REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

Leslie Mendoza vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 445667

Respondent’s Memorandum

4A
I-A
 OUTLINE OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD NOT BE QUASHED

BECAUSE THE WARRANT OF ARREST WAS PROPERLY
IMPLEMENTED AND A DEFECT IN THE SAME SHOULD
NOT BE A GROUND TO QUASH THE SAME.

II. THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL WAS FILED IN

THE PROPER VENUE DUE TO THE LACK OF
QUALIFICATION IN THE LAW REGARDING THE SPECIFIC
PLACE WHERE THE CRIMINAL ACTION SHOULD BE
FILED.

III. THE CRIMINAL ACTION FOR THE CRIME OF CYBER

LIBEL FILED BY WINNIE TORRES AGAINST THE
PETITIONER HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED BECAUSE THE
OFFENDED PARTY HAS FIFTEEN YEARS FROM MAY 21,
2014 OR UP UNTIL MAY 21, 2029 TO FILE THE PROPER
ACTION AGAINST LESLIE MENDOZA.

IV. THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL IS NOT BARRED

BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY BECAUSE THE RELEVANT
MATERIALS IN BOTH CASES DIFFER FROM EACH
OTHER.

V. THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL IS NOT BARRED

BY RES JUDICATA BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT
APPLY TO CRIMINAL CASES.
 FACTS

1. Leslie Mendoza is the owner, founder and editor-in-chief of The

Juicy Scoop, a local news corporation. The Juicy Scoop
publishes a daily tabloid of the same name in Tacloban City
featuring local news and gossips.

2. In January 2011, Leslie Mendoza wrote and published an article

on The Juicy Scoop detailing the efforts of the local police in
cracking down a child trafficking ring in Tacloban City. The article
appeared in the January 11, 2011 issue of The Juicy Scoop
(“2011 Article”). The article reads:

“POLICE CRACKS DOWN CHILD

TRAFFICKING RING; RESCUES 176
MINORS AND RECOVERED VEHICLES
OWNED BY A LOCAL POLITICIAN.
By: Leslie Mendoza

January 11, 2011. Yesterday, at 9:00 p.m.,

members of the PNP raided a warehouse
owned and operated by a child trafficking ring.
Inside the warehouse, the PNP engaged in a
shootout with the members of the child
trafficking ring. 3 of the members were shot
dead, while 5 were wounded. 1 police officer
was wounded.

The PNP arrested a total of 20 men involved in

the child trafficking, and rescued 176 minors,
all of whom were placed in cages and drugged
and sedated. The PNP recovered 5 Black Ford
Expeditions which were verified to be
registered and owned by former Mayor Winnie
Torres.”

3. In response to this article, former Tacloban City Mayor Winnie

Torres filed a criminal complaint for Libel under Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code against Leslie Mendoza. After conducting a
preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Tacloban City found probable cause to indict Leslie Mendoza for
Libel and filed an information with the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban (“RTC Tacloban”), Branch 19. The case is entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Leslie Mendoza.”

4. On July 13, 2012, the RTC Tacloban issued a Decision acquitting

Leslie Mendoza.
1
5. On December 16, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the
documents implicating Winnie Torres were falsified and without
these documents, there is no evidence linking her to the child
trafficking activities.

6. On May 21, 2014, the Juicy Scoop digitized and uploaded on its
website the 2011 article, but with minor edits from Leslie
Mendoza (“2014 article”). The 2014 article appears on the
website and reads as follows:

“POLICE CRACKS DOWN CHILD

TRAFFICKING RING; RESCUES 176
MINORS AND RECOVERED VEHICLES
OWNED BY THE FORMER CITY MAYOR.
By: Leslie Mendoza

January 11, 2011. Yesterday, at 9:00 p.m.,

members of the PNP raided a warehouse
owned and operated by a child trafficking ring.
Inside the warehouse, the PNP engaged in a
shootout with the members of the child
trafficking ring. 3 of the members were shot
dead, while 5 were wounded. 1 police officer
was wounded.

The PNP arrested a total of 20 men involved in

the child trafficking, and rescued 176 minors,
all of whom were placed in cages and drugged
and sedated. The PNP recovered 5 Black Ford
Expeditions which were verified to be
registered and owned by former Mayor Winnie
Torres.
Edited and updated May 21, 2014”

7. On November 21, 2017, the Office of the City Prosecutor found

probable cause to indict Leslie Mendoza for Cyber Libel. An
information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 114. The case is entitled “People of the Philippine vs.
Leslie Mendoza.”

8. On November 23, 2017, the RTC Pasig found probable cause

and issue a warrant of arrest against Leslie Mendoza. The
warrant of arrest was received by the PNP on the same day.

9. On November 28, 2017, Leslie Mendoza filed a motion to quash

the warrant of arrest and the information.

2
 10. The RTC Pasig denied the motions to quash filed by Leslie
Mendoza. Leslie Mendoza elevated the denial of her motions to
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.

11. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for certiorari and
upheld the ruling of the RTC Pasig. The Court of Appeals held that
the warrant of arrest is valid on the grounds that there is no time
within which a warrant may be implemented and that the right to
question the validity of the warrant was waived when she posted
bail. Additionally, they ruled that the venue and prescription are
proper. Finally, they held that there is no double jeopardy or res
judicata in this case as the crime charged is different from the one
charged in 2011.

ISSUES

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD

BE QUASHED.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANT OF ARREST WAS

PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED.

B. WHETHER OR NOT A DEFECT IN THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST IS
A GROUND TO QUASH THE SAME.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL

WAS FILED IN THE PROPER VENUE.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL

IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL

IS BARRED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CYBER LIBEL

IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

3
 DISCUSSION

1. The warrant of arrest

should not be quashed.

The warrant of arrest was

properly implemented.

For a warrant of arrest to issue, the Regional Trial Court, through

the judge, must personally give an evaluation regarding the information
within its jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure under
Rule 112, Sec. 61 states that:

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.

— (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by
the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7
of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of
information.

The foundational step to consider whether such warrant of arrest

is properly implemented is to check on its validity. Such validity may be
upheld once there is a valid finding of probable cause. In People v.
Castillo and Mejia2, the Court has laid down the distinction between the
two types of probable cause, namely executive and judicial.

The executive determination of probable cause comes from the

preliminary investigation, where it is the public prosecutor who charges
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by

1
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Effective December 1, 2000), Rule 112, § 6
2
People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95 (2009).

4
law and whether probable cause exists to decide on whether a case
must be filed in court.3 The judicial determination of probable cause is
made by the judge in ascertaining the need to file a warrant of arrest
against the accused.4 What is needed to support the validity of such
warrant is a valid judicial determination of probable cause.

For a judicial determination of probable cause to be valid,

however, Hao v. People5 states that under the Constitution and The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

“A judge is mandated to personally determine

the existence of probable cause after his
personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s
resolution and the supporting evidence for
the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a
mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s
findings and to conduct his own examination
of the facts and circumstances presented by
both parties.”

In this case, such determination of probable cause was

personally made by the judge, based on the Office of the City
Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to indict Leslie Mendoza for
cyber libel. While the finding of the prosecutor was valid, the judge still
has the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause
exists to issue a warrant of arrest.6 Absent a finding of irregularity or
invalidity in the establishment of probable cause, its validity still stands.

Upon establishing probable cause and after the production of the

warrant of arrest, the rules on the execution of such is laid down in The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 113, Sec. 47 which states
that:

“Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head

of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was
delivered for execution shall cause the
warrant to be executed within ten (10) days
from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period, the officer to whom it
was assigned for execution shall make a report
to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of

3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Hao v. People, 735 SCRA 312 (2014).
6
Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014).
7
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Effective December 1, 2000), Rule 113, § 4

5
 his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state
the reasons therefor. (4a)”

In this case, the execution of the warrant was made within ten
days from its receipt since the warrant of arrest was received by the
PNP on November 23, 2017 and Mendoza was arrested in her house
the following day at 5:00 p.m. on November 24, 2017.

Likewise, the implementation of the warrant is valid regardless of

the time it was served because according to Section 68 of the same
rule mentioned above, “An arrest may be made on any day and at any
time of the day or night.”

With all the aforementioned, there has been no showing of an

irregularity in the issuance, execution, and implementation of such
warrant of arrest. Thus, its validity still holds.

A defect in the implementation

of the warrant of arrest is not a
ground to quash the same.

In People vs. Givera9, a presumption holds that a warrant of

arrest remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled, or quashed.
The rules, however, impose minimal operational guidelines and
restrictions that would warrant the quashal of the warrant of arrest,
such as establishing probable cause, setting no limit as to the time of
the service of the warrant, and enforcing it ten days from its receipt by
the PNP.10

The Court, in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals11, likewise states that:

“when the law or rules would provide

conditions, qualifications or restrictions,
they so state. Absent specific mention
thereof, and the same not being inferable by
necessary implication from the statutory
provisions which are presumed to be
complete and expressive of the intendment
of the framers, a contrary interpretation on
whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.”

Proof of defects in its implementation based on the minimal

requirements provided for by law will not necessarily quash the entirety

8
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Effective December 1, 2000), Rule 113, § 6
9
People v. Givera, 349 SCRA 513 (2001).
10
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Effective December 1, 2000), Rule 113
11
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249 (1994).

6
of the warrant of arrest. It leaves the discretion of its implementation to
the instrumental agency in charge of its execution. Absent such strict
guidelines on how such must be implemented, apart from the time of
issuance, period of execution, and establishment of probable cause, it
is presumed to be valid unless it be fatally defective.

Likewise, acting in the discharge of official functions, such official

duties enjoy the presumption of regularity. The Court held in People v.
Arposeple12, that such presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty “stands when no reason exists in the records by which to
doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.”

2. The criminal case for Cyber Libel

was filed in the proper venue.

Section 21 of Republic Act 1017513 or the Cybercrime Prevention

Act of 2012 vests the Regional Trial Courts with jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of said act:

Section 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional

Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any
violation of the provisions of this Act including
any violation committed by a Filipino national
regardless of the place of commission.
Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was
committed within the Philippines or committed
with the use of any computer system wholly or
partly situated in the country, or when by such
commission any damage is caused to a natural
or juridical person who, at the time the offense
was committed, was in the Philippines. There
shall be designated special cybercrime courts
manned by specially trained judges to handle
cybercrime cases.

Since there is no qualification in the law regarding the specific

place where the criminal action should be filed, then it can be
concluded that the filing of the criminal complaint in Quezon City and
the subsequent filing of the information in the Regional Trial Court in
Pasig City was proper. This is also in accordance the ruling in the case
of Tolentino v. People of the Philippines14 which relied on the silence
of the law as to the specific place of filing the cyber libel complaint in
declaring the filing of the information proper.

12
People v. Arpospele, G.R. No. 205787 (2017).
13
An Act Defining Cybercrime, Providing for the Prevention, Investigation, Suppression and the
Imposition of Penalties Therefor and for Other Purposes [CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012],
Republic Act No. 10175, § 21
14
Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310 (2018).

7
3. The criminal action for the crime
of Cyber Libel filed by Winnie Torres
against the petitioner has not yet
prescribed.

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code15, specifically the second

and the fourth paragraph, are the pertinent provisions when it comes
to the prescription of offenses related to the present case, to wit:

Art. 90. Prescription of crime –

Crimes punishable by other afflictive

penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

In addition, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code16 supplies the

rule as to when the prescriptive period of different offenses shall begin
to run:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of

offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.

Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime

Prevention Act of 201217 specifically punishes the crime of libel as
defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code if such acts are
committed through a computer system or any other similar means.

Although the Section 8 of RA 1017518 regarding penalties does

not provide for a specific punishment for the crime of cyber libel, it is
however provided in Section 6[5] of the same law that:

SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by

the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and

15
An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws [REVISED PENAL CODE], Act No. 3815,
Article 90 (1930).
16
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 91.
17
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012, Chapter II, § 4(c)(4).
18
Id. § 8.

8
 special laws, if committed by, through and
with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, as the case may
be.

Libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code19 is specifically

punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods. Since the acts referred to in the Cybercrime
Prevention Act are those specified in Article 355, similar libelous acts
committed by means of using communications and information
technology shall be punished by one degree higher than the penalty
prescribed in the RPC, pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175.

In Tolentino v. People of the Philippines20, the Court had the

opportunity to discuss the nature of the prescriptive period of libel in
relation to the Cybercrime Prevention Act and Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code:

Although Republic Act (RA) No. 10175, or the

Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, does
not categorically state the prescriptive
period for such action, the new prescriptive
period for the crime of libel in relation to RA No.
10175 can be derived from the penalty imposed
on the said crime. Section 6 of RA No. 10175
provides that the "penalty to be imposed shall
be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
by the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, and special laws, as the case may
be." As such, the former penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium
periods is increased to prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period. The new penalty, therefore,
becomes afflictive, following Section 25 of
the RPC. Corollarily, following Article 90 of the
RPC, the crime of libel in relation to RA
10175 now prescribes in fifteen (15) years.

19
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 355.
20
Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310 (2018).

9
 In the present case, the prescriptive period for the alleged
offense commenced on May 21, 2014 when Juicy Scoop digitized and
uploaded the subject article on its website with minor edits coming from
the petitioner herself. Following the established rule of the Supreme
Court in the case of Tolentino21, the offended party has 15 years from
May 21, 2014 or up until May 21, 2029 to file the proper action against
Lopez.

4. The criminal case for Cyber Libel

is not barred by double jeopardy.

There is no bar by double jeopardy

because the relevant materials in
both cases differ from each other.

The requisites for double jeopardy are: (1) A first jeopardy

attached to the second, (2) The first jeopardy is terminated, and (3)
The second jeopardy is for the same offense of the first.22 In this case,
the third requisite is lacking.

In Disini v. Secretary of Justice23, the Court holds that,

Online libel is different. There should be

no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online
or vice versa, that identical material cannot be
the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation
of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same offense. Xxx Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.24 (emphasis supplied)

While the two materials are essentially the same, the phrase
“Edited and updated May 21, 2014” was added to the material
uploaded online. This phrase qualifies the second article from the first
one. In the first article, the initial findings of registration and ownership
of the cars relating to the crime pointed to Mayor Winnie Torres. In the
time period between the two articles, a court decision was released
ruling that the said documents supporting the first article are falsified.
The phrase “edited and updated” connotes that the facts in the second
21
Id.
22
Canceran v. People, 761 SCRA 293, 306 (2015).
23
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 723 SCRA 109 (2014).
24
Id.

10
material are up to date and if the article is followed, the former Mayor
is still imputed to be the owner of the said cars. However, it was already
proven that she is not. The two articles differ not only in form but also
in substance in that the first is true while the second is not. While truth
is not an essential element in libel, in this case it is material as it
differentiates the two articles.

As interpreted by the court, Cyber Libel would only fall within the
ambit of double jeopardy when the two materials are identical25. Since
the materials in this case are not one and the same, there are two
separate acts of publication and as such, no double jeopardy.

5. The criminal case for Cyber Libel

Is not barred by res judicata.

The case is not barred by res

judicata because the doctrine
does not apply to criminal cases.

In Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan26, the Court held, “Res judicata is

a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.27” The case at bar is a criminal proceeding as it involves
Cyber Libel, which is a penal law. Additionally, the provision defining
cyber libel is applied to the revised penal code, to wit:

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of

libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed through
a computer system or any other similar means
which may be devised in the future.28

The libel in this case and the previous case both fall within the
ambit of a criminal proceeding. As such, res judicata is inapplicable.

Even if res judicata was applied

to this case, the elements
would still be lacking.

The essential elements for res judicata are the following: (1) the
former judgment must be final;29 (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;30 (3) it

25
Id.
26
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80, 87 (1999).
27
Id.
28
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012, Chapter II, §. 4 (C) (4).
29
Navarro v. Director of Lands, 5 SCRA 834, 836 (1962).
30
Id.

11
must be a judgment on the merits;31 and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions (a) identity of parties (b) identity of subject
matter and (e) identity of cause of action32 The first element, finality of
judgment, is present as the former case was a criminal case that
resulted into an acquittal. The law provides that in criminal cases, a
judgment of acquittal is final upon its promulgation. 33 The second
element, jurisdiction of the court, is present as well. For the first case,
RTC of Tacloban was proper because RA 436334 provides:

"The criminal and civil action for damages in

cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense…” 35

The assailed article then was published in Tacloban where the

newspaper was in circulation. The third element, judgment based on
merits, is also present. As the facts state, Leslie’s acquittal was based
on her good motive. This is a material element in libel cases and as
such a material basis for a judgment. Lastly, the last element is present
only until the identity of the parties in both cases.

In this case, the identity of subject matter and cause of action

differ. As already mentioned, the materials in the first and second
article are different because of the qualifying phrase “edited and
updated” which conveys a different idea as that of the first.

Be that as it may, having two different materials constitute two

and separate acts of publication. This calls for different causes of
action. The first case was anchored on the publication of the article on
the newspaper while the second is anchored on the publication of a
different material on the website.

This is an entirely different cause of action and as such should

not be barred by the first criminal case.

31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Argel v. Pascua, 363 SCRA 381, 385 (2001).
34
An Act further Amend Article Three Hundred Sixty of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No.
4363, (1965).
35
Id., §. 1.

12
 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that Winnie Torres’ case

against the petitioner for the crime of Cyber Libel should prosper
considering that there are no legal impediments that should allow the
case to be dismissed.

First, the warrant of arrest was properly implemented because

as a foundation, the warrant of arrest was validly produced upon the
judge’s finding of probable cause upon a personal determination based
on the information and the finding of the prosecutor of probable cause.
With regard to the execution of such, its implementation was well within
Section 4, Rule 113 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as
the arrest was made within ten days from its receipt. It is also fully
compliant with Section 6 of the same mentioned law, as arrests may
be made at any time of the day or night.

Likewise, absent such strict guidelines on how warrants of arrest

must be implemented, apart from the period and time of issuance and
the establishment of probable cause, it is presumed to be valid unless
proven to be fatally defective. It also holds that acting in the discharge
of official functions, such official duties enjoy the presumption of
regularity.

Second, the filing of the case has been filed right within the
period of prescription. Since the prescription for cyber libel must be
read in relation to its penalty, which is an afflictive penalty, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code state that offenses which are
punished by such penalties shall prescribe in 15 years. Considering
that the cause of action accrued in May 21, 2014, when Juicy Scoop
edited and uploaded the assailed article, the action will only prescribe
on May 21, 2029.

Third, the information is properly filed and the RTC Branch 114
of Pasig City has properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Considering that Section 21 of Republic Act No. 10175 or the
Cybercrime Prevention Act, in discussing jurisdiction, granted the
power to try Cybercrime offenses in general to the Regional Trial
Courts, without qualification as to the specific place where the
information should be filed in order to be considered valid. Following
this doctrine, as cited in Tolentino v. People as well, it can be
concluded that the filing of the information in Pasig was proper and
thus constitutes no legal impediment.

Finally, the criminal case does not fall within the ambit of both
double jeopardy and res judicata. Content-wise, the materials in the
first and second article vary because of the phrase “edited and
updated” that was added onto the later article. The Court holds in Disini
v. SOJ36 that cyber libel would only constitute double jeopardy if the
materials published on print and on the internet are identical.37
Additionally, the qualifying phrase, albeit short, conveys a different
reality as the circumstances surrounding the two articles have
changed, specifically with the acquittal of Winnie Torres. Because of
the difference in the relevant material, there is also no identical subject
matter and cause of action that are requisites to res judicata.
Nevertheless, the case being a criminal proceeding, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply as it is only limited to civil cases.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this

Honorable Court to DISMISS the petition for lack of legal basis and to
AFFIRM the ruling of the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petitions
for certiorari and upholding the ruling of the RTC of Pasig.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines 29 May 2019

AGGABAO, Rica
PANDY, Jan Harrley
VELUZ, Anna
Counsels for the Respondent

36
supra note 23.
37
Id.