTER OF AN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

The distinction between the history of education and the history of educational
teachings and theory was made quite early94. The "history of pedagogical praxis" was
contrasted with the history of "pedagogical opinions" and "pedagogical teachings"95, the
"history of educational systems" with the "history of educational teachings"96, the "history of
educational conditions" or "educational history" with the "history of pedagogical
literature,,97. The first-mentioned topics belong to cultural and social history, the others, in
part to intellectual history, and in part to the history of science.
STOY compared the relationships between these two areas with those between
church history and the history of dogma9B. This comparison, however, should remind us not
only of the difference between norms and the way people comply with them, but also of
the close connections existing between these two branches of educational history. In the
same sense that the church cannot exist without dogmas, educational systems cannot exist
without opinions, principles or practical theories of education. Conversely, the
"pedagogical thought systems of different epochs" always employ certain educational
practices as their "presupposition and point of reference"99. The content of an epoch's
educational theories and practices can of course be differentiated in terms of the contrast
between ideal and real, but they still belong together in the historical description of an
epoch's pedagogics. Of course, they can also be studied separately using more specialized
approaches, but this can still occur within the same historical subdiscipline of educational
science.
It must be emphasized, however, that we are dealing here with normative or practical
theories, theories of the art of teaching, or practical pedagogics, none of which should be
confused with educational science in the strict sense of the word. The history of educational
science, even though it is a historical discipline, is not the same as historiography of
education; rather, it has the same relationship to educational science as does epistemology
of educational science.
In general terms, the subject matter of historiography of education is the same as
that of educational sqence, insofar as it includes past phenomena and their development
in the course of time 1OO• This subject matter ranges from complex phenomena like
educational situations (or fields) with their relationships to the larger socia-cultural

94 SCHWARZ (1829: 5).

95 STOY (1861: 120 ff.).
96 WILLMANN (1957: 40 f.).
97 DOLCH (1950: 217).
9B STOY (1861: 121); likewise WILLMANN (1957: 41).
99 BRUNNENGRA.BER (1934: 9).
100 Cf. p. 48 ff. above.
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 163

systems in which they are integrated and by which they are conditioned to the relatively
simple elements of educational situations such as school laws, curricula, classrooms or
textbooks.
Since pedagogics originated in theories of the art of education which were mainly
intended for teachers and were long used chiefly in institutions for teacher training,
historical studies in pedagogics tended to emphasize the history of educational ideas and
that of school systems. However, the first theoreticians of historiography of education
already recommended that "educational situations" be viewed as a "function of variables
centered in the political and social life of different peoples" and that "general social needs
and circumstances" be viewed as a "key to the forms in which the education of a certain
epoch expresses itself'lOl. Historiography of education is expected to broaden our horizons
by seeking "education in the whole of cultural life and in the social units of a people and a
time"102.
Viewed in this fashion, schools appear as just one educational complex of ends and
means among others. Other subject areas of the historiography of education are education
in the family, the tribe, neighborhood or community, in the religious congregation, in peer
groups, in professional associations and factories, in military units, in clubs, homes, etc.
From prehistoric China to the present, from primitive peoples to modem industrial
society, there have been countless ways of influencing people to approximate certain
ideals.
As soon as we begin studying these manifestations of education, their accompanying
conditions and effects more closely, we are quickly led far beyond their original
boundaries. Thus the study of educational aims unavoidably leads us to the world views,
norm systems, customs and self-images of societies. The study of educators and educands
leads to inquiries about their psychic state, their attitudes toward one another,
intergenerational relationships, the self-image of age groups, etc l03. The study of
educational actions and institutions as means to some end leads us to examine their
success, undesired effects, importance in the educand's subjective world, relationships to
the other contributing conditions in personality development, etc. The study of the
contents of teaching leads to questions of cultural goods, to criteria for the selection of
teaching material contents, and to the political powers determining this selectionlO4. An

101 STOY (1861: 115 f. and 125; similarly 172).

102 WILLMANN (1906: 401). WILLMANN carried out this program in exemplary fashion in his D1daktik als
Bildungslehre [Didactics as Educational Theory] (1882-88), whose first part also treats the "historical types
of educational systems".
103 Cf. BERG (1960: 21-118); MUHLMANN (1975); RASSEM (1975); HORNSTEIN (1965 and 1966);
ARIES (1976).
104 Cf. DOLCH (1965a). On the canonical problem of c1assicallanguage school texts d. MEISTER (1931: 54
ff.). On power struggles over curricula cf. WENIGER (1960: 22 ff.).
164 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

astonishing number of factors influence educators, educational motives 105, educational

plans, educational actions and educational institutions on the one hand and educands and
their reactions to education on the other 106.
In view of the complexity of its subject matter and relationships to countless other
mental and socio-cultural phenomena, the historiography of education shares one of the
vulnerabilities of educational science as a whole: namely it is prone to expand into an
encyclopedic hyper-science of personality development under the influence of society and
culture, thus completely obscuring the central question of the relationship between ends
and means 107. In recent years the historiography of education has been reinterpreted for
the present purely programmatically as "historical socialization research", whose purpose is
to study the "conditions for the genesis of personality in the framework of time"108.
Confronted with this program it is appropriate to ask where, in the network of conditions
and relationships between individuals, society and culture, do educationally relevant
phenomena begin and end? If everything affects education, what, then, is the special subject
matter of the historiography of education?109 How does it differ from a universal psycho-
history110?
The subject matter of educational science is not the emergence of personality, but
the actions through which people attempt to as lastingly as possible influence the
personalities of others. Educational science does not study socialization processes (i.e.
learning processes in educands) but rather the relationships between a certain class of
ends (educational aims) and the means used to bring about these ends (education), in
regard to success, failure or undesirable side effects. Of course the personalities of
educators, their aims, educational actions and effects depend on countless conditions;
certainly neither desired nor undesired effects arise in educands without learning
processes and their conditioning factors. It is necessary to take some of these conditions
into account insofar as they are necessary for the scientific study of education, but when
they replace education as the focus of attention, then something other than educational
science is being pursued.
If we do not wish to lose the subject matter of education in the vast flood of events
affecting people, it is imperative that the historiography of education adhere to the
concept of education as action lll . This basic concept of educational science encompasses

105 Cf. DOLCH (l%lb) on this concept.

106 Cf. HENRY's (1971) list based on material from cultural anthropology.
107 Cf. p. 64 above.
108 U. HERRMANN (1974: 285 ft).
109 Cf. SLOAN (1973: 259).
110 Cf. NIPPERDEY (1976) for a study of this research area.
III Cf. p. 40 ff. above; BREZINKA (1990: 64 ff.) provides more detailed information.
 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION 165

more than enough research material, especially when one takes into account the enormous
problem area of indirect educaJion, with a multitude of relevant actions which aid in
building up and protecting certain cultural patterns 112• These patterns are presumably the
most important external conditions for educands in learning to comply with the norms of
their particular groups113. Some examples of this would be the importance of cult, liturgies,
religious festivals and celebrations in acquiring and retaining the psychic dispositions
which make possible religious belief, certainty about the meaning of life and the
acceptance of moral norms. A historiography of indirect education in both religious114 and
secular life 115 is urgently needed. It is a matter of the actions and works which SCHILLER
meant in his call to surround people "with noble, with grand and with ingenious forms,
enclose them in symbols of excellence, until a vision of the ideal prevails over reality and
art over nature"116.
If the historiography of education holds fast to the guiding principle of studying the
relationships between ends, means and results, then even the history of schools still affords
an inexhaustible area for research. The turning away from simple historical descriptions of
legal norms, organizational forms, attendance figures and idealized curricular programs
has just begun. The "demythification of school history"117 results when we start to question
the political interests of school policy-makers, the social interests of teachers, the capacity
to realize proclaimed ideals in instructional practice, the self-perpetuating character of
school bureaucracies (above and beyond their designated official functions), the
compatibility of simultaneously pursued educational aims, differences between the self-
images of teachers and the images students have of them and conversely the differences
between the self-images of students and the images teachers have of their students, the
reasons for instructional success and the causes of failure, undesirable side effects, as for
example school-related psychic disorders affecting pupils and teachers, disaffection with
schools on the part of students and parents, unexpected attitude changes in large bodies of
graduating students, unemployment caused by a surplus of graduates in certain areas, etc.
In the case of modern society, which is often termed a "society of and for
education"118, which believes in the power of education and in which exploiters of

112 Cf. STOY (1861: 173).

113 Cf. KRIECK (1944); W. FLITNER (1961a).
114 For material on the Catholic Church ct. BOPP (1928); for an intellectual history of indirect education by
religious organizations ct. JAEGER (1947: 332 ff.).
115 For material on education in totalitarian Communist states ct. MONNEROT (1952), lANGE (1954),
MOBUS (1965); for material on the National Socialist schools cf. GAMM 1962.
116 SCHILLER (1795: 187).
117 Cf. SLOAN (1973: 245 ff.).
118 Cf. LENGRAND (1979). For a critique of such educational visions cf. BREZINKA (1981: 182 ff.).
166 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION

education call for "permanent education", perhaps the greatest service which historians of
education could perform would be to write "a history of pedagogical superstition"ll9.

119 A proposal made by STaY (1861: 139). For programmatical beginnings d. BERNFELD (1928); for a
history of the belief in education as a panacea in the United States since 1865 cf. PERKINSON (1977).
II. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
(German: Philosophie der Erziehung; French: philosophie de l'education; Italian:
ftlosofta dell' educazione; Spanish: ftlosofta de la educaci6n; Russian: ftlosoftja vospitanija)

On one hand, the aims of education are essential for deciding

each individual pedagogical question, whereas on the other,
they depend on a complete world view, i.e. on the totality of
views on the value and meaning of human life. This, however,
has since time immemorial been considered the ultimate
question of philosophy. Thus, pedagogics is essentially
dependent on philosophy.
JONAS COHN (1919)1

Since the word "philosophy" has many meanings, many different things can be meant
by the expression "philosophy of education". As a first step, we must differentiate between
philosophy as an activityZ or thought process and philosophy as a system of statements3 • In
this book the word "philosophy" is always used to denote statement systems, results of
philosophical thought or the products of philosophical activity. What are the
characteristics of philosophical statement systems? Which traits differentiate philosophy
from statement systems not belonging to philosophy? What is the field of study or the
problem area of philosophy? Before we can attain insight into what is meant by philosophy
of education, it is first necessary to delve into these questions.

VARIOUS CONCEPTS OF PHILOSOPHY

Ever since the word first appeared and continuing on until the present, the statement
systems designated "philosophy" have differed widely in their ends, content and methods of
validation.

1 COHN (1919: 11).

2 On the meaning of this word cf. WITIGENSTEIN (1981: 25, § 4.112): "Philosophy aims at the logical
clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists
essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the
clarification of propositions".
3 Cf. DIEMER (1962: 27 ff.). This distinction is also referred to as "philosophy as process" and "philosophy as
product". Cf. for example BRAUNER and BURNS (1965: 20 ff.).
168 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

In ancient Greece, "philosophy" was originally understood to be knowledge valued

for its own sake. Philosophy was originally a universal science4 • Its primary subject matter
included nature, man, morals, the state, the arts and the rules for correct thinking. In
addition to the purely theoretical problem area there also soon developed a practical
focus. Philosophy combined theories on the world and theories on living a good life, i.e.
natural and moral philosophy. After the death of ARISTOTLE this unity dissolved
because the growth of knowledge made it necessary to specialize. Individual sciences
developed and the name "philosophy" was from then on used primarily in the sense of "the
religion of the educated"5 or moral teachings on the proper conduct of life. Since then, the
word "philosophy" has had the additional secondary meanings of an "ersatz religion", a
"secular doctrine of salvation" and "wisdom teachings".
In Christian Europe the task of providing religious knowledge was left to theology.
The term "philosophy" was again used to mean all non-theological knowledge based on
reason (with the exception of jurisprudence and medicine). Since the seventeenth century,
however, the specialized sciences have definitively separated themselves from philosophY;.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the last of the disciplines earlier considered to
be parts of philosophy: logic, psychology, political science and pedagogy finally became
autonomous. Philosophy was mainly relegated to studying problems of acquiring
knowledge (epistemology). Epistemology, as well as the epistemological foundations of
both the individual sciences and non-scientific statement systems, have become the main
problem areas for which philosophy continues to be indisputably responsible. At the same
time, however, there has continued to be an interest in philosophy as a world view and as a
practical guide to living. Instead of declining, "philosophy" has become more relevant: the
retreat from religion, the secularization of beliefs, the loss of traditional patterns of living
and the insecurity caused by crises of meaning, scepticism and nihilism have led - as
happened in Late Antiquity - to a search for and provision of basic world-view and moral-
orientation teachings under the name of "philosophy".
It is in keeping with the variety and disunity of modern culture that today all the
concepts of philosophy that were espoused during different historical periods in the past
now appear concurrently7. Indeed, there is no generally accepted concept of philosophy. A
comparison of the concepts referred to under this designation will establish neither a
common subject matter nor a common method. According to the particular end being
pursued, there are at least five classes of statement systems which might be regarded as

4 Cf. WINDELBAND (1919: 12 ff.); T. GOMPERZ (1911, Vol. 1: 417); V. KRAFT (1%7: 5 ff.); J. RITTER
(1%9: 9 ff.).
5 T. GOMPERZ (1909, Vol. 3: 360).
6 Cf. V. KRAFT (1967: 30 ff.).
7 Cf. WOHLGENANNT (1977).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 169

"philosophy"8: 1. world-view or ideological philosophy or philosophy as an "ideological

substitute for religion"9; 2. philosophy as a "system of rules for mastering life" or as a guide
to living; 3. philosophy as a system of theoretical statements conceived independently of
the findings of both the individual sciences and world views; 4. philosophy as a unified
picture summarizing the results of the individual sciences; and 5. philosophy as the
investigation of fundamental principles, as a theory and critique of knowledge.
It seems a hopeless endeavor to search for common characteristics by which such
different statement systems could be delimited from non-philosophical ones. The various
kinds of philosophy have less in common with one another than some have with science
and others with religious teachings and poetry. For that reason it has often been suggested
that "scienticity" be used as a criterion and that "scientific philosophy'olO be differentiated
from "world-view philosophy", "speculative", "metaphysical", "dogmatic", or "irrationalistic"
philosophy11. "Scientific philosophy" (or "philosophy as science") would thus be subject to
the same general norms already established for science: its aim would be to gather
knowledge, and its procedures would correspond to the general rules of scientific
method 12, which calls for clear concepts, the intersubjective testability of claims and their
testing through the application of logic and comparison with empirical data. The "logic of
research"13 would thus be the same for "scientific philosophy" as for the individual sciences.
"Philosophy has no specific way of acquiring knowledge"14. According to its adherents,
"scientific philosophy" differs from "pretended philosophy"15 or "pseudo-philosophy"16 in its
use of scientific method.
This attempt to draw boundaries is problematical since, as is well known, there are
several different concepts of science. Some statement systems and methods regarded as
scientific by phenomenological, hermeneutical or dialectical philosophy would not be
considered so, if judged by the ideal of knowledge found in analytic philosophy. Thus for

8 According to STEGMULLER (1969a: XXXVIII ff.).

9 FUNKE (1969: 3 ff.).
10 Cf. REICHENBACH (1951); V. KRAFT (1967); FREY (1970: 94 ff.). For a critical view of this subject cr.
WINDELBAND (1919: 5 ff.) and SCHELER (1954a: 77): "'Scientific philosophy' is ... an absurdity, since
positive science has to set its assumptions by itself, draw all possible consequences by itself, and resolve its
contradictions by itself; when philosophy tries to put a word in, science quite correctly keeps it at arm's
length".
11 Cf. V. KRAFT (1967: 45); FREY (1970: 94 ff.)
12 Cf. above, p. 16 f. and 31 ff.
13 BRENTANO (1893: 79).
14 V. KRAFT (1967: 65). Cf. also POPPER (1977: 15): "Philosophers are as free as others to use any method
in searching for truth. There is no method peculiar to philosophy".
15 KANT (1796: 378).
16 BRENTANO (1876: 58). Cf. KASTIL (1951: 25 ff.) on BRENTANO's teachings of philosophy as science
and its surrogates.
170 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

example HUSSERL called his phenomenological philosophy a "strict science"l? and

considered intuition ("Wesensschau") an acceptable method, whereas from the point of
view of analytical philosophy it lacks the essential characteristic of science, namely the
intersubjective testability of statements produced by applying this method18. Basically the
same applies to hermeneutical philosophy and the "hermeneutical method"19 as well as to
dialectical philosophy and the "dialectical method,,20. Because different concepts of
"science" exist, the expression "scientific philosophy" remains ambiguous. Some
philosophers use it to refer to metaphysical statement systems, others understand it to
mean only critical epistemological thought processes and their results. Whether at least a
certain kind of world-view philosophy or dogmatic philosophy (e.g. Marxist philosophy) is
recognized as "scientific philosophy" depends on which particular concept of science is
adopted. For this reason more exact specification is needed if we wish to define a concept
of "philosophy" in unmistakable terms.
Since I proceed from the concept of science developed by analytic philosophy, it
follows that the designation "scientific philosophy" can only be applied to a philosophy in
accord with this concept. However, this does not mean that this designation is advisable or
that all statement systems to which it refers should automatically be classified as science.
The separation of analytic philosophy from "ideological", "speculative", "metaphysical",
"dogmatic", or "irrationalistic" philosophy by means of the attribute of scientific character
still does not explain how it differs from the individual sciences.
In answering this question, most adherents of analytic philosophy, critical or
transcendental philosophy (in KANT's sense) and phenomenological philosophy agree
that philosophy does not have a subject matter in the sense that individual sciences do, but
is rather a "basis science"Zl. The problem area of philosophy consists of the epistemological
foundations or assumptions of both the individual sciences and non-scientific assertions. "It
is the critic, controller and corrector for the life-world, faith-oriented and scientific self-
understanding and nothing more"zz.
Whereas both scientific and everyday statement systems always have certain aspects
of the world as their subject matter, analytic-epistemological statement systems are
concerned with the problems of validating, justifying, testing and criticizing the empirical
statements of the individual sciences, as well as those of non-scientific knowledge. In

I? HUSSERL (1%5). For a critique cf. SCHELER (1954a: 74 ff.).

18 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969a: 89).
19 cr. FREY (1970: 103 ff.).
20 Cf. POPPER (1949).
Zl Cf. STEGMULLER (1%9: XXIII); WINDELBAND (1919: 25 ff.); H. WAGNER (1967: 372 ff.); FREY
(1970: 23 ff. and 131 ff.); FUNKE (1966a: 9 ff.).
2Z FUNKE (1966a: 11).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 171

regard to both scientific and non-scientific theories, philosophy must therefore be viewed
as metatheory23,
Since philosophical studies of this type are carried out according to the general rules
of scientific method, many scholars have felt justified in designating this area of philosophy
"scientific philosophy", This term. however, does not adequately express the special
position of philosophy as metatheory (or also as a discipline characterized by reflection on
object language words and statements24) with regard to all other individual sciences. For
this reason, the type of philosophy referred to by this designation is also called "critical
philosophy"25, "analytic philosophy"26 or "methodological philosophy"27, Its field of study
includes the theory of cognition and epistemology28, the criticism of claims to knowledge.
According to KANT, philosophy is the "policeman in the realm of the sciences"29, Perhaps
it would be least confusing if it were to be named "analytic-epistemological philosophy" or
"epistemological philosophy".
We owe our growing insights into scientific method and its limitations to the different
branches of analytic-epistemological philosophy. However, this philosophy is neither the
only existing philosophy, nor is it the only acceptable one. Analytic-epistemological
philosophy enables us to separate scientific from non-scientific statement systems in a
relatively clear fashion, but it cannot provide one thing which is also sought after and
offered under the heading "philosophy" - namely world views (Weltanschauung) and moral
wisdom. World-view and moral statement systems do not belong to science as it is now
understood in the West, but there are types of philosophy which can be viewed as world
views, normative systems of ethics or as a combination of the two. Such systems deal with
theoretical and practical problems which the sciences themselves are not competent to
deal with.
Let us first take a look at the relevant theoretical questions. Referring to "science"
makes it easy to forget that there are a large number of individual sciences in which
limited subject matters are researched according to certain divisions of labor. However,
people seek to gain not only specialized knowledge, but also "unified and clearly
understandable knowledge of reality as a whole"30. Statement systems on "reality as a

23 Cf. FREY (1971: 19 ff.).

24 Cf. FREY (1971: 19); FUNKE (1956: 54 ff.); H. WAGNER (1967).
25 WINDELBAND (1919: 26); FUNKE (1966a: 11); "Critical" means here "epistemologically critical" and not
for example "critical of society ".
26 Cf. STEGMULLER (1969a: 429 ff.).
27 MITTELSTRASS (1974: 25).
28 From the Greek "episteme" = knowledge. The word is more common in English, Spanish, French and
Italian than in German.
29 KANT (1796: 394); similar is SCHELER (1954a: 73).
30 BECHER (1949: 9).
172 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

whole" were once called "metaphysics" and beginning with the nineteenth century, have
also been referred to as "world views" (Weltanschauung). Thus for example SCHELER
wrote that "philosophical metaphysics is a setting of world views"31 in which scientific
results do enter, but which as a whole transcend scientific knowledge, which is always
hypothetical and incomplete. Some authors understand metaphysics to be a "scientific
world view", but by assigning it the task of answering "questions as to the essence, origin,
aim and meaning of reality as a whole"32, they raise considerable doubts as to whether they
are employing the analytic concept of science used here.
Among these metaphysical philosophies there are great differences in the degree to
which they follow the rules of scientific method. One finds not merely conceptual fantasies,
"dream philosophy" ("Traumphilosophie") and "philosophical music"33 but also stringently
constructed metaphysical systems applying empirico-inductive methods34 which progress
with pointed, rational arguments - even as far as testing the hypothesis that God exists35 •
For this reason I consider it inappropriate to summarily designate all examples of this type
of philosophy "irrationalistie36 without taking into account the enormous differences in the
rationality of their foundations. More proper terms, it seems to me, would be "world-view
philosophy" (German: "weltanschauliche Philosophie") or "metaphysical philosophy". I
prefer the term "world-view philosophy", because it can also be applied unambiguously to
statement systems whose authors did not consider them metaphysical.
In addition to world-view or metaphysical questions, which are above all viewed as
theoretical problems, there are also practical problems which the sciences are not
competent to deal with. Of principal interest is the valuation of the things we come across
in our lives and the ends we pursue, as well as the norms to which our actions should
conform. The philosophical statements dealing with these themes bear the names
"axiology", "ethics", "moral philosophy" or "practical philosophy"37. Axiology38 (or
philosophy of values) studies that which people consider valuable and establishes
principles or norms for valuating. Ethics (or moral philosophy) treats the most important
class of valued objects: the morally valuable (or morally good); it establishes norms for
moral goodness (moral ideals, virtues) and for morally good action. All philosophical

31 SCHELER (1923: 14). Here 'setting' presumably means 'set' or 'determined'.

32 BECHER (1949: 160 f.).
33 KASTIL (1951: 34 C.).
34 Cf. BECHER (1949: 166 ff.).
35 Cf. for example BRENTANO (1968).
36 CC. FREY (1970: 94 ff.).
37 "Practical" (from the Greek "prattein" = to act) in this case means "relating to actions or acting"; it refers to
a philosophy which provides instructions for acting.
38 From the Greek "axios" = value and "logos" = teaching. Cf. HARTMANN (1935: 39), where it is
emphasized that axiology is the "foundation" of ethics, called "value philosophy" ("Wertphilosophie") in
German.
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 173

statement systems of this kind have in common that they seek to establish and justify
norms. Thus it is useful to designate them as norm-setting or normative philosophy, the
most important manifestation of which is normative ethics (or normative moral
philosophy). This philosophy is called "normative" in order to avoid confusion with "meta-
ethics", the branch of analytic-epistemological philosophy which examines already existing
ethical expressions and statements in epistemological terms39.
In the same way that in most cases world views (Weltanschauung) and morals are
closely related in human thought, there are also close relationships between world-view
and normative philosophy. The metaphysical depiction of the ''whole of reality" is "usually
directly connected to a valuating judgement", so that it is possible to speak of a "valuating
metaphysics'o4O. "Valuating metaphysics", "which combines metaphysics and axiology as well
as world and life views" has even been referred to as "the culmination of the entire system
of (world-view or metaphysical) philosophy"41.
Having given an overall view of the three main classes of statement systems bearing
the name "philosophy", we can investigate the meaning of "philosophy of education". In
doing so it is also useful to first deal with problems which have been treated either under
this or a similar name (as for example "philosophical pedagogics"42, "pedagogics based on a
philosophical foundation"43 or "educational philosophy't44), or which have been subject to
programmatic demands to be treated in this fashion.

VIEWS ON mE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Texts concerning "philosophy of education" express quite different opinions as to

which problems, topics or subject matter belong in this area of knowledge. One can
distinguish at least eight meanings of the word or eight classes of statement systems given
this name.
In individual cases it is often difficult or even impossible to definitively assign a text
to one of these classes, since there is a bit of each in every text. More so than "pure"
philosophers, advocates of the philosophy of education or philosophical pedagogics insist
that philosophy is responsible for all questions. This argument owes its semblance of
legitimacy to the fact that almost all philosophers who have written on education - ranging
from PLATO to DEWEY - simply wrote what they considered important in this area

39 Cf. HOSPERS (1967: 566 ff.); ALBERT (1972a: 127 ff.); HOERSTER (1976).
40 Cf. BECHER (1949: 11).
41 BECHER (1949: 14) (my addition).
42 Cf. SPRANGER (1933); DEWEY (1968); BOLLNOW (1969: 43).
43 Cf. COHN (1919).
44 CF. FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 85 ff.); KRIECK (1930).
174 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

without taking into account modem distinctions between empirical theories, practical
theories and the philosophy of education. However, if we indiscriminately classify
everything that philosophers (or self-styled philosophers) have written about education as
"philosophy of education", then this area of knowledge is left to the subjective
understanding of the given author and to chance. Since I do not expect this uncritical
attitude to add much to our knowledge, I will attempt, despite the problems inherent in
classification, to differentiate the statement systems found under the heading "philosophy
of education" according to analytic-epistemological criteria.
1. Sometimes "philosophy of education" or "philosophical pedagogics" means nothing
more than a system of scientific-empirical statements on education that is only insignificantly
augmented by normative statements. In the case of older authors who classify psychology
under theoretical philosophy (or metaphysics45 ) and teachings on society and culture under
practical philosophy (or ethics46 ) the word "philosophy" still includes the meanings which
we express today with the words "scientific" and "theoretical".
In Germany, this usage continued to influence many scholars up until the middle of
the twentieth century. For example, if one examines what SPRANGER taught as
"philosophical pedagogics'047 and MEISTER as "cultural philosophical pedagogics't48, one
will find that it was almost entirely composed of empirical statements on psychic, social
and cultural phenomena. SPRANGER described these phenomena in a highly idealized
way, MEISTER more soberly, but at a high level of abstraction. Describing phenomena
idealistically does not, however, produce philosophical statements, but only more or less
false or defective ones. Nor do definitions, descriptions and classifications attain
philosophical character simply because they are located at a high level of abstraction.
Finally, empirical problems do not acquire philosophical status simply because their
discussion is strewn with occasional value judgements, ideals and admonitions49.
When dealing with this problem, we must therefore remember that much of what
was earlier considered to be philosophy and still is by some pedagogical authors has long
become accessible to treatment by a particular specialized branch of science. "A problem
is, however, no longer philosophical when it can be solved by the methods of empirical
science"50.

45 a. HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: XXXIV ff.).

46 Cf. HERBART loco cit. and SCHLEIERMACHER (1957, Vol. 1: 11 f.).
47 Cf. SPRANGER (1933).
48 Cf. MEISTER (1959), (1961) and especially (1%5).
49 This is typical of SPRANGER, not, however, of MEISTER.
50 WOHLGENANNT (1977: 340). a. also ADLER (1942: 205 ff.). Incidentally, both SPRANGER (1933: 16)
and MEISTER (1947b) expressly understood and referred to their "philosophical pedagogics" as "science".
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 175

2. Occasionally "philosophy of education" is understood to be a universal science in

the Platonic-Aristotelian or medieval sense of the word "philosophy", i.e. as a combination
of empirical educational science, normative, metaphysical and analytic-epistemological
philosophy. This view is reminiscent of the ideal of all-encompassing knowledge or
"Pansophia" pursued by COMENIUS5\ and can thus be called ''pansophic philosophy of
education". A definition typical of this approach to philosophy is given by PRICE:
"Philosophy of education" means "any body of thought that includes a theory of education,
an ethics that justifies the goal that the theory adopts, a metaphysics that explains the
psychological and sociological parts of the theory of education and an epistemology that
explains why certain methods of teaching and learning are effective and demonstrates our
ability to know the truth of any thought whatsoever,,52. The "theory of education" making
up one of the four parts of this type of "philosophy of education" is defined as "a view
about the facts of human nature and society on which are based recommendations about
the curriculum, the methods, and the administration of education, regarded as means to
the ultimate goal of just and good citizens living in a just and good society".
This conception of philosophy is based on an analysis of PLATO's Republic, which
PRICE considers a "paradigm" or "model" of "philosophy of education", one which in his
view is still valid today. Critically speaking, it must be noted that he uses a concept of
philosophy which has long since been made obsolete by the differentiation of both the
individual sciences and philosophy. Today it is hard to imagine a "philosophy of education"
based on these foundations which would not be an enormous conglomeration of material
that could hardly meet modern epistemological standards. However, there is no denying
that such conglomerations (which are called "philosophy of education" or something
similar) do exist in contemporary pedagogical literature.
3. Sometimes the expression "philosophy of education" is used to refer to a practical
theory of education (or in our terminology a system of practical pedagogics). Still influential
in Germany is HERBARTs view of pedagogics as a practical discipline which was to be
treated "philosophically" and regarded as a part of philosophyS3. Even after pedagogics
became largely autonomous from philosophy there was for the most part widespread
agreement that educational aims must be taken from ethics, so that (practical) pedagogics
is "in a certain sense applied ethics"54. In the United States, on the other hand, it would
seem that the careless use of the word "philosophy" to mean a "working theory of life"55 is

51 Cf. COMENIUS (1966).

52 PRICE (1967: 231 r.).
53 cr. HERBART (1914, Vo1.2: 9); similar is WAlTZ (1898: 10 ff.).
54 REIN (1911, Vol. 1: 61).
55 Cf. DEWEY (1913: 697).
176 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

at fault to the extent that what is propagated as "philosophy of education" is often nothing
more than a form of practical pedagogics56 .
4. The expression "philosophy of education" also refers to statement systems dealing
with the influence that philosophical doctrines have exerted on educational theories (and
thereby possibly also on educational praxis)57. Such statement systems can be better
characterized as contributions to the historiography of ideas, and depending on the mode of
inquiry, to the historiography of the influence of philosophical literature on pedagogics or
to the historiography of pedagogical ideas and their origins.
5. Related to the above category are also those statement systems in which
philosophical doctrines are studied according to what they say either directly or indirectly
(as far as it is reconstructable by interpretation) about educational questions. This cate-
gory includes the many studies dealing with the relationships between the philosophies of
idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism, etc., on the one hand, and pedagogics on the
other58• I would also consider as belonging to this category the many texts which attempt to
utilize the works of individual philosophers for purposes of educational theory59 or "to
make them productive for a pedagogical approach"6O. Such studies can be thought of as
interpretations ofphilosophical texts from a pedagogical point of view.
6. Sometimes a statement system is expressly designated an "analytic philosophy of
education"61, or more often statement systems are given the indefinite name "philosophy of
education" in the sense of analytic or epistemological philosophy62. In reality they are not
about education, but rather about statements referring to education or theories of
education. There can be no such thing as an "analytic philosophy of education", since the
concept "education" relates to actions, whereas analytic-epistemological philosophy treats
only statements (and the words or concepts making up statements). What this incorrect
designation really refers to is an analytic (or epistemological) philosophy of pedagogics, in
other words the analytic-epistemological philosophy of pedagogical statement systems or the
metatheory of education. In contrast to the (world-view and normative) philosophy of
education, educational science and practical pedagogics, this branch of philosophy

56 Cf. GOWIN (1969: 947): "an educational theory which guides practices".
57 Cf. BRUBACHER (1969).
58 For a study of idealism cf. HORNE (1942); ANTZ (1962); BUTLER (1966); on realism cf. BREED
(1942); BROUDY (1%1); on pragmatism cf. BAYLES (1966); on existentialism BOLLNOW (1959); V.C.
MORRIS (1%6).
59 On ARISTOTLE, KANT and DEWEY cf. FRANKENA (1965); on PLATO and ARISTOTLE cf. FINK
(1970).
60 TOLLKOTTER (1961: 11) (in an educational-philosophical study of JASPERS).
61 Cf. SCHEFFLER (1954); MACMILLAN and KNELLER (1964: 27 ff.); CAHN (1970: 367 ff.).
62 Cf. O'CONNOR (1957); McCLELLAN (1976).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 177

represents a higher level of analysis, since as a metatheory, it has these three classes of
pedagogical theories as its subject matter.
That the difference between philosophy of education and philosophy of pedagogics is
often overlooked is mainly due to the fact that the word "education" is used both in
reference to educational actions and to the discipline or theory of education. The lack of
consideration given to this double meaning is probably a basic cause of the conceptual
confusion in Anglo-American literature on "philosophy of education"63 - confusion which
has also had a negative influence on the pedagogical literature of other countries. To avoid
misunderstandings based on imprecise use of language, it must be emphasized once more
that the analytic-epistemological philosophy of pedagogical statement systems is a
philosophy of educational theories, not a philosophy of education.
7. Under the name "philosophy of education" we also find statement systems which
can be designated world-view philosophies of education. These statement systems differ
widely according to the content of the world-view philosophies on which they are based.
Authors holding strictly to the old distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy
will emphasize their theoretical (metaphysical, ontological, philosophical-anthropological)
character. When scholars reject this distinction (as for example DEWEY), problems of
theoretical and practical philosophy become confused.
For the first type of author, world-view (or metaphysical) philosophy contains no
normative statements, but remains confined to descriptive statements on the "essence"
(Wesen 64 ), "principles"65, or "meaning"66 of education. According to STRASSER,
"fundamental philosophical pedagogics" or the "ontology of education" describes the "being
of man in general", but does not say "what man should be". In this view, ethics is
responsible for determining norms or values67. According to KNELLER, the "speculative"
philosophy of education "seeks to establish theories of the nature of man, society, and the
world by which we may order and interpret the conflicting data of educational research
and the human sciences"68.
These examples show that the problems which are claimed to be treated in statement
systems of this kind either deal with concept and theory formation and belong to empirical
educational science or, as "ontological" questions, have no special relationship to

63 Unambiguous English expressions for "analytic philosophy of education" are "philosophy of educology" or
"meta-educology". Cf. STEINER MACCIA (1969).
64 Cf. STRASSER (1965: 103 ff.).
65 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1917: 85 ff.). For a study of the many philosophical meanings of the word
"principle" cf. DIEMER (1962: 42 ff.); in pedagogics EGGERSDORFER (1954: 953 f.)
66 Cf. W. FLITNER (1966: 42); ROHRS (1969: 65).
67 STRASSER (1965: 108 f.). Similar is KLAFK1 (1964: 167 ff.).
68 KNELLER (1963: 66). Similar is FRANKENA (1956: 290): "a speculative philosophy of education ... looks
for hypotheses about man and the world which may be relevant to education".
178 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

pedagogics, but can be treated by ontology. In this sense STRASSER himself admits that
"fundamental philosophical pedagogics" is "as yet not pedagogics", but rather a "branch of
philosophical anthropology"69. A "philosophical pedagogics" of this kind that "is not
pedagogics" is not only a logical absurdity, but presumably also dispensable.
Actually, this type of theoretical, value-free non-normative world-view philosophy of
education cannot be found in pure form. Just as there exist basically close connections
between world-view and normative philosophy, there is scarcely any world-view philosophy
of education that does not contain at least value judgements and usually also normative
statements on educational means, curricula, virtues for educators, etc. It is hard to draw a
boundary between this type of philosophy and normative philosophy of education. Often,
the main function of world-view statements is to justify norms for educational action by
reference to the hierarchy of values already established in a given world view. In this case,
we are dealing primarily with mixed statement systems of a normative world-view
philosophy of education. If we can nevertheless distinguish here between world-view and
normative philosophies of education, it is because there do in fact exist statement systems
caned "philosophy of education" which are mainly of the world-view type and which are
meant more to proclaim and spread a world view among educators than to provide a
concrete and detailed normative basis for educational actions.
Examples of this would be found in the educational-philosophical writings of JOHN
DEWEY and ERNST KRIECI(, which with a certain degree of justification can also be
interpreted as models of pansophic or (in the case of DEWEY) normative philosophy of
education. On the basis of metaphysical, anthropological and historiographical
assumptions, both authors developed a broadly-based socio-cultural philosophy criticizing
the existing society and calling for its transformation. DEWEY stated that "philosophy is
the theory of education as a deliberately constructed practice". For him philosophy "is the
theory of education in its most general phases 'l1o, and the problems of philosophy and
education are the same71.
This enormous broadening of the philosophy of education's subject matter was made
easier by the dodge of basing the philosophy of education, not on the action concept, but
on the event concept of education72 • DEWEY understood "education" to be "all influences
that shape dispositions". He includes among these influences not only the daily interactions
between people, but also all influences emanating from the political constitution of society,

69 STRASSER (1965: 108).

70 DEWEY (1968: 328, 332, 331). This naturally applies only to pragmatic philosophy, which he himself
represented. Cf. here FRANKENA (1%5: 137 ff.).
71 DEWEY (1913: 701). Similarly, DILTHEY (1961: 7) wrote that "the climax and the goal of all true
philosophy is pedagogy in the broadest meaning of the word, an educational teaching of man".
72 Cf. BREZINKA (1990: 64 ff.).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 179

class relationships, the distribution of wealth, etc. 73 • Similarly, KRIECK viewed as

"education" every "influence, regardless of its origin, which evokes or influences becoming,
structuring or forming"74. Based on these assumptions, the world-view philosophy of
education becomes a doctrine which outdoes all individual disciplines in its universality, a
doctrine which deals with "human becoming", the "mental world"75, the "process by which
social groups maintain their continuous existence", the "various interests of life", and the
social "change of disposition" which seems "desirable" to its creators76. World-view
educational philosophy is claimed to be capable of offering that which the sciences cannot:
an "overall picture", a "unified world view,m, "an attempt to comprehend ... which would
influence the conduct of life", "an idea of what is possible, not a record of accomplished
fact"78.
A world-view philosophy of education does not differ in its content from the world-
view philosophy upon which it is based. It merely repeats this philosophy in a form adapted
to the needs of educational theorists and educators, but is, however, supplemented by
more or less clear interpretations of educational phenomena in the light of this world view
and by more or less precisely formulated demands on educands, educators and politicians.
These interpretations and proposals are not imported into, but presumably stem from the
original world view. However, this applies only to world-view philosophies which are truly
applied forms of autonomous ideological philosophy, as for example Aristotelian-
Thomistic philosophy79, Marxist philosophyS°, pragmatic philosophyll1 or phenomenological
philosophy82. In addition, one also finds both eclectic and original theories of varying
quality which express more the personal Weltanschauung of the author than a well-known
approach to world-view philosophy83.
As we have seen, there are statement systems which can be characterized as
ideological philosophies of education. However, this certainly does not mean that they also
contribute to solving theoretical or practical problems which could not be solved in
another or better way. It is rather precisely the mishmash presented as an "overall view" or

73 DEWEY (1913: 7(0).

74 KRIECK (1922: 47).
75 KRIECK (1922: 45 and 53).
76 DEWEY (1%8: 321, 332, 328)
77 KRIECK (1922: 302).
78 DEWEY (1%8: 324, 326).
79 Cf. ADLER (1942); McGUCKEN (1942); MARITAIN (1943) and (1956).
80 Cf. for example SUCHODOLSKI.
81 Cf. DEWEY (1968) and (1974); WILHELM (1975).
82 Cf. STRASSER (1%5) and (1964).
83 This applies for example to KRIECK (1922), who constructed a bizarre irrationalistic ideological
philosophy which was later used as the basis for National Socialist educational philosophy (cf. KNELLER
(1941). For an example of an eclectic world-view philosophy of education on a vague religio-humanistic
basis cf. R. ULICH (1961) and for a critique BREZINKA (1%3).
180 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

"synopsis" that makes it more difficult to even clarify many problems, let alone contribute
to a rational solution. Neither educational theorists nor educators need the ballast of
general world-view or metaphysical discussions which deal with the world and life in
general, but not with education in particular84 • Also, world-view philosophy of education
can replace neither the empirical science of education nor a practical pedagogics dealing
with concrete conditions and tasks. What we really need here are answers to the value-
related and normative questions arising in educational planning and acting. In my view,
the purpose of philosophy of education lies in providing the normative- and value
orientation for educators and politicians which the empirical science of education cannot.
What is of absolute necessity for supplementing the latter is not the seven types of
statement systems we have discussed above under the heading "philosophy of education",
but solely the normative philosophy of education. It alone, in conformity with our concept
of science, can be clearly separated from educational science, practical pedagogics and the
philosophy of educational knowledge (or metatheory of education).
8. The term "philosophy of education" or related expressions is most commonly used
to mean a normative philosophy of education. Since different things are meant by this
concept, we must first try to obtain a clear idea of what a normative philosophy of
education really is.
Already HERBART emphasized that (practical) pedagogics is dependent on
"practical philosophy", which "determines what should be" and thus the aim or end of
education85 . According to WAlTZ the "tasks of education" can only be derived from ethics
in its capacity as "the justifying science"86; "ethics establishes models for the will" and "ideal
demands"87. According to REIN, "practical philosophy or ethics" constructs "the standards
for determining the value or lack of value things have" and "the ethical foundation
determines the character of a pedagogical system"88. However, none of these theoreticians
was thinking of a special normative philosophy of education in the sense of a relatively
autonomous philosophical discipline; rather, they simply limited themselves to adopting
statements on personality ideals from systems of ethics viewed as generally or absolutely
valid89 and incorporating them into that area of practical pedagogics dealing with
educational aims.

84 Cf. McMURRIN (1962: 630) on "the confusion arising from the insistence that metaphysics and the art of
teaching have something importantly and intrinsically to do with each other, although just what that is, is
never quite revealed".
85 HERBART (1914, Vol. 2: 10 and 9).
86 WAlTZ (1898: 14).
87 WAlTZ (1898: 11).
88 REIN (1911, Vol. 1: 60 and 62).
89 Cf. WAlTZ (1898: 18); REIN (1911, Vol. 1: 105).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 181

There seem to be two primary reasons why since the end of the nineteenth century
attempts have been made to construct a relatively autonomous normative philosophy of
education. The first is the decline of Christian belief and ethics in formerly Christian
societies with the concomitant spread of mutually contradictory ethical perspectives,
doubts about the possibility of a generally valid set of ethical principles, ethical relativism
and agnosticism. Under these circumstances the ideals upon which practical pedagogics is
dependent for its educational aims could no longer be derived from a generally accepted
system of ethics, since such an ethical system no longer existed. This problem first became
critical in France as a result of the radical secularization of the French school system,
which led to attempts to find and justify "purely rationalistic education". "Rational"
education was understood to be "an education that is not derived from revealed religion
but rests exclusively on ideas, sentiments and practices accountable to reason only"90.
The second stimulus for developing a normative philosophy of education came from
the recognition that ideals borrowed from ethical systems are too abstract, indefinite and
lacking in content to serve as educational aims which would help us achieve a rational
understanding of the means needed for their implementation. References are often made
to "the" end91 (or aim) of education as if there were only one such aim upon which
everything else depends. These references disguise the fact that a higher aim like "virtue"92
or "morality"93 can be nothing more than a collective designation for a complex structure of
desired psychic dispositions. To facilitate rational aim-oriented educational actions, such
dispositions must furthermore be specified as clearly and precisely as possible.
The first outlines of a normative philosophy of education in German-speaking
countries stem from the writings of FRIEDRICH WILHELM FOERSTER and JONAS
COHN. FOERSTER, in his "Attempt at a 'Philosophy of Education'''94, based his approach
on a critique of indecisiveness in questions of principle. He condemns "entirely vague goals
which have no organizing power and which fail to impose unambiguous demands on
people"95 and emphasized that "precision in goal-setting" is the only thing that can give us
"real accuracy in choosing methods"96. He confesses to the Christian "hierarchy of life
aims" and shows in a realistic and concrete way what Christian ideals mean as educational

90 DURKHEIM (1973: 3). cr. on this subject FOERSTER (1915: 192 ff.).
91 Cf. HERBART's book entitled Allgemeine Padagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet [General
Pedagogics as Derived from the Aim of Education] (1806).
92 Cf. HERBART (1914, Vol. 2: 16): "Virtue is the name for the entirety of the pedagogical end". WAlTZ
(1898: 67) interprets it as the ability for a "moral structuring of life".
93 ZILLER (1901: 133). cr. as well the vague and ambiguous statements by REIN (1911, Vol. 1: 164), who
defmed the aim of education as the "truly good person, receptive to and skillful at everything laudable and
worthwhile, ... conscientious and religious from full conviction".
94 FOERSTER (1917: VII).
95 FOERSTER (1917: 71).
96 FOERSTER (1917: 65 f.).
182 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

aims and what educators should do to change both themselves and their educands in
accordance with them. COHN believed that the aims of education could be "deduced"
from "value insight" into the nature of the pupil and the community97. He also takes into
account the historical situation by attempting to draw "pedagogical conclusions" from an
analysis of contemporary culture98 . His "philosophical foundation of pedagogics" is,
however, not only limited to the "interpretative" "demonstration" of educational aims, but
also takes evaluative and normative positions on all "essential aspects of education".
Other authors do not share the belief in the possibility of "deducing" educational
aims, but instead emphasize that they are set and that one must decide in favor of them99 •
The differences of opinion on the justification of educational aims are understandably just
as great as those regarding value judgements and norms in general. There are no special
methodological problems involved in justifying educational aims; rather, the same basic
problematic exists for all value judgements, hierarchies of ends and ideals. Accordingly,
with regard to method, all the currents of thought found in normative (or practical)
philosophy appear again in the normative philosophy of education.
In regard to content, all contributions to the subject assign a central role to the aims
of education: Which psychic dispositions should be encouraged in the educand and why? It
is a matter, not only of moral virtues, but also of every type of excellence or competency
considered worth striving for lOO • To justify educational aims or to answer the "why"·
question one needs standards: a criterion or selective principle. One must take recourse to
basic evaluative principles which are part of a theory of values and thus ultimately of a
valuating world view (Weltanschauung). Every normative philosophy of education is based
on decisions having a basis in an ideology or world view. It is not enough to list possibilities
and then weigh their pros and cons lOl ; instead these deliberations must result in value
judgements and aims if they are to fulfill their normative purpose.
For most authors, the normative philosophy of education is not limited to setting,
explaining and justifying educational aims, but also includes all problems of valuation and
norm-setting which result from educational actions. Problems of curriculum planning are
just as much a part of this as are problems of parental educational rights vis-a-vis the
educational demands made by the state or the professional ethics of educators lO2 . Often
the question of means or methods also plays a role, and then not only in regard to their

97 Cf. COHN (1919: 18 ff.); on method (49 and 87).

98 COHN (1919: 64 ff.); similar GIESE (1931).
99 Cf. BEHN (1923: 7 ff.).
100 Greek: "arete" (cf. ARISTOTLE Nic. Ethics 1984a); Latin: "virtus"; English: "excellence": d. FRANKENA
(1965: 7 ff.). As an interpretation d. BREZINKA (1987) and (1988b).
101 Cf. KAUFMANN (1%6: 258 ff.).
102 Cf. e.g. JOHNSTON (1%3) as an example of a Catholic normative philosophy of education.
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 183

moral, but also to their technological value: what should (or should not) be done when and
how, in order to encourage the desired psychic dispositions set as aims of education for the
educand?103 Normative philosophy of education thus not only sets aims, but also makes
recommendations on means, and it attempts to justify the latter104. Accordingly it has much
in common with practical pedagogics.
Having presented a short survey of what in pedagogical literature is called
"philosophy of education", I wish to take a closer look at its most important branch, the
normative philosophy of education. In order to facilitate an understanding of its tasks and
problems it is useful to start with a look at traditional normative-descriptive pedagogics
and investigate the treatment of valuative and normative problems in the context of
philosophy of education.

NORMATIVE SHORTCOMINGS OF TRADITIONAL NORMATIVE·DESCRIPTIVE

PEDAGOGICS

In practical theories of education, from which scientific pedagogics originated, value

judgements and norms are freely borrowed from the particular world-view and moral
teachings valued in the community to which the author belongs and for whose members he
writes. Thus for example COMENIUS proposes as the three general goals of his
educational theory "beatitude" (harmony with God), ''virtues'' and "the arts" (Le. knowledge
and abilities); he differentiates them into specific sub-goals (thirteen virtues, eight
branches of knowledge, etc.). The main portion of his work is dedicated to the question of
how children should be led to acquire these psychic dispositions 105• In educational theories
of this type the religious and moral convictions of the community concerning value
hierarchies of objects and potential aims, the meaning of life, virtues and vices are
incorporated into educational doctrines without explicit justification, because they are
considered self-evident. It is clearly stated which aims should be reached through
education, which means are recommended and how means, obstacles and other aspects of
educational situations should be judged106.
Beginning in the nineteenth century with the first attempts to demarcate scientific
pedagogics from theories of the art of education, educationists sought to develop a mixed
normative-descriptive discipline. This would deal, not only with empirical tasks, but would
also have the normative goal of "creating" and 'justifying"107 normative ideas, "reviewing"

103 cr. FRANKENA (1965: 11).

104 cr. FRANKENA (1956: 228).
105 Cf. COMENIUS (1633: 26 ff.).
106 cr. e.g. LOCKE (1989); SALZMANN (1780,1796,1806).
107 Cf. HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 126).
184 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

and "valuating" already present ends or "defining" or "establishing" new ones108• To this day,
some scholars are still trying to establish an epistemological basis for a scientific
pedagogics of this type. Their intention is to present this mixed normative-descriptive
system as superior to empirical educational science. As their key argument they claim that
scientific pedagogics should continue to engage in valuating and norm-setting, because
educators need normative aids for their personal orientation.
Let us examine whether and to what extent the proponents of this normative-
descriptive program for pedagogical science have fulfilled the normative tasks they set for
themselves in the last century. Compared with the norm content of the best prescientific
educational theories and the first beginnings of a scientific pedagogics made by
HERBART, the normative content generally declined more than it grew. This is true for
technical norms, of which it was once said that to search for them leads to a "vacuum", a
"no-man's-land in which each person can believe what he wishes"109. It applies equally well
to educational aims and their justification (or the teleology of normative pedagogics110)
and to moral norms for educational action (or normative ethics for educators).
In the texts which proponents of a normative-descriptive pedagogy regard as
scientific, one seldom finds anything more than general normative statements almost
totally lacking in content111 • Usually they merely repeat the names of the inadequately
defined convictions, attitudes and abilities which the majority of their "refined"
contemporaries found desirable. Educationists were often content in "lofty popularity" to
bind together "in a pleasing bouquet the most beautiful flowers from the meadow of
ethical life, happiness, perfection, ethical personality and likeness to God"112. Even an
author like WILLMANN, who placed particular emphasis on the "normative character" of
scientific pedagogics ll3, offers as "educational ideals" nothing more concrete than "living
knowledge", "intellectual ability", and "purified volition". These he combined in a "wisdom
in which knowledge and ability are transfigured into an attitude dedicated to moral goods
and virtue"114.

lOB Cf. HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 134 ff.); WILLMANN (1957: 306 ff.) on "the valuation of educational ends".
109 Cf. REDL and WINEMAN (1957: 268 ff., especially 278).
110 From the Greek "te1os" = goal, end and "logos" = teaching. What is meant here is the nonnative theory of
educational aims (as opposed to descriptive, comparative, historical theories which belong to empirical
educational science). Cf. STOY (1861: 31 ff.); REIN (1908: 59 ff.); GIESE (1931: 118 ff.).
111 Cf. e.g. WAlTZ (1898: 65 ff.); ZILLER (1901 : 131 ff.); WILLMANN (1957: 314 ff.); REIN (1911, Vol. 1:
85 ff.).
112 DILTHEY (1888: 14); likewise (1%1: 175).
113 WILLMANN (1957: 44 ff.).
114 WILLMANN (1957: 320 and 313).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 185

More recent authors call for the "humanization of man"115, "humanitarianism through
the humanization of interpersonal relationships"116, the "complete personality"117, "the
release of man to his humanity"118, "the realization of maturity"119, "the creation of a correct
consciousness"l20 or "emancipated identity"l21. Even if one remembers that such
catchwords "become more understandable when one is familiar.. . with the meaning
contemporary consciousness placed in them"122, educators profit little from their
interpretation. When trying to set concrete aims, as educators must in dealing with specific
educands under specific conditions, experience has shown that "in their ideal other-
worldliness ... the ethical values making up on the whole the meaning and content of our
lives ..." leave us "without a guide"123.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the insight became widespread that educational
aims rest on ideologically determined decisions and are thus unavoidably partisan. Perhaps
as a consequence, the normative statements on educational aims of most theoreticians
belonging to the normative-descriptive school of thought came to have less and less
substantive content, became vaguer and deliberately strived for world-view neutrality. The
effort to assure pedagogics taken as a whole the status of a science led to a neglect of
normative tasks by pedagogical authors, even those who ascribed to it a mixed normative-
descriptive or a purely normative-philosophical character and emphasized its responsibility
for educational praxis. Because they felt that setting educational aims is clearly not a
scientific activity, they avoided committing themselves to set aims and the task of justifying
them and were content with pseudo-normative interpretations of the Zeitgeist,
interpretations which for the most part remained unclear and lacking in concrete
normative contentl24 . In part one was satisfied with meaningless formal and quasi-value-
neutral educational aims such as "personality uniformly value-oriented by a world view and
imbued with value by the surrounding culture"125. The concretization of such formulas was

115 W. FLITNER (1964: 47).

116 KROH (1954: 112).
117 HENZ (1964: 26).
118 BALLAUF (1962: 26).
119 MOLLENHAUER (1968: 69).
120 GIESECKE (1%9: 92 ff.).
121 WELLENDORF (1970: 91).
122 WILLMANN (1957: 316). On the interpretation of pedagogical slogans d. KOMISAR and McCLELLAN
(1%1).
123 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1912: 102).
124 DILTHEY's promise (1961: 10) that ..... from the nature of our people and our time we will derive the
concrete and full ideal of the present educator and educational system in Germany" has never been fulfilled
and in fact cannot be fulfilled in a logically correct (and thus scientifically justifiable) manner (my italics);
d. SPRANGER (1973: 267 ff.); W. FLITNER (1954: 48) (reprinted (1965: 192): "educational aims thus
become evident here; they are valid for every person following our analysis of the present situation ...
What they are 'ultimately' based on is not of decisive importance".
125 MEISTER (1%5: 21); similarly COHN (1919: 46).
186 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

left to "practical pedagogics"l26 or to "educational teachings"127 whose value judgements

and moral norms were borrowed from the given society, its culture and Weltanschauung.
Based on insight into the "historicity of human existence", educators with their normative
questions were referred back to the "consensus on the meaning of existence" already valid
in their "sphere of Iife"I28.
No less unsatisfactory than the contribution of normative-descriptive pedagogics to
setting, concretizing and justifying educational aims are its contributions to the ethics of
educational action. The reason for this has to do mainly with the inadequate state of
technological knowledge on education. At present sufficient scientific knowledge is still
lacking of the relationships between precisely defined ends and means and the effects of
these on specific educands under specific circumstances. Until this deficit is made up, we
will not be able to set more specific ethical norms for educators than the most general
norm that the educand should not be harmed. As far as I can tell, the sound contributions
to the ethics of educational action concentrate primarily on the problem area of authority
and freedom l29, which is somewhat removed from educational practice, and on the virtues
educators should have l3O. Even in regard to the latter area of study a knowledgeable
observer has remarked that "until now astonishingly little thought has been given to the
problem of the educator's virtues"l31. As to the means from which the educator must
choose, up to now the area most thoroughly treated from the perspective of educational
ethics has been that of punishment132•
Thus normative-descriptive pedagogics - in spite of all insistence on its praxis-
orientation133 - contains not only very few insights into educational technology, but also
few concrete and well-founded norms. This contradiction between its program and its real
content appears to be caused by the difficulties involved in combining and realizing both
empirical science and normative philosophy in one and the same discipline. Wishing to
gain acceptance as a science for their mixed statement system, the adherents of this
approach seek as much as possible to comply with the norm of value-neutrality. This norm,
however, is valid only for the sciences and not for normative philosophy with its wholly
different tasks. But the proponents of normative-descriptive pedagogics want to evade the
common objection that a world view (or an ideology) is being propounded in the name of
scientific pedagogics and yet avoid having to entirely forego the normative side of its own

126 MEISTER (1965: 21 ff.).

127 W. FLITNER (1954: 42 ff.); LOCHNER (1963: 511 ff.).
128 W. FLITNER (1958: 33); (1954) and (1965: 176 ff.).
129 cr. the informative collection by REBEL (1967) as well as STROHAL (1955).
130 cr. F. SCHNEIDER (1940); WOLF (1962); BOLLNOW (1968a: 52 ff.).
131 BOLLNOW (l968a: 52).
132 cr. SACHSE (1894); SCHEIBE (1967); PETERS (1972: 272 ff.).
133 cr. e.g. W. FLITNER (1958: 18).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 187

program. Thus it offers up a multitude of vague, unclear or empty normative statements

for educators to unravel134• Although clearly defined, concrete norms are needed for
educational actions, it is precisely these which are lacking. Although the norm of scienticity
in regard to value judgements and normative statements can mean only that they should
be validated, this is done either inadequately or not at all.
These normative shortcomings of mixed normative-descriptive scientific pedagogics
would be less critical were it not for one thing. Many educational theorists have all too
long allowed themselves to be kept from working toward an autonomous normative
philosophy of education by a belief that the problems of valuating and norm-setting could
be solved entirely within the framework of "scientific pedagogics".
In order to define the field of study belonging to the normative philosophy of
education, it is first necessary to differentiate its problems from those connected with the
value judgements and norms which are treated in the empirical science of education and in
the philosophy of educational knowledge (or meta-educology).

VALUATIONS AND NORMS AS AN EMPIRICAL, NORMATIVE AND

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

The area comprising valuations and norms is not only vast and difficult to survey, but
at least as theoretically controversial as any other branch of knowledge. The key words of
this subject are ambiguous, for example ''value'', "norm", "morality", "morals", or "good"13S.
There is a lack of clear concepts and even of agreement on the interpretation and
classification of the empirical foundations. Even more extensive is the disagreement on the
possibility and methods involved in recognizing values and justifying norms. Related to this
is the absence of agreement on which problems should be treated in ethics or moral
philosophy. Added to this conceptual, classificatory and epistemological confusion are the
enormous differences of opinion surrounding all questions of content, ranging from
hierarchies of values, goods, purposes and virtues and continuing through ideals of
personality and society on up to moral norms, rules or prescriptions. Whether we examine
theories of values, goods and virtues, doctrines of the ideal personality or society, or the
theory of duties, we find opposing conceptions everywhere, and seldom are the arguments
for one side or the other convincing enough to exclude all doubts about their
correctness136.

134 Cf. e.g. MOLLENHAUER (1972: 68).

135 Cf. WRIGHT (1963) and (1963a); lAUTMANN (1969); SCHOLL-SCHAAF (1975).
136 Cf. WEISCHEDEL (1976).
188 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

To avoid confusion in explaining the tasks of a normative philosophy of education,

we must distinguish between empirical, normative and epistemological problems.
1. The empirical problems concern valuations and norms as psychic and social facts in
both past and present. These problems are dealt with in the empirical sciences. The main
tasks are to collect, describe, interpret, compare, classify and explain these phenomena.
Some of the problems are of a psychological nature. Among other things, it is a matter of
the psychic processes involved in valuating and selecting, in goal-oriented behavior,
motivation, moral sentiments, the development of value consciousness, the ability to make
moral discriminations and act morally, individual differences in valuating and complying
with norms, as well as the psychopathology of valuation and moral behavior137• Other
problems are related to sociology. These include questions of the dependence on socio-
cultural factors of values, norms and attempts to justify norms l38 • In answering these
questions historiographical studies are indispensable, whereby the history of actual moral
life is just as important as that of moral teachings.
In the study of educational situations as well as of educational theories, many factual
questions arise dealing with the valuations made by educators, educands, and educational
theorists, educational aims and their influence, and normS for educational actions as well
as their origins, distribution and influence. I will name only a few examples: "Which
educational aims are espoused by which groups of people in a particular historical
epoch?"; "What was intended by the proponents of the educational aim 'ability to use
critical reason'?"; "What do parents with firm religious convictions think of proposals to
educate children in the unrestricted use of their critical reason?"; "Which socio-cultural
conditions have led to repealing the norm that pupils should be subject to corporal
punishment for poor achievement?"; "How do teachers respond to the proposal that the
pupil's individuality should be taken into account during instruction?"; "What can be done
to achieve the educational aim 'ability to work independently'?" The 'answers to these
questions are factual statements whose truth can be tested empirically.
Questions of this kind can be dealt with by the empirical disciplines of value theory,
empirical moral disciplines (moral psychology, moral sociology, the historiography of
morals and moral teachings) or descriptive ethics. It is a matter of problems which can in
principle be solved using scientific and empirical methods.
2. Normative problems can be understood both in a narrow and in a broad sense. In
the narrow sense, it is a matter of the question "What should I do?"139. In a broad sense, it

137 Cf. for example SHERIF (1%6); HUUTS (1969); KElLER (1970).
138 Cf. OSSOWSKA (1972).
139 Cf. KANT (1923: 25), where moral philosophy is characterized as an answer to the question "What ought I
to do?"
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 189

is a matter of a more encompassing question which is prior to the first: "How should one
valuate?" Setting norms is only possible after we have ascribed positive or negative value
to phenomena and established a hierarchy of goods (or values). Further, by setting a
highest aim (ideal, value, good) life can be assigned value and meaning. For many reasons,
this belongs among the normative problems l4O. Consequently I have combined the
problems of assigning meaning, of valuating, and of setting norms under the overarching
concept of normative problems. Only these problems form the subject matter of normative
philosophy. This conception corresponds to a tradition going back to ARISTOTLE,
according to which the task of ethics or moral philosophy is not only to establish norms,
but above all to answer questions as to the highest good, the highest (or correct) aim, the
proper hierarchy of goods (or values) and man's determinationl41 .
Thus the category of normative problems in the broad sense includes first of all
problems of valuation which should be treated in (non-descriptive, valuating or) normative
value theory (axiology)142. It is important to remember that moral valuations are only one
category among others. There are also value concepts of knowledge, law, religion, utility,
efficiency, beauty, vitality, etc. 143.
If educators and legislators concerned with education are to acquire the proper
normative orientation, it is absolutely necessary that answers be found to a wide variety of
questions about valuations. This applies to all aspects of educational situations and
particularly to ends and means. As an example one need only examine the problems
involved in selecting teaching material from a given cultural heritage or instructional
content from the wide variety of available subject matter l44. For example, there is a great
deal of older literature on "pedagogical axiology"145. This area includes didactics in the
narrower sense of the word (as a theory of teaching content), which is for the most part
identical with what is today called "curriculum theory"I46. The central factor is that of value
judgements, for only after judgements have been made is it possible to establish norms.
Problems of norm setting constitute the second sub-area of normative problems in the
broad sense of the word. There are numerous different kinds of norms, and many attempts

140 Cf. REININGER (1946), who treats "the question of the meaning of life as the basis of a hierarchy of
values" and an ethics to be based upon it.
141 Cf. ARISTOTLE Nic. Ethics (1984a: Book 1); BRENTANO (1952: 87 ff.); PAULSEN (1903, Vol. 1: 245
ff.); CATHREIN (1924, Vol. 1: 106 ff.); SCHELER (1954) (on page 30 he calls ethics the "theory of moral
values, their hierarchy and the norms resting upon this hierarchy"); HARTMANN (1935: 227 ff.); BEHN
(1930).
142 For a study of the epistemological controversies over doctrines of value d. HARTMAN (1961).
143 Cf. V. KRAFf (1951: 19 ff.).
144 Cf. WILLMANN (1957: 336 ff.); WENIGER (1960); for a history of curricula d. DOLCH (1965a).
145 Cf. KAMMEL (1927).
146 Cf. BLANKERTZ (1972).
190 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

have been made to classify them l47. For the normative philosophy of education it is above
all important to distinguish between norms asserting that something ought to be and norms
asserting that something ought or ought not to be done l48 • The former are called ideals, the
latter behavioral norms (prescriptions for acting or refraining from action). In the case of
ideals one can distinguish between personality ideals and societal ideals. Since the
personality traits of educands are always the targets of educational actions, the normative
theory of personality ideals or virtues as educational aims is of central importance for
orienting educators.
Behavioral norms can be divided into technical and moral norms. In normative
philosophy of education we need not concern ourselves with technical norms, since their
factual content consists of nomological hypotheses whose formulation and testing are the
province of empirical educational science 149. Their normative content depends on the
particular aims being set, which are themselves treated by the normative theory of
personality ideals as aims of education. Of greatest importance, however, are moral norms
for educational action. These norms express what, according to certain moral criteria,
should or should not be done in education. The following norms can serve as examples:
"Natural feelings of self respect must be treated with careful consideration and shielded
from devastating offenses"150, "One should refrain from disturbing incipient self-
determination. .. through the demands of unceasing discipline"15l; "Except with good
cause, one should never disrupt the status quo among children or transform their relations
into ... forced compliance"1S2.
3. Epistemological problems concern among other things the language of value
judgements and normative statements, their logical peculiarities and the arguments used
to justify them. In this case we are dealing with the philosophy of both valuating and
normative statements (or statement systems). To the extent that this is an analytic-
epistemological study of moral norms, one speaks of meta-ethics. Its main tasks are "to
critically examine contexts of justification in ethical argumentation and to critically
evaluate moral principles and criticize the prevailing ethical systems and the dominant
morality"153.
Here are some examples of questions taken from the epistemological philosophy of
normative educational knowledge: "What is the meaning of the statement (designated as

147 Cf. WRIGHT (1963a).

148 Cf. WRIGHT (1963a: 14).
149 Cf. p. 146 ff. above.
150 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 404).
151 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 406).
152 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 409).
153 ALBERT (1972a: 162). Cf. FRANKENA (1973: 95 ff.) and KAULBACH (1974) on meta-ethics. On the
problem of justifying educational norms cf. E. KONIG (1975: Vol. 2).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 191

an 'imperative of method'I54): 'Contact with content should be fruitful'?"; "What is the

meaning of the norm that the aim of education is the 'acquisition of abilities for critical
participation in the struggle against conditions hampering free discourse'''155?; "What
normative content is contained in the educational aim proclaimed by the German
Educational Council 156 that German pupils should acquire the ability to 'realize the
freedom and rights which the Constitution grants'?".
Having demarcated the normative from the empirical and epistemological problem
areas, I would now like to treat in greater detail the specific tasks of normative philosophy
of education.

THE TASKS AND PROBLEMS OF A NORMATIVE PHIWSOPHY OF EDUCATION

As with every kind of empirical knowledge, the findings of educational science can be
used for any purposes whatever. How it is used depends on decisions for or against certain
aims selected from the sum of all possible aims. From educational science we learn only
about facts, but nothing about how we should evaluate and what we should want.
People rely on normative aids to orient themselves towards basic principles of
valuation, hierarchies of goods, ideals, virtues and duties. The most vital of these aids are
contained in and acquired from the legal norms, the moral teachings and the
Weltanschauung of the groups to which people belong. To structure essential
interpersonal relationships, for example between marriage partners, parents and children,
supervisors and subordinates, there are institutionalized patterns of valuating and acting.
These patterns are localized in the form of mores and social customs. For example, many
professions have codes of behavior or professional ethics, as do teachers and other
educators. Thus when searching for meaning, values and norms individuals are not left
entirely to their own means, but rather find in their immediate surroundings customarily
transmitted systems of meaning, basic values, ideals and norms for acting. Much of "what
the philosophers called a 'rational foundation for morality' and tried to supply was ...
merely a scholarly variation of the commonfaith in the prevalent morality; a new means of
expression for this faith; and thus just another fact within a particular morality"157.
Today a belief in the dominant morality and its justification is no longer this simple.
In the open (or pluralistic) societies of today there are fewer and fewer normative aids for
orienting people. Among other reasons, this can be attributed to the disappearance of

154 w. FLITNER (1963: 19).

155 MOLLENHAUER (1972: 68).
156 Deutscher Bildungsrat (German Educational Council) (1970: 29).
157 NIETZSCHE (1968: 288).
192 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

small, closed groupsl58, the dissemination of a scientific world view, our increased
enlightenment about the variety of world views, beliefs, moral teachings and lifestyles
existing among people and the loss of ties to a single system of interpretations as the sole
binding source of obligations. These changes have promoted a rationalistic and
individualistic approach to life and have made people sceptical, insecure and confused in
questions of meaning, values and norms. The number of universally accepted moral norms
hardly extends beyond those of basic human rights l59.
No amount of rhetoric about "self-determination", "self-realization", "autonomy" or
"emancipation" can disguise the fact that most people living in highly industrialized
societies are subject to external influences. The need for recognition by others brings with
it a strong feeling of dependency and an "unusual receptivity to follow ... the actions and
wishes of others", especially in regard to published opinionsl60 • Due to tbis state of mind,
there are few who dare to establish valuation principles and norms for themselves and
others that would go beyond or even contradict the existing vague standards which they
share with others. Even the so-called protest movements of recent decades have not
created new meanings and norms, but have rather only fought against, derided and
weakened the old ones. They have merely contributed to the general perplexity most
people experience, without at the same time reducing their reluctance to express
themselves on world-view or moral questions. This reluctance also results because in our
enlightened age we are more familiar with (or at least have an idea of) the difficulties
involved in justifying value judgements and normative statements: we do not wish to leave
the firm ground of scientific knowledge. Those arguing in a scientifically founded manner
may thus avoid criticism, but at the same time they will nevertheless not acquire a
normative orientation. This orientation is based both on knowledge, and also on the
courage to valuate, make decisions and profess one's beliefs.
Today, analytic and epistemological critical philosophy thrives much better than does
normative philosophy. It is less risky for philosophers to analyze, interpret and criticize
value judgments and norms than it is to formulate and justify them (if they are not already
the dominant norms and values). On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that educators
need normative orientation aids which will not leave them helpless in concrete educational
situations. As with all people who must act, they have a "need for limited horizons" and
"the nearest tasks"161. The less they are able to depend on tradition (Le. in this case an

158 Cf. BREZINKA (1971b: 94 ff.) and (1988: 108 ff.).

159 Cf. the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950 and Articles 1-19 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz) of
23 May 1949.
160 Cf. RIESMAN (1965: 22 ff.).
161 NIETZSCHE (1968: 292); in greater detail (1983). Similar is DURKHEIM (1973: 34 f.).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 193

institutionalized system of meaning including its relevant morals), the greater is the danger
that education will become lost in the broad room for maneuver granted by a liberal legal
system and be governed by random flights of inspiration and changing fashions. A value-
neutral analysis of all possible values and norms pertaining to education in the sense of an
empirical science of morals or descriptive ethics is no substitute for the normative
orientation aids needed by educators. GOETHE's comment applies especially well to
today's problems of empirical knowledge about values, ideals, moral norms and their
religious, world-view or philosophical foundations: "Knowledge no longer advances us in
the world's hectic rush: before a man has taken note of everything, he himself is 10st"162.
Under these circumstances only a valuating normative philosophy of education can
offer normative orientation. Because this philosophy must establish norms, it will as a
matter of course take sides for or against other possible meanings, values and norms. This
does not occur irrationally, but rather on the basis of more or less thorough knowledge,
both of the phenomena which are to be valuated or normatively interpreted or adapted,
and of the actual valuations that people make. Certainly reasons can be given for
supporting one value and rejecting another, and indeed the philosophical character of
normative philosophy consists precisely in the openness of its statements to logical
justification. However, this justification, no matter how complete, can never render a
concrete decision superfluousl63.
It goes without saying that a normative philosophy of education cannot replace the
accepted world views, valid laws, moral sentiments and institutionalized moral action
norms for educators. As a statement system, normative philosophy is not a primary
element of societal order or of social control. Rather it contains value judgements and
normative stipulations espoused on the basis of a certain world-view and moral point of
view (in the sense of a more or less well-founded system of beliefs). Only adherents
perceive the normative content of a given viewpoint as a binding expression of their own
will. In the eyes of others it is simply a proposal for which agreement is sought. Only
insofar as it is persuasive can the normative content of a viewpoint be adopted by others
and enter into the moral life of individuals and groups. Only if the assent of the majority
has been obtained can particular norms attain formal legal validity and enforceability.
Of course this reference to the limited influence of normative philosophical
statement systems does not alter the fact that normative philosophy aims to influence
other people. Those who develop and propagate such philosophies have every intention to
teach ideals l64 . Normative philosophy "is a practical discipline, its doctrines aim at gaining

162 GOETHE (1943: 31) (No. 215).

163 a. LUBBE (1971a) and (1971) on decision-making theory.
164 Cf. KANT (1989: 658): "Teacher in the ideal".
194 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

power"165. It is a discipline "in which the aim is not only to investigate human behavior, but
also to guide it"I66. "The philosopher of normative ethics must be out to encourage the
performance of one action and to prevent another"167.
The simplest way of classifying the tasks of a normative philosophy of education is
according to the ends-means schema. On this basis, we can distinguish between a
normative philosophy of educational aims or normative pedagogical teleology and a
normative philosophy of means l68 . In the sub-area concerned with means it is necessary to
distinguish between educators and their educational actions on the one hand and material
means on the other. I have named the first group of topics in this sub-area "normative
ethics for educators". This sub-area can further be divided into a normative teaching of
virtues for educators and an ethics of educational actions (theory of duties). The second
group of topics includes the (valuating or normative) axiology of material means (theory of
goods). The latter can be divided into the value theory of teaching content (normative
didactics) and the normative philosophy of educational organizations (axiology of teaching
content and educational organizationsI69). The normative philosophy of education is thus
not confined to moral norms for education, but also extends to value judgements,
including, besides moral value judgements, also legal, aesthetic, religious, economic and
hygienic judgements.
For reasons of space I cannot treat in depth the substantive problems of the
normative philosophy of education nor the meta-theoretical problems of this type of
pedagogical statement systems l70; instead I shall confine myself to a few brief comments.

165 BRENTANO (1952: 9). Cf. also NIETZSCHE (1968: 326): "Genuine philosophers, however, are
commanders and legislators: they say 'thus it shall be'! They first determine the Whither and For What of
man ... Their 'knowing' is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is - will to power".
166 OSSSOWSKA (1972: 18 f.).
167 OSSSOWSKA (1972: 40). Essentially the same thing can already be found in ARISTOTLE (1984a, II, 2:
1743): "For we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good".
168 This is a concession to popular usage. Strictly speaking, we would have to distinguish between a normative
philosophy of educational aims (i.e. the ends of education) and a normative philosophy of education (i.e.
educational actious as means), especially when (as in this book) "education" is understood to be actions
falling under the concept of means. The generally used name "philosophy of education" is thus actually ouly
an abbreviation for "philosophy of educational aims and education (as means)".
169 For a study of the concept of organization, in the sense of a social structure oriented towards specific ends
and rationally constructed to realize them cf. MAYNTZ (1%3: 36 ff.).
170 Expressed fully: the problems of an analytic-epistemological philosophy of the normative philosophy of
education.
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 195

THE NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATIONAL AIMS AND ITS

METATHEORY

Educational aims are ideals of an educand's personality (or the personalities of a

number of educands). They express something which is desired17l : the psychic dispositions
(abilities, competencies, virtues) which the educand should acquire and whose acquisition
should be aided by educators and their educational actions tn. Personality ideals are
created or established: they are demands which are put forward. They can be
acknowledged and accepted or rejected and opposed. Some apply to the personality as a
whole, others to sub-areas (dispositional complexes) or individual traits (dispositions).
The basic personality ideals which are binding for all members of a society already
exist for educators in their particular culture. One does not need to create new ones, but
rather to clarify, interpret, concretize, complete and possibly also to further develop them.
This is a process which fundamentally concerns all citizens in a democracy. Professional
educators and educational theorists do not have more responsibility in this regard than do
other citizens and professional groups.
Accordingly then, an educational system is that sector of a societal system which has
been specifically entrusted with the task of realizing those psychic dispositions which have
been set as personality ideals - dispositions upon which the survival and continued
functioning of a society and its social structures depends173 • In order to be able to fulfill
this task, not only the dispositions and dispositional structures which are to be realized, but
also those which are to be suppressed, must be defined more precisely than is necessary for
the communication and action orientation of members of society who are not called upon
to deal specifically with educational problems. Above all, however, educands should not be
left to the vagaries of chance in that great expanse of free space for action which exists
within the boundaries of those few fundamental ideals which are held to be universally
valid. It is in this vast free space of legally authorized or permitted action possibilities that
struggles over concrete personality ideals are played out in pluralistic societies. Here
incompatible demands are made, and contradictory hierarchies of virtues are put forward.
Here the promotion of vices is permitted and not legally prosecuted, although they bring
incalculable suffering to their victims. Here recognition is simultaneously claimed for vast
numbers of ideals, each of which which can be evaluated in quite various ways. With the
decline of tradition-bound societies and the expansion of historical knowledge, a flood of

171 a. WEINBERGER (1970: 293 ff.).

In a. on the normative double character of educational aims d. BREZINKA (1990: 136 ff.).
173 a. WILLMANN (1957: 604 ff.); DURKHEIM (1972: 29 ff.).
196 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

world-view and normative stimuli have come into play which threaten to cripple most
people's ability to bind themselves permanently to specific ideals.
Education as a rationally purposeful action cannot take place at all until selections
have been made from the chaos of existing and possible ideals. The planning of means
presupposes clarity about ends and their hierarchy. Ideals must be evaluated,
differentiated from one another and weighed as to their merits. Since it is impossible to
consider all ideals, there is no way to avoid making choices. These choices will vary
according to given world views and interpretations of events. The resulting responsibilities
are also the concern of every mature citizen, but many do not fulfill them at all, and most
others do so only incompletely and unsystematically. For that reason there must be a
division of labor in which educational philosophers make decisions for others and try to
enlist support for their proposals. In doing so, it is not merely a question of new slogans or
abstract catch-all names like "divinity", "humanity", "personality" or "emancipation", but
rather of a psychologically and logically structured hierarchy of psychic dispositions174,
which are then to be explained and clarified by examples. What is needed is not a
comprehensive list of all desirable dispositions for thinking, feeling and acting, but rather a
system of selected concrete virtues175, acquired knowledge and abilities 176 that relate to
today's socio-cultural situation and its inherent dangers. Such a system, instead of being
all-encompassing, must be one-sided in the sense of adhering to certain basic world-view
and moral decisions. It should make educands, as well as educators, aware of the special
tasks to which they ought to dedicate themselves.
In explaining how the selection and setting of educational aims comes about one
cannot help but refer to epistemological philosophy. The analytic-epistemological (or meta-
theoretical) problematic of educational aims has two main elements: normative content and
its interpretation on the one hand, and validation or justification on the other. This
problematic recurs in similar forms in all other sub-areas of normative philosophy of edu-
cation and its metatheory, and accordingly I shall discuss the justification of educational
aims in this light. In discussing the other sub-areas it will thus be unnecessary to deal with
this further.
Educational aims should be examined with regard to normative content. It is a matter
of determining whether or not there is any, and if so, what it consists in. Some of the most
prominent educational aims are merely pseudo-normative empty formulas lacking any

174 Cf. MEISTER (1947c); STROHAL (1961).

175 Cf. SCHELER (1955); BOLLNOW (1951 / 52); PIEPER (1974) on the concept of virtue.
176 cr. the discussion of this in HORNEY (1%3); BREZINKA (1988: 71 ff.); WILSON (1%7: 190 ff.);
HENTIG (1968: 69 - 100) and (1971); WOLF (1m) and (1975).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 197

substantive content177• Such normative statements are broad in their logical scope, but
quite limited in normative content. In general the normative content of a statement is
inversely proportional to the scope of the empirical, existential or action possibilities with
which it is compatible. The normative content of a normative statement is thus inseparable
from its empirical content, i.e. from statements on the life styles or actions which the norm
espouses, forbids or permits. Empirical content becomes part of a norm when a demand
for or claim is made that it "ought to be". Lack of normative content always means a lack
of empirical content. Normative statements "only then have a true normative content when
they exclude particular very carefully defined ways of acting or thinking. A normative
principle that contains no instructions of this kind is in this sense fully lacking in content
and hence has no regulative function"178.
Examples of this would be the following pseudo-normative statements: The pupil
should learn "to act responsibly"; "Responsibility has its meaning in each commitment of
the ego in which it must validly structure its actions"; "All responsibility rests on the
ultimate principle of morality: the good. The responsible person measures himself against
this principle. To accept responsibility and to act in a morally structured fashion mean one
and the same thing"I79. How educands should be formed or what they should be able to do
cannot be inferred from such normative statements and their interpretation. It is unclear
what the concept of "responsibility" as the "valid structuring of actions" means in psychic
reality, by what standards such a structuring may be recognized as "valid" and what "the
good" consists in.
As further examples take the norms stating that pupils should be educated to a state
of "maturity", "ego-identity" or "emancipation". Such educational aims have a minimal
normative content, which becomes recognizable only after they have been empirically
interpreted according to certain moral and political ideas. Instead of serving as a
normative aid to orienting educators, they act more as emotionally arousing but
nonetheless highly abstract symbols of belieflso. They are catchwords by means of which
the supporters of a particular ideology can recognize one another and which serve to
support their convictions and social cohesiveness. Seldom are they just pure ''verbal music"
or "a jingle of words"l81. What they mean under given socio-cultural conditions is of course
not explicitly stated in the phrases themselves, but can be inferred from the interpretations

171 Cf. TOPITSCH (1970) and DEGENKOLBE (1965) for a comprehensive discussion of pseudo-normative
empty formulas.
178 TOPITSCH (1966: 83). For a study of empty norms in pedagogics cf. BEST (1960).
179 PETZELT (1964: 281 f.).
ISO Cf. SCHMITT (1971) for numerous examples of pseudo-normative empty formulas in recent German
religious pedagogy.
181 PARETO (1963: 1117, § 1686).
198 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

made by their authors and adherents l82 . A careful analysis of the empirical content of such
normative phrases serves not only to identify their world view, but is a necessary
precondition for critical judgement and for making responsible decisions for or against
them183 • Before we can test the validity, implications and feasibility of an educational aim,
it is first necessary to discover which psychic dispositions are intended l84 •
The metatheoretical problematic of justifying educational aims is - as already
mentioned l85 - no different from that of justifying ideals (as a sub-class of norms) in
general. To have a clear idea of the problem we must take into account the different
metatheoretical conceptions of the characteristic features of normative statements. The
three most important such conceptions are treated below186 •
The meta-ethical naturalists maintain that normative concepts can be fully defined by
means of descriptive concepts, that normative statements can be translated without loss of
meaning into empirical statements, and that accordingly normative statements can also be
derived from empirical ones. Norms and value judgements are viewed as disguised factual
statements, which like all factual statements can be true or false. According to this view,
for example, the meaning of the normative statement, "Austrian schools ... should equip
young people with the knowledge and skills necessary for their lives and future
professions"187, is nothing more than the normative analogue of the descriptive statement
"The Austrian Parliament has decided (or: the law prescribes ...) that schools should
equip young people with certain knowledge and skills". According to this view, the
problem of justifying aims would be confined to the question of whether the lawmaker
actually expressed this demand - something that can be answered in purely empirical
terms. Thus the is-ought probleml88 does not exist for the naturalist.
The meta-ethical intuitionists (or non-naturalists) are of the opinion that there is an
essential difference between normative and descriptive statements and that normative
statements cannot be derived from descriptive statements or justified in purely empirical
terms. In their opinion, basic principles of valuation, as well as basic norms, are recognized
as intuitively self-evident. Value judgements or normative statements derived from these
norms or principles are in their view neither true nor false, but rather valid or invalid.
The meta-ethical non-cognitivists (or emotivists) teach that normative statements
mainly fulfill a practical function. Their chief characteristic is not that they describe or

182 Cf. KOMISAR and McCLELlAN (1961: 200 ff.); TOPITSCH (1966: 84).
183 For an analysis and critique of the educational aim "maturity" (Mundigkeit) d. SPAEMANN (1971);
ROSSNER (1974: 47 ff.); BREZINKA (1981a: 151 ff.).
184 On the logical and empirical testing of educational aims d. HASEWFF (1960).
185 Cf. p. 182 above.
186 Cf. FRANKENA (1973: 96 ff.); HOSPERS (1961: 526 ff.); ZEDLER (1976: 84 ff.).
187 Austrian Law for the Organization of Schools of 25 July 1962, § 2.
188 For an analysis of this problem d. MORSCHER (1974a).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 199

establish a certain content (Le. that they have solely cognitive character), but rather that
they express certain demands or proposals l89 • For that reason they cannot be true or false.
In the radical variant of this doctrine, normative statements (and value judgements) are
said to be devoid of empirical content and are interpreted solely as emotive responses and
as means to evoke such responses in others. This view has proven untenable and today has
few adherents l9o • In its moderate version, non-cognitivism still maintains that normative
sentences should be distinguished from empirical or descriptive statements (and is
therefore occasionally called "non-descriptivism"), but at the same time it asserts that these
sentences have an empirical (or descriptive) content to which an ought demand of
normative character is then added. (The same is true of value judgements: they have an
empirical content which is supplemented by a valuating character).
I believe that moderate non-cognitivism offers the most reasonable conception191 of
normative statements and proceed on this basis. This conception views norms as "ought"
sentences or demands which have a greater or lesser empirical content and can be
rationally justified or criticized. This view rests on the empirical fact that people generally
believe their norms (and value judgements) "will stand up under scrutiny in the light of the
most careful thinking and the best knowledge, and that rival judgements will not stand up
under such scrutiny"I92.
The expression '~ustification of norms" is ambiguous. Much confusion and
unnecessary polemics can be traced to the failure to clearly distinguish among its
meanings. "Justification of norms" can mean the following: 1. logical (or deductive)
justification; 2. justification through a recognized (or valid) norm-setting procedure; 3.
justification in the sense of providing empirical reasons (or "justifying norms in a content-
evaluative sense"). Only this third meaning refers to the actual problematic of justifying
norms l93 .
In logical justification only the question of logical consequence (derivability or
deducibility) is taken into considerationl94 • This means that a normative statement is
considered to be justified when it can be derived from valid normative statements. This
ultimately assumes taking recourse to the highest normative statements, basic norms or
normative basis statements which cannot themselves be derived from other statements and
which must be assumed to be already established. The justification of such basic norms

189 Cf. STEVENSON (1944) and HARE (1972), two of the main representatives of moderate emotivism.
190 For a critique of this viewct. V. KRAFT (1951: 183 ff.); HOSPERS (1%1: 562 ff.); TOULMIN (1968);
BAIER (1974: 41 ff.); NAJDER (1975: 98 ff.).
191 a. FRANKENA (1973: 106 ff.); ZECHA (1972) and (1977: 148 ff.).
192 FRANKENA (1973: 107 ff.).
193 Cf. WEINBERGER (1970: 222 ff.)
194 Cf. ZECHA (1972: 590 ff.) and (1977: 144 ff.).
200 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

cannot be carried out logically, but only content-evaluatively in the sense of the third
concept of justificationl95 •
Ignorance of the limits (or misconceptions about the possibility) of deductively
justifying educational aims is still widespread in pedagogics. For example, one need only
examine attempted derivations of educational aims from factual statements or assertions
that educational aims high in content can be derived from educational aims low in content
(Le. that "concrete" aims can be derived from "general" or "highest" aims). The following
statements exemplify fallacious deductions of "ought" from "is": "If we ... have recognized
that problem-solving thought processes and cognitive performances are the most
productive abilities which man can develop in the cognitive sphere, it is precisely these
which should be developed early in the child"; "If... the sciences foreshadowing and
shaping the future... have become more important than those studying the past, the
former should be included in the curriculum earlier and more intensively than before"I%.
To this sort of thinking belong attempts to solve the problem of the transition from "is" to
"ought" in such a way that the existence of this problem is denied; it is claimed that "in the
human sciences there is no value-free seeing, but rather valuations are already
contained. .. in seeing"197. "Facts and norms" are supposedly "inseparably joined" and
descriptive statements should "not be separated from ... norms", because this would rob
norms of their validity or justificationl98 • This (logically justified) scepticism as to the
possibility of deriving norms from descriptive statements l99 leads to factual statements
being ascribed normative character and normative statements being ascribed factual
charaetertJO.
The fallacy that substantively rich educational aims can be validated or justified by
deriving them from substantively weak "higher" or "more general" aims is widespread in
normative didaetics 201 • Such arguments ignore the elementary logical insight that a derived
statement cannot contain anything more than was stated in the premises from which it was
derived. Substantively rich educational aims can thus never be obtained through any
conceivable process of derivation (deduction). Instead we must either abandon

195 For a basic discussion of this point d. DUBISLAV (1937).

196 ROTH (1971: 43).
197 BOLLNOW (1974: 124); similarly (1971: 701 ff.). No doubt this applies to subjective experience (d.
REININGER 1946: 29 f.), but 1. the sciences refrain from the use of subjective value experiences and 2.
valuations are not norms, i.e. they say nothing about "what ought to be".
198 DlLTHEY (1895: 267).
199 DILTHEY (1961: 10) is by contrast far removed from this scepticism when he promises that he will
"derive . .. ideals from the nature of our folk and time".
200 For a defense of this position d. BOLLNOW (1974), for a critique ZECHA (1977: 185 f.).
201 Cf. for example MEYER (1972) and (19713). For a critique of this d. HlLGENHEGER (1973) and
(1973a); ZECHA (1977: 172 ff.).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 201

educational aims low in content or supplement them with additional characteristics (often
referred to as "interpretation") to increase their content.

Take as an example the normative statement, "Pupils should acquire the ability to
realize the freedoms guaranteed them by the constitution"202. We will not be able to derive
a single more specific educational aim from this norm, although it is possible to interpret it
by listing the freedoms or rights named in the constitution and by assigning to them certain
dispositional complexes which will presumably enable pupils to take advantage of these
rights (e.g. freedom of belief, freedom of thought, the right to raise and educate children).
Of course the educational aims which are derived from such an interpretation of basic
rights can hardly suffice to provide norms for the whole curriculum of a national school
system, but they do serve as a criterion for criticizing or excluding incompatible
instructional aims and methods. In any case it would be absurd to speak of "deriving"
educational aims and to believe in their derivability when in fact the only logical possibility
is to set norms or interpret set norms and to justify them on the basis of a valuation of their
content.
In the second sense the word "justification" means that a normative statement is valid
because a norm-giving agent (rule-maker or legislator) has established it after carrying out
a prescribed norm-setting procedure. In this case justification does not refer to the
substantive grounds which are (or could be) given in the norm-setting process, but rather
to the procedural correctness of the manner in which a norm has been set (e.g. a majority
decision following all applicable procedural rules). This sense can be more accurately
described as formal legitimation. One also speaks of "procedural legitimation"203. Such
legitimation provides a legal basis which can lead the addressees of a norm to accept it,
but does not provide factual reasons in support of the norm contents. The norms applying
to norm-setting procedures themselves create more normative problems, as for example is
shown by the conflict over the co-determination (or participation) of people affected by
instructional aims (e.g. teachers, pupils or parents) in their formulation and ratification204 •
Since these problems apply more to the procedures for setting aims than to their actual
justification, we do not need to consider them.
The actual problem of justifying norms concerns the justification of norms on the
basis of a valuation of their content. This problem combines both rational processes and
acts of will. The degree to which empirical knowledge plays a role in such justification is a
matter of controversy.

202 Based loosely on a formulation of the German Educational Council (1970: 29).
203 Cf. ZEDLER (1976: 187 ff.) and CUBE (1977: 95 f.) for studies of formal legitimation in education.
204 Cf. for example RASCHERT (1975: 76 ff.).
202 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Some supporters of empirical educational science have created the impression that it
is completely impossible to justify values and norms on the basis of empirical knowledge.
Thus in cases of conflicts between two norms (or normative proposals) it would also be
impossible to determine whether empirical reasons speak more for one than the other.
The only "legitimizing instance" responsible for justifying a norm's content (as opposed to
formal legitimation by procedural means) would thus be "personal belief'205. Those who
agree with a certain norm would be "just as right as all others who espouse different,
possibly contradictory norms". There is no behavior "that is objectively ... good or bad"206.
Such statements are extremely vague. If they are simply intended to mean that norms can
be set but not scientifically proven and that they are based on choices from among several
alternative possibilities, then there is no reason to disagree. However, something so
obvious should be expressed more clearly: in particular, there should be no grounds for
confusing the right to free expression with the question of justifying the contents of
opinions (in this case, of normative statements). If on the other hand the above statements
mean that there are no more or less objective (i.e. factual, independent of subjective
wishes) grounds, their epistemological position is untenable. In utter disregard for the
empirical evidence to the contrary, the rational components of value judgements and
norms are quite unjustifiably underestimated 207 by the assertion that in regard to "moral
views ... everyone ... is equally right''208.
Sweeping judgements of this kind are misleading and have dangerous practical
consequences because they ignore the existence of essential distinctions. Referring to this
problem, JONAS COHN wrote that "relativism is correct in maintaining that there can be
no purely logical proof of the validity of extra-logical values, aims or norms, i.e. there is no
contradiction in denying the validity of any given ethical, aesthetic or other value.
However, this does not mean that there is no way to make a scientific decision about their
validity"209. Rational argumentation about value judgements and norms cannot be confined
to purely logical or deductive arguments any more than can rational arguments about
empirical assertions. Rather, we can and must rely primarily on empirical knowledge21o.
The share that knowledge and decisions play in justifying norms can be specified as
follows 211 :

205 CUBE (1977: 96).

206 ROSSNER (1975: 51); similarly (1977: 48).
207 ROSSNER (1975: 52).
208 Cf. e.g. AUSUBEL (1971).
209 COHN (1919: 49).
210 Cf. in this regard KAUFMANN (1966: 254 ff.).
211 After WEINBERGER (1970: 223 f.).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 203

1. Although the determination of a norm's content is indeed dependent on knowledge

(empirical knowledge, information), determination is not itself knowledge, but rather an
act of will.
2. "Norm justification is based on knowledge of the societal situation in which the norm
being set is to intervene".
3. "Establishing norms is always an act of choice between different... possible
regulations .... The explanation of possible regulations being chosen among - in which an
act of norm-setting establishes the chosen alternative as a norm - is a process of cognition:
an objective framework is recognized within which the various alternatives for norm
regulation are spun out". However, the choice of a norm is not determined by cognition
alone, ''but by the system of ends of the one creating the norm, dependent on the
orientation of his will".
4. A key rational element in weighing justifications is empirical knowledge (or the
conjectures based on such knowledge) of the effects that norms will have. The analysis and
valuation of a norm's foreseeable effects using available knowledge about mankind, its
situation and the aspects of reality to be regulated is essential to both the rational
justification and the rational critique of norms.
As soon as these elementary distinctions are taken into account it becomes apparent
that deliberate acts of choice and commitment are by no means the sole basis for
establishing or recognizing norms, but rather that broadly-based empirical knowledge and
judgements of their content, as well as the motivation to accept them can play an
important role2l2 . For reasons of space it is not possible to treat the many interesting
special problems relating to the justification and critique of educational aims213• I must
close this section with a brief reference to the remaining equally-important sub-areas of
normative philosophy of education.

NORMATIVE ETHICS FOR EDUCATORS AND THE NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF

TEACHING CONTENTS AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1. Educators themselves are the most important variable which can be influenced in
helping educands acquire the psychic states established as educational aims. For that
reason pedagogics has long emphasized the importance of the educator's example and has
called on educators to acquire certain virtues. The theory ofvirtues for educators is based on
the experience that of all the factors influencing the educand before, during and after

212 Basic analytic philosophy texts on this subject are V. KRAFT (1967: 99 ff.); (1951: 183 ff.); (1%3); (1968:
101 ff.); FEIGL (1%9); FRANKENA (1973); BAIER (1974).
213 Important contributions to this are to be found in ZECHA (1977). Cf. also KLAUER (1973: 106 fr.).
204 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

educational actions, the educator's personality is the most important. According to

HERBART, the necessary authority can only be acquired "through the superiority of the
mind ...; it must be present, apart from education itself'214. This means that not only are
professional virtues such as patience, tactfulness and justness important, but that educators
must also possess dispositions to think, feel and act which independently of their
educational actions exemplify the moral and intellectual ideals of the society in which they
live.
In this sense BUBER wrote that "the decisive power to influence" is based on a
"selection of the best aspects of the world as a field of influences affecting man" - aspects
which should be brought together in the personality of the educator. The most important
factor preceding an educational action is the "hidden influence of the personality as a
whole", which presupposes that the educator has already gathered the "constructive powers
of the world ... in himself'215. This argumentation - particularly in times of value
relativism and moral scepticism - can easily lead to unrealistic ideals which morally overtax
the educator216 • However, there is truth in the basic idea that the unplanned everyday
experience of educands in contacts with their educators is generally more important than
are intentional educational actions217•
It can already be seen from this relatively abstract argument that the theory of virtues
for educators has an empirical basis218 • This basis consists of observations of the effect
other people's character and behavior have in helping educands reach the psychic states
chosen as educational aims. Since harmful influences are generally easier to determine
than positive ones, vices and bad habits are more comprehensively and empirically better
researched than are virtues. What is espoused as virtue is in many cases nothing more than
the opposite of a negatively regarded attitude or way of acting. For example, knowledge of
the harmful consequences of cold or unloving treatment of children is used to justify the
norm of warmth as an educational virtue and loving attention as an educational
responsibility. These norms cannot be derived solely from the above-mentioned empirical
knowledge of negative consequences. However, they can be empirically and logically
justified as soon as a norm has been set stating that the phenomena considered harmful
should be avoided.
2. What we have already said about the theory of virtues is also valid for the theory of
the duties of educators or the ethics of educational actions. Between these two aspects of

214 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 251) (my italics).

215 BUBER (1953: 23 f. and 45).
216 On morally overtaxing professional educators, cf. BREZINKA (1955) and (1988: 34 and 167 f.).
217 Cf. BREZINKA (1981: 209 ff.).
218 On the theory of virtues for educators ef. SALZMANN (1806); F. SCHNEIDER (1940); SPRANGER
(1951); WOLF (1962); BOLLNOW (1968a: 44 ff.); DERBOLAV (1971: 136 ff.).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 205

ethics for educators there exist very close ties, since virtues are in essence behavioral
dispositions. From the perspective of psychology, the inference that virtues exist is
justifiable only if corresponding behaviors actually occur. From an ethical perspective the
role of virtue consists in helping people behave virtuously.
like the theory of virtues, the theory of duties is based on the ends-means schema.
Thus attitudes and behavioral patterns which seem appropriate for promoting morally
good ends are set as norms, insofar as they neither contradict higher moral norms nor
produce unwanted, morally bad side effects. Similarly, there are injunctions against
attitudes and behavioral patterns which would hinder the realization of desired ends219•
The empirical basis for rules enjoining or proscribing behavior thus consists of sets of
technological statements. Moral judgements on particular educational aims are, however,
an insufficient basis for formulating an ethics of educational actions, because different
means (which could have different effects on educands) can be selected to achieve a
respective aim. For that reason, potential technical norms must be judged on the basis of
higher moral norms. Examples of this are the norm "to leave individuality as intact as
possible"22O; the norm that each educational action should be judged by "experience of the
other side"221, i.e. by empathy with educands; the norm that "all education must take place
in a climate of love"222; the norm of "responsibility to and for the educand" or of the
"authenticity of the pedagogical connection between the educational demands of a subject
and the educand's consciousness of questions"223.
Higher norms of this kind are frequently called (moral) ''principles'' of education. The
theory of duties is among other things concerned with principles for the moral evaluation
of concrete educational situations, the educational actions taking place in them and the
given technical possibilities for educating. As with educational aims, educational principles
vary greatly in their normative content. Similarly, many educational principles include
normative statements which are practically bereft of any content. However, general
principles are never sufficient to establish moral norms for educational actions. These
principles can serve no other purpose than to act as guidelines and must therefore be
supplemented by concrete behavioral norms applying to concrete alternatives for acting in
typical educational situations224 . It is not enough for pedagogical statement systems to
simply repeat general ethical statements on responsibility, fairness, respect for a partner's

219 SALZMANN (1780) provides many examples of this.

220 HERBART (1913, Vol. 1: 267).
221 BUBER (1953: 35 ff.).
cr.
222 SPRANGER (1951: 416); for an interpretation (1958: 80 ff.).
223 DERBOLAV (1971: 134).
224 Preliminary empirical work on this subject is to be found in WINNEFELD (1957: 128 ff.); TAUSCH
(1973). Cf. also the research reports of GERNER (1972) and NICKEL (1974).
206 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

dignity, etc. What is needed is a specific catalogue of profession-specific duties for

educators which can guide them in testing the moral aspects of everything they do or fail to
do in fulfilling their duties225 • Such a catalogue of duties must constantly be reanalyzed and
adapted to changing conditions, but we should not be so awed by the rapid change going
on in our time that we do not even dare to promulgate and enforce moral norms for
educators.
3. The problems involved in normative philosophy of teaching content (or "curriculum
theory") are too broad to even be sketched here226 •
In recent years the desire to transform this into a quasi-scientific theory has led to
the creation of pedagogical statement systems which in their lack of content, long-
windedness and bombast surpass everything that has previously been written in the way of
boastful pedagogics227. Apparently the intimidating, scientific-sounding verbosity of
curriculum theory has led some authors and many readers to lose sight of the simple fact
that the formulation and justification of teaching plans is a branch of normative philosophy
of education and that the results of these studies should not be passed off as those of
empirical educational science. At present, "curricula" and their justification offer a most
rewarding subject matter for the analytic-epistemological philosophy of pedagogical
statement systems228•
4. So numerous are the problems involved in the normative philosophy of educational
organizations that I must limit myself to mentioning only a few. These problems begin at
the level of the great political issues concerning education - the state monopoly in
education, the length of mandatory school attendance, school forms and degrees, teacher
training and supervision - and continue down to such specific questions as the
authorization of textbooks, tests, grading, etc. There are a wide variety of problems in need
of solution, and the pros and cons must be weighed before we can make effective
decisions. One need only think of the current and topical conflicts concerning such
problems as comprehensive schools, the combination of professional school and on-the-job
training, the integration of traditionally distinct types of schools, etc. Or consider the
problems entailed by the postulate of "equality of educational opportunity"229.
In all these issue areas it is imperative that we arrive at value judgements and
propose norms. As much as possible the results of scientific research - including those of

225 Beginnings can be found in SALZMANN (1806); scattered throughout HERBART; COHN (1919: 199 ff.);
F. SCHNEIDER (1940); MAKARENKO (1974); DREIKURS and SOLTZ (1966); BREZINKA (1988a);
for recent Soviet contributions cf. TSCHERNOKOSOWA (1977).
226 For an overview cf. BLANKERTZ (1975); HESSE and MANZ (1972).
227 For a critique cf. NICKLIS (1972).
228 As an example cf. the critique of the justification of the North-Rhine Westfalen guidelines for political
instruction made by LAUFS (1976).
229 Cf. KLEINBERGER (1967); KlAUER (19n).
 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 207

educational science - should be used in justifying such judgements and norms. However,
we should not forget that we are at all times dealing with normative philosophical
arguments which, even when much material from the empirical sciences is utilized, cannot
be fashioned into a purely empirical process of testing and confirmation. Honesty dictates
that in pedagogical statement systems of this kind there should be a clear specification of
the limits of empirical knowledge, the value system used to interpret this knowledge and
where value judgements and normative statements begin and empirical statements end23O•
If we do not wish to deceive government policy-makers, who are largely dependent on the
results of the normative philosophy of educational organizations, then we should not pass
off as scientifically confirmed knowledge statements which are no more than perhaps well-
founded opinions - opinions that are ultimately based on specific world-view and moral
presuppositions.

230 An example of a violation of this rule is found in EIGLER and KRUMM (1972), who, reporting on the
results of a poll on homework, suddenly call for the introduction of full-time schools (p. 127), although the
questionnaire which they used did not even touch on this issue. They unjustifiably imply that their demand
is based on the answers of the parents and school administrators polled.
III. PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS
(German: Praktische Piidagogik; French: pedagogie pratique; Italian: pedagogia
pratica; Spanish: pedagogfa practica; Russian: prakticeskaja teorija vospitanija)

If I have not interpreted the lessons of history falsely, it seems

to me that experience shows there was never a large, thriving
people that was not carried by some sort of belief, even if it
consisted of nothing more than a lofty sense of patriotism. And
if from the standpoint of science, doubt can and must attack
every principle, from the standpoint of social utility we must
act calmly and leave untouched the principles which guarantee
the prosperity of our social system.
VILFREDO PARETO (1906)1

PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS AND SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Educational science, viewed historically, developed out of practical theories of

education, but the emergence of educational science has not made practical theories
superfluous. The first pioneers of empirical educational science expressly emphasized that
practical educational teachings were not only justified, but also indispensable. These
scholars did not seek to do away with such practical theories and replace them with
educational science, but rather hoped that they could be improved using the new
knowledge which educational science was to provide. They did, however, combat the
unjustified claim that practical pedagogics was already educational science - a science
which was first to be created by applying scientific methods to educational problems. This
positive appreciation of educational teachings is particularly to be found in the writings of
the younger OTTO WILLMANN, EMILE DURKHEIM, and RUDOLF LOCHNER.
For WILLMANN (1839-1920) the justification for the existence of educational
teachings results from the difference between theoretical and practical approaches to
education2 • Methodologically, he bases this justification on the unbridgeable gap between
laws and rules: laws are statements about what is; rules prescribe what should happen3• As
early as 1875, WILLMANN had conceived of scientific pedagogics as an explanatory

1 PARETO (1976: 166).

2 Cf. PFEFFER (1962: 173 ff.); HAMANN (1965: 74 ff.).
3 WILLMANN (1875: 17 ff.) and (1876: 263 f.).
210 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

science of facts and practical pedagogics as a system of rules and norms for action which by
nature cannot be derived from scientific knowledge. Since according to WILLMANN
mankind has been "charged" with the educational task, it is indeed justified in promul-
gating "theories of the art of educating" for this purpose. He characterized such theories as
normative, "postulatory", or "regulative". Their style is "imperative"4.
Educational teachings give instructions for educators to act correctly and effectively.
They "determine what should happen, of course only under certain conditions, since this
cannot be simply established in general terms"s. Educational teachings are "not universal,
but rather are bound to a particular ground"6, a "particular society", and a particular
historical situation. The validity of their statements is temporally and spatially limited. As
to content, there are considerable differences among educational teachings. They can be
more or less broadly based, and more or less thoroughly worked out. They range "from the
instruction that something must be done in a certain way on up to an ideal
conceptualization of an improved education"7. Common to them is the task of specifying
how education should be carried out in a particular society under particular historical
conditions. At the same time they remain bound to the living ethos and existing social
conditions of that society. However, this does not mean that educational teachings cannot
also "turn to the reform of society, church, state, etc."s.
In a 1911 article, DURKHEIM (1858-1917), too, assumes that it is possible to reflect
on education with either scientific or practical aims in mind. In the case of scientific aims,
attempts are made to describe and explain "what is" or "has been". These endeavors result
in scientific theories. In other cases one attempts to establish what ought to be done.
Attention is directed at the future. It is not a matter of depicting current practices, but
rather of prescribing future actions. DURKHEIM calls the results of these endeavors
"practical theories" (theories pratiques). He calls the scientific theory of education "science
of education" (La science de ['education) and practical theories "pedagogy" (pedagogie).
"Pedagogy is something other than the science of education"9.
"Practical theories" occupy a place between "art" (in the sense of "practicing an
ability" or praxis) and science. These theories are conceived when people "reflect upon the
actions that are performed, not to understand or explain them, but to assess their worth;
whether they are as they should be, whether it would be useful to change them and in what
way, or whether one should replace them completely with new procedures". The concern is

4 WILLMANN (1875: 18 f.) and (1876: 288).

5 WILLMANN (1875: 22).
6 WILLMANN (1876: 290).
7 WILLMANN (1876: 289).
8 WILLMANN (1876: 290).
9 DURKHEIM (1956: 100).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 211

with a combination of thoughts whose aim is to provide orientation for action. ''Practical
theories" are "programs of action ': Pedagogy, too, is viewed by DURKHEIM as a "practical
theory" of this kind. "It does not study systems of education scientifically, but it reflects on
them in order to provide the activity of the educator with guiding ideas'tlO. Pedagogy thus
has the aim of guiding educators' behavior11 •
DURKHEIM made special mention of the reformist quality inherent in "pedagogy".
The conditions and practices of both past and present are usually held in low esteem by
authors of "practical theories" of education, who primarily emphasize their deficiencies.
Almost all the great pedagogical writers - RABELAlS, MONTAIGNE, ROUSSEAU and
PESTALOZZI - were revolutionaries: they rebelled against the educational practices of
their contemporaries and mentioned both past and new educational systems only to reject
them l2 • WILLMANN judged educational teachings in a similar light when he remarked
that "in most cases pedagogical reflection is evoked by the practical desire to improve
existing educational mores and forms, if not to fully renew them, and is therefore ...
aimed at shaping them for the future. Reformistic endeavors, however, never come to
proper terms with the past"13.
Having characterized "pedagogy" as "practical theory", DURKHEIM discussed the
objection that a "practical theory" is only possible and admissible when it can be based on
an already developed science, of which pedagogy would be merely an application. He
admitted that educational science hardly existed and that sociology and psychology had not
yet been extensively developed. Should we then leave "pedagogy" waiting until these
sciences have made greater progress? DURKHEIM's answer was as realistic as it was
committed: We cannot wait patiently until the sciences supply us with results! We have
already begun to educate and we must carry on with it! We must come to terms with
educational problems because we must live!
"At many points our traditional system of education is no longer in harmony with our
ideas and our needs. We have a choice, then, only between the following two alternatives:
either try to preserve the practices that the past has left to us, anyway, even though they no
longer answer the exigencies of the situation, or to undertake resolutely to reestablish the
disturbed harmony by finding out what the necessary modifications are"14.
To choose the first alternative is a futile endeavor and leads nowhere. But how else
can we discover the changes needed in educational systems if not by using reason? "Only
the thinking mind can fill in the gaps in the tradition, when the latter has been faulty. Now,

10 DURKHEIM (1956: 102).

11 DURKHEIM (1973: 58).
12 DURKHEIM (1956: 99 f.).
13 WILLMANN (1957: 36).
14 DURKHEIM (1956: 103).
212 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

what is pedagogy if not reflection applied as systematically as possible to the phenomena of

education, with the aim of regulating its development? No doubt, we do not have at our
disposal all the elements that would be desirable for resolving the problem; but that is no
reason for not seeking to resolve it - because it must be resolved. We can only do our best,
collect as many instructive facts as we can, interpret them as methodically as we can, in
order to reduce to a minimum the chances of error .... Nothing is so vain and sterile as
that scientific puritanism which, under the pretext that science is not fully established,
counsels abstention and recommends to men that they stand by as indifferent witnesses, or
at least resigned ones, at the march of events .... No doubt, to act under these conditions,
one runs risks .... Science, as advanced as it may be, would not know how to eliminate
them. All that can be asked of us is to put all our science, as imperfect as it may be, and all
our mental ability into the anticipation of these risks, as well as we can. And this is
precisely what the role of pedagogy is"l5.
These quotes show that DURKHEIM, while conceiving of "pedagogy" as a practical
theory, wanted to base it as much as possible on the results of the sciences and of critical
thinking. Even in its normative statements, pedagogy should build upon knowledge of
historically developed reality. In the past, "pedagogy has too often been only a form of
utopian literature"l6. DURKHEIM to the contrary wanted to free it of its outdated,
confining utopian traits so that educators could really use it as an aid to their daily practice
and its many difficulties. It was of course quite clear to him that the development of such a
statement system would necessitate unusually manifold and complex intellectual
accomplishments. Although he had described the rules of the scientific method for
sociology in exact terms l7, it seemed to him that there was hardly any satisfactory way to
"lay down for pedagogy an abstract code of methodological rules"l8.
DURKHEIM's metatheoretical views on education remained as little known in
German-speaking countries as those of the young and critical WILLMANN. It was only in
1934 that RUDOLF LOCHNER (1895-1978) - who wrote independently of his
predecessors but in agreement with their programs - published the first textbook
consistently treating educational science as an empirical science. Yet, this pioneer of a
stringent educational science always maintained that educational teachings (German:
Erziehungslehren) were indispensable and deserved to be taken seriously. In his view, "the
ultimate aim of educational teachings" lay "not in factual knowledge", "but in action.
Educational teachings are based on the sciences, among them educational science; their task

15 DURKHEIM (1956: 104).

16 DURKHEIM (1956: 110).
17 Cf. DURKHEIM (1965).
18 DURKHEIM (1956: 112).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 213

is to determine what ought to be, to establish and recommend aims, and to judge and prescribe
w'O's of acting"19.
LOCHNER understood "teachings" in this context to be "an ordered summary of
advice, recommendations, or norms on how to. . . organize, control and improve in a
subject area". "A teaching raises the claim to set norms". Its norms prescribe actions and
the way they are to be implemented; however, they also serve as a "criterion in judging and
valuating actions, behavioral patterns and situations"20.
An educational teaching depicts "how one should educate, how the educator should
behave and what a person acting as an educator has to take into consideration when
seeking to achieve educational results. Educational teachings are concerned with aims,
norms and also their formulation in easily-grasped terms. They tend not toward research,
but rather toward aids for practical action". Educational teachings "are intended to
influence the educational praxis found in a particular group, i.e. to dispense advice on
securing, broadening, restructuring and improving it"21.
LOCHNER's ideas about the logical character of educational teachings go farther
than those of DURKHEIM. The latter did not in principle reject the idea that "pedagogy"
is an "applied" theory which "derives" practical consequences from the basic sciences of
psychology, sociology and educational science, but only dismissed it as being unrealistic for
the time being, i.e. as long as these sciences continued contributing so little to solving
educational problems22. This attitude is connected to the fact that he, like his predecessor,
AUGUSTE COMTE, the founder of positivism, did not respect the logical gulf separating
factual statements from norms. Instead he believed it possible by means of empirical
research to both evaluate and alter morals and to find scientific rules for practical
actions23 • LOCHNER, on the other hand, found that in principle an "educational teaching"
could not be viewed as an "applied science", "because educational teachings also have
other foundations in addition to scientific ones"24. In his opinion, educational teachings
rely - or at least should rely - on the research results of educational science and other
empirical sciences, as well as on logic, ethics and the "thought processes of educational
philosophy". If we are to determine the aims of education "we must above all take into
account contemporary life". By this he meant "needs and demands entering into our
consciousness", "world-view and religious ties" and "opinions, ideas, beliefs, wishes and

19 LOCHNER (1934: 2).

20 LOCHNER (1947: 7 f.).
21 LOCHNER (1963: 511).
22 DURKHEIM (1956: 102 ff.).
23 Cf. DURKHEIM (1967: 114 ff., esp. 121). For a critique of this position cf. ROSS (1933: 258 ff.); BRECHT
(1961: 206 ff.).
24 LOCHNER (1963: 512).
214 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

experiences of the surrounding society", of standard-setting "cultural representatives",

political leaders, "professionals", etc. An educational teaching is "conceived in terms of the
specific way of life which it endeavors to serve". It is "always bound to a particular time and
place and tends to be realized in concrete terms"25. However, the greater "the sphere for
which an educational teaching is constructed, the less concrete can be its rules and
statements,,26. Another "source for formulating its advice" is "the educational and other life-
experiences of the theoretician who drafts the educational teaching".
There is considerable freedom in choosing the themes of an educational teaching.
There is "no absolute necessity that under all circumstances one or another must be
considered, inevitably formulated and taken into account". However, LOCHNER does
single out three central "areas": the teleological, methodical and organizational domains.
In accordance with the practical intent of educational teachings, he lays his main emphasis
on methodical advice and its justification.
LOCHNER's achievement consists in his being the first to carefully analyze the
pedagogical statement system known as "educational teachings", an analysis in which he
does justice to both the non-scientific character of pedagogics and to the possibility of
constructing it in close proximity to science. He thereby overcame (at least in
programmatic terms) the methodical and substantive isolation of educational teachings
from the sciences and made clear that scientists need not be ashamed to occupy
themselves with such teachings. He called for the application of science to the
development of educational teachings wherever possible and saw the practical use of
educational science in precisely its "making an educational teaching moderate, sensible
and contemporarily relevant and open to the future"27.
In addition to WILLMANN, DURKHEIM and LOCHNER, as the most important
pioneers of empirical educational science, RICHARD MEISTER (1881-1964) also
emphasized the autonomy and particular worth of "pedagogical theories of the art of
educating" alongside of "scientific pedagogics". He distinguished between a theoretical
science of education and "theories of the art of educating" as practical theories for
education. "Pedagogics as science is the theory of education as a cultural fact"28. It "is
fundamentally world-view neutral"29. By contrast, "theories of the art of educating" form a
''very concrete and therefore never universally valid ... system of norms which regulates
education in a particular cultural area at a particular time". It serves as "the foundation of

25 LOCHNER (1963: 514 f.).

26 LOCHNER (1963: 523).
27 LOCHNER (1960: 17); in NICOLIN (1969: 421).
28 MEISTER (1947b: 65)
29 MEISTER (1965: 21).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 215

education in the cultural sphere in and for which it has been created"JO. In MEISTER's
opinion, "pedagogics as a theory of the art of educating" must make concrete normative
statements about the aim of education, Le. about a particular hierarchy of values which
pupils are to acquire. "Every system of values is above all based on a criterion for a
hierarchy of values". According to him, such a criterion "can be provided only by a specific
world view (Weltanschauung), i.e. by a conviction regarding man's determination and the
choice of a dominant value based on this conviction"31. Therefore, theories of the art of
educating are necessarily determined by world views.

THE DEMARCATION AND DESIGNATION OF PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

After what has been said here about the tasks and characteristic features of practical
theories of education, it is not difficult to demarcate them from educational science.
Practical theories of education have a practical rather than a scientific aim: they are
created to equip educators with the practical knowledge which they need for rational
educational actions. They refer to a societally, culturally, institutionally limited sphere of
educational action. Formulated from a world-view standpoint as normative theories, they
contain both normative and descriptive statements. They should be free of scientific and
philosophical ballast not serving their immediate purpose32. In summary, a theory of
practical pedagogics is a mixed normative-descriptive statement system which should inform
particular groups of educators in particular socio-cultural situations about their educational
tasks and the means needed to fulfill them, and which should inspire educators to educational
action in accordance with prevailing world views and morals.
Demarcating practical theories of education from normative philosophy of education
is more difficult. Although the normative philosophy of education is also a mixed
normative-descriptive statement system, it is limited in its functions. It must justify certain
classes of value judgements about educationally relevant phenomena and promulgate and
justify non-technical (in particular moral) norms pertaining both to the ends of education
and to education as a means. Normative philosophy of education should not only answer
questions relating to values and norm-setting, but also rationally justify its answers. All the
basic world-view and moral norms essential for the purposes of practical pedagogics are
assumed to be valid and are not subjected to renewed questioning or explication. To the
extent that in formulating practical pedagogics one can find support in a normative

30 MEISTER (1947b: 55).

31 MEISTER (1965: 20 f., similarly 55).
32 Cf. MILL (1974: 947). "And art in general consists of the truths of science, arranged in the most convenient
order for practice, instead of the order which is the most convenient for thought".
216 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

philosophy of education, its conclusions may be taken into consideration, but this is not
absolutely necessary, since world-view and moral norms can be taken directly from
prevailing world views and moral teachings. The main body of relevant pedagogics is made
up of technical norms of education, which are based on the given ends being pursued and
on the technological hypotheses provided by educational science. There thus exists a
division of labor between these three areas: the relevant educational knowledge of ends
and means developed in educational science and in the normative philosophy of education
(insofar as such knowledge exists) is utilized in practical pedagogics with respect to a
certain area of educational action under certain socio-cultural conditions. It is then
developed into a statement system oriented toward action or practical application.
Educational theoreticians of many countries agree on the usefulness of distinguishing
between scientific and practical theories of education33• Finding an unambiguous name for
a practical theory of education is, however, more difficult. The traditional German
expression "educational teaching" (Erziehungslehre) is unsatisfactory, because it requires
additional explanation if it is to be properly understood. Indeed, it suggests only that
statement systems are meant which are not subsumed under the concept of science.
Furthermore, it is hampered by the one-sided conception fostered by scientific
historiography, that an "educational teaching" is a prescientific statement system with an
underlying scientific intent; Le. that it represents the unsuccessful or misguided theories of
people on a naive level of consciousness and that it has already been made obsolete by
educational science. Anyone reading or hearing the word "educational teaching" will
hardly recognize the great variety existing in non-scientific educational statement systems,
especially regarding the degree to which they are based on science or have been conceived
on the basis of rules applying to science. In addition, the term "Erziehungslehre" is for the
most part untranslateable into other languages.
Under these circumstances it seems to me appropriate to search for a more precise
term. The most obvious choice would be to fall back on the word "pedagogics" and to
make it more precise by means of additional specification. This is justified because
"pedagogics" is the traditional designation for a practical theory of education, for a
"practically oriented theory of the art of education which seeks to directly contribute to
action"34. The use of the same word to designate scientific theories of education has
resulted in the linguistic and intellectual confusion which has plagued work on both
scientific and practical theories of education to this day. This confusion was caused by a

33 Cf. for Germany DOHMEN (1966); for England HIRST (1963) and (1966), O'CONNOR (1957), BEST
(1965); for Holland STELLWAG (1967: 208 ff.); for the United States ARCHAMBAULT (1965),
AUSUBEL (1953); BRAUNER (1964), NEWSOME (1964) and (1967), CHRISTENSEN (1981); for
Japan MURAl (1969: 70 ff.).
34 DOPP-VORWALD (1964: 94).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 217

misunderstanding of the logical character of practical theories and the claims to scienticity
made by educational theorists themselves. On the other hand, if the suggestions for
demarcating these concepts presented here are accepted, there will no longer be cause to
reject the term "pedagogics". The only thing still to be clarified is the choice of an adjective
to render the term more precise.
As far as I can see, the most suitable adjectives are "normative", "applied", "practical",
"pragmatic" and "praxiological". The term "normative pedagogics" does in fact express a
distinction with regard to the empirical science of education, but would cause this term to
be confused with the normative philosophy of education. "Normative pedagogics" is usually
employed with this last meaning in mind 35 • For this reason it is not suitable for our
purposes.
The term "applied pedagogics" would be open to misunderstanding in two regards.
First, it could refer to a technological statement system in the strict sense of the word, Le.
to educational science insofar as it formulates technological statements. Also, it might be
falsely considered analogous to certain scientific disciplines, for example "applied
psychology". At any rate, the practical theory of education does not mean the same thing
that BENEKE meant when he wrote that pedagogics is "for the most part applied
psychology"36. Pedagogics as "applied psychology" would be understood more as a scientific
theory of education. On the other hand, it could also be assumed that "applied pedagogics"
referred to the practical application of theoretical insights, i.e. educational praxis itself.
This error is above all caused by careless usage, to which some scholars even contribute by
designating a "practical endeavor for mankind" as "pedagogics"37 or viewing "pedagogics" as
"an entity encompassing both the practice and theory of education"38. For these reasons the
adjective "applied" is useless for our purposes.
If one stresses more advisedly that "pedagogics" should always refer to theory and
never to praxis, the words "practical", "pragmatic", and "praxiological" should come closest
to the meaning specified here. "Practical" means relating to praxis, to action, useful for
action39 . However, when used in conjunction with "theory", "discipline" or "statement

35 Cf. A. FISCHER (1932b: 160): "Normative pedagogy is in a certain sense applied philosophy, religion,
world view .. ."; SPIELER (1932: 532): "Purely normative pedagogy ... should by all means be classified
under the disciplines of philosophical principles, and to be sure under the disciplines of practical
philosophy"; HEITGER (1975: 733): "Normative pedagogy" is "aimed at giving meaning and justifying
normative statements". Cf. also LASSAHN (1974: 94 If.); E. KONIG (1975: 34 If.). By contrast, MEISTER
(1924: 18) or (1934: 50) uses the term to mean a "theory of the art of educating" or a "pedagogical theory of
the art of educating".
36 BENEKE (1835, Vol. 1: 30 and XIll); similar is DILTHEY (1963: 13).
37 GROOTHOFF (1964: 212).
38 FROESE (1967: 127).
39 From the Greek "praxis" action. Cf. EISLER (1929: 487 f.); HOFFMEISTER (1955: 484);
STOCKHAMMER (1967: 274); BALDWIN (1960: 320).
218 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

system", the word can have two different meanings. First it can simply mean that the
subject matter of such a theory is an action or practice. A practical theory in this sense
would remain confined to a purely theoretical, Le. a descriptive, causal-analytic treatment
of its subject matter. Secondly, however, it can mean that the task of a theory is to provide
norms for action 40 • It is solely this second sense that is referred to when the awkward
expression "practical theory of education" is replaced by the term ''practical pedagogics".
"Practical pedagogics" thus refers to a normative theory of education which is suitable for
praxis or which provides instructions for action.
The word "pragmatic" also means practical, relating to actions, enabling one to act,
serving praxis41 • Since WILHELM FLITNER has already introduced the concept
''pragmatic pedagogics", and thereby has expressly emphasized its normative, norm-
interpreting and norm-criticizing tasks42, there would not seem to be any impediment to
using this term for the practical theory of education. "Pragmatic pedagogics" has the same
meaning as the term "practical pedagogics" in the sense specified above. Both terms could
be used together or as replacements for one another. There is, however, reason for
preferring the term "practical pedagogics". First, in contemporary German the word
''pragmatisch'' (pragmatic) is more ambiguous, less understandable and less common than
the word ''praktisch'' (practicalt3. Second, in the English language, the term normally used
to designate the subject matter referred to here is "practical", whereas "pragmatic" is used
in this sense only by way of exception44 • For that reason the only appropriate terms here
are "practical theory of education" or "praxiology of education". To help promote the
standardization of the international language of pedagogics it would thus be desirable to
give preference to the term "practical pedagogics".
Finally the expression ''praxiologicaf' must be considered. However, it too has a
number of meanings. Some scholars use it in reference to a "science of effective action" in
the sense of a value-free technology45. Others consider it a normative philosophy of human
actions in the sense of a synthesis of normative anthropology and social and cultural
philosophy, having "independent research tasks" and extending to a normative "theory of

40 Failure to take into account the ambiguity of the words "practical" and "pragmatic" seems to have
contributed a great deal to the confusion prevailing in pedagogy and in the metatheory of education. As an
example d. MEISTER (1%5: 58 ff.).
41 From the Greek "pragma" = action. Cf. SCHISCHKOFF (1969: 486); EISLER (1929: 484);
HOFFMEISTER (1955: 483).
42 W. FUTNER (1964: 45).
43 Cf. UIIstein Lexikon (1969: 695).
44 Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 8 (1%1: 1224).
45 Cf. KOTARBINSKI (1%5); OSSOWSKA (1972: 19): "Praxiology compiles rules guaranteeing successful
action which could at one time be in harmony with and at another contradict a moral value for action - a
fact which plays no role in such considerations".
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 219

society as a whole"46. Since in our case neither a value-free, technologically-oriented

educational science nor a normative philosophy of education is intended, but rather a
statement system which pertains to practice and is based on the two above-mentioned
systems, it should at present cause the least misunderstanding if we hold to the term
"practical pedagogics". "Practical pedagogics" is not only the oldest (and was formerly also
the most widely used47 ) term, but under this name there already exist many contributions
to the practical theory of education which can still be considered exemplary for this type of
pedagogical statement system48 •

HERMENEUTICAL PEDAGOGICS AS PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

In German-speaking countries it has been primarily the adherents of so-called

"hermeneutical pedagogics" ("Geisteswissenschaftliche Padagogik") who deserve credit for
drawing attention to the limitations of the empirical science of education and promoting
the insight that practical theories of education are indispensable. They have, however,
proceeded from a broadly-conceived vague concept of "the humanities as science" which
allowed them to treat world-view and normative statements as scientifically legitimate49 •
One should nevertheless not be misled by their use of the term "science", since in reality,
the supporters of "hermeneutical pedagogics" were not concerned with science in the strict
sense of the word as it is now used, but with practical theories which "should provide
guidance for life"50. It is precisely these tasks - which they considered the most important
ones for "scientific pedagogics" - that upon close inspection tum out to be the responsibility
of practical pedagogics.
This assertion can be documented by examining the writings of WIlRELM
DILTHEY (1833-1911), who assigned pedagogics responsibility for obtaining "the rule
about what ought to be from the knowledge of what is''51. That DILTHEY's "scientific
pedagogics" (all its emphasis on description notwithstanding) was also intended as an
educational teaching for educators can be clearly seen in his statement that "scientific
pedagogics" has as its "most attractive task" the description and analysis of "pedagogical
genius": this depiction of genius "should instill the incipient educator with a feeling of his

46 DERBOLAV (1975: 91 ff.) and (1976).

47 Cf. STOY (1861: 15 and 213 ff.); WILLMANN (1876: 288 ff.) and (1913: 1161); REIN (1908: 15 ff.) and
(1911, Vol. 2); MESSER (1931: 48 ff.).
48 Cf. for example MATTHIAS (1922).
49 Cf. ROTHACKER (1927: 107 ff.) on the dependence of the humanities on Weltanschauung.
50 DILTHEY (1963: 24).
51 DILTHEY (1963: 16).
220 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

own dignity and with enthusiasm for his profession"52. Thus, in addition to information,
DILTHEY seeks to provide moral inspiration, whereby one could also interpret the
statement above as affirming that the express purpose of offering such information is that
it will suitably inspire educators. DILTHEY's students SPRANGER and NOHL perfected
the art of writing idealized, morally inspiring but not purely historiographic depictions of
great educators. NOHL saw in particular the "ultimate meaning" of his presentation of the
history of pedagogics in its ability to convey something of the "educational impulse" to
educators53 .
Another of DILTHEY's students, MAX FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1878-1923),
emphasized that pedagogical theories "relate to the subject matter of their investigation in
a completely different fashion than do the stringent empirical sciences". Pedagogical
theories "do not reconstruct their subject matter ... in thought", but are "rather means for
producing, shaping and realizing. They are not the impartial cognition of what is, but
rather the partial promulgation of what should be'~ In "pedagogical science" is expressed
"how the formation of a developing mind ... should be guided and shaped in the spirit of a
certain cultural ideal"54.
In similar fashion, THEODOR LITI (1880-1962) called for pedagogics to be a
"theory of action" which does not merely observe educational facts "in order to understand
and interpret them as they are found, but rather to derive from their mental assimilation
benefits for praxis itself,55. LITI declared his support for a "philosophically founded, aim-
setting science of the whole of national education", which he called "cultural pedagogics".
By means of a "constructive process" (which LITI does not describe in detail), "cultural
pedagogics" should derive "ideas offering guidance for the future from the intellectual
stocks of the present" and "pedagogically mould the basic tendencies of that which is
emerging". He expected "cultural pedagogics" to provide policy-makers with "guiding ideas"
and to give ''strength and support to the ethos of educators in their role as caretakers of the
national intellectual heritage"56.
For LITI, "pedagogics" was neither a purely theoretical nor an applied science.
Rather, he ascribed to it its own "method of thinking" - so-called "pedagogical thinking".
This meant above all thinking the way LIITs highly idealized educator would presumably
think. He used words like "seeing" (Schauen) and "contemplating" ("Erschauen" or
':Ausschauen") without posing the scientific question of how the validity of what was "seen"
could be established. "Educational thinking" was characterized by LITI as a

52 DILTHEY (1963: 30).

53 NOHL (1958: 4).
54 FRISCHEISEN-KOHLER (1921: 13).
55 LITI (1949: 85 f.).
56 LITI (1965: 10 f.).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 221

"comprehensive intellectual behavior", "which with its deepest roots reaches below the
contrast between theory and practice"57. At another point he wrote that "the theoretical
understanding of the state of affairs called 'education' on the one hand and the practical
approach to the tasks of education on the other" were "so to speak secondary forms of a
single basic approach to the problem of 'education' in general", which "stands above the
contrast between theory and practice, between researching facts and setting aims"S8. Based
on this assumption, he asserted that "understanding reality and determining what it ought
to be grow directly from ... a common root"S9. In his opinion, the task of pedagogical
theory was to contribute to educational practice by producing a "philosophico-cultural
overall view". "In it the will to self-formation reflects upon what it should become by
perceiving what it was and is; in tum, it understands what it was and is in striving for what
it should be"6O.
This is not the place to grapple with LITI's unclear methodological ideas. Rather,
these quotes demonstrate that "hermeneutical pedagogics" (at least in programmatic
terms) can be viewed as a specifically German form of practical pedagogics61 . For our
context it is also important that LIlT assigned pedagogical theory the task of giving the
teacher "a sense of historical perspective". As he saw it, pedagogical theory must "accept the
concreteness of the situation in which he performs his work and not strive for a universal
validity through which pedagogical theory would lose touch with this situation"62.
NOHL, SPRANGER, FLITNER and WENIGER all had conceptions of pedagogics
similar to LITI's. HERMAN NOHL (1879-1960) thought that pedagogics was irrevocably
tied to "world-view attitudes"63 and saw its aim mainly in the moral orientation of
educators. EDUARD SPRANGER (1882-1963) assigned pedagogics the task of "grasping
a given cultural reality, subsuming it under ordering concepts and finally shaping it by
setting values and norms"64. He realized that values cannot be scientifically proved and that
world-view commitments and moral decisions transcend the possibilities of scientific
knowledge65 . Nevertheless he did demand of pedagogics that it should take upon itself "the
problem of the legitimacy of norms", undertake a "critique of educational ideals" and take
into account "the metaphysical", without which "the primal pedagogical phenomenon"

57 LITI (1949: 109).

58 LITI (1949: 102).
59 LITI (1949: 104).
60 LITI (1965: 23 ff.).
61 On the other hand, in practice (apart from contnbutioDS to the historiography of pedagogical ideas),
"hermeneutical pedagogics" mainly has the character of a mixed world-view-normative philosophy of
education.
62 LITI (1949: 118 f.).
63 NOHL (1949: 117).
64 SPRANGER (1920) in ROHRS (1964: 17).
65 SPRANGER (1963: 39 ff.)
222 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

cannot even be caught sight 0£66. SPRANGER could only assign pedagogics such tasks
because he viewed it as a mixture of world-view-normative philosophy of education on the
one hand, and practical pedagogics on the other, rather than as an empirical science of
education.
WILHELM FUTNER (1889-1990) called pedagogics a "pragmatic human science"
(Geisteswissenschaft), because it relates to practice, "to interactions with other humans",
"which always presupposes a self-interpretation". In his opinion, pedagogics "should
become an aid to practical education"67. According to FLITNER, it is characteristic of
pedagogics that it becomes involved in "intellectual struggles". Pedagogics ought to
"attempt to fight the intellectual battle through to a practical result". Pedagogics thus
originates "in the discussion carried out by responsible parties" trying to reach an
agreement on the "right form of education". Pedagogics strives to "promote pedagogical
formation" and to create a "public spirit of education" which will "further advance the
civilization of our culture". In his words, pedagogics is to educate the individual into "an
informed guarantor and a co-working bearer of this educational spirit"68.
Pedagogics is thus clearly placed in the service of practical and political tasks. The
fact that FU1NER is concerned with an "ethical" discipline and not with an empirical
science also manifests itself in his (as well as UTr's) rejection of analytic-empirical
methods and their claim that pedagogics has its own special method: "the process of
existential reflection"69. For him pedagogics is "thinking from the standpoint of responsible
educators"; it is "committed self-reflection", in which the subject examines "his will and
beliefs"70.
FLITNER saw "the most eminent task" of pedagogics in bringing about an "agreement
on the content and meaning of education", on the true value content of a given historical
situation". Its second task consists in giving educators "a sense ofperspective in the turbulent
struggles of our age". "Only of tertiary importance is the direct technical aid which must be
provided ... for the difficulties involved in the educational endeavor'o71. This definition of
the aims of pedagogics leaves little doubt that FU1NER is referring here to a practical
theory, i.e. to a normative theory of education which provides guidance for action. That
FU1NER designated his practical theory "science" and distinguished it from "educational
teachings"72 is of little significance in objective terms and is mainly a problem of usage.

66 SPRANGER (1%2: 122 ff.).

67 W. FLITNER (1966: 15 ff.).
68 W. FLITNER (1966: 21).
69 W. FLITNER (1958: 26).
70 W. FLITNER (1958: 18); cf. also (1%4: 45).
71 W. FLITNER (1%4: 142); similarly (1958: 24).
72 Cf. W. FLITNER (1958: 15 ff.); (1954a: 113 ff.).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 223

This is a result of his unusually broad concept of science and his restricted concept of
professional educational teachings, which refers only to specific regional, epochal and
world-view professional teachings designed for educators. In terms of logical structure,
however, there are no fundamental differences between what he calls "scientific
pedagogics" and "educational teachings", but merely differences in degree. On the basis of
our proposals for defining theories of education, his "scientific pedagogics" can be viewed
as a relatively abstract practical pedagogics intended to serve a pluralistic society.
ERICH WENIGER (1894-1961) too called for pedagogics to make a contribution to
educational practice: pedagogics "is only valid insofar as it aids practice, insofar as the
practitioner can put its results to use". Citing SCHLEIERMACHER, he ascribes to
pedagogics the task of improving the educational system: its goal is "to clarify practice for
each individual". For WENIGER, the basis of "true" pedagogical theory is "the
theoretician's partiality in his educational task and in educational activity. He must share
the responsibility of practice, affirm its aims, think from the standpoint of aims and
responsibilities ... Only as an interested party can one have insight"73.
These quotes from so-called "hermeneutical pedagogics" should suffice to
demonstrate that its leading representatives were mainly concerned with offering practical
theories of education. That many of their writings have turned out to be quite impractical
is probably a result of their preference for world-view-normative philosophy of education
and their neglect of the technical problems of education.
Practical theories of education can be conceived from every kind of ideologico-moral
point of view. Whereas in earlier times religious denominational statement systems
predominated, in the twentieth century (parallel to the loss of influence on the part of
religious communities in general), politico-denominational pedagogical statement systems
have stepped to the center of the stage. When for example MOlLENHAUER ascribes to
pedagogics the task of criticizing real education "in the name of a better education" by
"showing th~ deficiencies of what exists by confronting it with that which is possible", he is
in full agreement with the socially critical variant of the practical pedagogics tradition.
And when MOLLENHAUER assigns not only to educational practitioners, but also to
pedagogical theory the tasks "of bringing about a potential for social change in the coming
generation", of providing a "critique of aims", of "accepting responsibility for the realization
of maturity" or of "approaching education from the claims of emancipation", he is talking
about political decisions, a result of the "committed self-reflection" that FUlNER called
for - but not about scientific cognition74 •

73 WENIGER (1953: 20 f.). For a positive interpretation of this concept, developed by WENIGER (following
HORKHEIMER and HABERMAS), d. DAHMER (1968: 48 ff.).
74 MOLLENHAUER (1968: 69).
224 PRACfICAL PEDAGOGICS

As is the case with normative philosophies of education, practical theories of

education are not only acceptable for the orientation of educators, they are also necessary.
Particularly in an open and rapidly changing society we need the courage not only to
evaluate norms in a sensible fashion and to retain proven ones, but also to criticize
questionable norms and establish new ones. However, one should not pass off normative
pedagogical statement systems as "science", for even a simple linguistic analysis will quickly
show that their principal statements are not descriptive but of a prescriptive-emotive
nature, i.e. involved in "merely promoting and recommending"75.

THE ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

Having examined the most important programmatic statements on practical

pedagogics and its "hermeneutical" and "critical-emancipatory" manifestations we must
now treat its content in greater detail. Generally speaking, the content of a specific
practical pedagogics depends both on the cultural state of a society (or group) for which it
is intended and its members' state of consciousness. For practical pedagogics to achieve its
purpose, it must be adapted to the existing state of consciousness and existing educational
practices, even when it has a socially critical and reformist intent.
We have already ascertained that practical pedagogics serves purposes other than
those of educational science. Therefore, it is improper to judge it solely according to the
criteria applicable to scientific theories. The basic metatheoretical problems of practical
pedagogics are rather those of the extent to which it can be scientific and still fulfill its
purpose. The ultimate issue is a political and moral problem that cannot simply be solved
by a sweeping decision in favor of enlightenment, criticism and scienticity at any price, but
rather one requiring highly differentiated study.
It is desirable to begin with the four main tasks which have confronted practical
pedagogics up to the present. In accordance with the programmatic decIarations with
which we are already familiar, these tasks should accomplish the following purposes: 1.
Offer educators a valuating interpretation of the relevant socio-cultural situation. 2. List
the aims of education. 3. Provide practical points of view, rules, advice or instructions for
educational actions and for structuring educational institutions. 4. Evoke, promote and
support value orientations and dispositions for morally sound educational actions (i.e.
"professional virtues") of educators.

75 According to LOCHNER (1%3: 511) this is a distinguishing linguistic characteristic of practical pedagogics
(which he called an "Erziehungslehre" or "educational teaching").
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 225

Practical pedagogics thus consists of situational-analytic, teleological, methodical and

motivational and professional ethics-oriented elements. The problem of the degree to
which enlightenment, rationality and critical reflection are possible and desirable must be
answered differently for each of these elements. Practical pedagogics should of course be
formulated in the spirit of the general rules of the scientific method, but these rules are
not useful to the same degree for solving each practical pedagogical task.
Let us first turn to the situation-analytical element of practical pedagogics. Here we
are concerned with the problem of orienting educators to the socio-cultural situations in
which they must act. Historiography can without a doubt provide much concrete material
clarifying how these situations have developed out of past events. What is really needed,
however, is a depiction of current history, especially in regard to the aspects relevant to
future educational and educational-political actions. Only to a limited degree can we rely
on the results of empirical social science research and there remains a great latitude for
the choice and interpretation of facts. Both selection and interpretation are unavoidably
based on a particular point of view, which, however, can never be the only possible or
correct one. The basic world-view, religious, philosophical and political decisions
expressed in making a commitment to particular educational aims also influence the
interpretation of the historical situation. A wide variety of positions are possible here,
ranging from a more or less unconditional affirmation of existing conditions to a partial or
total critique of them; these interpretations can rest on different facts or even on the same
facts interpreted differently. An example is the contrast between a Marxist and a liberal
historiography. Since a view of history corresponding to one's own hierarchy of values can
also motivate action in accordance with these values, it is understandable that the
situation-analytical elements of practical pedagogics generally turn out to be partisan, i.e.
inseparably fused to the therein postulated value hierarchy.
What does this imply for the question of the various manifestations of practical
pedagogics? A statement system whose situation-analytical statements are unconditionally
presented as the sole true and definitive treatment of its subject matter would normally be
characterized as "uncritical" or "dogmatic". However, if it is made clear that we are dealing
with an interpretation made from a certain point of view, that no interpretation is final and
that other interpretations are also possible and justifiable, practical pedagogics can in this
specific regard be called "critical" or "hypothetical"76.
Even more difficult to evaluate than the situation-analytical element of a practical
pedagogics is its teleological element. In closed, relatively unified societies, or in similarly
structured subgroups of a society (for example the Christian churches) the educational

76 For a discussion of the difference between historical interpretation and scientific theories cr. POPPER
(1957, Vol. D: 265 ff.).
226 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

aims suggested in educational teachings are straightforwardly borrowed from prevailing

convictions77. To the extent that an educational science is at all possible in such societies,
the world-view content and moral norms which the society views as essential will be taboo
for it. A critical moral philosophy which weighes alternatives to these convictions hardly
exists; instead, reflection goes no farther than dogmatism and the exegesis of texts which
the given society considers binding. Under these circumstances, practical pedagogics itself
has in teleological regard no other choice than to be dogmatic.
At first glance it would seem that in an open, world-view pluralistic society a
dogmatic practical pedagogics is neither acceptable nor possible. In such a society
competing world views and norms are subject to analysis by both the social sciences and
epistemological research. Critiques of dominant world views are permitted and there exists
a critical moral philosophy. Theoretically, all conceivable normative possibilities can be
brought into play, in extreme cases even to the extent of paralyzing the ability to make any
decision at all. In practical terms, however, neither education nor such other areas of
society as politics, economics or jurisprudence can be left to the arbitrary results of freely
constructed normative thought and the sampling of alternatives. Rather, effective
educational action requires us to make decisions to pursue certain aims and to fulfill
certain tasks and requires that these decisions not be continually called into question. This
applies not only to individual educators, but also to all educational personnel in a given
society and its subgroups, whose members must mutually support one another if they wish
to avoid the risk that despite great efforts their actions will end in educational failure.
It is not just a specific problem of practical pedagogics but also an existential
question facing every society in which scientific thought and general enlightenment are
already widespread. "Is an ideology-free society possible? More precisely, can a society
recognize its values for what they are, without any ideological support and yet with
reasonable stability remain committed to them?"78. There is no sure answer to this
question, but previous historical experience (especially with "intellectuals" or "educated
people") and social-psychologically founded assumptions about people's fears, their need
for security and a feeling of community give cause for scepticism79 • There is much to be
said for GEHLEN's thesis that "If one behaves 'objectively' towards the gods and

77 As an example of a thus-conceived Catholic practical pedagogics cf. EGGERSDORFER (1955: 556), where
the question: "Who sets (the) aim of a good education and who forbids that of a bad one?" is answered by
saying that it is "necessary for our thinking" to take recourse here to a "transcendental personal God". "He
sets aims and arranges them for the whole world into must and ought, in necessity and freedom and allows
us to recognize them through spiritual openness". For a Protestant variant cf. BOHNE (1953: 72 ff.).
78 Cf. BERGMANN (1%7: 324 f.).
79 a. MANNHEIM (1986: 12 ff.); (1%8: 19 f.); (1970: 25 f.). A rationalistic contrary position is offered in
GEIGER (1964).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 227

institutions of one's own society ... one already sees them as outmoded"so. The continued
critical relativization of our own convictions has a destructive effect upon them. In their
place "'ideas' spring up which leave us no choice but to discuss them"Sl. As a result, the
certainty of behavior which is indispensable for education disappears and the danger arises
of "bringing an ideal of the meaningless pursuit of the new into the spirituallife"82.
The loss of binding convictions characteristic of times of social upheaval, the retreat
from traditions and the devaluation of traditional symbols should not, however, lead one
to the short-sighted view that a society could ever do without a certain minimal stock of
common beliefs, traditions and symbols. Only the content and forms of expression change,
but in each case there isa limitation of the possibilities for action by evaluating them and
arriving at a social consensus on valid ideals and the relative importance of various goals.
Even if such a consensus is no longer based on divine revelation, tradition or the authority
of an elder, but rather on an appeal to critical reasoning, public opinion or the will of the
majority, it is still a matter of the (at least temporary) dogmatization of certain world-view-
moral postulatess3 . Even if these postulates are increasingly formulated in a quasi-scientific
language, one should not be misled into believing that these are empirically confirmed
statements and not convictions and beliefs.
What consequences does this have for the question of the various manifestations of
practical pedagogics? If the teleological content of a statement system is based on the
presupposition of a value consensus which does not exist among its addressees (be it
because it no longer exists or because it does not yet exist), such a statement system must
be considered useless in practical terms (Le. either outmoded or utopian). In any case,
however, practical pedagogics is dogmatic in teleological terms - and rightly so. Neither
educational actions nor practical theories for these actions are possible without world-view
and moral decisions to explain and guide them. Practical "systems thus must be one-sided
and must have a certain content as long as they claim to structure life in terms of world
views"84. The critical discussion of theoretically possible alternatives belongs in educational
science and in normative philosophy of education.
The methodical element of practical pedagogics poses quite different problems. Here
it is a matter above all of problems of if-then, ends-means and conditional relationships. In
practice, instructions or rules for educational actions and for structuring educational

80 GEHLEN (1956: 290).

SI GEHLEN (1956: '2%1).
82 ROTHACKER (1927: 155).
83 Interesting examples of this are the "Recommendations and Reports of the German Committee for
Education" (Deutscher AusschuB fUr das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen 1966), as well as the
recommendations and reports of the German Educational Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat).
84 ROTHACKER (1927: 156).
228 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

institutions make greater promises of effectiveness the more they are based on the
relevant technological knowledge developed by educational science. The quality of
practical pedagogics is in its methodical statements most dependent on scientific research.
For our particular problem this means that the distinctions between naive and critical,
dogmatic and hypothetical, informative and uninformative types of practical pedagogics
can be made most convincingly for their methodical components. Even today, the greatest
weakness of many contributions to practical pedagogics is that their methodical and
organizational elements have been formulated without proper attention to the results of
the relevant sciences.
However, in the interest of fairness one must remember that psychological and
sociological research have only recently turned to problems relevant to practical
pedagogics. The latter has long been forced to rely on its own insights in advising
educators and educational policy-makers. This led to a tradition of applying "common
sense" to educational questions, a tradition that even today has retained a considerable
autonomy vis-a-vis the statements of social scientists. If in the future more scientific
knowledge is introduced into practical pedagogics than has been the case up to now, this
will not obviate the need for "common-sense" thinking.
There are two reasons for this. First, instructions on methods and organizational
matters can only to a very limited degree be based on empirically confirmed nomological
hypotheses. However, since we cannot make educators wait until scientific research has
become more productive, practical pedagogics must inevitably offer advice or
recommendations based on regularities which are merely conjectured and on causal
relationships whose existence are inferred, but not adequately tested using scientifically
valid procedures. This is completely justified as long as the appropriate reservations are
made. Still, it would be misleading to depict such advice and its justification as
scientifically certain. In order not to create difficulties in educational practice, especially
with regard to the addressees of education, the method-oriented components of practical
pedagogics should be formulated carefully and modestly, commensurate with the
extremely hypothetical character of our knowledge of education.
To complicate the matter even more, there is yet another problem to be dealt with:
the fact that even the limited scientific knowledge which is technologically useful cannot
be directly translated into instructions pertaining to concrete behavior in concrete
situations. The results of psychological and sociological research always stand in a certain
relationship to the specific conditions under which they were obtained, and these
conditions often have little in common with the conditions under which educators must
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 229

act85 . Thus it is always necessary to interpret these results in regard to the specific practical
problems which one expects to solve using instructions based on said results.
In the best of cases, science provides us with information on general nomological
regularities, i.e. abstractions which never exactly correspond to real situations. To make
them practically applicable, we must first translate them into concrete action instructions.
Ideally this translation process would be carried out by every educator for his own concrete
situation86 • If this is not to be a completely umealistic and excessive demand on educators,
practical pedagogics must relieve educators of a number of the steps involved in
translating educational-technological knowledge into situation-specific instructions.
Practical pedagogics must act as a mediator between the sciences and the situational- and
practice-oriented thinking of educators. This means that we must understand the given
concrete circumstances and then, on the basis of available scientific resources, select the
knowledge relevant to educational actions in the given circumstances.
An especially important aspect of this process is the translation of knowledge from
the complicated and abstract jargon of scientific specialists into the simple, concrete and
vivid everyday language of educational practitioners. If this translation process and the
intellectual simplification usually associated with it do not succeed, practical pedagogics
will be ignored by the people for whom it is intended and will thereby completely miss its
mark. It would thus be thoroughly unacceptable to conclude that a text written in simple,
unspecialized language is a naive form of practical pedagogics. Naivete manifests itself not
in simple language, but in a lack of appropriate awareness of the problems to be solved.
Finally, let us examine the professional-ethics oriented motivational elements of
practical pedagogics. There are considerable differences here between individual
statement systems, ranging from massive propaganda for a certain world view to discrete
advice on sound living and mental health. Sometimes the intention of aiding the
professional ethos of educators is almost completely obscured by the desire to strengthen
their belief in a particular religion, world view or political order. As with the practical
theories of society, politics and economics, those of education serve not only informational
purposes, but also that of providing "normative-emotional behavioral guidance" for their
addressees. They can "often exert a politically relevant influence on peoples' sense of
motivation"87.
Because of this, the objection has been made that practical theories of education are
based on a "low regard for moral autonomy as well as on a lack of trust in the moral

85 Cf. B. MORRIS (1%6: 137 ff.).

86 Cf. for example CARPENTER and HADDAN (1964: 10 ff.).
87 TOPITSCH (1%5: 25).
230 PRACfICAL PEDAGOGICS

decision-making power of those being advised"88. In examining this objection let us first of
all disregard the fact that many more weighty arguments can be brought forward in favor
of such a sceptical position than in favor of an optimistic one. Instead, it should suffice to
examine the relationship between practical pedago~cs as a statement system and the
actual situation in which educators find themselves. It becomes clear that the influence of
practical pedagogics is much less direct and irresistible than is supposed by critics
concerned with protecting personal freedom of choice. Unclear formulations, for example,
that educational teachings seek "to realize assigned tasks,,89 as well as other unacceptable
personifications of statement complexes obscure the simple fact that it is not educational
theories, but at best educators who bring about changes. It is not the content of a practical
theory which is realized, but the concrete aims which educators have chosen.
To understand the tasks and limitations of practical pedagogics it is of great
importance to make a further distinction in addition to that between descriptive and
prescriptive (especially normative) statements: a message aimed at someone is not the
same thing as an attempt to make him believe the content of the message or to make him
do what one has communicated. If we say to someone that he should do something, this is
nothing more than an answer to the question "What should I do?". The listener or reader
now knows what he should do (from our point of view), but "he is not necessarily thereby
influenced one way or the other, nor have we failed if he is not; for he may decide to
disbelieve or disobey us, and the mere telling him does nothing - and seekS to do nothing -
to prevent him from doing this,,90.
It would thus be mistaken to view practical pedagogics as a means that could work to
hold educators in tutelage and influence them in favor of certain proposals by
circumventing their ability to make rational choices. Rather, practical pedagogics is a non-
binding theoretical proposal made to educators living in a vast pluralistic society where it
represents only one of many such competing proposals. LOCHNER recognized this quite
clearly when he wrote: "An educational teaching offers aims and means", but "it cannot
demand that the practical educator choose only one aim and one means - namely the ones
that seem reasonable to the author of the educational teaching. There is a great latitude
for choice here, so that it is possible to talk at people and sometimes even to convince
them, but not to force them into agreement"91. To overdramatize the possibility of
educators simply being talked into doing something is to underestimate the ability people
have to arrive at their own decisions. In reality, such an objection would only be valid if

88 HElD (1%7: 87 f.).

89 PFEFFER (1962: 111), according to WILLMANN (1876: 264 and 288).
90 HARE (1964: 15 f.).
91 LOCHNER (1963: 514).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 231

human behavior were determined by a simple stimulus-response mechanism, so that an

educational teaching could be viewed as a stimulus and the value orientation of educators
as the response necessarily following from it. This primitive schema, however, does not do
justice to people's ability to interpose thoughts and decisions between the onset of a
stimulus and their response to it.
The motivating influence which practical pedagogics can exert on educators probably
occurs more indirectly and less irrationally than is supposed, whereby the reinforcement of
already existing dispositions is probably the most important factor. Practical pedagogics
can, for example, contribute to the growth of a certain readiness to reflect on one's own
educational actions from the point of view of the interpretations and advice it sets forth.
At best, practical pedagogics can provide an impetus for educators to engage in further
studies, in that it contributes quite indirectly to the continuing self-control of educators
and thus assists them in some way to acquire the personality dispositions needed for
successful educating.
When practical pedagogics is formulated in the awareness that its chances of
achieving professional-ethics oriented motivational ends are limited, it can be designated
"critical". On the other hand, when it is dominated by appeals, exhortations or attempts to
arouse emotions and proselytize, practical pedagogics is perhaps best referred to as
"appellatory"92.

OBJECTIONS TO PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

Doubts have been raised from a number of sides as to whether practical pedagogics
can be at all justified as a third, relatively autonomous, statement system alongside science
and philosophy of education. However, there is no disputing that under various names
practical pedagogics has always existed. A glance at modem pedagogical literature shows
that only a fraction claims to be scientific or philosophical, and that even in this small
group there is much that does not meet strict scientific criteria. Thus the problem is not
one of introducing a new type of pedagogical statement system belonging neither to the
sciences nor to philosophy, for these statement systems have long existed and comprise
approximately 90-95 percent of pedagogical publications. They were not invented by the
educational theorists who have analyzed them and underlined their indispensability.
Accordingly, our metatheoretical task can only consist in establishing the characteristic
features of these pedagogical statement systems and the ends which they serve, working

92 As an example of the appellatory form of practical pedagogics we can use a large share of the writings of
FRIEDRICH WILHELM FOERSTER.
232 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

out the difference between them and scientific and philosophical theories and supplying
rules which should be observed when formulating them. As is always the case with the
metatheory, our concern is to describe (or reconstruct) existing statement systems, to
criticize them and to offer normative plans for their improvement.
Attempts to justify practical pedagogics have met with criticism, not only from
opponents, but also from supporters of the concept of science formulated by analytic
philosophy. Let us first examine the arguments of authors supporting other concepts of
science. These authors make the meta-scientific basis assumption that science should not
be limited to descriptive statements, but should also include value judgements and
normative statements. Thus MENZE writes that "to decide" is the "highest task set for
pedagogical science"93. In his opinion, normative statements should not be excluded from
this science, but are instead essential to it. "Pedagogical science" is a matter of subjecting
known facts "to normative claims" and evaluating them. MENZE claims that "scientific
pedagogics" does not have the "structure of the social sciences", but rather the "double
character" of a theoretical and "pragmatic science"94. Similarly, he calls for us to abandon
the distinction between educational science and practical pedagogics (called by him
"educational teachings") because it is "fruitless", and maintains that the "field of
educational teachings ... must be incorporated into a newly defined and different type of
'educational science"'95. He likewise disputes the claims of "empirical pedagogics" to ''being
the only scientific pedagogics"96, and calls for a neo-normative pedagogics. This type of
pedagogics differs from the older normative pedagogics in that it is based not on
presumably universal moral principles, but on value standards established by society.
Basically, however, MENZE holds fast to his belief in the "scientific character of
normative statements" and the "objectivity" of value judgements.
The problematic nature of this conviction can be easily seen by analyzing the
following claim: "A normative statement is valid if, on the basis of value standards created
by the exigencies of modern life, it assesses subjectively a factual situation thought to be
true in such a way that this assessment is commensurate with the totality of modern
cultural life"97. However, in a pluralistic, open society it will hardly be possible to
determine with complete certainty which of the competing value standards is
representative of the "totality of cultural life". In a closed society it is indeed easier to
determine which value standard is "created by the exigencies of modern life", but this does
not mean that this value standard is necessarily valid. Prevailing values and norms are

93 MENZE (1%7: 327). For a critique of this view cf. BOVERSEN (1968).
94 MENZE (1%7: 328 f.).
95 MENZE (1%7: 322):
96 MENZE (1968: 656).
97 MENZE (1%7: 321).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 233

accessible to empirical research only in the form of cultural facts; empirical science cannot
prove their validity. "An empirical science cannot teach anyone what he ought to do, only
what he can do or - under certain circumstances - what he wants to do"98.
To support a valuating and norm-setting educational science is to ignore the logical
gap separating factual statements and values (and/or norms) as well as the difference
between the acceptance and justification of norms. This implies a commitment to the
questionable belief that "true morality consists in demands arising from the innermost
tendencies or strivings of reality (Le. of human nature), vaguely felt demands and which
find their expression in actual moral conceptions"99. Supporters of all ideologies share the
commitment to this belief. They do not want their dogmas regarded as such, but as part of
"science". I can see no benefit in this for scientific knowledge, but only the danger of a
regression into the confessionalization of science. It makes little difference whether it is a
Catholic scholar like POGGELER, who considers possible a "Catholic pedagogics fully
retaining its scientific character"100, or MENZE, who supports a normative a-religious
"pedagogical science", or GIESECKE, who would put educational science in the service of
the political ideology of ''democratization''101. Once the barriers between educational
science and practical pedagogics have fallen, every ideological group can claim the word
"science" for their normative pedagogical convictions. It is then no longer possible to keep
educational science free of ideology, as for example LOCHNER succeeded in doing;
although standing in the shadow of dictatorship, he completely ignored National Socialist
literature in his 1934 textbook on educational science, and expressly banished it to the
category of non-scientific "educational teachings"102.
The opponents of the metatheoretical justification of practical pedagogics are thus
not concerned with such justification per se, but rather with continuing unchallenged to
pass off their own practical pedagogics (as well as their normative philosophies of
education) as educational science. Here it deserves mention that the adherents of such
valuating "scientific pedagogics" come from quite different ideological and political camps.
They include not only ideological dogmatists and politically "conservative" authors, but
also ideologically liberal and politically "progressive" personalities. The social history of
science shows that the supporters of Catholic church scholasticism and Marxist party
scholasticism103, the followers of German idealism and the ideologues of National

98 MAX WEBER (1%8: 6).

99 ROSS (1933: 263) (with reference to the positivists COMTE and DURKHEIM).
100 POGGELER (1959: 519); similarly ROMBACH (1965: 84). For a critique of these views ct. BREZINKA
(1988: 216 ft.).
101 GIESECKE (1%9: 194 f.).
102 ct. LOCHNER (1934: 209).
103 Cf. HONIGSHEIM (1960: 41 ft.) on the concept and forms of scholasticism.
234 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

Socialism and neo-Marxism have all used the same means to ensure that their ideas gain
as much influence over people's minds as possible, namely by combatting the ideal of
value-neutrality in science 104.
The principal argument against approving the existence of practical pedagogics with
its basis in world-view and moral beliefs is: to accept practical pedagogics would mean that
"the norms of pedagogical actions . . . would in the final analysis be handed over to ...
dogmatic determination" instead of being made "accessible to criticism"105. This would
"remove it from the critical grasp of science" and "grant it asylum in the less critical realm
of educational teachings"106. In particular, Marxist-Leninist educational theoreticians
complain bitterly that in practical pedagogics there is an "irrational determination and
canonization of ends" in the form of a "mini-pedagogics" which acts as a "practical ersatz
religion"107.
In this argument three completely separate questions are confused: a metatheoretical
question of scientific systematization, an empirico-psychological question and a moral
question. The first concerns the theoretical framework in which value judgements and
norms relevant to education should be discussed and criticized. According to my proposals,
this framework exists in empirical educational science, the philosophy of educational
knowledge and in the philosophy of education. One of the primary tasks of educational
science is to investigate educationally relevant values and norms as facts in relation to the
conditions of their origin, their meaning in the given social system and their effects. For its
part, the analytic-empirical philosophy of pedagogical statement systems has the task of
testing the validation of pedagogical value judgements and normative pedagogical
statements, whereby in addition to logical rules, empirical scientific knowledge should also
be drawn upon to test its empirical foundation. Finally, the normative philosophy of
education offers the opportunity to discuss alternatives and to criticize every possible kind
of norm system - be it on the basis of one's own basis norms or those of any other norm
system. Since the normative statements of a practical pedagogics can be made the object of
empirical, metatheoretical and normative-philosophical studies, they do not fundamentally
stand above all criticism. Rather, they can be adequately criticized only in a framework
which takes an impartial, neutral stance as to their validity. A "redefinition of the concept
of science"108 with the goal of "incorporating"l09 a practical pedagogics which is unavoidably
determined by world views and morals into an evaluative-normative "educational science"

104 Cf. TOPITSCH (1%8: 8 ff.).

105 MENZE (1968: 651).
106 HILGENHEGER (1971: 432).
107 STIERAND (1975: 208 f.).
108 TOPITSCH (1968: 15).
109 MENZE (1967: 322).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 235

would not increase, but rather limit the possibilities for criticism, as all examples of so-
called religious and political "scientific pedagogics" prove: the only criticism they allow is
that which is directed against the norms of their opponents 110•
The second question brought up in arguments against the justifiability of practical
pedagogics is empirical and psychological: is it true that in most cases both individuals and
groups can only find a meaning in life, normative orientation and emotional security when
their basic ideological convictions and moral norms are shielded from continuous radical
criticism? Based on my knowledge of this subject matter I have already replied to this
question in the affirmative111 . Anyone who considers practical pedagogics unnecessary in
this empirical and psychological respect would have to demonstrate that religious,
ideological, moral or political education can succeed without assuming that educands and
educators already have definite fundamental beliefs and basic moral norms.
The third question concerns morals: is it morally forbidden for practical pedagogics
to provide educators with value judgements and normative statements without criticizing
such judgements and statements in the same pedagogical statement system? The answer to
this moral question depends on the nature of the value hierarchy which is set forth and
whose acceptance is called for. Thus it depends on how we answer the question as to
whether a critique of norms is of the greatest value in practical pedagogics. More
generally, is a consciousness which relativizes value judgements and criticizes norms the
highest good for people, and in particular for educators as addressess of practical
pedagogics?
I reply in the negative to this question with the same empirical arguments with which
I replied affirmatively to the second empirical and psychological question. Being aware of
the widespread nature of "noogenic neuroses"112 (i.e. those originating in spiritual crises), I
consider the "madly thoughtless shattering and dismantling of all foundations, their
dissolution into a tireless unspinning and historicizing of all there has ever been" by
modern man to be a spiritual and social danger113 • Outside the sphere of science and

110 It is typical for this view that the Communist pedagogue STIERAND's (1975) criticism of my metatheory
degenerates into irrational insults like "capitalist apologist", "dishonest political intentions", "bourgeois bias"
or "supporter of the decaying capitalist society". His call for the statement systems which I differentiate to
be combined in a single valuating and normative "scientific pedagogics" culminates in his declaration that
"successful scientific solutions to these questions ... " can only occur "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism" or
the "ideology of the working class", in which "objectivity and partisanship ... form an indivisible whole". Cf.
also F. HOFMANN (1972: 80), where the true reasons for rejecting my metatheory are indicated: "It
encourages doubt ... as to the legitimate connection between science and ideology as well as politics and
pedagogics and devalues, indeed negates the influence of ... the Marxist-Leninist Party on the theory and
practice of education" by claiming that the latter "stands apart from stringent scientific interests". In this
fashion the "basic ideological concerns of modern revisionism" and "social democracy" are advanced.
111 Cf. BREZINKA (1971b: 251 ff.) and (1981: 62 ff.).
112 FRANKL (1975: 135 ff.); d. also (1972: 176 ff.).
113 NIETZSCHE (1983: 108); d. also BUBER (1953: 27).
236 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

analytic-epistemological philosophy I reject all rationalistic, value-relativistic and nihilistic

demands that result in the destruction of the "mood of pious illusion in which alone
anything which wants to live can live"1l4. I share NIETZSCHE's view - one which has been
confirmed many times by research on life aims l15 - it is "only in love, only when shaded by
the illusion produced by love that man is creative", specifically only in "unconditional faith
in right and perfection. Anything that constrains a man to love less than unconditionally
has severed the roots of his strength"116. In my opinion, a principal advantage of my
metatheoretical proposal for differentiating the various branches of educational
knowledge is that because educational science is kept free of ideological and normative
tasks and elements it can better fulfill its empirical tasks, without denying recognition and
furtherance to pedagogical statement systems which serve the world-view and moral
orientations of educators and are themselves based not only on the results of educational
science, but also on world views and moral teachings.
Most opponents of this distinction incorrectly create the impression that through
practical pedagogics dominant ideologico-moral beliefs will be forced upon non-
conformist, disbelieving or unbelieving educators. This argument completely ignores the
fact that practical pedagogics is "a pedagogics directed at a certain milieu", in which an
author with similar views seeks to help educators with common ideological and moral
convictions answer the question of "how we should educate"117. With this situation in mind
it would be senseless to carry out a critique of basic, commonly accepted norms. It is not
even necessary to justify these norms in detail (as is the case when establishing new
norms), because the people affected already agree on them. In contrast to normative
philosophy of education (in which the justification of proposed or newly established norms
is essential), in practical pedagogics it is sufficient (as long as one is not proselytizing those
of other persuasions) to remind 118 educators what the basic ideological assumptions are
and what is morally (and/or legally) expected of them.
As I already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, not only opponents, but also
individual adherents of analytic philosophy's concept of science oppose the right of practical
pedagogics to exist. Thus for example HElD is of the opinion that "educational teachings"
are "completely superfluous"1l9. He considers LOCHNER's view that educational science

114 NIETZSCHE (1983: 95). As an interpretation cf. BREZINKA (1989a).

115 Cf. ALLPORT (1958: especially 86 ff.) and (1954); BUSEMANN (1967); BUHLER (1972); BUHLER and
MASSARIK (1969).
116 NIETZSCHE (1983: 95). Cf. BREZINKA (1987a).
117 WILLMANN (1913: 1161).
118 Cf. SCHULLER (1973: 11 ff.) on "paraenesis" (Lalin and Greek) ~ warning, reminder, prescription as one
type of moral reasoning.
119 HElD (1967: 101).
 PRACfICAL PEDAGOGICS 237

must for practical reasons be supplemented by "educational teachings" to be "untenable"12o.

HElD sees in practical pedagogics "a highly questionable, quasi-unscientific application of
'pure' theory"l21. Demands for or approval of this are the result of "an enormous
underestimation of the potential of a (pure) empirical science"122. He points out "that even
(pure) empirical science advises de facto" and "that a pragmatic orientation of science
neither necessitates value judgements nor impairs the logical structure of empirical
science". Value-neutral empirical science has "room for goal-setting without thereby
having to be normative", and can perform a "sober and exact analysis of the consequences
of alternative decisions".
These arguments are based on the analysis of scientific explanation described
above l23 , which suggests that the application of scientific theories for prediction and their
technical application for proposed aims "is simply a kind of reversal of the basic explanatory
schema"I24. Thus in this view it is fundamentally possible to transform theories of
educational science into technological statement systems which tell us how we can reach
an already established aim, which aims are unattainable, which means are unsuitable,
which side effects are to be expected, etc.
Let us assume for a moment that a usable technology of education already existed.
Could it still replace practical pedagogics? This question could be answered in the
affirmative only if the tasks and elements of practical pedagogics were entirely of a
descriptive, causal-analytic and technological nature; thus if practical pedagogics were
nothing more than pre-scientific empirical-theoretical attempts at understanding reality
which would have to be abandoned as soon as better-confirmed scientific theories became
available. This, however, is not the case. Rather we have established that practical
pedagogics was developed with a practical purpose in mind, in order to answer the
question "What ought we to do"? Technological statement systems, however, only enable
us to answer the question "What can we do"? A technological statement system is nothing
more than a theoretical statement system formulated in another way. Its informational
content "does not exceed that of its theoretical basis" and is "usually less". A technological
statement system contains no regulations and "no prescriptive statements of any kind"125.
Thus when HElD claims that educational science can "recommend" and "advise"I26,
and when he speaks of "empirical scientific recommendation"127, and the structure of

120 HElD (1967: 87).

121 HElD (1967: 101).
122 HElD (1967: 87).
123 Cf. p. 137 ff. above.
124 Cf. POPPER (1964: 96); ALBERT (1964: 61 ff.).
125 ALBERT (1964: 67); similar (1965a: 192 ff.).
126 HElD (1967a: 213).
127 HElD (1967a: 214).
238 PRACfICAL PEDAGOGICS

"empirical scientific advice" as being logically the same as the structure of empirical
scientific explanationl28, these are inexact formulations which promise more than they can
scientifically deliver. Open to similar misunderstanding is his claim that the "pedagogical
research of facts" could serve educational practice "not only with information about
reality", "but also with its own (even fully value-free) system of pedagogical
recommendations and warnings"129. By way of rebuttal it can be said that in the strict sense
of the word, technological statement systems never provide anything more than
"information about reality". The additions needed for creating a "system of
recommendations and warnings" are value judgements. This can already be seen by
looking up the lexical meanings of "recommend" and "warn". "To recommend" means to
tell or show others what is good, useful or pleasant for them, to endorse something, to
advise that something be done. "To warn others" means to call their attention to danger, to
unpleasant or threatening circumstances; to attempt to keep them from doing something
by making them aware of unpleasant consequences l3O •
Recommendations and warnings have a place in educational science only as objects
of study. They are prescriptive statements and thus belong in the prescriptive statement
system of practical pedagogics, although they should be formulated as much as possible in
terms of the empirical theories of educational science. This of course does not deny that
due to their greater knowledge, educational scientists as persons can be particularly
qualified to give pedagogical advice and warnings. However, in this context we deal, not
with people, but with statement systems.
Even if one expects educational science to solve the many existing practical
educational problems, an increase in empirical knowledge - no matter how large - does not
make valuation superfluous. The application of scientific knowledge in concrete situations
"presupposes decisions on setting goals and employing means which themselves cannot be
derived from technology; but technological statements must be taken into account in
making them"l3l. These decisions cannot be left entirely to the individual discretion of
educators. In order to ensure the orderliness and continuity of education, they must be
made for relatively large social groups and for a certain period of time. It will always be
necessary to evaluatively present educational tasks and action possibilities in any given
situation on the basis of such socially pre-existent or strived-for framework norms.

128 HElD (1967a: 219).

129 HElD (1967a: 219).
130 Ullstein Lexikon (1%9: 270 and 966) and American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1982: 1034, 1363).
131 ALBERT (1964: 68). Cf. the following comment: "We must thus distinguish between the technological
system, its application in a concrete situation and the decisions which lead to the realization of a certain
action alternative. If this kind of distinction is not made - especially if one does not distinguish between
technological statements and their practical application in a social context - confusion easily results which in
turn leads to methodological difficulties, especially in regard to value problematics."
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 239

BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

As was shown at the start of this book, every attempt to classify pedagogical
statement systems can ultimately be traced back to normative determinations. My
proposals for differentiating the various fields of educology are also largely based on
certain decisions as to what should be recognized as educational science, philosophy of
education and practical pedagogics. In all three cases the focus is on ideals or norms which
can help us judge particular statement complexes. We have already defined the normative
concept of practical pedagogics in abbreviated form as a "theory suitable for acting or a
normative theory of education providing instructions for acting"132. Using epistemological
language we can also call it a "practical canon", i.e. a system of instructions based on
science and "dogmatics"133.
What does this mean in concrete terms? What form should practical pedagogics
have? Which qualities or features of existing or conceivable practical pedagogical
statement systems do we consider desirable? By way of an answer I present a number of
minimal proposals based on the previous discussion.
1. Practical pedagogics should provide useful empirical information about existing
educational situations, as well as normative orientation for educational actions. This
knowledge should correspond to the given tasks and level of education of the people for
whom it is intended. Practical pedagogics should as much as possible take the results of
the sciences into account and convey them to educators in a praxis-oriented form l34 • At
the very least, it should not contain statements which contradict scientifically validated
statements (e.g. observational results, historical facts, nomological hypotheses,
theories).
2. The meaning of pedagogical statements should always be clear. In particular, there
should be no uncertainty about whether a statement is intended to be an empirical
statement, analytic statement, value judgement or normative statement. This is an
indispensable precondition for testing whether statements are true and/or valid.
Empirical statements should be formulated in such a way that they can in principle be
tested empirically (Le. through observation).
3. Practical pedagogics should adhere to the rules of logic. This applies to its methods
of deriving not only descriptive, but also normative statements. Of particular
importance is the rule that norms (ought statements) should not be derived from

132 Cf. p. 218 above.

133 From the Latin "canon" ; rule, norm, guide line. Cf. DIEMER (1970: 225).
134 For a study of the related epistemological problems cf. OELKERS (1976); for a critique of practical
pedagogy's "loss of practice" due to misunderstandings about the necessity of "making it more scientific" cf.
STUTIGEN (1975).
240 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS

descriptive (is) statements, but only from premises of which at least one should be
normative l35 •
4. The fundamental value principles upon which value judgements are based should
be designated as such or should at least be clearly recognizable from the particular
context in which they appear. The validity of value judgements depends on their
logically correct derivation from more general value judgements and ultimately from
previously existing value axioms. Only after we have accepted the underlying basis
valuations must we also accept the value judgements derived from them, insofar as the
evaluated objects or situations actually have qualities whose value has already been
established 136•
5. The content of norms should be formulated as clearly as possible. The limiting term
"as possible" is included, because the conditions needed to realize educational aims are
in most cases insufficiently known and it is thus extremely difficult to formulate
pedagogical rules or proposals. In addition to the relatively abstract general rules for
acting or abstaining from action, practical pedagogics should pay more attention to
specialized norms whose sphere of validity is limited to typical groups of people, age
groups, situations, etc. On the other hand, pseudo-normative empty formulas without
normative content should be limited to the indispensable minimum needed with respect
to the value system of the particular target group for which a practical pedagogics is
formulated.
6. The language of practical pedagogics should be easy to understand. By using the
best possible form of presentation, the theoretician should make his work attractive and
accessible to readers. It is important to make complicated relationships clear and to
simplify difficult thoughts, without at the same time encouraging the false sense of
security which results from ignorance of the limited character of available knowledge137•
7. Since practical pedagogics should, among other things, also serve to motivate
morally sound actions, it is justified in using not only descriptive and informative, but
also emotive language, i.e. language which appeals to people's emotions. The emotive
use of language should, however, not replace or displace descriptive language, but
rather serve to emotionally support the acceptance of rationally founded value
judgements and moral norms l38 •

135 Cf. WOHLGENANNT (1969: 81 ff.).

136 Cf. V. KRAIT (1951: 212 ff.).
137 Excellent examples of practical pedagogics are MATTHIAS (1922) for secondary teachers; MATTHIAS
(1922a); MAKARENKO (1958); DREIKURS and SOLTZ (1966); METZGER (1960) for parents.
138 Cf. STEVENSON (1944: 332 ff.).
 PRACTICAL PEDAGOGICS 241

These seven minimal requirements for contributions to practical pedagogics are

certainly not complete, but they will hopefully suffice as temporary criteria for judging the
quality of pedagogical literature. One should never forget that practical pedagogics
reaches many more educators and influences them to a much greater degree than does
empirical educational science. Practical pedagogics is that statement system concerned
with the training of educators. For this reason educational scientists should not abandon
this field to mere amateurs. It may be both morally and politically more important to
provide the best possible (if also necessarily incomplete) practical pedagogics in the here
and now than to devote ourselves to long-term specialized research in educational science.
If we do not wish educators to fail in their endeavors, then educational theoreticians must
take their responsibility for the quality of practical pedagogics just as seriously as that for
educational science and philosophy of education.
CONCLUSION: ON THE VARIETY AND UNITY OF
PEDAGOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

The striving for scientific unity often seduces thinkers to want

to artificially fuse together and deductively take apart that
which by its nature exists as many things side by side.
FRIEDRICH HERBART (1806)1

Our discussion of the three statement systems of educational science, philosophy of

education and practical pedagogics leads to a recognition that the problems of education
are much more numerous and complicated than is expressed in traditional "pedagogics".
This applies not only to the selection and justification of educational aims and other
norms, but also to the testing of means to educational ends which have either already been
proposed or which are still being formulated and tested. Alone the practical need for a
division of labor should convince educational theoreticians to adhere to the differentiation
of pedagogical knowledge set forth in this book. Primarily, however, it is for logical and
methodological reasons that a distinction between science, philosophy and praxiology (or
practical theory) is necessary. Can we nevertheless speak of a unity of pedagogical
knowledge? Will the three statement systems continue to exist separately, or can they again
be combined into a more comprehensive higher level "theory"?
If one adheres to the concept of science promulgated by analytic philosophy, a "unified
pedagogical theory'l2 synthesizing the above-mentioned statement systems cannot be achieved.
The ideal of a unified system of pedagogical knowledge presumably goes back to practical
needs arising in teacher training. There the call is rightly made for a synthesis, but this
"synthesis" does not mean a systematic summarization of existing scientific knowledge on
the psychic dispositions set as educational aims and the conditions necessary for realizing
them. It means instead a normative or practical theory of education relating to present
educational actions under particular cultural conditions.
To the extent that an epistemologically justified synthesis of actual knowledge and
normative demands is sought, this can only be achieved in practical pedagogics 3• Practical
pedagogics, however, cannot be said to be a unified theoretical system of pedagogical

1 HERBART (1913, Vo!.l: 259).

2 Cf. BOKELMANN (1970: 227 ff.).
3 This is actually (albeit not terminologically) conceded by such authors as W. FLITNER (1976: 3) and
STRASSER (1972), who view "unified pedagogical theory as a practical science".
244 CONCLUSION

knowledge, but can rather be viewed as a praxis-oriented selection of existing theoretical

knowledge on the one hand and possible valuations and norms on the other. Anyone
seeking to construct a system of practical pedagogics in its modern critical form will make
use of knowledge taken from educational science and concepts derived from philosophy of
education, but the resulting synthesis is expressly limited to a certain historical situation
and is bound to contain basic valuations which are socio-culturally determined, subject to
change and more or less controversial. Such an action-oriented valuating synthesis should
provide educators with information about the particular areas with which they are
intimately concerned and a perspective on the various necessary decisions. In regard to
theory, practical pedagogics is thus something less, and in regard to practice, something
more than a unified scientific theory of education.
By contrast, in educational science it is only possible to construct a synthesis of
statements on education which is open to empirical testing. Viewed as an ideal statement
system, it would indeed be a "unified theory" of existing scientific knowledge about
education. At present, we are nonetheless still far removed from such a synthesis of
empirical educational science. However, in view of the growing specialization of
educational research it is today especially important to construct a unified scientific theory
of education. Because of their complex nature, educational aims and the knowledge
relevant to achieving them will in the future also have to be studied using an
interdisciplinary approach. However, since each of these respective disciplines, for
example psychology, psychiatry, sociology, ethnology, etc., have their own system and as a
rule even a number of competing systems, it is not enough to make an encyclopedic
summary of research results pertaining to education. Rather, the creative task lying before
us is to construct from the numerous separately conceived sub-theories a single unified
theoretical system4•
Since it is no longer possible to command an overall view of the results of specialized
research, and since an expert assessment of such results depends on a familiarity with
knowledge which is becoming increasingly complex both in its content and methodology,
the danger of dilettantism in constructing such a system is great. Generalists who try to
create such a synthesis expose themselves more to criticism than specialists who deal only
with a narrow range of problems which they understand in detail. Nevertheless, for the
sake of the many people expecting educational science to help solve educational problems,
there is nothing which is more urgently needed today than the courage to create such a
synthesis. The more stringent methodical requirements which I have called for in this book
can act as a useful check on statements about educational science. It would nonetheless be

4 Cf. 62 ff. above.

 CONCLUSION 245

a serious misunderstanding if educational theoreticians took it upon themselves to

sacrifice an overall approach and an interest in the essential problems of education for the
security and precision that can be achieved at most in a few sub-areas. Fear of making
mistakes leads to creative sterility. It would serve the cause of education more if we
reckoned from the start with the possiblity of errors and viewed every systematic proposal
as a system of hypotheses which is more or less uncertain, incomplete, and represents only
one possibility among others. The less dogmatically syntheses of educational science are
formulated, the more they deserve the tolerance (along with the necessary criticism) which
comes with a knowledge of the inherent difficulties of the matter.
If on the basis of our methodological assumptions there is no possibility of "a unified
pedagogical theory" which would simultaneously be scientific and practical, it does not
mean that we should reject any synthesis of pedagogical knowledge. Rather, empirical
syntheses in educational science and action-oriented valuating syntheses in practical
pedagogics are both possible and urgently needed. Anyone who is dissatisfied with such
syntheses should consider the fact that everything knowable about education can be
treated at least somewhere within the framework of educational science. To the extent
that no other purpose but the acquisition of scientific knowledge is pursued, there would
be nothing to gain from expanding its scope. On the other hand, whatever appears useful
to educators in making daily decisions can be included in the systems of practical
pedagogics. It would contradict the practical purpose of these systems if we incorporated
into them the entire range of scientific educational knowledge, since only a small fraction
of this knowledge is useful for educational actions in specific professional situations. There
are thus neither sound scientific nor practical reasons to search for higher forms of
theoretical integration than already exist in the respective areas of educational science and
practical pedagogics.
In constructing both types of statement systems we are in many respects dependent
on philosophical studies. A satisfactory system of educational science can only be created if
we take into account epistemology and the philosophy of science. A well-founded system
of practical pedagogics has as its prerequisites the analyses and decisions of axiology and,
above all, moral philosophy. This is because it is necessary to make choices between
different ends and means; standards (criteria) are needed for this. Practical pedagogics is a
synthesis of selected knowledge taken from educational science, world-view interpretations
and moral statements which serves as the theoretical basis for rational educational
decisions.
The problem of the unity of pedagogical knowledge is related to various issues and
not merely to the possibility of a unified pedagogical theory. Up to now we have only
considered one sense of the expression "pedagogical knowledge": the more or less well-
246 CONCLUSION

confirmed statements which are summarized in statement systems or "theories". Since this
book deals with pedagogical statement systems, this sense of the term "pedagogical
knowledge" has stood in the foreground. However, in another, more traditional sense the
expression "pedagogical knowledge" refers to a personal quality: what a person has learned
and now knows about education. If the problem of the unity of pedagogical knowledge is
considered in this light, it refers to the combination in the educators' (or educational
theoreticians') personality of pedagogical knowledge of ends, means and situations, moral
convictions and ability to valuate adequately. This concept of the unity of pedagogical
knowledge can thus refer to the state actually existing in a certain person (descriptive
meaning) or to an ideal that ought to be realized (normative meaning).
In our context this idea of unity means an ideal for educators: it is a state of
personality for them to achieve. This means that educators are able to order and interpret
everything they know about human beings and their education in regard to educational
activity in concrete situations. This subjective unity, which is realized by every educator in
an individual way, can also be described as the ideal of pedagogical culture (German:
"padagogische Bildung"); others have called this ideal structure of psychic dispositions
pedagogical wisdom.
In any case we are not dealing here with the entirety of pedagogical knowledge, but
rather with the practical ability to make educational judgements using information directly
relating to specific situations and actionss. This type of ability is based on knowledge of
ends, educands and the means which are presumably best suited for a given educational
situation. Such knowledge is never definitive, but is always uncertain and open to
improvement6• It helps provide clarity on the potential alternatives open to the educator
but is seldom sufficient to fully justify a particular action7•
In the past few decades there has without a doubt been a tremendous growth of
knowledge in the social sciences. However, the situation of educators has not changed
greatly. In the past as now it is appropriate to include in pedagogical culture not only what

5 Cf. DUCASSE (1969: 174): "Wisdom is knowledge of what, in given circumstances, it would on the whole be
best to do".
6 By this criterion the moderate, self-critical, sceptical meaning of "pedagogical wisdom" can be distingnished
from the irrational, mystical meaning of the word "wisdom", which predominates in the educational
philosophies of WILLMANN (cf. HAMANN 1965: 36 ff.) or STRASSER (1965: 153 ff.). STRASSER
characterizes wisdom as "a complete openness for transcendental Truth-Goodness-Beauty in its indivisible
unity" which makes the appearance of the educator as "advisor and leader" dependent on whether he can
"account before himself and others as to the meaning of human life and death" (p. 167). The sense that I
refer to is similar to that given in the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. XII, 1961: 191 f.): 'Wisdom: Capacity
of judging rightly in matters relating to life and conduct; soundness of judgement in the choice of means
and ends".
7 For an expecially clear and sober analysis of the general problematic of the relationship between scientific
theory and practice cf. H. GOMPERZ (1934).
 CONCLUSION 247

we know about education, but also a recognition of the limits of our educational knowledge8•
Educators will always have to act, even though much remains uncertain. No one can
relieve them of the responsibility for their decisions, but increased knowledge in
educational science, philosophy of education and practical pedagogics can contribute to
helping them make these decisions as rationally and responsibly as possible.

8 Cf. BREZlNKA (1981: 181 ff.).

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NAME INDEX

Abb, Edmund 16 Bettelheim, Bruno 131

Abel, Theodore 161 Betti, Emilio 153, 154
Acham, Karl 32, 151, 158 Black, Max 73, 130
Achinstein, Peter 77 Blankertz, Herwig 9, 73, 189, 206
Achtenhagen, Frank 81 Bloch, Ernst 66
Adler, Mortimer J. 174, 179 Bochenski, Joseph M. 7, 82, 108, 114, 143,
i\dorno, TheodorVV.67, 157 158
i\ichhorn,August 131 B6decker, Willi 131
.Albert, Hans 17,20,21,22,30,31,32,58, B6versen, Fritz 232
78, 79 , 87, 89, 109, 113, 122, 127, Bohne, Gerhard 226
142,146,154,173,190,237,238 Bohnen, .Alfred 32, 78
.Albrecht, Gunther 160 Bokelmann, Hans 8, 243
.Allport, Gordon VV. 80, 125, 236 Bollnow, Otto Friedrich ix, 5, 64, 114,
Anderson, Richard G. 88 115, 130, 151, 154, 155, 158, 161,
Andreski, Stanislav 81 173,176,186,196,200,204
Antz, Louise 176 Bopp, Linus 165
Archambault, Reginald D. 216 Bosl, Karl 151
i\ries, Philippe 163 Bowlby, John 133
i\ristotle 4, 11, 12, 168, 176, 182, 189, 194 Brandt, Ahasver von 160
i\rnstein, Donald 4 Brandtstiitter, Jochen 64
i\schersleben, Karl 135 Brauner, Charles J. 2, 16, 167,216
i\tteslander, Peter 133, 144 Brecht, i\rnold 16, 17,92,213
Ausubel, David P. 141,202,216 Bredenkamp, Jiirgen 130
Breed, Frederick S. 176
Baier, Kurt 199, 203 Brentano, Franz 169, 172, 189, 194
Baldwin, James M. 217 Brezinka, Wolfgang ix, x, xi, 7, 24, 28,35,
Ballauf, Theodor 15, 185 40,41, 47, 53, 56, 57, 65, 71, 75, 77,
Barion, Jakob 20, 23 81, 86, 133, 148, 149, 164, 165, 178,
Baumrind, Diana 88 179, 182, 192, 195, 196, 198, 204,
Bayles, Ernest E. 176 206,233,235,236,247
Becher, Erich 171, 172, 173 Brodbeck, May 135
Becker, VVesley C. 88, 136 Bromme, Rainer 115
Behn, Siegfried 182, 189 Bronfenbrenner, Urie 134
Beneke, Friedrich Eduard 54, 217 Broudy, Harry S. 176
Benner, Dietrich 7, 8, 9 Brubacher, John S. 176
Bennett, Neville 137 Brunnengriiber, Hans 149, 162
Berelson, Bernard 126, 136 Buber, Martin 204, 205, 235
Berg, Jan Hendrik van den 163 Buhler, Charlotte 236
Bergmann, Gustav 226 Buttemeyer, Wilhelm x
Bernfeld, Siegfried 1,2,57, 102, 166 Bubr, Manfred 136
Best, Edward 70, 197, 216
288 NAME INDEX

Bunge, Mario 16, 32, 73, 78, 101, 103, Dolch, Josef 8, 42, 80, 149, 151, 161, 162,
104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 163, 164, 189
125, 142, 146, 147 Dreikurs, Rudolf 206, 240
Burckhardt, Jacob 149 Dubislav, Walter 91, 200
Burns, Hobert W. 167 Ducasse, C. J. 246
Busemann, Adolf 20, 37, 126, 236 Durkheim, Emile 7, 8, 11,37, 48, 50, 86,
Butler, J. Donald 176 181, 192, 195, 209, 210, 211, 212,
Butts, R. Freeman 4 213,214,233

Cahn, Steven M. 176 Eastman, George 23

Caldwell, Bettye M. 136 Eggersdorfer, Franz Xaver 49,177,226
Campbell, Norman 106 Eigen, Manfred 125
Camap, Rudolf 73, 77, 79, 108, 110, 111, Eigler, Gunther 133, 207
120 Eisermann, Gottfried 151, 159
Carpenter, Finley 229 Eisler, Rudolf 217, 218
Carr, Edward Hallet 151, 159, 160 Elzer, Hans-Michael 15
Casler, Lawrence 133 Endres, Walter 81
Cathrein, Viktor 189 Ennis, Robert H.
Christensen, James E. x, 216 Erdmann, Karl Otto 71, 72
Chwostow, W. M. 67 Erlinghagen, Karl24,65
Clements, Millard 70 Essler, Wilhelm K 14
Cohn, Jonas 6, 167, 173, 181, 182, 185,
202,206 Faber, Karl-Georg 150, 153, 156, 158,
Comenius, Johann Amos 12, 175, 183 159, 161
Comte, Auguste 213, 233 Feigl, Herbert 32, 113, 203
Connell, William F. 4 Fend, Helmut 86
Copi, Irving 70 Feuerstein, Thomas 68
Cube, Felix von 201 Feyerabend, Paul K 32
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 26
Dahmer, Ilse 12, 223 Fijalkowski, Jurgen 30
Dahrendorf, Ralf 139 Fink, Eugen 176
Debus, R. L. 4 Fischer, Aloys 2, 48, 49, 50, 55, 61, 63,
Degenkolbe, Gert 197 102, 130, 217
Derbolav, Josef 3, 6, 7, 20, 25, 63, 64, 153, Flammer,August 137
204,205,219 Flitner, Andreas 64, 81
Deutscher Bildungsrat 191, 201, 227 Flitner, Wilhelm 5, 14, 16, 56, 62, 74, 84,
Dewey, John 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179 86, 149, 153, 154, 155, 158, 160, 165,
Diemer, Alwin 28, 95, 96, 104, 130, 167, 177, 185, 186,~91,218,243
177,239 Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm 181, 231
Dietrich, Albert 65 Frankena, William K 85, 76, 77, 178, 182,
Dilthey, Wilhelm 15, 48, 50, 54, 60, 96, 97, 183, 190, 198, 199
102, 153, 154, 178, 184, 185, 200, Frankl, Viktor E. 235
217,219,220 Freud, Sigmund 23
Dopp-Vorwald, Heinrich 216 Frey, Gerhard 67, 169, 170, 171, 172
Dohmen, Gunther 24, 216 Freyer, Hans 51
 NAME INDEX
Friedrichs, Jiirgen 130,
Frischeisen-Kohler, Max 7, 8, 48, 51, 54,
93,173,177,185,220
Frit~ch,Theodor55
Frohlich, Werner D. 76
Froese, Leonard 153, 217
Funke, Gerhard 67, 154, 159, 169, 170,
171
Gadamer, Hans-G. 154
Gamm, Hans-Jochen 9, 27, 67,165
Gehlen, Arnold 63, 64, 226, 227
Geiger, Theodor 226
Geissler, Erich E. 56
Gerner, Berthold 205
Geyser, Joseph 55
Giese, Fritz 182, 184
Giesecke, Hermann 15, 85, 233
Giesen, Bernhard 139
Glockner, Peter-Heinrich 75
Gmurman, W. J. 65, 66
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 193
Gottler, Joseph 65
Goldschmidt, Dietrich 68
Goldstein, Leon J. 95, 150, 159, 160
Gomperz, Heinrich 160, 246
Gomperz, Theodor 168
Goode, William J. 131
Gowin, D. B. 4,176
Graumann, Carl Friedrich 59,141
Groothoff, Hans Hermann 15, 63, 153,
217
Guyer, Walter 16
Habermas, Jiirgen 32,61,67,223
Hiiberlin, Paul 86
Hamann, Bruno 209, 246
Hare, Richard M. 77,198,230
Hartman, Robert S. 189
Hartmann, Nicolai 51,172,189
Haseloff, Otto Walter 198
Hatt, Paul K 131
Heckhausen, Heinz 84
Hedinger, Hans-Walter 150
Hegel, Georg W. Friedrich 14,39
289
Heid, Helmut 230, 236, 237, 238
Heidegger, Martin 154
Heitger, Marian 217
Hempel, Carl Gustav 16, , 32, 73, 77, 101,
106, 108, 138, 139, 140, 142, 158,
161, 164
Henry, Jules 164
Hentig, Hartmut von 86, 196
Henz, Hubert 15, 96, 185
Herbart, Johann Friedrich 6, 11, 12, 13,
15, 39, 54, 60, 69, 84, 85, 86, 99, 152,
158, 174, 175, 180, 181, 183, 184,
190,204,205,206,243
Herold, N. 106
Herrmann, Theo 96,126,127,
Herrmann, Ulrich 156, 157, 158, 164
Hesse, Hans A. 206
Heyde, Johannes Erich 83
Hilgard, Ernest R. 141
Hilgenheger, Norbert 200, 234
Hillebrecht, Werner 149, 157
Hirscher, Johann Baptist 12
Hirst, Paul H. 4, 216
Hoerster, Norbert 173
Hoffmeister, Johannes 217, 218
Hofmann, Franz 235
Hofmann, Hans-Georg 67
Hofstiitter, Peter R. 144
Holzkamp, Klaus 100, 141
Homans, George Caspar 61, 62, 64, 123,
131
Honigsheim, Paul 233
Horne, Hermann H. 176
Horney, Walter 196
Hornstein, Walter 163
Hospers, John 73,106, 173, 199
Huijts, Joseph H. 188
Hume, David 119
Husserl, Edmund 125, 170
Immisch, Peter 135
Jaeger, Werner 165
Jaspers, Karl 176
Johannesson, Ingvar 132
290 NAME INDEX
Johnston, Herbert 182 Kroeber, Alfred L. 61
Juhos, Bela 111, 120 Krober, Giinter 106
Junker, Detlef 92 Kroeber-Riel, Werner 77, 78
Kroh, Oswald 48, 185
Kainz, Friedrich 70, 71 Kuethe, James L. 4
Kammari, M. D. 66 Kuhn, Thomas 80
Kammel, Willibald 189
Kanitscheider, Bernulf 106 Lange, Max G. 165
Kant, Immanuel 169,171,176,188,193 Langeveld, Martinus J. 15,56,151
Kaplan, Abraham 16, 29, 60, 73, 77, 101, Laska, John A. 4, 26, 27
103, 110, 111, 125, 137 Lassahn, Rudolf 9, 217
Kastil, Alfred 169, 172 Laucken, Uwe 133, 135
Kaufmann, Walter 182,202 Laufs, Joachim 206
Kaulbach, Friedrich 130, 190 Lautmann, Rudiger 187
Keiler, Peter 188 Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 21
Kempski, Jurgen von 16, 154 Leinfellner, Werner 31,32, 103
Kentler, Helmut 131 Lemberg, Eugen 20, 23
Kerlinger, Fred N. 60, 61, 133 Lempert, Wolfgang 68
Kessen, William 77 Lengrand,Paul165
Kim, Paul 160 Lenk, Hans 32, 122, 142
Klafki, Wolfgang 68, 177 Levi-Strauss, Claude 81
Klauer, Karl Josef 55, 132, 133, 134, 203, Levit, Martin 4
206 Lewin, Kurt 47, 49
Klaus, Georg 67, 136 Lichtenstein, Ernst 12
Kleinberger, Aharon Fritz 206 Lieberman, Myron 21
Klima, Rolf 126 Lingelbach, Karl Christoph 65
Kluckhohn, Clyde 61, 125 Linke, Werner 63
Kneller, George F. 77,176, 177,179 Lippitt, Ronald 132
Konig, Eckard 9, 189, 190, 217 Litt, Theodor 5, 73, 75, 84, 220, 221, 222
Konig, Helmut 65, 156 Lobkowicz, Nikolaus 67, 103
Konig, Rene 32 Loch, Werner 64, 77
Komisar, B. Paul 185, 198 Lochner, Rudolf 1, 4, 8, 16,26,38,40,47,
Koroljow, F. F. 65,66 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 62, 102, 149, 186,
Kotarbinski, Tadeusz 218 209, 212, 213, 214, 230, 224, 233,
Kraft, Julius 58, 67 237
Kraft, Viktor 7, 14, 23, 29, 31,32, 54, 67, Locke, John 183
70, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 95, 100, 102, LOwith, Karl 91
104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, Loos, Joseph 15
112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, Lubbe, Hermann 19, 193
122, 127, 131, 143, 158, 161, 165, Lundgreen, Peter 150
168,169,189,199,240
Kramer, Horst 66 MacKenzie, Norman 60
Kraus, Oskar 83 MacMillan, C. J. B. 176
Krieck, Ernst 50, 52, 54, 55, 65, 66, 173, Marz, Fritz 15
178, 179 Maier, Franz Georg 159, 160
 NAME INDEX 291

Makarenko, Anton Semjonowitsch 206, Nagel, Ernest 15, 16,32,93, 106, 122, 127,
240 161
Mandler, George 77 Najder, Zdzislaw 83, 84, 85, 86, 199
Mannheim, Karl 226 Neidhardt, Friedhelm 76
Maritain, Jacques 84, 179 Nelson, Leonard 54
Marrou, Henri-Irenee 10, 150, 156, 159, Newsome, George L. 70, 216
160 Nezel, Ivo 9
Martinak, Eduard 48, 51, 55 Niblett, W. R. 4
Massarik, Fred 236 Nickel, Horst 205
Masterman, Margaret 80 Nicklis, Werner S. 206
Matthias, Adolf 219, 240 Nicolin, FriedheIm 1, 149, 150, 153,214
Mayntz, Renate 133, 194 Nietzsche, Friedrich 191, 192, 194, 235,
McClellan, James E. 176, 185, 198 236
McGucken, William 179 Nieuwenhuis, H. 16
McMurrin, Sterling M. 180 Nipperdey, Thomas 149, 164
Meister, Richard 5, 10,24, 48, 51, 52, 55, NoW, Herman 84, 153, 220, 221
59, 61, 93, 149, 151, 163, 174, 185,
186,196,214,215,217,218 O'Connor, Daniel J. 176, 216
Menze, Clemens 13, 232, 233, 234 Oelkers, Jiirgen 239
Merton, Robert K. 88 Opp, Karl-Dieter 16, 109, 141
Messer, August 219 Oppenheim, Paul 140
Metzger, Wolfgang 16, 127,240 Ossowska, Maria 188, 194,218
Meumann, Ernst 55
Meyer, Hilbert L. 81, 200 Pages, Robert 132
Mill, John Stuart ix, 14, 54, 57, 116, 117, Pareto, Vilfredo 23, 28, 197, 209
131,145,215 Parke, Ross D. 136
Mills, Charles Wright 151 Parsons,llalcott81
Mises, Richard von 109 Paulsen, Friedrich 189
Mittelstrass, Jiirgen 171 Peirce, Charles Sanders 22, 122
Mabus, Gerhard 165 Perkinson, Henry J. 166
Moller, Bernhard x Perquin, Nicolaas C. A 15
Mollenhauer, Klaus 27, 67, 185, 187, 191, Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich 211
223 Peters, Richard S. 16, 186
Momrnsen, Hans 159 Petersen, Peter 26
Monnerot, Jules 165 Petzelt, Alfred 16, 197
Monroe, Paul 15 Pfeffer, Fritz 15, 37, 48, 49, 209, 230
Montaigne, Michel de 211 Pfister, Adolph 12
Montessori, Maria 2, 102 Piaget, Jean 60, 69, 96
Morris, Ben 229 Pieper, Josef 196
Morris, Van Cleve 176 Plato 173, 175, 176
Morscher, Edgar 85, 91, 104, 198 Plessner, Helmut 16
Miihlmann, Wilhelm E. 163 Poggeler, Franz 233
Murrai, Minoru 27, 216 Popper, Karl R. 22, 28, 31, 32,58, 78, 101,
Murray, Henry A 125 104, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117,
292 NAME INDEX

118, 119, 120, 121, 127, 138, 142, Scheffler, Israel 3, 63, 75, 77, 176
144,148,169,170,237 Scheibe, Wolfgang 186
Price, Kingsley 175, 224 Scheler, Max 86, 169, 170, 171, 172, 189,
196
Rabelais, Franc;ois 211 Schelsky, Helmut 160
Radnitzky, Gerhard 30, 153 Schick, August 133, 135
Raschert, Jiirgen 201 Schiller, Friedrich 165
Rassem, Mohammed 163 Schindler, Ingrid 149, 151, 158
Rebel, Karlheinz 131, 186 Schischkoff, Georgi 218
Redl, Fritz 131, 184 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 6, 10, 11, 12,
Reichenbach, Hans 106, 109, 110, 113, 54,223
169 Schmid, Michael 139
Rein, Wilhelm 13, 15, 95, 175, 180, 181, Schmidkunz, Hans 49
184,219 Schmied, Dieter 132, 133
Reininger, Robert 83, 189,200 Schmitt, Rudolf 197
Rescher, Nicholas 88 Schneider, Friedrich 16, 25, 56, 86, 135,
Richter, E. 1 186,204,206
Riesman, David 192 Schneider, Karl 130
Ritter, 26 Scholl-Schaaf, Margret 187
Ritter, Joachim 12, 168 Schopenhauer,Arthur46,81
Ritzel, Wolfgang 15 SchrOdinger, Erwin 107, 110
ROd, Wolfgang 32,113 SchUller, Bruno 236
Rohrs, Hermann 15,76,77, 79,177 Schiitz, Alfred 22, 125
Rossner, Lutz 9,68, 131, 198 Schulze, Theodor 12
Rohracher, Hubert 58 Schulze, Winfried 97, 151, 159
Rolfus, Hermann 12 Schuppe, E. 1
Roloff, Ernst M. 15 Schwarz, Friedrich Heinrich Christian 10,
Rombach, Heinrich 66, 233 152, 162
Ross, Alf 213, 233 Schwarzer, Rolf 137
Roth, Heinrich 62, 64, 86, 200 Scriven, Michael 81, 143
Rothacker, Erich 14,51,71,219,227 Sears, Robert R. 58
Rousseau, Jean Jacques 211 Seiffert, Helmut 15
Rudner, Richard S. 65,87,113 Sells, Saul B. 141
Ryan, Alan 16, 137, 142 Sherif, Muzafer 188
Ryans, David G. 133 Shields, James J. 27
Shulman, Lee S. 134
Sachse,J.J.186 Sigwart, Christoph 57,106, 117, 118, 119
Sailer, Johann Michael 13 Skinner, Burrhus F. 23
Salzmann, Christian Gotthilf 183, 204, Skowronek, Helmut 132, 133
205,206 Sloan, Douglas 164, 165
Savigny, Eike von 77 Smith, B. Othanel 77
Schafer, Karl-H. 149 Solomon, Daniel 133
Schafers, Bernhard 124, 128 Soltis, Jonas F. 77
Schaff, Adam 20, 73 Soltz, Vicki 206, 240
Schaller, Klaus 62, 74, 79, 141 Spaemann, Robert 198
 NAME INDEX 293

Speck, Josef 64
Spieler, Josef 217 Ulich, Dieter 109, 171
Spinner, Helmut 104, 128 Ulich, Robert 179
Spranger, Eduard 16, 25, 79, 151, 173, Uslar, Detlev von 124
174,185,204,205,220,221,222
Stegmiiller, Wolfgang 7, 16,29,30,31,32, Vogel, August 40
33, 73, 78, 79, 82, 106, 108, 109, 110, Vogt, Klaus 56
115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 127, Vries, Josef de 49
128, 137, 139, 140, 142, 158, 161,
169, 170, 171 Wagner,Hans 170, 171
Stein, Alois von der 96 Wagner, Julius 61
Steiner Maeda, Elizabeth 35, 177 Waitz, Theodor 5, 12, 13, 39, 54, 99, 100,
Steiner, Gary A. 126, 136 175, 180, 184
Steinhagen, Klaus 137 Walk, Leopold 10
Stellwag, Helena W. F. 216 Walters, Richard H. 136
Stern, Erich 8 Walton, John 4
Stevenson, Charles L. 77,199,240 Weber, Max 40,87,89,90,91, 115,233
Stieglitz, Heinrich 76 Weinberger, Ota 195, 199,202
Stierand, Gerhard 234, 235 Weingartner, Paul 5, 7, 17,29,32,58,85,
Stockhammer, Morris 217 87,96,104
Stoy, Karl Volkmar 149, 161, 162, 163, Weischedel, Wilhelm 187
165,166,184,219 Weldon, Thomas D. 77
Strasser, Stephan 177, 178, 179,243,246 Wellendorf, Franz 185
Strebel, V. 12 Wellmann, Carl 77
Stroker, Elisabeth 32, 111, 120 Weniger, Erich 13, 75, 163, 189,221,223
Strohal, Richard 186, 196 Werder, Lutz von 84
Stiittgen, Albert 239 White, Ralph K. 132
Suchodolski, Bogdan 179 Wichmann, Otto 56
Wilhelm, Theodor 9,179
Tarski, Alfred 138 Willmann, Otto 12, 15, 18,37,48,50,55,
Tausch, Reinhard & Anne-Marie 205 61, 102, 149, 153, 154, 161, 162, 163,
Tenorth, Heinz-Elmar 155 169, 184, 185, 189, 195, 209, 210,
Theobald, D. W. 123, 136 211,212,214,219,230,236,246
Thiele, Gunnar 149 Wilson, John 18, 196
Thomas, William I. 47 Windelband, Wilhelm 96, 97, 168, 170,
Thurner, Franz 137 171
Tollkotter, Bernhard 176 Wineman, David 131, 184
Topitsch, Ernst 17, 19, 21, 30, 32, 68, 70, Winnefeld, Friedrich 49, 130, 205
88,89,197,198,229,234 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 167
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston 146, 199 Wohlgenannt, Rudolf 29, 32, 73, 79, 96,
Trapp, Ernst Christian 1 104,113,168,174,240
Travers, Robert M. W. 16, 133 Wolf, Karl 186, 196, 204
Trier, Jost 11 Woody, Thomas 10
Trieschman, Albert E. 131 Wright, Georg Henrik von 32, 123, 131,
Tschernokosowa, Walentina 206 136, 139, 161, 187, 190
294 NAME INDEX

Zdarzil, Herbert 64
Zecha, Gerhard 89, 93,199,200,203
Zedier, Hans-Peter 198, 201
Zenke, Karl 68
Zetterberg, Hans L. 136
Ziller, Tuiskon 39, 181, 184
Zimmermann, Ekkart 133
SUBJECT INDEX

Ability 11,43 ft., 78, 88, 92, 119, 124, 128, Completeness of a theory 135
147, 175, 184, 188, 191, 201, 210, 212, Complexity 73, 81, 88, 107, 110, 123 ff.,
220,226,230,231,246 131, 147, 159, 164
Action 51, 53, 61, 139, 164 f. Comprehensibility 79 ff.
-, social 60, 62 Concept 72 ff.
Aim 144 -, descriptive 197 f.
Ambiguity 72 ft., 130 -, general 41, 97, 104
Analytic philosophy 30 f., 68, 99, 169 ff., -, normative 157, 198,239
176,232,236,243 -, theoretical 77, 111, 121
Anxiety 137 Concept of education 38 ft., 42 f., 47 f.,
Application of scientific knowledge 88, 53, 75 f., 164, 178
238 Condition 53, 57, 118, 133, 134 f., 137 f.,
Approach 9, 39, 50, 51, 52, 57, 63, 72, 93, 143, 145, 147,229 (see: Cause)
97, 99, 101, 112, 134, 144, 148, 151, 153 -, necessary 57, 135 ft., 144
ft., 159, 175 f., 179, 181, 186, 192, 221, -, negative 57
244 f. -, sufficient 116, 136
Apriorism 32 Confirmation 17, 88, 110 ft., 113, 115, 119
Art 10 f., 210 f. ft., 131, 156, 207
Art of education 11 ft., 15, 38, 163, 183, Conscientiousness 43
216 Consensus 155, 186,227
Attitude change 58 Construction 62, 80, 127 ft., 133, 137
Axiology 172 f., 189, 194,245 Constructivism 31, 113
Contact 11, 85, 141, 191
Basis science 170 Context of discovery 113 f., 121, 161
Basis statement 116 ft., 119 f., 159, 199 Context of justification 113 f.
-, normative 199 f., 234 f., 239 f. Conviction 8, 43, 69, 101, 107, 151, 215,
Behavior 60 232
Behavioral science 60, 61 Correspondence theory of truth 105
Critical theory 9, 67 f.
Case 143, 146 Critique 22, 26, 56, 67, 75, 77, 158, 169,
Case study 131 181,203,221,223,225,235 f.
Cause 50, 54, 56, 100, 133, 136, 145, 147 Cultural pedagogics 220
Causal-analytic 134, 159, 218, 237 Cultural science 51, 61, 151
Causality 107 Culture 61 f.
Changeability 125 Curriculum theory 80,189,206
Clarity 64, 72 ft., 77, 79, 87, 89, 92, 100,
103,126,246 Decision 18, 30, 55, 59, 66 f., 90, 101, 118,
Cognition 203 146, 157 f., 161, 193, 201 f., 224, 226,
-, scientific 30 f., 113, 223 230
Coherence theory of truth 105 Deduction 138 f., 142, 200
Colloquial language 70 Definition 73, 76 f.
-, programmatic 75 f.
Comparison 15, 54, 105, 113, 125, 151,
162, 168, 169 Demand 195, 198 f.
296 SUBJECT INDEX
Demarcation 69, 74, 215
Derivability 122, 199,201
Derivation 86, 113, 200, 240
Description 15, 17,41, 48, 50, 52, 56, 70,
74, 76, 85, 90, 94 f., 102, 130, 139, 150,
160,162,219
Determinant 134
Didactics 189, 194, 200
Disposition, psychic 39 f.
Dogmatization 227
Doubt 1, 12, 15, 18, 22, 58, 60, 88, 90, 99,
149,156,209,212,222,225,246
Ecology of education 134
Educand 39, 45 f., 163 f., 195, 204 f.
Education 3, 5 f., 38 ff., 42 ff., 62 f., 71, 75
f.,82,177
., indirect 47 f., 165
Educational action 40, 46 ff., 59, 99, 178,
184, 186, 190, 204 f., 215 f., 226
-, traditional40
Educational aim 40, 93, 147, 188, 191,
198,201
Educational means 47 f., 56 f., 73, 92 f.,
100, 134, 136, 157, 178
Educational organization 203
Educational planning 56, 180
Educational practice 4, 52, 56, 81, 129,
143,186,221,223,228,238
Educational praxis 9, 56, 70, 102, 176,
185,213,217
Educational reality 6, 14, 16, 18, 20, 48 f.,
51,54,56,74, 100 f., 129, 154
Educational research 3, 16, 51, 99, 149,
150,177,244
Educational science (see: science of
education) 3, 4, 6 ff., 24 ff., 37 ff., 63 ff.,
191 ff., 211 ff., 233 ff., 243 ff.
Educational situation 49, 125, 129, 143,
157,246
Educational success 11, 56, 129, 148
Educational teaching 38, 70, 213 f., 216,
219, 230 f., 237
Educational technology 145, 147, 152, 186
Educational theory 4, 10, 12, 16,24 f., 48,
152, 176, 183
Educator 18,20,38,46, 163, 179, 191 ff.,
203 ff., 219 ff., 229, 236, 240 f., 245 ff.
Educology 2, 3, 7, 9, 15 f., 27, 35, 77, 80,
187
Effect 51, 56, 133, 136, 145, 146 f., 164,
204 f.
-, undesired 55 f., 57, 147 f., 164
Emancipation 43, 67, 156, 161, 192, 196,
197,223
Emotional value 71
Emotive use of language 71, 241
Empirical content 12, 84, 110, 128, 197,
198,199
Empirical generalization 121
Empirical science 5, 7 ff., 15, 17, 24, 26,
29, 62, 80, 90, 102, 105, 151, 153, 174,
186,193,212,222,233,237
Empirical statement 7,146,240
Empiricism 26, 3lf., 102, 113, 120 f.
-, naive empiricism 102, 120 f.
End 14, 38, 40, 48 ff., 53 ff., 60 f., 71 f.,
145 ff., 172 f., 181
Ends-means relationship 53 f.
Epistemology 14, 29, 31, 68, 113, 138, 152,
158,162,168,171,175,245
Essence 29, 42, 58, 66, 74, 94, 113, 170,
172,177,205
Ethics 6, 12 f., 172 ff., 175, 177 ff., 180 f.,
188, 193 ff., 205 f.
Ethics for educators 21, 24 ff., 182, 184,
191,194,203,205,225
Evidence 19, 22, 97, 134, 202
Example 204
Experience 115, 120 f., 159
Experiment 132
Explanandum 138 ff., 142
Explanans 139 f.
Explanation 50,95,97, 111, 127 f., 137 ff.,
144,147,237
-, deductive-nomological 139
-, inductive-statistical 139
., partial 140 f.
Extrapolation 117 f.
Fact 117, 200
-, education as 37, 48 f. 54
-, historical 159 f.
Falsification 119 f.
Falsificationism 31 f.
Field 47
 SUBJECT INDEX 297

Field study 130 ff. Interest 20 f., 25,64,67,85, 127, 144, 155
-, developmental 130 ff., 168, 172,228,245
-, exploratory 130 f. Interpretation 10, 14, 20, 22, 24, 64, 78,
-, hypothesis-testing 133 85, 87, 95, 115, 123 f., 154 f., 158 ff.,
., long-term 130 176, 185, 187, 196, 197,201, 222,224 [
" multivariate experimental longitudinal Intersubjective testability 92, 104, 105,
134 169 f.
-, multifactor approach 134 Intuition 112 f., 115, 170
., multivariate approach 134
Invariant 132
Formal legitimation 201 f.
Formal object 49
Jargon 64,81,229
Forms of education 11, 47 f., 75
Justification 103 ff., 112 ff., 171, 182, 192,
Foundations of education 4, 26 f. 198 ff., 234 f.
-, content-evaluative 199 ff.
Generality 73, 108, 111 " logical 193, 199
Given 53, 102 f., 154
Group 144 ff. Knowledge 193,202
., pedagogical 23, 25, 27, 33, 243, 245,
Hermeneutics 153 f. 246
Hierarchy 18, 44, 50, 112, 178, 181, 189, -, prescientific 22
196,215,225,235
Historical 3, 29, 43 f., 48, 50, 51 f., 56, 66, Language 23, 26, 69 ff., 190, 240
89, 94 ff., 104, 117 f., 122, 139, 149 ff., -, functions of 70
155 ff., 157-158, 159-161, 162-165, 182, -, theoretical 77
188, 196,210,221 ff., 225 ff., 239, 244 -, of educational science 69, 72, 80, 82
Historiography 3, 16, 56, 95 ff., 113, 149 Law 106, 154,210
f., 151-157, 158-161, 162, 176, 188,216, -, scientific 106, 107
225 -, statistical 109
History 51,94 ff., 149 ff., 157 ff., 160 -, theoretical 111
Human science 222 Learning 10, 45, 47, 76, 78, 81, 86, 88,
Humanities 9, 17, 29, 32, 51 ff., 58 f., 73, 126, 133 f., 137, 164 f., 175
75,104,115,123,139,219 Logic 33, 91, 105, 109, 113 f., 116, 119,
Hypothetical construct 95, 150 168 f., 213, 240
Logical conclusion 91
Ideal 29, 40, 44,172,181,190,230,245 Logical consistency 116
Ideology 6, 9, 19-23, 65 ff., 90, 147, 182, Logical scope 197
186,197,226,233
Individuality 46, 107, 188,205 Marxism-Leninism 67, 104
Induction 116 ff., 120 Mass communication 57
Influence 4, 6, 11, 20 f., 30, 45, 47, 57 ff., Material object 49
62, 87 f., 92, 100, 125, 132, 135, 144, Meaning 71 ff., 79 f., 160, 239 f.
146,164, 174, 176 f., 179, 188, 193,204, Means 14, 49 f., 56, 93, 135, 145 ff., 182
213, 223, 225, 229 ff., 234 ff., 194,204 f.
Information content 87 Meta-ethics 173, 190
Inspiration 13, 113 f., 121, 193,220 Meta-language 82
Instructional content 189 Metaphysics 26, 172 ff.
Intention 11, 19, 41, 47, 71, 73, 99, 123, Metatheory 1, 31, 33 f., 65, 171, 176 f.,
184,193,229 180, 195 f., 232
298 SUBJECT INDEX
Method 114, 182
-, scientific 20, 24, 29, 32, 38, 68, 87, 115,
169, 171 f., 212, 225
Method of testing 120, 161
Mode of inquiry 100, 176
Moral philosophy 6, 168, 172 f., 187, 189,
226,245
Morals 188, 191, 193, 213 f., 232 f.
Name 26, 28, 72, 149 f., 216 ff.
Nomological hypothesis 116 ff., 136, 143
ff.
Nomological knowledge 94, 99, 102, 123
ff., 129, 130 f., 140, 144
Nomological statement 110, 138
Nomothetical 96 f., 99, 106, 107, 111, 112,
126
Norm 3 ff., 14, 18, 25, 29, 31, 33, 38, 40,
42, 54, 68, 85 ff., 123, 148 f., 152 ff.,
172, 187 ff., 192 f., 222, 239 f.
-, educational technical 184, 189 f., 216
-, methodological 87
-, moral 152 ft., 165, 184, 189 f., 215 f.
-, technical 5, 146 ff., 152 ff., 204 ff.
-, world-view 152 ff., 215 f.
Norm content 184
Norm justification 203
Norm setting 189
Normative statement 85, 91, 96, 197, 198,
199,201,232,240
Normative theory 33, 190, 218, 222, 239
Object language 171
Objectivation 51,61, 114, 115
Objectivity 20,67,115,232
Observation 2, 17, 22, 39, 87, 102, 103,
113,117,121,122,142,155,240
Ontology of education 177
Organization 50
Ought 40
Overall view 6, 134, 173, 179, 221, 244
Pansophia 175
Parents 11, 12, 71, 81, 131, 132, 136, 140,
165,188,191,201
Partiality 65, 66, 223
Pastoral care 42
Pedagogical anthropology 64
Pedagogical psychology 63
Pedagogical superstition 166
Pedagogical teleology 194
Pedagogical terminology 38
Pedagogics (pedagogy) 1 ff., 13 ff., 24, 25
f., 37 f., 176 f., 211 ff., 216 ff.
- applied 217
-, Catholic 65, 233
-, confessional 65
-, critical 8, 67, 68
- critique of 26
-, cultural-philosophical174
-, descriptive 5, 8, 54, 102, 183, 186
-, emancipatory 9, 65, 67
-, hermeneutical 8, 51 f., 114,154 ff., 160,
219 f., 221, 223
-, historical 95, 161
-, Marxist 65, 66, 68
-, National Socialist 65
-, normative 9, 15, 23, 67, 102, 151, 154,
157,184,217,232
-, normative-descriptive 5 ff., 21, 37, 54,
183-187,215
-, philosophical 7, 173, 174, 177, 178
political 68
-, practical 25, 27 f., 32, 35, 55, 92, 155,
161, 162 f., 175 f., 180 f., 183,209,210,
215 f., 218 f., 221-223, 224-230, 231-
238,239-241,243 ff., 247
-, pragmatic 9, 218, 222
-, psychological 15, 60, 69
-, systematic 95, 96, 153
-, theoretical orientations of 8 ff.
-, traditional 8, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 52, 54,
56, 99, 100, 101, 135, 153
-, as a social science 37 f.
Pedagogue 66
Perception 46, 113, 117
Personality 14, 38, 40 f., 42-46, 52 f., 57,
58, 64, 66, 72, 80, 82, 86, 100, 133-137,
140, 163 f., 180, 184 f., 187, 190, 195 f.,
204,231,246
-, ideal 53, 180, 190, 195
Philosophical 174
Philosophy 6 f., 103 L, 167 ff., 245
-, analytic-epistemological 171, 173, 175,
176,177,206,236
-, Aristotelian-Thomistic 179
-, critical 171
 SUBJECT INDEX 299
-, dialectical 30 f., 66, 169 f. Pseudo-normative empty formulas 196 f.,
-, dogmatic 170 240
-, epistemological 171, 176, 190, 196 Pseudo-philosophy 169
-, irrationalistic 169 f., 172, 179 Psychic disposition 39, 40
-, Marxist 170, 179 Psycho-history 164
-, metaphysical 158, 172 Psychology 15, 49 f., 58 f., 60, 63 f., 174,
-, normative 173, 178, 180-183, 186, 187- 188,211 f., 217,244
190, 191-196, 203, 206 f., 215-219, 222
Psychotherapy 42, 45, 57, 58
f., 227, 234, 236
-, phenomenological 169 f., 179 Pupil 38,39, 100,137,182,188,197
-, practical 12, 13, 14, 67, 172, 174, 177, Purpose 4 f., 9, 12, 17 f., 24, 30, 33 f., 43 f.,
180,218 53, 60, 69 ff., 73-76, 90, 92, 112, 115 f.,
-, pragmatic 179 151, 155, 164, 180, 182, 205, 210, 215,
-, scientific 169, 170, 171 220,224,237,245
., speculative 26
-, theoretical 174 Rationalism 32, 113
-, world-view 169,170,172,178,179,180 Reality 105, 119 ff.
Philosophy of education 3, 8, 25, 27, 28, Recommendation 238
32, 35, 167, 173-178, 180 f., 183, 231, Reconstruction 95, 157
234,239,241,243 f., 247 -, of past phenomena 159 ff.
-, analytic 176 f. Reform 19, 210
-, normative 176 f., 178, 18D-183, 187 f.,
Regularity 106, 107, 108, 109, 118
190 f., 193 f., 195 f., 203, 206, 215, 217-
219,221 ff., 227, 234, 236 Rejection 16,27,30, 113, 120, 121,222
-, pansophic 175, 178 Relativism 20, 181,202, 204
-, world-view 177 ff. Research 120 f., 169
-, world-view-normative 221 ff. Research technique 95
Philosophy of pedagogics 176,177 Responsibility 3, 6, 20, 43, 67, 92, 185,
Philosophy of science 29, 30, 99, 245 195, 197, 204, 205, 206, 219, 223, 241
247 '
Postulate 20, 78, 89,107, 114, 118,207
Practical canon 239 Result 136
Pragmatism 32, 176 Rhetoric 57, 192
Praxiological217,218 Rights 191, 193
Praxiology 25, 35, 218, 243 Rule 146 f., 210,220,226
Praxis 9, 103, 211, 218, 220 ff.
Prediction 78, 94, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, School 163, 164,165
142,143,144,145,237 Science 4 f., 16 ff., 22 f., 28 ff., 65 ff., 87,
Prescription 85 101, 103 ff., 209 f.
Principle 177, 181, 190 f., 197 f., 205, ., applied 6, 213, 220
239 f. -, Marxist-Leninist 66
-, practical 5, 161
Probability 104, 109, 110, 124, 139
-, epistemological 109 f. Science of education 1-5, 7, 15-16, 23 f.,
., logical 110 25 f., 32,35,37,38,48,51-58,62 f., 65,
-, mathematical 109 f. 70, 99, 127, 151, 180, 187, 209 f., 214,
217,219,222,243 ff.
Problem 100 ff., 209 ff., 211 ff.
Professional ethics -, critical 9, 67 f.
-, descriptive-analytic 51, 53
-, pedagogical (see: ethics for educators)
., empirical 7, 9, 21, 25, 27, 51 f., 55, 68
Proof2,26,56,69,202
f., 92, 100 ff., 153 ff., 158, 175 ff" 184,
Propaganda 42,57, 68, 75, 81,229 190,202,206,209,214,234,241,244
300 SUBJECf INDEX

-, nomothetical 96 f., 99 ff. Teacher 70, 133, 137 f., 143, 152, 163,206,
-, object of 38, 48 ff., 54 f., 162 ff. 221,243
-, theoretical 56, 96 Teaching 10, 38, 42, 70, 84 ff., 157, 162 f,
Scienticity 15, 66, 92, 169, 170, 187, 217, 175,189,194,203,206,210,213
224,232 Technology 54, 57, 99 ff., 127 f, 144 ff.,
Seeing 200, 220 237 ff.
Self-reflection 10 Technology of education 148, 237
-, committed 222 f. Teleological 53, 54, 57, 64, 93, 214, 225,
Sense 60 f., 161 f., 176 f., 185 226,227
Sentence 7, 35, 72, 82, 199 (see: Testing 17, 24, 68, 94 ff., 101, 105, 111-
Statement) 116, 119, 120 f., 125, 130-134, 160, 169
Situation 46 f., 172, 190, 206 f., 234, 240, 243 f.
Social interaction 59 Text 154
Social science 15, 21, 37, 58, 60 ff., 64-68, Theoretical 96
97,124,127,135,139,225 Theory 10, 17, 28, 64, 96, 102 ff., 111 f.,
Social work 42, 57 134 f.
Socialization 64, 72, 76 ff., 164 -, practical 4, 6, 12, 18,37, 103, 153, 175,
Sociology 3, 16, 49, 62 f., 72, 80, 96, 113, 211 f., 216 ff., 222, 230, 243
141, 188, 211 ff., 244 -, scientific 1, 4, 15, 23, 103, 105 f., 111 f.,
116, 121 f., 206, 210, 217, 244
Source 160
Statement 7,18, 103 (see: Sentence) Theory formation 177
-, basis 116 ff, 159, 199 Theory of action 220
-, descriptive 18, 75, 85 f., 89 f., 92, 122, Theory of goods 194
198,215 Tradition 12, 14, 30, 56, 155, 161, 189,
- descriptive technological 146 f. 192, 195, 211, 223, 227 f.
-, empirical 7, 17, 90 f., 105, 146, 170, Transcendental philosophy 170
174,198,207,239,240 Truth 17, 19,20, 22 f., 28 f., 31, 61, 66 ff.,
-, general 113 83, 90, 104 f., 113 ff., 116, 119, 154,
-, mixed 91, 178, 186, 230 159,161,175,188,204
-, nomological 23, 96, 106 if., 110, 113,
116, 119, 122 f., 126, 128 f., 133, 137- Unconditional 225, 236
141, 142 f, 144
Unified pedagogical theory 243, 245
-, normative 85, 91, 96, 197, 198, 199,
201,207,230,232,240 Uniqueness 41,89,123, 125
-, particular 117 Unity of pedagogical knowledge 243,
-, prescriptive 237 f. 245 f
- pseudo-normative 196 f Universal validity 221
- singular 97,117,143 Universality 179
-, technological 146 f., 152, 205, 217, Usefulness 28, 56, 83, 87, 152, 216
237 f Utopia 67, 137, 157, 212, 227
-, universal 97, 117 ff.
Symbol 72 Vagueness 73
Sympathetic understanding 113, 114, 115, Validity 17, 24, 29, 42, 85 f, 89, 104, 108,
160, 161 110, 112 ff., 116 f., 122, 126, 129, 133,
Synthesis 32, 218, 243, 244, 245 193,198,200,202,210,220,233f,240
System 17, 106 f., 122, 134 f., 244 Valuation 18, 23, 38 ff., 55, 68, 75 f., 82
-, hypothetical-deductive ff., 145 f., 154 ff., 158, 172, 184, 187 ff.,
Systematic 153 227
Value 83, 145,227
 SUBJECT INDEX 301

Value bearer 83
Value foundation of science 87, 88
Value judgement 146, 161,240
Value-neutrality 20, 65, 68 f., 82 ff., 86,
87,89,90-93,186,234
Variable 107, 123, 132-135, 137,203
Verbal music 197
Verification 93, 115, 120
Verstehen (sympathetic understanding)
113 f., 160
Virtue 172, 181 f., 186, 190, 193, 196,
204 f.

Warning 47
Weltanschauung (see: world view)
Wisdom 168, 171, 184,246
Word 73 ff.
Work 9, 12,21,42 f., 58, 92, 145, 156, 183,
188,216,221,230,240
World view (Weltanschauung) 9,18,20 f.,
23 f., 28, 65 ff., 152, 155 f., 168, 172 ft.,
178, 191, 193,215,225 ff., 233
Philosophy and Education

1. C.I.B. Macmillan and J.W. Garrison: A Logical Theory of Teaching. Erotetics and
Intentionality. 1988 ISBN 90-277-2813-5
2. J. Watt: Individualism and Educational Theory. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0446-2
3. W. Brezinka: Philosophy of Educational Knowledge. An Introduction to the Founda-
tions of Science of Education, Philosophy of Education and Practical Pedagogics.
1992 ISBN 0-7923-1522-7

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS - DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON